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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/8/2009

File Folder PRESIDENT REAGAN MEMORANDUMS OF
CONVERSATION (2) [FEBRUARY 12, 1981]

FOIA

F2002-072/1

Box Number 48

COLLINS

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60742	MEMCON	RR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO OF ITALY <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	2/12/1981	B1
60743	MEMCON	VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FM COLOMBO <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	2/12/1981	B1
60744	MEMCON	RR MEETING WITH QAIS ABDUL MUN'IM AL-ZAWAWI, OMANI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS <i>R 4/9/2018 M371/1</i>	4	1/12/1981	B1
60745	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF RR MEETING WITH QAIS ABDUL MUN'IM AL-ZAWAWI, OMANI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS <i>R 4/9/2018 M371/1</i>	2	1/12/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8100464

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 13 FEB 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 13 FEB 81

smf
1/8/09

KEYWORDS: ITALY

COLOMBO, EMILIO

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ FORN MINISTER COLOMBO

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 17 FEB 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with Italian Prime Minister Emilio Colombo

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State Alexander Haig
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, George Vest
NSC Staff Member, James M. Rentschler
State Department Interpreter, Neil Seidenman

Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo
Italian Ambassador to the U.S. Paolo PANSA Cedronio
Ms. Isabella RANDONE, Interpreter

DATE, TIME February 12, 1981
AND PLACE: 3:30-3:50PM, Oval Office

Responding to the President's word of welcome, Foreign Minister Colombo said he was delighted to have this opportunity to meet with the President. He brought with him, he said, an expression of very warm wishes to the President from President Pertini, Prime Minister Forlani, and indeed the entire Italian people. Italy considered it essential to touch base with the new Administration, and for that reason the Foreign Minister was especially grateful for today's meeting. (u)

The President replied that he appreciated the Foreign Minister's greetings. The United States enjoys great friendship with Italy which makes it entirely appropriate for the President to be meeting with such a distinguished representative of his country. The President noted that Italian support for the deployment of theater nuclear forces in Europe had been very strong, and this was a contribution to our common security which made us very happy. The President went on to say that he had had a nice phone conversation with Prime Minister Forlani shortly after assuming office; in that conversation he told the Prime Minister that he was anticipating the Foreign Minister's visit. (u)

Foreign Minister Colombo emphasized that the President's phone call had been greatly appreciated in Italy. It was a sign that the new Administration wanted to have even closer contact with a country which has been a faithful friend and ally dating back to the end of the Second World War. Italians recognize and appreciate the extent to which the United States has enabled their country to prosper since that time. (u)

The President responded that the feelings were mutual. He had looked forward to the Foreign Minister's visit to underscore the close ties which exist between our two countries. The President said he knew that the Foreign Minister had had a

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Review February 13, 2011
Cl. and Ext. by R.V. Allen
Reason: NSC 1.13 (a)

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NLS M06-015 #6

BY LOI NARA, DATE 10/16/06

full substantive discussion with the Vice President and the Secretary of State and that therefore there was probably no need to review many of the issues which interest our governments. The President indicated that there was one key issue it might be worth spending some time on during his exchange with the Foreign Minister, and that was the question of theater nuclear forces. (C)

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The Foreign Minister acknowledged that the TNF issue had been discussed at length earlier in the day with the Secretary of State. He emphasized that so far as Italy was concerned, the issue presented no problems. Italy had accepted the decision, and continued to support it. The government had had some difficulty, but it was working on implementing the decision. There would be perhaps additional problems in the future, but the government is not afraid. It is accustomed to living in the "difficult democracy" which is Italy's. The Foreign Minister expressed the view that it was important to maintain the link between the deployment part of the TNF decision and negotiations aimed at reducing them. When Italy decided to support TNF, it was aware that its actions did not affect Italy alone; indeed, it was undertaken to assist other allies, notably the Federal Republic of Germany. The Foreign Minister speculated that without Italian help on the issue, the Federal Republic might have found it very difficult to proceed with TNF. It was therefore important to be consistent in the application of the December 12, 1979 decision which NATO took; the link should be continued. (C)

The President thanked the Foreign Minister for his views and told him chucklingly that he was especially pleased to hear that there were no problems; the President said he wished that everyone who came in to see him were like that but that unfortunately the Foreign Minister was very unusual in that respect. The President went on to say that he had a very personal link with the Foreign Minister's country. He said that his sport is riding and that he is especially indebted to Captain Caprilli who created the modern system of riding with his innovation of the forward saddle. The President said that he himself has a Periani saddle. (U)

Ambassador Pansa interjected that he was particularly pleased to hear the President's comment and that it carried special meaning for a man like himself who was a former cavalry officer. (U)

The Foreign Minister told the President that in Italy riding is widespread, and that knowing he practices that sport only enhances the high degree of confidence in him which the Italian leadership already had. The Foreign Minister went on to say that many other sports are popular in Italy, too, but perhaps the most popular is tight-rope walking. Many people have watched Italy try to maintain a precarious balance, steering its way through many different obstacles; these spectators often watched in amazement and wondered where Italy was going. The result, however, has been very positive so far, since Italy has become a democratic society, a committed Atlanticist, and a faithful European partner. It is a nation that is secure, and this is perhaps the single most important contribution that Italy can make to the world community. The Foreign Minister added that his country is now engaged in fighting the serious threat of terrorism. The problem is difficult because terrorists have an internal organization, they have their own doctrine, and they have international links indicating a well-coordinated destabilization scheme. Nevertheless, Italy has just come through a debate on terrorism and he is personally pleased to be part of a government which has received a very large vote

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of confidence from the Italian people on this issue. Of course there are deaths and tragedy, but the government has achieved a measure of success. The Italian people stand united in the fight against terrorism. (U)

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The President responded that we are well aware of the strides Italy has made in that area. He stressed that we are all victims of terrorism: terrorism exists for one reason, and that is because there is a belief in certain parts of the world that those who have designs on other parts of the world can further those designs by intimidating the citizens of democratic societies and making them believe that there is no defense against terrorism. The President said that we in years past had very unwisely taken away from some of our agencies - for example the CIA and the FBI - the very tools they need to combat terrorism. The President stressed that we are determined to restore those tools and to wage an effective fight against terrorism. (U)

With another exchange of amenities the meeting concluded. (U)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

February 13, 1981

5

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER
SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Meeting with Colombo

Attached for your files is the memorandum of conversation covering the President's February 12 meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo. Do you want a copy to go to State?

YES _____

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE NSC _____

✓
EVA has seen
2/16/81

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
Review February 13, 1987

Dist. approved by S/S-S:
A. Adams 3/6/81

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1981 MAR 9 PM 2 Memorandum of Conversation

8107244

6

DATE: February 12, 1981
PLACE: President's
office
TIME: 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: US-Italian Relations

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

Italy

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary
Richard V. Allen, National Security
Adviser to the President
James Rentschler, NSC
George S. Vest, Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Interpreter

Foreign Minister Colombo
Paolo Pansa Cedronio,
Ambassador to the United States
Interpreter

COPIES TO: S,D,P,S/P,NSC,S/SEUR,PM,Embassy Rome and Bonn

Colombo expressed appreciation that the President could find time to see him and conveyed greetings from the Italian people, President Pertini, and Prime Minister Forlani, and the wishes of all for the success of President Reagan's work and for the continuing good relations between our two countries.

The President appreciated the Foreign Minister's visit and said he was especially pleased with our relations both bilaterally and as NATO allies, and in the latter connection he singled out Italian support for TNF. He mentioned appreciatively also his recent phone conversation with the Prime Minister.

Colombo replied that the President's call to the Prime Minister had been valued for its substantive exchange value and for its significance as evidence of the close contacts between our two countries. After all, our happy relationship goes back to the end of World War II. It is the closest of relations and will stay that way.

(Drafting Office and Officer)
EUR:GSVest
FORM DS-1254
2-65

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RDS-1 2/17/91

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 #60742
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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-2-

The President said the feeling is entirely mutual, and he too was determined to keep it that way.

Colombo, observing that substantive issues were covered with the Secretary of State and Vice President, nevertheless mentioned TNF again. The Italian position is, he said, that there are no real problems. Italy has accepted and adheres to its decision and is working out its implementation. There will be practical difficulties, but Italy is used to this. After all, it has been living with its own difficult democracy for some decades. He stressed the importance of maintaining the link which was part of the NATO decision in December 1979. When Italy decided to accept TNF, it did so in a context where it was assisting others like the FRG. Without Italy the FRG would have been in real difficulty. Therefore, it is most important to maintain that link, the decision on both production and deployment and arms control talks at the same time.

There was then an exchange on the President's personal link to Italy, i.e., his interest in the sport of riding which is indebted to Captain Caprilli.

Colombo, taking off from the comment on sport, said another sport which has occupied Italy since World War II is tightrope walking. Throughout these years people have asked how the Italians manage, but the Italians have indeed kept their balance on the rope and carried forward a nation which is democratic, Atlantic, European, international-minded, and secure in time of difficulty. Italy is now fighting terrorism which has internal origins and doctrine, but also has international links. Both the President and the Secretary have mentioned this problem. The Italians have recently debated it in Parliament and won a vote of confidence, so the Italians are united; they have problems, but he had no doubt they would overcome them.

The President said we are all victims of terrorism in the sense that there are some areas in the world that believe they can convince people that their government cannot protect them. In the US, for example, we have taken away some of the tools of protection from the FBI and the CIA and we are determined to give them back the tools to do their job.

(Time having run considerably beyond the originally scheduled visit, the Vice President suggested that the meeting regretfully should conclude. The President and Colombo again exchanged warm reassurance of the close ties between our two countries.)

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(Classification)

V104193
8107244

Date February 19, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

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1/8/07

8

TO: S/S - Mr. John H. Kelly
FROM: Director, S/S-S - Alvin P. Adams *AA*
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

The Secretary/The President, Italian FM Colombo, et. al.

Date February 12, 1981

Notetaker George Vest, Assistant Secretary, EUR

The attached memorandum of conversation is submitted for an S/S clearance and approval of distribution. A brief summary of any action commitments made at the meeting and an indication of any follow-up action being taken on those commitments follow below, together with suggested distribution. Please return the memcon directly to my office for distribution by S/S-I.

ACTION COMMITMENTS:

None.

FOLLOW-UP:

None.

Distribution: S, D, P, S/P, NSC, S/S
Other EUR, PM, Embassy Rome, Embassy Bonn

Cleared S/S
Noted S/S-S

AA
EXJ
4/3/81

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(CLASSIFICATION)

Dist approved by S/S:
A.Adams 3/5/81

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60743

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8107245

Memorandum of Conversation

1981 MAR 9 PM 2:14

DATE: February 12, 1981
PLACE: Vice President's
office
TIME: 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: US-Italian Relations

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

Italy

The Vice President
The Secretary
Admiral Daniel Murphy
James Rentschler, NSC
George S. Vest, Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs

Foreign Minister Colombo
Paolo Pansa Cedronio, Ambassador
to the United States
Foreign Minister's Party

COPIES TO: S,D,P,S/P,NSC,S/S,EUR,Embassy Rome

The Vice President welcomed Colombo in the warmest terms, saying that the Administration welcomed Colombo's visit both from the point of view of substance and symbolism. He emphasized how important the US felt it was to have a strong Italy.

Colombo expressed appreciation for this welcome and said that he approached our relationship with the same conviction. The responsibilities are difficult in our two countries, but our objectives are shared. He recognized that the political experience and geography of Italy gave Italy some special understanding and value.

The Vice President, turning to Secretary Haig, stressed that he had the full confidence of the President, especially because of the breadth of his understanding on European and international matters. He assumed the Italians shared our confidence, and this would make it possible for us to understand each other better, to see things the same way, and work closely together.

EUR:GSVest

(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET~~

FORM DS-1254
2-65

RDS-1 2/17/91

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M37111 # 60743
BY FW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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-2-

Colombo responded that this was exactly the Italian opinion of the Secretary. After an exchange of courtesies about the friendship of the Vice President for Migluolo in Colombo's party, Colombo commented on the domestic political situation in Rome. He noted that the Foreign Minister only the day before had received a strong vote of confidence in Parliament in which the four parties got a large majority. This would make it possible for the government to continue actively its policy. In the meantime the PCI has become more and more committed to an opposition role which had emerged last year at approximately the same time as the earthquake in southern Italy. The PCI, rather than trying to join the government, now insists it is an alternate to the government and obviously hopes to attract the Socialists into a coalition. He thought this would not happen. This position reflects internal structural problems in the PCI and perhaps the feeling that a possible Soviet intervention in Poland would make their situation in Italy more difficult. 10

The Vice President said that President Reagan is a man of firm principle and fully shares Secretary Haig's concern about an aggressive Soviet Union. This means that we are determined to strengthen the Alliance and also to bring more order into our domestic affairs where the United States has experienced too much regulation and declining productivity. The Administration will reverse those trends. The people elected President Reagan to do this and he will do it. (At this point the Vice President escorted Colombo to call on the President.)

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(Classification)

8104194
Date February 19, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

out
1/8/09

TO: S/S - Mr. John H. Kelly
FROM: Director, S/S-S - Alvin P. Adams
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

40

8107245

11

The Secretary/The Vice President & Italian FM Colombo

Date February 12, 1981

Notetaker George Vest, Assistant Secretary, EUR

The attached memorandum of conversation is submitted for an S/S clearance and approval of distribution. A brief summary of any action commitments made at the meeting and an indication of any follow-up action being taken on those commitments follow below, together with suggested distribution. Please return the memcon directly to my office for distribution by S/S-I.

ACTION COMMITMENTS:

None.

FOLLOW-UP:

None.

Distribution: S, D, P, S/P, NSC, S/S
Other EUR, Embassy Rome

Cleared S/S
Noted S/S-S

AA for JK
6/3/81

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(CLASSIFICATION)

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ID 8100602

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFICATION ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 19 FEB 81 16

TO ALLEN

FROM KEMP

DOCDATE 18 FEB 81

snf 1/8/09

12

KEYWORDS: OMAN

ZAWAWI, QAIS ABDUL

SUBJECT: MEMCON & SUMMARY OF PRES FEB 12 MTG W/ OMANI MINISTER ZAWAWI

ACTION: ALLEN APPROVED RECOM

DUE:

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

60744

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Qais Abdul Mun'im Al-Zawawi, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 13

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State Alexander Haig
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Geoffrey Kemp, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council (notetaker)

His Excellency Qais Abdul Mun'im Al-Zawawi
Omani Ambassador Sadek J. Sulaiman
Brigadier Timothy Landon, Former Equerry to the Sultan

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Thursday, February 12, 1981; 1602 - 1620;
The Oval Office

Minister of State Zawawi began by presenting President Reagan with a personal letter from Sultan Qaboos. President Reagan took several minutes to read the letter.

The President said he was very grateful for the letter, thanked the Sultan very much and asked that his best regards be given to the Sultan when His Excellency returns. He appreciated the support that Oman has given the United States in its peacemaking efforts in the Middle East, for its cooperation in providing military facilities, and assisting us in our ability to patrol the Strait of Hormuz. The President noted that though we had much to do in developing the facilities we planned in Oman, we wanted to proceed as soon as we can. He also appreciated the permission granted to increase the number of weekly P-3 flights originating out of Oman. Finally, the President noted that the letter from Sultan Qaboos drew attention to the potential problems we all faced concerning Soviet activity. We were in agreement that this is a serious problem.

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Classified and Extended By: Richard V. Allen
Review February 12, 2010
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)(e)(f)

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NLRR M3-71/1 # 60744

BY fw NARA DATE 4/9/18

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

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Minister Zawawi, on specific instructions from the Sultan, congratulated the President on his election. His country has worked closely with our country for many years. While his government understood that it will be sometime before the new administration can define its foreign policy, especially at the regional and local level, it was hoped that when this was done, United States policy toward Oman will take into account the wishes of the Omani people. Omani policy has been consistent in its alignment with the West rather than with the Eastern bloc. Although Oman had no necessary objection to countries adopting communist systems of government if they wish to of their own free will, it strongly opposed Soviet imperialism which was on the ascendency. Such imperialism required a strong response from the free world, especially from the United States. He noted that Oman had been an outspoken critic of Soviet expansionism. This expansionism was at the expense of the sovereignty of small countries. It included both subversion and direct military intervention. He had been very glad to talk to Secretary of State Haig yesterday and to realize that changes had already occurred in American foreign policy. He particularly referred to the President's own statements and the importance he, the President, attached to linkage and was glad that the United States would not make binding policy agreements with the Soviet Union unless they were prepared to reciprocate. Soviet expansion in Angola, Mozambique, and the Horn were ominous trends, culminating, of course, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, he understood that American concern with Soviet expansion was global and included Soviet activities in Cuba, Latin America, Cambodia, and Eastern Europe, especially Poland. But he drew particular attention to the problems of his own region, the Arabian Peninsula. The people of Oman were put where they were by God. They could not move; they could not do anything about their geography. However, their outspoken criticism of the Soviet activity was possible, in part because they believed that President Reagan spoke out of conviction in his opposition to Soviet activities. Other countries in his region have been unable to speak so clearly for reasons best known to themselves. 14

He said Oman would like to see greater cooperation with the United States on all these matters with the understanding that there would be no American interference with Omani domestic affairs. He noted that the previous administration had been concerned with human rights. He quoted a saying from his country that "the people of Mecca know best." Oman did not need a sermon on human rights. However, Oman could cooperate closely with the United States. It had done so in the past. His people were proud and had a sense of independence and while they attached a great deal of importance to military and political initiatives, felt that there should be a longer term relationship with the United States based on economic as well as political and military cooperation. To this extent the U.S.-Omani Joint Commission which has been established can make this long-term policy more realistic.

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He hoped that we would be able to exploit more fully Soviet weaknesses in the Middle East, either by covert or overt means. He noted the possibilities of doing this in South Yemen. He also urged that we assist elements that are pro-Western or moderate in other regional countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. His country was working with other pro-Western Gulf countries in a new Gulf cooperative organization and would like to work closely in these matters with the United States. 15

The President assured Zawawi that our policy was not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Oman. While we all value human rights, each of us had different approaches as to how to implement them. We certainly value very much the cooperation of friendship that now exists between Oman and the United States. The President assured him that we are going to be more assertive of our own rights and our own interests in the future. We look forward to greater cooperation and consultation over matters of mutual concern. This will be our position.

Minister Zawawi said that Sultan Qaboos and other officials in Oman had met with Richard Allen prior to the American elections and had had very fruitful conversations. Since that occasion every action by the new administration has been very encouraging. He hoped that the desire for closer cooperation expressed by Mr. Allen and subsequently the President would be successfully implemented.

The President was grateful for those remarks and noted that when Richard Allen returned from Oman he brought back word that such cooperation was hoped for. The President stressed that this cooperation would be expressed in actions rather than words.

Secretary Haig stated that he had already had an extremely profitable conversation with His Excellency and hoped for more talks to focus on security matters in the Gulf. He wanted to assure His Excellency that actions rather than words would indeed be the hallmark of this administration and noted that already the United States had taken steps to bolster support for Morocco in its efforts to stand up to Soviet pressure. He wanted His Excellency to know that we are not preparing for an over-the-horizon presence in areas critical to us but one that gives us a presence all the time.

Minister Zawawi drew attention to one point raised by Sultan Qaboos' letter concerning Soviet energy problems. Given the probability of Soviet shortfall in petroleum supplies in the 1980s, it was felt that we should not give the Soviet Union an excuse for interference in the Gulf because of this energy shortage and that this issue was something that we might consult further about to see what can be done.

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The President agreed that we would indeed like to talk and consult further about these matters.

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After an exchange of pleasantries, the meeting adjourned at 1620.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0602

SECRET ATTACHMENT

February 19, 1981


17

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Summary of the Meeting Between
President Reagan and Qais Abdul
Mun'im Al-Zawawi, Omani Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs

Attached for your information is a summary of President Reagan's meeting with Omani Minister Zawawi on February 12, 1981.


Richard V. Allen

Attachment

SECRET ATTACHMENT

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

60745

18

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Summary of the Meeting Between President Reagan and Qais Abdul Mun'im Al-Zawawi, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State Alexander Haig
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Geoffrey Kemp, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council (notetaker)

His Excellency Qais Abdul Mun'im Al-Zawawi
Omani Ambassador Sadek J. Sulaiman
Brigadier Timothy Landon, Former Equerry to the Sultan

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Thursday, February 12, 1981; 1602 - 1620; The Oval Office

Minister of State Zawawi presented President Reagan with a personal letter from Sultan Qaboos.

President Reagan appreciated the support that Oman has given the United States in its peacemaking efforts in the Middle East, for its cooperation in providing military facilities and assisting us in our ability to patrol the Strait of Hormuz, and the permission granted to increase the number of weekly P-3 flights originating out of Oman. The President noted that the United States and Oman were in agreement that Soviet activity in the Middle East was a serious problem.

Minister Zawawi noted Omani policy has been consistent in its alignment with the West rather than with the Eastern bloc. Oman strongly opposed Soviet imperialism which was on the ascendency. Such imperialism required a strong response from the free world, especially from the United States. He referred to the President's own statements and the importance he, President Reagan, attached to linkage and was glad that the United States would not make binding policy agreements with the Soviet Union unless they were prepared to reciprocate. Soviet expansion in Angola, Mozambique, and the Horn of Africa were ominous trends, culminating, of course, with

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Classified and Extended By: Richard V. Allen
Review February 12, 2010
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)(e)(f)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M37111 #60745
BY RW NARA DATE 4/9/18

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the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He drew particular attention to the problems of his own region, the Arabian Peninsula. Oman's outspoken criticism of Soviet activity was possible in part because they believed President Reagan spoke out of conviction in his opposition to Soviet imperialism. Oman would like to see greater cooperation with the United States on all these matters, with the understanding that there would be no American interference with Omani domestic affairs. The Omani people were proud and had a sense of independence, and while they attached a great deal of importance to political and military initiatives, they felt that there should be a longer term relationship with the United States based on economic cooperation. To this end, the U.S.-Omani Joint Commission was a sign of progress. He hoped that the United States would be able to exploit more fully Soviet weaknesses in the Middle East, either by covert or overt means. He noted the possibilities of doing this in South Yemen. He also urged that we assist elements that are pro-Western or moderate in other regional countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. His country was working with other pro-Western Gulf countries in a new Gulf cooperative organization and would like to work closely with the United States on these matters. 19

The President assured Zawawi that our policy was not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Oman. The President noted that the United States was going to be more assertive of its own rights and its interests in the future. The President stressed that cooperation with Oman would be expressed in actions rather than words.

Secretary Haig wanted to assure Zawawi that actions rather than words would indeed be the hallmark of this administration and noted that already the United States had taken steps to bolster support for Morocco in its efforts to stand up to Soviet pressure.

Minister Zawawi drew attention to Soviet energy problems. Given the probability of Soviet shortfall in petroleum supplies in the 1980s, Oman felt we should not give the Soviet Union an excuse for interference in the Gulf because of this energy shortage and that this issue was something that we might consult about further.

The President agreed that we would like to consult further on these matters.

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FEB 18 1981

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

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ACTION

February 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*
SUBJECT: Memcon and Summary of the President's
Meeting with Omani Minister Zawawi

At Tab I, for your information and the President's file, is the memorandum of conversation between President Reagan and Qais Abdul Mun'im Al-Zawawi, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, on February 12, 1981.

At Tab II, for your approval and signature, is a memorandum to the Secretary of State forwarding a brief summary of the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve and sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab II.

APPROVE

RVC
2-19-81

DISAPPROVE

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *my*, DATE *1/8/09*

SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT