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File Folder BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING AND AMBASSADOR
MURPHY MISSION (9/26/1984)

FOIA

M10-361

Box Number 34

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
109424	CABLE	DAMASCUS 06290	4	9/26/1984	B1
109425	CABLE	CAIRO 29406 (INCLUDES COVER SHEET) R 10/12/2012 M361/2	8	9/26/1984	B1
109426	CABLE	AMMAN 08965 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	22	9/26/1984	B1
109427	CABLE	AMMAN 08967 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	6	9/26/1984	B1

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, EG, IS, JO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S MEETING WITH ASSISTANT
SECRETARY MURPHY: ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN A ONE AND A QUARTER HOUR MEETING SEP-
TEMBER 25, PRESIDENT MUBARAK TOLD VISITING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY MURPHY THAT EGYPT IS PREPARING THE GROUND
FOR INITIATIVES IN THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH HE HOPES
WILL CULMINATE IN THE MEETING HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE WITH
PRESIDENT REAGAN AT THE END OF NEXT FEBRUARY OR EARLY
MARCH. HE CONFIRMED THAT HE IS IN ACTIVE COMMUNICATION
WITH NEW ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER PERES ABOUT AN EARLY
SUMMIT BETWEEN THEM, BUT INSISTED THAT CONCRETE RESULTS
MUST BE ASSURED FIRST. SPECIFICALLY, HE WANTS RESOLUTION



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OF THE TABA DISPUTE AND NEW ISRAELI "CONFIDENCE BUILD-
ING" MEASURES TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS LIVING IN THE WEST
BANK. HE INDICATED THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON
IS NOW BEING HANDLED TO HIS SATISFACTION. THE PRESIDENT
IS SENDING HIS ADVISOR, OSAMA EL-BAZ (WHO WAS ALSO PRES-
ENT), TO MEET KING HUSSEIN IN AMMAN SEPTEMBER 27 TO DIS-
CUSS THE EGYPTIAN APPROACH TO ANY NEGOTIATIONS AND TO
PERSUADE THE KING TO "SLOW DOWN" HIS APPROACH TO THE
RUSSIANS. MUBARAK, MURPHY AND EL-BAZ AGREED THAT AFTER
MURPHY'S MEETING WITH HUSSEIN SEPTEMBER 26 MURPHY WOULD
COMMUNICATE ANY NEW ELEMENTS IN THE KING'S THINKING TO
EL-BAZ FOR THE SUBJECT MEETING EL-BAZ WILL HAVE WITH
HUSSEIN. IN A SEPARATE LATER MEETING, EL-BAZ EMPHASIZED
THAT WHILE THE GOE WILL RECEIVE EZER WEISMAN OR OTHER
ISRAELI ENVOYS IN PRELIMINARY CONTACTS, THE EGYPTIANS
WILL ACKNOWLEDGE BUT NOT PUBLICIZE
SUCH VISITS UNTIL CONCRETE MOVEMENT IS EVIDENT. DIS-
CUSSION OF RAS BANAS SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESIDENT MUBARAK INVITED ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY
TO MEET WITH HIM AT HIS HOME NOT FAR FROM THE AIRPORT
IMMEDIATELY UPON MURPHY'S ARRIVAL FROM ISRAEL; PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISOR EL-BAZ, AMBASSADOR VELIOTES, ARN DIRECTOR DAVID
MACK, AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR GEORGE SHERMAN WERE ALSO PRE-
SENT. IN THE FRIENDLY AND QUITE STRAIGHT FORWARD EXCHANGES
OVER AN HOUR AND A QUARTER, MUBARAK INTERRUPTED MURPHY'S
ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETINGS WITH ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER PERES
AND DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN TO ASSURE MURPHY THAT HE WAS
READY TO MEET PERES (PER PERES' REQUEST); BUT, HE ADDED,
HE HAD TOLD PERES CONCRETE RESULTS MUST FIRST BE ASSURED
FROM THAT MEETING.

4. AFTER MURPHY FINISHED THE REVIEW OF HIS MEETINGS IN
BOTH SYRIA AND ISRAEL ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR ISRAELI WITH-
DRAWAL FROM LEBANON, A GOOD PART OF THE SECOND HALF OF



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THE MEETING TURNED TO THE EGYPTIAN APPROACH TO NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. MUBARAK SAID THAT, DESPITE HIS WORRIES THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL WOULD BE WEAK, HE HAD RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY (THROUGH CHARGE MOHAMED BASSIOUNI) TO PERES' SUGGESTION THAT THEY MEET -- CONDITIONAL ON GUARANTEED RESULTS, FIRST, ON TABA AND, SECOND, ON ISRAELI "CONFIDENCE BUILDING" MEASURES ON THE WEST BANK. JUST TO MEET AND TALK WOULD BUILD UP UNWARRANTED EXPECTATIONS; WITHOUT CONCRETE PROGRESS EMBARRASSMENT AND BITTERNESS WOULD FOLLOW. EL-BAZ INTERJECTED THAT EGYPT DOES NOT WANT A REPETITION OF THE FRUITLESS FIRST SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IN ISMAILIA IN DECEMBER 1977. HE RECALLED THAT THIS LED TO MISUNDERSTANDING AND MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS WHICH REQUIRED THE PROLONGED, PERSONAL INTERVENTION OF PRESIDENT CARTER TO SORT OUT. MUBARAK EXPLAINED THAT TABA WAS IMPORTANT AS A BEGINNING -- HE NOTED THE STRENGTH OF EGYPTIAN PUBLIC FEELINGS ABOUT THIS "PIECE OF EGYPTIAN TERRITORY," THOUGH MANY EGYPTIANS DID NOT KNOW WHERE IT IS; PRELIMINARY CONTACTS COULD NARROW DOWN DIFFERENCES TO "ONE OR TWO" POINTS, AND THEN PERES AND HE WOULD REACH AGREEMENT IN THEIR MEETING.

5. PRESSED FOR SPECIFICS ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES REGARDING THE PALESTINIANS, MUBARAK AND EL-BAZ CITED THE FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES: PERES COULD SHOW WILLINGNESS TO TALK WITH SOME PALESTINIAN LEADERS ON THE WEST BANK; COULD MAKE A GENUINE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH KING HUSSEIN, COULD STOP THE THICKENING OF SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK, AND COULD "CRUSH" JEWISH TERRORISM IN THAT TERRITORY.

6. AMBASSADOR VELIOTES NOTED THAT PERES' STATEMENT TO THE KNESSET MARKED A CHANGE ON POLICY ON SETTLEMENTS, AND

MURPHY NOTED THAT THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER FELT HE HAD MADE A REAL EFFORT IN THAT STATEMENT TO PREPARE CONTACTS

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WITH KING HUSSEIN (FOR INSTANCE, DROPPING SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO CAMP DAVID). MUBARAK SAID HE WAS LAUNCHING CONTACTS WITH HUSSEIN AND THE PALESTINIANS ABOUT WHERE TO MOVE NEXT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WAS SENDING EL-BAZ SEPTEMBER 27 TO MEET WITH KING HUSSEIN, BOTH ABOUT POSSIBLE NEW STEPS, AND TO "SLOW DOWN" HUSSEIN'S APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS. BY THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, WHEN MUBARAK AND EL-BAZ HAD SUGGESTED (AND MURPHY AGREED) THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY SEND TO EL-BAZ ANY NEW ELEMENTS OF HUSSEIN'S THINKING DISCOVERED IN HIS OWN MEETING DUE SEPTEMBER 26, THE PRESIDENT FELT HUSSEIN WOULD GIVE "POSITIVE" ANSWERS TO THE REQUEST TO MODERATE HIS APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS TRYING TO PERSUADE HUSSEIN THAT HIS TIMING WAS BAD IN MOVING QUICKLY. IN A SEPARATE MEETING LATER, EL-BAZ TOLD MURPHY AND VELIOTES THAT HUSSEIN FEELS "SURROUNDED" BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA, WITH THE UNITED STATES "UNWILLING" TO STRENGTHEN OR PROTECT HIM AND THE SAUDIS UNRELIABLE. EL-BAZ WOULD TRY, HE SAID, TO POINT OUT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT GIVE HIM THE NECESSARY MEANINGFUL SUPPORT EITHER MILITARILY (THROUGH EQUIPPING HUSSEIN'S WESTERN ARMY) OR POLITICALLY (BY RESTRAINING THE SYRIANS OR RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE).

7. IN THE MEETING WITH MUBARAK, THE PRESIDENT SAID HIS INTENT IN ALL THESE EFFORTS WITH THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, WITH KING HUSSEIN, WITH THE PALESTINIANS (WHICH ONES UNSPECIFIED), WAS TO FORM "AN ESTIMATE OF HOW TO MOVE AHEAD." THE AIM, HE SAID, WAS A MEETING HE WOULD LIKE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AT THE END OF FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH, SO THEY COULD DECIDE WHERE TO GO NEXT--WITH THE

ELECTIONS BEHIND PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE OBVIOUSLY SAW A POSSIBLE SEPARATE MEETING WITH PERES IN THIS CONTEXT, BUT EMPHASIZED AT EACH TURN THAT THE MEETING MUST BE MORE THAN JUST TALK. RESULTS WERE CRUCIAL. IN LISTING TABA AND THE WEST BANK AS THE TWIN FOCI, MUBARAK WAVED ASIDE



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LEBANON AS ANOTHER ISSUE FOR THE TALKS--NOTING HE WAS
SATISFIED WITH HOW EFFORTS AT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ARE NOW
BEING HANDLED.

8. MURPHY RELAYED TO MUBARAK PERES' PERSONAL MESSAGE OF
ASSURANCE THAT THE NEW PRIME MINISTER DESIRES TO TALK TO
THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ON A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES, SUCH
AS RED SEA SECURITY, REGIONAL SECURITY, MILITARY
ESCALATION IN THE AREA, AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION FOR
MUTUAL BENEFITS. TO MURPHY'S REMARK THAT THE NEW
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DID NOT DESIRE A CONFRONTATION IN
THE AREA, MUBARAK QUICKLY JUMPED IN TO SAY EGYPT WAS
CERTAINLY NOT LOOKING FOR A CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL.

9. WHILE MUBARAK DID NOT RESPOND ON THE AREAS FOR
DISCUSSION PROPOSED BY PERES, EL-BAZ IN THE LATER
MEETING FIRMLY REJECTED ANY PROJECTS FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION IN THE SINAI OR FOR INCLUDING ISRAEL IN TALKS ON
RED SEA SECURITY. HE SAID THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC WOULD
NEVER ACCEPT JOINT PROJECTS IN THE FORMERLY OCCUPIED
TERRITORY--FEARING THEM AS AN OPENING WEDGE FOR RE-
ASSERTION OR ISRAELI POWER; HE RECALLED SADAT WAS ADAMANT
ON PROHIBITING ANY SUCH COOPERATION IN THE SINAI. OTHER
STATES ALONG THE RED SEA SAW ISRAEL AS A SECURITY THREAT
AND WOULD NOT AGREE TO INCLUDE IT IN MEASURES TO INCREASE
SECURITY OF THAT AREA. BEYOND THAT, AS LONG AS ISRAEL
WAS REPRESSING THE PALESTINIANS AND OCCUPYING LEBANON
EGYPT COULD NOT ENTER INTO ANY SORT OF SECURITY COOPERATION
WITH ISRAEL. EL-BAZ SAID ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION
COULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR GETTING AROUND MAJOR
POLITICAL OBSTACLES FIRST--AND HERE HE RETURNED TO THE

STANDARD THEME OF MOVEMENT ON THE PALESTINIAN FRONT.

10. IN THE EARLIER MEETING WITH MUBARAK, BOTH MURPHY AND
VELIOTES STRESSED THAT THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS
CERTAINLY NOT ACTING LIKE IT WAS IN PARALYSIS. WHILE



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NOT RESPONDING DIRECTLY, MUBARAK NOTED THAT HE WAS WELL
AWARE THAT PERES WAS A MODERATE POLITICIAN; THEREFORE, HE
HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IMMEDIATELY TO WRITE HIM A
CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE WITH SUBSTANCE, AND WAS ACTIVELY
ENGAGED WITH PERES' REQUEST FOR A MEETING. EL-BAZ SAID
RABIN'S RAPID EVICTION FROM THE WEST BANK TOWN OF
NABLUS OF 40 ILLEGAL JEWISH SETTLERS WAS A "GOOD STEP."
AT THE SAME TIME, RETURNING TO THE UNCERTAIN POLITICAL
SITUATION IN ISRAEL, MUBARAK SAID THE GOE IS TALKING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER YITZAK SHAMIR IN THE SAME "GENERAL
TERMS" AS WITH PERES. EL-BAZ AT HIS SIDE ADDED: "WE
DON'T PLAY ONE FACTION OFF AGAINST ANOTHER. WE WILL
DEAL WITH THE SITUATION AS IT EXISTS."

11. AT THE LATER MEETING, EL-BAZ EXPLAINED THAT THE GOE
IS DETERMINED NOT TO ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC DIALOGUE WITH THE
NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WHICH SUBSTITUTES "SWEET TALK"
AND A SERIES OF MINISTERIAL VISITS FOR CONCRETE PROGRESS.
EGYPT WOULD NOT PERMIT THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO REST ON THE
REWARDS OF PUBLIC IMPRESSIONS WITHOUT HAVING REAL RESULTS.
TO DO OTHERWISE, HE SAID, WOULD SIMPLY ENCOURAGE THE
"HAWKS" TO BELIEVE RELATIONS WITH EGYPT CAN WARM UP--A
POPULAR MOVE IN ISRAEL--WITHOUT ANY REAL CHANGE IN THE
STATUS QUO. EZER WEIZMAN, HE SAID, WOULD BE WELCOME; THIS
HAS BEEN TOLD TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT WAS WAITING TO HEAR THE
DATES PROPOSED. YET THE VISIT WOULD RECEIVE NO PUBLICITY
(BEYOND CONFIRMING IT TOOK PLACE), AND WEIZMAN WOULD NOT
BE "PICTURED" MEETING ANY EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL. ASKED IF THE

GOE WAS NOT RISKING A PASSIVE NON-RESPONSIVE IMAGE OF ITS
OWN AND MIGHT LOSE AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN MODERATES
NOW THAT A NEW GOVERNMENT WAS IN PLACE IN ISRAEL, EL-BAZ
RESPONDED THAT EGYPT WAS TAKING ALL THE INITIATIVES CITED
BY THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD "RECIPROCATE" IN KIND TO ANY
CONCRETE MOVES BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT--NO MATTER HOW
SMALL THE GESTURE. HE HIMSELF BELIEVED PERES HAD A
"SECRET SCENARIO"--TO ENGAGE THE LIKUD IN THE HEAVY AND



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UNPOPULAR BURDEN OF ECONOMIC REFORM AT HOME, WHILE
CONCENTRATING HIMSELF ON POPULAR MOVES TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS WITH EGYPT; THEN IN A YEAR HE WILL BREAK UP
THE UNITY GOVERNMENT TO FORM A NEW COALITION WITH THE
SMALLER PARTIES WITHOUT NEW ELECTIONS. THIS NEW COALITION
WOULD BE POSITIONED TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT MOVES FOR PEACE.
HE HAD NO READY ANSWER TO THE OBVIOUS QUESTION WHETHER
THE LIKUD WOULD SIT PASSIVELY BY WHILE SUCH TACTICS WERE
CARRIED OUT.

12. COMMENT. MUBARAK HAS NOW PROVIDED US THE OUTLINES OF
TH APPROACH TO ISRAEL AND THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH WE CAN
EXPECT TO SEE FOLLOWED OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS. HE AND
EL-BAZ HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT IT IS AIMED AT KEEPING
MATTERS MOVING UNTIL THE UNITED STATES CAN RESUME A MORE
ACTIVE ROLE AFTER THE ELECTORAL PERIOD. MUBARAK IS
WORRIED ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT,
AND DOES NOT WANT EITHER TO BE SUCKED INTO POLITICAL
HORSE-TRADING IN ISRAEL OR TO PROVIDE FREE CONCESSIONS.
YET, HE EVIDENTLY HAS DECIDED TO TEST THE INTENTIONS AND
CAPABILITIES OF PERES IN TWO AREAS WHERE THE PRIME MINISTER
MAY BE ABLE TO DELIVER (TABA AND SMALL STEPS IN THE
WEST BANK)--THEREBY FORTIFYING EGYPTIAN EFFORTS TO
ATTRACT HUSSEIN AND MODERATE PALESTINIANS TO THE PEACE
PROCESS (WHEN AND IF IT RESUMES). HUSSEIN'S SURPRISE
ANNOUNCEMENT (SEPTEMBER 25) OF RESUMED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH EGYPT SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE EGYPTIANS AND GIVE A
SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO EL-BAZ'S SEPTEMBER 27 VISIT TO

AMMAN (WHERE, WE NOTE, HE MAY ALSO MEET WITH YASSIR
ARAFAT). END COMMENT. VELIOTES

NOTE BY OC/T: SECTION 3 DELAYED; WILL FOLLOW.



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PLEASE REPEAT TO BEIRUT, TEL AVIV AND DAMASCUS FOR
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE
SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON TALKS WITH ISRAELIS

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: IN SEPARATE MEETINGS
SEPTEMBER 25 AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WITH PERES,
RABIN, ARENS AND AIDES, MURPHY DISCUSSED HIS TALKS
IN SYRIA AND LEBANON. ISRAELIS WERE ATTENTIVE
AND CLEARLY FASCINATED TO HEAR SYRIAN ATTITUDES.
THEY OBVIOUSLY DESIRE TO KEEP PROCESS MOVING AND
WANT MURPHY TO CONTINUE HIS MISSION ON TWO
SEPARATE TRACKS:

-- (1) DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN TO OBTAIN THEIR
AGREEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS: FIRST, NO
MOVEMENT FORWARD OF SYRIAN ARMY AS IDF WITHDRAWS;
SECOND, PREVENTION OF INFILTRATION FROM BEYOND
SYRIAN LINES INTO SOUTH LEBANON, AND THIRD,

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PRINCIPLE OF DIRECT MILITARY LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN
LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS.

-- (2) FIRST, AGREEMENT OF LEBANESE TO AN
EXPANSION OF UNIFIL MANDATE TO COVER THE WHOLE
AREA FROM WHICH IDF WOULD WITHDRAW AND SECOND,
LEBANESE WILLINGNESS TO ENTER DIRECT TALKS ASAP
ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOUTH LEBANON
FOLLOWING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE ISRAELIS
ENCOURAGED MURPHY TO CONTINUE ON TO SYRIA AND THEN
HOLD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE. THEY
ARE AWARE THAT THERE WILL BE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES
ESPECIALLY WITH THE FUTURE ROLE OF LAHAD'S
FORCES, BUT THEY WANT TO SEE SOME CONCRETE RESULTS
IN THE NEAR FUTURE, EVEN IF MANY QUESTIONS ARE
LEFT TO BE WORKED OUT IN SUBSEQUENT TALKS WITH
BOTH SYRIANS--THROUGH U.S. MEDIATION--AND
DIRECTLY WITH THE LEBANESE, PERHAPS WITH A U.S.
PRESENCE IN THE LATTER MEETINGS. OVER THE COURSE
OF THE TALKS, ISRAELI COMMENTS TENDED TO SHIFT FROM
THEIR LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES TO THEIR MORE
IMMEDIATE ONES. WE SEE ISRAEL'S MOST URGENT
GOALS AS THE FOLLOWING: KEEP THE SYRIANS TALKING,
EXTEND UNIFIL WITH A MORE FLEXIBLE MANDATE, AND GET
DIRECT LEBANESE-ISRAELI MILITARY TALKS UNDERWAY.
THESE WOULD APPEAR ROUGHLY TO BE OUR OWN IMMEDIATE
GOALS AS WELL. END SUMMARY.

3. THE FIRST MEETING SAM AND I HAD AT MINISTRY
OF DEFENSE IN TEL AVIV INCLUDED RABIN, ARENS,
GENERAL LEVY, KIMCHE, LUBRANI AND DMI CHIEF
BARAK, IN ADDITION TO OTHER ISRAELI AIDES, A
STENOGRAPHER AND MEMBERS OF BOTH SAM'S AND MY

STAFF. RABIN WANTED FIRST TO KNOW ABOUT THE
REACTION IN DAMASCUS TO THE IDEAS HE HAD CONVEYED.

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I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE SYRIANS WERE OBVIOUSLY INTERESTED IN CONTINUING OUR TALKS BUT WOULD HAVE SERIOUS TROUBLES WITH SOME OF THE POINTS I PRESENTED. I MADE IT CLEAR TO ISRAELIS THAT I HAD DESCRIBED MY IDEAS AS AMERICAN IDEAS/ ASSUMPTIONS AND THAT WE WOULD ONLY PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE IF THERE WAS AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES. I SAID IT EMERGED THAT THE KEY PROBLEMS WOULD BE THE WAY IN WHICH UNIFIL WOULD BE DEPLOYED AND IN THE ROLE OF "LOCAL FORCES" WHICH THE SYRIANS WERE PRONE TO REFER TO AS "LAHAD'S GANG". I PRESENTED THE ISRAELIS MY SET OF EIGHT IDEAS/ASSUMPTIONS AS THEY HAD BEEN PRESENTED IN THE MEETINGS WITH THE THREE SYRIAN PRINCIPALS. I NOTED THAT I HAD TOLD THE SYRIANS THAT THESE IDEAS HAD NOT BEEN RAISED WITH THE LEBANESE, THAT I SAID IN DAMASCUS I WOULD GET ISRAELI VIEWS ON THE IDEAS AND WOULD BE RETURNING TO LEBANON TO BRIEF THE LEBANESE. I WOULD ALSO GO BACK TO DAMASCUS IF IT SEEMED USEFUL.

--

4. I TOLD THE ISRAELIS OF ASSAD'S REACTION. (TO WHICH THEY LISTENED INTENTLY). I NOTED THAT ASSAD SAID THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO THE LEBANESE PROPOSALS THAT SOUTH LEBANON BE MANAGED BY A COMBINATION OF THE LAF AND UNIFIL. ASSAD DID NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF "LOCAL FORCES". HE SAID THAT SOME OF THE IDEAS I HAD PRESENTED INFRINGED

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2745

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 08 AMMAN 08965

NODIS

S/S FOR HILL ONLY FROM MURPHY

PLEASE REPEAT TO BEIRUT, TEL AVIV AND DAMASCUS FOR
- AMBASSADORS AND CHARGE ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE

SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON TALKS WITH ISRAELIS

ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THREATENED SYRIAN
SECURITY AND THAT SYRIA WOULD OPPOSE ANY MOVEMENT
OF UNIFIL CLOSER TO THE SYRIAN BORDER. SYRIA
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A CHANGE IN THE UNIFIL MANDATE
WOULD BE NECESSARY, SINCE THEY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE
MORE FORCES TO COVER THE ENTIRE ISRAELI-LEBANESE
BORDER. I WENT ON TO RELATE ASSAD'S POSITION
IN DETAIL, DRAWING FROM OUR REPORTING TO THE
DEPARTMENT. I CONCLUDED BY NOTING IT WAS UNSURPRISING
THAT ASSAD DID NOT SHOW ALL OF HIS CARDS AT THIS
POINT, THAT HE WAS CAREFUL NOT TO REJECT OUR
IDEAS AND THAT ASSAD APPEARED TO BE IN VERY GOOD
SHAPE.

5. RABIN SAID THAT HE WAS FOR CONTINUATION OF THE
TALKS AND WANTED MURPHY TO GO BACK TO DAMASCUS.

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HE RELATED THE WAY ASSAD HAD APPROACHED THE 1974 GOLAN NEGOTIATIONS AND HOW THE SYRIANS HAD STARTED OUT WITH A VERY HARD POSITION. RABIN SAID HE WAS WORRIED THAT ASSAD PUT EVERYTHING ON THE LEBANESE, NOTING THE ISRAELI VIEW THAT THE LEBANESE COULD PROVIDE NO EFFECTIVE FORCES FOR THE SOUTH. RABIN SAID THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYTHING COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT A STRONG SYRIAN ROLE. ISRAEL MUST TALK DIRECTLY WITH THE LEBANESE, BUT HE DOUBTS THAT THE LEBANESE CAN DO ANYTHING UNLESS THE SYRIANS IMPOSE IT. SECONDLY, RABIN SAID THAT THE USE OF THE ASL WAS A VITAL INGREDIENT WITHOUT WHICH ISRAEL CANNOT ENVISAGE SECURITY AGREEMENTS THAT IT COULD ACCEPT. THIRDLY, THERE SEEMED TO BE BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN APPROACH TO UNIFIL. ISRAEL DOES NOT SEE AN EFFECTIVE UNIFIL ROLE UNLESS IT REACHES ALL THE WAY UP TO THE LEBANESE-SYRIAN BORDER. BASICALLY, WHAT ISRAEL WANTS IS TO HAVE UNIFIL IN WHAT THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT DESCRIBED AS ZONE (A), WITH "LOCAL FORCES" IN ZONE (B) SOUTH OF THE ZAHRANI. NONETHELESS, SAID RABIN, THE FACT THAT THE SYRIANS ARE WILLING TO TALK IS POSITIVE. THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE BEKAA IS "LIKE A BONE IN THEIR THROAT," AND WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT THE IDF WILL STAY THERE UNTIL AFTER THE WINTER AT LEAST.

6. WITH REGARD TO LEBANON, MURPHY SAID AT THE PRESENT TIME GEMAYEL AND KARAMI BRIDLE AT THE IDEA OF DIRECT MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH MURPHY THINKS THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO SYRIA. THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH HE SAID COULD USEFULLY BE RAISED WITH GEMAYEL ALONE. RABIN

AGREED, BUT SAID THAT SUCH TALKS COULD NOT BE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARMISTICE, WHICH IS DEAD,

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AND HAD BEEN SINCE 1967. MURPHY SAID THAT
GEMAYEL ALSO MENTIONED THE "RHODES FORMULA," WHICH
HE SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND AS PROXIMITY TALKS. RABIN
REMINISCED THAT HE ATTENDED THE TALKS IN
RHODES AND THAT THE TALKS THERE WERE OF ALL
FORMS, INCLUDING SITTING IN THE SAME ROOM BUT
"NOT AROUND THE SAME TABLE," WHICH GAVE THE
EGYPTIANS A FACE-SAVING OUT. IT ALSO INCLUDED
INFORMAL DIRECT TALKS AND PROXIMITY TALKS USING U.N.
MEDIATORS. MURPHY ASKED WHETHER ISRAEL AGREED TO
EARLY TALKS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL AT THE
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY LEVEL. RABIN SAID THAT THEY
DID "SUBJECT TO CABINET APPROVAL." HE STRESSED
THAT EVEN IF THE INTERLOCUTORS ARE MILITARY,
ISRAEL WANTS A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT
THAT WOULD NOT BE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 1948
ARMISTICE.

7. MURPHY SAID THAT THE ONLY OTHER DIFFICULTY
WHICH WAS RAISED BY THE LEBANESE CONCERNED
LAHAD'S FORCES. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN BECAUSE GEMAYEL
AND KARAMI WERE TOGETHER. IN ANY CASE, HE
DOUBTED IT WOULD BE MEANINGFUL TO HAVE A GEMAYEL
AGREEMENT TO ANYTHING TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT COULD
NOT ALSO COMMIT KARAMI. THE MOST THAT THE
LEBANESE WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE IS THAT LAHAD'S
MEN COULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE LAF AS INDIVIDUALS.
LEBANESE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 'AWN, ON THE

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NODIS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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OTHER HAND, SEEMED TO HAVE NO PARTICULAR TROUBLE
WITH LAHAD AS A PERSON AND HAD NOTED THAT LAHAD
WAS IN CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF.
RABIN OBSERVED THAT UNLESS THE SYRIANS WERE TO TALK
TO THE LEBANESE, THE LEBANESE WOULD REACH NO
CONCLUSION ABOUT BEGINNING DIRECT TALKS.

8. MURPHY THEN MENTIONED THAT GEMAYEL HAD
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT TALKS BY THE ISRAELIS TO
"BOTH LEBANESE SIDES" AND THAT GEMAYEL SEEMED TO
HAVE FOUND THIS THREATENING. MURPHY SAID THAT IT
FURTHER REINFORCED THE IMPORTANCE OF DIRECT
TALKS BETWEEN THE LAF AND THE IDF. RABIN SAID
THAT THE MESSAGE ISRAEL GETS IS THE LEBANESE FEAR
A SPEEDY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. EARLIER THEY HAD
EXPECTED THAT THE SYRIANS COULD TAKE CARE OF

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JUMBLATT--NOW THEY ARE NOT SO SURE. GEMAYEL IS FEARFUL THAT WHEN THE ISRAELIS LEAVE THERE WOULD BE VACUUM, AND HE HAS NO FORCES TO USE IN THE SOUTH IN A STRUGGLE AGAINST THE SHI'A AND THE DRUZE. ALL THE TALK BY THE GOL ABOUT THEIR CAPABILITY TO SEND TROOPS INTO THE SOUTH IS NONSENSE. NONETHELESS, RESPONDED MURPHY, THIS LEBANESE POSTURE IS A FACADE WHICH ASSAD CAN USE.

9. LEVY WONDERED WHETHER THERE COULD BE SOME ASSOCIATION OF THE LAF WITH UNIFIL IN THE SOUTH. HE COMMENTED ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE LAF WERE ALREADY PRESENT IN THE SOUTH ALBEIT IN A NON-ACTIVE CAPACITY. AMBASSADOR LEWIS NOTED THAT THE ISSUE WAS ONE OF FINDING COSMETIC ARRANGEMENTS BEHIND WHICH PEOPLE CAN HIDE, AND THAT THERE IS A PRECEDENT UNDER WHICH THE LAF COULD BE IN THE UNIFIL AREA. ARENS SAID THAT THE LAF HAD NO POTENTIAL TO MAKE A CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION, BUT AS LONG AS THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT THEIR PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH WAS TOTALLY COSMETIC IT WOULD BE O.K. RABIN AGREED, SAYING THAT HE DIDN'T MIND ANY FACE-SAVING FORMULA WITH RESPECT TO THE LAF.

10. MURPHY NOTED THAT GENERAL LAHAD IS BEING DESCRIBED IN BEIRUT NOT ONLY PRIVATELY BUT IN THE PRESS AS A STOOGES, PAID AND CONTROLLED BY ISRAEL. TIME APPEARS TO BE AGAINST A COSMETIC ARRANGEMENT FOR LAHAD'S FORCES. VARIOUS ISRAELIS AT THE TABLE NOTED THAT CHAMOUN SUPPORTS LAHAD. LEWIS SAID THAT TIME SEEMS TO BE RUNNING AGAINST CAMILLE CHAMOUN'S ROLE IN LEBANESE POLITICS, AND MACK ADDED THAT DANY CHAMOUN IS CONSIDERED BY MANY

LEBANESE TO BE AN ISRAELI STOOGES.

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11. GENERAL LEVY SAID THAT THE PROBLEM IS TO FIND A POLITICAL COVER FOR THE ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON TO BE PART OF THE LAF. THIS IS THE ONLY SOLUTION FROM BOTH THE ISRAELI AND THE LEBANESE POINTS OF VIEW. IT IS VERY HARD, HE NOTED, TO BUILD ANY NEW UNITS IN THE LEBANESE ARMY. MURPHY WONDERED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POTENTIAL FOR OTHER "LOCAL FORCES" TO BE STITCHED INTO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR FACE-SAVING PURPOSES. LEVY DOUBTED THAT THERE COULD BE ANY FORCES OTHER THAN THE ASL, AND LUBRANI THOUGHT THAT THE SOLUTION WAS FOR THE SHI'A TO CONTINUE TO JOIN THE ASL AS THEY HAD BEEN DOING. MURPHY NOTED THAT THEY HAVEN'T BEEN DOING SO IN GREAT NUMBERS. LEVY EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE SHI'A ARE NOT AT THE PRESENT TIME "MATURE ENOUGH" TO BUILD A FORCE THE WAY THE DRUZE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO. MURPHY CONCLUDED THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT WE MUST STRETCH OUR THINKING ON THE PACKAGING AND PRESENTATION OF THIS ISSUE, AND RABIN AGREED.

12. RABIN SUMMED UP WHAT ISRAEL EXPECTS TO GET FROM THE SYRIANS. FIRST, TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SYRIANS ON THE AGREEMENT WHICH ISRAEL WOULD REACH WITH THE LEBANESE. SECONDLY, THAT SYRIAN FORCES WOULD NOT MOVE AHEAD AS THE IDF WITHDREW. AND THIRD, THAT SYRIAN FORCES WOULD PREVENT INFILTRATION FROM BEHIND OR AROUND THEIR LINES

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NODIS

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SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON TALKS WITH ISRAELIS

INTO THE SOUTH. RABIN SAID THAT UNDERSTANDINGS ON
THESE THREE POINTS CAN BE PROVIDED TO THE U.S.
HE NOTED THAT FOR OVER TEN YEARS ASSAD HAS KEPT
SIMILAR COMMITMENTS MADE TO KISSINGER ON THE
GOLAN. THE SYRIANS MAY DENY THEM PUBLICLY, BUT
WILL KEEP SUCH UNDERSTANDINGS.

13. AS THE MEETING DREW TO A CLOSE, MURPHY
PASSED ALONG A REQUEST OF PRIME MINISTER KARAMI
TO ALLOW LEBANESE OFFICIALS TO VISIT THE VILLAGE
OF SAHNOUN, WHERE A MASSACRE HAD RECENTLY TAKEN
PLACE. RABIN RESPONDED THAT THEY SEE NO PURPOSE
FOR SUCH A VISIT. IF THE LEBANESE REALLY WANT TO
DO SOMETHING LIKE THIS THEY SHOULD TALK DIRECTLY
WITH THE ISRAELIS.

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14. AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING THEN PROCEEDED TO JERUSALEM FOR A MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PERES. PERES WAS JOINED BY RABIN, ARENS, KIMCHE AND MEMBERS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STAFF. THE MEETING WAS RECORDED BY THE ISRAELIS ON TAPE.

15. MURPHY STATED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE BASICALLY GLAD TO RESUME DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. ON LEBANON. AT THE END OF HIS MEETING WITH ASSAD, HE HAD SAID HE MIGHT BE COMING BACK, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE REACTION WOULD BE IN ISRAEL TO HIS IDEAS. IN HIS DESCRIPTION OF HIS MEETING WITH ASSAD, MURPHY STRESSED THAT ASSAD DID NOT REACT TO SPECIFIC POINTS IN THE PRESENTATION OF THE EIGHT IDEAS. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT ASSAD DID NOT WANT TO MAKE A RESPONSE EITHER FOR OR AGAINST. THERE WERE SOME SPARKS WHEN MURPHY DREW HIM OUT ON THE QUESTION OF UNIFIL BUT ASSAD ESSENTIALLY REPLIED THAT SYRIA WILL SUPPORT WHAT LEBANON WANTS. CLEARLY IT IS UP TO THE GOL TO CARRY THE BALL IN DISCUSSING ANY CHANGE IN THE MANDATE. IN MORE DETAIL THAN HE HAD USED IN THE MEETING AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MURPHY BRIEFED THE ISRAELIS ON THE MANNER IN WHICH HE HAD PRESENTED HIS EIGHT IDEAS, READING FROM OUR REPORTING CABLES. REGARDING ELEMENTS FOR SECURITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, MURPHY NOTED THAT IN HIS BRIEF QUESTIONING OF GENERAL 'AWN HE DID NOT SENSE THAT THE LAF HAD A TIMETABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT THERE. HE SAID HE HAD ALSO STRESSED TO THE SYRIANS HIS IDEA ABOUT NEEDING A MECHANISM FOR COMMUNICATION, THAT IS, SOME KIND OF DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE GOL AND GOI. PRESIDENT ASSAD'S ONLY REAL REACTION WAS ON

THE UNIFIL QUESTION. KHADAM AND SHAR'A BY CONTRAST BOTH PICKED UP STRONGLY ON THE QUESTION OF LOCAL

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FORCES, WHICH THEY INTERPRETED TO MEAN LAHAD'S
ARMY. THUS, THE TWO PROBLEM AREAS APPEAR AS OF
NOW TO BE THE ROLE FOR THE ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON
AND THE ISSUE OF UNIFIL'S EXTENSION AND FUTURE
ROLE. ASSAD AGREED THAT THE UNIFIL MANDATE CAN
BE CHANGED AS THE LEBANESE DESIRE.

16. PERES FOCUSED IMMEDIATELY ON THE UNIFIL
QUESTION, ASKING WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
FOR UNIFIL TO BE DEPLOYED UP TO THE SYRIAN BORDER.
MURPHY RESPONDED THAT ASSAD SEEMED TO BE UNPREPARED
ON THIS ISSUE BUT HIS IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS THAT
UNIFIL COULD NOT BE ON HIS BORDER. WHEN THE
SUBJECT OF A POSSIBLE UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT IN SIDON
WAS RAISED, ASSAD PAUSED. HE SAID THAT THAT SHOULD
NOT BE NECESSARY, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE
ISRAELIS WILL HAVE WITHDRAWN AND THERE ARE NO
MAJOR PHALANGE UNITS IN THE AREA. ASSAD DID NOT
HAVE A CRISP SET OF IDEAS ON UNIFIL, BUT HE WAS
CLEARLY NEURALGIC ON HAVING UNIFIL ON HIS BORDER.
ASSAD ALSO SAID THAT THE NUMBERS OF UNIFIL
PERSONNEL MUST BE ENLARGED TO COVER THE WHOLE
BORDER BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA. PERES ASKED ABOUT
A PROMISE THAT SYRIAN FORCES WOULD NOT MOVE FORWARD
AS THE IDF WITHDREW. MURPHY SAID THAT THERE HAD
BEEN NO REACTION FROM THE SYRIANS ON THIS SPECIFIC
POINT, BUT THERE WAS OF COURSE A CERTAIN PRECEDENT
IN THE 1176 "RED LINE" UNDERSTANDING.

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NODIS

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SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON TALKS WITH ISRAELIS

17. IN GENERAL, SAID MURPHY, ASSAD'S REACTION WAS TACIT. IT WAS INTERESTING THAT NONE OF THE THREE SYRIAN OFFICIALS REACTED NEGATIVELY TO THE CONCEPT OF DIRECT GOI-GOL DISCUSSIONS. THIS PERCEPTION IS NOT SHARED IN BEIRUT, WHERE THE LEBANESE SAY THAT THE SYRIANS OPPOSE SUCH DIRECT DISCUSSIONS.

18. RABIN OBSERVED THAT WE HAD MADE A GOOD BEGINNING. WITHOUT HAVING UNDUE EXPECTATIONS, THE FACT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REJECTION IS UNUSUAL FOR THE SYRIANS. RABIN ASKED THAT WE PURSUE OUR EFFORTS AND STICK TO THE POSITIONS ALREADY BROACHED. RABIN SUMMARIZED THESE POSITIONS AS FOLLOWS:

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-- (1) SECURITY FOR THE NORTHERN ISRAELI
BORDER IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE IDF TO WITHDRAW
BEYOND THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY,

-- (2) THAT SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE UNLINKED
TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL,

-- (3) THAT SYRIAN FORCES WOULD NOT MOVE FORWARD,

-- (4) THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD PREVENT INFILTRATION,

-- (5) THAT THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE PHASED
TO TEST IMPLEMENTATION,

-- (6) SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE NEGOTIATED
DIRECTLY WITH LEBANON BUT WOULD NEED TO BE A
GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT, SIGNED BUT
NOT NECESSARILY AT A POLITICAL LEVEL. THE AGREEMENT
COULD NOT BE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS DEAD,

-- (7) UNIFIL SHOULD FILL THE AREA VACATED BY THE
IDF; THIS WOULD PLACE UNIFIL IN WHAT THE MAY 17
ACCORD DESCRIBED AS ZONE (A) FROM THE SEA TO THE
SYRIAN BORDER. IN ZONE (B), WHERE THERE WOULD
HAVE TO BE SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, THE
UNIFIL PRESENCE WOULD BE "SYMBOLIC". IN THIS ZONE
THE ONLY "LOCAL FORCE" TO REPLACE THE IDF WOULD BE
THE ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON,

-- (8) RABIN ADDED THAT, OF COURSE, ISRAEL WOULD
RESERVE ITS RIGHT TO EXERCISE SELF DEFENSE IN
SOUTH LEBANON UNDER U.N. ARTICLE 52.

19. RABIN ALSO HAD SUGGESTIONS ON OUR TALKS WITH
THE LEBANESE, AS WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BRIEF THEM
ON MURPHY'S IMPRESSIONS FROM HIS VISIT TO DAMASCUS.



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(COMMENT: WE WILL ALSO HAVE TO BRIEF THE LEBANESE ON MURPHY'S IMPRESSIONS FROM OUR VISIT TO ISRAEL. END COMMENT.) RABIN SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD EXPECT THE FOLLOWING FROM THE LEBANESE:

-- FIRST, THEY NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO CHANGE THE UNIFIL MANDATE SO THAT UNIFIL WOULD FILL ALL AREAS VACATED BY ISRAEL.

-- SECOND, AGREEMENT ABOUT SECURITY MATTERS NEEDS TO BE NEGOTIATED DIRECTLY BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL AND SIGNED AS A FORMAL DOCUMENT. (COMMENT: THE LEBANESE WILL BE EVEN MORE RELUCTANT TO START STODIRECT TALKS IF THEY ARE TOLD PROCESS MUST END WITH ANOTHER FORMAL DOCUMENT, EVEN IF LIMITED TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. END COMMENT.)

20. ARENS, WHO HAD SAID VERY LITTLE TO THIS POINT, THEN DESCRIBED WHAT HE SAW AS THE FOUR BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE ISRAELI POSITION.

-- FIRST, NO FORWARD MOVEMENT BY SYRIAN FORCES,

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-- SECOND, SYRIA TO PREVENT INFILTRATION,



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-- THIRD, UNIFIL WOULD FILL THE AREA EVACUATED
BY THE IDF IN THE NORTHERN PART OF SOUTHERN
LEBANON,

-- FOURTH, THE ASL WOULD BE THE MILITARY FORCE
IN CONTROL SOUTH OF THE ZAHRANI.

ARENS NOTED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD NEITHER ACCEPTED
NOR REJECTED THE FIRST TWO POINTS, AND THAT
THEY HAD REJECTED THE THIRD AND FOURTH POINTS.
MURPHY CLARIFIED THAT IT WAS KHADDAM AND SHAR'A
WHO HAD REJECTED THE FOURTH POINT REGARDING THE
ASL, A POINT THAT HAD NOT BEEN ADDRESSED BY ASSAD.
ARENS STRESSED THAT THE FOUR ELEMENTS WERE A
PACKAGE; PULL ONE OUT AND NOTHING WOULD BE LEFT.



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21. PERES SAID THAT MURPHY HAD MADE A GOOD START. WE SHOULD KEEP A LOW PROFILE AND AVOID RAISING EXPECTATIONS. HE SAID THAT WE SHOULD BE CONDUCTING TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS. WITH THE SYRIANS THEY COULD BE SECRET, AIMING FOR AN "AGREEMENT WITHOUT NEGOTIATIONS" BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. THE ISRAELIS SAID, JOKINGLY, ONE CAN NEGOTIATE WITH THE LEBANESE WITHOUT REACHING A MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT. THE LEBANESE ARE UNABLE TO FOLLOW THROUGH. WITH THE LEBANESE THE IMPORTANT DECISION WOULD BE TO START TALKING. ISRAEL EXPECTS NO DEFINITE CONCLUSION TO ITS TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE. EVEN IF THE LEBANESE WERE TO DECIDE UPON SOMETHING, THEY LACK THE FORCES TO CARRY IT OUT. PERES OBSERVED THAT "NOT ALL OF US" THINK THAT LAHAD'S FORCES ARE THE "GREATEST ARMY IN THE WORLD." IT IS A POOR ALTERNATIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, ITS STRENGTH IS THE LACK OF ANY OTHER ALTERNATIVE. YET, IN THE VIEW OF PERES, TO WAIT FOR THE LAF TO BE BUILT UP WOULD BE AN ENDLESS PROCESS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SYRIANS SAY THAT THESE MATTERS ARE FOR THE LEBANESE TO DECIDE, YET ISRAEL KNOWS THAT THE LEBANESE DON'T DECIDE SUCH MATTERS BY THEMSELVES.

22. PERES THEN SUMMARIZED WHAT IT WAS ISRAEL WANTS FROM THE SYRIANS. FIRST, THAT THEY NOT MOVE AHEAD WHEN THE IDF WITHDRAWS. SECOND, NO INFILTRATION FROM BEHIND SYRIAN LINES. THIRD, UNIFIL SHOULD BE A FORCE FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN TO THE SYRIAN BORDER. PERES SUGGESTED THAT WE SIMPLY TRY TO AGREE WITH THE SYRIANS ON WHAT CONCERNS THEM,

SUGGESTING WE DON'T HAVE TO SEEK THEIR ADVICE REGARDING THE ROLE FOR LAHAD'S FORCES. THE SYRIANS KNOW THAT THE IDF IS SIMPLY NOT GOING TO LEAVE A VOID. PERES ECHOED THE EARLIER COMMENTS

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OF RABIN ABOUT SYRIAN RESPECT FOR THEIR
COMMITMENTS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO REACH AGREEMENTS
WITH THE SYRIANS, BUT BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA RESPECT
THEIR AGREEMENTS WHEN REACHED. PERES SAID THAT
HE WAS GLAD THAT MURPHY HAD COME. PERES STRESSED
THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO GO BACK INTO LEBANON.
THEIR REASON FOR COMING IN WAS THE SECURITY OF
ISRAEL. IN THEIR PROCESS OF LEAVING LEBANON THEY
HOPE TO FIND A WAY OF PROTECTING ISRAEL'S SECURITY
WITHOUT THE IDF BEING IN LEBANON. THE GUARANTEES
FOR ISRAEL WOULD BE THE PRESENCE OF LAHAD'S ASL,
AND THE FACT THAT ISRAEL RESERVES THE RIGHT TO
TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES IF INFILTRATORS RETURN
INTO THE AREA.

23. A DISCUSSION ENSUED ON THE UNIFIL MANDATE.
WITH MURPHY ASKING HOW SPECIFIC WE NEED TO BE
IN WHATEVER EXTENSION IS VOTED ON OCTOBER 19.
INITIAL ISRAELI REACTION WAS THAT THE ENTIRE AREA
VACATED BY THE IDF MUST COME UNDER UNIFIL.
SPECIFICALLY, THE ISRAELIS USED THE TERM, "FILL
THE AREA". AS THE DISCUSSION PROGRESSED THERE
WAS LESS CERTAINTY ON THIS POINT. MURPHY NOTED
THAT IT MIGHT SUFFICE SIMPLY TO SAY THAT UNIFIL
WOULD REPLACE ISRAELI FORCES AS THEY WITHDRAW.
LEWIS CONCLUDED THAT THE ISRAELI CONCEPT IS CLEAR.

