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Withdrawer

CAS **FOIA** 3/2/2011

File Folder

TERRORISM [OCTOBER 1981-FEBRUARY 1982]

M10-338

Box Number 91393

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			1	
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages		Restrictions
106194 MEMO	DOUGLAS FEITH TO RICHARD ALLEN RE PLO GROUPS AND TERRORISM (ANNOTATED)	2	11/9/1981	B1 B3
	PAR 7/10/2012 M338/1			
106214 EXCERPT	TAB A TO 106194	1	ND	B1 B3
	D 7/10/2012 M338/1			
106215 MEMO	RAYMOND TANTER TO ALLEN RE PLO	1	11/9/1981	P5
106198 LETTER	TO ADMIRAL POINDEXTER RE ASSESSMENT	1	2/11/1982	B1 B3
	PAR 7/10/2012 M338/1			
106199 REPORT	RE TERRORISM (ATTACHMENT TO 106198)) 14	2/2/1982	B1 B3
	D NLSSF97-051/1 7/10/2012 M338		<i>UPHELD</i>	
106201 MEMO	TO POINDEXTER RE TERRORISM	1	2/12/1982	B1 B3
	D 7/10/2012 M338/1			
106204 REPORT	RE TERRORISM (ATTACHMENT TO 106201)	4	2/11/1982	B1 B3
	D NLSSF97-051/1 7/10/2012 M33	•	<i>UPHELD</i>	
106206 MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO WILLIAM CASEY RE TERRORISM	1	2/20/1982	B1
	R 7/10/2012 M338/1			

Freedom of information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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TERRORISM [OCTOBER 1981-FEBRUARY 1982]

FOIA

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ID Doc Type	Doo	cument Descriptio	n	No of Pages		Restrictions
106207 MEMO		IS SHOEMAKER TO MAS REED RE TER		1	2/16/1982	B1
	R	11/29/2012	M338/1			
106212 MEMO		AUL BREMER TO C LECTION	LARK RE	1	2/8/1982	B1
	R	5/25/2000	NLSSF97-051/1 #2	24		
106213 NSC PROFILE SHEET				1	2/8/1982	B1
	R	5/25/2000	NLSSF97-051/1 #2	25		
106209 MEMO		ES NANCE TO THE RORISM	VICE PRESIDENT RE	1	12/31/1981	B1
	R	7/10/2012	M338/1			
106211 PAPER	RE T	ERRORISM (ATTA	CHMENT TO 106209)	5	12/23/1981	B1 B3
	PAR	?	NLSSF97-051/1 #. UPHELD 7/10/201 #106211			

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Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records

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Subject File

File Folder: TERRORISM 1/20/81---12/31/83 VOL I [2/5]

Date: May 20, 1999

[Memos] Box 91393

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo [6545]	Douglas Feith to Richard Allen, re PLO Groups and Terrorism, 2p	11/9/81	P1/F1 P5
2. notes	exerpts from cables, re PLO, 1p	nd	P1/F1
3. memo	Raymond Tanter to Richard Allen, re PLO, 1p	11/9/81	P5
4. letter	to John Poindexter, re attached, 1p,	2/11/82	P1/F1
5. publication	re terrorist groups, 16p (11 numbered pages)	2/2/82	P1/F1
6. memo	to Poindexter, re "Serious International Terrorist Threat", 1p	2/12//82	P1/F1
7. summary	"Serious International Terrorist Threat", 4p	2/11/82	P1/F1
8. memo	William Clark to Casey, re collection, Ip	2/20/82	P1/F1
9. memo	Chris Shoemaker through Thomas Reed to Clark, re improved collection, 1p	2/16/82	P1/F1
10. mem o	L. Paul Bremer to Clark, re collection, 1p R 5/25700 N-5F-97-05/4-24	2/8/82	P1/F1
11. profile sheet	8200757, 1p.	2/8/82	P 1/F1
12. memo	James Nance to the Vice President, re terrorist activities against Americans, 1p	12/31/81	P1/F1
13, memo	re growing terrorist danger for Americans, 5p P F97-051/174 26	12/23/81	P1/F1 53

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
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P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office ((a)(2) of the PRA].
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information ((a)(a) of the PRA). [(a)(4) of the PRA].

Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records

Archivist: lov

Subject File

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10. memo	L. Paul Bremer to Clark, re collection, 1p	2/8/82	P1/F1 81	
11. profile sheet	8200757, 1p	2/8/82	PI/FI BI	
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MEMORANDUM

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6545

106194

SECRET -

INFORMATION

November 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

DOUGLAS J. FEITH

SUBJECT:

PLO Groups and Terrorism (U)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M338 #106194

BY KAL NARA DATE 7/10/12

At today's NSC Staff Meeting, you raised the question of whether any PLO organizations do not engage in international terrorism. (C)

The PLO is an umbrella organization. There are five organizations under the umbrella, each of which is represented in the Executive Committee of the PLO: Fatah (led by Arafat), Saiqa (Syrian-dominated), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (led by Hawatmah), the Arab Liberation Front (led by Rahman Ahmad), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command. All five of these organizations continue to engage in international terrorism. (U)

While some analysts favor a distinction between "international terrorism" and terrorist acts committed in Israel, others see little merit in such a distinction, given that (1) the USG recognizes Israel as a sovereign state and (2) the terrorist acts committed in Israel involve border crossings in that those acts are planned or supported from outside Israel. (U)

A CIA special National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Soviet Support for International Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence," dated May 27, 1981, stated on page 20:

Fatah, the largest group in the PLO, is headed by Yasir Arafat, whose policy before 1973 was to engage in terrorism, both within Israel and internationally. Since then, he has <u>largely</u> <u>dissociated</u> Fatah from terrorism outside Israel and the occupied territories. (emphasis added) (S)

Note that Arafat has not dissociated Fatah entirely from international terrorism. Note that this quotation implies that Fatah continues not only to conduct but to associate itself with terrorism in Israel. (S)

A CIA research paper, entitled "Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980," dated May 1981 stated on page 17:

SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT Der Cl by CIA Review 8/28/2001



SECRET

E.O. 12068. As Amended BC. 3.3(b)(1)

(In 1980,) Fatah, the largest group in the PLO, while presumably waiting for the result of Arafat's diplomatic initiatives, restricted its international terrorist attacks to the Middle East countries. It conducted terrorist attacks in Jordan, Kuwait, Israel, and the West Bank. ... Fatah also continued to train groups that often used terrorism and maintained contacts with supporters abroad. (C)

Thus, even Fatah, the most "moderate" of the five organizations under the PLO umbrella, continues to engage in terrorist activities, though such activities appear to be confined chiefly to the Middle East. It is noteworthy that

(see Tab A). (C)

Charles Waterman, CIA's NIO for the Middle East, confirmed to me today that there are no groups in the PLO that are not terrorist, but, he contended, there are, within certain PLO groups, factions that are not terrorist.

The President would be on firm ground in characterizing the PLO as a terrorist organization. This is no less true because some PLO members administer social welfare programs rather than plant bombs in supermarkets. (C)

Norm Bailey concurs.

Attachments

Tab A Excerpt

SNIE 11/2-81 В

PA 81-10173

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10 October, 1981

Janet

For your possible use, we have attached a copy of the earlier Tanter memo on this same topic.

We need to talk about a reduction of the infighting on this topic.

Illen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

RAYMOND TANTER

SUBJECT:

The PLO and the President's Press Conference

During the staff meeting of November 9, you inquired as to whether there are any organizations within the PLO that are not terrorist in nature. It was suggested that all of the organizations within the PLO are terrorist though there may be individuals who are not themselves terrorists within these units. My response was that the President should not brand all of the PLO organizations as terrorist since the PLO includes a number of social and political institutions. Indeed, the CIA's Palestinian Handbook states that:

Palestinian students' and women's groups, farm organizations, and professional unions are represented in the PLO and elect delegates to the National Council ... A PLO Research Center was established in Beirut in February, 1965, and a Planning Center in 1969. Another PLO agency is the Palestine Red Crescent Society.(U)

While there are non-terrorists institutions within the PLO, however, none of the Fedayeen groups disavow terror as an instrument. These groups include Fatah, the Syrian controlled Saiqa and the pro-Syrian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. These three favor a negotiated settlement, while the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine vacillates between favoring a negotiated settlement and not.

