

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: National
Security Planning Group (NSPG): Records, 1981-1987
Folder Title: NSPG 0090 05/25/1984
Box: 91307

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

Withdrawer

DLB 1/31/2007

File Folder NSPG 0090 05/25/1984 [IRAN-IRAQ WAR]

FOIA

F1772

Box Number 91305

JOYCE BATTLE

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
33393	FORM	WASHFAX RECEIPT <i>R 1/14/2008 F1772</i>	1	5/22/1984	B1	B3
33394	MEMO	DONALD FORTIER TO LIST, RE: BACKGROUND PAPER <i>R 3/25/2008 NLRRF1772</i>	1	5/22/1984	B1	B3
33395	PAPER	STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE IRAN-IRAQ CRISIS	5	ND	B1	
33396	MINUTES	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFING, MAY 25, 1984 RE: GULF WAR <i>R 7/22/2011 M263/1</i>	3	ND	B1	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

5 OF 8
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

DOCDATE 840525

PARTIC	BUSH, G	PRESIDENT	WEINBERGER, C
	VESSEY, J	SHULTZ, G	BAKER, J
	MCFARLANE	MEESE, E	POINDEXTER

END OF DOCUMENT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CH NARA, Date 3/20/02~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM .I PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8490619 2

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 23 MAY 84 19

TO ACENCIES

FROM FORTIER

DOC DATE 22 MAY 84

KEYWORDS IRAN

IRAQ

NSPG

PERSIAN GULF

SUBJECT IRAN - IRAQ BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 25 MAY NSPG

ACTION. FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

RLF#

LOG 8490590

8490591

NSCIFID NSPG0090

(K / K)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

3
ID 8490619

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 23 MAY 84 19

TO AGENCIES FROM FORTIER

dlb 1/31/07 DOC DATE 22 MAY 84

KEYWORDS IRAN

IRAQ

NSPG

PERSIAN GULF

SUBJECT IRAN - IRAQ BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 24 MAY NSPG

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE STATUS C FILES IF

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8490606

NSCIFID

(K / K)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

WASHFAX

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

22 MAY 1984 20 23

NM 011 A

33393

MESSAGE NO. 950 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 6
FROM DONALD R. FORTIER
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION BACKGROUND PAPER FOR NSPG ON IRAN-IRAQ

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>REAR ADMIRAL JONATHAN HOWE</u>		
<u>DOD</u>	<u>MR. RICHARD ARMITAGE</u>		
<u>DOD</u>	<u>BRIGADIER GENERAL CARL STINER</u>	<u>J-5</u>	
<u>CIA</u>	<u>MR. GRAHAM FULLER</u>		<u>8</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>MR. FRITZ ERMARTH</u>		

REMARKS

SYSTEM II 90619

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS F1772 #33393BY LOT NARA, DATE 1/14/08

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90619

33394

May 22, 1984

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR REAR ADMIRAL JONATHAN HOWE
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State

MR. RICHARD ARMITAGE
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs

BRIGADIER GENERAL CARL STINER
Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs
Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5)

MR. GRAHAM FULLER
NIO for Near East and South Asia
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. FRITZ ERMARTH
NIO for USSR/EE
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Background Paper for NSPG on Iran-Iraq (S)

Attached is a short piece that attempts to put recent events in the Gulf in a slightly broader strategic setting, highlighting in the process certain branch points in the escalation process. It is easier to raise the key questions than to answer them. Our thought was, however, that such a piece might help provide useful background in preparing principals for Thursday's NSPG. Your thoughts on the issues raised in the paper would be extremely valuable. (S)

Donald R. Fortier
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment
Five pages

~~SECRET~~
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR f1772 #33394

BY CW NARA DATE 3/25/08

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

Withdrawer

DLB 1/31/2007

File Folder

NSPG 0090 05/25/1984 [IRAN-IRAQ WAR]

FOIA

F1772

JOYCE BATTLE

Box Number

91305

8

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

33395 PAPER

5

ND

B1

STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE IRAN-IRAQ CRISIS

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

13
CHRON FILE

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90661
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 31, 1984

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER *J*

FROM: *VLP* PHILIP A. DUR

SUBJECT: Your Notes of the NSC
Briefing for the
President, May 25, 1984

Attached are your meeting notes
in typescript for file/future
reference.

Attachment
Briefing Notes

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CHRON FILE 19

NLRR M09-263#33396

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90661

33396

BY RU NARA DATE 7/22/11

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

National Security Council Briefing
May 25, 1984, 9:30-10:30 a.m., Oval Office

SUBJECT: Gulf War

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

State

Secretary George P. Shultz

OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. James A. Baker, III

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

RADM John M. Poindexter

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane: Talked from "Discussion Paper":

- UN update
- STINGER - all recommended immediate emergency shipment

Secretary Weinberger: We recommend sending 200 on Tuesday.

General Vessey: They really need 1,200, but we only want to send 200 on an emergency basis.

Secretary Shultz: Israel has come in opposing the sale. We will pay a price.

Mr. McFarlane: I think threshold of tolerance on Hill is 500.

Mr. Baker: We should take advantage of emergency conditions now and send as many as we can.

Mr. McFarlane: I think we should not go for follow-up number. It will be defeated. We wait for another emergency.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

The President: We should send 400 now. Wait until they use these and then we could provide more. Shouldn't we tell Arens our reasoning for selling STINGERS.

Secretary Shultz: We are doing that and will continue to do so.

Mr. McFarlane: Next, what do we do if they ask for AWACS and/or tanker support? What about F-15 support?

General Vessey: They have asked for tanker support for their F-15s CAP over Saudi territory.

Secretary Weinberger: We would need one more KC-10.

General Vessey: Chiefs recommend we send one KC-10. Our attorneys say no war powers requirement. If Iranians step up attacks and threaten AWACS, then we should ask to send F-15s.

** Need carrier air to protect carrier.

Mr. McFarlane: The decision to send KC-10 does not require F-15s at this point.

General Vessey: Saudis have asked for tanking. We have to get them to agree to accept one more tanker.

The Vice President: Don't we need a request?

Secretary Weinberger: We have the request.

Secretary Shultz: A more likely threat is a terrorist attack on our facilities. Then we would be in war powers situation.

Secretary Weinberger: I agree with terrorist threats.

The President: What about contingency plan, if they attack us. Then we would attack the air base from where the aircraft came.

General Vessey: Our contingency plans would have us attack a military base--not necessarily same base.

Mr. McFarlane: Let's be clear. If direct Iranian violence against a U.S. target, are we agreed we should retaliate against an Iranian target.

The Vice President: Don't want to get us into an automatic war.

Secretary Weinberger: We aren't asking for automatic approval.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

SENSITIVE

The Vice President: Would the Saudis and Kuwaiti air forces be with us?

Secretary Weinberger: It would depend on what we were responding to.

General Vessey: If it is response to an attack against U.S., we would want to do it ourselves.

Mr. Baker: I want to be sure we understand that there is no automatic approval for retaliation against Iran for any terrorist action they might be involved with.

Secretary Shultz: But, we need to consider these issues so we can move promptly.

Mr. McFarlane: We need to send the President a range of things that could happen and what we might do in retaliation.

The President: In response to terrorist attacks, then we take out an expensive enough target that they will think twice next time. But, I think a more likely target will probably be a ship and we should respond.

Mr. McFarlane: Should we have an Iranian demarche through Pakistan? (no support) Can we get STINGERS before next Tuesday?

The President: Send 400 now. Hold-up on official notification until STINGERS are in-country and we actually make transfer.

General Vessey: We may want to inform key committee chairmen so they don't take more negative action against some other bill.

The Vice President: I'm concerned that we not push ourselves on the Arabs. We should wait until asked. Europeans may think we are trying to force our way in.

ADM Poindexter: Saudis asked French for air defense systems and French have agreed to four.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE