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Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject
File: Records, 1981-1985

Folder Title: Memorandums of Conversations, President
Reagan [02/02/1981: President Chun of Korea]

Box: 48

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Ronald Reagan Library

Case:1546

Archivist: Lisa Jones

DOC	TYPE	DATE	PAGES	CLASS.	CLOSED
1	Memorandum	02-06-1981	1		03-24-2003
	NSC #: 8100239 WHORM Subject #: To: The President From: Richard V. Allen Subject: Your Meeting with President Chun of Korea, 1p [Sent to External Referral] Restriction: FOIA(b)(1) R 8/4/06 USF 1546 #1				
2	Memo of Conversation	02-02-1981	5		03-24-2003
	NSC #: 8100239 WHORM Subject #: To: From: Subject: President's meeting with President Chun Doo Hwan of the Republic of Korea, 5p [Sent to External Referral] Restriction: FOIA(b)(1) R " " " #2				
3	Memorandum	02-03-1981	1		03-24-2003
	NSC #: 8100239 WHORM Subject #: To: Richard V. Allen From: Donald Gregg Subject: Memorandum of Conversation President Reagan/President Chun, 1p [Sent to External Referral] Restriction: FOIA(b)(1) R " " " #3				

COLLECTION: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Files

SERIES: Subject File

TITLE: Memorandums of Conversation
 President Reagan Memorandums of Conversation (3) [February 2, 1981: President Chun of Korea]

OA/ID NUMBER: No Box #

BOX NUMBER: 48

Folder #: 3 of 9

Restriction Codes

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
 PRA-1 -National Security Classified Information.
 PRA-2 -Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
 PRA-3 -Release would violate a Federal statute.
 PRA-4 -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 PRA-5 -Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors.
 PRA-6 -Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
 C. -Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donors' deed of gift.
 PRM. -Closed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
 FOIA(b)(1) -National security classified information.
 FOIA(b)(2) -Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.
 FOIA(b)(3) -Release would violate a Federal statute.
 FOIA(b)(4) -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information.
 FOIA(b)(6) -Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
 FOIA(b)(7) -Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 FOIA(b)(8) -Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions.
 FOIA(b)(9) -Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells.

DOC	TYPE	DATE	PAGES	CLASS.	CLOSED
4	Memorandum	00-00-0000	1		03-24-2003

NSC #: 8100239 WHORM Subject #:
 To: President
 From: Richard V. Allen
 Subject: draft of docid 11573, 1p
 [Sent to External Referral]

Restriction: ~~FOIA(b)1~~ R 0/4/06 NLSF-1546 #4

COLLECTION: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Files

SERIES: Subject File

TITLE: ~~President Reagan Memorandums of Conversations~~ (3) [February 2, 1981: President Chun of Korea]

OA/ID NUMBER: No Box #

BOX NUMBER: 40

Folder #: 3 of 0

Restriction Codes

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
 PRA-1 - National Security Classified Information.
 PRA-2 - Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
 PRA-3 - Release would violate a Federal statute.
 PRA-4 - Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
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 FOIA(b)(6) - Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
 FOIA(b)(7) - Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 FOIA(b)(8) - Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions.
 FOIA(b)(9) - Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen _____

MEMORANDUM

0239

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 6, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN *Rich*

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with President Chun of Korea (U)

Attached, for your information, is a summary, prepared by Donald Gregg of the NSC staff, of the meeting you held with President Chun of Korea on February 2. (U)

I believe that Chun's visit came off very successfully. Feedback from the Korean side has been universally favorable. The meetings and luncheon at the White House were ideal from their viewpoint, and Chun's other meetings, at State, on Capitol Hill, and in New York at the United Nations, also went well. (U)

U.S. press reactions have been good. There has been wide recognition that the Koreans are strong allies, facing extremely difficult problems as they cope with an implacable North Korea. Our side avoided striking any notes of fulsome praise of Korea which would have brought heavy press criticism. Human rights survives as a concept, but in a broadened context. (U)

Our Asian allies seem to be very pleased with the visit, and have noted your specific mention of the fact that meeting with President Chun sent a signal, not just to Korea, but to all of Asia that the U.S. is deeply committed to the security and stability of that area. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Review on February 4, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS #1546 #1

CA NARA, DATE 8/4/06

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

0239

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting
with President Chun Doo Hwan of the
Republic of Korea

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State Alexander Haig
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
Counsellor Edwin Meese
Chief of Staff James Baker
Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs Richard Allen
United States Trade Representative Bill Brock
Assistant to the President and Press
Secretary James Brady
U.S. Ambassador to Korea William Gleysteen
Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian Affairs-designate John Holdridge
NSC Staff Member Donald Gregg (Notetaker)
State Department Officer Douglas McNeal (Interpreter)

President Chun Doo Hwan
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Economic Planning Byong Hyun Shin
Foreign Minister Shin Yong Lho
Ambassador to the United States Yong Shik Kim
Minister of National Defense Yong Bock Choo
Secretary General to the President
Kyung Won Kim
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ro-myung Gong
Senior Protocol Secretary of the President
Pyoung Hoon Kim (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME February 2, 1981
AND PLACE: 11:20 - 12:05 P.M., Cabinet Room

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL CL BY R. V. Allen
☐ DECL ☒ REVIEW ON February 3, 2011
EXT BY ND 6 YRS BY R. V. Allen
REASON NSC 1.13 (a)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F1546 #2

CS NARA, DATE 8/4/06

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President Reagan said that a brief meeting had been held in the Oval Office, where greetings had been exchanged and substantive discussions started. The President stated that the visit of President Chun was an opportunity to reaffirm Korean/American friendship, to restore the alliance, and to symbolize our strong interests in the Pacific region as a whole. The President stated that he wanted to make plain that it would not be a policy of his administration to suggest that any American troops be pulled out of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The President stated "we are committed to the security of the Republic."

President Chun replied in English "Thank you very much."

President Reagan stated that he wanted to resume the full range of consultative meetings which had previously been suspended and that a Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) should be held sometime in 1981, with details to be worked out by the two defense ministers.

The President also said that he supported President Chun's recent call for reciprocal visits between North and South Korea. The President added that the United States would include the ROK in any meetings held with North Korea, and that the U.S. would not move unilaterally. As he put it, "If we go, we will go side by side." President Reagan then asked for President Chun's views on the military, political, and security situations.

President Chun responded by thanking President Reagan for his welcome words with regard to keeping U.S. troops in Korea and scheduling an SCM. President Chun said "I take your words as a gift, and they will allow me to return home with an easy mind." President Chun stated that ROK security involves the military balance in all of Northeast Asia. He noted that the Soviets have 46 divisions in the area and that the United States has had to send units of the 7th Fleet to the Indian Ocean in response to hostilities in the Persian Gulf. President Chun stated that a "gap" in Northeast Asia has resulted, and that miscalculations on the part of North Korea or the Soviet Union might result.

Turning to the Korean Peninsula, President Chun noted that North Korea has 730,000 troops while the South has only 610,000. He added that in terms of aircraft, artillery, tanks and ships North Korea was also ahead by roughly a two-to-one ratio. President Chun added that presence of U.S. troops on the Peninsula help to correct the balance and stated confidently that the ROK, with U.S. support, could stop any North Korean adventurism.

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President Chun stressed the need for continued economic growth as the basis for expansion of ROK military forces. He stated that he wanted to have more than five million men in the Korean reserve forces. Chun stated that with continued political stability, economic growth and military force expansion, the ROK could not only stop North Korean aggression but could also be a strategic asset for the United States in Northeast Asia. President Chun stated that Korean strength could be a counterweight to Soviet forces. Commenting on the 39,000 U.S. troops now in Korea, President Chun stated that these troops have a strategic impact, as they cause the Soviets to keep 500,000 troops in Northeast Asia, plus naval units. President Chun said he felt that Secretary of State Haig, as a former military commander, would agree that the United States military presence in Korea acts as a stabilizing factor in all of Northeast Asia.

Secretary Haig stated his full agreement with Chun's statement.

President Reagan stated that he was aware of the heavy economic burden that Korea was carrying in order to keep up its high level of defense spending. The President stated that the U.S. will expedite transfer of technology and weapons systems and that we will try to increase our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit levels. The President also stated that if Korea wanted to continue planning for the purchase of the F-16 fighter, the U.S. would proceed with the necessary notifications of the U.S. Congress.

President Chun replied that on the military security front the ROK would continue to play its role as a strategic asset for the U.S. in Northeast Asia. Turning to the economy, President Chun stated that he was trying to develop Korean defense industries but that to do this Korea would need technological help from the United States. President Chun said that he had intended to raise the F-16 issue, as well as the need for other weapons, and stated his pleasure that President Reagan had already mentioned the subject. He stated that he was grateful for economic support of the sort mentioned, and indicated a strong Korean interest in proceeding with plans for purchase of F-16 aircraft.

Turning to the political situation in his country, President Chun stated that Korea had tried to transplant American democracy across the Pacific, with only varying degrees of success. President Chun stated that President Reagan's view that each country exists under special circumstances would enable the Free World to unite more effectively behind American leadership. President Chun added that in the 1970s,

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several countries close to the United States had succumbed to communism. President Chun said he felt this was due in part to some lack of consistency in U.S. foreign policy. President Chun added that this era had passed, and that with the current clear policy of the Reagan administration, the United States and Korea can work more closely and effectively together.

President Reagan responded that he would continue his clear and consistent policies. He noted that the United States and Korea had become good trading partners and cited the fact that many of our agricultural products are sold to Korea. President Reagan acknowledged that we have economic problems of our own but that we would extend FMS credits and grain sales credits to the best of our ability.

