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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

Withdrawer

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File Folder NSPG 0144 02/12/1987 [U.S. POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST]

FOIA

F1772

Box Number 91306

JOYCE BATTLE

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33407	AGENDA	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.... FEBRUARY 12, 1987 R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	1	ND	B1
33408	FORM	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD PAR 1/14/2008 F1772	1	2/10/1987	B3
33409	FORM	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD PAR 1/14/2008 F1772	1	2/10/1987	B3
33410	MEMO	FRANK CARLUCCI TO [THE PRESIDENT], RE: MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP, FEBRUARY 12, 1987 R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	4	2/11/1987	B1
33411	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES FOR TALKING POINTS R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	1	ND	B1
33412	PAPER	TALKING POINTS (FOR MEETING) R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	8	ND	B1
33413	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #33412 R 2/21/2012 F1772/1	8	ND	B1
33414	MINUTES	NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 12, 1987 PAR 7/22/2011 M263/1	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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33415	MEMO	FRANK CARLUCCI TO LIST, RE: OPERATION <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	2/26/1987	B1
33416	MEMO	ROBERT OAKLEY TO FRANK CARLUCCI, RE: OPERATION <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	2/23/1987	B1
33417	CABLE	DRAFT CABLE, NO CABLE, RE: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION <i>R 3/25/2008 NLRRF1772</i>	3	2/19/1987	B1
33418	FORM	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS <i>PAR 1/14/2008 F1772</i>	1	2/12/1987	B3 B6

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90124

33407

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Thursday, February 12, 1987

White House Situation Room

11:00 a.m - 12:00 p.m.

US POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST

Agenda

- I. Opening Remarks.....The President
- II. Introduction.....Carlucci
 - o Where we are
 - o Looking ahead
- III. Intelligence Assessment.....Gates
 - o Position of US in Middle East (7 minutes)
 - o Prospects for Iran-Iraq War and Gulf States
 - o Radical vs. Moderate Regimes
 - o Role of Israel
 - o Soviet Policy
- IV. Building Blocks of Strategy.....Carlucci
 - o Israel-Jordan-Syria-Egypt-Palestinians (7 minutes)
 - o Iran-Iraq
 - o Gulf States
 - o Shamir Visit
 - o Congress
- V. Diplomatic Strategy.....Shultz
 - o Peace-seeking Process, including quality of life (West Bank) and international conference (7 minutes)
 - o Egypt: Arms and Financial Issues
 - o Iran-Iraq War and Diplomatic Efforts
 - o Gulf States and Political/Military Support
- VI. Military Considerations.....Weinberger
 - o Iran-Iraq War and Gulf Security (7 minutes)
(including freedom of navigation)
 - o Security Cooperation with Other Arabs
 - o US-Israeli Strategic Relationship
- VII. Discussion.....All participants
(20 minutes)
- VIII. Summary.....Carlucci
(5 minutes)

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NLRR F1772 #33407

BY FW NARA DATE 2/21/12

2

Participants

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
Chief of Staff to the President
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Plus representatives from the following departments and agencies:

Office of Management and Budget
Central Intelligence Agency
Joint Chiefs of Staff

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)RECEIVED 10 FEB 87 19³

TO AGENCIES FROM GREEN

DOCDATE 10 FEB 87

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST

NSC NSPG

AGENDA

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF NSC MTG 12 FEB RE MIDDLE EAST

ACTION: GREEN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

90148

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NSPG0144 (J / J)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
7cc President	C 2/10 IP 2/11 C 2/12	Green Sgd to Agencies Reopen/forward to Pres for info For Info Noted by Pres		Churn, GS6 280, 182, Churn

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National Security Council
The White House

87 FEB 11 P 4: 55

System # _____
Package # 90124
DOCLOG JM A/O 01

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Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Colin Powell	<u>3</u>		
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Situation Room			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>JM 2/11</u>	<u>D</u>

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The White House

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Rodman/Cockell			
Al Keel			
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>JM 2/10</u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	<u>3A</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>CDX</u>

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NSC 412 Agenda

4

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Colin Powell	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Frank Carlucci	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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(Date/Time) 2/80

*Need your review asep - notice
going out this a.m.*

*DX,
Bob*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/2

Bob,

See revisions

✓

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

0900

2/16/87

Colin-

Frank agrees with me

that we should make the
unusual move of letting
the President set the

agenda and the general

policy lines and the

content rather than simply

listening to everyone else;

they will not be conversing

or complicated. Would you

look at this before Bob

Pearson moves it?

