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Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country
File: Records, 1981-1985
Folder Title: France (03/22/1984-05/20/1984)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/7/2008

File Folder FRANCE (3/22/84-5/20/84)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

NOUZILLE

69

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48518	MEMO	COBB TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WTH ADVISORS TO MITTERRAND R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	3/22/1984	B1
48519	TALKING POINTS	FOR MEETING WITH FRENCH ADVISORS R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	ND	B1
48520	CHART	CHART R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	ND	B1
48531	BIO	BIO	1	3/14/1984	B1 B3
48532	BIO	BIO	2	3/12/1984	B1 B3
48533	BIO	BIO	1	3/14/1984	B1 B3
48534	TRANSMITTAL SHEET	NSC PROFILE SHEET R 5/24/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	4/4/1984	B1
48521	CABLE	040248Z APR 84 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	4/4/1984	B1
48522	CABLE	DRAFT RE MCFARLANE TO ATTALI AND SAULNIER R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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S2007-081

Box Number 14

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69

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48523	CABLE	102120Z APR 84	1	4/10/1984	B1
48524	MEMO	COBB TO MCFARLANE RE REACTIONS TO MITTERRAND VISIT R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	5/3/1984	B1
48525	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE REACTIONS TO MITTERRAND VISIT R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	4/12/1984	B1
48526	MEMO	WALLIS TO CLARK/DEAVER RE MITTERRAND'S POSSIBLE TACTICS AT WILLIAMSBURG R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	4	5/16/1983	B1
48527	MEMO	NAU TO CLARK RE MITTERRAND'S TACTICS R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	1	5/16/1983	B1
48528	MEMO	BEAL TO MCFARLANE RE US AMBASSADOR OBJECTIONS TO POLLING IN FRANCE R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	2	5/24/1984	B1
48529	CABLE	071710Z MAY 84 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	5/7/1984	B1
48530	TALKING POINTS	MEETING WITH GALBRAITH R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	ND	B1

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8402361

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFICATION ENCLOSURE(S)

*sent
1/7/08*

RECEIVED 23 MAR 84 18

TO

McFARLANE

FROM COBB

DOC DATE 22 MAR 84

KEYWORDS FRANCE

SUBJECT McFARLANE MTG W/ FRENCH ADVISORS TO MITTERRAND 23 MAR 5:30 PM

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 22 MAR 84 STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

McFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID

(DW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C *MAR 23 1984* *McFarlane noted*

CO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA *(R)*

National Security Council
The White House

✓ 1066 97

RECEIVED

System # I
Package # 2361

8-1 MAR 22 P 5: 07

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Tom Shull	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: 3/23 1730
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

2361

3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 22, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with French Advisors to Mitterrand
-- Friday, March 23, 1984 -- 5:30 p.m.

RCM HAS SEEN

48518

You have agreed to meet with three key Mitterrand advisors for thirty minutes on Friday at 5:30 p.m. in the Situation Room following the working breakfast. At Tab I are talking points that you may wish to use in your discussions. These points do not address any of the issues raised explicitly in the three background/briefing memorandums you have already reviewed.

Bios on the three are attached at Tab A. I have also attached at Tab B a wiring diagram of the organization of the Elysee Palace so that you might see how the President's office is structured.

In a nutshell, here are thumbnail sketches of the three and their functions:

- JEAN-LOUIS BIANCO (beeahnCO): Secretary-General of the Elysee (Chief of Staff), roughly Jim Baker's counterpart. Domestic policy orientation, but growing expertise and influence in foreign affairs, notably on Chad, Lebanon and on dealing with the U.S. on Central America. Also oversees French intelligence. "Technocrat" image. Direct access to Mitterrand. Attali protege. Favors close, but discreet consultations with the U.S.; cool towards Soviets.
- JACQUES ATTALI (ahtahLEE): Direct access to Mitterrand, with whom he enjoys close relationship (surrogate son). Summit coordinator with special emphasis on economic and monetary issues (principal drafter of new "Bretton Woods" proposal). As "Special Counsellor" to the President, he combines Ed Meese and Dick Darman functions, but with strong foreign policy involvement. Somewhat unpredictable, but reputation for brilliance; moves in and out of involvement on several issues. Often at odds with the Foreign Ministry. Well disposed towards the U.S., but critical of American economic policies.
- HUBERT VEDRINE (vuhDREEN): Diplomatic Counsellor with special interest in East-West, European, and North African Affairs. Mitterrand's godson, but not personally close to the President. Coordinates non-crisis affairs and President's travel.

Has Seen

Don Fortier, Jack Matlock and Doug McMinn concur.

Attachments

- Tab I - Talking Points
- Tab A - Bios
- Tab C - Diagram

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081#48518

BY *AK* NARA DATE 4/29/10

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2361

4

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH FRENCH ADVISORS

48519

- We are very pleased with the Mitterrand visit. As the President said, our relations have never been better, particularly on the congruence we share on national security concerns. There is no small irony in the similarity of our foreign and domestic economic policies considering we have a conservative President here and France is governed by a Socialist-Communist coalition. I was struck by the similarity of their analyses of Soviet ideology, behavior and intentions.
- The French Communist Party's influence seems to have waned. Do you feel they will continue to oppose the austerity program? To move closer to Moscow?
- Our cooperation in foreign affairs has generally been excellent and we are pleased with the manner in which we have coordinated our actions. Still, consultations have not always been what they should be. Do you have any suggestions for improving them?
- I see that Paris plans to provide additional aid to Habre. I know you wish us to increase our commitment, but this may be difficult. Nonetheless, we are open to serious proposals on how to deal with the fundamental strategic threat Libya poses. We will look into this further. I am concerned over Libya's stepped up support for rebel infiltrations and guerrilla activity in Southern Chad, and terrorism in neighboring states.

