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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/7/2008

File Folder FRANCE (2/27/84-3/21/84)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

NOUZILLE

68

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48502	SCHEDULE PROPOSAL	KIMMITT TO RYAN RE BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MITTERRAND R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	3/5/1984	B1
48503	MEMO	TYSON/COBB TO MCFARLANE RE BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MITTERRAND R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	1	3/5/1984	B1
48504	MEMO	TYSON/COBB TO MCFARLANE RE BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MITTERRAND R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	1	2/27/1984	B1
48505	CABLE	161254Z MAR 84 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	3/16/1984	B1
48506	MEMO	COBB TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH FRENCH MINISTER OF DEFENSE HERNU R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	2/23/1984	B1
48507	MEMO	COB TO MCFARLANE RE MEETINGS WITH FRENCH ADVISORS TO MITTERRAND R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	1	3/19/1984	B1
48508	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 48507 R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	1	3/19/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/7/2008

File Folder FRANCE (2/27/84-3/21/84)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

NOUZILLE

68

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48509	MEMO	ADELMAN TO ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS RE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	3/19/1984	B1
48510	MEMO	COBB TO MCFARLANE RE MITTERRAND UPDATE PAR 5/7/2011 M081/1	2	ND	B1
48511	MEMO	COBB TO MCFARLANE RE MITTERRAND	1	3/20/1984	B1
48512	TALKING POINTS	MITTERRAND	1	ND	B1
48513	MEMO	MENGES/TILLMAN TO MCFARLANE RE MITTERRAND'S VISIT R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	2	3/21/1984	B1
48514	TALKING POINTS	RE MITTERRAND VISIT R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	2	ND	B1
48515	MEMO	DUR TO MCFARLANE RE US PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	1	3/22/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

NOUZILLE

68

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48516	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	ND	B1
48517	TALKING POINTS	RE MEETING WITH ATALIE R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFICATION ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 27 FEB 84 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM TYSON

DOC DATE 27 FEB 84

COBB

27 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

AP

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: SP FOR PRES BREAKFAST MTG W/ MITTERRAND

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / 1)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

MAR 0 2 1984

Mcfarlane approved

Cobb

5 MAR 0 2 1984

further action

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Mcfarlane approved

Kubmitt spd SP

C, C, R

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II
90243
ADD-ON

2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1984

48502

CONFIDENTIAL

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL/RECONSIDERATION

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

REQUEST: The President to have a breakfast meeting
with French President Francois Mitterrand.

PURPOSE: The range of issues to discuss with the French
President is extensive and too broad to cover in the
currently allotted time: Lebanon, the Middle East, Persian
Gulf security, and East-West relations, etc. Additionally,
Mitterrand will be here midway in his tenure as Chief of
State of the country currently holding the Presidency of the
European Communities. He will just have presided over an EC
summit meeting and will undoubtedly be empowered to speak on
behalf of the EC on a wide range of economic issues.
President Mitterrand personally has requested this second
meeting.

BACKGROUND: A previous request for this second meeting was turned
down because of concerns with the precedential aspects of an
additional session, and indications that Mitterrand would
publicly criticize U.S. economic policy while in the U.S.
We have granted second meetings on several occasions
(Nakasone in January '83; Zhao in January '84; Kohl last
summer) and we have received private assurances from the
French Ambassador that Mitterrand does not intend to make
any critical speeches here and, in fact, clearly wants this
visit to be non-controversial and successful, highlighting
the positive aspects of Franco-American relations.

