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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject  
File: Records, 1981-1985

**Folder Title:** Memorandums of Conversations,  
President Reagan [September, 1981]

**Box:** 49

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 8/15/2011

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT REAGAN (SEPTEMBER 1981)

**FOIA**

M10-351/M10-371

**Box Number** 49

JAUVERT/BROWER

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
116573	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	6	8/5/1981	B1
116574	MEMCON	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND PRIME MINISTER KAARE WILLOCH OF NORWAY <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	10/15/1981	B1
116575	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S FIRST PLENARY MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN <i>D 4/9/2018 M371/1</i>	8	9/9/1981	B1
116576	MEMCON	RE. SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S SECOND PLENARY MEETING WITH BEGIN	6	9/10/1981	B1
116577	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	9/21/1981	B1
116578	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH LEBANESE PATRIACH KHORAICHE <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	9/16/1981	B1
116579	MEMCON	RE. MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT DANIEL ARAP MOI RE. KENYA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	9/25/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~ *Rw 8-15-11*

ID 8105039

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED 03 SEP 81 17

TO ALLEN

FROM KEMP

DOCDATE 02 SEP 81

KEYWORDS: EGYPT

AP

SADAT, ANWAR

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW SADAT & PRES ON AUG 5

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 04 SEP 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

BAILEY

TANTER

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 9/09</i>	<i>RVA apud memcon</i>		<i>GK</i> ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

*PA* (circled)

*(cdsm)*

#2  
subject

~~SECRET~~

116573

5039

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

2

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
 Vice President George Bush  
 Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger  
 Edwin Meese III, Counsellor to the President  
 Michael Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President  
 Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 Charles P. Tyson, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Coordination)  
 Robert McFarlane, State Department Counsellor  
 Nicholas Veliotes, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
 Ambassador Alfred Atherton, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt  
 Geoffrey Kemp, NSC Staff Member

President Anwar El-Sadat  
 Kamal Hasan Ali, Deputy Prime Minister  
 'Abd al-Razaq 'Abd Al-Magid, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 Lieutenant General Muhammad 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, Minister of Defense and War Production  
 Mansur Muhammad Hasan, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs and for Culture and Information  
 Usama al-Baz, Under Secretary, Foreign Ministry  
 Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Wednesday, August 5, 1981; 11:50 am-12:25 pm; The Cabinet Room

~~SECRET~~

Classified and Extended By: Richard V. Allen  
 Review August 5, 2011  
 Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13 (a)(e)(f)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
 NLRB M3711 #116573  
 BY RW NARA DATE 6/20/15

The President: We have just had a very fine meeting in the Oval Office. We had a general discussion of the situation in the Middle East and the Arab World. I have sought President Sadat's thoughts on these ideas and I wonder if we could now discuss the peace process.

There is a word that we are both going to have to understand very clearly, namely "autonomy." We would appreciate hearing your views on this, Mr. President, as to what you think "autonomy" means.

President Sadat: First of all, let me seize this opportunity to express our gratitude to the United States and the support that the United States is giving to Egypt without which we could never have gotten to where we are now. Even though we have improved our institutions, we could not have gotten here without U.S. help. Whatever happens we now play the role of full partner, a true partner, in the bright moments and the dark moments. We feel indebted to you.

The peace process, Mr. President, was started by the United States and Egypt right after the October War when Henry Kissinger visited the Middle East in November 1973. As you may remember, we structured the peace process, first to have a disengagement agreement and then a session in Geneva -- an international conference in which the United States and the Soviet Union would serve as co-chairmen to put the final touches on an overall settlement. This was the plan.

When I say the United States and Egypt started the process together, I mean Syria, who was in the October War with me, was not prepared to be a partner for lots of reasons. Saudi Arabia and the others were only spectators, but they supported the disengagement agreement. We made the disengagement for Syria, in fact, in the summer of 1974. After that, Egypt and the United States continued the second disengagement agreement. Then there were the United States elections. Then President Carter decided that the next step should not be a third disengagement agreement but rather a final conference in Geneva. However, by the end of October 1977 it was quite obvious that my colleagues in the Arab World, in particular Syria and the Palestinians, had let Jimmy Carter down. Until this moment, Saudi Arabia was with the United States. Carter then sent me a letter and said "your difficulties with your colleagues are more difficult than your difficulties with Israel." I answered in my handwriting. I told him that there should be a bold action. I didn't think of the initiative at that time, but I did realize that my colleagues had let Carter down.