DECLASSIFIED

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NLRR NO7-081 #48519

BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/16

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2

~~SECRET~~

- The situation in the Persian Gulf gives us great cause for concern. Should there be a disruption of the petroleum shipping the consuming countries must insure that they do not repeat the mistakes of 1979 when we madly tried to outbid each other on the spot market. What preparations are you taking in case of a disruption? If the Iranians attempt to interfere with shipping or block the straits, how should the Allies repond?
- NPT: Mitterrand was a strong advocate of the NPT while in opposition. We see considerable movement (China, Pakistan) and feel French commitment to join would be major, positive impetus forward for NPT.
- We are impressed with Mitterrand's tough approach to the USSR. While we are doing everything possible to move our dialogue forward, the Soviets -- principally Gromyko -- are digging their heels in. If they want to emphasize the "competitive" side of "peaceful coexistence," we are prepared to compete. Particularly where they challenge our interests -- terrorism, subversion, and Third World adventurism.
- Our cohesion on security policy accomplished through economic strength. Although we have differences, we are pursuing the common objectives of securing non-inflationary growth and a commitment to eliminate rigidities in our domestic economy. We are both making progress and we are very impressed by the turn-around you have accomplished in your politically courageous

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3

6

austerity program. The President is looking forward to the London Economic Summit where we can stress the importance of open markets for goods and capital. Jacque, I know from the reports of the Summit prep meetings that your role in the sherpa process has been a critical one, and that in many areas, our thinking on economic policy is quite in sync.

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~~SECRET~~


Organigramme de l'Elysée
Août 1982

DECLASSIFIED/RE/EASe

NLRR M07-081 + 48520

BY CW NARA DATE 4/29/18

48520



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FOIA

S2007-081

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48531	BIO	1	3/14/1984	B1
	BIO			B3

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ID	Document Type	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
	Document Description			
48532	BIO	2	3/12/1984	B1
	BIO			B3

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~TOP SECRET~~

12
ID 8490438

RECEIVED 05 APR 84 09

TO ATTALI, J FROM MCFARLANE

DOCDATE 04 APR 84

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081#48534

BY AL NARA DATE 5/24/10

KEYWORDS. FRANCE

IRAN

SAULNIER

IRAQ

SUBJECT. BLUE CHANNEL MSG RE IRAN IRAQ PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT

ACTION: MCFARLANE APPROVED RECOM

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(K / K)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

PATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House



System #

TH

Package #

90438

04 APR 4 9:02

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>N/12</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

~~TOP SECRET~~OUTGOING
14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2563
SIT100 AN008468DTG: 040248Z APR 84 PSN: 010494
TOR: 095/0228Z-----
DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM RLPH SIT /007
-----OP IMMED
DE WTE #2563 0950228
O 040248Z APR 84
FM THE WHITE HOUSEDECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081 #48521
BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10 48521

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS EYES ONLY WH02563

PERSONAL FOR MR. ATTALI AND GENERAL SAULNIER

FROM MR. MCFARLANE - EYES ONLY

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AS WE DISCUSSED IN OUR MEETING WITH JACQUES HERE IN WASHINGTON, WE REMAIN CONCERNED WITH THE GROWING INSTABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION AS THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ENTERS WHAT MAY BE A NEW AND MORE OMINOUS PHASE. THE IMMINENCE OF WHAT KHOMEINI HAS TERMED AS "THE FINAL OFFENSIVE" MAKES IT WORTHWHILE THAT WE COMPARE OUR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS OF THE SITUATION AND THE DIRECTIONS THIS CONFLICT COULD TAKE.

3. WE ARE PRESENTLY EXAMINING A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE ESCALATION SCENARIOS: TWO APPEAR ESPECIALLY WORRISOME: (A) MAJOR IRAQI ESCALATION WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY EXTENDS THE WAR INTO THE GULF PROPER

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING
15

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2563

DTG: 040248Z APR 84 PSN: 010494

OR (B) AN IRANIAN BREAKTHROUGH INTO IRAQI TERRITORY (BASRA). WE BELIEVE THAT EITHER OUTCOME WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE REGION AND THE WORLD'S ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF THE REGION.

LIKE YOU, WE ALSO ARE ENGAGED IN THE SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL AND URGENT MEASURES TO AVERT AN IRAQI COLLAPSE. TO DATE OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED ON EASING IRAQ'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT, BY HELPING TO DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE OUTLETS FOR IRAQI OIL, AND CONCERTED EFFORTS TO CURTAIL ARMS FLOWS TO IRAN.

4. IN VIEW OF OUR PUBLIC STANCE OF NEUTRALITY IN THE WAR, FOR REASONS WHICH YOU WELL UNDERSTAND, AND IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE FAMILIARITY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT WITH IRAQ'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES, WE WOULD ESPECIALLY WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON WHAT MORE FRANCE MIGHT DO TO ASSIST IN BOLSTERING IRAQI DEFENSES, AND WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP YOU IN THIS REGARD. AS JOHN POINDEXTER MENTIONED TO JACQUES AT THE EMBASSY DINNER, WE ARE OPEN TO YOUR SUGGESTIONS AND ARE WILLING TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE ON A PRIVATE AND BILATERAL BASIS.

5. WE IT THINK WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE CONSULTED CLOSELY AND DISCREETLY ON THESE MATTERS TO COMPARE OUR RESPECTIVE ASSESSMENTS OF THE SITUATION AND WHAT MORE MIGHT BE DONE ALONG THE LINES DISCUSSED ABOVE. IF YOU ARE AGREEABLE, I WOULD PROPOSE TO HAVE JOHN POINDEXTER, TRAVEL TO PARIS EARLY NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS FURTHER WITH YOU.

WARM REGARDS,

BUD
0406

TOP SECRET

FROM WHITE HOUSE
TO ELYSEE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 1007-081 #48522

BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/10

Sit Room

Pls send tonight.
JCM

48522

TOP SECRET VIA BLUE CHANNEL

PERSONAL FOR MR. ATTALI AND GENERAL SAULNIER

FROM MR. MCFARLANE - EYES ONLY

1. TOP SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS WE DISCUSSED IN OUR MEETING WITH JACQUES HERE IN WASHINGTON, WE ~~ARE INCREASINGLY~~ ^{remain} CONCERNED WITH THE GROWING INSTABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION AS THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ENTERS WHAT MAY BE A NEW AND MORE OMINOUS PHASE. THE IMMINENCE OF WHAT KHOMEINI HAS TERMED "THE FINAL OFFENSIVE" MAKES IT ^{worthwhile} ~~IMPERATIVE~~ THAT WE COMPARE OUR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS OF THE SITUATION AND THE DIRECTIONS THIS CONFLICT COULD TAKE.

3. WE ARE PRESENTLY EXAMINING A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE ESCALATION SCENARIOS: TWO APPEAR ESPECIALLY WORRISOME: (A) MAJOR IRAQI ESCALATION WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY EXTENDS THE WAR INTO THE GULF PROPER OR (B) ~~AN UNSUCCESSFUL~~ IRANIAN BREAKTHROUGH INTO IRAQI TERRITORY (BASRA). WE BELIEVE THAT EITHER OUTCOME WOULD HAVE ^{serious} ~~THE MOST PROFOUND~~ CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE REGION AND THE WORLD'S ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF THE REGION.

LIKE YOU, WE ALSO ARE ENGAGED IN THE SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL AND URGENT MEASURES TO AVERT AN IRAQI COLLAPSE. TO DATE OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED ON EASING IRAQ'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT, BY

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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CONCERTED EFFORTS TO CURTAIL ARMS FLOWS TO IRAN.

4. IN VIEW OF OUR PUBLIC STANCE OF NEUTRALITY IN THE WAR, FOR
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AND VULNERABILITIES, WE WOULD ESPECIALLY WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON
WHAT MORE FRANCE MIGHT DO TO ASSIST IN BOLSTERING IRAQI DEFENSES,
AND WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP YOU IN THIS REGARD. AS JOHN
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POSSIBLE ON A PRIVATE AND BILATERAL BASIS.

5. WE THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE CONSULTED CLOSELY AND
DISCREETLY ON THESE MATTERS TO COMPARE OUR RESPECTIVE ASSESSMENTS
OF THE SITUATION AND WHAT MORE MIGHT BE DONE ALONG THE LINES
DISCUSSED ABOVE. IF YOU ARE AGREEABLE, I WOULD PROPOSE TO HAVE
~~MY DEPUTY, ADMIRAL~~ JOHN POINDEXTER, TRAVEL TO PARIS EARLY NEXT
WEEK TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS FURTHER WITH YOU [REDACTED].

Warm regards

Bud

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

48523 CABLE

1 4/10/1984 B1

102120Z APR 84

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NSC/S PROFILE

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19
ID 8402927

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 12 APR 84 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

smf 11/1/88

DOCDATE 12 APR 84

KEYWORDS FRANCE

VISIT

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO MITTERRAND STATE VISIT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 13 APR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

FORTIER

SOMMER

MATLOCK

KIMMITT

MARTIN

COMMENTS

REF# 8410814

LOG 8401113

NSCIFID

(HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

McFarlane x 5/3

For info

MAY 04 1984

McFarlane noted

CO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *WHA PA* (C)

National Security Council
The White House

encl

20

RECEIVED

System # I

Package # 2927

84 MAY 3 A 9:45

1138

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>T</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Positive</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>done</u>	<u>Attach Tab-A</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2927

21

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48524

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION

May ³/₅, 1984

RCM HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB TC

SUBJECT: Reactions to Mitterrand State Visit

State has sent you a memorandum (Tab A) summarizing the very positive U.S. and French assessments of Mitterrand's visit. State indicates:

- Mitterrand is delighted with the personal relationship he believes he has established with the President.
- During his visit, the French President accented the overwhelming areas of policy agreement between the U.S. and France and particularly stressed our convergence of views on security issues and East-West relations.
- The extent of French media coverage given the visit was unprecedented and was generally positive in tone.
- A notable spin-off from the visit is the Mitterrand fascination, picked up by the French media, with the link between technological advancement and the role of the free enterprise system, particularly venture capital (another step in the retreat of French Socialism).

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-081 #48524

BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Washington, D.C. 20520

22
2927

April 12, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reactions to the Mitterrand State Visit

The Mitterrand state visit was clearly perceived, both in the United States and overseas, as an enormous success for both countries.

From the U.S. standpoint, based on overall domestic and foreign press reactions, our objective of using the Mitterrand visit to demonstrate the strength and unity of the Alliance was achieved. Foreign government assessments echo this, but it was most strongly demonstrated by French official and press commentary.

Official French reaction to the Mitterrand state visit was one of clear delight. The Elysee Secretary General reported that Mitterrand was especially pleased with the personal relationship he felt he had established with the President and the French press focussed its coverage of the Washington portion of the visit on the overall harmony of views between the two Presidents. Much note was taken of the fact that both Presidents insisted that U.S.-French convergence on Western security issues overrode our differences and Mitterrand reinforced this theme in his public speeches, frequently stressing the overwhelming areas of policy agreement and downplaying, or even refusing to answer questions about, areas of disagreement such as Central America.

Mitterrand's warm reception in the US was gratifying to French national pride. French media coverage of the visit was unprecedented in the three-year history of this much-travelled President and, reportedly, in the 26 year history of state visits by Presidents of the Fifth Republic. Coverage by the American media was also impressive. The visit was viewed overall as a successful culmination of gradually improving Franco-American relations over the past few years. The generally positive tone of the coverage contributed to an overall impression of an era of extremely good Franco-American relations. One spin-off of the visit was a remarkable number of favorable reports in the French media on the United States, mostly feature items on U.S. technology, free enterprise,

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-051 #48525

BY CA NARA DATE 5/15/10

CONFIDENTIAL

23

- 2 -

culture, education system, etc. Mitterrand himself told the Economic Club of New York that one thing he had learned in the U.S. was the link between technological advancement and the creation of conditions favorable to the stimulation of venture capital.

French Government and Socialist Party leaders expressed satisfaction with the visit. The Opposition sought to argue that Mitterrand's warm welcome was more the result of France's traditional good relations with the US than Mitterrand's own accomplishments. But in the general euphoria, even the Communists refrained from criticizing the visit, maintaining that "France should have good relations with both superpowers."

The recent offer by the French Foreign Minister to consider mine-sweeping operations off Nicaragua, coming in the immediate wake of the Mitterrand visit, is a reminder that however warm our relations with France at the moment, there are still certain differences of perspective, which combined with France's unique assertive view of its independence, will from time to time put us at cross purposes. It is not clear that the Cheysson offer had Mitterrand's blessing, nor is it clear the French will follow through on it. But we must anticipate that however this current issue is resolved, there will still be future occasions when we will find French behavior inconsistent with our own policies and interests.

Our relations with France are frequently characterized by one step backward for every two steps forward. The fact that the French, with regard to Central America, have taken a step backward should not detract from the fact that the Mitterrand state visit was the culmination of a process in which we have taken several important steps forward as well. The visit underlined for the peoples on both sides of the Atlantic the basic commonality of interest on basic issues. This should facilitate the working out of differences and the avoidance of major conflicts in the future.

for Mr. Hill
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

24

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8390634

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 17 MAY 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM NAU

DOCDATE 16 MAY 83

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

EAST WEST ECONOMICS

WALLIS, A

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: WALLIS SPECULATION ON MITTERRAND TACTICS

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

MAY 1 7 1983

Clark

HA -

DISPATCH

MAY 1 7 1983

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FILE

(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90634

25

May 17, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*

SUBJECT: Wallis Speculation on Mitterrand's
Tactics

Allen Wallis has forwarded some personal notes on his
conversations with Mitterrand and Attali in Paris.

Attachment

Tab A - Wallis Notes

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 1/7/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26
48526

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: William P. Clark
National Security Advisor

Michael Deaver
Assistant to the President and
Deputy Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Personal Speculation about Mitterrand's
Possible Tactics at Williamsburg

The speech that President Mitterrand gave at a social reception on May 9 for delegates to the OECD Ministerial meeting included many references to the Williamsburg Summit - what it ought to do, what Mitterrand would propose, etc. This has led to a good deal of speculation about Mitterrand's intentions at the Summit, not only by us and representatives of the other nations which will participate in the Summit, but also by the OECD delegates generally. One non-Summit country delegate referred to the speech as "a political hijacking," and one of the newspapers referred to "a captive audience." The circumstances of standing for more than half an hour before the speech, and continuing to stand for forty-five minutes throughout the speech and the response by the Chairman of OECD did not help Mitterrand win friends or influence people.

It seems worthwhile to record here some miscellaneous facts surrounding the speech which may or may not help us deduce Mitterrand's intentions.

Early on the morning of the speech, Monday, May 9, I met with Jacques Attali. He told me that Mitterrand had decided to make a speech at the OECD reception, and that it would be not just a welcoming speech but a serious exposition of Mitterrand's economic views. Attali said that they had worked on the speech most of the way back from China, an eighteen-hour flight ending Sunday morning, May 8. Attali said that his President wanted me to know in advance that he would be making such a speech.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081# 48526
BY CU NARA DATE 5/9/10

After I arrived with Secretary Shultz at the reception Monday evening, and was standing along the wall at the spot assigned to the United States, Attali's assistant, Pierre Morel, came to me, obviously having made a special point of doing so, and said that Attali wanted me to know that the speech would be a very long one. He said that it is in no way intended to be confrontational.

During the meeting of an hour or more that Secretary Shultz and I had with Mitterrand late Tuesday morning, I said at some length and in some detail that the differences between the United States and France on economic policy are not differences in objectives but differences in judgment as to what means will be effective. At Attali's suggestion, I showed Mitterrand the card I have been carrying with a quotation from Mitterrand's March 23 speech to the nation, saying that when two countries have different rates of inflation there is no way that their exchange rate can be constant. I used this in supporting my point that we too feel that stability is important in exchange rates, and that we too feel that the dollar is too high. We are, however, convinced that intervention in foreign exchange markets will accomplish nothing. Similarly, I pointed out that we too feel that interest rates in the United States are too high, but the differences between us are on effective means of getting them lower since, in our opinion, the means favored by the French would raise expectations of inflation, and thereby increase rather than decrease interest rates.

