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State File: Records
Folder Title: USSR General Secretary
Chernenko (8490236, 8490283, 8490304)
Box: 39**

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Head of State File

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Chernenko - 8490236-8490448 **Date:** 5/6/99

Box 39 (page 1 of 2)

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8490236			
1. Memo	Robert McFarlane to Reagan, re: Letter from Chernenko, 1 p.	2/24/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
2. Letter	Chernenko to Reagan, 3 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #191</i>	2/23/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
NSC System II #8490283			
3. Letter	Reagan to Chernenko, 5 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #192</i>	3/6/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
4. Memo	McFarlane to Reagan, re: Your Reply to Chernenko and Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 2 p.	3/6/84	P1/F1/P3/F3/ P5
5. Letter	Copy of Item #3, 5 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #194</i>	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
6. Draft Letter <i>lea: Memo</i>	Reagan to Chernenko, 7 p. <i>McFarlane to RE re Chernenko letter 1p</i>	3/4/84 <i>2/24/84</i>	P1/F1/P3/F3 <i>B1</i>
NSC System II #8490304			
7. Letter	Reagan to Chernenko, 1 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #196</i>	3/8/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
8. Letter	Reagan to Brent Scowcroft, 1 p. <i>R 10/26/00 NLSM00-003 #76</i>	3/8/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
9. Talking Pts	On START and INF, 3 p. <i>R 10/26/00 NLSM00-003 #77</i>	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Head of State File

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File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Chernenko - 8490236-8490448 **Date:** 5/6/99

Box 39 (page 2 of 2)

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8490448			
10. Letter	Reagan to Chernenko, 7 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 199</i>	4/16/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
11. Memo	McFarlane to Reagan, 2 p.	4/16/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
12. Memo	George Shultz to Reagan, re: Response to Chernenko's March 19 Letter, 3 p.	4/6/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
13. Memo	<i>R 7/25/00 F99-051 # 201</i> Jack Matlock to McFarlane, re: Response to Chernenko Letter of March 19, 1 p.	4/12/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
14. Email	Forward note to Matlock from McFarlane via Kmmitt, re: Shultz Change to Rply to Chernenko, 1p.	4/9/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
15. Memo	<i>Same text as #12</i> Copy of item #12, 3 p. <i>R 7/25/00 F99-051 # 204</i>	4/6/84	P1/F1/P3/F3
16. Draft Letter	Reagan to Chernenko, 7 p. <i>R " " " #205</i>	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
17. letter	Chernenko to MR 6p. (in Russian)	3/9/84	b1
18. translation	of item #17 7p.	3/19/84	b1
19. remarks	AMBASSADOR'S oral remarks 7p.	ND	b1

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RECEIVED 24 FEB 84 19

TO PRESIDENT

FROM MCFARLANE

DOC DATE 24 FEB 84

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTIN

23 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

HS

START

SUBJECT: CHERNENKO LTR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION VIA DACOM

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRESIDENT

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)dlb
512549

REF#

LOG 8490283

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 3/7 action completed by 90283

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

February 23, 1984

Dear Mr. President,

We appreciate the kind feelings transmitted on your behalf by Mr. Bush at the hour of sorrow for the Soviet people.

In your letter you expressed some thoughts with regard to Soviet-American relations and spoke in favor of putting them on a constructive basis.

I told Mr. G. Bush and would like to reaffirm it to you personally that our approach of principle to dealing with the United States remains unchanged.

This approach reflects a joint view of the Soviet leadership and enjoys a full support of the entire people of our country.

In conducting our foreign policy we will continue persistent efforts with the aim of strengthening the peace and lessening the danger of war. We will stand for a peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, will seek to develop an equal and mutually advantageous cooperations with all countries, if they are ready, on their part, to do likewise. This, of course, applies, in full measure to the United States, too.

In practical terms, this means also that our positions laid down, in particular in our message to you of January 28, remain in force. Therein, we clearly expressed our view as to the present state of affairs concerning the issues of nuclear weapons in Europe and in the area of strategic weapons, as well as with regard to the arms limitation and reduction process as a whole. We are expecting your reaction.

I would like, Mr. President, that you and I should have a clear understanding from the very beginning on the central

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NLS F99-051#191

BY *smb* NARA DATE *10/16/00*

matters of the relations between the USSR and the USA. These are the matters of security. The Soviet Union does not seek a military superiority, nor does it seek to dictate its will to others, but we will, of course, be safeguarding the interests of our security and those of our allies and friends from any attempts to damage those interests.

I believe, you will agree that in a nuclear age we must not allow the irreparable to take place, be it through design or mistake. We are not seeking a confrontation with the U.S. Such a confrontation would hardly be in the interests of your country, either. If you and I have a common understanding on this point, then it should be put into effect also in practical deeds.

From this standpoint it is important that restraint be exercised in everything, in matters big and small, and that both sides display the high degree of responsibility which is required by the interests of international security and stability. As a minimum, it is necessary to do nothing in the practical policy, that could exacerbate the situation and cause irreversible changes in Soviet-American relations as well as in the international situation as a whole.

We are convinced that it is impossible to begin to correct the present abnormal and, let's face it, dangerous situation, and to speak seriously of constructive moves, if there is a continuation of attempts to upset the balance of forces and to gain military advantages to the detriment of the security of the other side, if actions are taken prejudicing the legitimate interests of the other side.

There is another important point which the U.S. leadership must clearly understand: not only the U.S. has allies and friends. The Soviet Union has them too; and we will be caring for them.

We look at things realistically and have no illusions that it is possible to carry on business in total abstraction from the objective differences which exist between a socialist country and a capitalist country.

For instance, our morality does not accept much of what is endemic to the capitalist society and what we consider as unfair to people. Nevertheless, we do not introduce these problems into the sphere of interstate relationship. Just as we believe it is wrong and even dangerous to subordinate our relations to ideological differences.

These are the considerations of a general nature which I thought necessary to convey to you. As to the specific areas where the Soviet Union and the U.S. could, right now and with no time lost, move in a constructive way, those have been outlined by us, including in the message that I mentioned. I would like to expect that a positive reaction on your part will follow.

We have always been resolute advocates of a serious and meaningful dialogue - a dialogue that would be aimed at searching for common ground, at finding concrete and mutually acceptable solutions in those areas where it proves realistically possible.

In conclusion I will emphasize once again: a turn toward even and good relations between our two countries has been and continues to be our desire. And such a turn is quite feasible, given the same desire on the U.S. side.

Sincerely,

K.CHERNENKO

Moscow,
The Kremlin

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

6
ID 8490236

RECEIVED 24 FEB 84 19

TO PRESIDENT

FROM MCFARLANE

DOCDATE 24 FEB 84

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI

23 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

ARMS CONTROL

START

SUBJECT: CHERNENKO LTR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION VIA DACOM

DUE:

STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines: August 28, 1997

NARA, Date: 4/17/03

COMMENTS

REF#

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
ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

ID 8490236

SOURCE DATA

PAGE 801

McFARLANE

840224

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI 840223

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFORMATION

ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	
PRESIDENT	Z	84022419	FOR INFORMATION VIA DACOM	(INITIAL)

	X	84030720	SEE 90283 FOR FINAL ACTION	(UPDATES)
	X	88120716	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S	

DUE DATE STATUS C FINDATE 840307 (C) B FILE SII NSCIF

S/O MCFARLANE INFO

DDOC DATE NSC DISTRIBUTION DISPATCH FOR ACTION DISPATCH FOR INFO

EO

Washington, D.C. February 24, 1984

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have been instructed to transmit herewith through your good office the enclosed letter by Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU Konstantin U. Chernenko to President Reagan.

I would appreciate your bringing this letter to the attention of the President.

With best regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'A. Dobrynin', with a stylized, cursive script.

Anatoly F. DOBRYNIN

Ambassador

The Honorable
George P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

9.

