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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

Withdrawer

DLB 1/31/2007

File Folder NSPG 0089 05/17/1984 [IRAN-IRAQ WAR]

FOIA

F1772

Box Number 91305

JOYCE BATTLE

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33386	AGENDA	DUPLICATE OF #4269; NSPG MEETING - MAY 17, 1984 R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	1	ND	B1
33387	LIST	PARTICIPANTS, NSPG MEETING MAY 17, 1984 PAR 1/14/2008 F1772	1	ND	B3
33388	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP....MAY 17, 1984 R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	2	ND	B1
33389	AGENDA	DUPLICATE OF #33386 R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	1	ND	B1
33390	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #4270; CHECKLIST FOR CONCLUSION OF NSPG: RESPONSE TO ESCALATION IN THE GULF R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	1	ND	B1
33391	AGENDA	DUPLICATE OF #33386 R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

Withdrawer

DLB 1/31/2007

File Folder NSPG 0089 05/17/1984 [IRAN-IRAQ WAR]

FOIA

F1772

Box Number 91305

JOYCE BATTLE

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33392	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: FOLLOW-UP TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG) MEETING, MAY 17, 1984: ESCALATION IN THE GULF WAR R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	2	5/17/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

DOCDATE 840517

PARTIC	PRESIDENT	GATES, R	IKLE, F
	TAFT, W	PERLMAN, D	KELLEY, P
	THOMSON, H	DUR	FORTIER
	KEEL, A	ECKERT, W	HOWE, J
	SHULTZ, G	BAKER, J	MCFARLANE
	MEESE, E	POINDEXTER	

END OF DOCUMENT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CH NARA, Date 3/20/02

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SYSTEM II
90590

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 17, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
The Department of State

COLONEL JOHN H. STANFORD
Executive Secretary
The Department of Defense

MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Agenda for the National Security Planning Group
(NSPG) Meeting: Response to Escalation in the
Gulf War (TS)

Attached is an agenda for the meeting of the NSPG this afternoon
from 1:30-2:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Agenda

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 1/21/07

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33386

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG) MEETING
White House Situation Room
Thursday, May 17, 1984
1:30-2:00 p.m.
AGENDA

- I. INTRODUCTION. Robert McFarlane
- II. DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES--ARAB EXPECTATIONS
OF U.S. SUPPORT. Secretary Shultz
- III. MILITARY RESPONSES TO IRANIAN ATTACKS
ON GULF ARAB SHIPPPING. Secretary Taft
GEN Kelley
- Possible escalation scenarios if U.S.
provides direct assistance
 - Utility of U.S. tacair deployments to
Saudi Arabia
 - Role of AWACs and possible need for U.S.
tanker support
 - Vulnerability of U.S. forces and
installations to Iranian reprisals
- IV. NEXT STEPS. All
- Pros and cons of U.S. statement supporting
planned Saudi/GCC statements to deter
future Iranian aggression
 - Public diplomacy to quiet oil market
 - U.S. position regarding possible UK
initiative in UN
 - Response to King Fahd

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/2

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 17, 1984

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SIGNED

FROM: PHILIP A. DURELL *pd*

SUBJECT: Transmittal of National Security Planning Group
(NSPG) Meeting Agenda

Attached at Tab I is memo you could send to your counterparts forwarding the agenda (Tab A) for this afternoon's NSPG meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and transmit (via LDX) the memo at Tab I with Tab A attached.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Kimmitt Memo to Agency Counterparts
Tab A - Agenda

cc: Don Fortier
Geoff Kemp
Howard Teicher

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CAJ* NARA, Date *3/20/02*

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

C

84 MAY 17 P12 20

URGENT

DS

MESSAGE NO. 912 CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET PAGES 2

FROM ROBERT M. KIMMITT

(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA FOR NSPG

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	CHARLES HILL	515	
DOD	COL JOHN STANFORD		
CIA	THOMAS B. CONNACK		
DOD	BGEN GORGE A. JOULMAN		

REMARKS

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NSPG 4
89

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: VYCKY LARA *Vycky*

SUBJECT: Attendance List for National Security Planning
Group Meeting, May 17, 1984 (U)

The following officials plan to attend the National Security
Planning Group Meeting on Iran/Iraq which is scheduled for
May 17, 1984 in the Situation Room from 1:30 to 2:00. (C)

The President

The Vice President's Office
Mr. William Eckert

State:
Secretary George P. Shultz
Admiral Jonathan Howe (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs)

Defense
Dep Sec William H. Taft, IV
Dr. Fred C. Ikle

Energy
Mr. Donald Pearlman

CIA
Mr. William J. Casey
Mr. Robert Gates (Deputy Director for Intelligence)

OMB
Dr. Alton Keel

JCS
General P. X. Kelley (Acting Chairman)
Lt General Herman O. Thomson (Director, Plans & Policy)

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White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By *dh* NARA, Date *1/31/07*

1

CONFIDENTIAL

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC:

Mr. Donald R. Fortier

Approved K As Amended _____


Attached for your approval is a seating plan for this meeting.

Approved _____ As Amended K

Attachment
Seating Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify: OADR



REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on May 17, 19 84

for President of White House
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President's Office:
Mr. William Eckert

State:
Secretary George P. Shultz
Admiral Jonathan Howe

Defense:
Dep Sec William H. Taft, IV
Dr. Fred C. Ikle

Energy:
Mr. Donald Pearlman

CIA:
Mr. William J. Casey
Mr. Robert Gates

OMB:
Dr. Alton Keel

White House:
Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC:
Mr. Donald R. Fortier

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing/White House Requested by Victoria Lara
Room No. Situation Room Room No. 372 Telephone 3044
Time of Meeting 1:30PM Date of request May 17, 1984

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

33387

NSPG Meeting
May 17, 1984
Time: TBA 1:30 TO 2:00
Situation Room
Principal + 1

SUBJECT: Iran / Iraq

OVP- Eckert

State - (Sheila) 632-5804 Howe / Shultz

Defense - (Betty) 697-6064 TAFT / IKL

JCS - (SGT. Orr) 645-4824 General PX Kelley (acting chairman)

CIA - [REDACTED] Casey / Gates

Evergy -

NEESE - Carol

BAKER -

DEANER -

MCPARLANE -

POINBETEN -

FORTIER -

FOIA(b) (5)

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By LOI, NARA, Date 1/14/08

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 17 MAY 84 12

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM DUR

dlb 11/31/07

DOCDATE 17 MAY 84

KEYWORDS NSPG

AGENDA

PERSIAN GULF

SUBJECT TALKERS FOR 17 MAY NSPG MTG RE ESCALATION OF GULF WAR

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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LOG 8490590 8490594 NSCIFID NSPG0089 (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES(S)

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM DUR

dlb 1/21/07

DOCDATE 17 MAY 84 12

KEYWORDS NSPG

AGENDA

PERSIAN GULF

SUBJECT TALKERS FOR 17 MAY NSPG MTG RE ESCALATION OF GULF WAR

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8490590

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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COPIES TO

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	C MAY 17 1984	Pres noted		PP ✓

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

33388

~~TOP SECRET~~MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: Thursday, May 17, 1984

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 1:30-2:00 p.m.

FROM: Robert C. McFarlane *RCM*

I. PURPOSE: To review the recent escalation in the Gulf war and determine an appropriate response.

II. BACKGROUND: In a meeting with Secretary Shultz this morning, Prince Bandar asked for U.S. support of Saudi actions in response to Iranian attacks on ships calling at Gulf Arab ports, namely: a public statement from the U.S. which would condemn Iranian attacks on non-belligerent shipping and deter future attacks. Accelerated arms deliveries and possible augmentation of USAF AWACs and aerial tankers to support enhanced Saudi air defenses. In addition to considering the Saudi request, we will want to review public measures we could take to calm the international oil market place.

In light of the Saudi request and in anticipation of this afternoon's discussion, the following considerations seem pertinent:

- To date, our public statements on the increasing number of attacks on non-belligerent shipping have been balanced. We denounce escalation by both sides. We need to consider whether we want to distinguish between attacks on ships conducting trade with belligerent (Iran or Iraq) as opposed to non-belligerent ships engaged in the neutral trade.
- The Saudis want us to consider deploying additional AWACs and tankers which would provide direct support to their fighters in the air defense role. Given: (1) that the Saudis will be stretched very thin to provide adequate fighter cover for Gulf shipping, and (2) that our AWACs and tankers could become more vulnerable to Iranian reprisals, we should probably tie the support the Saudis want to access for a modest number of U.S. fighters which would deploy simultaneously to Saudi Arabia.
- We should probably avoid rhetorical statements intended to deter further Iranian attacks on non-belligerent shipping. Such statements, unless they are accompanied by actions and a posture which would allow us to deal effectively with more aggression could be perceived as hollow and could expose us to risks that we are unable to meet.