At the meeting of Personal Representatives on Thursday, May 12, Attali asked me to take a short walk with him just before lunch, saying that he had something he wished to bring up with me. He opened the conversation by saying that President Mitterrand wants the Summit to be a political success for President Reagan, and is prepared to do whatever he can to make it a success. He then said that two things are very important to Mitterrand: First, France cannot tolerate the idea of a study by GATT on trade in high technology products. The study by the OECD provided for by the OECD Ministerial meeting is acceptable, but not a study in GATT. He said that a study in GATT would be "an attack on France's whole industrial policy." I pointed out that it might be or it might not be such an attack, depending upon the nature of France's "industrial policy." Second, it is essential to Mitterrand that the Summit agree to initiate some sort of study of the desirability of holding an international monetary conference.

I indicated strong doubts that the United States could agree to that. Attali indicated that if Mitterrand were satisfied on these two points, he would try to assure a "political success" for Reagan at the Summit.

During the afternoon meeting of the Personal Representatives, the point in the thematic paper that had been submitted by the United States suggesting that the Summit agree to press forward with GATT work on trade in services and high technology products was altered by removing the reference to high technology products and transferring it to a point where GATT was not mentioned, only an exhortation to halt and reverse protectionism. This change was not supported by me or the other U.S. participants; on the contrary, it was opposed. Also during the afternoon discussion a point was added reading, "Invite Ministers of Finance in consultation with the Managing Director of the IMF, to define the conditions for improving the international monetary system and to consider the part which might, in due course, be played in this process by a high-level international monetary conference." This point also was opposed by the United States representatives and also by the German representative. Throughout the meeting the British representative (Sir Robert Armstrong) sided with the French representative (Jacques Attali) on virtually every point that came under discussion, including these two.

Thursday night, after the evening session had ended, I took Attali aside and asked him whether he was satisfied with the outcome on the two points he had raised with me at noon, trade in high technology and a monetary conference. He said that he was. I asked exactly what, in that case, President Mitterrand would be provided to do at the Summit towards making it a "political success for President Reagan." There was no incisive answer from Attali, but rather a clear indication that what Mitterrand would do is refrain from being abrasive and disruptive. Furthermore, it appeared in the conversation that Attali's approach had not been pre-authorized by Mitterrand, but was simply a venture of his own. (While I think that it is important economically that the world's leaders project an appearance of unity and cooperation in meeting the current problems, I have to admit that I cannot see the political damage to President Reagan of Mitterrand's being obstreperous.)

At one point Attali said that President Mitterrand would appreciate it very much indeed if at some point during the discussions President Reagan would call on him to discuss the outcome of the work on technology launched at the Versailles Summit.

SECRET

- 4 -

29

The preceding are, admittedly, simply unrelated trivia that may or may not throw light on the Mitterrand enigma.



Allen Wallis

WAWallis:jad
May 14, 1983

SECRET

National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 90634

MAY 1 6 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			
			MAY 1 7 1983

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II
90634

31

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48527

CONFIDENTIAL

May 16, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM: HENRY NAU *HN*

SUBJECT: Wallis Speculation on Mitterrand's Tactics

Allen Wallis has forwarded to you and Mike Deaver some personal notes on his conversations with Mitterrand and Attali in Paris.

The notes cover -

- the mood at the Ellysee for the Mitterrand speech.
- a snippet from Shultz's meeting with Mitterrand.
- a private conversation with Attali at the sherpa meeting.

The latter may be of some interest. It suggests that the French are unlikely to disrupt the Summit since they, not the U.S., will clearly be seen as the cause of such a disruption.

I have attached a short note from you to Deaver forwarding his copy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the note to Deaver at Tab I.

Approve /

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I - Note to Deaver

Tab A - Wallis Notes

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-0811 #48527

BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/10

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8403991

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVA
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM BEAL

smf
1/7/06

RECEIVED 18 MAY 84 18

DOC DATE 18 MAY 84

TO MCFARLANE

KEYWORDS FRANCE

USIA

SUBJECT: AMB GALBRAITH OBJECTIONS TO US PUBLIC OPINION POLLING IN FRANCE

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 21 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEAL

SOMMER

RAYMOND

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 4/8 mcfarlane Approved

BE

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 3991

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>3</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

John suggests you may wish to raise
this issue with Galbraith.

33A

National Security Council
The White House

System #

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Package #

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64 MAY 31

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1		
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3		
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	✓	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room	3A	✓	DACOM

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

If Bud sees Van Halbritz,
he could raise this issue.

Note to Beal: RCM approved
recommendation but noted on
routing slip "If State won't take
this on we shouldn't. It's not
an NSC issue" RCM

33-B

cc

National Security Council
The White House

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System # I

Package # 3991

81 MAY 10 A10:46

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	<u> </u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Tom Shull	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Wilma Hall	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
NSC Secretariat	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Situation Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u>Beal</u>	<u>3</u>	<u> </u>	<u>A</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Please coordinate with
Sommer and Raymond.

Stockman → Hatfield

TO: NSFEG (FLORENCE GANTT)

June 7, 1984

- orig attached*
1. #4198 - Kemp: RCM signed memo to President; forwarded on 6/5. (Earlier RCM had raised question: Does Treasury also clear the letter? If so, go ahead & send forward thru Darman." RMK note: 6/5 - per JMP, Treasury clears. *4/5 Pres sgd 14r.*
 2. #3991 - Beal: RCM approved recommendation but noted on routing slip "If State won't take this on, we shouldn't. It's not an NSC issue."
 3. DACOM (FF# 33) - Shultz Memo, subject: Your Meeting with Japanese PM Nakasone, June 7. Per Kimmitt: Priority to Paul Thompson; Action to McMin; Comment - Sigur & Martin; Info - Poindexter. *#4474*
 4. System II 90547 - DeGraffenreid: Recommendation 1: RCM approved, noting "without prejudice on ultimate decisions." Recommendation 2: RCM approved. Per Kimmitt copy sent to Brunson McKinley here; copy to go to Hill from D.C.; to Matlock for further action.
 5. System II 90315 - Raymond: RCM approved recommendation; sent to President on 6/5. *closed 4/5 - orig filed 4/8*
 6. #4450 - Sigur: RCM approved recommendation, noting: "I see no problem if Nakasone personally wants it. It can be an Evans photo." RMK sent to Bill Martin asking him to coordinate with Henkel and State. Done. CLOSE OUT.
 7. #4286 - Matlock: Kimmitt cover note forwarded Kimmitt-edited State draft response to Michael Deaver with recommendation that he send in final from here (London).
 8. #4483 - Menges/Chris Lehman/Tillman: RCM has seen. *-action closed NFAR, get Menges info noted -*
 9. #4410 - Childress: RCM has seen.

.cc NSDFP
.cc NSBTM
.cc NSKMS
.cc NSGVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

34

3991
Re-done

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48528

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

May 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

RICHARD BEAL ^{RB}

SUBJECT:

US Ambassador Objections to US Public Opinion
Polling in France

ISSUE

US Ambassador Galbraith (France) has repeatedly turned down requests by USIA to sponsor public opinion polling in France on a variety of issues, particularly security-related ones. Such polls have been conducted over a number of years, are highly useful to US decision-makers, and do not encounter similar objections from other US missions in Europe.

BACKGROUND

The USIA Office of Research designs and commissions studies on foreign policy issues of concern to USG policy-makers. The questionnaires developed by USIA, after being cleared by area desks within USIA, are sent to the State Department and to relevant missions abroad for clearance. The Department and the missions judge whether fielding the questionnaire will be too politically sensitive; they are not charged with presenting a critique of the intent or wording. The Research staff, however, usually complies with any suggested re-wording.

Ambassador Galbraith has routinely refused to allow polling in France on any issue related to security or defense. As a result, during the Reagan administration, multi-country analyses of European public opinion toward nuclear weapons, the superpowers, and Atlantic security issues examine the attitudes of publics in Britain, Italy, and West Germany -- not France. This is most unfortunate because these polling results have been invaluable to policy-makers as well as to those who strive to communicate our policy decisions and reasoning. In particular, results of USIA polls were crucial to the formulation of USG public diplomacy strategies in Europe on INF deployment and Central America.

Ambassador Galbraith's objections to security-issues polling in France appears to stem not so much from his fears of political sensitivity -- which is the only really valid objection upon which missions are to base a rejection -- but from his personal misunderstanding of polls, his view that these polls are designed to elicit negative results, and that USG policy-makers are not

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081/1 #48528

BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

interested in hearing such bad news. The Ambassador communicated his opinions in a cable to USIA and USIS posts in key European capitals, a copy of which appears at Tab I.

A rebuttal to the Ambassador's objections appear at Tab II.

This matter was reviewed internally with Ty Cobb, Peter Sommer, Steve Steiner, and Walt Raymond, who feel that a cable response to Ambassador Galbraith would not be appropriate at this time. They suggest that you take the opportunity to speak with Ambassador Galbraith about this issue when he comes to London next week. We concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you speak to Ambassador Galbraith in London regarding this issue (Talking Points are provided at Tab III), requesting him to reconsider his decision not to permit the security survey be conducted in France.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

"If State won't take this on, we shouldn't. It's not an NSC issue." RCM

Attachments

- Tab I - Galbraith Cable to USIA
- Tab II - Rebuttal to Galbraith's Cable
- Tab A - Copy of Security Survey Questionnaire
- Tab III - Recommended Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

36

48529

P 071710Z MAY 84
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHIA/USIA/WASHDC PRIORITY 2954
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4846
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7994
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0299
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 8814
RUDKPHQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 9556
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAQUE 8349
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 8641
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 18018

FOR P/RQE ADLER: EU/SBELL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS:
SUBJECT: SPRING 84 SECURITY SURVEY

REF: USIA 22549

WE CONTINUE TO QUESTION THE UTILITY AND WISDOM OF U.S.-SPONSORED PUBLIC OPINION POLLS ON SECURITY ISSUES IN WESTERN EUROPE. SUCH POLLS WILL CONTINUE TO YIELD PREDICTABLY NEGATIVE RESULTS BECAUSE OF THE WORDING OF THE QUESTIONS POSED. EUROPEAN PUBLICS WILL ALWAYS PREFER FEWER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ETC., IF SUCH QUESTIONS ARE POSED IN THE ABSTRACT. WE ALSO NOTE THE LACK OF CONTROL OVER DISTRIBUTION OF PREVIOUS POLL RESULTS. THESE RESULTS ARE NOW AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS IN THEIR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS. INF DEPLOYMENT REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT WESTERN DIPLOMATIC VICTORY, AND OUR WEST EUROPEAN PARTNERS DESERVE CREDIT FOR THEIR LEADERSHIP IN DEALING WITH PUBLIC OPINION ON THIS ISSUE. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERCUT THIS EFFORT BY EXTRACTING POLL RESULTS WHICH APPEAR TO CONTRADICT THEIR STATED POLICIES. THE PROPOSED POLL IS NOT REPEAT NOT APPROVED FOR FRANCE.

GALBRAITH
BT
#8018

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 748529

BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/11

CONFIDENTIAL

- I. "Such polls will continue to yield predictably negative results because of the wording of the questions posed."

The wording of the USIA-sponsored questionnaire (see Tab A) is very carefully balanced, realistic, and objective. The question wording has, in fact, elicited consistently more positive responses than have commercial polls on the same subject.

More important, responses to the same question have varied considerably in France (in the past, when polling there was conducted more freely). This indicates that public opinion about the US and its policies is not necessarily negative. For example, between March 1981 and April 1982, the number of French who felt it was better for France to belong to NATO than to become neutral increased substantially.

It is also worth noting that, in many cases, USIA question wording has been adopted by respected polling firms (such as Gallup affiliates) in their regular polling series.

2. "European publics will always prefer fewer nuclear weapons if such questions are posed in the abstract."

The questions are not asked in the abstract; they are always formulated within a realistic policy context. Thus, people are not asked whether they want more of fewer weapons unless these are realistic alternatives. When USIA last asked French opinion on INF stationing, a plurality was in favor, and a two-to-one majority thought that having nuclear weapons in Western Europe helps to prevent a Soviet attack rather than making an attack more likely.

3. There is "...lack of control over distribution of previous poll results."

Although the results are unclassified, they are distributed within the US only to USG officials on a limited basis; virtually all recipients are within the executive branch. Foreign distribution is to relevant US missions. USIA policy dictates that a one-year embargo is placed on all data and analyses; this policy is vigorously enforced by USIA.

The reason for leaving the results unclassified is so that US public affairs officers abroad may use the data and analyses at their discretion. Officers are encouraged to use the data in support of US policy and objectives, but they are asked to hand out the published analyses only when they view it as necessary in the interests of US policy.

The risk of leaks of USIA research report is small. In more than 25 years of polling, there have been only a few unintended releases of data. USIA is, however, in the process of reconsidering whether results of security issues polling should be classified.

4. "Results are now available to support the Soviets and their sympathizers in their propaganda campaigns."

On one hand, polling freely is a matter of principle. One of our most precious values is our high regard for the truth. If a foreign public finds our policy on some issue objectionable, we are not fearful of facing that fact -- we even take the trouble to seek out their opinions, regardless of what they are. We cannot take on the behavior of the Soviets, who try to hide the truth and to manipulate reality.

On the other hand, the data are more valuable to US policy-makers and USIS programmers than to the Soviets and their friends. When public opinion is in fact opposed to US policy, it is better for the USG officials to act in full awareness of this information than to deny ourselves access to this type of intelligence.

Also, lest we forget, the same information on public opinion abroad is available to anyone who wishes to poll for the data. Our refusal to poll can only hurt us, for it is we, through USIA, who ask the most objective questions.

5. "We should not undercut (Western European leadership) by extracting poll results which appear to contradict their stated policies."

One of the primary objectives for polling is to gather data which will be useful to government officials with whom we cooperate in Europe. Without information on how their publics perceive NATO policies, for example, it is very difficult for these officials to develop methods by which to inform and sway public opinion. Our surveys do a great service to our allies.

Security Study, May 1984

1. How closely do you generally follow news about international affairs -- very closely, fairly closely, not very closely, or not closely at all? [Trend, to separate attentives]
2. What do you think is most responsible for current international tensions? [PROBE: What else?]
[USE CODE PROVIDED AND SUPPLEMENT AS NECESSARY. CODE FIRST ITEM SEPARATELY FROM OTHERS. CODE UP TO FOUR ITEMS.]
3. Please use this card to tell me your feelings about the U.S. [Hand card] do you have a very good, fairly good, neither good nor bad, rather bad, or very bad opinion of the U.S.? [T]
4. And how about the Soviet Union. Do you have a very good, fairly good, neither good nor bad, rather bad or very bad opinion of the Soviet Union? [T]
5. In general, how much confidence do you have in the ability of the Soviet Union to deal responsibly with world problems -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? [12/83]
6. And how much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal responsibly with world problems -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? [12/83]
7. On balance, do you think that U.S. policies and actions during the past year have done more to promote peace or done more to increase the risk of war? [Dec. 83]
8. And how about Soviet policies and actions during the past year -- have they done more to promote peace or done more to increase the risk of war? [Dec. 83]
9. Do you feel that in pursuing detente, the reduction of tensions between East and West, [SURVEY COUNTRY] has made too many concessions to the East, not enough concessions, or that our detente policy has been about right? [NEW]

10. How concerned are you that the Soviet Union will pressure [SURVEY COUNTRY] into adopting policies which are against the interests of our country -- very concerned, fairly concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned? [April 83]

11. And how concerned are you that the Soviet Union will attack Western Europe within the next five years -- very concerned, fairly concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned? [T - March 81]

12. If the Soviet Union were to attack Western Europe, how much confidence do you have that the U.S. would do whatever is necessary to defend [SURVEY COUNTRY] even if this would risk the destruction of U.S. cities -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? [July 1983]

13. To what extent do you feel [SURVEY COUNTRY] is shouldering its fair share of the burden of Western security -- are we taking on too much of the burden, about the right amount, or not enough? [IHT/HARRIS Oct. 83 MODIFIED: SC INSTEAD OF WEU]

14. All things considered, do you think that having American troops stationed in Western Europe helps to prevent a Soviet attack or makes a Soviet attack on Western Europe more likely? [NEW]

15. Do you think the number of American troops now stationed in Europe should be increased, left at their present level, decreased, or withdrawn completely? [Modified March 81]
Now a few questions about NATO, the defense alliance between Western Europe, the United States and Canada.

16. Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which view is closer to your own? [July 83]

17. Which of the statements on this card [HAND CARD] comes closest to your own view of how [SURVEY COUNTRY] could best provide for its security in the future? [Based on USIA March 81 and Gallup Feb. 82]

- a) remain a member of the NATO alliance between Western Europe, the United States and Canada.
- b) remain a member of NATO but establish within NATO a West European defense force under European command
- c) withdraw from NATO and establish a West European defense force not allied to the U.S.
- d) withdraw from NATO and become a neutral country.

18. How much confidence do you have in NATO's ability to prevent an attack on Western Europe -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? [July 82]

19. Do you think that a Soviet attack can best be prevented by strengthening NATO's conventional forces or by modernizing NATO's nuclear forces?

20. Suppose that NATO is unable to prevent an attack and Western Europe is actually invaded. How much confidence do you have in NATO's ability to defend Western Europe against an attack -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? [July 82, with new preamble]

21. There are different opinions about the use of nuclear weapons in Europe by NATO. Which one of the following is closest to your own? [CARD] [July 82]

- a) NATO should not use nuclear weapons of any kind under any circumstances
- b) NATO should use nuclear weapons only if the Soviet Union . uses them first in attacking Western Europe
- c) NATO should use nuclear weapons to defend itself if a . Soviet attack by conventional forces threatened to . overwhelm NATO forces.

22. Do you think [SURVEY COUNTRY'S] defense spending should be increased, decreased, or kept at about its present level? [April 82]

23. In your opinion, do NATO's conventional, that is non-nuclear forces need to be strengthened or are they adequate now? [NEW]

24. Would you favor or oppose increasing [SURVEY COUNTRY] defense spending in order to strengthen NATO's conventional forces if that would reduce NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons? [NEW]

25. Do you believe the U.S. is or is not making a genuine effort to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union that would reduce the number of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe? [Dec. 83]

26. And what about the USSR -- do you believe that the USSR is or is not making a genuine effort to reach an agreement with the U.S. that would reduce the number of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe? [Dec. 83]

28. As you probably know, no agreement has been reached between the U.S. and the USSR to reduce the number of medium-range missiles in Europe. So, in keeping with a NATO decision, some new medium-range nuclear missiles have been stationed in Western Europe. Which of the following [HAND CARD] best describes your reaction to the stationing of these missiles in Western Europe?

- I strongly support the stationing of these missiles
- I support the stationing, but I don't feel strongly about it
- I oppose the stationing, but I don't feel strongly about it
- I strongly oppose the stationing of these missiles.

If Opposed:

29-30B. Here are a number of reasons why some people say they are opposed to stationing these missiles [HAND CARD]. Which of these reasons is for you the most important?

Which of the other reasons are important for you?

[PREVIOUSLY ASKED OPEN] [CODE UP TO FOUR REASONS, MOST IMPORTANT SEPARATELY.]

- a] All nuclear weapons should be abolished
- b] There are already too many nuclear weapons in the world; no new ones are needed
- c] They are American weapons over which we would have no control
- d] These missiles may provoke a Soviet attack
- e] These missiles are likely to involve us in a U.S.-Soviet war
- f] These missiles could lead to a nuclear war confined to Europe
- g] A nuclear balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union already exists in Europe; no new weapons are needed.
- h] The missiles will escalate the U.S.-Soviet arms race.

If Supports:

29-30B. Here are a number of reasons why some people support stationing of these missiles [HAND CARD]. Which one of these reasons is for you the most important? Which of the others reasons are important for you?

[Code up to four reasons, most important separately]

- a] to help prevent/deter an attack; to make war less likely
- b] to defend/protect Western Europe in case of an attack by the East
- c] to balance/match the medium range nuclear missiles the Soviets have aimed at Western Europe
- d] to force the soviets to negotiate reductions in medium range nuclear missiles
- e] to share greater responsibility for west Europe's defense
- f] to avoid having the Soviet Union take advantage of our weakness.
- g] to honor the commitment of all nato countries to deploy these missiles in Western Europe if arms control negotiations with the USSR fail
- h] to demonstrate NATO's strength and determination.

31-34. Here are some other proposals which might be introduced at a conference on disarmament. For each of these [HAND CARD] please tell me whether you favor it strongly, favor it somewhat, oppose it somewhat, or oppose it strongly. [NEW]

31] a non-aggression pact renouncing the use of military force except in self-defense

32] creation of a nuclear-free zone in East and West Europe

33] an agreement that neither side will be the first to use nuclear weapons.

34] A comprehensive ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons.

35. How much confidence do you have that the Soviet Union would keep its word and observe such agreements -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? [NEW]

36. And how much confidence do you have that the United States would keep its word and observe such agreements -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all? [NEW]

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH

1. The NSC along with the SPG, IIC, and FORA strongly support USIA public opinion polling in European countries on key foreign policy issues, especially security and defense-related topics.
2. USIA-sponsored polls and subsequent analyses have proved invaluable in generating effective public diplomacy strategies. Without such data, USG policy-makers would be ill-informed regarding public reactions to US policy initiatives.
3. USIA-developed questionnaires go through a rigorous screening and approval process, a process in which we have every confidence. They are not designed to elicit negative reactions to US policy, but regardless of whether public opinion in a given country is positive or negative, we need to be aware of what the prevailing opinions are.
4. In NSDD 130 the President has stated that public opinion polling is extremely useful in foreign policy decision-making and that both the amount and effective use of polling in this area should be increased.
5. We find it unfortunate that the most recent survey being conducted in six European countries is not also being fielded in France. Please reconsider approval of the security issues questionnaire so that we will be able to have multi-country data from Europe and updates on French attitudes from surveys taken several years ago.

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TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. White House Situation Room

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Robert Kimmitt for Mr. McFarlane / LONDON

/ TOR: 042140Z KM

2. Robert Kimmitt / SITTO # 86 /

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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PKG#3991

AMBASSADOR OBJECTIONS TO US
PUBLIC OPINION POLLING IN FRANCE

for morning package

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