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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 5/11/2011

File Folder BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING AND AMBASSADOR
MURPHY MISSION (9/29/1984-10/03/1984)

FOIA

M10-361

Box Number 34

BIRD

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
109467	CABLE	TEL AVIV 13751 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	2	9/29/1984	B1
109468	CABLE	DAMASCUS 06375 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	2	9/29/1984	B1
109470	CABLE	BEIRUT 8388 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	3	9/29/1984	B1
109471	CABLE	STATE 291028 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	3	9/30/1984	B1
109472	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE LEBANON R 10/12/2012 M361/2	1	ND	B1
109474	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE THE MURPHY MISSION AND NEXT STEPS R 10/12/2012 M361/2	3	9/29/1984	B1
109476	CABLE	SECTO 11035 R 3/21/2012 M361/1	3	9/30/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
109479	CABLE	TEL AVIV 13887 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	2	10/2/1984	B1
109480	CABLE	RIYADH 05526 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	4	10/2/1984	B1
109482	CABLE	NEW YORK 92457 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	5	10/2/1984	B1
168437	CABLE	SAME AS 109482 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	5	10/2/1984	B1
109484	CABLE	TEL AVIV 13915 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	2	10/3/1984	B1
109486	CABLE	SAME AS 109484 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	2	10/3/1984	B1
109488	CABLE	STATE 294314 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	12	10/3/1984	B1

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 OF 03 TEL AV 13751 290931Z
ACTION NODS-00

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4276

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 13751

NODIS

S/S FOR HILL ONLY FROM LEWIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

CLASS: PREL, PBOR, MILI, IS, LE, US, SY

REJ: LEBANON: PERES-GEMAYEL CONTACTS

(~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

PERES TOLD ME DURING OUR PRIVATE LUNCH ON SEPTEMBER
IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GEMAYEL INDICATING A DESIRE
FOR SOME DIRECT CONTACT. PERES DOUBTS VERY MUCH THAT
THIS MEANS A READINESS FOR ANY FACE-TO-FACE MEETING,
BUT ASSUMES RATHER THAT IT MEANS GEMAYEL WANTS TO
ESTABLISH A DIRECT LINK WITH PERES THROUGH A TRUSTED
INTERMEDIARY. HE IS REPLYING THAT INDEED HE ALSO
WOULD LIKE SUCH A DIRECT CONTACT, THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT
ABANDON THE CHRISTIANS AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE
ASSISTANCE TO THEM (PRESUMABLY WEAPONS). PERES ALSO
INTENDS TO USE THIS CHANNEL WHEN IT IS ESTABLISHED TO
TRY TO REASSURE GEMAYEL ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS IN
SOUTH LEBANON. HE WILL STRESS THE GOI'S DETERMINATION
TO WITHDRAW AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE IN A WAY WHICH WILL
NOT LEAVE CHAOS BEHIND. HE WILL MAKE CLEAR, HOWEVER,
THAT SOME FORCE MUST BE THERE IN PLACE OF THE IDF

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M10-361/z #109467
BY CN NARA DATE 10/12/12

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Department of State

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WHICH GIVES ISRAEL SOME MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE BORDER AREA. AT PRESENT, THE SLA IS THE ONLY REAL, AVAILABLE SURROGATE FOR THE IDF IN THIS ROLE AND PERES WILL URGE GEMAYEL TO FIND A WAY TO ACCEPT IT AS SUCH, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.

3. I PASSED THIS INFORMATION DIRECTLY TO DICK MURPHY AND REG BARTHOLOMEW THROUGH A SEPARATE CHANNEL SO THEY WOULD BE AWARE OF IT BEFORE MURPHY'S MOST RECENT MEETINGS IN BEIRUT. BECAUSE OF THE ENORMOUS SENSITIVITY IN BEIRUT ABOUT THIS SUBJECT, PERES' REMARKS TO ME MUST BE GIVEN THE STRICTEST CONTROL. LEWIS

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 OF 03 DAMASC 06375 290936Z
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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8860

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 06375

NODIS

FOR S/S HILL ONLY

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, SY, IS, LE

SUBJECT: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH LEBANON

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M10-361/2 #109468

BY W NARA DATE 10/12/12

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH CHARGE SEPTEMBER 29, UK CHARGE SUMMARIZED INFORMATION REPORTED BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV CONCERNING THE ISRAELI APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE VIS-A-VIS SOUTH LEBANON. CHARGE WAS STRUCK WITH THE APPARENT COMPLETENESS OF THE BRITISH REPORT OF THE OUTLINE AND SOME OF THE DETAILS OF THE ISRAELI POSITION AS CONVEYED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY--E.G., DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN LAHAD'S FORCES, NO SYRIAN FORWARD MOVEMENT, GRADUATED WITHDRAWAL TO "TEST" SYRIAN INTENTIONS, NECESSITY FOR SYRIAN "UNDERTAKINGS." CHARGE DID NOT, OF COURSE, DISCUSS OUR "IDEAS" OR CONFIRM FOR UK CHARGE THE ISRAELI PRESENTATION TO AMBASSADOR MURPHY.
3. ON A RELATED SUBJECT, FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE'S REPORTING CABLE OC HIS MEETING WITH UROUHART (APPARENTLY ON SEPTEMBER 27) SPECIFIED THAT UROUHART BELIEVES THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AMERICAN DECISION TO UNDER-

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Department of State

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TAKE ACTIVE MEDIATION, THE SYG (I.E. UROUHART) WILL DO
SO. UK CHARGE ALSO NOTED FCO CONCLUSION THAT IF THERE
IS NO USG OR UN INITIATIVE, THE FRENCH WILL SEEK AN
ACTIVE MEDIATING ROLE. GLASPIE

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PAGE 02 OF 04 BEIRUT 08388 291256Z
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CO1/04 008709 NOD699

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0181.

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BY CN NARA DATE 10/2/12

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SS FOR HILL: DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ASSISTANT
SECRETARY MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE

SUBJECT: GEMAYEL ON SHULTZ-KARAMI MEETING AND ON
MEETING WITH MURPHY

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH DICK MURPHY, I TOLD GEMAYEL EARLY SEPTEMBER 29 THAT KARAMI WOULD BE SEEING THE SECRETARY IN NEW YORK, AND THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT KARAMI NOT GO INTO THAT MEETING WITH A CLOSED MIND AND PRESENT RIGID POSITIONS. I SAID THAT, AS MURPHY HAS MADE CLEAR, WE WERE STILL VERY MUCH IN THE STAGE OF ASSESSING WHETHER THIS EFFORT COULD GO ANYWHERE AND HOW MUCH WE COULD OR SHOULD DO, AND KARAMI'S APPROACH SHOULD TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

3. GEMAYEL HAD HEARD THAT THE MEETING WAS FIXED FOR TUESDAY. HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT I WAS SAYING, AND BELIEVED THAT KARAMI WOULD NOT PUSH RIGID POSITIONS IN PART BECAUSE IT WAS NOT HIS STYLE. THAT SAID,

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001/04 008709

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GEMAYEL ASKED ME TO ADVISE SECRETARY SHULTZ TO KEEP THE CONVERSATION GENERAL AND AVOID PUTTING KARAMI INTO A POSITION WHERE HE HAD TO GIVE CLEAR RESPONSES ON THE ISSUES. HE SAID THIS WOULD GIVE HIM TIME TO KEEP ON TRYING TO "SMOOTH OUT THE ROUGH EDGES" AND WORK OUT PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS. HE THOUGHT PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS COULD BE FOUND. BUT KARAMI WAS NOT THE ONE TO MAKE COMPROMISE OR TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE IN GETTING TO THEM. HE, GEMAYEL, WOULD HAVE TO DO THAT.

4. I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT WE WERE OBVIOUSLY THINKING THE SAME THOUGHTS AND THAT I WOULD PASS ON WHAT HE SAID TO SECRETARY SHULTZ AND DICK MURPHY. I THEN ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT OF YESTERDAY'S MEETING "IN TWO WORDS." GEMAYEL RESPONDED THAT IT WAS A "POSITIVE STARTING POINT." "BUT WE KNOW HOW FAR THE ISRAELIES WILL HAVE TO GO AND THE QUESTION WILL BE HOW MUCH THE US IS WILLING TO DO TO GET THEM THERE." GEMAYEL THEN PICKED UP ON HIS FEARS THAT THE ISRAELIS EITHER WILL NOT WITHDRAW OR WILL WITHDRAW ABRUPTLY WITHOUT COORDINATION WITH THE GOL. GEMAYEL NOTED THAT AS FOR SYRIA, ASSAD SEEMED POSITIVE AND READY TO HELP.

5. I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT HE HAD LEFT OUT THE ESSENTIAL ROLE LEBANON HAD TO PLAY IN REACHING PRACTICAL COMPROMISES. INDEED, I SAID THAT HOW SUCCESSFUL HE WAS IN DEVELOPING PRACTICAL LEBANESE POSITIONS ON SUCH MATTERS AS DEALING DIRECTLY WITH THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE CRITICAL IN DETERMINING HOW MUCH WE OR ANYONE ELSE COULD DO IN THE ENTERPRISE. I SAID THAT IN ANY EVENT, AS MURPHY HAD MADE CLEAR, WE WERE STILL DOING NO MORE THAN ASSESSING WHAT THE

POSSIBILITIES MIGHT BE AND WHETHER THERE WSS IN FACT A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE FOR US TO PLAY. WE WOULD



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NOT BE ENCOURAGED IF OTHERS APPROACHED THE ENTERPRISE AS ONE OF THE AMERICANS DELIVERING THE ISRAELIS. I WANTED TO ADVISE HIM AGAIN ON A PERSONAL BASIS, AS I HAD MANY TIMES BEFORE, THAT THE LESS THINKING AND TALK OF THAT SORT, THE BETTER FOR ALL CONCERNED, STARTING WITH LEBANON.

6. GEMAYEL SAID HE UNDERSTOOD BUT THERE WAS ONLY SO MUCH LEBANON COULD DO AND THE BALL COULD NOT BE PUT IN ITS COURT. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD, BUT THE SAME HELD FOR US. GEMAYEL SAID HE WOULD IN ANY EVENT BE TRYING TO WORK OUT SOME "PRAGMATIC IDEA" AND HAD ALREADY STARTED THE PROCESS. HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ME NEXT WEEK FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. I SAID I WAS AT HIS DISPOSITION.

7. COMMENT: GEMAYEL WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED WITH THE MURPHY MEETING AND IN GOOD SPIRITS AND GOOD HUMORED THROUGHOUT OUR BRIEF TALK. WHATEVER HIS NATURAL LEBANESE INCLINATION TO "LET GEORGE DO IT," I THINK HE WILL IN FACT BE WORKING HARD TO FIND WAYS AROUND SUCH ISSUES AS DIRECT TALKS, ETC. THE HARDEST PART WILL BE THE INTRICATE LEBANESE MINUETTE HE WILL HAVE TO CHOREOGRAPH TO GET KARAMI TO DANCE. I THINK GEMAYEL'S ADVICE ON HOW THE SECRETARY SHOULD HANDLE KARAMI IS BANG ON AND SUGGEST THAT IT BE FOLLOWED. BUT I THINK ALSO THAT KARAMI HAS TO GET THE MESSAGE THAT WHILE WE MAY HAVE OUR TOE IN THE WATER, A FULL PLUNGE IS NOT AT ALL A FOREGONE CONCLUSION AND WILL REQUIRE SOME EVIDENCE OF LEBANON'S (AND HIS) WILLINGNESS TO BE PRACTICAL. END COMMENT. BARTHOLOMEW

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APPROVED BY NEA: JPLACKE
S/S: BMCKINLEY
S/S-O: WGGRIFFITH
NEA: RHPELLETREAU
P: MPENDLETON

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TO AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR MID-361/2 #109471
BY CN NARA DATE 10/12/12

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, SA, LE, US
SUBJECT: POINTS ON LEBANON FOR YOUR MEETING WITH KING
FAHD

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT
2. FOLLOWING POINTS DEALING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S TRAVELS IN THE REGION MAY BE USED FOR YOUR MEETING WITH KING FAHD. FULLER DISCUSSION WILL OCCUR AFTER MURPHY'S RETURN WHEN HE AND SECRETARY SHULTZ MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD ON OCTOBER 1:

--ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY TRAVELED TO BEIRUT TO PROVIDE SECRETARY SHULTZ WITH A FIRST HAND REPORT ON THE TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST OUR EMBASSY AND IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THE SECRETARY'S PERSONAL CONCERN FOR THE

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C06/14 009118

NOD712

AMERICAN AND LEBANESE EMPLOYEES WHO WERE TRAGICALLY
KILLED AND WOUNDED BY THIS TERRIBLE EVENT.

--WHILE IN THE AREA, DICK TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS TRAVEL TO
UNDERTAKE ROUTINE CONSULTATIONS IN OTHER CAPITALS. DICK
DISCUSSED THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN, BUT

THERE WAS AN INEVITABLE EMPHASIS ON THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH
LEBANON IN BEIRUT, TEL AVIV AND DAMASCUS.

--IN THIS REGARD, WE TOOK SOME EXPLORATORY SOUNDINGS TO
SEE WHETHER A BASIS FOR MORE ACTIVE MEDIATION EXISTS. IT
IS BY NO MEANS CLEAR AT THIS POINT THAT THE ISSUE WILL BE
AMENABLE TO MEDIATION. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
CONCERNED PARTIES MAY BE TOO GREAT TO PROVIDE ANY
REALISTIC PROSPECT OF REACHING AGREEMENT.

--WE BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL WANTS TO WITHDRAW FULLY FROM
LEBANON. IT WILL NOT DO SO, HOWEVER, UNTIL ADEQUATE
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ITS NORTHERN BORDER HAVE BEEN
NEGOTIATED AND ARE IN PLACE.

--UNIFIL IS AN OBVIOUS PART OF THE PICTURE, AND THE LAF
MAY EVENTUALLY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY. ISRAEL REQUIRES,
HOWEVER, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN WHICH IT CAN HAVE
COMPLETE CONFIDENCE, INCLUDING THE PROTECTION PROVIDED BY
THE ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON. AS YOU KNOW, THIS IS A MAJOR
STICKING POINT.

--WE ARE NOW TRYING TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE
ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES. WE ARE NOT NOW, HOWEVER,
ENGAGED IN ANY SPECIFIC PROCESS OF MEDIATION.

--PRESS SPECULATION MAY HAVE CREATED UNREALISTIC
EXPECTATIONS OF AN IMMINENT NEW U.S. INITIATIVE OR OF A

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Department of State

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NOD712

MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH REGARDING LEBANON. THIS IS NOT THE
CASE.

--WE WILL, OF COURSE, KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU
REGARDING ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

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11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 30, 1984

Bud:

Attached is a memo for the President forwarding SecState's south Lebanon memo for your signature.

Howard

HRT

109472 11A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Next Steps Regarding South Lebanon (S)

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M10-361/2 #109472
BY CW NARA DATE 10/12/12

This memorandum forwards a memo from George (at Tab A) which (1) summarizes the results of Assistant Secretary Murphy's exploratory talks with Israeli, Syrian and Lebanese leaders regarding the South Lebanon issue and (2) recommends that we proceed deliberately and cautiously in preparation for your discussions on this subject with Prime Minister Peres on October 9. (S)

In essence, U.S. diplomatic involvement is desired. But we must recognize that considerable time and effort will be required, and that any effort will be accompanied by a degree of risk and uncertainty. This is especially true due to the rapid political changes taking place within the Arab world. We cannot be sure where these inevitably related events will lead, but an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would definitely further improve the regional climate in support of our goals and interests. However, we must not appear too eager, as all the parties must need us more than we need them if we are to have meaningful diplomatic leverage. (S)

Next Steps

Given the sensitive and preliminary status of our analysis, I agree with George's suggestion that the NSC charter a small working group to be chaired by Under Secretary Armacost to study our options and make recommendations in advance of your meeting with Peres. (S)

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from the Secretary of State

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Prepared by:
Howard R. Teicher

12

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109474

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NLRR MID-361/2 #109474

BY CW NARA DATE 10/12/12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1984

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz, Secretary *GPS*

SUBJECT: The Murphy Mission and Next Steps

Dick Murphy has completed his round of visits to Damascus, Jerusalem and Beirut. All three parties, in varying degrees, want to see some kind of U.S. involvement to help resolve the South Lebanon issue.

--Israel, with its new government, strongly favors as rapid a solution as possible to the issue of its presence in Southern Lebanon, provided the answer is consistent with Israeli security needs;

--Syria, although very guarded, realizes we can play a useful role;

--Lebanon is eager to see Israel withdraw, but remains weak and divided.

Yet there is not an easy road ahead. It will be very difficult to craft any kind of solution which meets the needs of all parties. If it is possible, it will take considerable time and effort. It is essential that all three parties believe they need a U.S. role more than the U.S. needs their cooperation - that their stake is bigger than ours. We believe we should proceed deliberately and cautiously. We should first determine Peres' flexibility during his visit and his meetings with you. Only if we believe further movement is possible, should we move on to the next step - a second trip to the area by Dick Murphy.

Murphy found that the role which the Israeli controlled "Army of South Lebanon" (ASL) might play looms as the principal obstacle to early agreement on Israeli withdrawal. Israel insists the ASL be responsible for border security. The Lebanese, backed by the Syrians, would at best accept integration of ASL personnel into the Lebanese army. We need to probe for greater flexibility on this issue.

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DECL: OADR

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-2-

In Syria, President Assad declined to comment in detail on our several ideas regarding Lebanese and Israeli undertakings on withdrawal and security arrangements. He endorsed the Lebanese position that security in the South be the responsibility of UNIFIL and the LAF. Assad's two lieutenants expressed firm Syrian opposition to Lahad's forces, claiming they were inconsistent with Lebanese sovereignty. On Murphy's second visit, the Syrians further signaled a desire not to explicitly discuss the subjects of no Syrian forward movement and prevention of infiltration. (Recalling tacit Syrian "understandings" on similar issues in 1974 and 1976, Murphy decided it was best not to try to corner them explicitly now). With regard to Lebanese-Israeli talks, Syria suggested that the Israeli-Lebanese Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) was the only acceptable framework it saw but stated it was prepared to discuss other alternatives. Khaddam agreed that Lebanon must take the initiative in talks with the UN Secretariat.

In Israel, the GOI urged the U.S. to continue trying to obtain Syrian agreement to prevent infiltration from behind its lines and not to advance as Israeli forces withdrew. They confirmed Israel has dropped its previous insistence on withdrawal of Syrian and Palestinian forces and on a political level negotiation with Lebanon. The Israelis also urged us to obtain Lebanese agreement to expansion of the UNIFIL mandate and direct military talks. The Israelis rejected ILMAC as a mechanism for these talks, and emphasized that Syria must play a major role in getting the Lebanese to move on UNIFIL expansion.

In Lebanon, Gemayel and Karami quickly agreed with our request to discuss an expanded UNIFIL mandate with the UN Secretariat. The second Israeli demand, some form of direct talks, is more difficult for Beirut, but Gemayel is instructing his staff to think of practical compromises for military-to-military talks. He knows such talks could be key to gaining Israeli confidence in the LAF, but frameworks other than ILMAC cause problems within the Lebanese cabinet.

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-3-

In light of the October 19 UNIFIL extension vote, I have asked Jeane Kirkpatrick and Murphy to consult with Under Secretary Urquhart, the UN official responsible for peacekeeping forces, concerning Murphy's and Urquhart's meetings in the area. The UN Secretariat is well suited to pursue detailed talks with the three parties and UNIFIL contributors on the renewal issue and appears willing to do so. Meanwhile, we will brief Peres in Washington next week on the Syrian and Lebanese responses and suggest that we and his advisors do some hard thinking together about whether the wide gaps between the Syrian and Israeli positions can be bridged. We can then recommend whether it makes sense to continue our efforts with the Syrians. Although Damascus appears, at this point, to see little incentive to make withdrawal more palatable to the Israeli government, it wants to continue the dialogue.

If you agree that we should proceed as outlined above, I suggest the NSC mandate the immediate establishment of a tightly-held, small working group, chaired by Under Secretary Armacost, to provide the necessary support for our efforts. It could, as necessary, draw on resources from other agencies.

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9513.

AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 11035

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), PREL, SA, US, XF

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO KING FAHD CONCERNING LEBANON

REF: RIYADH 5415

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHEN YOU MEET WITH KING FAHD OCTOBER 1, PLEASE
CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY.

3. BEGIN TEXT. YOUR MAJESTY:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY WILL MEET ON SUNDAY EVENING
WITH PRINCE SAUD AND PRINCE BANDAR IN NEW YORK, PRIOR TO
MY MEETING PRINCE SAUD ON MONDAY MORNING, TO GIVE THEM A
PRELIMINARY BRIEFING ON THE RESULTS OF HIS RECENT
CONTACTS IN LEBANON, SYRIA AND ISRAEL. IT WAS NECESSARY
FOR MURPHY TO RETURN DIRECTLY TO WASHINGTON TO BRIEF ME
PRIOR TO MY MEETINGS NEXT WEEK WITH SEVERAL OTHER KEY
REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER KARAMI AND
FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR. BECAUSE TIME, THEREFORE, DID
NOT PERMIT HIM TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA TO CALL ON YOUR

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NLRR MID-36d #109476

BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/12



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Department of State

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MAJESTY TO DISCUSS HIS CONTACTS WITH YOU DIRECTLY, I WISH TO TAKE THIS MEANS OF SUMMARIZING MY CURRENT IMPRESSIONS FROM MURPHY'S TRIP.

THIS ROUND OF CONTACTS WAS ONLY EXPLORATORY. IT WOULD NOT BE ACCURATE TO VIEW IT AS A NEW UNITED STATES INITIATIVE, AS SOME COMMENTATORS ARE DOING. HOWEVER, SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT POINTS HAVE EMERGED:

-- ISRAEL WISHES TO WITHDRAW RAPIDLY FROM LEBANON PROVIDED THAT IT CAN BE ASSURED OF SECURITY ALONG ITS NORTHERN BORDER. THERE IS NO LINK TO A RELATED WITHDRAWAL BY SYRIAN FORCES OR TO NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH LEBANON, WHICH ISRAEL WOULD, OF COURSE, HOPE TO ACHIEVE IN THE FUTURE;

-- THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IS EAGER TO SEE ISRAEL WITHDRAW AND BELIEVES THAT AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR UNIFIL CAN HELP THE LEBANESE ARMY PROVIDE SECURITY IN SOUTH LEBANON;

-- SYRIA, WHILE VERY CAUTIOUS, ALSO SEES A LARGER ROLE FOR UNIFIL AS ASSISTING IN MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

THESE ARE POSITIVE INDICATIONS, BUT MUCH STILL REMAINS TO BE DONE. I WILL EXPLORE FURTHER DURING MEETINGS NEXT WEEK, INCLUDING WITH UN REPRESENTATIVES, AND WHEN ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER PERES VISITS WASHINGTON OCTOBER 8 AND 9 TO SEE WHERE AND HOW WE CAN HELP THE INTERESTED PARTIES ALONG THESE LINES. YOUR MAJESTY'S VALUED SUPPORT FOR THE GOAL OF AN INDEPENDENT, UNIFIED LEBANON WILL CONTINUE TO BE VERY IMPORTANT. MY GOVERNMENT WILL

WISH TO STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADOR, PRINCE BANDAR, AND THROUGH SENIOR US



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OFFICIALS VISITING THE AREA.

C06/15 009140 NOD714

I BELIEVE THAT THE PARTIES HAVE A NEW APPRECIATION OF THE DANGERS OF WIDENING TURMOIL IF THE LEBANON ISSUE IS NOT SOON RESOLVED. ALL OF US WHO WISH TO AVOID THIS PROSPECT AND RESTORE UNITY AND SECURITY IN LEBANON MUST RENEW OUR EFFORTS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING TO WORK IN ASSOCIATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA IN THIS EFFORT AND APPRECIATE YOUR MAJESTY'S PERSONAL ATTENTION. RESPECTFULLY, GEORGE P. SHULTZ. END TEXT.

4. ADDITIONAL, MORE GENERAL, BACKGROUND IS ALSO BEING SENT SEPTTEL. YOU MAY DRAW ON THIS IN DISCUSSING LEBANON WITH FAHD BUT YOU SHOULD NOT BE MORE SPECIFIC THAN THE FOREGOING IN CHARACTERIZING THE PRESENT OR PROSPECTIVE US ROLE. SHULTZ

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ACTION NODS-00

C01/04 001157 NOD764

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----135550 021601Z /44

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4326.

~~S E C R E T~~ TEL AVIV 13887

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR MIB-36/27/109479
BY WJ NARA DATE 10/12/12

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE
SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON TALKS WITH ISRAELIS

REF: AMMAN 8965 (RPT STATE 289088)

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~

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2. REFTEL PROVIDES EXCELLENT AND COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF MURPHY'S SEPTEMBER 25 MEETINGS WITH ISRAELIS ON SOUTH LEBANON. FOR THE RECORD, HOWEVER, WE SAW NO EVIDENCE THAT THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WAS RECORDED ON TAPE BY THE ISRAELIS, AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 14 REFTEL. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, THE ISRAELIS DO NOT TAPE MEETINGS OF THIS NATURE, THOUGH THEY DO FROM TIME TO TIME HAVE A STENOGRAPHER PRESENT, WHICH WAS IN FACT THE CASE IN THE EARLIER MEETING WITH RABIN. MOREOVER, THE ISRAELI SIDE HAD TWO NOTETAKERS PRESENT AT THE PERES MEETING (NIMROD NOVIK AND YOSEF BEILIN).

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3. SECOND, THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 27 DROPPED A "NO" AND SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS: "RABIN AND PERES BOTH SAID THERE

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WOULD BE NO PROBLEM."

4. OTHERWISE, THE REPORT GIVES AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF MURPHY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELI LEADERS. WE WOULD ONLY NOTE IN ADDITION THAT RABIN EXPRESSED GREAT SKEPTICISM AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION ABOUT GEMAYEL'S DESIRE TO SEE THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH LEBANON. IN FACT, RABIN THOUGHT GEMAYEL MAY TRY TO STREW OBSTACLES IN THIS PATH, FEARING THAT AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD WEAKEN THE POSITION OF THE CHRISTIANS IN THE NORTH. RABIN ALSO THOUGHT THAT EGYPT AND JORDAN WANTED ISRAEL TO REMAIN IN THE SOUTH IN ORDER TO KEEP A PRESSURE POINT ON THE SYRIANS.

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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0433
INFO AMCONSUL JEDDAH

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NLRR M10361/2 #109480
BY CN NARA DATE 10/12/12

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO SECDEL NEW YORK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, SA, US
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 1 MEETING WITH KING FAHD: CONSULTATIONS
ON LEBANON

REF: A) SECTO 11035 B) STATE 291028

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: KING FAHD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO SECRETARY SHULTZ' MESSAGE PROVIDING STATUS OF MIDDLE EAST CONSULTATIONS AND EXPLAINING REASONS MURPHY WAS UNABLE TO STOP IN SAUDI ARABIA THIS TIME. HOWEVER, FAHD POINTEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAS INFLUENCE WITH BOTH LEBANON AND SYRIA, IS READY TO PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE IN HELPING USG RESOLVE THE LEBANESE CONFLICT, AND WISHES TO CONTINUE TRADITIONALLY CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH USG ON THIS ISSUE. FAHD IS CONSIDERING SENDING AN ENVOY TO LEBANON AND IS WILLING TO GO PERSONALLY TO SYRIA TO HELP IN EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE LEBANESE PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.



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3. DURING OCTOBER 1 MEETING I PRESENTED TO KING FAHD SECRETARY SHULTZ' MESSAGE, WHICH FAHD HAD INTERPRETER READ ALOUD TO HIM. FAHD SEEMED PLEASED WITH CONTENTS OF LETTER. FAHD, HOWEVER, IMMEDIATELY POINTED OUT THAT SAG HAS IN THE PAST PLAYED AN EFFECTIVE ROLE IN DEALING WITH THE LEBANESE PROBLEM, CLEARLY IMPLYING THAT FAHD WISHES TO CONTINUE TO DO SO AND TO WORK CLOSELY WITH USG IN THAT REGARD.

4. FAHD SAID SAG INFLUENCE IN LEBANON DERIVES FROM ITS TRADITIONALLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS. FAHD SAID HE IS CONSIDERING SENDING AN ENVOY TO VISIT GEMAYEL IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE PROCESS OF FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT PROBLEMS IN LEBANON.

5. FAHD WISHED TO ASSURE THE USG OF HIS PERSONAL INTEREST IN HAVING A ROLE FOR SAUDI ARABIA IN FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE LEBANESE PROBLEM. THE SAG'S ROLE WAS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SYRIA AND LEBANON BECAUSE OF ITS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEM. WHEN I MENTIONED PER REF A THAT THE SYRIANS ARE VERY CAUTIOUS AND THAT WE MIGHT AT SOME POINT NEED FAHD'S HELP WITH THEM, FAHD REPLIED THAT SYRIA IS PERHAPS FEARFUL AND CONSEQUENTLY RELUCTANT TO TAKE RISKS BUT THAT FAHD IS WILLING TO TRY TO PERSUADE THEM TO TRY TO BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE EVEN IF THAT REQUIRED HIS TRAVELLING TO SYRIA "FOR A DAY OR TWO." FAHD CONCLUDED THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO SOLVE THE LEBANESE PROBLEM AND ALLOW THE LEBANESE TO "LEAD THEIR OWN LIVES." FAHD SAID SAG WELCOMES CONTINUATION OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE USG ON LEBANON, A PRACTICE THAT WAS STARTED "BY HABIB."

6. I ALSO WENT OVER THE POINTS IN REF B, EMPHASIZING THAT MURPHY'S TALKS WERE ONLY EXPLORATORY AND THAT WE



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ARE BY NO MEANS YET ENGAGED IN A MEDIATION ROLE. FAHD
INTERJECTED APPROVINGLY "IT IS AT LEAST A START." I
POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL WANTS OUT OF LEBANON FULLY
AND FAST AND IS NO LONGER LINKING ITS WITHDRAWAL WITH
SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL OR IMMEDIATE FULL NORMALIZATION OF
RELATIONS WITH LEBANON. THE CHALLENGE IS TO FIND A
FORMULA TO PROTECT ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER AND THAT
IS NOT EASY. FAHD RESPONDED THAT A MEANS MUST BE
FOUND TO ASSURE THE SECURITY BOTH OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN
BORDER AND OF LEBANON.

7. I CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE
ACREEMENT TO BE WORKED OUT AND THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO
INVOLVE LAHAD'S ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON. FAHD RESPONDED
THAT ANY SOLUTION IS ALRIGHT IF IT ACHIEVES ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. I CONCLUDED BY EMPHASIZING THAT
THERE IS AS YET NO BREAKTHROUGH BUT ONLY SOME HOPE FOR
FORWARD MOVEMENT. FAHD REPLIED "LET'S START TALKS AND
THEN SEE." WHEN I SAID WE WOULD BE LOOKING TO FAHD FOR
HIS ASSISTANCE AND WISE COUNSEL, FAHD ASSURED ME HE IS
READY TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

8. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE
WAS SUCCESSFUL IN ARRESTING FAHD'S EVIDENT CONCERN OVER
NOT BEING INCLUDED IN MURPHY'S RECENT MIDEAST CONSULTA-
TIONS, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE CURRENT LEBANESE
SITUATION. THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH SAG
FONMIN SAUD SHOULD HAVE A FURTHER POSITIVE EFFECT ON
FAHD. THIS LATEST EPISODE HAS REVEALED, HOWEVER,
THAT FAHD WISHES TO BE PERSONALLY INVOLVED AND CON-
SULTED ON EVERY SIGNIFICANT STEP ON THE LEBANESE ISSUE
AND IS STILL WILLING TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH SYRIA
AND LEBANON. HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY WISH TO HOLD US TO
THE SECRETARY'S COMMITMENT TO KEEP HIM INFORMED ON

THESE ISSUES.



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9. SUGGEST DEPT ALSO PASS AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO,
DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM AND TEL AVIV.

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O 021700Z OCT '84 ZFF6
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 429J.
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M/D-361/2 #109482
BY CN NARA DATE 10/12/12

~~SECRET~~ USUN NEW YORK 02457

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, SY, LE, UNGA
SUBJECT: MURPHY MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
ABDEL MEGUID: OCTOBER 1

REF: SECTO 11008

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. MURPHY REVIEWED FOR MEGUID IN GENERAL
TERMS HIS MEETINGS IN RECENT DAYS IN LEBANON SYRIA,
ISRAEL AND EGYPT. MEGUID REPORTED HE HAD URGED SHAMIR
TO DISENGAGE FROM LAHAD IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE SAID
THAT EGYPT SEES UNIFIL AS THE MOST APPROPRIATE
SUBSTITUTE AND WOULD DO ITS UTMOST TO WORK WITH US IN
THE UN ON THE UNIFIL QUESTION. A CHANGE IN THE UNIFIL
MANDATE WILL IN MEGUID'S VIEW REQUIRE SYRIAN
ACQUIESCENCE. THE SOVIETS WILL NOT OVERRULE SYRIA.
MEGUID SUGGESTED THAT WE BEGIN THINKING ABOUT HOW TO
DEAL WITH SYRIAN INTERESTS IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. HE
AGREED ON THE NEED TO MINIMIZE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO



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CURRENT EFFORTS. MURPHY AGREED TO TELEPHONE MEGUID BEFORE THE LATTER DEPARTS ON OCTOBER 6. END SUMMARY.

3. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY MET WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ESMAT ABDEL MEGUID AT THE LATTER'S SUITE IN THE WALDORF TOWERS IN NEW YORK ON OCTOBER 1. MEGUID WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EGYPTIAN PERMREP KHALIL, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE EL RIDI, AND MEGUID'S SPECIAL ASISTANT HENDAWI. DAS PELLETREAU AND EGY DIRECTOR DUNFORD ALSO SAT IN.

4. AFTER MURPHY HAD GIVEN AN OVERVIEW OF HIS RECENT MEETINGS IN BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JERUSLALEM AND CAIRO, MEGUID NOTED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES ARE LOOKING FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA AND EGYPT IS PRAYING FOR THE SUCCESS OF U.S. EFFORTS. MURPHY STRESSED THAT THE RECENT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS COULD ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS EXPLORATORY; THAT THE U.S. HAS MADE NO DECISION TO REINVOLVE OURSELVES AS A MEDIATOR IN THE LEBANON SITUATION.

5. MEGUID REPORTED THAT HE HAD TOLD ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR IN THEIR MEETING THAT EGYPT STRONGLY DESIRES THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF FROM LEBANON AND THE EXTENSION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. AT THE SAME TIME EGYPT RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMACY OF ISRAEL'S DESIRE FOR ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ON ITS NORTHERN BORDER. MEGUID REPORTED THAT HE ALSO TOLD SHAMIR THAT EGYPT WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE GOI DISENGAGE FROM THE LAHAD FORCES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AS THEY ARE A MAJOR POINT OF CONTENTION. HOW THIS DISENGAGEMENT WOULD OCCUR WOULD BE A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION. SHAMIR, MEGUID REPORTED, WAS

CLEAR IN ASKING EGYPT FOR HELP ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. EGYPT WAS TRYING TO HELP



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BECAUSE PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD HELP MOVE ALONG
OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN TO EGYPT.

6. MEGUID WENT ON TO SAY THAT EGYPT, AS A UNSC MEMBER, WOULD DO ITS UTMOST TO WORK WITH THE U.S. AND THE UN ON THE QUESTION OF UNIFIL RENEWAL. EGYPT BELIEVES THAT UNIFIL IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE SUBSTITUTE FOR ISRAELI FORCES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. IF, HOWEVER, THE OBJECTIVE IS TO CHANGE UNIFIL'S MANDATE, IT WILL REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. HERE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SYRIANS IS CRUCIAL. IF SYRIA BACKS THIS POSITION ON A UNIFIL MANDATE, THEN THE SOVIETS WOULD ABSTAIN. AN INITIATIVE ON UNIFIL HAS TO BE PREPARED CAREFULLY. IF WE WANT TO GET UNIFIL INVOLVED, WE WILL HAVE TO NEUTRALIZE SYRIA. IN RESPONSE TO MURPHY'S QUESTION, MEGUID REITERATED HIS FIRM BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT OVERRIDE SYRIA ON THIS QUESTION. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD TOUCHED ON THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

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7. MURPHY ASKED IF MEGUID HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SYRIA WOULD GO ALONG OR DRAG ITS FEET. MEGUID ANSWERED THE QUESTION BY ASKING WHAT WOULD BE IN A STRENGTHENING OF UNIFIL FOR THE SYRIANS. MURPHY SAID HE HAD NO CONFIDENT ANSWER BUT PERHAPS CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI TROOPS 20 MILES FROM DAMASCUS IN THE BEKAA VALLEY AND CONCERN ABOUT FUNDAMENTALIST ELEMENTS LOOSE IN LEBANON BEYOND SYRIAN CONTROL WERE FACTORS IN SYRIAN THINKING. MEGUID SAID THAT INDEED THESE COULD BE POSITIVE FACTORS IN ENCOURAGING SYRIAN COOPERATION. HE SAID THAT WE HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITIONS OF ALL THE PARTIES INTERESTED IN A VIABLE AGREEMENT. THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT ON LEBANON HAD SEEMED TO MANY TO BE AN IMPOSED AGREEMENT. MEGUID DESCRIBED HOW HE HAD TOLD SHAMIR THAT

ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON HAD BEEN ISRAEL'S BIGGEST BLUNDER. ISRAEL HAD TAKEN EGYPT FOR GRANTED AND THE



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EGYPTIAN REACTION HAD BEEN ONE OF SHOCK. THIS
COMPLETELY CHANGED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
EGYPT. MEGUID REPORTED THAT SHAMIR HAD LISTENED VERY
CAREFULLY. MEGUID SAID THAT HE SAW A TREMENDOUS
OPPORTUNITY IN THE RECENT SIGNS OF ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY
TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN THE AREA. HE SAW NO GREAT RISKS
FOR THE U.S. IN RESUMING AN ACTIVE ROLE. THE SYRIANS
ARE IN A POSITION TO MOVE THINGS ALONG.

8. MEGUID REITERATED THAT EGYPT WAS PREPARED TO PLAY A
POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE UN. KHALIL
WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER THE UN SECRETARIAT HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO EXPAND THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WITHOUT
RECOURSE TO THE UNSC.

9. MEGUID SAID THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO SHAMIR THAT
ISRAEL'S RELATIONSHIP WITH LAHAD WAS POLITICALLY
DANGEROUS. AS LAHAD IS ALWAYS CONSIDERED AS A LEBANESE
EXTENSION OF THE IDF. THE TASK IS TO FIND A WAY FOR
UNIFIL TO FILL THIS ROLE. MURPHY CAUTIONED THAT UNIFIL
CANNOT REPLACE IN ALL RESPECTS THE KIND OF ROLE WHICH
ISRAEL ENVISIONS FOR LAHAD. AS OF TODAY THE ISRAELIS
SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO LAHAD.

10. MEGUID SKETCHED OUT A VISION OF THE FUTURE WHERE
ULTIMATELY THERE COULD BE A LEBANESE ARRANGEMENT WITH
ISRAEL WITH SYRIA'S BLESSING. THE SYRIANS, BEING GOOD
MERCHANTS, WILL BE LOOKING FOR SOMETHING IN IT FOR THEM
WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THIS
IS THE LINK BETWEEN THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE
PEACE PROCESS. HE URGED THAT U.S. OFFICIALS KEEP THIS

IN THE BACK OF THEIR MINDS AND BE PREPARED WHEN THE
SYRIANS TAKE AN INITIATIVE. MURPHY URGED CAUTION WHEN
ASSESSING SYRIA'S POSITION AND COUNSELED MEGUID TO
MINIMIZE PUBLIC FOCUS ON EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS IN
LEBANON. HE SAID THAT WE WILL HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE



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AFTER THE SECRETARY MEETS WITH SHAMIR IN NEW YORK AND
MEETINGS WITH PERES IN WASHINGTON. WHEN MEGUID SAID
THAT HE WOULD BE LEAVING ON SATURDAY. MURPHY SAID THAT
HE WOULD TELEPHONE MEGUID TOWARD THE END OF THE WEEK TO
EXCHANGE FURTHER IMPRESSIONS.

11. MEGUID RETURNED TO HIS "VERY CORRECT AND FRANK"
DISCUSSION WITH SHAMIR. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD SHAMIR
THAT EGYPT WAS READY TO RETURN ITS AMBASSADOR TOMORROW
BUT SHAMIR HAD TO UNDERSTAND EGYPT'S POSITION ON LEBANON
AND THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE
DESCRIBED THE SENSITIVITY IN EGYPT TO THE TABA ISSUE
ALONG THE SAME LINES AS HE DID IN HIS MEETING WITH THE
SECRETARY (REFTEL). HE NOTED THAT EGYPT AND THE U.S.
SHARE THE SAME LONG TERM OBJECTIVES. HE PROMISED TO
KEEP HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH MURPHY DISCREET BUT NOTED
THAT THE FACT OF HIS MEETING WITH MURPHY WOULD BE
PUBLISHED.

12. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED BEIRUT.
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 429J.

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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BY

NARA DATE

~~SECRET~~ USUN NEW YORK 92457

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, SY, LE, UNGA

SUBJECT: MURPHY MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
ABDEL MEGUID: OCTOBER 1

REF: SECTO 11008

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. MURPHY REVIEWED FOR MEGUID IN GENERAL TERMS HIS MEETINGS IN RECENT DAYS IN LEBANON SYRIA, ISRAEL AND EGYPT. MEGUID REPORTED HE HAD URGED SHAMIR TO DISENGAGE FROM LAHAD IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE SAID THAT EGYPT SEES UNIFIL AS THE MOST APPROPRIATE SUBSTITUTE AND WOULD DO ITS UTMOST TO WORK WITH US IN THE UN ON THE UNIFIL QUESTION. A CHANGE IN THE UNIFIL MANDATE WILL IN MEGUID'S VIEW REQUIRE SYRIAN ACQUIESCENCE. THE SOVIETS WILL NOT OVERRULE SYRIA. MEGUID SUGGESTED THAT WE BEGIN THINKING ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH SYRIAN INTERESTS IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. HE AGREED ON THE NEED TO MINIMIZE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO

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CURRENT EFFORTS. MURPHY AGREED TO TELEPHONE MEGUID BEFORE THE LATTER DEPARTS ON OCTOBER 6. END SUMMARY.

3. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY MET WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ESMAT ABDEL MEGUID AT THE LATTER'S SUITE IN THE WALDORF TOWERS IN NEW YORK ON OCTOBER 1. MEGUID WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EGYPTIAN PERMREP KHALIL, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE EL RIDI, AND MEGUID'S SPECIAL ASISTANT HENDAWI. DAS PELLETREAU AND EGY DIRECTOR DUNFORD ALSO SAT IN.

4. AFTER MURPHY HAD GIVEN AN OVERVIEW OF HIS RECENT MEETINGS IN BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JERUSLALEM AND CAIRO, MEGUID NOTED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES ARE LOOKING FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA AND EGYPT IS PRAYING FOR THE SUCCESS OF U.S. EFFORTS. MURPHY STRESSED THAT THE RECENT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS COULD ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS EXPLORATORY; THAT THE U.S. HAS MADE NO DECISION TO REINVOLVE OURSELVES AS A MEDIATOR IN THE LEBANON SITUATION.

5. MEGUID REPORTED THAT HE HAD TOLD ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR IN THEIR MEETING THAT EGYPT STRONGLY DESIRES THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF FROM LEBANON AND THE EXTENSION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. AT THE SAME TIME EGYPT RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMACY OF ISRAEL'S DESIRE FOR ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ON ITS NORTHERN BORDER. MEGUID REPORTED THAT HE ALSO TOLD SHAMIR THAT EGYPT WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE GOI DISENGAGE FROM THE LAHAD FORCES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AS THEY ARE A MAJOR POINT OF CONTENTION. HOW THIS DISENGAGEMENT WOULD OCCUR WOULD BE A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION. SHAMIR, MEGUID REPORTED, WAS

CLEAR IN ASKING EGYPT FOR HELP ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. EGYPT WAS TRYING TO HELP

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BECAUSE PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD HELP MOVE ALONG
OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN TO EGYPT.

6. MEGUID WENT ON TO SAY THAT EGYPT, AS A UNSC MEMBER, WOULD DO ITS UTMOST TO WORK WITH THE U.S. AND THE UN ON THE QUESTION OF UNIFIL RENEWAL. EGYPT BELIEVES THAT UNIFIL IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE SUBSTITUTE FOR ISRAELI FORCES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. IF, HOWEVER, THE OBJECTIVE IS TO CHANGE UNIFIL'S MANDATE, IT WILL REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. HERE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SYRIANS IS CRUCIAL. IF SYRIA BACKS THIS POSITION ON A UNIFIL MANDATE, THEN THE SOVIETS WOULD ABSTAIN. AN INITIATIVE ON UNIFIL HAS TO BE PREPARED CAREFULLY. IF WE WANT TO GET UNIFIL INVOLVED, WE WILL HAVE TO NEUTRALIZE SYRIA. IN RESPONSE TO MURPHY'S QUESTION, MEGUID REITERATED HIS FIRM BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT OVERRIDE SYRIA ON THIS QUESTION. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD TOUCHED ON THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

7. MURPHY ASKED IF MEGUID HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SYRIA WOULD GO ALONG OR DRAG ITS FEET. MEGUID ANSWERED THE QUESTION BY ASKING WHAT WOULD BE IN A STRENGTHENING OF UNIFIL FOR THE SYRIANS. MURPHY SAID HE HAD NO CONFIDENT ANSWER BUT PERHAPS CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI TROOPS 20 MILES FROM DAMASCUS IN THE BEKAA VALLEY AND CONCERN ABOUT FUNDAMENTALIST ELEMENTS LOOSE IN LEBANON BEYOND SYRIAN CONTROL WERE FACTORS IN SYRIAN THINKING. MEGUID SAID THAT INDEED THESE COULD BE POSITIVE FACTORS IN ENCOURAGING SYRIAN COOPERATION. HE SAID THAT WE HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITIONS OF ALL THE PARTIES INTERESTED IN A VIABLE AGREEMENT. THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT ON LEBANON HAD SEEMED TO MANY TO BE AN IMPOSED AGREEMENT. MEGUID DESCRIBED HOW HE HAD TOLD SHAMIR THAT

ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON HAD BEEN ISRAEL'S BIGGEST BLUNDER. ISRAEL HAD TAKEN EGYPT FOR GRANTED AND THE

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EGYPTIAN REACTION HAD BEEN ONE OF SHOCK. THIS
COMPLETELY CHANGED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
EGYPT. MEGUID REPORTED THAT SHAMIR HAD LISTENED VERY
CAREFULLY. MEGUID SAID THAT HE SAW A TREMENDOUS
OPPORTUNITY IN THE RECENT SIGNS OF ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY
TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN THE AREA. HE SAW NO GREAT RISKS
FOR THE U.S. IN RESUMING AN ACTIVE ROLE. THE SYRIANS
ARE IN A POSITION TO MOVE THINGS ALONG.

8. MEGUID REITERATED THAT EGYPT WAS PREPARED TO PLAY A
POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE UN. KHALIL
WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER THE UN SECRETARIAT HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO EXPAND THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WITHOUT
RECOURSE TO THE UNSC.

9. MEGUID SAID THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO SHAMIR THAT
ISRAEL'S RELATIONSHIP WITH LAHAD WAS POLITICALLY
DANGEROUS. AS LAHAD IS ALWAYS CONSIDERED AS A LEBANESE
EXTENSION OF THE IDF. THE TASK IS TO FIND A WAY FOR
UNIFIL TO FILL THIS ROLE. MURPHY CAUTIONED THAT UNIFIL
CANNOT REPLACE IN ALL RESPECTS THE KIND OF ROLE WHICH
ISRAEL ENVISIONS FOR LAHAD. AS OF TODAY THE ISRAELIS
SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO LAHAD.

10. MEGUID SKETCHED OUT A VISION OF THE FUTURE WHERE
ULTIMATELY THERE COULD BE A LEBANESE ARRANGEMENT WITH
ISRAEL WITH SYRIA'S BLESSING. THE SYRIANS, BEING GOOD
MERCHANTS, WILL BE LOOKING FOR SOMETHING IN IT FOR THEM
WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THIS
IS THE LINK BETWEEN THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE
PEACE PROCESS. HE URGED THAT U.S. OFFICIALS KEEP THIS

IN THE BACK OF THEIR MINDS AND BE PREPARED WHEN THE
SYRIANS TAKE AN INITIATIVE. MURPHY URGED CAUTION WHEN
ASSESSING SYRIA'S POSITION AND COUNSELED MEGUID TO
MINIMIZE PUBLIC FOCUS ON EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS IN
LEBANON. HE SAID THAT WE WILL HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE

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AFTER THE SECRETARY MEETS WITH SHAMIR IN NEW YORK AND
MEETINGS WITH PERES IN WASHINGTON. WHEN MEGUID SAID
THAT HE WOULD BE LEAVING ON SATURDAY. MURPHY SAID THAT
HE WOULD TELEPHONE MEGUID TOWARD THE END OF THE WEEK TO
EXCHANGE FURTHER IMPRESSIONS.

11. MEGUID RETURNED TO HIS "VERY CORRECT AND FRANK"
DISCUSSION WITH SHAMIR. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD SHAMIR
THAT EGYPT WAS READY TO RETURN ITS AMBASSADOR TOMORROW
BUT SHAMIR HAD TO UNDERSTAND EGYPT'S POSITION ON LEBANON
AND THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE
DESCRIBED THE SENSITIVITY IN EGYPT TO THE TABA ISSUE
ALONG THE SAME LINES AS HE DID IN HIS MEETING WITH THE
SECRETARY (REFTEL). HE NOTED THAT EGYPT AND THE U.S.
SHARE THE SAME LONG TERM OBJECTIVES. HE PROMISED TO
KEEP HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH MURPHY DISCREET BUT NOTED
THAT THE FACT OF HIS MEETING WITH MURPHY WOULD BE
PUBLISHED.

12. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED BEIRUT.
KIRKPATRICK

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS FOR
AMBASSADOR AND CHARGE ONLY

DEPARTMENT FOR S/S HILL ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, SY, IS, LE
SUBJECT: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH LEBANON

REF: DAMASCUS 6375

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IT DOES NOT SURPRISE US THAT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN
TEL AVIV HAS MANAGED TO PUT TOGETHER A FAIRLY COMPLETE
ACCOUNT OF THE ISRAELI POSITION ON SOUTH LEBANON
(REFTEL). MOST OF THE ISRAELI POINTS HAVE APPEARED IN
ONE FORM OR ANOTHER IN THE LOCAL PRESS AND THE NEW
BRITISH AMBASSADOR COULD EASILY HAVE STITCHED THESE
TOGETHER BASED ON HIS INITIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH VARIOUS
ISRAELI LEADERS. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE ONLY GIVEN THE
BRITISH A MOST GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MURPHY'S VISIT TO
THE AREA.
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BY CW NARA DATE 10/2/12



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APPROVED BY NEA: RWMURPHY

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EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR AND CHARGE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, US, LE, SY

SUBJECT: MURPHY BREAKFAST MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
SHAMIR, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2

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SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR MURPHY'S IMPRESSION OF ATTITUDES
IN DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT RATHER THAN A DETAILED REPORT OF
HIS MEETINGS. MURPHY INDICATED THAT HE RETURNED FROM THE
TRIP WITH THE SENSE THAT THE GOL SEEMS GENUINELY



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INTERESTED IN REACHING SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH THE GOI ON WITHDRAWAL, AND THAT SYRIA SEEMS WILLING TO PERMIT THE GOL TO PURSUE THIS WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE COMMENTS OF SHAMIR AND HIS COLLEAGUES, WHO WERE PRIMARILY IN A LISTENING MODE, REVEAL CONSIDERABLE ISRAELI SKEPTICISM ABOUT SYRIAN MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS IN SANCTIONING ISRAELI-LEBANON CONTACTS ON WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS. SHAMIR ASKED WHY, IF SYRIA BELIEVES THAT ISRAEL IS COMMITTED TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON IN ANY EVENT, SHOULD THE SARG BE WILLING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS? MURPHY POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD MADE VERY CLEAR IN BOTH DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT THAT THE GOI DID NOT HAVE ONLY THE SINGLE OPTION OF A FULL AND CAREFULLY COORDINATED WITHDRAWAL; AN ISRAELI PULLBACK COULD BE PARTIAL AND/OR SUDDEN. ALL PARTIES HAVE AN INTEREST IN AVOIDING A REPEAT OF THE AUG. 1983 SCENARIO IN THE SHUF. SHAMIR DID NOT GIVE ANY OVERALL PERSONAL REACTION TO OUR APPROACH, NOR DID HE INDICATE HOW WE OR THE GOI MIGHT PROCEED. END SUMMARY.

3. ASST SEC MURPHY HAD A ONE-HOUR BREAKFAST MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR OCT. 2 TO DISCUSS THE PROSPECTS FOR DISENGAGEMENT IN LEBANON IN LIGHT OF MURPHY'S RECENT VISIT TO THE REGION. OTHERS PRESENT INCLUDED AMB. ROSENWE, AMB. NETANYAHU, MR. LEVIN, MR. PAZNER, MR. BEN ARON, HANON BAR-ON, AND NEA/IAI LOKEN (NOTETAKER). AT SHAMIR'S REQUEST, MURPHY PROVIDED HIS IMPRESSION OF ATTITUDES IN DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT RATHER THAN A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE VARIOUS MEETINGS.

4. THE ISRAELIS WERE PRIMARILY IN A LISTENING MODE, BUT THEIR QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS REFLECT SOME OF THEIR CONCERNS AT THIS TIME: ARE THE SYRIANS REALLY INTERESTED IN AN ACCOMMODATION PERMITTING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL? IF

SO, WHY? WHAT DO THE SYRIANS HOPE TO GAIN THEREDY? WHAT TYPE OF ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM? SHAMIR



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DID NOT GIVE ANY OVERALL PERSONAL REACTION TO OUR APPROACH TO THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE, NOR DID HE INDICATE HOW WE OR THE GOI MIGHT PROCEED. (COMMENT: HE PROBABLY CHOSE TO DO SO WITH NEXT WEEK'S MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON IN MIND.)

5. BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION, MURPHY NOTED THAT DURING HIS TRIP HE HAD NOT CARRIED ANY USG "PLAN" FOR FACILITATING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, BUT RATHER A SET OF ASSUMPTIONS OR IDEAS TO EXPLORE WITH THE CONCERNED PARTIES. THE SYRIANS HAD NOT INITIALLY MADE A DIRECT RESPONSE. ASAD HAD INDICATED THAT SOME OF OUR IDEAS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, WHILE OTHERS WERE NOT. ON THE QUESTION OF MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN FORCES AND CONTROLLING INFILTRATION THROUGH SYRIAN LINES, KHADDAM'S REACTION HAD BEEN CRYPTIC TO THE POINT OF DELPHIC, IN CALLING THEM "UNJUSTIFIED." SHAMIR NOTED THAT THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN "UNACCEPTABLE" -- PERHAPS A SIGNIFICANT NUANCE.

6. ON A POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE, THE SYRIANS EMPHASIZED THIS WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOL. ASAD DID SAY THAT IN ANY NEW OR EXPANDED ROLE UNIFIL SHOULD "NOT MOVE CLOSER TO THE SYRIAN BORDER". AS FOR THE LEBANESE, GEMAYEL HAS INSTRUCTED KARAMI TO DISCUSS RENEWAL OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT. MURPHY NOTED THAT THE USG BELIEVES WE MUST PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY IN CONSIDERING ANY CHANGE IN UNIFIL'S MANDATE, FOR THIS COULD CREATE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVIET MISCHIEF.

7. THE BOTTOM LINE, MURPHY SAID, IS THAT LEBANON SEEMS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN REACHING SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH THE GOI ON AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND THE SARG SEEMS WILLING TO PERMIT THE GOL TO PURSUE ARRANGEMENTS TO THAT

END WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE QUESTION REMAINS, THOUGH, WHY WOULD SYRIA BE WILLING TO COOPERATE? MURPHY CITED



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SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES: (1) THE THREAT POSED TO SARG BY THE IDF PRESENCE IN THE BEKAA; (2) SYRIA'S INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AS A COUNTER TO DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS; (3) THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE SYRIAN OCCUPATION ON THE TROUBLED SYRIAN ECONOMY. MURPHY ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF SYRIAN MOTIVES.

8. SHAMIR ASKED IF THE SYRIANS HAD DIVULGED ANY SPECIFICS OF THEIR IDEAS ON POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. MURPHY REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NOT, BUT THAT WE HAD CLEARLY CONVEYED TO THE SARG THE ISRAELI POSITIONS AS PRESENTED TO MURPHY IN ISRAEL.

9. SHAMIR WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER SYRIA CONSIDERS ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON TO BE A BURDEN. MURPHY SUGGESTED THAT IT COULD PERHAPS BE BETTER DESCRIBED AS AN IRRITANT THAN A BURDEN. THE SYRIANS ARE TIRED OF DEALING WITH THE FRACTIOUS LEBANESE, BUT THEIR PERCEIVED SECURITY AND POLITICAL INTERESTS GIVE THEM A CONTINUED STAKE IN LEBANON. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE SYRIANS HAD MENTIONED THEIR OWN INTENTIONS TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON, MURPHY SAID THAT THE SARG HAD TAKEN THE STANDARD LINE THAT THIS WAS A MATTER SOLELY OF BILATERAL CONCERN TO THE SARG AND THE GOL.

10. IF SYRIA IS WILLING TO SANCTION GOL-GOI DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, SHAMIR ASKED, WILL THE SARG GIVE THE LEBANESE SOME LATITUDE OR CLOSELY CONTROL THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS? MURPHY REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT BE CERTAIN BUT THOUGHT THAT SYRIA WOULD PREFER NOT TO

BECOME INVOLVED IN THE DETAILS. THE ISRAELIS POINTED OUT THAT THIS PRESENTS THE DANGER OF REPEATING THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT SCENARIO, IN WHICH SYRIA HAD REJECTED THE GOL-GOI AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT. MURPHY REPLIED THAT IN THIS REGARD THE SYRIANS DRAW A CLEAR LINE BETWEEN



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POLITICAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE SARG REMAINS OPPOSED TO ANY ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD GIVE ISRAEL "POLITICAL GAINS" FROM ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO SYRIA BEFORE (E.G. 1974, 1976).

11. IT IS ONE THING THAT GEMAYEL AND KARAMI MAY BE WILLING TO EXPLORE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GOI, NETANYAHU OBSERVED, BUT WHAT ABOUT OTHER LEADERS LIKE BARRI AND JUMBLATT? MURPHY NOTED THAT HE HAD HAD NO CONTACT WITH OTHER LEBANESE PERSONALITIES. WE BELIEVE BARRI, AT LEAST, IS ANXIOUS TO HAVE ISRAEL WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO HELP HIM CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER IN THE SHIA COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTH. SHAMIR ASKED WHETHER ASAD IS WORRIED ABOUT THE PROLIFERATION OF RADICAL GROUPS IN LEBANON AND WHAT MAY BE SYRIA'S GROWING INABILITY TO CONTROL THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. MURPHY RESPONDED THAT ASAD MAY REALIZE THAT SYRIA HAS A TIGER BY THE TAIL IN TERMS OF SHIITE FANATICS AND THAT SYRIA MUST DEAL IN PARTICULAR WITH THE IRANIAN PRESENCE IN THE BEKAA BUT HE HAD MADE NO SUCH ALLUSION. SHAMIR AND MURPHY AGREED THAT SYRIA MUST ALSO CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE IN CONTROLLING THE ACTIVITIES OF PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON.

12. SHAMIR RETURNED IN VARIOUS WAYS TO HIS QUESTION: IF SYRIA BELIEVES THAT ISRAEL IS COMMITTED TO WITHDRAW REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHY SHOULD THE SARG BE WILLING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS? MURPHY SAID HE HAD MADE VERY CLEAR IN BOTH DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT THAT THE GOI DID NOT HAVE ONLY ONE OPTION, I.E., A CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED AND FULL WITHDRAWAL. RATHER, DEPENDING ON THE

CIRCUMSTANCES, AN ISRAELI PULLBACK COULD BE PARTIAL RATHER THAN FULL, AND/OR SUDDEN RATHER THAN SCHEDULED -- THE LATTER SCENARIO REMINISCENT OF WHAT HAPPENED IN THE SHUF IN AUGUST 1983. MURPHY NOTED THAT THIS POSSIBILITY IS GEMAYEL'S BIGGEST FEAR, AND THAT IN MURPHY'S OPINION



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ALL PARTIES SHARE AN INTEREST IN AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL.

13. MURPHY SAID THAT THE US HAD NO PARTICULAR SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN MIND FOR MOVING AHEAD ON NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT WE HAD EMPHASIZED TO THE LEBANESE AND SYRIANS THE IMPORTANCE OF GOI/GOL MILITARY-TO-MILITARY TALKS. THE IMPORTANT THING TO KEEP IN MIND IS THAT PROCEDURAL DETAILS SHOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF THE BASIC NEED FOR A DIALOGUE.

14. IN CLOSING, SHAMIR WRITELY REMARKED THAT WHILE HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED MURPHY'S COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS, HE REGRETS HE IS NOT ABLE TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS DIRECTLY WITH ASAD.