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12

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- Several European countries, most notably the UK, have stressed multilateral approaches, in part to be able to have a veto on what we do. We need to work closely with our friends, but we also need to protect our option for military response to further Iranian aggression, if the Iranians continue to escalate and we are asked to assist the Saudis and others.

III. PARTICIPANTS: See attached list (Tab A).

IV. PRESS PLAN: None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: See attached agenda (Tab B).

Prepared by:
Philip A. Dur

Attachments

Tab A - List of participants
Tab B - Agenda

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15

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on May 17, 19 84
for President of White House
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President's Office:
Mr. William Eckert

State:
Secretary George P. Shultz
Admiral Jonathan Howe

Defense:
Dep Sec William H. Taft, IV
Dr. Fred C. Ikle

Energy:
Mr. Donald Pearlman

CIA:
Mr. William J. Casey
Mr. Robert Gates

OMB:
Dr. Alton Keel

JCS:
General P. X. Kelley
Lt General Herman O. Thomson

White House:
Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC:
Mr. Donald R. Fortier

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing/White House

Room No. Situation Room

Time of Meeting 1:30PM

Requested by Victoria Lara

Room No. 372 Telephone 3044

Date of request May 17, 1984

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

33389

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG) MEETING
White House Situation Room
Thursday, May 17, 1984
1:30-2:00 p.m.
AGENDA

- I. INTRODUCTION. Robert McFarlane
- II. DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES--ARAB EXPECTATIONS
OF U.S. SUPPORT. Secretary Shultz
- III. MILITARY RESPONSES TO IRANIAN ATTACKS
ON GULF ARAB SHIPPPING. Secretary Taft
GEN Kelley
- Possible escalation scenarios if U.S.
provides direct assistance
 - Utility of U.S. tacair deployments to
Saudi Arabia
 - Role of AWACs and possible need for U.S.
tanker support
 - Vulnerability of U.S. forces and
installations to Iranian reprisals
- IV. NEXT STEPS. All
- Pros and cons of U.S. statement supporting
planned Saudi/GCC statements to deter
future Iranian aggression
 - Public diplomacy to quiet oil market
 - U.S. position regarding possible UK
initiative in UN
 - Response to King Fahd

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/2

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 16, 1984

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ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR *lif*

SUBJECT: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting:
Recent Escalation in the Gulf war

Attached at Tab I is a memo you could send to the President regarding the subject NSPG scheduled for this afternoon from 1:30-2:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.

At Tab II is a checklist for your use during the meeting. There are no significant disagreements with State and DOD on how we should proceed.

lif Don Fortier and Howard Teicher concur. *lif for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial the memo to the President at Tab I and forward with Tabs A and B attached.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you use the checklist provided at Tab II during the meeting.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President
 - Tab A - List of Participants
 - Tab B - Agenda
- Tab II - Checklist for use by Robert McFarlane

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By *alb* NARA, Date *1/31/01*

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CHECKLIST FOR CONCLUSION OF NSPG:
RESPONSE TO ESCALATION IN THE GULF

- The discussion should address the items on the agenda. The most important considerations include:
 - Nature of our public statement--should we begin distinguishing between the neutral trade and the belligerent trade.
 - How should we handle possible UK initiative with the UN.
 - Adequacy of RSAF to protect oil shipping with and without additional AWACs and tankers.
 - Responsiveness of U.S. tacair to Saudi request.
 - How vulnerable are we now to Iranian reprisals, both conventional and unconventional.
 - Can we accelerate certain Saudi arms requests (e.g., AIM-7M improved SPARROW).
- Ideally, we would reach following decisions/conclusions:
 - Public statement which, while balanced (denouncing acts of escalation by both belligerents), distinguishes between neutral and belligerent trade..
 - No rhetorical efforts to deter future Iranian attacks. Deterrent actions are in order.
 - Positive reply to request for AWACs/tankers provided tacair accompanies to provide adequate defense.
 - Public diplomacy to quiet international oil market.
 - Cautious response to UK diplomatic initiative--don't tie our hands, if we have to respond with force deployments.
 - Letter to Fahd stressing need for action on request, if he wants U.S. help to deter future Iranian attacks.

