

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

**Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of
State File: Records
Folder Title: USSR General Secretary
Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793)
Box: 39**

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8490757

RECEIVED 02 JUL 84 16

TO PRESIDENT

FROM POINDEXTER

DOC DATE 02 JUL 84

DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *2307/5/84*

KEYWORDS USSR

HS

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SHULTZ, G

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO CHERNENKO & SHULTZ TALKING POINTS FOR MTG W/ DOBRYNIN

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE AND DECISION DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRESIDENT

BAKER, J

COMMENTS ** NO COPIES OR DISTRIBUTION PER POINDEXTER

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

JUL 02 1984

C JUL 02 1984

Pres approved
Pres sgd ltr

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90757

2

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Date JUL 02 1984

Subject: PRES LTR TO CHERNENKO & SHULTZ TALKERS

no system

CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Judge Clark	_____ Cmdr. Dur	_____ Mr. Lord	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Mr. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Mr. Brazil	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ NSC Registry
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Col. Myer	_____ Capt. Sims	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Ltc. Cobb	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Shull	_____ NSC MSG Center
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Sommer	
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Mr. Poe	_____ Mr. Teicher	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

CYS

Date

Time

Received/Signed For By:

4E830

THE VICE PRESIDENT				
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	ORIGINAL	7/2/84	1735	Curtis H. Seyler
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon	1	3 Jul 84	1055	D. McFarlane
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEGB				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEGB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90757

3

Date JUL 02 1984

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

STAG
M3D

Subject: PRES LTR TO CHERNENKO & SHULTZ TALKERS

CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Judge Clark	_____ Cmdr. Dur	_____ Mr. Lord	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Mr. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Mr. Brazil	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ NSC Registry
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Col. Myer	_____ Capt. Sims	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Ltc. Cobb	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Shull	_____ NSC MSG Center
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Sommer	
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Mr. Poe	_____ Mr. Teicher	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT				
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	ORIGINAL	2 JUL	1800	Emckinley
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1984

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter of June 6 deals with a number of issues which I would like to pursue after careful deliberation, but I wish to take the opportunity provided by Ambassador Dobrynin's return to Moscow to give you my thoughts on the proposal your government made June 29 for a conference in Vienna in September regarding the "militarization of outer space."

First, let me say that I believe your proposal for a conference is an excellent idea. I am prepared to have a delegation in Vienna September 18. I would observe that the date and location is of less importance than our agreement to begin serious discussions of ways arms competition can be slowed and the risk of nuclear war reduced.

Let me describe my concept of the way a useful conference might be organized. I believe that each of our delegations should be free to raise questions of concern to its side which are relevant to the overall topic. However, these should not be raised merely for the sake of exposition and debate, but with a clear mandate to seek out and find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches which hold promise for concrete results.

I have studied the position you have taken regarding the resumption of negotiations on nuclear arms. Even though I cannot agree with your reasons, I am not asking you to change that position in order to start discussions. But inasmuch as strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons systems are the most lethal systems and are intimately associated with those other space weapons on which you propose to negotiate, it is clear that it will be difficult to move very far in solving some of the problems without addressing the others. It would,

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F97-028 #1
NARA, Date 2/4/99

therefore, be difficult to understand a refusal even to discuss ways that negotiations on nuclear systems might be resumed. As I have pointed out to you several times, I have a number of ideas as to how these problems might be resolved to the advantage of both our countries. I believe that it is in our mutual interest to resolve our current impasse on offensive nuclear weapons.

Regarding the other space weapons referred to in your proposal, I am optimistic that we can find significant aspects of anti-satellite weaponry which could be a fruitful object for negotiations. In sum, I am agreeable to a conference without preconditions of any sort, but one based on a commitment by both of us to find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches to the important questions before us.

You spoke in your last letter about the necessity of dealing with each other as equals. Naturally, I agree, and I believe the approach I have outlined for a conference embodies this principle in both form and spirit. As we have both often observed, it is time for deeds. Finding ways to make progress on the central issues I have outlined would be a deed for which the whole world would thank us.

Of course, we need not wait until a conference is organized to discuss the issues before us. I will be pleased to continue our discussion of these and related topics, on a confidential basis, both in our correspondence and through our respective representatives.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to receiving your thoughts on these matters. It is my earnest hope that you will join me in seizing the opportunity we have to make a major step toward improving relations between our countries and creating a safer world for all.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent "R" at the beginning.

His Excellency
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

TALKING POINTS FOR THE SECRETARY'S USEWITH DOBRYNIN -- JULY 2, 1984

- I think that you gathered last night a first-hand sense of the President's seriousness about getting substantive arms control talks moving forward.
- He carefully studied Mr. Chernenko's last letter and has prepared this letter today in reply. It does not try to address all of the issues between us, but concentrates on a problem Mr. Chernenko focused on--what he called the "militarization of outer space."
- The President confirms what we indicated to your Embassy last Friday night. We accept your proposal of earlier that day to meet September 18 in Vienna.
- As we have indicated in our statement on Friday, the militarization of space began when the ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be deployed.
- We have noted what you wish to discuss in Vienna. We will be prepared to address those issues. We have identified issues we plan to raise as well.
- As the President notes in his letter, we anticipate that we will come to Vienna with constructive suggestions both on the question of resuming negotiations on offensive nuclear systems and on negotiating approaches to ASAT limitations.
- I wish to make one point very clear: contrary to initial press commentary, we have set no preconditions for these talks in September.
- The U.S. and Soviet Union need not agree to any common agenda on those talks. The U.S. is prepared to meet at the time and place the Soviet Union has proposed, and to address the issues the Soviet Union has proposed, in addition to which, the U.S. side will raise other issues.
- The U.S. believes that it is important to consult privately on more detailed preparations and groundwork for this meeting in order to assure that it is fruitful.
- As the President has indicated, we see this meeting as a valuable opportunity for businesslike and constructive exchanges through which we might work out mutually acceptable approaches to arms control negotiations. We are serious about using this opportunity to make progress.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECLAS: OADRDECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJF 97-028 #2
Mr., NARA, Date 2/4/99

- Thus, we are prepared to refrain from any further public comment on these discussions if you will do the same. Our preference is to pursue this question quietly through private diplomatic channels.
- I would further note that on several recent occasions, the Soviet Government has stated that the upcoming U.S. Presidential election has no bearing on its policies in this regard. I can confirm to you the same holds true for us. As the President's letter indicates, if the Soviet side wishes to hold these talks after the election in late November or December as opposed to September, that is acceptable to us as well.
- I hope that in your consultations in Moscow, you will personally underscore the seriousness and positive manner in which we are seeking to handle your proposal.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90757

UNCLASSIFIED with
SECRET ATTACHMENT

July 2, 1984

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Letter to Chairman Chernenko

Attached is the proposed letter to Chairman Chernenko, along with the talking points that Secretary Shultz would use when he gives the letter to Ambassador Dobrynin this evening if you approve. The letter was prepared by Jack Matlock and cleared with State (Shultz), Defense (Ikle) and JCS (Moreau).

We recommend your signature.

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED with
SECRET ATTACHMENT
DECLASSIFY: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 2, 1984

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter of June 6 deals with a number of issues which I would like to pursue after careful deliberation, but I wish to take the opportunity provided by Ambassador Dobrynin's return to Moscow to give you my thoughts on the proposal your government made June 29 for a conference in Vienna in September regarding the "militarization of outer space."

First, let me say that I believe your proposal for a conference is an excellent idea. I am prepared to have a delegation in Vienna September 18. I would observe that the date and location is of less importance than our agreement to begin serious discussions of ways the arms competition can be slowed and the risk of nuclear war reduced.

Let me describe my concept of the ways a useful conference might be organized. I believe that each of our delegations should be free to raise questions of concern to its side which are relevant to the overall topic. However, these should not be raised merely for the sake of exposition and debate, but with a clear mandate to seek out and find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches which hold promise for concrete results.

I have studied the position you have taken regarding the resumption of negotiations on nuclear arms. Even though I cannot agree with your reasons, I am not asking you to change that position in order to start discussions. But inasmuch as strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons systems are the most lethal systems and are intimately associated with those other space weapons on which you propose to negotiate, it is clear that it will be difficult to move very far in solving some of the problems without addressing the others. It would,

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
Authority NJF 97-020 #3
BY 2, NABA, Date 2/1/77

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8490769

UNCLASSIFIED ON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFICATION(S)

RECEIVED 09 JUL 84 15

TO PRESIDENT

FROM DAM, K

DOCDATE 07 JUL 84

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTIN

07 JUL 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

SUBJECT. CHERNENKO RESPONSE TO PRES 2 JUL LTR RE VIENNA TALKS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRESIDENT

MCFARLANE

POINDEXTER

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# 8419419

8419420

LOG 8490757

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C JUL 18 1984

Kinnitt spd memo

DISPATCH

JUL 18 1984

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

System #

II

Package #

90769

84 JUL 23 P 4: 35

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Put in appropriate
SYS II file 90769



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 20, 1984

84 JUL 21 A 4:30

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Signed Original of Chernenko's July 7 Letter

Soviet Chargé d'Affaires Isakov has sent us the signed original of Chairman Chernenko's July 7 letter to the President on the proposed Vienna talks. The letter, together with Isakov's covering note, are attached.

B. McKinley
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
a/s

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 5/6/99

EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 - 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

Mr. Richard R. Burt,
Assistant Secretary,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

July 18, 1984

Dear Mr. Burt,

Enclosed is the original of the letter of July 7, 1984
by Chairman K.U. Chernenko to President Reagan, a copy of
which was transmitted through you at our meeting on July 7,
1984.

Sincerely,



Victor F. Isakov
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Enc.

14

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ РОНАЛЬДУ У. РЕЙГАНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

Вашингтон

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Я внимательно прочитал Ваше письмо от 2 июля с.г. Скажу откровенно, я искал в нем позитивного ответа на наше предложение о проведении в сентябре текущего года советско-американских переговоров о предотвращении милитаризации космического пространства. К сожалению, такого ответа в письме нет.

Приходится сделать такой вывод, несмотря на то, что Вы сообщаете о готовности приступить к переговорам в Вене. Ведь из Вашего письма ясно следует, что США согласны участвовать не в тех переговорах, которые предлагает и в которых готова участвовать советская сторона.

Напомню, что Советский Союз выступает за принятие срочных мер, которые позволили бы надежно перекрыть все каналы распространения гонки вооружений на космос. Сделать это можно, запретив все космические ударные средства, о чем мы и предлагаем провести переговоры, установив одновременно с их началом мораторий на испытания и развертывание таких средств.

С американской стороны говорится о проведении по сути дела не переговоров по космосу, а какой-то "конференции" без определенной повестки дня, то есть разговор был бы обо всем и ни о чем конкретно.

Мы далеки от того, чтобы недооценивать значение вопросов ядерных вооружений, которые в Вашем письме увязываются с проблемой космоса. Нашу позицию насчет того, как решать эти вопросы, Вы знаете. Но по-прежнему ничто не указывает на готовность американской стороны учесть эту позицию и открыть путь для выхода из нынешнего тупика. Запрещение космического оружия – самостоятельная проблема большой важности. Пристегнуть же ее к фактически заблокированным сейчас вопросам ограничения и сокращения ядерных вооружений означало бы поставить и переговоры по космосу в тупиковую ситуацию. В то же время развертывание космического ударного оружия неизбежно привело бы к резкому скачку гонки вооружений и на Земле, еще более осложнило бы возможность принятия действенных мер по ограничению и сокращению вооружений вообще. Мы убеждены, что такое развитие событий не отвечало бы ничьим интересам.

DECLASSIFIED

MSF97-028 #5 MVA 5/17/00
Authority CAS, NARA, Date 8/20/02

2.


Что касается собственно космического оружия, то акцент здесь должен, конечно, делаться не на том, чтобы что-то изучать. Нужно договариваться о практических мерах, чтобы не допустить появления ударного космического оружия любых видов. Этим и определяются те конкретные вопросы, которые СССР выдвинул для переговоров, с тем чтобы проблема решалась во всех ее аспектах и радикально.

Об этом, а не о чем-либо ином мы предлагаем вести переговоры. И прежде чем наши делегации встретятся за столом переговоров, нужно четко условиться о предмете этих переговоров. Этого требуют важность и актуальность проблемы.

Мы подходим к этим переговорам серьезно, ответственно и ждем такого же отношения с американской стороны. Если, однако, для Вас, по каким-то причинам затруднительно дать согласие на такие переговоры в названное нами время, мы вынуждены были бы с этим считаться. Важно, чтобы у нас было согласие, что такие переговоры нужны и что мы будем их вести, причем без неоправданной затяжки.

В заключение еще раз хочу подчеркнуть главное. Не может быть сомнения в том, что благоразумнее заранее исключить космос из сферы военного соперничества, чем потом пытаться устранять неизбежный в противном случае серьезный, а может быть и непоправимый ущерб стабильности и безопасности. Я призываю Вас, господин Президент, еще раз взглянуть на всю проблему под этим углом зрения. Хотелось бы надеяться, что Вы сможете дать позитивный ответ на наше предложение, которое остается в силе.

С уважением



К. ЧЕРНЕНКО

Москва

7 июля 1984 года

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Translation from the Russian

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have carefully read your letter of July 2, 1984. Let me say frankly that I was looking in it for a positive response to our proposal to hold Soviet-American negotiations this September on preventing the militarization of outer space. Regrettably, there is no such response in the letter.

One has to reach such a conclusion despite the fact that you express readiness to start negotiations in Vienna. For from your letter it clearly follows that the U.S. is not agreeing to participate in the kind of negotiations which the Soviet side proposes and in which it is prepared to participate.

Let me recall that the Soviet Union favors the adoption of urgent measures which would enable us effectively to block all channels for extending the arms race into space. This can be done by banning all space attack systems, which is precisely what we propose to have negotiations about, and by establishing a moratorium, simultaneously with the start of negotiations, on testing and deployment of such systems.

The American side essentially is talking about conducting not negotiations on space, but some sort of "conference" without a definite agenda, i.e. there would be a conversation about everything and about nothing specifically.

We are far from underestimating the importance of questions of nuclear armaments, which in your letter are linked with the problem of space. You know our position with regard to how to solve these questions. But as before, nothing points to the readiness of the American side to take into account this position and open the way out of the present impasse. Banning space weapons is a problem of great importance in its own right. To tie it to questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms, which are in fact currently blocked, would be to put negotiations on space attack weapons into a stalemated position as well. At the same time, the deployment of space attack weapons would inevitably lead to a sharp escalation of the arms race on earth too, and would complicate all the more the possibility of undertaking effective measures for limiting and reducing armaments in general. We are convinced that such a development of events would serve nobody's interests.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97028 #6BY M27 NARA, DATE 5/18/00

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

As for space weapons themselves, the emphasis here should, of course, not be on studying something. It is necessary to reach agreement on practical measures in order to prevent the appearance of space attack weapons of any kind. This is also what determines the concrete questions put forward by the USSR for negotiations, in order to resolve the problem in all its aspects and in a radical way.

We approach these negotiations seriously and responsibly, and we expect the same attitude from the American side. If, however, for some reason it is difficult for you to give consent to such negotiations at the time we suggested, we would have to take that into account. It is important that we be in agreement that such negotiations are necessary, and that we will conduct them without unjustifiable delays.

In conclusion I wish to emphasize the main point once again. There cannot be any doubt that it is more sensible to exclude space from military competition in advance, rather than trying later on to eliminate the otherwise inevitable, serious and perhaps even irreparable damage to stability and security. I appeal to you, Mr. President, to look at this whole problem once again from this perspective. I would like to hope that you could give a positive reply to our proposal, which remains in force.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko.

Moscow
July 7, 1984

SECRET/SENSITIVE

90769

RET'D AND DESTROYED BY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ON

7/19/84

7/17/84

Dan Murphy:

BWRN

Don Gregg asked me to
send you a copy of the
attached for the Vice President.

Bob Kinnitt

Return
to Bryan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90769/90793 19

Date JUL 18 1984

Subject: CY OF CHERNENKO LTR - 7 JULY

512549
WJ

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Amb. McFarlane	_____ Ms. Dornan	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Teicher
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Cmdr. Dur	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Wattering
_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Ltc. Cox	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. Menges	_____ Cpt. Shull	_____ NSC Registry
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Ltc. North	_____ Mr. Sommer	_____ NSC MSG Center

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

CYS

Date

Time

Received/Signed For By:

THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Exec sec/Room 7241

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
Main Bldg/Room 3422

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Pentagon

DIRECTOR, ACDA
Room 5933/Dept. of State

CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 State

CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 State

DIRECTOR, CIA
Langley, Va/or Pickup

CHAIRMAN, JCS
The Pentagon

DIRECTOR, OMB
Room 252 OEOB

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS
Room 6333, State Dept.

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
GA257, Forrestal Bldg

DIRECTOR, AID
Room 5942, Dept. of State

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Dept. of Justice, Room 5119

DIRECTOR, OSTP
Room 360, OEOB

DIRECTOR, USIA
400 C Street, S.W.

THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
18th & E. Street NW

THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
Independence & 14th SW

UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW

THE DIRECTOR, FEMA
500 C Street,

DIRECTOR, DMSPA
Room 3E813, Pentagon

1

18 JULY 1984 Wayne C. Chilton

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

II
90793
90769 AND

7/18/84

Colin Powell:

"Tab B," per request.

Bob Kinnitt

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Translation from the Russian

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97028#7

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

BY M77 NARA, DATE 5/17/0

Dear Mr. President:

I have carefully read your letter of July 2, 1984. Let me say frankly that I was looking in it for a positive response to our proposal to hold Soviet-American negotiations this September on preventing the militarization of outer space. Regrettably, there is no such response in the letter.

One has to reach such a conclusion despite the fact that you express readiness to start negotiations in Vienna. For from your letter it clearly follows that the U.S. is not agreeing to participate in the kind of negotiations which the Soviet side proposes and in which it is prepared to participate.

Let me recall that the Soviet Union favors the adoption of urgent measures which would enable us effectively to block all channels for extending the arms race into space. This can be done by banning all space attack systems, which is precisely what we propose to have negotiations about, and by establishing a moratorium, simultaneously with the start of negotiations, on testing and deployment of such systems.

The American side essentially is talking about conducting not negotiations on space, but some sort of "conference" without a definite agenda; i.e. there would be a conversation about everything and about nothing specifically.

We are far from underestimating the importance of questions of nuclear armaments, which in your letter are linked with the problem of space. You know our position with regard to how to solve these questions. But as before, nothing points to the readiness of the American side to take into account this position and open the way out of the present impasse. Banning space weapons is a problem of great importance in its own right. To tie it to questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms, which are in fact currently blocked, would be to put negotiations on space attack weapons into a stalemated position as well. At the same time, the deployment of space attack weapons would inevitably lead to a sharp escalation of the arms race on earth too, and would complicate all the more the possibility of undertaking effective measures for limiting and reducing armaments in general. We are convinced that such a development of events would serve nobody's interests.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

As for space weapons themselves, the emphasis here should, of course, not be on studying something. It is necessary to reach agreement on practical measures in order to prevent the appearance of space attack weapons of any kind. This is also what determines the concrete questions put forward by the USSR for negotiations, in order to resolve the problem in all its aspects and in a radical way.

We approach these negotiations seriously and responsibly, and we expect the same attitude from the American side. If, however, for some reason it is difficult for you to give consent to such negotiations at the time we suggested, we would have to take that into account. It is important that we be in agreement that such negotiations are necessary, and that we will conduct them without unjustifiable delays.

In conclusion I wish to emphasize the main point once again. There cannot be any doubt that it is more sensible to exclude space from military competition in advance, rather than trying later on to eliminate the otherwise inevitable, serious and perhaps even irreparable damage to stability and security. I appeal to you, Mr. President, to look at this whole problem once again from this perspective. I would like to hope that you could give a positive reply to our proposal, which remains in force.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko.

Moscow
July 7, 1984

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

II
90769

84 JUL 9 P 3: 26

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		A
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

File for record purposes only.
Copies have gone to Pres,
REN, JMR, Matlock

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

STAFF	C/O
McFarlane	C
Poindexter	C
Kimmit	O
Shull	
PRESTON	C
KATLOCK	C
Thompson	
Merchant	
NSC S/S	

Delivered
Eyes only
Disseminated per
JO's instructions

LDX

Approval: _____

C : Copy

O : Original

8419419
XR8419420

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

84 JUL 9 P3: 26

July 7, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

SUBJECT: Chernenko's Response to Your July 2 Letter
on the Vienna Talks

Soviet Chargé Isakov came in to see Rick Burt Saturday afternoon under urgent instructions from Moscow to hand over a reply from Chernenko to your July 2 letter on the Vienna talks. An unofficial translation, as well as the Russian original, are attached.

Chernenko's letter stresses the following points:

-- It insists that you have not yet given a positive response to the Soviet proposal to negotiate on preventing "the militarization of space" in September, and that "the American side" is still talking about some "conference" without a definite agenda.

-- It very forcefully makes the point that nuclear negotiations are frozen, and that linking them to negotiations on outer space is therefore a recipe for deadlock on outer space too. The resulting arms race in space would accelerate the arms race on earth as well, Chernenko says, and would make it harder to limit and reduce armaments in general.

-- As a result of these two factors, the letter goes on, "it is necessary to come to a clear understanding as to the subject of these negotiations" before our delegations meet at the negotiating table. If it is hard for us to agree to such negotiations in September, they will "take that into account."

In response, Burt first recalled that it was we who had suggested beginning talks later if the Soviets preferred. He said we would study the letter and reply soon, but stressed that both you and the Secretary have told the Soviets we are prepared to come to Vienna with clear substantive ideas on outer space arms control. At the same time, we believe that if we are going to address this topic we must also discuss related issues like offensive nuclear weapons. In any event, however, we are prepared to enter into diplomatic discussions of the agenda for talks, and Burt invited the Soviets to begin such preparatory discussions without delay.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS *F92-028-HJ*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

BY *11-30*

NARA, DATE *5/17/85*

2

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

Isakov replied by asking again whether we are ready to negotiate on "preventing the militarization" of outer space. If we were making an announcement, would we be willing to say that, he asked. Burt said that in discussing the agenda for a Vienna meeting, we could address the issue of what any announcement might say. Isakov concluded that he would report the exchange, and the specific question of initiating a discussion of the Vienna agenda, to Moscow.

On the way out, Isakov commented to the State Department official accompanying him that the Soviets are offering the Administration a political "bumper harvest" if negotiations on outer space begin in September; all that was being asked was that the agenda be fixed before the two delegations sat down. The official replied that you do not need Soviet help to get reelected, and that the Administration is approaching the talks on the assumption that they must be to mutual benefit, without regard to such considerations.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

Drafted: EUR: RBurt^{RB}
7/7/84 1124M

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

28
8419420

Его Превосходительству
Рональду У.Рейгану
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Вашингтон

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Я внимательно прочитал Ваше письмо от 2 июля с.г. Скажу откровенно, я искал в нем позитивного ответа на наше предложение о проведении в сентябре текущего года советско-американских переговоров о предотвращении милитаризации космического пространства. К сожалению, такого ответа в письме нет.

Приходится сделать такой вывод, несмотря на то, что Вы сообщаете о готовности приступить к переговорам в Вене. Ведь из Вашего письма ясно следует, что США согласны участвовать не в тех переговорах, которые предлагает и в которых готова участвовать советская сторона.

Напомню, что Советский Союз выступает за принятие срочных мер, которые позволили бы надежно перекрыть все каналы распространения гонки вооружений на космос. Сделать это можно, запретив все космические ударные средства, о чем мы и предлагаем провести переговоры, установив одновременно с их началом мораторий на испытания и развертывание таких средств.

С американской стороны говорится о проведении по сути дела не переговоров по космосу, а какой-то "конференции" без определенной повестки дня, то есть разговор был бы обо всем и ни о чем конкретно.

Мы далеки от того, чтобы недооценивать значение вопросов ядерных вооружений, которые в Вашем письме увязываются с проблемой космоса. Нашу позицию насчет того, как решать эти вопросы, Вы знаете. Но по-прежнему ничто не указывает на готовность американской стороны учесть эту позицию и открыть путь для выхода из нынешнего тупика. Запрещение космического оружия - самостоятельная

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97028#9

~~SECRET~~

BY msj NARA, DATE 5/1/78

проблема большой важности. Пристегнуть же ее к фактически заблокированным сейчас вопросам ограничения и сокращения ядерных вооружений означало бы поставить и переговоры по космосу в тупиковую ситуацию. В то же время развертывание космического ударного оружия неизбежно привело бы к резкому скачку гонки вооружений и на земле, еще более осложнило бы возможность принятия действенных мер по ограничению и сокращению вооружений вообще. Мы убеждены, что такое развитие событий не отвечало бы ничьим интересам.

Что касается собственно космического оружия, то акцент здесь должен, конечно, делаться не на том, чтобы что-то изучать. Нужно договариваться о практических мерах, чтобы не допустить появления ударного космического оружия любых видов. Этим и определяются те конкретные вопросы, которые СССР выдвинул для переговоров, с тем чтобы проблема решалась во всех ее аспектах и радикально.

Об этом, а не о чем-либо ином, мы предлагаем вести переговоры. И прежде чем наши делегации встретятся за столом переговоров, нужно четко условиться о предмете этих переговоров. Этого требуют важность и актуальность проблемы.

Мы подходим к этим переговорам серьезно, ответственно и ждем такого же отношения с американской стороны. Если, однако, для Вас по каким-то причинам затруднительно дать согласие на такие переговоры в названное нами время, мы вынуждены были бы с этим считаться. Важно, чтобы у нас было согласие, что такие переговоры нужны и что мы будем их вести, причем без неоправданной затяжки.

В заключение еще раз хочу подчеркнуть главное. Не может быть сомнения в том, что благоразумнее заранее исключить космос из сферы военного соперничества, чем потом пытаться устранять неизбежный в противном случае серьезный, а может быть и непоправимый ущерб стабильности и безопасности. Я призываю Вас, господин Президент, еще раз взглянуть на всю проблему под этим углом зрения. Хотелось бы надеяться, что Вы сможете дать позитивный ответ на наше предложение, которое остается в силе.

С уважением,

К. ЧЕРНЫШКО

Москва

7 июля 1984 года

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

ID 8490793

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF UNCLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 16 JUL 84 16

TO PRESIDENT

FROM DAM, K

7/15/84

DOCDATE 16 JUL 84

KEYWORDS USSR

HS

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTII

SUBJECT: DRAFT LTR TO CHERNENKO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 17 JUL 84 STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LINHARD

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8490769

NSCIFID

(K / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
M Falane	X 7/17	Forward to Pres for sig		
PR	P JUL 18 1984	signature via FDB		VP
	JUL 18 1984	Pres sgd ltr		
STATR	C JUL 18 1984	for dispatch		Jm

DISPATCH

ed 2 sheet JUL 18 1984

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90793 31

Date JUL 18 1984

Subject: ORIGINAL OF PRES LTR TO CHERNENKO

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☒ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Amb. McFarlane	_____ Ms. Dornan	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Teicher
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Cmdr. Dur	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Ltc. Cox	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. Menges	_____ Cpt. Shull	_____ NSC Registry
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Ltc. North	_____ Mr. Sommer	_____ NSC MSG Center

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

CYS

Date

Time

Received/Signed For By:

THE VICE PRESIDENT				
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	<u>ORIGINAL</u>	<u>7/18/84</u>	<u>1900</u>	<u>CD Stange S/S-I</u>
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

DECLASSIFIED

Guidelines, August 28, 1997

JARA, Date 6/6/95

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90793 32
Date JUL 18 1984

Subject: ORIGINAL OF PRES LTR TO CHERNENKO

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☒ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

☐ Amb. McFarlane	☐ Ms. Dornan	☐ Mr. R. Lehman	☐ Mr. Pollock	☐ Mr. Teicher
☐ Adm. Poindexter	☐ Cmdr. Dur	☐ Mr. Levine	☐ Mr. Raymond	☐ Cmdr. Thompson
☐	☐ Mr. Fontaine	☐ Col. Lilac	☐ Ms. Reger	☐ Mr. Tyson
☐ Sit. Room	☐ Mr. Fortier	☐ Ltc. Linhard	☐ Mr. Robinson	☐ Mr. Wettering
☐ Mr. Beal	☐ Mr. Helm	☐ Mr. Martin	☐ Gen. Russell	☐ Exec. Secretary
☐ Ltc. Childress	☐ Mr. Kemp	☐ Mr. Matlock	☐ Col. Rye	☐ NSC Secretariat
☐ Ltc. Cox	☐ Mr. Kraemer	☐ Mr. Menges	☐ Cpt. Shull	☐ NSC Registry
☐ Mr. De Graffenreid	☐ Mr. Laux	☐ Mr. McMinn	☐ Mr. Sigur	☐ NSC Admin.
☐ Ms. Dobriansky	☐ Mr. C. Lehman	☐ Ltc. North	☐ Mr. Sommer	☐ NSC MSG Center

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT				
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	<u>ORIGINAL</u>	<u>7/18/84</u>	<u>1845</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

II
90793

7/18/84

Brunson Mc Kinley:

Please send via cable to
Embassy Moscow tonight,
per our secure call.

Thanks -

Bob Kimmitt

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 18, 1984

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your prompt reply to my letter of July 2. I appreciate the opportunity to clarify my reaction to your proposal for a meeting of delegations in Vienna in September, as my earlier statements seem to have been misunderstood.

It is certainly not my intention to propose a "conference without a definite agenda," involving "a conversation about everything and about nothing specifically." Of course, agreement on the content and objective of these talks is desirable, and both sides should have a clear idea of the issues the other considers relevant and important, so that the interchange can be concrete and productive.

It is also not my desire to have a conference merely to "study something," as you put it in your letter. As I stated in my previous letter, there should be a clear mandate to seek out and find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches which hold promise for concrete results.

Defining the agenda should be the immediate task of our diplomatic representatives. As you know, yours have been invited to present Soviet views on this question. I have no objection to making presentation of the Soviet proposals the first item, and my delegation will be instructed to respond to them promptly and constructively.

As we consider the agenda, I think you will agree that neither of us can assert the right to define for the other those issues which are relevant to the questions being discussed. To attempt to do so would not reflect a serious and responsible approach to solving problems and would hardly be consistent with the indispensable principle of dealing on the basis of equality.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-051 * 211


BY smf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

The fact is that, if we are to negotiate effectively regarding weapons in space -- or as you would put it, "the militarization of outer space" -- we must take into account the overall strategic environment of which these weapons are but one element. Many military activities in space, after all, involve efforts to monitor, to communicate with, to warn against, or to counter offensive nuclear systems, while many of those offensive weapons pass through outer space to reach their targets. Problems involving strategic systems, including anti-satellite weapons, therefore, must encompass existing offensive systems. This is not a matter of policy preference, but a practical fact of life. I am sure you recognize this since, in your last letter, you noted the close relationship between the question of weapons in space and the arms competition on earth.

Is it reasonable to assume that we can make significant progress in solving part of the problem, while ignoring other parts? I think not, and this is the reason I have suggested that we try to find ways to resume negotiations on offensive nuclear arms. These are in fact the most destructive weapons in our hands, and if we cannot find ways to reduce the dangers they present, whatever efforts we make in other areas will be severely hampered. This is the reason I feel strongly that we must also discuss ways to resume negotiations on offensive nuclear arms while at the same time we turn our attention to arms control of weapons in space.

Mr. Chairman, I can reiterate to you that I accept your Government's proposal to begin talks in Vienna on September 18. My acceptance is without any precondition -- as I assume your proposal was. I am confident that our representatives can rapidly work out an agreed statement of the meeting's content and objectives, so long as my interest in making concrete progress is matched on your part.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large, prominent "R" at the beginning.

His Excellency
Konstantin Chernenko
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

National Security Council
The White House

1251
System #

II

Package # 90793

84 JUL 17 P 6: 30

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	2	✓	A
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	
NSC Secretariat	4	B JUL 18 1984	D
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Recommend 7/18 0930 (there is not
an 0930 on 7/19)

84 90793 37

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 7-8 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

8490793 39

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 9-10 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

National Security Council
The White House

4

System # II
Package # 90793

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>Staff</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Achim Matlock
Curt Linhard
RCM → Pres
due 7/17

> only

SUPER SENSITIVE 8420203

84 JUL 16 P 3: 51

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1984

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*
SUBJECT: Draft Letter to Chernenko

Attached at Tab 1 is a proposed reply to Chairman Chernenko's letter to you of July 7 regarding the proposed Vienna meeting. Secretary Shultz has reviewed this draft. In so doing, however, he noted that the seventh and, particularly, the eighth paragraphs, which deal with the question of new technologies and their potential effect on strategic stability, have important implications for the conduct of future discussions with the Soviet Union.

At Tab 2 is a revised version of the eighth paragraph containing a more cautious formulation on this issue, which you may also wish to consider.

Attachments:
As Stated

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-051 #216
BY *Cts* NARA, DATE *7/25/06*

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

4.
20-10-11

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

4

2

1

8490793 40

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 13 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SYSTEM II PROFILE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

97
ID 8490793

RECEIVED 16 JUL 84 16

TO PRESIDENT FROM DAM, K DOCDATE 16 JUL 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO CHERNENKO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 17 JUL 84 STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LINHARD

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED


White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By LS NARA, Date 4/17/02

REF# LOG 8490757 8490760 NSCIFID (K / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

OBE-NFAR



DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

DAM, K

840716

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFORMATION

LINHARD

ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	(INITIAL)
MATLOCK	Z	84071616	PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES	

MCFARLANE	Z	84071718	FWD TO PRES FOR SIG	(UPDATES)
PRESIDENT	Z	84071809	FOR SIGNATURE VIA PDB	
	X	84071817	PRES SGD LTR	
STATE	X	84071818	FOR DISPATCH	
	X	88120716	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S	
DUE DATE 840717 STATUS C FINDATE 840718 (C) B FILE SII NSCIF				
S/O MATLOCK INFO				
DDOC DATE NSC DISTRIBUTION DISPATCH FOR ACTION DISPATCH FOR INFO				
840718 VICE PRESIDENT				
840718 MATLOCK CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI HILL, C				

EO

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 14-15 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.