Bob O.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

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Subject: NSC MTG 33408

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon	(1)	2/11/87	10:53	David E. ...
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John A. Spomer
JOHN A. SPOMER, CAPT, USAF

X42010

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THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 400 Maryland Avenue, SW, Room 4181				

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By CAH Date 4/13/02
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

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Page 1 of 1 Pages

14

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

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87 FEB 10 P 7: 28

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES two
FROM GRANT S. GREEN, JR. _____ EXEC SECRETARY
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION MEMO OF NSC MTG
LOG: 90124

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
STATE	NICHOLAS PLATT	EXEC SEC	
STATE	AMB HUGH MONTGOMERY	US MISSION TO UN	
DOD	JAMES F. LEMON	EXEC SEC	
JCS	JOSEPH C. STRASSER	EXEC ASST TO CHAIRMAN	
CIA	H. LAWRENCE SANDALL	EXEC SEC	

REMARKS _____

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LDX
SYSTEM II
90124

February 10, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

CAPTAIN JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


MR. L. WAYNE ARNY
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LARRY TAYLOR
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

AMBASSADOR HUGH MONTGOMERY
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on February 12, 1987 (U)

There will be an NSC Meeting on US Policy in Middle East on Thursday, February 12, 1987, at 11:00 a.m., in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Attached for your information is the agenda for this meeting. (S)


Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As Stated

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By dlb NARA, Date 1/31/07

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Subject: NSC MTG

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By CH NARA, Date 4/13/02

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
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By NLS, NARA, Date 1/14/88

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

the President has seen 2/12

SYSTEM II
90124

33410

February 11, 1987

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: February 12, 1987
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI 

I. PURPOSE

To discuss our current posture in the Middle East and to plan our strategy toward the region in advance of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's visit.

II. BACKGROUND

The probe of Iran did not work out as we had hoped. The Iranians have twisted our good faith effort to serve their own interests, to our detriment. Apart from not producing a real opening with Iran, our effort has raised questions about our credibility among some key Arab friends. In addition, Congressional inquiries and media preoccupation have created the potential for strains in the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

It does us little good to focus on the past. We must move forward, not be passive. In doing so, we should keep two basic principles in mind. First, one doesn't restore credibility by launching bold initiatives that are bound to fail; that's a prescription for more trouble, not less. Second, we have important, enduring strengths in the region: our friends in the area look to us as their ultimate guarantor; they see us as the one indispensable player in the Arab-Israeli peace-seeking process; economic preoccupations, particularly in Egypt and Jordan, increase their stake in maintaining relations with us.

These residual strengths mean that we need not panic or rush to "compensate" those who feel let down by us. Our approach must take account of our strengths and our need to be reliable and consistent, moving ahead slowly but steadily without a misstep.

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cc Vice President
Donald Regan

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RY RW NARA DATE 2/21/2

That argues for measured approaches along diplomatic, economic, and military fronts. In the Persian Gulf, that means re-invigorating our efforts in Operation Staunch; pushing initiatives to end the war; augmenting our local military presence to reassure friends and deter the Iranians; contingency planning with the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Bahrainis; and going ahead with limited arms sales.

In the Middle East, it means giving the peace-seeking process more momentum. Here, diplomatic and economic efforts come together. The only real progress being made on peace is happening on the West Bank, where Israeli-Jordanian cooperation is unprecedented and where Palestinian expectations have been raised by Hussein's West Bank Development Plan. We must make sure that Hussein is seen as delivering and these raised expectations don't get frustrated--that is a certain prescription for increased radicalism.

To make headway on the West Bank and also restore some of our lost credibility with Hussein, we need to provide money on the order of about \$30 million; that is a very small investment for building peace in the area. Besides the money, we'll need to work closely with the Jordanians, Israelis, and Palestinians in the territories to resolve problems and give a greater push to West Bank development projects that have economic value and political symbolism.

The name of the game is keeping hope alive for an ultimate overall peace. Along with our efforts on the ground, therefore, we should also work toward a negotiating process that promises a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Presently, there is no clear path to producing such negotiations. King Hussein wants an international conference to do so. We have always been skeptical about such a conference, seeing it as producing a forum for debate, not negotiation; as introducing the Soviets into the diplomatic process; and as building pressure on us to produce something we can't deliver.

Our skepticism about a conference remains. But given Hussein's and Mubarak's perceived needs, and the importance of creating at least the hope that a negotiating process seeking peace is alive, we should continue to discuss with Jordan, Israel, and Egypt to see if understandings can be reached that satisfy our basic concerns about a conference. We should have no illusions in this regard and we must assure Israel that they will not be forced into a conference. We shouldn't mislead the Jordanians and

Egyptians about our skepticism and our needs. Rather, we should challenge both to come up with a structure that can lead to real negotiations capable of producing positive outcomes.

That, alone, will be helpful with Egypt. But Mubarak's real preoccupation is his economy. Your recent directive to George Shultz and Jim Baker to come up with a more responsive package for the Egyptians on FMS debt relief is critical in this regard. The FMS debt relief issue has become the symbol of frustrated Egyptian expectations about the U.S. relationship. Helping the Egyptians on this and on their IMF standby agreement will remove some of the uneasiness that has crept into the relationship, although we must tell the Egyptians that they, themselves, must work hard on economic reform.

Shamir opposes an international conference. He prefers to avoid even discussions that could produce understandings on it. However, he faces a consensus in the Israeli cabinet that accepts the value of dialogue on the conference, even if general skepticism remains strong.

During his visit we should make clear our views of how we would like to proceed on Quality of Life and on the conference, letting him know that we will not go to a conference if our basic concerns cannot be met. That should reassure him, particularly at a time when he needs, for Israeli domestic reasons, to come to Washington, look like he's managing the U.S. relationship effectively, and show that U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation is alive and well. He doesn't need a public battle with us, and we have little to gain by having one with him.

Nevertheless, we do want him to leave here with some clear understandings of what needs to be done in the peace-seeking process and what we plan to be doing in the region as a whole. Our discussions of regional issues and, in particular, our approach to the Gulf war, should be linked to a reaffirmation of our commitment to strategic cooperation with Israel. Indeed, one of the strongest factors that motivates strategic cooperation is the stake that both the United States and Israel have in strengthening the forces of moderation and weakening those of radicalism in the region. (I will be sending you a memo spelling out our basic objectives in the Shamir meeting prior to the visit.)

In this broad overview of the diplomatic, economic, and military approaches that need to be pursued in the Middle East, I haven't mentioned Syria or terrorism. Neither can be ignored. Syria, of course, has used terrorism as an instrument of policy. Recently, Assad, mindful of his difficulties and his regional and international isolation, has tempered his behavior. Without softening our basic posture toward Syria, the time may be right for a probe to see if the Syrians are prepared to work out some tacit arrangements on southern Lebanon. Their isolation and Assad's desire to restrain Hizbollah may create an opening here--one which would also offer payoffs on both the peace and terrorism fronts.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press plan.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Suggest you make introductory remarks (attached at Tab C) and then I will introduce the agenda and the issues we will cover in the meeting.

Prepared by:
Robert B. Oakley
Dennis B. Ross

Attachments

Tab A	Agenda
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Talking Points

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

33411

Not trying to ~~specific~~ decision.
Some policy review to set framework
we all comfortable with, out of
which series of discussions can flow.

Lot of things happening. War,
Peace Process, Lebanon, Mujah, ~~incremental~~
Baker Shamir.

Have overall strategy. Must
be well coordinated. War dep,
econ. & ~~public~~ military components.
Lots of pressures to ~~be~~ pick us
apart, part with Shamir
coming. Purpose of this mty
is to make sure that won't
happen.

~~Start with unit assessment~~
Hallmark is incrementalism. Systematic
temper approach to rebuilding
credibility.

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/2

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33412

TALKING POINTS

- Hallmark of our approach right now should be incrementalism.
We need to develop a systematic, tempered approach to rebuilding credibility. We needn't panic, nor rush to "compensate."
- Rather should move in a low-key way on the peace-seeking process. Working both on a broader long-term negotiating process--symbolized by a possible international conference--and in bilateral areas. George and Cap will get into the specifics of our diplomatic and military strategies, but let me outline a number of the principles that should guide U.S.
- We will want to take measured specific steps along a variety of diplomatic, economic, and military tracks, restoring confidence in us and enhancing the stakes that many of our friends have in us. The cumulative impact will make our point, provided we are consistent and do not appear to falter on any of these tracks.
- We must not lose sight of our residual assets and strengths. Our friends look to us as their only protector in extremis. Those like Egypt and Jordan see various forms of economic

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12

assistance from us as essential, particularly at present time when economic difficulties are seen by them as having dangerous political consequences. Egypt and Israel, of course, see our military relationships as central.

- Moreover, even while some may question our ability to be the sole arbiter of Middle East peace, no one in the Arab world questions the fact that we must be involved if any progress toward Arab-Israeli peace is to be made.

Supporting Arab Moderates

- On specifics, we'll do all we can bilaterally and multilaterally to ease Egypt's cash flow and debt problems; while pushing them to reform, we should look for ways to cushion the political shocks that they fear will result from economic reform. The military relationship with Egypt appears sound enough as is.
- Jordan, too, has major preoccupations with economic development plans and with the image of drift in the peace-seeking process. These come together on the issue of our support for the King's West Bank strategy. He needs money and he and other prospective donors, as well as Israel, await a commitment from us that demonstrates real, not simply verbal support for this program.

- Since the concrete developments on the ground in the West Bank are the one thing we really have going in the peace-seeking process, it's hard to believe that we can't come up with \$30 million to support it. That's a very small investment in peace. If we don't allocate it ourselves, there is so much support on the Hill that Congress might do it on its own. Being forced to act by Congress is not the way for us to demonstrate a commitment already made.

Easing Arab-Israeli Tensions

- Quality of Life on the West Bank was George's idea and has moved much farther than anyone thought it could. We must deliver both money and political support, working with Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians in the territories to inject still more momentum.
- That and a broader negotiating process aimed at a political solution will create hope. We need both to counter an image of drift and to give a positive political impetus to Quality of Life, something which it has lacked. This can encourage more Palestinian participation despite PLO opposition.

- It is all right to talk about an international conference, provided it has an essentially pro forma role. Any conference that isn't pro forma is by definition not something that will contribute to peace.

- We're interested in negotiations that produce outcomes; we should be prepared to work on extensive understandings that ensure that bilateral agreements can neither be vetoed nor held up by such a conference. Ensure that agreements (including the implementation of those agreements) in one bilateral committee (e.g., Jordan-Israel) cannot be held hostage to the pace of discussions in other committees (e.g., Syria-Israel). Ensure that the Soviets have no role unless they meet our tests or conditions. And ensure that gaps on substantive issues can be narrowed before actually deciding to call a conference.

- Lacking such understandings, we will end up expending valuable political capital over a process that has no substance, and that ends up putting heavy pressure on us to produce something which we cannot deliver. The U.S. does not need more unrealized expectations or perceived failures in the Middle East.

Shamir Visit

- Clearly, how we approach a conference is something that we will want to discuss with Shamir. The Cabinet position on a conference is not that different from ours, although Shamir is more reserved. We will want to explain the value of hope in a larger process toward peace, and working to see if enough understandings can be worked out so that a constructive conference can actually be put together. If it can, that's one thing. If it can't, the U.S. won't go. We should tell Shamir that.

- More than this, we want Shamir to be helpful on Quality of Life and not to bow to pressure from the right-wing, which could undercut Hussein's position. Shamir very badly wants this visit to show him as a leader and statesman, and to show that the strategic relationship is alive and well.

- That is difficult in the current setting. While the various investigations (including the Tower Commission) and the media are beyond our control, we can make positive statements about Shamir, and should. But he needs to understand clearly our interests in the West Bank and in a broader negotiating process. He should also hear about our broader strategic concerns in the region.

- We should reassure him privately and publicly of our continuing commitment to strategic cooperation. The current fall-out from Iran doesn't change our common stake in seeing moderate regimes strengthened and the forces of radicalism weakened in the area. We might talk to him in this context about our view of the situation in the Gulf.

Iran-Iraq and Gulf

- On Iran, we (and Israel) must recognize that their present policies are unhelpful to our interests, both short-term and long-term. The strategic importance is there and perhaps Khomeini's death will produce an opening for serious dialogue, or a need for activity if the struggle for power becomes intense and opportunities for us or the Soviets are created, but we need to deal with the present problems. George may have some thoughts on this, including reinvigorating the Staunch policy. That should be applied strictly to exports from this country as well as other countries.
- On Iraq, we need to be more helpful, both in what we say and what we do. They need psychological reassurance perhaps even more than material help. Perhaps we can make a statement on the war and on the Gulf in connection with the

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-7-

UN negotiations. May yet find a UNSC resolution with teeth worth pursuing. More than this, there are a few things we can provide Iraq, such as better intelligence, but we are limited by our policy of no weapons to either side. And fact remains that Iraqi problems in the war are not a result of material needs.

- In the Gulf, Cap has some ideas of what we can do to enhance freedom of navigation and closer coordination with GCC states, both individually and as a group. I understand General Crist has gone to the Gulf for talks on this subject. Also, the UK is interested in working with us.

- We also need to proceed with limited arms sales to Gulf countries. This is a sensitive issue vis-a-vis Congress and we must consult them carefully, explaining how they fit into our overall strategy, that they are not "compensating" for Iran, and that we do not have any hidden agendas.

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-8-

Syria/Terrorism

-- In this overview, haven't mentioned Syria or terrorism. Can't ignore either. Though terrorism has always been an instrument of his policy, Assad has recently tempered his behavior. Many want to think about a probe. Doesn't mean making concessions to Assad. Does mean recognizing his difficulties, his obvious new-found interest in reducing his isolation, and his need to rein-in the Hizbollah and the PLO in Lebanon. This would also meet our needs and those of Israel. Now may be a good time to see if tacit understandings on southern Lebanon could be worked out, something that would help on both the peace and terrorist fronts.

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31
SYSTEM II
90124

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 11, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*
DENNIS B. ROSS *DR*

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting, February 12, 1987, Situation Room,
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum to the President regarding the meeting. Tab C includes suggested talking points for the President to use to start the meeting. General talking points for your use are attached at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Agenda
Tab B List of Participants
Tab C Talking Points for the President
Tab II General Talking Points

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997
By *CH* NARA, Date *4/13/02*

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33413

TALKING POINTS

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12

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- Moreover, even while some may question our ability to be the sole arbiter of Middle East peace, no one in the Arab world questions the fact that we must be involved if any progress toward Arab-Israeli peace is to be made.

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Iran-Iraq and Gulf

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Syria/Terrorism

-- In this overview, haven't mentioned Syria or terrorism. Can't ignore either. Though terrorism has always been an instrument of his policy, Assad has recently tempered his behavior. Many want to think about a probe. Doesn't mean making concessions to Assad. Does mean recognizing his difficulties, his obvious new-found interest in reducing his isolation, and his need to rein-in the Hizbollah and the PLO in Lebanon. This would also meet our needs and those of Israel. Now may be a good time to see if tacit understandings on southern Lebanon could be worked out, something that would help on both the peace and terrorist fronts.

SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8790148

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED 17 FEB 87 18

TO GREEN

FROM OAKLEY

1/31/87 dlb

DOC DATE 17 FEB 87

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST

NSPG

MINUTES

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF NSPG MTG 12 FEB RE MIDDLE EAST

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GREEN

RODMAN

COMMENTS

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LOG 90124

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NSPG 60144

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National Security Council
The White House

87 FEB 17 P 6: 46

System # _____
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Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>A</u>
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Frank Carlucci	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

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42
SYSTEM II
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 17, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: NSPG Minutes, February 12, 1987

Attached at Tab I for your approval are the minutes of the NSPG meeting held on February 12 from 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the NSPG minutes at Tab I.

Approve *E*

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Minutes of NSPG Meeting

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *4/13/02*

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SYSTEM II
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

33414

National Security Planning Group Meeting
February 12, 1987, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m., Situation Room

SUBJECT: Middle East (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President's Office:
Don Gregg

State:
John C. Whitehead
Richard Murphy

Treasury:
James Baker

OSD:
Caspar W. Weinberger
Richard Armitage

Justice:
Edwin P. Meese

OMB:
Joe Wright
Wayne Army

CIA:
Robert Gates
[REDACTED]

JCS:
Admiral William Crowe
Lt. General John Moellering

White House:
Donald T. Regan
Frank C. Carlucci
Colin Powell
Robert B. Oakley

Minutes

President Reagan opened the meeting by stressing the importance of the region and the role of the United States. We support the peace process and Israel, but also the moderate Arabs. We want

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NLRR MD9-263 #33414
BY RW NARA DATE 7/22/11

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As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (b)(1)

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-2-

to move ahead, gradually but surely, with the peace process. He emphasized the need to help Iraq in order to block Iranian and radical Shia expansionism. Some Arab Governments are concerned that the U.S. is weak and unable or unwilling to help our friends because of the Iran problem. This is not true. Nor should there be any hint or speculation that we were trying to bring about an Iranian victory. That would be very bad for the Arab moderates in the Gulf. We sought to bring victory to neither side but sought to explore ways to end the war peacefully. Now we need to help Iraq. We also need to get on with the peace process, but gradually.

Mr. Carlucci observed that the meeting is not for decisions but for a broad policy review, to set a framework so that individual actions will fit into it. There is a great deal going on in the region, visitors are coming here. We must put all the parts together. We must also work closely to keep in step and avoid being picked apart. The U.S. is not in such bad shape in the region but we must pay attention and work to improve our position.

Mr. Gates agreed that the U.S. is in better shape than it might appear. Radicals have suffered setbacks -- Libya, Syria, and even Iran. Moderates are closer together, due to fear, and doing reasonably well. There are some doubts about the U.S. over arms sales to Iran but the moderate Arabs are still with us. Mubarak needs our help. Israel has had problems, with the Pollard affair, covert acquisition of technology, and the Iran arms deal, but relations with us are still good. The Iranian offensive near Basra scared other Arabs and there is still almost a 50% chance that Iran could capture it but with lots of casualties. Summing up, Gates said there are five basic problems facing the U.S.:

1. Moderate Arabs may lose their will to resist because they fear we have lost our will to help them due to terrorism
2. Iran may overrun Iraq
3. Israel's long-term strategic superiority could at some future date be threatened
4. South Lebanon is a threat to Israel, due to presence of Palestinians and Hizballah and other radicals there
5. Must be alert to long-term Soviet initiatives in the region

Carlucci asked Secretary of Treasury Baker and Assistant Secretary Murphy to comment on their recent trips to the Middle East as additional agenda items and said he would yield his time so that others could have more.

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-3-

Secretary Baker said he had been pleased with his trip to Saudi Arabia and his talks with Crown Prince Abdullah and others. They had accepted and appreciated the President's reassurances and said they, as friends, would stand behind the U.S. Basically, although scared about Iran and disappointed in us, they are still with us. They also think oil prices can be maintained at present levels, and have been working to get support of non-OPEC countries such as the USSR and Norway.

Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead agreed that we still have a solid foundation in the region and retain the initiative. No one else can act, leaving it to us where the peace process is concerned. With Shamir, we want to feel him out. He worries about Sharon and Levy but is less adamant in opposition to a peace conference than before. We will see if there is a way to get him on board. Shamir wants the visit to be a success and will probably accommodate us if not pressed too hard. We support Quality of Life on the West Bank but have no money. This is the fault of Congress. We also need to help Mubarak and ease his problems with FMS, within our own limitations.

Secretary of Treasury Baker noted that the overwhelming majority of borrowers are domestic and will demand equal treatment with Egypt. One must proceed carefully and pay attention to Congressional views on this. Secretary of Defense Weinberger suggested getting something of value from Egypt, such as base rights at Ras Tanarah, as compensation for flexibility on FMS. He opposed Baker's suggestion of asking Congress for a special act of Congress to benefit both Israel and Egypt, since it would upset other governments such as Turkey. Whitehead wondered about getting Arab governments and banks to pay off some of Egypt's debt. Baker thought this could be reviewed again.

Whitehead said there was nothing new on the Iran-Iraq war. UN Security Council is talking but not much real hope. We should find a means to reassure Iraq, as they are urging us to do, inter alia by making a statement. We need to reassure the Gulf States and continue with Operation Staunch. Carlucci asked about whether Staunch is being applied domestically. Attorney General Meese said that Justice is doing so, as did Baker for Treasury.

Murphy said he had talked to Mubarak, Hussein and the Israelis about the peace process and the international conference. Peres is okay but Shamir is unfamiliar and unhappy with the idea. However, he does not want to oppose Washington and has not closed the door. Hussein badly needs the conference in order to provide cover for bilateral, direct negotiations with Israel.

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-4-

Secretary of Defense Weinberger said we are looking at some things for Iraq. The UN Security Council, counterbattery radar, infra-red protection for Saddam's plane, and more intelligence. We need to do still more. Iran can not be allowed to win, lest its army and revolutionary zeal move on to threaten other countries. DOD is studying how to get supplies up the Gulf, and MIDEASTFOR has agreed to escort a Kuwaiti ship carrying U.S. tanks to Bahrain. We also need to help Egypt and Jordan. It is essential to get FMS payments down, and we should get Jordan's HAWKS out of concrete. Carlucci commented about opposition to this in Congress. Weinberger said that we also need to help the Saudis and he will be having military talks with Prince Sultan in April. On the peace process, he urged reviving the President's 1982 peace plan.

Chairman of the JCS Crowe observed that military-to-military relations are pretty good but the fact remains that we need more access to ports and harbors and airfields in the Gulf and can not really operate without them. Must keep working at it.

The President noted that Congress had prevented us from selling aircraft to Jordan which is now sniffing around the Soviet MIG-29. If we could move ahead with a new aircraft, it would encourage Jordan and be a symbol to moderate Arabs. A Jordan-Soviet deal would be very bad. Meese and Baker recalled the very bitter previous fights with Congress and Begin and urged caution. Perhaps other, less-controversial weapons should be attempted first. Carlucci suggested talking to Shamir privately about arms for Jordan before going to Congress. Weinberger and Baker agreed on talking to Shamir and then moving the package of arms for Arab moderates. The President agreed and said that the Arab arms package should move shortly after the Shamir visit.

Carlucci summed up by stressing the need for the Administration to close ranks on handling Middle East issues, build upon U.S. residual strength, move ahead gradually but surely, advance the peace process, provide more support for Iraq, take other diplomatic and military steps, decide upon a new offer on Egyptian FMS, and try to find funds for Quality of Life on the West Bank.

President Reagan asked about the possibility of a multinational force for West Beirut. Weinberger and Crowe said it is much more difficult than it might look, bigger and lots of fighters, surrounding mountains, etc. They strongly advised against it.

Prepared by: 
Robert Oakley

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 27 FEB 87 10

TO

AGENCIES

FROM CARLUCCI

DOCDATE 26 FEB 87

OAKLEY

23 FEB 87

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST

IRAN

IRAQ

PERSIAN GULF

PUBLIC STATEMENTS

NSPG

SUBJECT: OPERATION STAUNCH

ACTION: CARLUCCI SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE:

STATUS C FILES IFM O

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87 FEB 24

P 2: 32 National Security Council
The White House

90191

System # _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Colin Powell	<u>3</u>	<u>CS</u>	
Paul Thompson	<u>5 4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Frank Carlucci	<u>6 4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Grant Green			<u>A</u>
Situation Room			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6⁴</u>	<u>done 2/26</u>	<u>D</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other cc: VP, SCS, JWC, JF

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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
February 26, 1987

33415

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Operation Staunch (S)

The President was very pleased to hear at the February 12 National Security Planning Group Meeting on the Middle East that you and your staffs are vigorously pursuing Operation Staunch. He urges that you continue your efforts, which are a crucial part of our general strategy for helping to bring the Iran-Iraq war to the earliest possible negotiated end. It will be important for our credibility in approaching foreign governments for the State Department to provide an assessment of what is being done to prohibit the export of weapons or spare parts to Iran from this country. The Justice and Treasury Departments should provide State with a comprehensive review of our efforts by March 31, 1987. (S)


Frank C. Carlucci

cc: Vice President
Chairman, JCS

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NLRRF 1772 # 33415

BY RW

NADA DATE 2/21/12

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90191

February 23, 1987

33416

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Operation Staunch

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to participants in the February 12 NSPG, reiterating the President's commitment to Operation Staunch. It will serve as a useful reminder as the Administration seeks to re-energize the effort.

The Presidential statement on the Iran-Iraq war and the threat to the Gulf that State has drafted underscores the importance of Staunch. (Advance copy for your information at Tab II; State will send over formal draft tonight.) We will also stress to UNSC Permanent Members this week the President's commitment to Staunch and the need to consider a U.N.-backed arms embargo against Iran if it continues to refuse a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. (Draft cable FYI at Tab III; final version to follow from State).