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TO

KIMMITT

FROM DUR

dlb
1/31/07

DOC DATE 17 MAY 84 19

KEYWORDS NSPG

AGENDA

PERSIAN GULF

SUBJECT AGENDA FOR 17 MAY NSPG MTG RE ESCALATION OF GULF WAR

ACTION. FOR SIGNATURE

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KIMMITT

COMMENTS

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DOC DATE 17 MAY 84

KEYWORDS NSPG

AGENDA

PERSIAN GULF

SUBJECT AGENDA FOR 17 MAY NSPG MTG RE ESCALATION OF GULF WAR

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KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B /)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 17, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
The Department of State

COLONEL JOHN H. STANFORD
Executive Secretary
The Department of Defense

MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Agenda for the National Security Planning Group
(NSPG) Meeting: Response to Escalation in the
Gulf War (TS)

Attached is an agenda for the meeting of the NSPG this afternoon
from 1:30-2:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. (S)


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Agenda

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 11/31/07

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THE WHITE HOUSE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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84 MAY 17 P12:20

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MESSAGE NO. 912 CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET PAGES 2

FROM ROBERT M. KIMMITT

(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA FOR NSPG

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
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STATE

CHARLES HILL

515

DOD

COL JOHN STANFORD

CIA

THOMAS B. CONNACK

DOD

BGEN GORGE A. JOULMAN

5153

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REMARKS

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By CH NARA, Date 3/20/02

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 912 CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET PAGES 2

FROM ROBERT M. KIMMITT (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA FOR NSPG

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	CHARLES HILL		
DOD	COL JOHN STANFORD		
CIA	THOMAS B. CORMACK		
DOD	BGEN GORGE A. JOULWAN		

REMARKS SYSTEM II 90590

P12: 26

THE WHITE HOUSE

MAY 17 12 29 PM '84

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URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 912 CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM ROBERT M. KIMMITT

(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA FOR NSPG

<u>AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>CHARLES HILL</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>DOD</u>	<u>COL JOHN STANFORD</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>THOMAS B. CORMACK</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>DOD</u>	<u>BGEN GORGE A. JOULWAN</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
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REMARKS

SYSTEM II 90590

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997

By Gts NARA, Date 5/20/02

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

33391

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG) MEETING
White House Situation Room
Thursday, May 17, 1984
1:30-2:00 p.m.
AGENDA

- I. INTRODUCTION. Robert McFarlane
- II. DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES--ARAB EXPECTATIONS
OF U.S. SUPPORT. Secretary Shultz
- III. MILITARY RESPONSES TO IRANIAN ATTACKS
ON GULF ARAB SHIPPPING. Secretary Taft
GEN Kelley
- Possible escalation scenarios if U.S.
provides direct assistance
 - Utility of U.S. tacair deployments to
Saudi Arabia
 - Role of AWACs and possible need for U.S.
tanker support
 - Vulnerability of U.S. forces and
installations to Iranian reprisals
- IV. NEXT STEPS. All
- Pros and cons of U.S. statement supporting
planned Saudi/GCC statements to deter
future Iranian aggression
 - Public diplomacy to quiet oil market
 - U.S. position regarding possible UK
initiative in UN
 - Response to King Fahd

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NLRR F1772# 33391
BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/2

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 17, 1984

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SIGNED

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR

SUBJECT: Transmittal of National Security Planning Group
(NSPG) Meeting Agenda

Attached at Tab I is memo you could send to your counterparts forwarding the agenda (Tab A) for this afternoon's NSPG meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and transmit (via LDX) the memo at Tab I with Tab A attached.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Kimmitt Memo to Agency Counterparts
Tab A - Agenda

cc: Don Fortier
Geoff Kemp
Howard Teicher

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CA NARA, Date 3/20/02

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Follow-up to the National Security Planning Group (NPSG) Meeting, May 17, 1984: Escalation in the Gulf War

We need to decide whether to issue a statement supportive of Saudi concerns about recent Iranian escalation. Alternatively, you could respond with a letter to King Fahd reaffirming our earlier offers of assistance in defending the freedom of navigation to and through the Gulf and cooperating with Saudi Arabia to defend against hostile threats to the Kingdom.

During a meeting this morning with Secretary Shultz, Prince Bandar delivered a message from King Fahd which included a decision by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG) to respond forcibly against future Iranian attacks. He also requested that the U.S. issue a statement expressing concern over recent Iranian attacks and continued support for Saudi Arabia. The request for a statement is premised on the belief that such a declaration by the U.S. would help deter future aggression from Iran. Prince Bandar also informed us that the SAG may request an acceleration of certain weapons and munitions and other assistance such as additional tankers and AWACs aircraft.

As Secretary Shultz explained to Prince Bandar, you and other Administration officials have already made statements along the lines suggested by the Saudis, although not explicitly directed at Iranian escalation. Moreover, it is not at all clear that more rhetoric, however strident, will deter the Iranians from further attacks on shipping. As George explained to Bandar, actions may be more important than statements at this point. The consensus is that we should issue a more modest statement through the Department of State spokesman recognizing the strong position taken by all the Gulf Cooperation Council Foreign Ministers to present the Iranians with a united front in the event of further aggression. There is also a consensus that the reassurances sought by the Saudis should be conveyed in a letter from you to King Fahd.

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cc Vice President

BY *RM* NARA DATE *2/21/02*

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The letter, which we expect to have for you tomorrow morning, will reaffirm our determination to defend freedom of navigation in the Gulf and assist in defending Saudi Arabia, with several important conditions. One is the prior need for active diplomacy by all who share our objectives to dampen the cycle of violence and escalation in the Gulf. We will point out to King Fahd that we are already actively engaged in this effort. Secondly, the Saudis must be reminded that we simply cannot mount a credible deterrent or an effective defense unless the Saudis request our assistance and provide access for the forces we will need to do the job. You made these points in an earlier letter to the King, but they bear repeating.

As to Saudi requests for direct assistance in the form of additional tankers and AWACs aircraft, the consensus is that we should respond positively to serious requests. There are several critical considerations in this regard. We need to keep in mind that our current tanker and AWACs presence in Saudi Arabia (and our warships in the Gulf) represent a certain exposure to Iranian attack. As GEN Kelley explained, the Saudis should be capable of providing defenses for the assets we presently have in the Kingdom.

If we increase that exposure, however, and if the situation continues to deteriorate, we will want to ensure that there are adequate U.S. assets to defend our forces in the region and to expeditiously respond to the threats we have said we were prepared to defend against. Under present circumstances, we could make an incremental change in our posture (e.g., an additional AWACs and 1-2 tankers) and still rely on Saudi tactical air to provide protection. If the situation worsens or if the Saudis request a significant augmentation of AWACs, we should insist on a coincident TACAIR deployment to reduce our exposure to Iranian reprisals.

A second point of concern, in this regard, is War Powers considerations. At present, our assets are in Saudi Arabia to train the Royal Saudi Air Force. If we augment our normal posture in response to increasing hostilities, we will need to consult with the Congress as we undertake additional deployments.

In sum, the Saudis seem to be asking us to reaffirm our commitments and demonstrate our concern about recent events. We agree we should do that, but we need to stress again to the Saudis the need for politically justifiable and militarily effective measures in response to continued Iranian aggression. This will be the thrust of your letter to King Fahd.

Prepared by:
Philip A. Dur

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 17, 1984

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ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR *hil*

SUBJECT: Follow-up to National Security Planning Group
(NSPG) Meeting, May 17, 1984: Escalation in the
Gulf War

Attached at Tab I is a memo you could send to the President to follow-up on the discussion at this afternoon's NSPG. State is preparing both a short press statement for the Department spokesman and a draft letter to King Fahd. They should be here by morning.

for Don Fortier concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Howard Teicher

Attachment

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *dlb* NARA, Date *1/31/07*

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 21, 1984

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~~w/ TOP SECRET attachment~~

ACTION UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE (S) dlb 11/31/02

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR *Phil*

SUBJECT: Notes of National Security Planning Group (NSPG)
Meeting, May 17: Escalation in the Gulf War

Attached at Tab I are notes of the NSPG meeting on the Gulf. It might be useful if we could provide these notes to the Vice President prior to the next meeting of the NSPG. If you deem it useful, I could pass them to Don Gregg.

