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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

Withdrawer

DLB 1/31/2007

File Folder NSPG 0087 03/30/1984 [IRAN-IRAQ WAR]

FOIA

F1772

Box Number 91305

JOYCE BATTLE

6

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33374	AGENDA	NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP - IRAN-IRAQ WAR - MARCH 30, 1984 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	ND	B1
33375	MEMO	DONALD FORTIER TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: SCHEDULE PROPOSAL: NSPG IRAN/IRAQ WAR/BUCKLEY ABDUCTION <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	3/22/1984	B1
33376	FORM	SCHEDULE PROPOSAL - RE: NSPG <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	ND	B1
33377	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO [THE PRESIDENT], RE: MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP ...MARCH 30, 1984 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	ND	B1
33378	PAPER	BACKGROUND PAPER FOR THE IRAN-IRAQ NSPG	2	ND	B1
33379	PAPER	RE: II. NATIONAL POLICY <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	2	ND	B1
33380	PAPER	KEY POINTS TO MAKE AT THE NSPG <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	ND	B1

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

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File Folder NSPG 0087 03/30/1984 [IRAN-IRAQ WAR]

FOIA

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Box Number 91305

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33381	TALKING POINTS	NSPG ON IRAN-IRAQ, 3/30/84 - CARD FORMAT <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	ND	B1
33382	PAPER	SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUPMARCH 30, 1984 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	4	ND	B1
33383	PAPER	SUMMARY OF CPPG REVIEW IRAN-IRAQ WAR <i>R 3/25/2008 NLRRF1772</i>	6	ND	B1
33384	PAPER	SUMMARY OF CPPG REVIEW IRAN-IRAQ WAR <i>R 3/25/2008 NLRRF1772</i>	7	ND	B1
33385	MINUTES	DUPLICATE OF 19212 (NSPG) MINUTES MARCH 30, 1984	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Friday, March 30, 1984, 11:00 A.M.

White House Situation Room

AGENDA

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| I. Introduction | Robert McFarlane |
| II. Special Envoy's Report | Donald Rumsfeld |
| III. Discussion of Key Military Issues | William Taft
John Vessey |
| - Force Closure and
U.S. Deterrence Options | |
| - Terrorism: Vulnerabilities and
Protective Measures | |
| IV. Political-Military Policy | George Shultz |
| - Possible Measures to Avert
Iraqi Collapse | |
| - U.S. Posture Toward Chemical Weapons Use | |
| V. Summary | Robert McFarlane |

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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March 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. (P) JOHN STANFORD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. WILLIAM VITALE
Executive Secretary
Department of Energy

DR. ALTON KEEL
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BGEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Notice of NSPG Meeting, Friday, March 30, 1984
11:00 - 12:00 p.m., White House Situation Room
(U)

An NSPG meeting will be held on the Iran-Iraq War and the Buckley Abduction on Friday, March 30, from 11:00 to 12:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance is principals only. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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White House Guidelines, August 22, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 1/21/07

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 22, 1984

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal: NSPG Iran-Iraq War/Buckley
Abduction, Friday, March 30, 1984

As per your PROFS memo, attached at Tab A is a Presidential schedule proposal for the NSPG meeting on Friday, March 30. I strongly recommend, however, that we defer the NSPG until Tuesday, April 3, if this is at all possible.

- Rumsfeld will be back with a fresh perspective of GCC attitudes toward the war and could be ally in breaking the bureaucratic log jam. *I understand he is not available following week.*
- Phil Dur will have received a detailed briefing from COMIDEASFOR on vulnerabilities of U.S. facilities to unconventional attacks.
- If the Buckley abduction is the reason to accelerate the time for the meeting, I'm afraid even Friday, March 30, may not be timely with the Kuwait trials scheduled for completion on March 27. Finally, if the verdicts in Kuwait are delayed (owing to concern for Iranian reaction) or if Buckley does not surface after the verdicts are read, we can probably wait until April 3, to discuss how we deal with this problem.

RECOMMENDATION

If any of this is persuasive, a schedule proposal for a Tuesday, April 3, NSPG meeting is attached (Tab B). If not, the March 30, proposal is at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove *J*

Attachment

Tab A - Presidential Schedule Proposal for March 30

Tab B - Presidential Schedule Proposal for April 3 *approach Don*

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BY *LIA* NARA DATE *2/2/12*

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

33376

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SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

REQUEST: For President to chair a meeting of the
National Security Planning Group (NSPG)

PURPOSE: To review our policy toward the Iran-Iraq
War and to consider options for political-
military responses to plausible war
escalation scenarios. To review policy
toward terrorist actions against U.S.
personnel and facilities.

BACKGROUND: An interagency review of U.S. policy toward
the Iran-Iraq War and the possible courses
this war may take has been completed. An
NSPG meeting is required to review
recommended options for U.S. responses to
possible escalation of the conflict.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Several NSC and NSPG meetings on related
subjects.

DATE & TIME: Tuesday, April 3 (one hour)

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS: President, Vice President, Secretary Shultz,
Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Hodel,
Director Casey, and GEN Vessey

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Discussion and decision meeting

REMARKS REQUIRED: NSC will provide

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/Don Fortier/Phil Dur

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BY 0111 NARA DATE 2/21/12

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

President
has seen.

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~~WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: Friday, March 30, 1984

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

I. PURPOSE

To review: our policy for the Iran-Iraq war; our readiness in the event of escalation; and our posture for forestalling terrorism in the region.

II. BACKGROUND

This NSPG meeting has been scheduled to review our current policies, military posture, and force readiness. Don Rumsfeld has just returned from a trip to the Gulf where he discussed the course of the war and its implications for Gulf security with several heads of state.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

VI. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

An agenda is at Tab A. I will open the meeting to review the issues. This will be followed by a report from Don Rumsfeld on his recent meetings. Will Taft and the JCS representative, General Gabriel, will discuss our military readiness and measures to improve our force posture. George Shultz will discuss the key aspects of our diplomacy. At Tab C is a background paper for this NSPG: a summary of previous National Security Decision Directives which pertain to the Middle East is at Tab D. Recommended talking points for your use during the meeting are at Tab E.

Prepared by:
Philip A. Dur

Attachments

Tab A	Agenda
Tab B	List of participants
Tab C	Background Paper for Iran-Iraq NSPG
Tab D	Summary of NSDDs on the Middle East
Tab E	Recommended talking points

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12

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CONFIDENTIAL

List of Participants, NSPG on Iran-Iraq
Friday, March 30, 1984, 11:00 a.m.
White House Situation Room

The Vice President's Office
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

State
George P. Shultz
Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld
Admiral Jonathan Howe

Defense
William H. Taft, IV
Dr. Fred Charles Ikle

Energy
Donald P. Hodel
Donald Pearlman

OMB
Dr. Alton Keel

CIA
William J. Casey
Robert M. Gates

JCS
General Charles A. Gabriel
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

White House
Edwin Meese, III
James A. Baker, III
Michael K. Deaver
Robert C. McFarlane
Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC
Captain Philip Dur
Dr. Richard S. Beal

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 1/31/07

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

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NSPG 0087 03/30/1984 [IRAN-IRAQ WAR]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

33378 PAPER

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B1

BACKGROUND PAPER FOR THE IRAN-IRAQ NSPG

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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II. NATIONAL POLICY

United States policy with respect to this situation is based on the policies stated in National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) 87, 99, 114, and 134. The aspects of these policies that apply to this Plan, are:

- A. NSDD 87, Comprehensive U.S. Energy Security Policy, provides for:
 - o Primary reliance on the domestic and international marketplace both before and, to the extent possible, during an energy emergency.
 - o Preparedness to enhance energy supplies in an emergency.
 - o Provision of energy supplies for defense and broader national security purposes under all circumstances, both emergency and non-emergency.
- B. NSDD 99, United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia, identifies US regional interests and objectives as:
 - o The prevention of the Soviet Union from attaining a position of hegemony in the region by deterring Soviet expansion and by supporting the sovereignty of all countries in the region. To protect its interests, the US will pursue the following objectives:
 - Deter Soviet aggression and maintain readiness for combat, if necessary.
 - Counter and reverse Soviet efforts to extend influence by other means.
 - o The maintenance of continued access for the US and its principal allies to Gulf oil. To protect its interests, the US will pursue the following objectives:
 - Protect US and Western access to adequate supplies of oil.
 - Help resolve regional conflicts that threaten our interests.
 - Strengthen regional stability by measures to improve economic conditions and indigenous defense capabilities.
 - Expand US influence with selected states in the

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BY 211 NADA DATE 12/1/12

region.

- Limit the ability of unfriendly or hostile regimes to destabilize or subvert selected friendly countries in the region.
- Discourage proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities in the region.

C. NSDD 114, US Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War, states that:

- o The US will undertake whatever measures may be necessary to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to international shipping and that US military forces will attempt to deter and, if that fails, to defeat any hostile efforts to close the Strait to international shipping.
- o The US will assign the highest priority in our consultations to access arrangements that would facilitate the rapid deployment of those forces necessary to defend the critical oil facilities and transshipment points against air or sapper attacks.

D. NSDD 134, United States International Energy Goals and Objectives, reaffirms the energy policies stated in NSDD 87 and adds the following policies for guaranteeing the continued flow of oil from the Persian Gulf:

- o In the short term, ensure, along with our allies and countries in the area, freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as protection of key oil production and transshipment facilities.
- o In the long term, favor increasing the number of alternative outlets for Persian Gulf crude.
- o Cooperate with other energy consuming countries through the International Energy Agreement (IEA) and other mechanisms to reduce panic, minimize economic dislocations, and assure that the US and its allies do not suffer unacceptable harm as a result of an oil supply shortfall.
- o Strive to obtain commitments from our allies to policies that will fairly share the burden and reduce the adverse impacts of a major oil supply disruption by means which accommodate the respective approaches of the US and its allies.

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KEY POINTS TO MAKE AT THE NSPG

- We simply cannot have a repeat of Beirut. If terrorists strike our facilities we must be prepared to respond quickly. And we should move now to get as much counterterrorist capability in place as possible.
- I know access is a problem. After Lebanon, however, Gulf states are unlikely to invite us in unless they see by the force we already have nearby that we are serious. We can't do a half-way job.
- Our responses must be timely. Delays only permit pressures to build on the Gulf states to compromise with Iran. A delay will also give the Soviets an opportunity to make mischief and say they want in on the action.

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RV 011) NARA DATE 2/21/12

33381

TALKING POINTS - NSPG ON IRAN-IRAQ, 3/30/84

- WE SIMPLY CANNOT HAVE A REPEAT OF BEIRUT. IF TERRORISTS STRIKE OUR FACILITIES WE MUST BE PREPARED TO RESPOND QUICKLY. AND WE SHOULD MOVE NOW TO GET AS MUCH COUNTERTERRORIST CAPABILITY IN-PLACE AS POSSIBLE.
- I KNOW ACCESS IS A PROBLEM. AFTER LEBANON, HOWEVER, GULF STATES ARE UNLIKELY TO INVITE US IN UNLESS THEY SEE BY THE FORCE WE ALREADY HAVE NEARBY THAT WE ARE SERIOUS. WE CAN'T DO A HALF-WAY JOB.
- OUR RESPONSES MUST BE TIMELY. DELAYS ONLY PERMIT PRESSURES TO BUILD ON THE GULF STATES TO COMPROMISE WITH IRAN. A DELAY WILL ALSO GIVE THE SOVIETS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE MISCHIEF AND SAY THEY WANT IN ON THE ACTION.

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NLRREF1772#33381

BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

March 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR
HOWARD TEICHER

SUBJECT: NSPG on Iran-Iraq -- Friday, March 30, 1984
11:00 a.m., White House Situation Room

Attached is a memo for you to transmit to the President in preparation for tomorrow's NSPG. I have included key points it is important for the President to make. Your talking points will be over separately with the State issues paper.

Recommendation

That you forward your memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachments

Tab I	McFarlane/President
Tab A	Agenda
Tab B	List of participants
Tab C	Background Paper for Iran-Iraq NSPG
Tab D	Summary of NSDDs on the Middle East
Tab E	Recommended talking points; 3 X 5 card

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 1/31/07

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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March 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR
HOWARD TEICHER

RCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: NSPG on Iran-Iraq War - Friday, March 30, 1984
11:00 a.m., White House Situation Room
Talking Points and State Issues Paper

Attached at Tab A are talking points for your use during the NSPG. At Tab B is the draft summary page of the CPPG held earlier this week on this subject.

Recommendation

That you use the talking points at Tab A during the meeting.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points
Tab B State paperDECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 1/31/07~~SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FRIDAY, MARCH 30, 1984, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

- The purpose of this meeting is to review our policy toward the Iran-Iraq war; specifically our military posture and diplomatic initiatives.
- Don Rumsfeld returned from the Gulf last night, having had very substantive discussions throughout the region, and we will shortly hear Don's first-hand assessment and recommendations.
- Bill (Casey), before we hear Don's report, would you please give us a status report on the intelligence-sharing program we have established with Iraq?
- Don, can we please hear from you?

-- Ambassador Rumsfeld --

- Don has raised several very key issues bearing on both the military and diplomatic fronts. First, I think it would be useful if Will Taft and General Gabriel could outline our

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BY RLJ NLRH 1772 # 33382
NARA DATE 2/21/12

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current posture and measures which could improve our deterrence of Iranian escalation and our capability to deal with escalation, should it occur.

-- Will Taft, General Gabriel --

[Ensure that we discuss the discrete scenarios the CPPG reviewed this week (Tab B) and the strategic warning indicators that escalation is likely. We also need to discuss:

- Force Closure improvements
- Deterrent measures
- Anti-terrorist posture at U.S. military facilities in the Gulf region]

-- We agreed earlier that the collapse of Iraq's defenses would be extremely detrimental to our interests and that appropriate measures be undertaken to prevent that outcome.

-- George, would you please provide us with your suggestions for additional steps we should consider?

-- Secretary Shultz --

[Discretely encouraging more French and Egyptian support for Iraq.]

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- Given the likelihood of continued Iraqi use of chemical weapons, it is important for us to now review our policy on this subject.
- George, would you please take the lead?

-- Secretary Shultz --

Summary Points

- I think we have a consensus that the approach Don has initiated makes sense. We need to follow it up now.
- We will prepare a draft Decision Directive for your collective review this afternoon. I see the following key points:
 - Dispatching a political-military team to the key Gulf countries to discuss possible escalation scenarios and the associated warning indicators.
 - Sending a letter from the President to King Fahd acknowledging Rumsfeld's talks, reiterating our commitments, and notifying him of our plan to dispatch a team next week.

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- Approving additional deployments to enhance our deterrent posture in the Gulf region.
- Consulting further with the British and French on the military and diplomatic initiatives we think are warranted.
- Enhancing our anti-terrorist defenses in the Gulf region.
- Our policy on possible initiatives and measures to prevent an Iraqi collapse.
- Our position on use of chemical warfare munitions in the Iran-Iraq war.

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WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

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MESSAGE NO. 569 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 1
 FROM R. McFarlane
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SYS. II # 90382

TO (AGENCY) DELIVER TO: DEPT/ROOM NO. EXTENSION

<u>B</u>	Agency State:	Attn S/S		
		Amb Donald Rumsfeld		
		S/SN Rm 7511 x0390		
<u>D</u>	Defense:	Lt Col Higgins		
		56064		
<u>VI</u>	Energy:	Mr. Vitale		
		252-5230 Rm 7A185		
<u>A</u>	CIA:	T. Cormack		
<u>D</u>	JCS:	Cmdr Hartung		
		695-4824		

REMARKS:



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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
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March 29, 1984

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET/SENSITIVE (with TOP SECRET Attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Iran-Iraq War: Summary of CPPG Review

The attached paper, "Summary of CPPG Review: Iran-Iraq War", is being sent to you for discussion and decision at the NSPG meeting scheduled for Friday, March 30.

Coray

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 1/21/07

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DECL: OADR

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Summary of CPPG Review
Iran-Iraq War

I. Introduction

The Iran-Iraq war may be entering a more dangerous phase with an increased risk of a major escalation which would threaten US interests in the security of the Gulf Arab states and freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. Iran has recently conducted a series of offensive actions and is expected soon to launch its largest operation of the war. Iraq may be increasingly driven towards attacks on Iranian oil exports to thwart Iran's strategy of attrition. Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if its own oil exports are seriously disrupted by Iraq, and could employ other options (e.g. attacks on Gulf state facilities, terrorism directed at the Gulf Arab states, and terrorist attacks on US personnel and facilities in the Gulf) to escalate the war in response.

The March 28 CPPG meeting reviewed US policy towards the war and the range of diplomatic and military measures we should take, both alone and in conjunction with our friends and Allies, in response to various escalation scenarios. This paper reviews actions that have already taken place or are being initiated to cope with the problem of escalation and presents the issue of policy towards a threatened Iraqi defeat for US NSC decision.

US diplomatic activity to date has been of four kinds. First, we have urged a cease-fire and negotiation in keeping with UN resolution 540. Iran does not seem at all interested in a peaceful outcome and is apparently impervious to outside urging. Second, we have consulted with our chief Allies, particularly the British and French, about coordinated diplomatic activity and about military contingency planning. Third, we have directly and indirectly urged a halt to the arms flow to Iran. Fourth, we have discussed diplomatic actions and military contingency planning with the moderate Arab states that are members of the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.

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BY C.1 NARADATE 3/25/08

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II. Politico-Military Actions

A. Discussion Items:

1. The importance of US Military Access. We are acutely aware of the limitations on US military activity in the Persian Gulf to deal with an escalation of the war, including threats to shipping and oil facilities. Deterrent measures are essential to prevent further escalation of hostilities. US military assets in the Gulf are vulnerable to attack, especially by suicide squads. The US cannot operate effectively in the Gulf without expanded access to GCC facilities. We will require airbases from which to operate fighter aircraft cover and through which to move supplies. We will need access to ports for an expanded naval presence. We will need coordination and communication with GCC militaries to prevent accidents and incidents. No GCC state has formally agreed to provide us access now, although several have suggested that it would be available in a crisis. Without prior agreement and military-to-military planning before hand on the details of US access, we will not be able to react quickly or effectively. These points have been made repeatedly to GCC leaders and our efforts to convince them will continue. They may however, remain reluctant because of: a) uncertainty that the situation requires the political risks involved, b) the possibility of provoking Iranian reaction, and c) doubts about American constancy. Some types of unilateral US deployments may add to their resistance by convincing them we do not need access.

2. Vulnerability to Terrorism. US facilities in the Gulf (private commercial, diplomatic, and military) are likely targets for Iranian sponsored terrorist attacks. Increasing our military presence in the Gulf region increases the likelihood of such attacks, although it may deter escalation of the war to involve others than Iran and Iraq. The use of US military forces in a Gulf contingency will almost certainly trigger a wave of terrorist attacks, which may occur in Europe and the US as well. We have some steps underway to deal with this problem (see below), but it remains an important consideration.

B. Actions Taken or Underway

A number of steps have recently been taken or are about to be initiated to deter escalation and improve our response capability to an escalation of the war into the Gulf.

1. Allied Deployments: At our request, the British are moving their minesweeper ships closer to the Persian Gulf. We have no response from the French to a similar request. We will

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continue to encourage both to shift some of their surface combatants from the Indian Ocean into the Persian Gulf for temporary show-the-flag visits. We will also discuss the possibility of small scale coordination or communications exercises among our ships, either in the Gulf or in the northern Arabian sea.

2. Follow-Up Talks with the British and French: The third round of US-UK politico-military talks on Persian Gulf Security will meet in London on 9 April and will address more detailed issues, such as the operation of a maritime protection system in the Gulf. An initial round of talks with the French is being planned. Military-to-military consultations with both the British and French are continuing.

3. Political Consultations: A strategy integrating U.S. leadership in defense of the security of the Gulf with energy policy actions by major allies and consumers will be developed in order to conduct consultations with major energy consuming states and with major shipping states. Energy consumers will be assured that a temporary closure of the Gulf will not significantly affect world supplies. The shipping states will be assured that the US will take action to maintain security of neutral shipping to and from non-belligerent ports in the Gulf. However, our ability to protect shipping effectively depends on access. States will be informed that they must request naval assistance from us to allow us to provide it legally. In making these approaches, we will also ask countries to use their diplomatic and economic (and where appropriate, military) leverage to encourage a ceasefire and an end to hostilities. Where appropriate, they will be asked what contributions they could make to the international effort to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, including maritime protection contributions. The British and French will be asked to make similar approaches.

4. Warning Indicators: The CIA has developed a set of strategic warning indicators of escalation into the Gulf. We will discuss those indicators to the Gulf states and seek their agreement in principle that they would grant access to US military forces when those indicators occur. We will also share the indicators with the British and French in forthcoming talks. The Intelligence Community will also develop by 6 April a set of tactical warning indicators for internal US use.

5. Exercise in Oman: Exercise ACCURATE TEST with US TACAIR deployed to Oman was completed March 28. The air defense exercise involved the US carrier Midway in the northern Arabian Sea and the Sultanate of Oman's Air Force. We have a series of follow-on exercises scheduled with Oman.

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11. Persian Gulf Surveillance/Information: The Intelligence Community will develop plans to facilitate the rapid transfer of information on activities in the Gulf among the US, Allies, and Gulf states. DOD will examine ways in which information can be passed through defense attache channels and military assistance groups, where applicable. DOD will also examine ways in which the US could facilitate a communications network of Gulf state and US command and coordination facilities. The Intelligence Community and DOD will provide an interim report by 23 April.

12. Turkey's Position Toward the War: We need to intensify our dialogue with Turkey on the war because of Turkey's close relations with both Iraq and Iran and its potential as a mediator. We should be alert to any signs that Turkey may be tilting toward Iran, although there is no clear evidence that such a shift is taking place. Secretary of

Defense Weinberger's forthcoming trip to Ankara may serve as an opportunity to raise this subject, and suggested talking points will be developed.

III. Policy Toward Iraq

A. Should the US Help Iraq Further?

We expect Iraq will continue to defend successfully against Iranian attacks. Nevertheless, we should consider, for planning purposes, our policy if Iraq is threatened with defeat.

An Iranian military victory could lead to the emergence of an Islamic revolutionary pro-Iranian regime in Baghdad which would seriously threaten the moderate states of the lower Gulf, and destabilize the entire region. An Iranian victory would also be a blow to American prestige, since Iran is an avowed enemy of the U.S. and some countries in the region may look to us to prevent an Iranian victory.

It is not clear, however, that there are steps we could take which would be decisive. Any steps we do take are likely to provoke Iran and could associate us with an Iraqi defeat. Any such steps also would complicate our efforts to curtail the flow of arms to Iran.

The CPPG discussed a number of illustrative options the U.S. might consider to deal with a threatened Iraqi defeat including: 1) use of U.S. forces; 2) direct sale of U.S. arm to Iraq; 3) encouraging others, such as Egypt and Jordan, to move forces to support Iraq, 4) encouraging countries such as France to provide additional assistance to Iraq; 5) doing nothing for Iraq, but taking steps to shore up the Gulf states; and 6) doing nothing beyond current initiatives.

Recommendations

The CPPG found that we lack adequate information to assess whether there are effective steps we could take now to help prevent an Iraqi defeat. It recommended the following:

1. The intelligence community should analyze, by April 15, Iraq's military needs and third party intentions in the event an Iranian victory is threatened.

2. Our embassies in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan should discuss the war and Iraq's situation with host governments for the purpose of determining more accurately those governments' estimates of Iraq's ability to withstand Iranian military efforts and the intentions of those three countries, if any, to

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provide additional assistance to Iraq. Such approaches would be made carefully, in a way that would not create the impression that we are prepared now to provide direct or indirect support to Iraq.

3. We should consult with the French on Iraq's situation, possible French plans to provide additional support to Iraq, if necessary, and ways in which the U.S. could be helpful to France, in support of such French assistance to Iraq.

B. Discussion Item: Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons

We publicly condemned Iraq's use of chemical after repeated demarches and in the face of overwhelming evidence. At the same time, we strongly criticized Iran's inhumane pursuit of the war and refusal to make peace. A UN experts team has since confirmed use of CW in the war. The Dutch are circulating in the Security Council a resolution condemning this practice, without mentioning Iraq, and calling on both sides to end the war. We will support the resolution if it comes to a vote. The fact that a minor regional power such as Iraq can produce chemical weapons demonstrates a proliferation potential and adds to the need for multilateral CW arms control.

We condemned this practice for several reasons

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-- we are condemning Soviet and Vietnamese use of chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia

-- we plan to sponsor a draft treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a comprehensive, verifiable ban on production and possession of CW.

The fact that Iraq is using chemical weapons complicates any additional steps we might take to sustain Iraqi resistance. Yet, it is possible that Iraq resorted to chemical weapons because it believes it is confronted with a serious -- if not desperate -- military situation. Our leverage over Iraqi CW use, therefore, may depend in part on our willingness and ability to strengthen other Iraqi military capabilities. US military assistance would, of course, end our neutrality and provoke Iranian responses. More importantly, we do not know what assistance Iraq would want from us, nor do we now know of anything we could provide that would make a significant or immediate difference.

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Iran-Iraq War: Summary of CPPG Review

Drafted: PM/P:RAClarke/RSokolisky:NRA/RA:PWilcox
632-0610 3/29/84

RB for

Clearance: PM:JTHowe
NEA:RMurphy
P:RRaphel (subs)
EUR:RHaass (subs)
JCS:LtGen Thomson
OSD/ISA:RArmitage

7 RB for

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Summary of CPPG Review
Iran-Iraq War

I. Introduction

The Iran-Iraq war may be entering a more dangerous phase with an increased risk of a major escalation which would threaten US interests in the security of the Gulf Arab states and freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. Iran has recently conducted a series of offensive actions and is expected soon to launch its largest operation of the war. Iraq may be increasingly driven towards attacks on Iranian oil exports to thwart Iran's strategy of attrition. Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if its own oil exports are seriously disrupted by Iraq, and could employ other options (e.g. attacks on Gulf state facilities, terrorism directed at the Arab Gulf states, and terrorist attacks on US personnel and facilities in the Gulf) to escalate the war in response.

The March 28 CPPG meeting reviewed US policy towards the war and the range of diplomatic and military measures we should take, both alone and in conjunction with our friends and Allies, in response to various escalation scenarios. This paper reviews actions that have already taken place or are being initiated to cope with the problem of escalation and presents the issue of policy towards a threatened Iraqi defeat for NSC decision.

US diplomatic activity to date has been of four kinds. First, we have urged a cease-fire and negotiations in keeping with UN resolution 540. Iran does not seem at all interested in a peaceful outcome and is apparently impervious to outside urging. Second, we have consulted with our chief Allies, particularly the British and French, about coordinated diplomatic activity and military contingency planning. Third, we have directly and indirectly urged a halt to the arms flow to Iran. Fourth, we have discussed diplomatic actions and military contingency planning with the moderate Arab states that are members of the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.

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B. Actions Taken or Underway

Recently, a number of steps have been taken or are about to be initiated to deter escalation and improve our response capability to an escalation of the war into the Gulf.

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Recommendations

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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG) MINUTES

33385

March 30, 1984

11:00 a.m.-12:00 noon

White House Situation Room

Participants: President, Shultz, Taft, Casey, Gabriel, Rumsfeld, Meese, Deaver, Murphy, McFarlane, Poindexter

McFarlane: Introduction--threat. What is our ability to deal with these threats?

Casey: Tehran is close to being ready to launch major attacks at Basrah. [REDACTED] Threat of Iranian attacks on Kuwait is increasing because of their assistance to Iraq.

Rumsfeld: Visited Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Bahrein, Kuwait. Iran will have trouble getting to Baghdad. Will probably settle for Basrah and establishment of fundamentalist Islamic state.

1. Countries feel vulnerable to terrorism, religious fundamentalism surrogates. Regimes see first task survival.

- U.S. ill equipped to deal with these threats.
- Because they are afraid they try to cut deals. Don't criticize countries causing trouble. In case of trouble they won't ask for help and may criticize.
- Domestically we must have the GCC public support.

2. They have inflated view of our capabilities. We contribute to it. We are not very capable unless we plan, exercise, think about it, and have public support. They think they can appease Iran by keeping us out.

3. They expect us to be effective. But we can't be unless we have planned it with their cooperation. It will take time. There will be a period of uncertainty. They will then question our ability. They'll begin to tilt to Iran. Lot of talk in Gulf about Shah and Lebanon and questioning of our commitment.

4. We must not look ineffective and uncoordinated. There is a tendency to over estimate our commitment and what we can do. If balloon goes up, our military will spend 90% of effort in self-defense.

5. As President said before, if you want to kill a snake you go for the head. We need to change governments in the countries that practice state-sponsored terrorism.

6. Events have proven that terrorism works.

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Taft: We have come to same conclusion as Don with regard to need for access. Have looked at triggering mechanisms that would allow us to get access.

We need to be sure Iraq doesn't lose. Iraq's fall is worst risk.

Gabriel: - Reviewed NSDD-114.
- U.S. presence in region
-- pre-positioning Diego Garcia
-- land based pre-positioning in Oman
-- established CENTCOM January 1983
-- political-military & military-military talks December 1983-January 1984
- Deterrent posture
-- Middle East Force
-- ELF-One
-- Battle Group in Indian Ocean
- Summary of exercises in area
-- went over ELF-1 tankers/CV air wing exercise.
Key is Saudi Arabia agreement.
-- B-52 exercise ("Busy Observer")

President: What would trigger Saudi Arabian cooperation?

Gabriel: Air attacks on Kuwait airfield.

Shultz: But they are more likely to use terrorist attacks or sabotage. It will be ambiguous.

President: If there are terrorist attacks, what will be our targets in Iran?

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McFarlane: Broad spectrum of possibilities. Iranian breakthrough. Could we live without Kuwait.

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As Amended
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Shultz: We need to work on access questions. At same time we can't use access as a cop out. Are we prepared to hit Iranian ports, cities, etc.

I really wonder whether we don't have other capabilities besides fighter raids to get to Iranians.

We should talk to French about Iraq. Iraq needs more competence.

Should almost seek an opportunity to do something against terrorism. We need to send a signal that we can do something about it. Need to look for an opportunity especially against Libya.

President: We can't afford another Beirut. Most likely, we will get another terrorist attack.

Do we have enough forces in the Gulf to respond even if we don't get access.

What if we bombed the area east of Basrah?

Shultz: That would be different matter to openly go into the war on the side of Iraq.

Gabriel: Our forces are ready. CENTCOM has plans but they all need access.

President: Are we certain that we will have a command structure that can carry out the mission without a lot of red tape.

Meese: We haven't talked about Congress.

Shultz: We are already talking about War Powers.

Rumsfeld: Oil is not the most important thing. Most important is to prevent Soviet involvement in the Gulf.

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