PARTICIPATION: Numerous occasions

DATE & TIME: March 23, 1984 -- Breakfast Meeting

LOCATION: To be determined

PARTICIPANTS: To be provided

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Meeting to cover above subject

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: To be determined

RECOMMENDED BY: State and NSC

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Tyrus W. Cobb

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM07-081 #48502

BY CU NARA DATE 4/29/10

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

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3

System # II

RECEIVED Package # 90243

84 MAR 5 P 2: 56

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	<u></u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	<u></u>
John Poindexter	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Wilma Hall	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Bud McFarlane	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>MAR 0 5 1984</u>	<u>D/Had carry</u>
Situation Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u>to Lyon</u>
Tom Shull	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90243

4

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48503

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

March 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON/TYRUS W. COBB *CM* *TWC*

SUBJECT: President's Breakfast Meeting with Mitterrand

Following a turndown of our original proposal to have a second meeting between President Mitterrand and President Reagan, we forwarded a memo (Tab A) to you requesting reconsideration of this decision. You agreed to resubmit the request for the March 7 long-range scheduler's session, and directed that we insure that Mitterrand did not intend to deliver a speech/remarks in the United States critical of U.S. policy. We have received private assurances from the French Ambassador; indeed, he has indicated that President Mitterrand intends to stress the positive aspects of Franco-American relations and very much wants this visit to be non-controversial and successful.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you concur with our recommendation for reconsideration of the request for a second meeting between Presidents Mitterrand and Reagan, and authorize Bob Kimmitt to send the attached schedule at Tab I to Fred Ryan.

Approve RMC

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Schedule Proposal

Tab A - Memo of February 27

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-081/1 #48503

BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/10

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ACTION

February 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

CHARLES P. TYSON/TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT:

President's Breakfast Meeting with Mitterrand

The attached (Tab A) proposal for a breakfast meeting between the President and Mitterrand on March 23, in addition to the regular meeting on the 22nd, was turned down at the February 22 long-range scheduling session. The primary rationales were:

- The President's schedule is too tight;
- Concern with the precedential nature of the second meeting;
- There are indications that Mitterrand may openly criticize U.S. economic policies during his visit.

We are concerned that a decision to turn down this second meeting will have adverse ramifications on overall U.S.-French relations. The French Ambassador has been pressing for this additional time and has indicated that it is very important to the French and to Mitterrand personally. In addition, we have granted these second meetings, e.g., to Nakasone in January '83, Zhao in January '84, and Kohl last summer. For the reasons listed on the attached request (number of issues to be discussed; EC President normally has a meeting with the President), we think that a reconsideration is warranted.

Granting the second meeting would have a positive influence on what Mitterrand says during his visit here. This "quid pro quo" can be communicated to the French so that they clearly understand that the meeting is contingent upon the absence of sharp criticism of U.S. policies while Mitterrand is here.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you agree that this issue should be discussed with the French Ambassador, and the request resubmitted at the February 29 scheduling meeting. (3/7)

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab A - Prior Schedule Proposal

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-0811 #48504

BY RW NARA DATE 10/11/10

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48505

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PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 8027
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DTG: 161254Z MAR 84 PSN: 044689
TOR: 076/1910Z

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DISTRIBUTION: MCF KIMM VP PUBS SIT EOB /009
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #8027 0761312
O 161254Z MAR 84 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 107-081-48505
BY GL NARA DATE 5/19/10

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8015

NODIS

INFO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7295
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0090
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3949
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1062

~~SECRET~~ STATE 078027

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NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PREL, FR, LE
SUBJECT: FRENCH RESPONSE TO EAGLEBURGER'S DEMARCHE

REF: STATE 74414

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. FRENCH CHARGE BOYER RESPONDED TO
EAGLEBURGER'S DEMARCHE ANNOUNCING THE DISSOLUTION OF
THE MNF WITH A FIVE-POINT REJECTION. HE INDICATED THAT
THE FRENCH WOULD LIKELY COME OUT PUBLICLY AGAINST THE
ANNOUNCEMENT IF IT IN ANY WAY IMPLIED THAT THE US WAS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

7

PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 8027

DTG: 161254Z MAR 84 PSN: 044689

SPEAKING FOR THE MNF AS A WHOLE OR THAT THERE HAD BEEN PRIOR CONSULTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. END SUMMARY.