The rejectionists include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the pro-Iraq Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Iraqi-controlled Arab Liberation Front and the Popular struggle Front, as well as Black June, which is close to Iraq. Note that the rejectionists are affiliated with Iraq; with the exception of the relatively independent Fatah, those who favor a negotiated settlement tend to affiliate with Syria.

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See Tab A for Q & A on the PLO and Terrorism.

Geoff Kemp concurs.

cc: D. Feith; Bob Kimmitt; Chris Shoemaker

THE PLO AND TERRORISM

- Q: Is the PLO a terrorist organization? Do all the PLO organizations engage in terrorism?
- A: Although the PLO has agencies that carry out political, social, and humanitarian tasks, none of the main groups such as Fatah have renounced terrorism. As a result of a failure to renounce terrorism, a failure to accept UN Resolutions 242/338, and a failure to accept Israel's right to exist, the U.S. will not negotiate with the PLO.

M/13 W/ Feith.
SUSPENSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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ALLEN

FROM FEITH

DOCDATE 09 NOV 81

TANTER

09 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST

TERRORISM

ARAFAT, YAS

MEDIA RELATIONS

SUBJECT: PLO GROUPS & TERRORISM & PRES PRESS CONF

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

KEMP

KIMMITT

SHOEMAKER

COMMENTS

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W/ATTCH FILE

106198

As Amended Sec. 3.5/



11 February 1982

Rear Admiral John M. Poindexter Military Assistant to the Assistant to President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Admiral Poindexter:

The Intelligence Community recently completed an updated assessment of the likelihood of various kinds of nuclear incidents perpetrated by foreign terrorist groups (enclosed). Its key findings acknowledge the rising public apprehension over nuclear power development and nuclear weapons modernization-conditions that present new opportunities for terrorist exploitation by attacking nuclear weapons or power plants or by perpetrating a hoax. The findings also underscore the very serious consequences of any such incidents including political pressures for removal of US nuclear weapons from foreign nations and a crippling of the nuclear power industry.

> Sincerely, Special Assistant for

Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

Enclosure Memo to Holders of SNIE 6-78

DECLASSIFIED IN PART NLRR M318 # 106198 BY KAL NARA DATE 7/10/12

Der Cl By:

Review on: 8 February 1988

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NSC S/S				

Rear Admiral John Poindexter, USN
Military Assistant to the
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
White House Situation Room
The White House
WAshington, D.C. 20500
Phone: 456-2255

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Department of State
Room 2513, NSB
Wahsington, D. C. 20520
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National Security Council
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NSC Staff; Room 386
Old Executive Office Building
Wahsington, D. C. 20500
Phone: 395-5865

Secret Service
Intelligence Division
Attn: SAIC Dennis T. Brosan
Room 825
1800 G Street, NW
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Phone 535-5731

Department of Treasury
Attn: Mr. J. Robert McBrien
OS/O; Room 4314, MTB
15th and Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington D.C. 20220
Phone: 566-8534

Federal Bureau of Investigation Attn: Mr. Robert J. Ivey Section Chief, Terrorism Section Criminal Investigative Division WAshington, D. C. 20535 Phone: 324-4664

The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci Deputy Secretary of Defense Room 3E944, The Pentagon Bldg. Washington, D.C.

General David C. Jones, USAF Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Room 2E873, The Pentagon Washington, D.C.

Director Defense Intelligence Agency Room 3E258, The Pentagon Washington, D.C.

Rear Admiral John Poindexter, USN Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs White House Situation Room The White House WAshington, D.C. 20500 Phone: 456-2255

Federal Bureau of Investigation Attn: Mr. Charles P. Monroe Deputy Assistant Director Criminal Investigative Div. Room 5012, New FBI Bldg. Washington, D. C. 20535 Phone: 324-4262

Mr. Noel Koch.

Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Department of Defense
Room 4E813, The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.
Phone: 697-7728

Lt. Gen. Philip C. Gast OJCS, Director for Operations Department of Defense Room 2D874, The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301
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Washington, D.C. 20520

Mr. Hugh Montgomery
Director, Bureau of Intelligence
 and Research
Department of State
Room 6531, New State Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20520

THE WHITE HOUSE

106206

February 20, 1982

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Collection Against International Terrorism

The President has expressed growing concern with international terrorism. Accordingly, we need to identify ways and means of raising the priority of our current collection against this target and to identify additional resources which could be brought to bear.

I would appreciate it if you would outline a plan to improve our collection capabilities on this problem.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M338 # 106706

BY KML NARA DATE 7/10/12

<u>SECRET</u> Review 2/16/1988

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CECRET

February 16, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

THROUGH:

THOMAS C. REED

FROM:

CHRIS SHOEMAKER

SUBJECT:

Improved Collection on Terrorism

Jerry Bremer has written you (Tab II) asking you to task CIA to raise the priority of collecting against terrorism. CIA has historically not focused adequate attention on terrorism collection and, therefore, State's suggestion should be acted upon. Bremer has also suggested that the President convey his concern with international terrorism directly to Mr. Casey, whenever possible.

Gregg Concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to Mr. Casey.

Approve _____ Disapprove ____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Mr. Casey

Tab II Incoming memo from Jerry Bremer

Review 2/16/1988

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M338 * 106207

BY KML NARA DATE 11/29/12



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

1

February 8, 1982

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE WILLIAM P. CLARK THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Improved Collection on Terrorism

Recent events, including the tragic death of Col. Ray in Paris, have again emphasized the unsatisfactory state of our intelligence collection effort against the international connections of terrorist organizations, particularly the Italian Red Brigades.

The Secretary, therefore, would appreciate your sending a letter along the lines of the attached draft to Bill Casey. By emphasizing the importance both you and the President also attach to this problem, he hopes that the collection priority can be significantly raised and additional resources devoted to the problem.

It unquestionably also would be helpful if the President could find an opportunity personally to emphasize to Bill Casey his growing concern with this problem.

> L. Paul Bremer, III Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft letter to Bill Casey.

NLS F47-051#2

SECRET GDS 1/22/83

RECEIVED 08 FEB 82 16

CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 08 FEB 82

FED IL F17-657#25

KEWKORDS: TERRORISM

INTELLIGENCE CASEY, W

SURJECT: PROPOSED PRES LIR TO CIA RE IMPROVED COLLECTION AGAINST INTL

TERRORISM

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 11 FEB 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRÉT ATTACHMENT

December 31, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JAMES W. NANCE TO

SUBJECT:

TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST AMERICANS

This morning's Daily Report included a synopsis of the attached CIA assessment of the growing terrorist danger for Americans.

NLRR M338 # 106209

BY KAL NARA DATE 7/10/12

cc: Ed Meese
 James Baker
 Michael Deaver

SECRET ATTACHMENT

SECRET NO FOREIGN/NO CONTRACT/ORCON

F97-051/17 #26 C45 11-051/17 #26

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

National Foreign Assessment Center
23 December 1981

Growing Terrorist Danger for Americans

Key Judgements

The kidnapping of General Dozier by the Red Brigades along with other recent international terrorist incidents portend increased security threats—particularly to Americans—in Europe, the Americas and the Near East over the next few months.—(S/NF)

--If anti-US operations produce positive results, terrorist groups that share the Brigades anti-US orientation--such as the Red Army Faction in West Germanv--will be encouraged to attempt attacks against US nationals. -(8/NF)

--The extradition from the United States to Israel of Abu Eain, a Palestinian terrorist, has provided radical Palestinians further incentive to attack Americans. (S/NF)

Innocent American passers-by--even if not deliberately attacked--appear at some risk in the United Kingdom, to which the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) again has extended its bombing operations, and in the Near East where terrorists increasingly have used mass-casualty producing car bombs. (S/NF)

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The actions of some terrorist groups may influence future behavior of other groups, but we see no evidence of a central coordinating authority. To some extent, the RAF and the Red Brigades share similar strategic objectives, but such issues as NATO nuclear weapons deployments are not at the forefront of PIRA or Palestinian concerns. (S/NF)

The Libvan threat to senior US officials and the Abu Eain extradition case are not issues being scressed by West European terrorist groups. Both the Libvan campaign and Palestinian anger over Abu Eain could involve the use of radical Palestinian groups against US interests, especially in the Middle East. (S/NE)

The US is facing terrorist threats from several guarters which, although unconnected, will challenge the US ability to react to widely dispersed and potentially serious international terrorist attacks. (S/NF)

The Dozier Kidnapping: Others to Follow?