I then made my initiative and visited Jerusalem. But without the United States as a full partner, nothing would have materialized. You may remember, Mr. President, that twelve months after my Jerusalem visit we had trouble. Then President Carter declared that the United States would continue to act in the process as a full partner. This was a turning point -- like the Lebanese cease-fire which you have just worked out. Carter called for Camp David and took a risk. (We shouldn't do this again -- not that Camp David was wrong, but that the organization should be improved.)

At Camp David, in the last hour, we reached an agreement. If I might tell you, Mr. President, Begin didn't sign except when he felt the United States and Egypt had reached an agreement which Carter put before him. Carter said to Begin that if he did not sign, he, Carter, would go before a joint session of Congress and tell them that the United States and Egypt have reached an agreement but that Mr. Begin could not make an agreement. This, in my opinion, made Begin sign. The Israelis have respected the first part of Camp David. We have no complaints and they have no complaints. On August 20 in Cairo, we will meet with the Government of Israel for the final step in the process.

Now, Mr. President, when we deal with Camp David, it is a very complicated issue with lots of dimensions. Everything has been very difficult since 1948 -- hatred, antagonisms, and war. At Camp David we couldn't solve it all at one meeting so we thought of a framework to guide us. We are not after a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace but a comprehensive settlement. That's what we are after. We've pledged to work for this. It is in the preamble to Camp David. We are after the comprehensive agreement, not a separate peace. The second part of Camp David is full autonomy for the Palestinians. We couldn't solve the Palestinian problem at Camp David. They were not with us. We've no right to decide for them. In the second part of Camp David, we will develop the framework which will permit us to solve the Palestinian problem -- putting the Palestinians on the proper approach. When the Palestinian problem is solved, comprehensive peace will happen. We had difficulties with the Government of Israel right up to the moment when they signed. They are very difficult to get to sign, but once they sign they are okay.

The second part of Camp David, which is the most complicated, that is the full autonomy agreements; we envisage that to solve the Palestinian problem. We cannot solve it at one go. We have a perceptual problem from both the Israeli and

~~SECRET~~

4

5

~~SECRET~~

the Palestinian perspectives. We said let us agree on Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza and the West Bank, not full withdrawal, but rather to withdraw to certain points for security. Then we would set in motion the process for an election. The election of a Palestinian autonomous body. Then the Israeli military government will cease to function. Then there will be a five-year interim after the end of the election. After three years we would sit together with the Governments of Israel, Egypt, and the United States, and the autonomous body of the Palestinians would sit together, and possibly King Hussein if he wants to, and decide upon the final stages of autonomy. It was agreed that when we signed King Hussein would be invited to resume his responsibilities. We made an agreement that when we signed the full autonomy papers we would send a letter to King Hussein to ask him to join. We know that the Government of Israel would probably hand over to the Jordanians. They could then ask Hussein for security guarantees like they've asked for me. This is the second part of Camp David.

In the agreement we say one year after the treaty with Israel we must come to an agreement on autonomy. This has not happened because Begin interprets full autonomy completely differently from us. Mr. Begin hails autonomy as for the people, not for the land. We said "no, it is for the people and the land." Still, Mr. Begin claims the land. But, we agreed in Camp David to discuss all claims. Let us drop all claims, but Begin has claims. King Hussein has claims. I could have claimed Gaza. The West Bank is not part of Jordan despite King Hussein's claim. It is part of Palestine. When the Palestinians sit down, as they will, then we will determine whose claims are right. In Camp David we gave the Palestinians the right to veto any agreement. We didn't want to reach an agreement in their absence, but we paved the way for them and after three of the five interim years to sit down with us.

We couldn't have an agreement on autonomy through the United States elections. Then there was the Israeli election. We can't wait now. If you ask me what we should do now, Mr. President, I must say this: In the last week a great event has taken place. You, Mr. President, have reached a cease-fire agreement between the Government of Israel and the PLO. No matter what Israel says, Arafat has said: "We shall respect the cease-fire." This could never have happened in the past. In the past he would have been killed. This has been done by you with the help of the Saudis. Why not build on this? Advise the Saudis to follow-up. The next step would be mutual and simultaneous recognition by the PLO and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the Israelis. After this cease-fire, which you achieved, Mr. President, this could now happen. Now I think the proper step should be mutual and simultaneous recognition.

The President: This means the Palestinians recognize Israel as a nation?

President Sadat: Yes, Mr. President.

The President: What about the Palestinians in Lebanon?

President Sadat: This doesn't cover Lebanon. It covers those areas under Israeli occupation -- the West Bank and Gaza. There are representatives of the PLO in occupied territories. They have been elected under the Israeli military administration. They are PLO. This can be handled by the Saudis. They can pay the proper price.

The President: Now, this is the first of our meetings on this. We are meeting with Begin, then with Hussein, and then with the Saudis. Let me ask. There is still a sizeable body of Palestinians in Lebanon. Some with radical factions. Arafat took it upon himself to police them. Doesn't this mean that the West Bank will become a state? Not even King Hussein has agreed to this if I understand what is going on? But, somehow they want to be a state.

President Sadat: It will come. I told Begin this. It will come. No one is against self-determination these days. These are technicalities that should be talked through behind the scenes by our subordinates. We cannot ignore the PLO. I declared in London that I shall tell President Reagan that the conditions are here to recognize the PLO -- that the conditions for not recognizing the PLO must be dropped. We must accept that Arafat has negotiated a cease-fire.

I didn't want to take all your time, Mr. President. I wanted to tell you that we can give momentum to the peace process. There is a new element here. Saudi Arabia is playing an important role with the Palestinians and the Syrians. If you ask me my scenario, after you meet with Begin, Hussein, and Fahd, there comes a moment when a certain paper needs to be drafted from which a new momentum to the peace process will take place. This will take into account the full autonomy aspect of Camp David which has not been acted upon yet. We are willing to submit a paper to you with our views on full autonomy. We can deliver it to Secretary Haig. More than this we can do. All we have to do is to make it easier to put pressure on Israel. They

have undermined our efforts with Iraq. We have to be patient with them because their public opinion has to be taken into account. We are ready to continue. But couldn't we try to find consensus on the full autonomy? For instance, I have suggested that we start with the Gaza -- Gaza strip. When I met Begin in Aswan he was ready to go with the Gaza.

You also may call for a summit meeting here in Washington, Mr. President. I recommend intense preparation for the summit if it takes place. It is most important that we avoid some of the errors made at Camp David.

The President: Thank you very much, Mr. President. We now have a clearer understanding. In fact, I have a clearer understanding of the problem than I've ever had. I feel greatly encouraged. We shall continue this discussion later. Thank you very much.

At this point, 12:25, the meeting adjourned.

(16)

#5039

RECEIVED

81 SEP 4 9:55

EVA HAS SEEN

JANET COLSON gc

BUD NANCE \_\_\_\_\_

DICK ALLEN RWA

IRENE DERUS + 80245

JANET COLSON gc

BUD NANCE \_\_\_\_\_

PETER \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO VP \_\_\_\_\_ SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO MEESE \_\_\_\_\_ SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BAKER \_\_\_\_\_ SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO DEEVER \_\_\_\_\_ SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BRADY \_\_\_\_\_ SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

Comments:

*Janet*  
 White out his initials  
 on the memo — or retype.  
 That does 't look just right.  
 Done

#5039

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

To -

Done  
JG

Could you  
contact Gen RMA  
request  $\frac{1}{2}$  lit  
Ken's office know.

Thanks-

Jand

TO ED  
for file

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~ACTION

September 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *OK*SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between  
the President and Egyptian President  
Anwar Sadat, Wednesday, August 5, 1981

Attached at Tab I for your review and the President's file is the memorandum of conversation between the President and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on Wednesday, August 5, 1981.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review the memorandum of conversation at Tab I and forward to Ed Roberts for the President's file.

APPROVE *RW*

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~*RW*  
*8/15/11*

RECEIVED 14 SEP 81 12

TO PRES

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 14 SEP 81

KEYWORDS: NORWAY

HS

WILLOCK, KARE

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TALKER FOR POSSIBLE PHONE CALL OR MSG OF CONGRATULATIONS RE NORWEGIAN ELECTIONS

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO PRES

DUE: 14 SEP 81 STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS REC'D IN WW 9/15 0700 HRS

REF# *Split of K7* LOG NSCIFID ( L / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
RA	IX 9/15	In memo		CF ✓
State	D 9/15	Draft reply for use	9/18	Concurrence
	9/16	noted by RVA w/ comment		
Blain	S 9/16	for further action		
	9/17	Noted by Pres.		
Blain	S 9/17	deferred action		

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
RA	V 10/3	for Concurrence	10/10	CF
Pres	IP 10/13	for info		EM, MB, JB ✓
	C 10/15	Noted by Pres		DB ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) dsm

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
Prime Minister Kaare Willoch of Norway  
DATE, TIME: October 15, 1981  
AND PLACE: 9:45 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.

The President: Mr. Prime Minister?

PM Willoch: Yes, it's a great pleasure to hear you.

The President: Well, I'm calling to congratulate you on your victory and formation of a new government.

PM Willoch: That's most kind of you, Mr. President, and I would like also that it is indeed a great pleasure and honor for me to receive your congratulations.

The President: I'm more than pleased to do it and certainly happy. I know that we share a belief about the private sector and individual initiative and the economic development of our countries, so I certainly wish you well in tackling your economic problems.

PM Willoch: Thank you for that, Mr. President, and I would like that we share the belief and attitude in the areas of security, foreign policy and the relations between East and West.

The President: Well, I'm delighted. I'm glad to hear that and if we ever have any problems or questions I hope that we'll just stay in contact with each other and work them out.

PM Willoch: Thank you for that, Mr. President. I may perhaps add that I consider myself a great friend of the United States and would like to work in favor of increasing the friendship and strengthening the alliance between the two countries.

The President: Well, I share your feelings and I shall be delighted to join you in that.

PM Willoch: Thank you for that, Mr. President. Indeed again, I would like to say that I feel very much pleased to receive a special telephone call from the President of the United States which is our greatest ally. I may also say that I've seen you so often on television that I almost feel that I know you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on October 15, 2001  
Classified & Extended by RVAllen  
Reason: NSC 1.13 (a)

DECLASSIFIED

NLR M371/1 # 116574  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

The President: Well, thank you for that. We'll find a way to get actually acquainted and know each other.

PM Willoch: I very much appreciate that, indeed.

The President: All right.

PM Willoch: I am perhaps a little more unknown to you than you are to me, but indeed I would like to secure an opportunity to make a personal acquaintance.

The President: Well, we shall see that that happens. I know how busy you are in these first few days of getting your government started. We both of us had the experience of ousting an established administration or regime.

PM Willoch: True that we are indeed busy, but I have a feeling that nothing compares to your working schedule which I really admire you for mastering so well.

The President: Well, thank you very much. Thank you and very best wishes to you in the work ahead.

PM Willoch: Thank you. And the same to you. The very best wishes for you and the United States.

The President: Thank you very much. All right. Goodbye.

PM Willoch: Goodbye, thank you.



NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED  
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
rw 8/15/11

ID 8105427

RECEIVED 14 SEP 81 12

TO PRES

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 14 SEP 81

BREMER

03 OCT 81

BLAIR

07 OCT 81

15

KEYWORDS: NORWAY

HS

WILLOCK, KAARE

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TALKERS FOR POSSIBLE PHONE CALL OR MSG OF CONGRATULATIONS  
RE NORWEGIAN ELECTIONS

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO PRES DUE: 17 OCT 81 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS REC'D IN WW 9/15 0700 HRS / ADDON RECD WW 10/8 1601 HRS

REF# 8128529 LOG NSCIFID ( L / D )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<u>Allen</u>	<u>X 10/15</u>	<u>Rec'd add info for decision</u>	<u>10/17</u>	
	<u>10/19</u>	<u>OBE per Carlson</u>		
<u>Rentschler S</u>	<u>10/19</u>	<u>any further action</u>		
<u>C</u>	<u>10/19</u>	<u>close per Carlson</u>		<u>LE</u>


DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

Jim Rentschler:

Unless RVA said something about sending these to the President, let's just file them away.