Changing the subject, President Chun stated that Korea highly values human rights and morality and that these important matters can be effective psychological weapons against opponents who do not have similar systems or values. Chun noted that with North Korean troops as close to Seoul as Andrews Air Force Base is to Washington, and with one million men confronting each other along the DMZ, past American statements on human rights had caused some confusion in Korea. He quickly added that now the issue is clear. He assured President Reagan that the ROK would be America's partner, and that it would share America's burdens in East Asia.

President Chun spoke of the political situation in the ROK and said that order and peace had been restored. He noted that the Korean people had wanted an end to turbulence and that his own administration had taken several effective measures. President Chun noted that there would be a Presidential election later in February, and that National Assembly elections would follow in late March or early April. He stated that with these elections the ROK will have launched its Fifth Republic.

President Reagan responded by stating his appreciation of what President Chun has done. He also stated his recognition of what the ROK accomplishes as a stabilizing factor in the Pacific Basin. President Reagan said that America will restore its own strength in Asia, and added that together the ROK and the United States must consider the question of human rights in the proper manner. He noted that in the past it has seemed that the United States has ignored the greatest violators of human rights, most of whom are to be found behind the bamboo and iron curtains. President Reagan expressed pleasure at the reinvigoration of an alliance that we are dedicated to continue.

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President Reagan also mentioned Dr. Sammy Lee, a great Olympic champion of Korean decent who has worked hard to train American athletes, and stated that we are very proud of him.

President Chun expressed thanks for President Reagan's views and asked if he could mention economic problems before ending for lunch. President Chun noted that in the past, thanks to U.S. aid, Korean economic growth had increased. President Chun also noted that Japan has been an economic partner of the United States and had achieved tremendous growth as a result of American aid and protection. President Chun stated his hope that Japan will exert more efforts toward self-defense and urged that the Japanese consider "investing in ROK defense." President Chun suggested that the Japanese be encouraged to extend economic support to the ROK in an amount equivalent to the costs of two divisions. President Chun noted that the ROK now spends six percent of its GNP for defense, while Japan spends only .9 percent. President Chun urged that the U.S. and ROK work together to get the Japanese to do more in terms of spending for defense and to realize that U.S. and ROK forces are also protecting Japan. President Chun closed the meeting by expressing the hope that the same kind of special economic relations that the U.S. has now extended to Japan and the NATO nations might also be extended to Korea.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

February 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON
FROM: DONALD GREGG *dg*
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation
President Reagan/President Chun ~~(U)~~

Attached is a summary of the President's conversation with Korean President Chun Doo Hwan held yesterday. At one or two points in the meeting there seemed to be some confusion regarding interpretation of President Chun's remarks. I have checked with other participants in the meeting and feel fairly confident that my summary reflects what was said. This applies particularly to President Chun's statement on page 5 that the Japanese should be encouraged to extend economic support to the ROK in an amount equivalent to the costs of two divisions. I gathered, from my conversation with Kyung Won Kim, that he would just as soon not have had that statement included in the meeting. ~~(S)~~

*2/7/81
dispatched/
copy of memo only*

C.C. Ed Murre (Hy mure)
gt as amended

SIGNED

2/6/81~~SECRET~~

Review on February 3, 1987

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NLS F1546 73*CS* NARA, DATE 8/11/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

0239

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with President Chun of Korea (U)

Attached, for your information, is a summary of the meeting you held with President Chun of Korea on February 2. (U) *prepared by the press of the NSC staff,*

I believe that Chun's visit came off very successfully. Feedback from the Korean side has been universally favorable. The meetings and luncheon at the White House were ideal from their viewpoint, and Chun's other meetings, at State, on Capitol Hill, and in New York at the United Nations, also went well. (C)

U.S. press reactions have been good. There has been wide recognition that the Koreans are strong allies, facing extremely difficult ~~time/space~~ problems as they cope with an implacable North Korea. Our side avoided striking any notes of fulsome praise of Korea which would have brought heavy press criticism. Human rights survives as a concept, but in a broadened context. (C)

Our Asian allies seem to be very pleased with the visit, and have noted your specific mention of the fact that meeting with President Chun sent a signal, not just to Korea, but to all of Asia that the U.S. is deeply committed to the security and stability of that area. (U)

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Review on February 4, 1987

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NLS F154674

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CN NARA DATE 8/4/06

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8100239

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NOT NARA, Date 3/24/03

RECEIVED 03 FEB 81 16

TO

ALLEN

FROM GREGG

DOCDATE 03 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

CHUN, DOO WHAN

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES FEB 2 MTG W/ PRES CHUN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

NANCE

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8100110

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(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Allen	X 2/4	add on forward to Pres for info		
Pres	IP 2/7	for info		EM
	C 3/13	(noted by Pres.) orig. returned		DE JZ, etc
		for files		

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W/ATTCH FILE PH (C)