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NODIS

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TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE

SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON TALKS WITH ISRAELIS

WE WILL PROBABLY NEED TO GO BACK AND FORTH
AMONG OURSELVES AND THE U.N. ABOUT THE WORDING.
UROUHART HAD BEEN RATHER UPBEAT ABOUT THE SYRIAN
ATTITUDE, BUT HE HAD NOT HEARD WHAT ASSAD HAD SAID
TO MURPHY ABOUT UNIFIL. KIMCHE NOTED THAT THE UNIFIL
DEPLOYMENT SHOULD NOT REQUIRE A FULL DEBATE OR A
CHANGE OF MANDATE. ARENS STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY
OF SOME KIND OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ASL AND
UNIFIL, BEGINNING WITH ITS PRESENT AREA OF OPERATION.

24. RABIN PROVIDED THE ISRAELI FOCUS ON WHAT WAS
REQUIRED FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE IN BEIRUT. FIRST,
A LEBANESE AGREEMENT ON A CHANGE OF MANDATE FOR
UNIFIL SO THAT IT COULD FILL THE AREA VACATED BY
THE IDF. SECONDLY, AN AGREEMENT BY THE LEBANESE
TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL ON WHATEVER



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IS NEEDED FOR ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURITY IN THE AREA VACATED BY THE IDF. MURPHY ASKED WHETHER WE SHOULD ADDRESS WITH THE LEBANESE THE QUESTION OF LAF DEPLOYMENTS. RABIN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED LATER IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

25. LEWIS NOTED THAT THE UNIFIL MANDATE NEED NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF EITHER THE ASL OR THE LAF. IT WOULD BE URQUHART'S PREFERENCE TO LEAVE THE MANDATE WORDING VERY GENERAL, ALLOWING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS AS TO HOW THESE TWO ENTITIES RELATED TO UNIFIL. MURPHY REMINDED THE ISRAELIS THAT THE ONLY TIME HE REALLY DREW "SPARKS" WITH ASSAD WAS ON THE ISSUE OF UNIFIL'S DEPLOYMENT ON HIS BORDER. HE WAS VERY NEURALGIC ON THAT POINT. READING FROM NOTES FROM THE MEETING WITH ASSAD, IT WAS CLARIFIED THAT HE HAD OBJECTED SPECIFICALLY TO ANY MOVE OF UNIFIL CLOSER TO HIS BORDER. LEWIS NOTED THAT UNDER THE ISRAELI CONCEPT UNIFIL WOULD BE DEPLOYED CLOSER TO THE SYRIAN BORDER IN THE SOUTHERN BEKAA VALLEY. RABIN RESPONDED THAT THE CONSEQUENCE OF A LACK OF SYRIAN AGREEMENT ON THIS WOULD BE FOR ISRAEL TO STAY IN THE BEKAA. RABIN URGED THAT WE NOT BE DISCOURAGED, SINCE IT MIGHT TAKE FIVE OR TEN MEETINGS TO OBTAIN SYRIAN AGREEMENT.

26. KIMCHE SAID THAT THE GOAL NEEDS TO BE FOR THE ASL TO BECOME THE "TERRITORIAL BRIGADE" OF THE LAF WHICH WAS ENVISAGED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. MURPHY OBSERVED THE ASL TODAY TOTALLED ONLY 2,100 MEN. ONE HAS TO ASK HOW THEY COULD PLAY A GREATER

ROLE THAN NOW, AFTER THE IDF HAS WITHDRAWN RABIN SAID THAT ISRAEL BELIEVED THEY WOULD BE



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CAPABLE SOUTH OF THE ZAHRANI OF PREVENTING
INFILTRATION AND STOPPING ACTIONS OF HOSTILE ELEMENTS.
PERES SAID THAT THEY WOULD FILL A VACUUM SINCE
THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH LEBANON DO NOT WANT TO SEE THE
PLO RETURN. LEWIS SAID THAT AS WE UNDERSTOOD
THE ISRAELI POSITION, THEY DO NOT ENVISAGE THE
PRESENCE OF THE ASL NORTH OF THE ZAHRANI. IN
ZONE (A) THE ARMED LEBANESE ELEMENT WOULD BE THE
ARMY. RABIN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE O.K. WITH ISRAEL
IF THE GOL SENT A LAF BRIGADE TO ZONE (A), IF IN
FACT IT HAD ONE TO SEND. ARENS OPINED THAT THE
GOL WOULD PROBABLY BE HAPPIER TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS
IN THAT AREA THROUGH UNIFIL.

27. RABIN STRESSED THE NEED TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE
RESULTS NOW. IN THIS SENSE, THE UNIFIL MANDATE
EXPLANSION AND CREATION OF MACHINERY FOR DIRECT
GOL-GOI TALKS TOOK PRECEDENCE. OBVIOUSLY THERE
WOULD HAVE TO BE SYRIAN APPROVAL FOR THE GOL TO
COOPERATE IN EITHER OF THESE TWO AREAS. TO ENGAGE
THE U.S. IN GOING BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL WOULD
GIVE THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT A MOTIVATION TO
COOPERATE. LEWIS CAUTIONED THAT WE ARE NOT ALL
THAT EAGER TO GET INVOLVED. HE ASKED WHAT THE
ISRAELI ATTITUDE WOULD BE IF THE GOL WANTS US
TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THEIR TALKS WITH ISRAEL;
THAT IS, TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT IN THE MEETINGS.
RABIN AND PERES BOTH SAID THERE WOULD BE NO

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-----221372 261502Z /42

O 261420Z SEP 84 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2751

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 08 OF 08 AMMAN 08965

NODIS

S/S FOR HILL ONLY FROM MURPHY

PLEASE REPEAT TO BEIRUT, TEL AVIV AND DAMASCUS FOR
AMBASSADORS AND CHARGE ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE

SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON TALKS WITH ISRAELIS

PROBLEM. LEWIS SAID THAT WE DO NOT WANT TO BE
INVOLVED, BUT AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE SAID THAT
WE WOULD BE HELPFUL IF BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON
WANT US TO BE.

BOEKER

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-----227132 261730Z /44-46

O 261711Z SEP 84 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2752

S E C R E T AMMAN 08967

NODIS

FROM MURPHY FOR S/S - HILL ONLY

PASS TO BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE
SUBJECT: BRIEFING GEMAYEL AND KARAMI

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE PLAN TO ARRIVE BEIRUT SEPTEMBER 27 FOR MEETINGS ON 28TH. WE NEED TO BRIEF GEMAYEL AND KARAMI ON OUR TALKS ABOUT SOUTH LEBANON WITH BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE SYRIANS. WE ENVISAGE AT THIS STAGE A GENERAL BRIEFING FOR GEMAYEL AND KARM TOGETHER. WE BELIEVE IT VITAL THAT GEMAYEL BE SEEN PUBLICLY TO BE WORKING CLOSELY WITH KARAMI, BOTH FOR INTERNAL REASONS OF DELIVERING THE GNU, AND OUT OF KNOWLEDGE THAT SYRIANS WILL IN ANY CASE BE DISCUSSING MATTER WITH KARAMI. WE WILL NEED KARAMI'S HELP DOWN THE ROAD, AND I DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE DEALING BEHIND HIS BACK, (AT LEAST UNTIL IT BECOMES NECESSARY). REGGIE AND I WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE DESIRABILITY OF HIS CLARIFYING SOME KEY POINTS WITH GEMAYEL AFTER

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BY CW NARA DATE 10/12/12



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I AM OUT OF TOWN, WHEN IT CAN BE WRAPPED INTO HIS DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER MATTERS. UNLESS REGGIE BELIEVES OTHERWISE, I FRANKLY DOUBT THAT I COULD MEET WITH GEMAYEL ALONE AT THIS TIME OF HEIGHTENED MEDIA INTEREST IN BEIRUT.

3. I PLAN TO BRIEF ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

-- PRIOR TO THE BOMBING OF OUR EMBASSY ANNEX THE SECRETARY HAD AUTHORIZED ME TO CONDUCT AN EXPLORATORY TRIP TO SOUND OUT THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON, SYRIA AND ISRAEL ON POSSIBLE IDEAS FOR FACILITATING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM SOUTH LEBANON. IN BEIRUT, MY CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER CONFIRMED MY IMPRESSION THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ISRAELI FORCES WAS IMPEDING YOUR OWN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, IMPROVE SECURITY IN BEIRUT AND EXPAND THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS OUTSIDE THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF BEIRUT. OUR CONVERSATION ALSO CONFIRMED THAT YOU WOULD WELCOME A MORE ACTIVE U.S. ROLE IN THIS REGARD.

-- IN DAMASCUS, IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH SHAR'A/KHADDAM ON SEPT 23 AND ASSAD ON SEPT 24, I DISCUSSED SOME IDEAS ON WHAT MIGHT WORK IN TERMS OF WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THESE WERE AMERICAN IDEAS THEY REFLECTED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WHAT ISRAEL COULD ACCEPT. PRESIDENT ASSAD SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT REACT TO THE DETAILS OF THESE IDEAS BUT HE AGREED THAT I COULD TRY THEM OUT WITH THE ISRAELIS. ASSAD SAID THAT HE SUPPORTS THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS TO PLACE UNIFIL AND

THE LAF IN SOUTH LEBANON, AND THAT HE DID NOT FIND THIS IN CONTRADICTION TO OUR IDEAS, BUT HE DISAGREED



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WITH SOME OF THE OTHER POINTS.

-- IN ISRAEL, ON SEPT 25, I HAD MEETINGS AT THE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN TEL AVIV WITH RABIN,
ARENS, GENERAL LEVY, DAVID KIMCHE AND OTHER
SENIOR AIDES. IN TEL AVIV, PERES WAS JOINED BY
BOTH RABIN AND ARENS, AS WELL AS SENIOR AIDES.
I AM CONFIDENT, THEREFORE, THAT THE ISRAELI
RESPONSES TO MY IDEAS REPRESENT A CONSENSUS OF
BOTH SIDES OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE
ISRAELIS AGREED IN GENERAL BUT EXPRESSED SOME
DIFFERENCES WITH THE AMERICAN IDEAS AND ADDED
SOME POINTS OF THEIR OWN. THE ISRAELIS STRESSED
THEIR DESIRE TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE, SUBJECT ONLY TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
THEY DEEMED ADEQUATE. THEY ASKED THAT WE MEET,
AGAIN WITH YOU AND WITH THE SYRIANS.

-- WITH THE ISRAELI FORMULATIONS IN HAND I RETURNED
TO DAMASCUS ON SEPT 27. I WILL LEAVE IT TO THE
SYRIANS TO CHARACTERIZE TO YOU THEIR REACTIONS IN DETAIL.
(TALKING POINTS BASED ON UPCOMING CONVERSATIONS IN
SYRIA SEPTEMBER 27 TO BE ADDED.)

-- THE ISRAELIS ASKED US TO MAKE TWO SPECIFIC
PROPOSALS TO YOU. FIRST, THEY WOULD LIKE THE
GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO TAKE THE LEAD WITH THE
U.N. SECRETARIAT IN SEEKING A RENEWAL AND
EXPANSION OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE. THE ISRAELIS
WOULD LIKE UNIFIL TO HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REPLACE
THE IDF IN THE AREA WHICH IT VACATES. THE ISRAELIS
RE NOT EAGER TO SEE UNIFIL REMAIN IN THE AREA
SOUTH OF THE ZAHRANI, WHERE THEY SAY IT SHOULD HAVE
ONLY A SYMBOLIC PRESENCE. NEVERTHELESS, YOU WILL

RECOGNIZE THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS NEW
ISRAELI SUPPORT FOR AN EXPANDED UNIFIL ROLE.



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WE ARE UNCERTAIN OF WHAT CHANGES IN THE UNIFIL
MANDATE MAY BE REQUIRED, BUT IN VIEW OF THE
VERY SHORT PERIOD BEFORE THE MANDATE EXPIRES
ON OCT 19 WE URGE THAT YOU MAKE A PROMPT APPROACH
TO THE U.N. SECRETARIAT TO BEGIN SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS
ON THIS MATTER.

-- THE ISRAELIS ALSO ASKED US TO STRESS TO YOU
THE NEED FOR DIRECT TALKS ON A MILITARY-TO-MILITARY
BASIS ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
SUCH DISCUSSIONS WILL, OF COURSE, NOT BE EASY.
FOR ONE THING, THE ISRAELIS REJECT AT THIS POINT
THE NOTION THAT THE LAF CAN BE DEPLOYED IN THE
AREA SOUTH OF THE ZAHRANI. THEY FRANKLY QUESTION
THE AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE LEBANESE
ARMY FOR THE TASK OF MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THIS
AREA OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO ISRAEL. THEY PREFER
TO BASE SECURITY ON THE FORCES OF GENERAL LAHAD.
THEY KNOW -- WE TOLD THEM -- THAT THIS IS
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE GOL. IN THAT CONNECTION, I
WOULD ONLY RECALL THE DEGREE TO WHICH ISRAELI
POSITIONS EVOLVED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE
MAY 17 AGREEMENT. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT IF YOU
ASSIGN YOUR MOST ABLE MILITARY MEN TO THIS TASK
IT WILL HELP GIVE THE ISRAELIS MORE CONFIDENCE
IN THE LAF. ONE OF THE BASIC REASONS WHY THE
ISRAELIS PREFER LAHAD'S FORCES TO THE LAF IS
THAT THEY HAVE BEEN DEALING DIRECTLY WITH
GENERAL LAHAD.

-- I KNOW YOU HAVE TOLD US YOU CANNOT ENTER INTO

DIRECT TALKS. IT MAY RELIEVE YOU TO KNOW THAT AT
NO TIME DURING MY TALKS IN DAMASCUS DID SYRIAN
LEADERS TELL ME THEY OPPOSED DIRECT LEBANESE/ISRAELI
TALKS AT THE MILITARY LEVEL. I CONSIDER THAT
VERY SIGNIFICANT. NATURALLY, THE ISRAELIS WOULD



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PREFER TALKS AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL
LEVEL, BUT THEY ARE NOT ASKING FOR THAT AT THIS
TIME. QUITE FRANKLY, I BELIEVE YOU WOULD BE
WELL ADVISED TO ASSIGN APPROPRIATE CIVILIAN EXPERTS
AS ADVISORS TO ANY MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS, BUT
THAT IS OBVIOUSLY YOUR DECISION TO MAKE.
THE POINT IS TO BEGIN TALKS ON AN URGENT BASIS
SO THAT YOU CAN HAVE A MAXIMUM IMPACT ON ANY
ISRAELI PLANS FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL.

-- AS YOU WILL RECALL WE HAVE SAID WE ARE READY
TO HELP LEBANON IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAEL AT
SUCH TIME AS YOU HAVE ESTABLISHED A FRAMEWORK
FOR TALKS AND HAVE CONCRETE PROPOSALS TO MAKE.
THAT REMAINS OUR POSITION. I MUST CAUTION THAT
WASHINGTON HAS NOT AUTHORIZED US TO PLAY THE ROLE
OF A MEDIATOR. I WILL BE REPORTING BACK TO THE
SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

-- (ONLY IF ASKED) U.S. REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE
PREPARED TO ATTEND TALKS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND
ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS. THIS WOULD NOT BE THE
ISRAELI PREFERENCE, BUT THEY HAVE AGREED THAT
THIS COULD BE DONE IF THE GOL WERE TO REQUEST
IT. I CANNOT AT THIS TIME DESCRIBE THE PRECISE
ROLE A U.S. PARTICIPANT MIGHT PLAY. THAT COULD
ONLY BE DETERMINED BY WASHINGTON, BASED ON THE
FRAMEWORK AND ANTICIPATED SUBSTANCE OF THE TALKS.

-- THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED ME AT OUR LAST MEETING
TO INQUIRE AS TO WHETHER GOL OFFICIALS COULD GO

TO THE VILLAGE OF SAHMOUR, WHERE THAT TERRIBLE
MASSACRE TOOK PLACE. I RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH
THE ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENSE. HE SAID THAT
THEY WOULD INSIST THAT YOU MAKE SUCH A REQUEST
DIRECTLY TO THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES. BOEKER



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