Done 5/22/84

RECOMMENDATION

That Tab I be passed to the Vice President.

Approve *RMK*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Notes of NSPG Meeting May 17

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 22, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *dlb 1/31/02*

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD GREGG *PG*

FROM: PHILIP A. DUB *PG*

SUBJECT: Notes of the National
Security Planning Group
(NSPG) Meeting, May 17:
Escalation in the Gulf
War

The attached is provided for the
Vice President's use before the
next NSPG (Thursday, May 24).

Please do not reproduce and return
to this office after reviewing.

Attachment

Notes of the NSPG Meeting, May 17

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 23, 1984

84 MAY 23 P 1: 02
Brian/Kathleen:

Corrections made as indicated
by RMK. Returned for your
original file.

Also attached is note to
Don Gregg forwarding the
notes of the NSPG to the
Vice President.

J
Fawn

National Security Council
The White House

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Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	4	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Don	3		A

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

- ① Please redo minutes (first page) per Tab K of staff manual
- ② Pass copy to Don Gregg for VP, asking for return if possible.
- ③ return.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting
May 17, 1984, 1:30-2:30 p.m., White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Escalation in the Gulf War ~~(TS)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President's Office:
COL Bill Eckert

JCS:
General P.X. Kelley

State:
Secretary George Shultz
RADM Jonathan Howe

The White House:
Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
RADM John M. Poindexter

OSD:
Deputy Secretary William Taft IV
Mr. Fred Ikle

NSC:
Mr. Donald R. Fortier
CAPT Philip A. Dur

DOE:
Mr. Donald Perleman

CIA:
Mr. Robert Gates

Minutes

McFarlane: Purpose of the meeting is to discuss how we should deal with worsening Gulf situation and recent attacks on shipping by both Iran and Iraq.

Prince Bandar called on Secretary Shultz this morning with a message from King Fahd asking for U.S. support.

We need to discuss what our public posture should be:

- Should we distinguish between attacks on belligerent and non-belligerent shipping?
- Can we improve deterrence through actions?
- If we decide to act, should we have TACAIR to accompany the additional AWACS and tankers the Saudis may be seeking?
- How should we deal with Allies and can we avoid international efforts which could veto unilateral actions?

Asked Secretary Shultz to summarize diplomatic efforts.

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Shultz: We have made many statements expressing concern about escalation through the State press spokesman and White House. We have stressed need to get acceptance of UNSC resolution 540; we have said attacks on shipping should stop; and we have stressed our determination to protect freedom of navigation in the Gulf. In short, we have made an abundance of public statements.

We have presented a demarche to the Government of Iraq through our interests section in Baghdad. We have made similar demarches to Iran through our friends and Allies who still have relations with Iran. The Vice President will give a message to President Zia (Pakistan) for relay to Tehran.

Our closest Allies are fully informed of our efforts and our sentiments.

I am not optimistic about the results of these demarches. The British, for example, want to take the situation to the UN. The GCC statement (foreign ministers) just issued also seeks to engage the UN. We don't think the UN efforts will be very successful, but they are bound to be presented. Our UNDEL will try to forestall efforts which inhibit our ability to act. Ken Dam will try to caution the UK in his conversations with Geoffrey Howe.

We think the EC-10 effort is useful.

Prince Bandar called on me this morning and made the following points:

- If Iran continues to escalate, the Saudis have decided they will respond forcibly.
- King Fahd wants us to make a statement (condemning Iranian attacks).
- Fahd is concerned about escalating shipping insurance rates. Oil Minister Yamani is going to London and speak to Lloyds.
- Fahd feels we should issue a strong statement to deter further Iranian aggression. He wants an explicit statement from the President or at least the Secretary of State.
- The Saudis are very concerned about Ariel Sharon's recent allegations. They worry the Israelis will try to use their leverage to keep us from assisting the Arabs.

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Shultz (continued):

- The Saudis want us to accelerate arms deliveries in the pipeline and they may ask for more AWACS and tankers.

I told Bandar we were concerned friends and that applied in peacetime and crises. The Israelis have told us there is no basis for Sharon's allegations, and I told Bandar the King should not worry that U.S.-Israeli relations would constrain our freedom of action.

The U.S. is counseling restraint and is engaged in active diplomacy to calm the situation. While we welcomed other efforts to quiet things down, I noted that going to the UN has downsides.

I questioned the need for more public statements since we have made so many. I told him I thought that actions spoke louder than words where deterrence was concerned.

I said if we're going to be effective in deterring aggression, we would have to move on access to Saudi facilities and combined planning. I told him we needed a decision on this.

Since I met with Bandar, the GCC foreign ministers have met in emergency session and released a public statement which contains three major points:

- The GCC condemns Iranian attacks.
- They consider that an attack on one member is an attack on all.
- They intend to take these acts of aggression to both the Arab League and the Security Council.

President: If I understand correctly, we have information that Iraq has attacked 34 ships and that Iran has attacked three.

Now as I see it, it's none of our business if one of these countries at war interrupts the oil sales of the other. But Iran is attacking non-belligerents and, therefore, there is a distinction between what Iraq is doing and what Iran is doing. Am I right?

Shultz: Well, from the Iranian viewpoint, the Iraqis are getting their money from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, so in that sense those countries are not innocent.

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President: But the 34 ships the Iraqis attacked were in the trade with Iran, right?

Gates: Most of those 34 ships were not tankers. There was a wide variety of ships including some combatants. In the last month (April to May), the Iraqis have begun attacking tankers. There have been six attacks on tankers--roughly one every four days.

President: I think Iraq is trying to shut off Iran's oil exports because they are a source of hard currency which is being used to finance the war.

But the Iranians also consider their attacks as going against the source of funds.

Our message to both is to insulate their sources of funds by stopping these attacks on shipping.

The GCC seems bent on laying the blame entirely on Iran.

McFarlane: I would like to call on Defense now to speak about our deterrence posture and measures we could take to enhance deterrence. Will Taft.

Taft: I will defer to General Kelley, who will brief on our military posture and the possible escalation scenarios.

General Kelley: (Briefed from map)

- Outlined U.S. force dispositions.
- Outlined locations of attacks on shipping.
- GCC air and air defense capabilities.
- Positions of Middle East Force ships (noted that flagship of the force was enroute to Pakistan).
- KITTY HAWK Battle Group can provide air cover over the middle reaches of the Gulf but can only sustain this posture for 48 hours and then only with USAF tanker support.
- KITTY HAWK aircraft can also conduct limited strikes against Iranian targets (specifically Busher, Bandar, Abbas) but this cannot be sustained.

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General Kelley (continued):

- Four AWACS in Saudi Arabia currently support one orbit for 12 hours/day. If we want sustained 24 hour coverage, we need 5 aircraft. If you want 2 orbits, as envisaged in our PORT GRAND OPLAN, we need a total of 10 AWACS.
- There is not great risk to AWACS from Iranian aircraft because AWACS can evade.
- The only way we can provide air cover over Gulf is to deploy U.S. TACAIR to Saudi Arabia.
- The Saudis may try to solve this problem themselves but we doubt they can maintain continuous CAP coverage.
- There is a U.S. alternative and that is to bring in enough F-15s to protect the AWACS orbits [probably meant 2 orbits] and help defend shipping.
- Protection of U.S. shipping is a big problem. Between now and July 1, ten U.S. flag tankers on charter to the Military Sealift Command will be transiting to the Gulf to take on fuel either in Bahrein or Kuwait. We need to decide what we should do about those tankers. The first one is scheduled to make a lift in Kuwait on May 23.
- The bottom line, Mr. President, is without access to Saudi bases, we cannot bring our combat capabilities to bear on the problem of protecting shipping in the Gulf.

Shultz: We need diplomatic efforts before we can get involved. We want to be there at the request of another country, if not the entire GCC. Ideally, we would also have the support of the British and the French.

Taft: That is right. We need to exhaust diplomatic effort to solve the crisis before we get involved militarily.

Shultz: This is the same old story--military power and diplomacy are not separate categories. We need both. Military effectiveness depends on successful diplomatic efforts (access, etc.). Successful diplomacy must have a military dimension. In this case, we need several things to be successful.

- We need a united front in the Administration.
- We need a carefully orchestrated and finely tuned political-military effort. They are interdependent and indispensable to our credibility.

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McFarlane: George, if our interest is in maintaining our credibility, what should our public posture be? What should we say to the Saudis, the UK, and our other Allies and how can we calm the oil markets?