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8490283

RECEIVED 05 MAR 84 12

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 05 MAR 84

MATLOCK

06 MAR 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI

HS

SUBJECT. PRES LTR TO CHERNENKO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

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REF# 8406734

8406718

LOG 849236

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Mcfarlane	X	Pres for signature		
Pres	P	for signature & decision		
	-	3/06 Krummelt spl		
	-	3/06 Pres approved memos 2 & 3		
	C	3/06 Pres spl ltr		

DISPATCH *ed via Shultz* W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

System # II
Package # 90283

MAR 6 11 P 6: 46

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
NSC Secretariat	3	MAR 0 6 1984 <i>[Signature]</i>	N
Situation Room			↓
Tom Shull			✓

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

File in SYSTEM II - no copies.
Bud gave George Shultz a copy
of cover memo and the original
of the signed letter at Tab A.
[Signature]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90283

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1984

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have given careful thought to your letter of February 23 and welcome your desire for a turn toward better relations between our countries. I agree with you that an improvement in United States-Soviet relations is feasible.

I am also pleased to see how quickly you have been able to pick up the burdens of your heavy responsibilities. My letter carried by the Vice President was intended to ensure that the occasion of your meeting would be used for our continued dialogue. Our tasks of leading the world's two most powerful nations are not easy and perhaps we two are the only ones who have the full understanding of these burdens of maintaining world peace. It is for that reason that I want you to know, Mr. General Secretary, how much I value the importance of communicating with you directly and confidentially.

It seems to me that our dialogue has reached a point where, as you said in your letter, we should look for specific areas in which we can move our relationship in a more positive direction. As for some of the principles you address in your letter, let me reiterate what I wrote to the late General Secretary and have stated publicly: the United States has no desire to threaten the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. Nor are we seeking either military superiority or to impose our will on others. I agree with you that we have an obligation to our peoples and to the world not to allow a nuclear conflict to occur and that this requires restraint in our actions.

You wrote also of "attempts to upset the balance of forces and to gain military advantages to the detriment of the security of the other side." I

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NLS F99-051 #192

~~TOP SECRET~~

BY any, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

12

agree that such attempts are dangerous. Yet, in our view, many actions of the Soviet Union in recent years would represent just such attempts.

But it is not my purpose to debate these matters here. Our views are well known. We should, instead, move beyond mutual recrimination and attempts to assess blame and find concrete steps we both can take to put our relations on a more positive track. To move this process forward, I would like to re-state once again our position on certain fundamental questions and then to make some specific suggestions as to what we might do concretely.

I think that we both begin with the premise that our strategic nuclear relationship lies at the center of our concern for future peace and stability in the world. I have the feeling that the significance of what I have tried to say recently on this subject is not appreciated by your side. Therefore I would like to explain some of these concepts and suggest a way to achieve a better understanding of our mutual positions.

The strategic arms talks have always had as an important stumbling block the fact that our forces are not constructed -- for understandable reasons of history and geography -- along the same lines. We are concerned about the current imbalance in large, MIRVed, land-based systems in favor of the USSR, which we consider to be the most destabilizing category of nuclear systems. You have criticized our proposals as one-sided and an attempt to restructure your forces without any attendant change in our forces. This is not our intent.

Our purpose is to achieve significant reductions in the strategic systems of both sides. Such reductions need not result in identical force structures. The balance we seek must obviously take account of the interests of both sides. That is why in my earlier communications I suggested that we explore what types of reciprocal concessions might bring our interests into better balance.

In my letter presented by the Vice President I went further and suggested that we have ideas on concrete ways to narrow differences between our

~~TOP SECRET~~

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- 3 -

13

respective positions. The trade-offs we are prepared to discuss would, I believe, bridge the proposals of both sides and provide, as I said, a more stable balance at lower levels.

The question of intermediate range nuclear arms also continues to be one that should be addressed by our two governments. We have put proposals forward that could form the basis for agreement on this question and we believe it would be in the interests of both of us and the world to return to those negotiations. If your side has new ideas on how to proceed, we are ready to give them serious consideration.

Beyond questions involving strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces, you and we have a broad agenda of arms control issues which offer opportunities for concrete progress. We are prepared to discuss in diplomatic channels our views on each of the areas you mentioned in your speech of March 2. As you know, our view is that a central problem in these areas is ensuring that any agreements are verifiable. We will take a serious attitude towards exploring possibilities in a constructive dialogue.

In several arms control fields, we have specific ideas for your side to consider. During the next round of the discussions in Vienna on MBFR, we will have ideas for moving the process ahead. On chemical weapons, we will have ready soon a draft treaty providing for a global ban on the production and stockpiling of these weapons. I also believe that the CDE Conference in Stockholm offers possibilities for concrete progress.

You have expressed concern about new American defense programs, particularly those related to ballistic missile defense. One of the reasons we believe it is important to resume discussions of strategic weapons issues in Geneva is that this would provide us an opportunity to discuss ballistic missile defense questions as well. You will recall that we suggested such an approach last year. Our offer remains in force.

Both sides also have expressed concerns about the other's military build-up, the threat we each perceive and the necessity to put in place measures which could help in time of crisis. Should we consider more direct consultations between those responsible for our defense?

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~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4 -

One specific area that offers an opportunity for early agreement is improvement in our hotline. The discussions among our experts have gone well. We will deliver to your side technical information in the next few weeks, and anticipate another round of discussions early this spring.

In addition to arms control, I believe that regional issues are also an important topic for our dialogue. You underlined the importance of these issues in your meeting with Vice President Bush. Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman have taken the initiative in recent months to give you our thinking on a number of critical regional questions. We are prepared to intensify these regional consultations. One area of immediate concern to both sides is the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

Another major objective of mine is to develop a better working relationship in areas of practical interest to both our nations. I believe our governments can agree on the mutual benefits of establishing consulates in Kiev and New York, as well as negotiation of a new exchanges agreement. And we can benefit from developing a package of measures to facilitate travel and the work of our diplomats through resumption of consular review talks. We are prepared to move ahead in all three of these areas.

We are also prepared to reinvigorate a number of existing agreements and to review seriously those coming up for extension. There are steps that we can take to increase activity under our agreements for cooperation in the fields of agriculture, environmental protection, housing and health.

I am pleased that our representatives at the International Civil Aeronautics Organization in Montreal are discussing specific measures countries can take to enhance the safety of civil aviation. Agreement on such measures would be a significant step forward.

There are other areas where I believe we could usefully work together. For example, I would like to reiterate our offer to conduct a simulated space rescue. This is the kind of practical cooperation which our two governments should be seeking to build a basis of greater confidence.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

- 5 -

15

Mr. General Secretary, following his visit to Moscow, Vice President Bush conveyed to me your message that we should take steps to ensure that history recalls us as leaders known to be good, wise and kind. Nothing is more important to me, and we should take steps to bring this about. For example, last year the agonizing situation of the Vashchenko and Chmykalov families was resolved. I was touched by this gesture. In my view, this shows how quiet and sincere efforts can solve even the most sensitive problems in our relationship. Similar humanitarian gestures this year also would touch the hearts of all Americans.

Therefore I conclude, as you did, that "a turn toward steady and good relations between our two countries" is desirable and feasible. I am determined to do my part in working for that end.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

90283 14
SYSTEM II

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/6/84

COLIN POWELL

Bud asked that the attached
draft be passed to the Secretary. It
has gone forward to the President.

Bob Kinnitt

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/14/95 BY [signature]

DECLASSIFIED

dlb

5/14/95

18
~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have given careful thought to your letter of February 23 and welcome your desire for a turn toward better relations between our countries. I agree with you that an improvement in United States-Soviet relations is feasible.

I am also pleased to see how quickly you have been able to pick up the burdens of your heavy responsibilities. My letter carried by the Vice President was intended to ensure that the occasion of your meeting would be used for our continued dialogue. Our tasks of leading the world's two most powerful nations are not easy and perhaps we two are the only ones who have the full understanding of these burdens of maintaining world peace. It is for that reason that I want you to know, Mr. General Secretary, how much I value the importance of communicating with you directly and confidentially.

It seems to me that our dialogue has reached a point where, as you said in your letter, we should look for specific areas in which we can move our relationship in a more positive direction. As for some of the principles you address in your letter, let me reiterate what I wrote to the late General Secretary and have stated publicly: the United States has no desire to threaten the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. Nor are we seeking either military superiority or to impose our will on others. I agree with you that we have an obligation to our peoples and to the world not to allow a nuclear conflict to occur and that this requires restraint in our actions.

You wrote also of "attempts to upset the balance of forces and to gain military advantages to the detriment of the security of the other side." I

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-051 #174

BY any, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

~~SECRET~~

agree that such attempts are dangerous. Yet, in our view, many actions of the Soviet Union in recent years would represent just such attempts.

But it is not my purpose to debate these matters here. Our views are well known. We should, instead, move beyond mutual recrimination and attempts to assess blame and find concrete steps we both can take to put our relations on a more positive track. To move this process forward, I would like to re-state once again our position on certain fundamental questions and then to make some specific suggestions as to what we might do concretely.

I think that we both begin with the premise that our strategic nuclear relationship lies at the center of our concern for future peace and stability in the world. I have the feeling that the significance of what I have tried to say recently on this subject is not appreciated by your side. Therefore I would like to explain some of these concepts and suggest a way to achieve a better understanding of our mutual positions.

The strategic arms talks have always had as an important stumbling block the fact that our forces are not constructed -- for understandable reasons of history and geography -- along the same lines. We are concerned about the current imbalance in large, MIRVed, land-based systems in favor of the USSR, which we consider to be the most destabilizing category of nuclear systems. You have criticized our proposals as one-sided and an attempt to restructure your forces without any attendant change in our forces. This is not our intent.

Our purpose is to achieve significant reductions in the strategic systems of both sides. Such reductions need not result in identical force structures. The balance we seek must obviously take account of the interests of both sides. That is why in my earlier communications I suggested that we explore what types of reciprocal concessions might bring our interests into better balance.

In my letter presented by the Vice President I went further and suggested that we have ideas on concrete ways to narrow differences between our

~~SECRET~~

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The question of intermediate range nuclear arms also continues to be one that should be addressed by our two governments. We have put proposals forward that could form the basis for agreement on this question and we believe it would be in the interests of both of us and the world to return to those negotiations. If your side has new ideas on how to proceed, we are ready to give them serious consideration.

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Both sides also have expressed concerns about the other's military build-up, the threat we each perceive and the necessity to put in place measures which could help in time of crisis. Should we consider more direct consultations between those responsible for our defense?

~~SECRET~~

One specific area that offers an opportunity for early agreement is improvement in our hotline. The discussions among our experts have gone well. We will deliver to your side technical information in the next few weeks, and anticipate another round of discussions early this spring.

In addition to arms control, I believe that regional issues are also an important topic for our dialogue. You underlined the importance of these issues in your meeting with Vice President Bush. Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman have taken the initiative in recent months to give you our thinking on a number of critical regional questions. We are prepared to intensify these regional consultations. One area of immediate concern to both sides is the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

Another major objective of mine is to develop a better working relationship in areas of practical interest to both our nations. I believe our governments can agree on the mutual benefits of establishing consulates in Kiev and New York, as well as negotiation of a new exchanges agreement. And we can benefit from developing a package of measures to facilitate travel and the work of our diplomats through resumption of consular review talks. We are prepared to move ahead in all three of these areas.

We are also prepared to reinvigorate a number of existing agreements and to review seriously those coming up for extension. There are steps that we can take to increase activity under our agreements for cooperation in the fields of agriculture, environmental protection, housing and health.

I am pleased that our representatives at the International Civil Aeronautics Organization in Montreal are discussing specific measures countries can take to enhance the safety of civil aviation. Agreement on such measures would be a significant step forward.

There are other areas where I believe we could usefully work together. For example, I would like to reiterate our offer to conduct a simulated space rescue. This is the kind of practical cooperation which our two governments should be seeking to build a basis of greater confidence.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. General Secretary, following his visit to Moscow, Vice President Bush conveyed to me your message that we should take steps to ensure that history recalls us as leaders known to be good, wise and kind. Nothing is more important to me, and we should take steps to bring this about. For example, last year the agonizing situation of the Vashchenko and Chmykalov families was resolved. I was touched by this gesture. In my view, this shows how quiet and sincere efforts can solve even the most sensitive problems in our relationship. Similar humanitarian gestures this year also would touch the hearts of all Americans.

Therefore I conclude, as you did, that "a turn toward steady and good relations between our two countries" is desirable and feasible. I am determined to do my part in working for that end.

Sincerely,

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

System # II
Package # 90283

RECEIVED

MAR 7 11:53
SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	RCM HAS SEEN	<u>ADVANCE</u>
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

CHERNENKO LETTER

Staffed to Matlock only. Please let
me know if others should receive.



21
SUPER SENSITIVE 8406734 XR 8406718

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90283

SECRET/SENSITIVE

March 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to General Secretary Chernenko

The Secretary has given his approval to the attached draft message to Chernenko.

for *Robert M. Hill*
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL:OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By *dh* NARA, Date *5/24/99*

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ID 8490304

RECEIVED 08 MAR 84 14

TO CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI FROM PRESIDENT

ms 25144

DOCDATE 08 MAR 84

KEYWORDS START

INF

SCOWCROFT, BRENT

ARMS CONTROL

USSR

HS

SUBJECT. PRES LTRS TO CHERNENKO RE SCOWCROFT VISIT ON START & INF ISSUES

ACTION. PRES SGD LTRS

DUE.

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COMMENTS ** NO COPIES TO ANYONE PER MCFARLANE

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Scowcroft *C-MAR 0 8 1984* *Pres ltr for hand delivery*

DISPATCH

for McFarlane

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1984

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have asked General Brent Scowcroft to take advantage of his visit to Moscow to discuss with you my thinking on the issues before our countries. As I have noted in previous communications, I believe the time has come for us to examine closely how we can make progress in the relationship and particularly in the area of nuclear arms reductions. An informal exchange of views may assist us in this effort.

General Scowcroft has my full confidence and that of Secretary Shultz, and I shall welcome any informal comments or suggestions which you may wish to convey to me through him.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union
Moscow

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-051 # 196

BY 474, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

NLS MOO-003 #16BY LOT NARA, DATE 12/13/00

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1984

Dear Brent:


I understand that you will be travelling to Moscow shortly as a member of a private group which has scheduled discussions with Soviet scholars and officials.

If the opportunity should arise during your visit to meet privately with Soviet policy makers, I would appreciate your discussing with them our current thinking on possible ways to improve the relationship and in particular to reduce the levels of nuclear arms. As you know, I attach the highest importance to making progress in this vital area.

Your counsel, particularly on strategic and nuclear questions, has always been of great value to me, and you are thoroughly familiar with my thinking on these matters. For this reason, it seems to me that you are in an excellent position to explain informally the possibilities for making progress, and to relay to us any thoughts or suggestions your Soviet interlocutors may have.

I look forward to meeting with you when you return.

Sincerely,



Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)
International Six, Incorporated
Suite 440
1875 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

TALKING POINTS ON START AND INF

-- I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you. As you may know, I have been in close consultations with President Reagan and key members of his Administration for many months. My most recent meeting with the President was this Thursday. When the President heard that I was coming to Moscow, he asked me to share with you here the current views in Washington regarding ways in which we might reduce tension between our countries. The President is committed to reducing tensions by solving some of the problems in the relationship. He is prepared to renew talks in areas where agreement seems possible. Secretary Shultz has informed Ambassador Dobrynin of this officially and has suggested a number of areas for negotiation.

-- The President also takes into account the fact that you and we agree that nuclear arms issues are a central feature of our relationship. He, therefore considers it important to look for ways in which negotiations on strategic and intermediate range weapons systems can be resumed. I, of course, have not come to negotiate on behalf of the United States Government. The President understands your position that you are not prepared to negotiate on START or INF at the moment, and will not assert that we are in negotiations.

-- However, the subject of nuclear arms control is one of central importance to both our countries, and the President thought it would be useful for us to have an informal discussion. In doing so, I will be pleased to convey to the President and his advisers any comments or suggestions you may wish to make. We will consider them informal, just as are my comments.

-- The Reagan Administration is serious in its desire to see the talks resume so that we might reach agreements in both START and INF. At the same time, the President feels that he has already enunciated forthcoming positions and is not inclined to make pre-emptive concessions. He is willing to conclude useful agreements on the basis of compromise by both sides.

-- The Soviet walk out of INF and START after failure to respond to build-down and "walk-in-the-woods" initiatives has been widely criticised and concern over compliance issues has increased.

-- The Reagan Administration believes that it has acted responsibly with respect to the NATO dual track decision and our differences over compliance, and has sought not to create obstacles to a return to negotiations nor to making progress once talks resume. The Administration seeks a constructive dialog to address our differences.

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BY WJS NARA, DATE 12/13/00

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-- Despite the refusal of the Soviet Union to set a date for resumption of START and INF negotiations, the United States has continued work on the issues which separate us. It is clear to us that the current Soviet proposal does not provide an acceptable basis for an agreement. However, we have been examining approaches in which trades between Soviet and American systems can be accomplished in ways which are both equitable and stabilizing. Some of these approaches would involve changes in framework from existing Soviet and American negotiating structures.

-- Such a framework could involve several different mechanisms for balancing areas of US interest with areas of Soviet interest including rights and limits which apply equally to both sides, different rights and limits for each side designed so that advantages granted to one side are compensated for by advantages granted the other side, and through the use of common measures which can accommodate different force structures under the same limits. A common framework incorporating elements of both sides approaches does seem possible.

-- The President remains strongly committed to the objective of significant reductions in nuclear arms and desires to achieve a long term agreement which will achieve those reductions. Officials in his Administration are also looking at the possibility of achieving those objectives in a series of steps.

-- The Administration remains interested in reaching an agreement on LRINF. Washington believes that the US and the Soviet Union are closer on substance than is widely recognized and that the major obstacle to concluding an agreement is political on the part of the Soviet side. The NATO alliance is highly suspicious of the political motivations of the Soviet Union during the INF negotiations. The very negative response Moscow gave to the "walk-in-the-woods" proposal was viewed as the most significant of many signals from the Soviet Union that the USSR did not desire an agreement. The President personally believes very strongly that the general structure for an agreement was contained in his United Nations Speech of September 1983. In that context, if the Soviet Union were to return to the LRINF negotiations in Geneva, the United States would undoubtedly be negotiating along lines which could result in what one might call a "modified walk-in-the-woods."

-- The United States will continue to negotiate in good faith in the many fora in which we are now engaged in arms control talks. However, the United States does not view these other negotiations as mitigating the responsibility of both sides to return to the START and INF negotiations. The absence of the Soviet Union from these key talks cannot but influence the climate of negotiations.

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-- The Reagan Administration, and much of the Congress, does not believe that the Soviet Union paid proper attention to the discussion of START trade-offs which was offered in the last round of START in Geneva.

-- The Administration has conducted extensive studies of various approaches to an equitable START agreement which would trade reductions in areas of US advantage or interest for reductions in areas of Soviet advantage or interest. The US position already contains within it much flexibility with respect to the content and structure of an agreement and further work has been completed.

-- During the development of the build-down initiative, I was involved with many of these approaches and have since been briefed on the current work in progress. All of these approaches have been designed to move in the direction recommended by the bipartisan Presidential Commission which I headed. Each attempts to address the question of trade-offs in an equitable and negotiable way.

-- It is not the intent of these proposals to mandate inequitable changes in Soviet force structure. Both the President and the Congress have agreed that arms control must move in the direction of more stabilizing systems. This means that, over time, we must move away from a preponderance of emphasis on heavily MIRVed land based missiles. Nevertheless, the US recognizes that MIRVed missiles play an important role in both sides nuclear forces.

-- The US has in mind trade-offs which would provide incentives to move away from MIRVed missiles and toward non-MIRVed missiles and aircraft in ways which provide for differences in force structures. For example, the Soviet Union currently has an advantage in non-MIRVed missiles, the US has the advantage in heavy bombers. Also, the Soviet Union has advantages in missile destructive capability and potential (for example, heavy ICBMs and missile force throwweight) and the United States has an advantage in the number of heavy bombers which are being equipped for long-range air launched cruise missiles.

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