Thanks.



Janet Colson

MEMORANDUM

5427 Add-On

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

October 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Phone Conversation between President and  
Prime Minister Willoch of Norway

Attached at Tab I is a memo to the President conveying the transcript of his phone conversation with the new Prime Minister of Norway which took place this morning. (State and Norwegian Ambassador Hedemann have been briefed on the call.)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ as amended \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I Memo to President  
A - Transcript of phone call

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

Rw 8/15/11

MEMORANDUM

5427 Add-On

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

18

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with the  
new Prime Minister of Norway

Attached is the transcript of your telephone conversation with the new Prime Minister of Norway, Kaare Willoch, which took place this morning.

Attachment

A - Transcript of Telephone Conversation

cc: Meese  
Baker  
Deaver

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

RW 8/15/4

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
*rw 8/15/11*  
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ID 8105674

RECEIVED 24 SEP 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM KEMP

DOC DATE 21 SEP 81

19

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

BEGIN, MENACHEM

SUBJECT: MEMCON <sup>OF</sup> PRES MTG W/ ISRAELI PM 9-10 SEP

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( D / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 9/28 LVA apud recon            GK

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (C) KL

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

*Withdrawer*

RB 8/15/2011  
W

*File Folder*

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (SEPTEMBER 1981)

*FOIA*

M10-351/M10-  
371  
JAUVERT/BROWER

*Box Number*

49

3

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
116575	MEMCON  SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S FIRST PLENARY MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN	8	9/9/1981	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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*Collection Name*

Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

*Withdrawer*

RB 8/15/2011  
W

*File Folder*

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (SEPTEMBER 1981)

*FOIA*

M10-351/M10-  
371  
JAUVERT/BROWER

*Box Number*

49

3

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
116576	MEMCON  RE. SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S SECOND PLENARY MEETING WITH BEGIN	6	9/10/1981	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS

ACTION

September 21, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversation Between the President and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Wednesday, September 9 and Thursday, September 10, 1981

At Tab I is the memorandum of conversation during the President's first plenary meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Begin on Wednesday, September 9, 1981.

At Tab II is the memorandum of conversation during the President's second plenary meeting with Prime Minister Begin on Thursday, September 10, 1981.

Please review and forward to Ed Roberts for the President's file.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review the memoranda of conversation at Tabs I and II and forward to Ed Roberts for the President's file.

APPROVE *[Signature]* DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_  
*True, complete memos*

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum of Conversation of First Plenary Meeting
- Tab II Memorandum of Conversation of Second Plenary Meeting

SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS

*RW 8/15/81*

#5674  
36

RECEIVED

81 SEP 25 AIO: 18

JANET COLSON

*JC*

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

*WA 27*

IRENE DERUS

*id 28*

JANET COLSON

*JC*

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

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SHOW CC

Comments:

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL  
*rw 8/15/11*  
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ID 8105541

RECEIVED 24 SEP 81 11

TO ALLEN

FROM FONTAINE

DOCDATE 22 SEP 81

37

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

DUARTE, JOSE N

SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR PRES 21 SEPT MTG W/ PRES DUARTE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 24 SEP 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8105488

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

*(PA) H.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

5541

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with President Jose Napoleon Duarte of the Republic El Salvador

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
Vice President George Bush  
Edwin Meese  
Richard V. Allen  
Amb. Dean Hinton  
Roger Fontaine

President Jose Napoleon Duarte  
Foreign Minister Chavez Mena  
Ambassador Rivas Gallont

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 21, 1981  
11:30-11:45 a.m., The Oval Office

The President opened the meeting referring to divisions within guerrilla ranks. The President also mentioned his conversations with Lopez Portillo in Grand Rapids. The President characterized Lopez Portillo's views on El Salvador and his seeing the insurgency there through the experience of the Mexican revolution. The President reminded Lopez Portillo that the U.S. had a revolution also, and the question was whether such a revolution has the support of the people. The President also pointed out the current junta in El Salvador was the result of a demand for change and reform. The President also remarked that he hoped Lopez Portillo genuinely believed the U.S. would intervene with marines, but that was not our purpose. Moreover, the President told Lopez Portillo that we did, indeed, favor reforms. The President proposed that we should separate Ungo and his MNR from the guerrilla groups who are supported by outsiders. He suggested that if the government of El Salvador and Ungo and his followers sat down and discussed matters, Lopez Portillo might be interested and be of some help. The President then asked President Duarte's reaction.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review Sept. 21, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 # 116577

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Pres. Duarte accepted the idea. He characterized the violent opposition as falling into two groups: those like Ungo who fought out of genuine frustration over the lack of change, and those who wish to pursue violence at any cost. The first group can come back if approached.

The President then asked if Lopez Portillo could be helpful.

Pres. Duarte responded all governments can help as he indicated in his September 15 speech. But Duarte warned it would be difficult for Ungo to leave the FDR. But if he accepts the democratic process, an agreement can be reached. Lopez Portillo cannot act as a mediator but be useful in encouraging Ungo to break from the FDR.

The President then asked if he should encourage Lopez Portillo to play this role.

Duarte said yes. The Pres. of El Salvador then made his formal points. First, he thanked the President for his support.

The President stated he was happy to help and expressed delight that Pres. Duarte would speak to the Congress, and that it was important for the members to hear from Pres. Duarte.

Pres. Duarte pointed out he had just seen the presidents of Panama and Costa Rica. They too are concerned over Cuban involvement in the region. Duarte then stated his government was working for justice and liberty. His government supported both private enterprise and democracy. He wanted to build a strong society by expanding the middle class. He said that he had not come to Washington to ask for anything but to seek continued understanding and support for his government's struggle on several fronts.

The President then observed we are now seeing a serious Soviet inroad into Latin America and thus isolate the U.S.

Pres. Duarte agreed and added that they have begun by picking the weakest countries -- in Central America. But Salvadorean people don't want violence or communism. But the media are a problem. They never report a show of support for democracy and against violence.

The Vice President asked about the Salvadorean bishops denouncing the violence.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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3

Pres. Duarte said the bishops had rejected the French-Mexican communique.

The Vice President asked if Bishop Rivera y Damas had signed the protest.

Pres. Duarte said yes, but pointed out that Rivera is different from the other bishops. He is an honest man but he does criticize the government as well as the revolutionaries. Unfortunately, the media replay the denunciations of the government, but never those condemning the left.

Mr. Allen asked about the impact of the French-Mexican communique.

Pres. Duarte said the September 15 crowds showed people were against the communique. Pres. Duarte added that Salvadoreans were actually very close to Mexico, but would reject interventionism. So did most of Latin America. Meanwhile, El Salvador will have problems in the UN, but we will take that on too.

The President observed we all have problems with the UN.

Pres. Duarte remarked there is one problem that perhaps the U.S. can be helpful on.

In London coffee quotas are being discussed, and there is a move to reduce the quota. It is not politically motivated, it is the normal economic in-fighting. "We need some help." Pres. Duarte then went on to assure the President his belief in democracy. He said he has fought dictatorship all his life, and that was his assurance on that question.

The President thanked him, and again expressed his approval of Duarte's meeting with members of Congress.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

5541 *RF*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

ACTION

September 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN *RF*

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation - President's Meeting with President Duarte

Attached at Tab A is the summary of the President's meeting with President Jose Napoleon Duarte of the Republic of El Salvador which was held on Monday, September 21.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the text of the memorandum of conversation.

Approve   ✓  

Disapprove           

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

*Roger -  
Usual fine,  
work. Frank,  
Dir*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

*RW 8/15/11*

# 5541

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RECEIVED

81 SEP 24 P 2: 12

JANET COLSON

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BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

*[Handwritten signature]*

IRENE DERUS

*[Handwritten signature]*

JANET COLSON

*[Handwritten signature]*

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO DEEVER

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CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

Comments:

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8105639

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 25 SEP 81 18

44

TO ALLEN

FROM TANTER

DOC DATE 24 SEP 81

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

AP

KHORAICHE, ANTONY P

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ LEBANESE PATRIARCH 16 SEPT

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 30 SEP 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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( J / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 9/28	Pointexter apnd recom		RT, CT

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

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~~SECRET~~

116578

45

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 11/3/11 # 116578  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with  
Lebanese Patriarch Khoraiche

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Charles P. Tyson, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security  
Affairs (Coordination)  
Raymond Tanter, NSC Senior Staff Member  
Leonore Annenberg, State Department Protocol  
Office

His Beatitude Anthony Peter Khoraiche  
Maronite Catholic Patriarch of Antioch  
and all the East

His Eminence Cardinal Cooke of New York  
Bishop Roland Abijaoudi  
Auxiliary Bishop to his Beatitude  
Bishop Francis M. Zayek  
Bishop of Saint Maron Diocese in Brooklyn

DATE, TIME, Wednesday, September 16, 1981; 10:30 a.m.-11:00 a.m.  
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The Patriarch expressed his concern that the United States will help rid Lebanon of the Syrian occupation. He said that Jordan was responsible for the Palestinian Arabs because Jordan annexed the West Bank during the late 1940's. When Jordan forced the armed Palestinians out of the East Bank (Jordan) in 1970, they fled to Lebanon; thus, Jordan should be held responsible for helping to find a solution to the Palestinian problem so that the Palestinians can allow Lebanon to live in peace. If the situation in Lebanon continues to deteriorate, this may set off a process resulting in the entire Middle East falling under Soviet domination. If Lebanon disappears, this would be a loss for the entire world, a loss that the leader of the free world should not allow to occur.

The President responded by acknowledging the false rumors that the U.S. was willing to see Lebanon disappear as part of a Palestinian solution. He reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity. He also expressed an interest in Syria withdrawing from Lebanon.

Cl. and Extended by Richard V. Allen  
Review on Sep. 16, 2011  
Reason for Ext. NSC 1.13 (b) (d)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

45

2

Cardinal Cooke said that Lebanon wants to live in peace and be a good neighbor to everyone, including Israel. Cooke felt strongly that the moral commitment of the U.S. to Lebanon is very important in sustaining the Lebanese people.

The meeting ended at 11:00 a.m. after gifts and pleasantries were exchanged.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5639

46

*agr*

SECRET ATTACHMENT

September 24, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for the  
President's Meeting with the Lebanese  
Patriarch Khoraiiche, September 16, 1981

Attached at Tab I for your review and the President's file is the Memorandum of Conversation for the President's meeting with the Lebanese Patriarch Anthony Peter Khoraiiche, Wednesday, September 16, 1981, 10:30 a.m.-11:00 a.m., in the Oval Office.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I and forward to Ed Roberts for the President's file.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

Attachment

Tab I - Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET ATTACHMENT

*RW 8/15/11*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

#5639  
47

9/26

Janet,

I see no reason  
to send this in to  
RVA. So I checked  
approved. RVA was  
at meeting. But  
do we need to send  
copies to anybody?

John

\* 5039  
48

RECEIVED

81 SEP 26 A 9: 45

~~JANET - Please  
Call me - Bud~~

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

J. P. ...  
DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

Jan 26/1000

Red vertical line with scribbles

Ed Roberts  
for file.

Red scribbles

NSC/S PROFILE

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*rw 8/15/11*

ID 8105653

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 25 SEP 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM WETTERING

DOCDATE 25 SEP 81

49

KEYWORDS: KENYA

AP

MOI, DANIEL T

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PRES MOI 25 SEPT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( J / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C</i>	<i>9/28 Noted by Allen</i>		<i>we ✓</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

*PA* (C) *A*

~~SECRET~~

116579

~~SECRET~~

50

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME AND PLACE: 11:40-12:00 a.m., the Oval Office,  
25 September 1981

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary of State Alexander Haig  
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker  
Ambassador William Harrop  
Michael Deaver, Assistant to the President  
Fred Wettering, NSC Staff Member

President Daniel arap Moi  
Foreign Minister Robert Ouko  
Ambassador John Mbogua  
Permanent Secretary, Office of the  
President Simon Nyachae

SUBJECT: Kenya

The President opened the conversation by thanking President Moi for his cooperation with the U.S., most recently evidenced by making his ports available to our naval forces. (U)

The President stressed our determination to press ahead in seeking an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibia problem and noted that Secretary Haig had some promising news in that regard. The President noted that we were bringing to an end a period of economic mismanagement and offered to make our expertise and advice available to the Kenyans who were having not dissimilar problems. The President then invited President Moi to speak. (S)

President Moi began a lengthy statement, starting initially by commenting on bilateral relations. He noted that the U.S. had provided \$180 million in aid to Kenya. He recalled our record of helping other nations like Germany with the Marshall Plan. He declared the Kenyan peoples' hopes for economic prosperity and asked the U.S. to continue to help. President Moi noted the values and ideals our two people share. He stated Kenya is an island of peace surrounded by angry countries. He stated Kenya had a democratic system that worked. President Moi noted that Kenya had certain priorities in which U.S. help was requested. (S)

~~SECRET~~  
Review on 9/25/87

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 #116579

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

51  
President Moi then enumerated several economic areas in which U.S. assistance was required, including a second, civilian port development, a manpower training program, a re-equipment of Kenya airlines. He noted that Kenya would like grant assistance and a 5-year grace period on loan assistance. He pointed out that Kenya had always paid its debts but stated Kenya was now under great economic pressures. He remarked that Kenya had the potential of becoming self-sufficient in food. (S)

President Moi then noted Kenya's views of regional matters. He noted that Kenya was surrounded by "unpredictable" countries except Sudan. He noted his efforts toward Somalia. (S)

At this point the President interjected a word of praise for Kenya's efforts in seeking rapprochement with Somalis. (S)

President Moi then went on to talk of the danger of Libyan activities in Africa. He stated that in the military field Kenya needed both advice and hardware. He also asked for help in the maritime transport field. (S)

The President noted that specific matters can be taken up with Secretaries Haig and Weinberger and Director McPherson. (U)

President Moi then asked the President to make sure that the South Africans withdraw their troops from Angola. He noted that presence of these troops in Angola could be used by the Libyans and Algerians to also send forces or make trouble. He then asked the President to please consider inviting President Kaunda of Zambia to Washington to see him. President Moi was concerned about developments in Southern Africa and believed President Kaunda needed support. (S)

Secretary Haig responded that we had South African assurances that they were out of Angola. (S)

The President noted that Secretary Haig has been working very hard and with some success in trying to get the Cubans out of Angola. (S)

The venue then changed to the State Dining Room for the working lunch. (U)

President Moi described his efforts to put together an OAU force for Chad to replace the Libyans, and asked for U.S. support. (S)

The President stated we certainly were in favor of getting the Libyans out. (S)

The President asked President Moi about recent Soviet activities in Africa. (S)

President Moi responded that the Soviets work through agents - Qadhafi in much of Africa, also the Cubans. A general discussion reflected a shared viewpoint on Qadhafi ensued. (S) 52

The President invited Secretary Haig to give President Moi an update on Namibia. Secretary Haig did so. President Moi responded that he was most encouraged to hear this news and supported these efforts. (C)

A brief discussion on global negotiations ensued. The President held the floor, noting that we were not in favor of creating new, arrogant bureaucracies. We wanted to use a rifle rather than a shotgun. We supported bilateral and regional approaches and use of existing international lending institutions. Secretary Haig described the Caribbean Basin approach. President Moi agreed with the President's points and approach. (S)

Substantive conversation concluded with an exchange of toasts. (U)

*[Handwritten signature]*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 25, 1981

53

UNCLASSIFIED  
w/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: FRED WETTERING *[Handwritten signature]*

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's 25 September Private Meeting with Kenya President Daniel arap Moi

Attached is my memcon covering the President's private meeting with Kenya President Daniel arap Moi from 1140-1200 on 25 September in the Oval Office.

I have also included a summary of remarks made between the two Presidents at the subsequent working lunch.

Attachment:  
Tab A Memcon of Pres. mtg with Moi

*[Handwritten notes: "Gambro", "Jarry & memo. k/"]*

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w/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*[Handwritten: "RW 8/15/11"]*

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81 SEP 26 A 9: 45

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

J. Panabaker

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

Comments:

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*Jan 26/1040*

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*igt 28*

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*9/28  
cc's for  
VP + Meese  
pent / JCP*