3. FRENCH CHARGE BOYER CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 14 TO FORMALLY RESPOND TO UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER'S DEMARCHE OUTLINED IN REFTEL. HE REJECTED THE PROPOSED FRENCH ASSOCIATION WITH A COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCING THE TERMINATION OF THE MNF AND MADE FIVE POINTS PURSUANT TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS: (1) THE SEPTEMBER 1982 EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE MNF PARTNERS AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COMMITTED EACH PARTNER TO THE MNF ON A BILATERAL LEVEL; (2) THERE WAS NO MENTION IN THESE AGREEMENTS OF ANY CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN MNF PARTNERS; NO WHERE DID IT SAY WE HAD TO ACT OR CONSULT TOGETHER; (3) THE FRENCH FORCE IN BEIRUT WAS UNDER EXCLUSIVE FRENCH COMMAND AND COULD ONLY BE WITHDRAWN BY FRANCE AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE; (4) OTHER MNF PARTNERS HAVE TAKEN THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT ACTIONS (IN WITHDRAWING) WITHOUT CONSULTING THE OTHERS; (5) FOR THE TIME BEING THE FRENCH CONTINGENT WOULD REMAIN IN BEIRUT AND THE RELEASE OF A JOINT STATEMENT IN THE FORM OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE.

4. BOYER, STATING HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT AND COULD SPEAK ONLY INFORMALLY, SAID THAT THE FRENCH TOTALLY DISAGREED WITH THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AND REJECTED OUR LANGUAGE WHICH IMPLIED TO THEM THAT WE WERE SPEAKING FOR THE MNF OR FOR FRANCE. BOYER STRESSED THAT IN THE VERY LEGALISTIC SENSE, CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE MNF PARTNERS WAS NEVER ENVISIONED. MURPHY POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT CONSULTATIONS HAVE IN FACT EXISTED AND THAT WE COULD NOT DENY THIS FACT, ESPECIALLY BEFORE CONGRESS AS THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 8027

DTG: 161254Z MAR 84 PSN: 044689

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TIME APPROACHES TO BEGIN DISBANDING THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT OF THE MNF. BOYER AGREED THAT CONSULTATIONS DID INDEED EXIST BUT SAW NO NEED FOR THE AMERICANS TO PUBLICIZE THIS FACT OR IMPLY IN THE COMMUNIQUE THAT THE AMERICAN DECISION TO DISBAND THE MNF WAS IN FACT AN MNF DECISION OR TAKEN AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER MNF PARTNERS.

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5. WHEN ASKED HOW THE FRENCH WOULD RESPOND TO THE RELEASE OF OUR COMMUNIQUE AFTER THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE, BOYER CAUTIOUSLY RESPONDED THAT HE FELT THE FRENCH WOULD TAKE PUBLIC EXCEPTION TO IT IF IT WAS WORDED IN A WAY WHICH IMPLIED THAT THE AMERICAN DECISION FOLLOWED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON THE SUBJECT OR THAT THE US WAS SPEAKING FOR THE MNF.

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6. MURPHY THANKED BOYER FOR HIS MESSAGE AND PROMISED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH SOON. HE ALSO AGREED TO HAVE THE COMMUNIQUE REEXAMINED SO THAT IT COULD BE POSSIBLY REWRITTEN TO ACCOMODATE FRENCH CONCERNS THAT OUR ACTIONS NOT BE SEEN AS BEING DONE WITH FRENCH APPROVAL. MURPHY CAUTIONED BOYER THAT, FOR LEGAL AND POLITICAL REASONS, WE WERE FIRM IN OUR INTENTION TO ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE, BUT WE WANTED TO AVOID A PUBLIC CLASH OVER THIS, ESPECIALLY RIGHT BEFORE THE STATE VISIT.

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7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ
BT

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8402231

TO

McFARLANE

FROM COBB

RECEIVED 19 MAR 84 12

DOC DATE 19 MAR 84

KEYWORDS FRANCE

AM

BIANCO, JEAN LOUISE

ATTALI, JACQUES

VEDRINE, HUBERT

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR McFARLANE TO MEET W/ FRENCH ADVISORS TO MITTERRAND MAR 23

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 21 MAR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

McFARLANE

HALL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC IF ID

(CM)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

MAR 1 9 1984

Cobb

S

3/20

McFarlane approved
For Further Action

3/21

mc

Cobb -

Close Out

3/29

C

3/29

NFAR per Cobb

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

FA

(C)

Secretariat

Cobb

w/ Bud
Gri.

10:15

TC

~~Set for
sit Rm~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

February 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with French Minister of Defense
Charles Hernu -- February 24 -- 3:15 p.m.

You have agreed to meet with Hernu tomorrow for 30 minutes in your office. Accompanying Hernu will be the French Ambassador Bernard Vernier-Palliez and Francois Heisbourg, International Affairs Advisor to the Defense Minister. We have arranged to have the State Department Interpreter Alex Toumayan at the session, although you may not feel that it is necessary.

- Hernu will likely want to discuss means by which we can enhance U.S.-France military cooperation. As you know, Ambassador Galbraith has been in contact with Hernu, pressing for Van's plan to preposition military stocks in France, and the establishment of a joint defense policy working group.
- State, with DOD's belated approval, has sent a strong note to Galbraith directing that he not pursue with the GOF the idea of prestocking military materiel in France. The objections were substantive from JCS (no requirement for prepositioning) to politico-military by OSD and SACEUR (usurping of the successful channel Rogers enjoys with Lacaze). Hernu may have some thoughts on this.
- On formal military cooperation, Weinberger will raise with Hernu the suggestion that we announce regular consultations at the level of Minister/Secretary of Defense. I will provide you a heads-up on this as to Hernu's reaction, but I suspect that France will not be too enthusiastic over increasing the public visibility of our contacts.
- State will press Hernu on means by which we can foster U.S.-French cooperation in the defense of Central Europe. Mitterrand has been quite vocal recently on European security, particularly in a major speech at the Hague on February 7. We need to draw him out as to specific French initiatives to "counter pacifism and neutralism" that Mitterrand suggested.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NLRR M07-081 #48306
BY AL NARA DATE 4/29/16

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~~SECRET~~₂

- The French are tightening up on technology transfer, particularly now that the MOD has taken a strong role in the COCOM process. They should be encouraged not to slack off.
- The French have looked with concern at our Strategic Defense Initiative since they feel it will drive the Soviets along the same road, thus rendering French and British strategic systems useless as deterrents. Hernu should be reassured that the U.S. will do nothing in SDI hastily nor without full and frank consultations with all our Allies.
- The French are concerned that NATO policy issues, such as Emerging Technologies, tech transfer, two-way street, are being handled too often by the various military committees, thus foreclosing French participation. Hernu should be told that with some imagination and flexibility, NATO should be able to work out the modalities for French cooperation, but that there must be a role for the military committees as well. (FYI: The French cannot have the benefits of walking out and staying in.)
- Hernu may talk about waiver of R&D costs and offsetting two-way street U.S. purchases of French equipment as part of a French AWACS buy. This issue is being addressed by DOD (Dr. Delauer and Co.). The SecDef is authorized to waive R&D costs on the basis of the promotion of NATO standardization and/or a compensatory "quid" for the U.S.
- As time permits, you may also wish to probe current French thinking on the military situation in the Persian Gulf and Chad. You may also wish to express our concern over reports that the GOF is considering the sale of air defense systems to Nicaragua.

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✓ *ce*

National Security Council
The White House

System # IPackage # 2231

RECEIVED

84 MAR 19 11:03

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>-</u>	<u>IC</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>A</u>
Situation Room			
Tom Shull	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Doug McMinn should join meeting with Attali for Summit purposes. Wm

Agree. RMC

~~Need Copy for Wilma~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 19, 1984

48507

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Meetings with French Advisors to Mitterrand

Three members of the official party accompanying French President Mitterrand to Washington have requested a meeting with you. Jean-Louis Bianco, the Secretary-General of the Presidency; Jacques Attali, Special Counsellor to the President; and Hubert Vedrine, technical advisor to the President would like to meet with you for 20-30 minutes on the margins of the White House meetings. I sense the request is more along the lines of a courtesy call, but the meeting could serve to enhance our channels of communication with the French on national security issues.

As you know Bianco is Mitterrand's chief of staff and Attali serves as a deputy chief of staff and counsellor to the President. Both are closely involved with politico-military issues and international security concerns. Vedrine handles general diplomatic matters with an emphasis on Soviet and Arab affairs.

If you agree to the meeting I will prepare talking points and further biographical data on the three. The best times for them for the session would be Friday the 23rd, preferably between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m., or in the morning at 10:00 following the Reagan-Mitterrand breakfast.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you agree to meet with Bianco, Attali and Vedrine Friday, March 23rd.

Approve *TCM*

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-D81/1 #48507

BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/10

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National Security Council
The White House

System # F

Package # 2231

10510

04 MAR 19 11:03

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>-</u>	<u>IC</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>A</u>
Situation Room			
Tom Shull	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

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(Date/Time)

Agree. RML

~~Need Copy for Wilma~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

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TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

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RECOMMENDATION:

That you agree to meet with Bianco, Attali and Vedrine Friday, March 23rd.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM07-08111#48508

BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/10

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16
ID 8402265

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 19 MAR 84 18

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM ADELMAN, K

*sent
1/7/08*

DOCDATE 19 MAR 84

KEYWORDS

NON PROLIFERATION

FRANCE

SUBJECT: ENCOURAGING FRANCE TO ADHERE TO NUCLEAR NON PROLIFERATION TREATY NPT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 21 MAR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

COBB

COMMENTS

*Points incorporated in Mitchell package.
DF*

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(JF)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 3/20 see 840113 for Final Action COV, DF ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (C) ME

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 20, 1984

TO NSC/S

From Sally Sherman *Sally*

Re. 2265

Per Don Fortier's note on profile sheet, "Points incorporated in Mitterrand package."

I believe Ty Cobb has done the "Mitterrand package."

Thanks.

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # _____

Package # 2265

84 MAR 19

P 4: 49

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Bill Martin

Bob Kimmitt

John Poindexter

Wilma Hall

Bud McFarlane

Bob Kimmitt

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

Tom Shull

1

K

2

A

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Staff for action to Fortier
Comment Cobb

return advance copy to me. *LB*

19
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2265

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

19 P12: 41
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

48509
March 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Encouraging France to Adhere to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

I strongly support Secretary Shultz' recommendation that the President make an appeal to French President Mitterrand for France to join the NPT and urge you to discuss this matter with the President.

Some recent indications are that France might be prepared to consider formal NPT adherence, as it could strengthen European unity and not require any changes in French nuclear policy. French NPT adherence would be a major arms control success and an important Administration accomplishment. It would clearly underscore the continued vitality of this important treaty, which has the widest adherence of any arms control treaty in history, and have a very positive effect on the 1985 NPT Review Conference. It could also encourage other key non-NPT parties -- such as Spain, Algeria and Niger -- to adhere.

Ken

Kenneth L. Adelman

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #48509

BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/11

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~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 20 MAR 84 19

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM COBB

DOCDATE 20 MAR 84

COBB

22 MAR 84

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

sup 1/7/08

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT MITTERRAND MOVIE & MITTERRAND UPDATE MEMO

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 22 MAR 84 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(DW MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 3/22 Noted by McFarlane

CO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) MR

Jeanne Hickie

Done just before visit
- Orig. taken & mmed.
to McFarlane. 21

National Security Council
The White House

22

System #

I

Package #

2292

84 MAR 22 P 5: 10

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	10	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		N
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

2292
ADD-on

23

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: Mitterrand Update

48510
DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M081 #48510

BY KML NARA DATE 5/9/11

NOTED

- Gemayal saw Mitterrand in Paris yesterday shortly before the President's departure to the U.S. to discuss failure of the Lausanne Conference. We understand that the French may announce on March 25 their decision to terminate the MNF. A ferry ship is arriving at Beirut, probably to prepare for the evacuation of French soldiers.
- The French have agreed that today's Cabinet Room session should focus on international security and regional politico-military issues, and tomorrow's breakfast will examine bilateral economic and U.S.-EC concerns. However, we could have a spill-over of economic issues into today's meeting which is why I have asked Ambassador Brock to attend. Incidentally, the March 19-20 EC meeting that Mitterrand chaired was a total disaster. We understand he issued a statement claiming the ten have agreed to open negotiations with the U.S. to secure American limitations on exports of corn gluten and soybeans.
- Mitterrand may raise our decision to leave UNESCO. They will note that they share many of our substantive concerns. They feel the organization can be salvaged. We should remain firm in our decision to leave.
-

13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

24

- Push NPT which France has not signed and Mitterrand favored while in opposition.
- The President, in dealing with the French, should recall this quotation from Napoleon Bonaparte:
"The French complain about everything...loudly and often."

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~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/7/08

ID 8402292

RECEIVED 20 MAR 84 19

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM COBB

DOCDATE 20 MAR 84

KEYWORDS FRANCE

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: MITTERRAND MOVIE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 20 MAR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(DW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

(MAR 2 1 1984

OBE per Kimmitt

GO ✓

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W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)MR

National Security Council
The White House

1059 *CT* 26

System # I
Package # 2292

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84 MAR 20 P 3:48

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WPM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>✓</u>	<u>14</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u>///</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>///</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>6</u>	<u>///</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

Recommend 0930 3/21

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Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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FRANCE (2/27/84-3/21/84)

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S2007-081

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Box Number

14

68

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
48511	MEMO	1	3/20/1984	B1
	COBB TO MCFARLANE RE MITTERRAND			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48512	TALKING POINTS MITTERRAND	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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ID 8402351

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 23 MAR 84 08

TO MCFARLANE

FROM TILLMAN

anf 1/7/06

DOCDATE 21 MAR 84

MENGES

21 MAR 84

KEYWORDS: CENTRAL AMERICA

FRANCE

SUBJECT. MITTERRAND WASHINGTON VISIT RE CENTRAL AMERICA

ACTION. NOTED BY KIMMITT

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MENGES

NORTH

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COMMENTS

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ASSIGNED

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COPIES TO

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Noted by Kimmitt

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PA (B)

National Security Council
The White House

✓ 1062 JIF 30

System # I
Package # 2351

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84 MAR 21 P 6: 47

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>Am</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP
(Date/Time)

51

~~SECRET~~

2351

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

March 21, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACQUELINE TILLMAN *JT*
CONSTANTINE C. MENGES *cm*

SUBJECT: Mitterand's Washington Visit--Central America

48513

France has been the most unhelpful European country regarding Central America. Examples of non-supportive actions are:

- (1) August 1981 French/Mexico communique which recognized El Salvador's guerrillas as a "representative political force" (publicly repudiated by 11 Latin American nations).
- (2) June 1982 -- received Ortega publicly in Paris and provided aid.
- (3) January 1983 -- sale of French rocket launchers and 10,000 rockets to Nicaragua (described as "non-offensive arms").
- (4) December-early January 1983 -- French diplomatic statements to US: Nicaragua is trying to make changes in its internal system; the US should make positive actions in return.
- (5) February 7, 1984 -- Foreign Ministry communique stating concern about air attacks against Nicaragua; noted increased tension in region (indirect criticism against US).
- (6) February 1984 -- considered request from Ortega for air defense assistance, eventually denied.
- (7) Early March 1984 -- sent 30 tons of medical supplies to Nicaragua.
- (8) March 1984 -- instrumental in preventing EC observers for El Salvador's elections; not sending any.
- (9) Consistently unhelpful in multilateral forums such as UN.

We are told that France does realize the importance of Central America to the US and has no intention of aggravating relations because of Central America. But we believe that President Reagan

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-0811 #48513

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/00

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should strongly and directly point out the importance of the region to our national security and the relevance to our worldwide commitments.

We revised talking points for Matlock, but wanted you to be fully informed about the issue.

RECOMMENDATION:

The talking points at Tab I could be used in the pre-briefing or however you deem useful and/or appropriate.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Talking Points

*Points at Tab I
adequately covered in
Cobb briefing paper.*

cc: Ty Cobb

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

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2351

33

TALKING POINTS

MITTERAND VISIT

- Central America continues to be one of the most important foreign policy issues for the United States.
- We want our allies to understand clearly that if Central America were to go communist, our worldwide defense commitments would be greatly affected. The allocation of our defense and economic resources have increased steadily since the Sandinistas came to power in 1979 and embarked on their path of aggression and subversion against her neighbors.
- We appreciate that our interpretations about events in Central America are different. We feel the evidence we have gathered about the role of Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet bloc in destabilization efforts against the entire region is completely persuasive.
- We believe strengthening El Salvador's democracy is critical to our effort and would have welcomed France sending observers so that France could have compared El Salvador elections with Nicaragua's.

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NLRR M07-D81/#49514

BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/00

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-- And while we know that El Salvador's government is less than perfect, we believe that democracy will eventually prevail there. But for us, of course, the most important issue is preventing a communist Central America which in our judgment is likely to be followed by the destabilization of Mexico.

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~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8490374

RECEIVED 21 MAR 84 15

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOC DATE 21 MAR 84

KEYWORDS: MNF

LEBANON

FRANCE

ITALY

GREAT BRITAIN

SUBJECT: PARTICIPATION IN MNF

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DUR

KEMP

FORTIER

SOMMER

COMMENTS

REF# 8408471

LOG 8490311

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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ACTION REQUIRED

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MAR 2 3 1984 McFarlane notal PD

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The White House

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Package #

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84 MAR 22 12:51

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	✗	
John Poindexter	3	✗	
Wilma Hall	4	✗	
Bud McFarlane	5	✓	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

3/23 10:15 mehy
(Date/Time)

Put in meeting folder.

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SYSTEM II
90374

37

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 22, 1984

48515

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SENSITIVE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR

HCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in the MNF: Consultations with the French

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from State which summarizes our recent consultations with other members of the MNF and the arguments for U.S. withdrawal from the MNF on the grounds that the structure is "rapidly becoming a hollow shell."

The French have chosen not to associate themselves with our planned action and insist that we not claim to have made our decision on the basis of consultations with them. Since they are still on the ground, it is logical for the French to resist association with a move which contradicts their continuing commitment. From our discussions with GOF officials, it is likely that the French will pull-out of Beirut, although the timing is uncertain.

Since there is no overriding or urgent reason to formally withdraw from the MNF, there is an opportunity here to consult with the GOF before we notify the Lebanese that we are terminating our participation. Inasmuch as the Lusanne Conference did not address the MNF and there is now little prospect that we will be "kicked out" by the GOL, we also have time to consult with Gemayel on this views for disestablishing the formal structure.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab B in your forthcoming discussions with Atalie.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Don Fortier
Geoff Kemp
Ty Cobb

Attachments

Tab A - Hill Memo to McFarlane (undated)
Tab B - Talking Points

SECRET

Declassify: OADR

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 1007-0841 #48515

BY RW NARA DATE 10/11/10

38

TAB

A



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 8408471

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET /SENSITIVEMEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

48514

SUBJECT: Participation in the MNF

The Department has remained in touch with the French, British and Italians on the future of the MNF. The following is a summary of their views:

France - The French have told us they do not want to be associated with any joint announcement on the termination of the MNF. They have informally asked that any U.S. statement be unilateral and not mention that we have had "consultations" with the French. We are not certain of French intentions for a continuing military presence in Beirut. Although we have heard that they plan to withdraw their forces by the end of the month, other sources say that the GOF has not yet made a final decision. Some of the parties at Lausanne expressed an interest in having French forces act as a buffer on the Green Line or elsewhere.

Italy - The Italians have told us they want to be fully cooperative and supportive on the MNF. Because of the French reaction, however, they believe any MNF announcement should reflect a "national autonomous character". They will try to ensure that any statement they make will be as similar as possible to ours. The Italians also implied that they were considering withdrawing their naval forces soon, perhaps in the next several days. We plan to tell them that we appreciate their cooperation, that any decision on force redeployments rests with the Italian government, yet we hope they will not announce a redeployment if Lausanne is still in session.

The U.K. - Richard Luce told us today that the redeployment of British MNF troops to Cyprus has now appeared in the London press, and HMG does not think it can delay a low-key statement much longer. As with the Italians, we encourage them not to announce their withdrawal from the MNF until after we had consulted with Gemayel after Lausanne. Nevertheless, they may well announce before the end of the week that the U.K. no longer is a participant in the MNF.

U.S. Plans - Reg Bartholomew will see Gemayel after his return from Lausanne and note we plan to terminate our participation. We will remain flexible on the timing, although we would like to wrap this up by the end of the month if possible. Once we have Gemayel's reaction, we will see how best to proceed.

Not done yet.

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/SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #46516
BY GW NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

*Not so
with
C200
French
still there*

Comment -The MNF structure is rapidly becoming an empty shell, and we have to determine how we can witness the formal demise of the organization in the least contentious way with a minimum of public attention. British and Italian plans are obviously far advanced, and the French prefer not to undertake coordinated action. The MNF is rapidly disappearing as an issue of public concern in the United States. We consequently believe we should focus on several specific points in the days ahead:

-- Keep the MNF a low-profile issue to ensure that it receives minimal public attention. Our actions with the allies, the Congress, and U.S. public should reflect that point;

-- Remain in close touch with the MNF partners, since the exchanges are useful in terms of Alliance management, even if we are generally going our separate ways in terminating our MNF participation;

-- Although it would be useful to have the content of any British and Italian statements generally reflect our own, probable Italian and British plans make it unlikely that we will be able to achieve close coordination on timing.

Bohnermeyer
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

41

TAB

B

~~SECRET~~

42

~~SECRET~~SENSITIVE

TALKING POINTS FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE FOR
MEETING WITH FRENCH NSCA MR. ATALIE
REGARDING THE MNF

48517

- As you know last week, we discussed the timing of our withdrawal from the MNF with your Foreign Ministry.
- The changed situation in Lebanon and the complete withdrawal of the British and Italian contingents did suggest some adjustment in the legal mandate governing our military presence.
- Initially, we were somewhat fearful that the MNF would become a contentious issue at the Lousanne Conference.
- After discussions with your Government, we reconsidered the timing of our action and decided to await developments at Lousanne before taking any further action.
- We have not discussed this matter with the Government of Lebanon and would earnestly seek your views on what should be done about the MNF.
- Has the GOF made a decision on withdrawal of its forces from Beirut?
- Would it be helpful if we delayed our withdrawal from the MNF until the French forces are withdrawn?
- We do have some constraints on the timing for our decision in that we need to make a report to the Congress by April 15.

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NLRR 7-081 #48517

BY CN NARA DATE 4/22/10~~SECRET~~

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