Steve Danzansky and Bob Dean concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Participants
Tab II Draft Presidential Statement
Tab III Draft Cable

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF1772 #33416
BY *RW* NARA DATE *2/21/12*

51

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

On January 23, while the Iranian assault against Iraqi forces was especially intense, I reiterated the deep concern of the United States at the suffering and instability which the Iran-Iraq war has brought to the Gulf region. Since that time, although Iraq has stopped the Iranian attack east of Basra and pushed it back somewhat, the fighting in this tragic conflict has continued on the ground, in the air, and at sea.

Clearly, the peoples of the region cannot rest secure until there is a negotiated end to the conflict. We have frequently called on Iran's leaders to join in working toward a negotiated settlement, as the Iraqis have repeatedly offered to do. Regrettably, the Iranian government has so far proved unresponsive in the face of all efforts to encourage reason and restraint in its war policy. It has also persisted in its efforts to subvert its neighbors through terrorism and intimidation.

We continue to work for a settlement that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. To help bring Iran into negotiations toward that goal, we will continue with our vigorous efforts to persuade the international community not to provide weapons to Iran for the prosecution of the war. Secretary Shultz has recently named Under Secretary-designate Ed Derwinski to be responsible for this government-wide effort. He and his mission have my full confidence and backing.

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As I emphasized in January, this conflict threatens America's strategic interests, as well as the stability and security of all our friends in the region. We remain strongly committed to supporting the self-defense of our friends in the region, and recently moved naval forces in the Persian Gulf to underpin that commitment. We also remain strongly committed to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Finally, we are determined to help bring the war to the earliest possible negotiated end. With that goal in mind we believe ~~the international community should call for an~~ *there should be negotiations, withdrawal to borders,* immediate cessation of hostilities, and be prepared, in the appropriate forum and through the appropriate mechanisms, to impose an arms embargo on either or both participants in the war should either refuse to heed this call.

NEA/NGA:GLBerry;APBurleigh 2/21/87 version

Wang 1841Z

Clearances:

NSC:ROakley;DRoss (this version includes NSC proposed language)

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NLRR F1772 #33417

BY CH NARADATE 3/25/08

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P: MHARMACOST

NEA/NGA: APBURLEIGH
S/P: ZKHALILZAD; EAP: GSIGUR
L: MGKOZAK; EUR: CTHOMAS
NSC:

NEA: MVCREEKMORE; EDJEREJIAN
IO: NSSMITH; INR: MIABRAMOWITZ
PM: PHUGHES
S/S: S/S-0:

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, BEIJING IMMEDIATE, LONDON IMMEDIATE, MOSCOW
IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE, USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE BONN, ROME IMMEDIATE, TOKYO IMMEDIATE

EXDIS FOR AMBASSADORS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION: PRESSING FOR U.N.
ACTION ON THE GULF WAR

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES
WILL PRESS FOR SUPPORT FROM THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A RESOLUTION DEMANDING A
CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES
TO THE BORDERS AS OF AUGUST 1980, AND RELATED ACTIONS TO
END THE WAR, ALL WITHIN A REASONABLE, WELL-DEFINED
TIMETABLE. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION, WE
ARE PREPARED TO INCLUDE PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A U.N. INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISM OF SOME SORT, TO
INVESTIGATE THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR AS WELL AS THE CREATION
OF AN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

3. THE U.S., WHICH AS A MATTER OF POLICY DOES NOT
TRANSFER MUNITIONS LIST ITEMS TO EITHER PARTY TO THE
CONFLICT, WOULD SUPPORT MANDATORY ACTION BY THE UNSC
UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER TO PLACE A FORMAL
ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST EITHER PARTY THAT REFUSES TO ABIDE
BY A UNSC RESOLUTION CAST IN THE ABOVE TERMS. THE

MHA

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APB

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NSS: MIA

MGK: (PH)

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NSC:

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~~SECRET~~

2

PRESIDENT WILL SHORTLY ISSUE A PUBLIC STATEMENT RENEWING THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DISCOURAGE THE FLOW OF WEAPONS FROM ALL SOURCES TO IRAN, THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY IN THE CONFLICT. AS HE DID IN HIS JANUARY 23 STATEMENT ON THE GULF WAR, THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO RESTATE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE SELF-DEFENSE OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF REGION.

4. ACTION ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT BAGHDAD AND USUN): PLEASE APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS OF ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AT A SENIOR LEVEL TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- ON JANUARY 23, AT A TIME WHEN FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ WAS ESPECIALLY INTENSE, PRESIDENT REAGAN ISSUED A STATEMENT REITERATING DEEP U.S. CONCERN AT THE SUFFERING AND INSTABILITY BROUGHT BY THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

--EVEN EARLIER IN JANUARY, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, SPURRED BY THE IRANIAN THREAT TO BASRA AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CALL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE COUNCIL, BEGAN TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY ADOPTING A STRONG RESOLUTION ORDERING A CEASE-FIRE, TIED TO AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-WAR BOUNDARIES.

-- SINCE THAT TIME, IRAQ HAS BLOCKED THE IRANIAN ATTACK EAST OF BASRA, PUSHING IT BACK TO SOME DEGREE. AS A RESULT THE SENSE OF URGENCY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION SEEMS TO HAVE FADED. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS RELAXATION IS A SERIOUS ERROR. FIGHTING IS CONTINUING ON THE GROUND, IN THE AIR, AND AT SEA. MANY MILITARY ANALYSTS EXPECT RENewed IRANIAN ATTACKS IN THE RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE.

-- CLEARLY, THE BEST HOPE FOR SECURITY IN THE GULF REGION LIES IN AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE CONFLICT. PRESIDENT REAGAN PLANS TO ISSUE A NEW STATEMENT SHORTLY CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR AND REAFFIRMING HIS BACKING FOR OPERATION STAUNCH, THE U.S. EFFORT TO INHIBIT ARMS RESUPPLY TO IRAN--THE RECALCITRANT PARTY IN THE WAR. WE WOULD WELCOME SIMILAR STATEMENTS FROM THE CAPITALS OF THE UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS.

-- MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS TIME FOR THE UNSC TO TAKE FORMAL, EFFECTIVE ACTION TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND PERSUADE IRAN TO CHANGE ITS POLICY ON THE WAR. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS FREQUENTLY CALLED FOR A NEGOTIATED END TO THE FIGHTING, BUT IRAN HAS SO FAR REFUSED TO JOIN IRAQ IN WORKING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS.

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SECRET

2

-- WE ARE APPROACHING ALL THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNSC TO URGE THAT THEY SUPPORT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION DEMANDING A CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO THE BORDERS AS OF AUGUST 1980, AND RELATED ACTIONS TO END THE WAR, WITHIN A REASONABLE, WELL-DEFINED TIMETABLE. WE ARE PREPARED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO INCLUDE IN THE RESOLUTION PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH A U.N. INVESTIATIVE MECHANISM TO STUDY THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR AS WELL AS CALL FOR A POST-WAR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

--FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE BELLIGERENTS, ESPECIALLY IRAN, THEY MUST BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT THE COUNCIL IS PREPARED TO BACK UP THE RESOLUTION WITH SEVERE SANCTIONS AGAINST ANY PARTY THAT FAILS TO HEED IT. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT AN ARMS EMBARGO WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SANCTION.

--WE RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT, BUT ARE CONFIDENT THAT WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THESE CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY OVERCOME. THE PRESIDENT HAS REDOUBLED OUR EFFORTS ON STAINCH. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT AN ARMS EMBARGO SHOULD BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF EARLY ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER.

-- GOOD EARLY PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AMONG THE FIVE PERMANENT COUNCIL MEMBERS IN NEW YORK IN STUDYING THIS ISSUE. WE NOW ASK THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT TAKE THIS PROPOSAL FOR AN SC RESOLUTION UNDER CONSIDERATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE MUST NOT WAIT FOR ANOTHER BLOODLETTING, WHICH COULD HAVE FARREACHING CONSEQUENCES, BEFORE WE TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION. WE, THE MAJOR POWERS, MUST ACT TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A TRAGEDY, WHICH COULD BE PROFOUNDLY DESTABILIZING IN THE REGION.

5. FOR BAGHDAD AND USUN: DRAWING ON THE ABOVE TALKING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE, PLEASE LET THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT KNOW THAT WE ARE APPROACHING THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO PRESS FOR AN EFFECTIVE UNSC RESOLUTION. PLEASE SOLICIT IRAQI COMMENTS ON THE TERMS WHICH WE ARE PROPOSING FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION. USUN AT ITS DISCRETION MAY ALSO INFORM THE SECRETARIAT AS WELL AS DELEGATIONS OF OTHER PERMANENT SC MEMBERS OF OUR APPROACH TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

6. MOSCOW AND BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. YYY/Y YYY
YYY/Y

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

NSPG 144

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

33418

Please admit the following appointments on 2/12/87, 19____
for President of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

- ✓ Don Gregg
- ✓ John C. Whitehead [REDACTED]
- ✓ Richard Murphy [REDACTED]
- ✓ James Baker
- ✓ Caspar W. Weinberger
- ✓ Richard Armitage [REDACTED]
- ✓ Edwin P. Meese
- ✓ Admiral William Crowe
- ✓ John Moellering [REDACTED]
- ✓ Robert Gates [REDACTED]
- ✓ Joe Wright
- ✓ Wayne Army
- ~~Donald T. Regan~~
- ✓ Frank C. Carlucci
- ✓ Colin Powell
- ✓ Robert Oakley

FOIA(b) (3)
FOIA(b) (6)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F1772 #33418
By LOS, NARA, Date 1/14/08

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House
Room No. Situation Room
Time of Meeting 11:00

Requested by Cathy Bergeron
Room No. gfl/ww Telephone 6534
Date of request 2/12/87

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742