15. POST-MEETING NOTE: IN A BRIEF ASIDE HANON BAR-ON REITERATED GOI SKEPTICISM OF SYRIAN MOTIVES IN ENCOURAGING -- OR AT LEAST NOT DISCOURAGING -- LEBANESE-ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS ON WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THE ISRAELIS FEAR THAT BECAUSE SYRIA HAS THE MEANS TO UPSET SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY TIME, IT MIGHT DO SO AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE SIMPLY IN ORDER TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. MURPHY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT POSSIBILITY BUT SAID HE FELT THERE WAS OTHER EVIDENCE THAT SYRIA JUST MAY WANT A DEAL FOR REASONS INCLUDING AN IMPROVED US-SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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SHAMIR, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2

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DID NOT GIVE ANY OVERALL PERSONAL REACTION TO OUR APPROACH TO THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE, NOR DID HE INDICATE HOW WE OR THE GOI MIGHT PROCEED. (COMMENT: HE PROBABLY CHOSE TO DO SO WITH NEXT WEEK'S MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON IN MIND.)

5. BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION, MURPHY NOTED THAT DURING HIS TRIP HE HAD NOT CARRIED ANY USG "PLAN" FOR FACILITATING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, BUT RATHER A SET OF ASSUMPTIONS OR IDEAS TO EXPLORE WITH THE CONCERNED PARTIES. THE SYRIANS HAD NOT INITIALLY MADE A DIRECT RESPONSE. ASAD HAD INDICATED THAT SOME OF OUR IDEAS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, WHILE OTHERS WERE NOT. ON THE QUESTION OF MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN FORCES AND CONTROLLING INFILTRATION THROUGH SYRIAN LINES, KHADDAM'S REACTION HAD BEEN CRYPTIC TO THE POINT OF DELPHIC, IN CALLING THEM "UNJUSTIFIED." SHAMIR NOTED THAT THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN "UNACCEPTABLE" -- PERHAPS A SIGNIFICANT NUANCE.

6. ON A POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE, THE SYRIANS EMPHASIZED THIS WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOL. ASAD DID SAY THAT IN ANY NEW OR EXPANDED ROLE UNIFIL SHOULD "NOT MOVE CLOSER TO THE SYRIAN BORDER". AS FOR THE LEBANESE, GEMAYEL HAS INSTRUCTED KARAMI TO DISCUSS RENEWAL OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT. MURPHY NOTED THAT THE USG BELIEVES WE MUST PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY IN CONSIDERING ANY CHANGE IN UNIFIL'S MANDATE, FOR THIS COULD CREATE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVIET MISCHIEF.

7. THE BOTTOM LINE, MURPHY SAID, IS THAT LEBANON SEEMS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN REACHING SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH THE GOI ON AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND THE SARG SEEMS WILLING TO PERMIT THE GOL TO PURSUE ARRANGEMENTS TO THAT

END WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE QUESTION REMAINS, THOUGH, WHY WOULD SYRIA BE WILLING TO COOPERATE? MURPHY CITED



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SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES: (1) THE THREAT POSED TO SARG BY THE IDF PRESENCE IN THE BEKAA; (2) SYRIA'S INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AS A COUNTER TO DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS; (3) THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE SYRIAN OCCUPATION ON THE TROUBLED SYRIAN ECONOMY. MURPHY ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF SYRIAN MOTIVES.

8. SHAMIR ASKED IF THE SYRIANS HAD DIVULGED ANY SPECIFICS OF THEIR IDEAS ON POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. MURPHY REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NOT, BUT THAT WE HAD CLEARLY CONVEYED TO THE SARG THE ISRAELI POSITIONS AS PRESENTED TO MURPHY IN ISRAEL.

9. SHAMIR WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER SYRIA CONSIDERS ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON TO BE A BURDEN. MURPHY SUGGESTED THAT IT COULD PERHAPS BE BETTER DESCRIBED AS AN IRRITANT THAN A BURDEN. THE SYRIANS ARE TIRED OF DEALING WITH THE FRACTIOUS LEBANESE, BUT THEIR PERCEIVED SECURITY AND POLITICAL INTERESTS GIVE THEM A CONTINUED STAKE IN LEBANON. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE SYRIANS HAD MENTIONED THEIR OWN INTENTIONS TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON, MURPHY SAID THAT THE SARG HAD TAKEN THE STANDARD LINE THAT THIS WAS A MATTER SOLELY OF BILATERAL CONCERN TO THE SARG AND THE GOL.

10. IF SYRIA IS WILLING TO SANCTION GOL-GOI DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, SHAMIR ASKED, WILL THE SARG GIVE THE LEBANESE SOME LATITUDE OR CLOSELY CONTROL THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS? MURPHY REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT BE CERTAIN BUT THOUGHT THAT SYRIA WOULD PREFER NOT TO

BECOME INVOLVED IN THE DETAILS. THE ISRAELIS POINTED OUT THAT THIS PRESENTS THE DANGER OF REPEATING THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT SCENARIO, IN WHICH SYRIA HAD REJECTED THE GOL-GOI AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT. MURPHY REPLIED THAT IN THIS REGARD THE SYRIANS DRAW A CLEAR LINE BETWEEN



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POLITICAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE SARG REMAINS OPPOSED TO ANY ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD GIVE ISRAEL "POLITICAL GAINS" FROM ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO SYRIA BEFORE (E.G. 1974, 1976).

11. IT IS ONE THING THAT GEMAYEL AND KARAMI MAY BE WILLING TO EXPLORE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GOI, NETANYAHU OBSERVED, BUT WHAT ABOUT OTHER LEADERS LIKE BARRI AND JUMBLATT? MURPHY NOTED THAT HE HAD HAD NO CONTACT WITH OTHER LEBANESE PERSONALITIES. WE BELIEVE BARRI, AT LEAST, IS ANXIOUS TO HAVE ISRAEL WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO HELP HIM CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER IN THE SHIA COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTH. SHAMIR ASKED WHETHER ASAD IS WORRIED ABOUT THE PROLIFERATION OF RADICAL GROUPS IN LEBANON AND WHAT MAY BE SYRIA'S GROWING INABILITY TO CONTROL THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. MURPHY RESPONDED THAT ASAD MAY REALIZE THAT SYRIA HAS A TIGER BY THE TAIL IN TERMS OF SHIITE FANATICS AND THAT SYRIA MUST DEAL IN PARTICULAR WITH THE IRANIAN PRESENCE IN THE BEKAA BUT HE HAD MADE NO SUCH ALLUSION. SHAMIR AND MURPHY AGREED THAT SYRIA MUST ALSO CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE IN CONTROLLING THE ACTIVITIES OF PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON.

12. SHAMIR RETURNED IN VARIOUS WAYS TO HIS QUESTION: IF SYRIA BELIEVES THAT ISRAEL IS COMMITTED TO WITHDRAW REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHY SHOULD THE SARG BE WILLING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS? MURPHY SAID HE HAD MADE VERY CLEAR IN BOTH DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT THAT THE GOI DID NOT HAVE ONLY ONE OPTION, I.E., A CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED AND FULL WITHDRAWAL. RATHER, DEPENDING ON THE

CIRCUMSTANCES, AN ISRAELI PULLBACK COULD BE PARTIAL RATHER THAN FULL, AND/OR SUDDEN RATHER THAN SCHEDULED -- THE LATTER SCENARIO REMINISCENT OF WHAT HAPPENED IN THE SHUF IN AUGUST 1983. MURPHY NOTED THAT THIS POSSIBILITY IS GEMAYEL'S BIGGEST FEAR, AND THAT IN MURPHY'S OPINION

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ALL PARTIES SHARE AN INTEREST IN AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL.

13. MURPHY SAID THAT THE US HAD NO PARTICULAR SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN MIND FOR MOVING AHEAD ON NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT WE HAD EMPHASIZED TO THE LEBANESE AND SYRIANS THE IMPORTANCE OF GOI/GOL MILITARY-TO-MILITARY TALKS. THE IMPORTANT THING TO KEEP IN MIND IS THAT PROCEDURAL DETAILS SHOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF THE BASIC NEED FOR A DIALOGUE.

14. IN CLOSING, SHAMIR WRYLY REMARKED THAT WHILE HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED MURPHY'S COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS, HE REGRETS HE IS NOT ABLE TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS DIRECTLY WITH ASAD.

15. POST-MEETING NOTE: IN A BRIEF ASIDE HANON BAR-ON REITERATED GOI SKEPTICISM OF SYRIAN MOTIVES IN ENCOURAGING -- OR AT LEAST NOT DISCOURAGING -- LEBANESE-ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS ON WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THE ISRAELIS FEAR THAT BECAUSE SYRIA HAS THE MEANS TO UPSET SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY TIME, IT MIGHT DO SO AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE SIMPLY IN ORDER TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. MURPHY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT POSSIBILITY BUT SAID HE FELT THERE WAS OTHER EVIDENCE THAT SYRIA JUST MAY WANT A DEAL FOR REASONS INCLUDING AN IMPROVED US-SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP.

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