Shultz: Let me answer the last question first. I think the recent statements of the Secretary of Energy about how oil continues to flow, how the stockpiles are etc., have already had a calming effect. I think we should continue on this line using similar statements from State, the White House, and Energy.

On the second point, I'm not convinced we should make any more public statements except to stress our interest in the security of the area. The press spokesmen seem the best way of continuing to make this point. If anyone here feels strongly to the contrary and feels there is mileage in another statement, I don't have any problem.

If you send a message to Fahd, I think it should be a strong and reassuring statement not a general or equivocal one.

We should make the Saudis come to us though. So far we've made all the commitments and have heard nothing from them. We need to stress these are shared responsibilities, and if they want our help, they are going to have to ask for it.

We have laid down markers on the subjects with the Gulf states and one of these days one of these countries is going to ask for our help. When they do we are going to have to respond.

We will need a unified government.

We will need a tightly coordinated political-military plan.

We have to anticipate that the party could get very rough. We are far away, it will be tough to get there with what we need. There is going to be terrorism and we have to ready for some street fighting.

Meese: Mr. President, I know you have another meeting to get to, but let me see if I can summarize this meeting with what I think are four key principles.

- We must protect U.S. flag vessels and we need to have the capability to retaliate against attacks on our shipping at the source of the aggression.
- We need to intensify and maximize the diplomatic effort to resolve this crisis.

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Meese (continued):

- We should provide logistical support for nations in the region trying to protect their shipping and territory.
- If we are asked to assist, we should only intervene directly as part of a truly international effort. We should not intervene unilaterally.

Shultz: That then is a formula for failure, because by the time we rally the support you have said is necessary, the game will be lost.

Meese: Is there really an alternative? How do you protect tankers?

General Kelley: You should know that we have a tanker scheduled to take a load of fuel into Kuwait next week. We could use the Middle East Force to escort that tanker, but then you expose the southern Gulf.

Shultz: (To Meese) What if Kuwait says, "You've been here asking for access to help in defending shipping, OK help. We're asking for it."

Meese: We ought to be pressing the UK and France to help.

Shultz: Are you saying we should back away? I'm sure it's going to be rough, if we go in. May be we should back out of the commitments we've made. Having pulled out of Lebanon, maybe we should ease away from this before it gets rough. Recognize that the effect will be catastrophic.

Baker: I thought our only commitment was to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to shipping and surely to defend our ships.

President: How much do we import from the Gulf? What is the normal U.S. flag traffic in the Gulf?

General Kelley: We have normally 2-3 U.S. flag tankers (MSC controlled) in the Gulf. I think there is a total of 7. These are the ships that give us concern, the MSC ships. We do have other places we can go to get our JP-5.

McFarlane: Maybe we could ask our deputies to carry on.

President: Let me say one more thing:

We've said we're not going to see the Gulf closed.

The British and French have said the same thing.

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President (continued):

What George has said...If we are going to have any influence in this part of the world, if we are going to help settle the problems of the Middle East, we can't stand aside. We can't have another blow to the confidence we've tried to build.

These are very serious considerations.

We've been involved in trying to settle the Middle East problems, trying to bring the Arabs and the Israelis together, that is what drew us into Lebanon in the first place.

We cannot be found wanting now, but it has to be at the request of these countries.

Meese: Somehow we have to involve other countries who are more dependent than we.

Taft: We've been very concerned about the reactions of those other countries in the face of Iranian attacks. The Iraqis are creating this situation (by escalating against tankers bound for Iran).

Shultz: I think, Mr. President, that it is important to review what we have said and what we have done to date.

- Publicly, we've said we'd keep the Strait open and the Gulf safe for shipping.
- We've given a more detailed commitment to each of the GCC countries, wherein we said we would protect non-belligerent shipping and help protect the oil facilities.
- The condition was they would have to ask for our help.
- While we have stressed the need for multilateral participation, our emphasis has been the need for quick action. For that, we've said we need access.
- We have given the GCC reason to understand that if they ask for our help, they will get it. That is the record of our discussions.

President: They are reluctant to ask us for help (or give us access) because they fear Iran. Have the GCC been asked to intercede with Iraq to stop these attacks?

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Shultz: We have. We have told them that the Straits and the Gulf are international waters and that they must be kept open--that has been our objective.

President: I must say, the Iraqis appear braver in attacking unarmed ships, than they have been in attacking Iranian military targets.

-- Adjourned --

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