The outcome of the Dozier kidnapping by the Red Brigades is likely to determine whether the Brigades, or other terrorist groups that oppose NATO policies such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany, attack US officials in the near term. The first Brigades communique on the Dozier kidnapping and earlier published materials suggest the Brigades are trying to tap antimilitary, anti-nuclear sentiment in Italy and West Europe. They hope to embarrass NATO and the US and to erode the Italian government's policies on the Alliance and nuclear weapons deployment. By prolonging the kidnapping, the Brigades seek maximum public attention. (S/NF)

The communique calls for a coordinated or cooperative effort between the Brigades, and other terrorist groups, specifically the RAF, PIRA and ETA Basques in Spain. We believe RAF operatives already have begun target selection and surveillance, and preparations for operations against US targets in West Germany. If the Dozier operation seems to be achieving positive results for the Brigades, the RAF is more likely to accelerate its preparations for an attack against an American official or installation in order to advance anti-US objectives both groups share. (S/NF)

The Irish Republican Army and ETA Basques are less likely to target Americans at this time. Most US officials in Spain are located outside normal ETA operational areas. Anti-NATO feeling in Spain is not high. (S/NF)

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Although anti-NATO, the PIRA values support from certain segments of American society and would risk categorical condemnation in the US should it attack American targets. There remains a threat of indiscriminate PIRA hombing in the London area, which could produce victims among American passers-by. The PIRA launched a bombing campaign in the United Kingdom this fall, and in the past, has attempted hombings in England during the holiday season. Stringent security has limited the effectiveness of such campaigns, but British authorities apparently have still not uncovered a cache of over 500 pounds of explosives believed hidden somewhere in the London area for use in a future bombing campaign. (18/NF)

The Abu Eain Extradition Case

The US extradition to Israel on 13 December of accused Palestinian terrorist Ziyad Abu Eain, after a two-year battle in US courts, has heightened anti-US sentiment in the Near East and the threat to the well-being of Americans there and elsewhere. US Embassies in the region have been warned during the past two years that US interests would be attacked if Eain were extradited to Israel. (S/NF)

His extradition comes at a time of increased tensions in the Near East over Israeli de facto annexation of the Golan Heights, the stalemated Palestinian autonomy talks and reinforcement of military positions along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Even moderate Arabs point to the refusal of US courts to extradite PIRA terrorists to the UK as evidence of a US double-standard on the question of extradition. (S/NF)

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	Most Libyan attempts against world leaders have been thwarted in the planning or operational phase before the attack could take place. In many instances, tight security around the intended victim has persuaded Libyan-directed assassins to call off the attempt. Nonetheless, the Libyan campaign against US officials is without predecent, and the potential effectiveness of security, and other deterrant measures is hard to gauge. (S/NF) REDACTED	
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American officals in Central America remain potential targets.

Mass-casualty producing car bombs have been used to some extent by the PIRA in the United Kingdom, but such attacks are mainly centered in the Near East. Statistically, there have been twice as many car bombings by international terrorist groups

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this year as during the same period in 1980, and resultant casualties in 1981 will be higher than for any year since 1968.

Most of the recent, serious car bombings have taken place in Beirut and Syria, where there are relatively light concentrations of Americans. Unless US interests are directly targetted, the threat from car bombings to Americans in the United Kingdom and the Near East seems incidental and remote.

New Dangers in Europe

If, as the French police apparently suspect, Armenian terrorists have worked operationally with radical Palestinian terrorists in Europe, a more ominous terrorist threat would obtain in West Europe. The Palestinians have a well-developed support infrastructure in Europe, and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) is among the most capable and dangerous terrorist organizations in the world. (S/NF)

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Americans could become targets of this potentially powerful combination if the Palestinians, in reaction to the Abu Fain case, expand their target list to include US nationals and solicit Armenian cooperation (S/NF)