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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

### **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT F	SUBJECT FILE		Withdrawer		
			RBV			
File Folder	MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRES	SIDENT		FOIA		
	REAGAN (OCTOBER 1981)		M10	-351/M10-371		
Box Number	49		JAU 4	VERT/BROWER		
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages		Restrictions		
116581 BIO	RE. WILLOCH	1	ND	B1		
	R 6/22/2015 M371/					
116582 MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH BANGLADESHI PRIME MINISTER RAHMAN	3	10/24/1981	B1		
	R 6/22/2015 M371/					
116583 MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM	4	10/24/1981	B1		
	R 6/22/2015 M371/					
116584 MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE KING OF SPAIN [COPY OF DOC. 116586]	5	10/13/1981	B1		
	R 6/30/2015 M371/					
116585 MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE KING OF SPAIN [COPY OF DOC. 116587]	5	10/13/1981	B1		
	R 6/22/2015 M371/					
116586 MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE KING OF SPAIN	5	10/13/1981	B1		
	R 6/22/2015 M371/					
116587 MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE KING OF SPAIN	5	10/13/1981	B1		
	R 6/22/2015 M371/					

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FI	<i>Withdrawer</i> RBW 8/15/2011		
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49		JAU 4	VERT/BROWER
Document Description	No of Pages		Restrictions
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R 12/21/2015 351/1			
RE. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HAIG AND KING JUAN CARLOS <b>R 6/22/2015 M371/</b>	2	10/22/1981	B1
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#### MEMORANDUM

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN AU

SUBJECT:

Telephone Call to Norwegian Prime Minister Kaare Willoch

On September 13 the Norwegian Conservative party, led by Kaare Willoch, defeated the incumbent Labor Party of Prime Minister Gro Brundtland. Kaare Willoch by his victory became the only Conservative head of state in Europe besides Margaret Thatcher. In addition, Willoch has advocated many economic ideas which echo "Reaganomics."

At the time of the election, you approved the idea of making a phone call to Mr. Willoch, to congratualte him on his victory and set the tone for warm and productive relations between our countries.

Prime Minister Willoch will take office on Tuesday, October 13. It would be most appropriate for you to make your call that day or a day or two afterwards.

Attached is a briefing memorandum for your use in making the call. It includes both some background information on Willoch and talking points. Willoch speaks good English, so there will be no need of translators.

Attachments:Tab ARecommended phone callTab BBio sketch of Willoch

cc: Meese Baker Deaver

'81 DCT 13 PI2:49

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### RONALD REAGAN LIBRARY TRANSFER/PARALLEL FILE SHEET

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FROM: Collection Exec. Sec., NSC: Subject File	
Series	$\rho$ , $\rho$ , $\rho$ , $\rho$
File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # <u>Memorandums of Conversation - 1</u> <u>Reagan (October 1981)</u>	resident
Box Number 49	

Description of Material:

- recommended telephone call to Kaare Willoch, PM & Norway, 10/14/81, 1 pg.

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Series:

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC #\_\_\_\_\_

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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

#### WASHINGTON

#### RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

Kaare Willoch, Prime Minister of Norway

DATE:

TO:

October 14, 1981

RECOMMENDED BY RICHARD V. ALLEN W

PURPOSE:

To congratulate a fellow conservative head of state on his election victory and the formation of a new government.

BACKGROUND: Prime Minister Willoch will be the only conservative head of state in Europe besides Margaret Thatcher. You have approved the placing of a telephone call to him to congratulate him on his election victory; wish him success as prime minister and set the tone for future cooperation between our governments.

TOPICS OF 1. Please accept my congratulations as you assume DISCUSSION: your duties as Norway's Prime Minister. I know the hard work that is necessary to campaign against an incumbent government and win.

> 2. I understand that you and I share a belief that the private sector and individual initiative have vital roles to play in the economic development of our countries. I wish you well in tackling your economic problems.

3. We look forward to continuing the strong Norwegian-American relationship. If we have differences in approach, let's talk with each other and work them out.

4. I'll let you get back to the business of starting your government. I know those first few days are hectic.

Historical File

Attachment Tab B Brief biographic sketch

Date of Submission

Action Call man

3

#### BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Kaare Willoch (phonetic: VILL-ock), Norway's new prime minister, was born in 1928; he graduated from the University of Oslo with a degree in economics, and entered Parliament in 1958, at the age of 29, the whiz kid of the Norwegian Conservative Party. He served in the government during the period 1965-1971 as Minister of Commerce and Shipping. During the 1970s he became the floor leader of the opposition to the socialist government. He gained foreign affairs expertise during this period while serving on the Nordic Council, including a term as President. On September 14 of this year he led the non-socialist parties in the general election, and succeeded in defeating the labor government. In his discussion of economic problems, he has emphasized the role of the private sector, and promised to reduce the government role in Norway's economy. Unable to form a coalition government, he will be taking office on October 13 as the head of a minority conservative government.

DECLASSIFIED NLRR M371/1 #116581 BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

#### MEMORANDUM

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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

October 13, 1981

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RICHARD V. ALLEN Mul

SUBJECT:

FROM:

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Attachments:Tab ARecommended phone callTab BBio sketch of Willoch

cc: Meese Baker Deaver 10/13 1200 5427

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SIGNED

MEMORANDUM

5427 Add-On

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

SIGNED

FROM:

DENNIS COBLAIR

SUBJECT:

Presidential Phone Call to Norwegian Prime Minister Willoch

At the time of Willoch's election victory on September 14, you sent the President a memorandum suggesting a congratulatory phone call to a fellow conservative head of state. The President approved the phone call. (Tab III)

The appropriate time for the call will be October 13 or shortly thereafter. That is the day that Willoch's minority government takes office.

Attached for your signature at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a briefing paper for him to use in making the call.

Also attached at Tab II is a presidential message to outgoing Prime Minister Brundtland. It is a courtesy message, designed to keep our fences mened with a lady who is bound to be a force in Norwegian politics for years to come.

#### RECOMMENDATION

Rim R Stanyly

CONCURS.

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I forwarding the briefing paper for his phone call.

Approve V

Disapprove

That you approve for transmission by the State Department to Embassy Oslo the Presidential message at Take to outgoing Prime Minister Brundtland. TAB  $\mathcal{I}$ 

Approve

Disapprove

Tab I	Memo to the President	
	A - Recommended telephone call	
	B - Bio sketch of Willoch	
Tab II	Presidential message to former PM Brundtland	
Tab III	Memo approved by President to schedule call	
Tab IV	Blair's September 14 memo to you	
Tab V	State cover memo and talking points	1. 3

DRAFT

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

As you prepare to relinquish the leadership of the Norwegian Government, allow me to join with your many friends and admirers, in this country and in Europe, who wish you the very best as you enter upon a new phase of your career in public service. I know that you will continue to play a significant and positive role in Norwegian public life for years to come.

Best wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely,

Ronald W. Reagan

Her Excellency

Gro Harlem Brundtland,

Prime Minister of Norway,

Oslo.

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5427

# THE WHITE HOUSE

The President has seen 9/17/81

september 14, 1981

18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RICHARD V. ALLEN DUK

SEP 14 P1:09

FROM:

MEMORANDUM

Norway is holding a general election (yesterday and today) which will most probably oust the Labor Party government of Prime Minister Brundtland (a woman).

The expected winner is Kare Willock, a Conservative, who has expressed admiration for you and for supply-side economics. According to news reports, he plans to:

- Cut income tax rates.
- Hold down public spending.
- End price controls.
- Cut the bureaucracy.
- Increase productivity.

After balloting concludes today, and if Willock wins, you may wish to consider telephoning this ideological soul-mate to express your enthusiasm rather than send a written message. A telephone call would underscore the importance of victory and would give you the opportunity to stress the growing vitality and influence of your programs.

We will prepare talking points in the event you choose to call.

Schedule call.

Prefer to send telegram.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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Comments:

OK. But will the msg be convertible to a talker if required.

RVA

MEMORANDUM

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

September 14, 1981

5427

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

DENNIS et

SUBJECT:

Message of Congratulations on Norwegian Election

Your memo to the President of 14 September recommended a telephone call or a written message of congratulations to Kare Willock. Early projections from the balloting show a probable non-labor coalition led by Willock. However, the conservatives did not win an outright majority and it would be more appropriate to send the message of congratulations when the government is actually formed. This will probably be in a day or two.


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



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October 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Congratulatory Message to the New Prime Minister of Norway

In the September 14 national election, the Conservative Party, under the leadership of chairman Kaare Willoch, significantly increased its strength in parliament. A new government, with Mr. Willoch as Prime Minister, is now being formed. That government is expected to be presented to parliament on October 13 following the October 12 resignation of the government of Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.

Attached is a draft message from the President to Prime Minister Brundtland. Also attached are suggested remarks that the President might wish to make in a congratulatory telephone call to Mr. Willoch after his government is presented to parliament.

Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- 1. Draft Letter
- 2. Suggested Talking Points



#### SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

13

-- PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS AS YOU ASSUME YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY.

-- I PRIZE THE WARM AND DEEP FRIENDSHIP THAT HAS EXISTED FOR GENERATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF NORWAY AND THE UNITED STATES.

-- I AM PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH THE SUPPORT NORWAY HAS GIVEN TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, AND I EXPECT THAT THAT CONTRIBUTION COULD WELL BE EXPANDED UNDER YOUR STEWARDSHIP.

-- I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE YEARS AHEAD TO STRENGTHENING THE BONDS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES BOTH BILATERALLY AND WITHIN NATO.

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15

#### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Bangladeshi Prime Minister

PARTICIPANTS: The President James A. Baker III, Assistant to the President Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Craig L. Fuller, Director, Office of Cabinet Administration Alvin P. Adams, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State

> Shah Azizur Rahman, Prime Minister of Bangladesh Mohammad Shamsul Huq, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Tabarak Husain, Ambassador of Bangladesh to the U.S.

PLACE: Sheraton Cancun Hotel, President's Suite October 24, 1981, 8:45 a.m.-9:00 a.m.

The President opened his meeting with Prime Minister Rahman by noting his satisfaction with the Cancun Summit. Prime Minister Rahman responded that Cancun was a disappointment to the Soviets. The President concurred, noting that the Soviets had hoped for acrimony.

Turning to the situation at home, Rahman noted that elections were scheduled for November 15. He stated that the Acting President was anxious to complete a democratic and peaceful transfer of power following the death of President Zia. Geopolitically, he continued, the position of Bangladesh is not enviable. Two neighboring states of India are communist-dominated. Relations with India are complicated by problems with the Ganges waters, border disputes, a newly-surfaced border island and the Indian hill tribes. Bangladesh, he stated, favors peaceful resolution of these matters.

RDS-1 10/26/01

Rahman then described Bangladesh's successful efforts to increase food production and to reduce the growth rate of its population (from 3% to 2% in the last year) as well as its food deficit. Bangladesh, he stated, receives all of its external aid from Western sources. Rahman emphasized that Bangladesh welcomed foreign investment, noting an investment law recently adopted by the legislature which provides greater investment incentives and security. The Prime Minister stressed the need for continued bilateral aid and his hopes that it would be 'possible for Bangladesh to reach self-sufficiency in three years. 11

Foreign Minister Hug stated that Bangladesh desires good relations with its neighbors. He drew attention to a proposal by former President Zia for regional cooperation in South Asia. South Asian Foreign Ministers will meet during the week of November 1 in Kathmandu to continue discussion of regional cooperation. Hug then reviewed bilateral problems with India, noting that his government would be in touch with us about possible assistance on the matter of the maritime boundary dispute. Minister Hug continued that the United States is Bangladesh's largest aid donor since independence. He stressed the importance of increasing U.S. aid levels and appreciated our promise to restore FY '82 assistance to the levels of FY '80. He expressed understanding, however, for the current U.S. budget constraints. The Minister continued that Bangladesh was prepared to provide "full facilities" to private sector (U.S.) development of its natural gas and oil deposits. The Minister stated that he would be in touch with the USG on how best to proceed on involving U.S. enterprises in explorations and development of these resources. SECRET

The President asked whether coal in Bangladesh was deep mined or strip mined. The Foreign Minister replied that the former was the case. Noting the importance of jute exports to Bangladesh and the recent decline of prices, the President asked whether Bangladesh's jute exports were as a raw product or as finished goods. The Foreign Minister noted that increasingly Bangladesh exports jute in finished goods.

The President stated that he was encouraged and delighted by Bangladesh's openness to private enterprise. This is, he noted, the only way to efficiently and rapidly develop the economy. He drew attention to the success of other countries which rely on the private sector (such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea) and noted the economic failures of states following the communist model.

The President closed the conversation by noting that he would do all he could to be helpful to Bangladesh. The Prime Minister extended an invitation for the President to visit Bangladesh. (The President did not reply.)

Drafted: S/S:APAdams 10/26/81

SECRET

#### DRAFT

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18

#### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with UN Secretary General Waldheim

PARTICIPANTS: The President James A. Baker III, Assistant to the President Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alvin P. Adams, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State

> Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations Albert Rohan, Director, Executive Office of the Secretary General

PLACE: Sheraton Cancun Hotel, President's Suite October 24, 9:45-10:00 a.m.

After a brief exchange of pleasantries, Secretary General Waldheim opened the conversation by noting that Cancun had been a 'good conference." Its results, he said, were pleasant. Somewhat pointedly, he expressed a hope that the President was satisfied. The President indicated that he was pleased with the results and with the absence of rancor at the conference.

In connection with Cancun, Waldheim noted that global negotiations would be on the General Assembly's agenda for discussion in the coming week and that this timing fit in well with the conclusion of the conference. Asking how we should proceed on follow-up to Cancun, he indicated some uncertainty on the next steps, suggesting in passing that he might "try to set up a committee" on follow-up.

The President said that setting up new institutions and organizations might be counterproductive. He pointed to his own

<u>SECRET</u> RDS-1 10/26/01

DECLASSIFIED

proposal of agricultural expert teams as an example of an unbureaucratic, inexpensive and effective method to solve practical problems. Expanding on his suggestion of agricultural task forces, the President expressed confidence that experts-farmers and academics--would be pleased and honored to visit countries with agricultural problems to offer their technical advice. The President continued that a similar approach might be followed in the energy area where experts could contribute much to proper development of energy resources. He emphasized the importance of impressing on "Third World leaders" the need to welcome and employ outside experts.

Secretary General Waldheim stated his impression that many developing countries--especially in Africa--increasingly recognized the importance of practical assistance measures such as the President's proposal. These leaders, he added, now recognized that "propaganda won't help." Cancun provided a chance to get away from acrimony, the Secretary General was hopeful that we would be able to proceed with "realistic" approaches. He expressed gratitude for the President's indications, October 22 and during the present meeting, of his willingness to provide task forces to help with agricultural and energy develop-Noting that this idea would be of great ment. interest to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), he said he would discuss the Director Bradford Morse "to see what we can do."

SECRET

Explaining the background to his views on the agricultural task force idea, the President described his own experience in California as Governor, where he called upon the expertise of volunteer private citizens and business leaders to help restore efficiency and financial soundness to the state. The President continued that, along the same lines, he has asked David Rockefeller and other business leaders to play a role in the Caribbean Basin initiative.

The Secretary General responded that these were "good examples" of how to obtain results. Then turning to current developments in the General Assembly, Waldheim told the President that this year's vote on the Kampuchea resolution (seeking a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea) received three more votes than last year. There is, he stated, a growing tendency against Vietnam in the United Nations. Austrian Foreign Minister Pahr will shortly convene a committee to follow up last summer's conference on Kampuchea. Waldheim stated that he would do his best to bring pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw from Kampuchea.

The President expressed his satisfaction that the United Nations is marshalling its forces to return Cambodia to its own people.

Waldheim then raised Afghanistan, recalling a resolution in 1980 which received "impressive support" for condemning the Soviet invasion and pressing for withdrawal from Vietnam. "Proximity talks", he continued, had started in New York to discuss the substantive issues.



The Secretary General noted that he had met with Saudi Crown Prince Fahd at Cancun. Fahd, he reported, was concerned that radical Arab states, particularly Syria, and the Soviets were the pressuring PLO leader Arafat to back away from /favorable comments on Fahd's eight-point peace plan he made during his recent visit to Japan. Waldheim said that he found the eight points "excellent" and that he would ask the Syrians to ease pressures on Arafat. 21

The President replied that there were some points in the Fahd proposal with which he agreed, and some with which he disagreed. It was, he thought, "at least a starting point"." "For the first time it recognizes Israel's right to exist."

The Secretary General inquired about the status of the AWACS vote in the Senate. He expressed hope that the President would prevail and said that he regretted that he could not help with the issue since it was a Congressional matter.

Concluding the meeting, Waldheim noted that the Security Council will elect a new Secretary General next Thursday. He hoped he could count on U.S. support. Waldheim then recalled conversations with Jeane Kirkpatrick in which the Ambassador noted the President's "understanding in this regard." The Secretary General said he was 'most gratified, deeply grateful" for this. He asked the President not to hesitate in calling on him whenever he needed help. The President made no response to this pitch, other than to note that he had "turned away many other candidates."

SECRET

Drafted:S/S:APAdams:bdf 10/26/81



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 26, 1981

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UNCLASSIFIED (With SECRET Attachments)

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memoranda of Conversation from Cancun

Attached are draft memoranda of conversation of the President's meetings with Secretary General Waldheim and the Prime Minister of Bangladesh at Cancun.

Katherne Surley for

L. Paul Bremer, III Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Memoranda of Conversation

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## 116584

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#### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: October 13, 1981 PLACE: Oval Office

SUBJECT; The President's Meeting with the King of Spain

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

#### SPAIN

The PresidentKing Juan CarlosSecretary HaigForeign MinisterRichard AllenAmbassador LladoAmb. Terence TodmanGeneral Sabino F.General of His

Foreign Minister Perez Llorca Ambassador Llado General Sabino F. Campo, Secretary General of His Majesty's Household Mr. Jorge del Pino, Director General for North American and Pacific Affairs

DECLASSIFIED

NIRR M371/1 # 116584 BY FW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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The President said he was very pleased to welcome the King and to have this opportunity to express his great admiration for the King's outstanding and impressive job in bringing democracy to Spain and consolidating it. He would be pleased to discuss any agenda that the King might wish.

The President said that on the bilateral treaty which was now being negotiated we are committed to help in the modernization of the Spanish armed forces. Despite the many problems we face in the budget field, we will do everything to provide as much assistance as we can in that area.

<u>The King</u> said the Prime Minister had asked to convey his regards to the President and to give assurances of the Spanish Government's determination to strengthen its ties with the West and to continue a strong Western orientation. Spain was determined to seek entry into NATO. The Communist and Socialists were trying to delay the process and obliging

> <u>SECREE</u>/NODIS RDS-1,3 10/22/01



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the Foreign Minister to spend a long time in debate but they would not be able to prevent a favorable decision on entry. Spain was also determined to enter the European Common market although it was facing some difficulties and would need help.


The King added that speaking personally, he shared the thoughts in the message he had conveyed from the Prime Minister and felt it was very important for Spain to integrate fully into Europe and all its organizations. He said it had been very useful to him to have had a conversation the previous evening with the Secretary on the <u>Middle East</u>. Maybe Spain does not see clearly enough what the U.S. sees and what leads the U.S. to the actions it takes. Spain needs more information in order to be able to be helpful to the U.S. He has good personal relations with the Kings of Saudi Arabia and of Jordan and possibly could be helpful to us. He would also like to know more about what Israel is doing because he felt it would be very difficult for Egypt to continue to maintain a positive attitude, unless it got a more favorable response from Israel.

<u>The President</u> said he was pleased that things were going well on the NATO issue. The Foreign Minister remarked that there were some difficulties but on balance things were moving in the right direction.

The President said with regard to the <u>Middle East</u>, the U.S. intended to be as helpful as possible to Egypt. He had spoken to Begin and Sadat earlier about keeping the peace process going and Mubarak had been here just a week earlier and the President had been heartened that after the tragic assassination of Sadat, the leadership had passed to Mubarak. He would be pleased to call on Spain to help in any way possible.

The Secretary said it seemed best to continue the process with the Camp David accord and that some progress seemed to be under way. The Israelis appeared to appreciate this and were being more cooperative. The outlook for progress was better now with Israeli and the U.S. elections out of the way. At the same time, the Israelis are feeling isolated and are very tempted to move into Lebanon, attack the PLO and get the security it does not believe it can obtain in any other way. The European proposal to create a separate Palestinian state or otherwise to intervene in Middle East matters runs the risk of triggering a negative reaction by Israel which has the capability of fighting for six months without U.S. support. He hoped that Carrington and the





- 3 -

Europeans would realize this and avoid <u>meddling</u> in the situation. He said the President had asked for us to be active in the Middle East process and for us to participate fully in the multilateral force for the area. The Europeans are not helping and are even in some cases making us nervous. Some of the initiatives that they are talking about may be fine in principle but in many cases are naive and even dangerous.


The King repeated that he considered it very important for Israel to comply with the Camp David accords. The Secretary noted that at the President's request he had seen Begin and stressed the importance of progress. He had received a commitment from Begin to complete withdrawal from the Sinai by April or resign. The Israelis are now beginning to have greater understanding of the need to continue the process and had scheduled talks on normalization.

The President noted that the cease fire in Lebanon would not have been possible without Saudi intervention at our request. Maybe the Saudis were coming closer to understanding us and to participating in bringing peace to the area.

The King said the Saudis want to be helpful but also must save face. He inquired whether we expected to sit down soon with the <u>PLO</u>. The Secretary responded that, despite the great publicity that had been given to this issue recently because of the statements of two former Presidents, the U.S. position is that if the PLO is prepared to recognize the existence of Israel and its right to live in peace and to recognize UN Resolution 242 and 238, then we would welcome finding a way to deal with them. The King asked to be kept informed and would be pleased to help in any way he could. The <u>President</u> agreed and said he would be pleased to call on the Spanish.

Morocco - The King said that relations were getting better with Morocco and that Spain hoped soon to remove the arms embargo. He was expecting a visit soon (maybe early next year) by King Hassan in return for his visit to Morocco some time ago. At the same time the Spanish are concerned that if the U.S. gave too many arms to Morocco it might create an imbalance in the region which would be destabilizing. The Foreign Minister noted that

#### SECRET /NODIS



the Spanish were producing arms and planes and were prepared to assist the Moroccans. Spain wanted to keep a moderate government in Morocco but it would also like to see a balance in arms supplies maintained. Any change to the left in Morocco would mean serious problems. Spain has a special relationship with Morocco and it seeks increased friendship but must be concerned over developments there. Spain would wish to maintain a dialogue with the U.S. on this subject.


The Secretary said he saw nothing on the horizon that could upset the balance. He knew that under the previous U.S. Administration some arms which had been promised to Morocco, had been held up. The President had decided to move ahead with delivery of these arms now. This was merely replacement of some minor items and would do nothing to upset the balance.

<u>Caribbean - The President</u> noted that he had started a <u>Caribbean</u> program with Canada and Mexico. He hoped to be able to help the poor countries of the area to develop their economies to bring stabilization and progress so that they would not be such easy targets for communism. At the forthcoming Cancun meeting he would see what could be done by the U.S. to be helpful. He believed in the proberb "if you give a man a fish, you fed him for a day, if you taught him to fish, he could feed himself for life."

<u>Cuba - Mr. Allen</u> said that surveillance of the flow of arms from Cuba through Nicaragua to El Salvador showed that the arms originated in the Soviet Union. With this assistance Nicaragua had developed an enormous military strength. It now has about 2.5 percent of its population under arms making it the strongest country in the area.

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The Secretary said this militarization was also true of Cuba. Gromyko had told him the arms being shipped to Cuba were defensive. The Secretary had pointed out to Gromyko that Cuba had more men under arms than he had commanded when he was in Europe.

<u>Mr. Allen</u> noted that the militarization of the area had complicated the situation throughout even in Costa Rica, which the President referred to as having been one of the most democratic countries in the region over a long period of time.

The King stated that it would be most important when Spain joins NATO for there to be some immediate positive reaction from the allies which would show their full endorsement of the Spanish move. The Foreign Minister said he had some ideas on what steps would be taken and he would be discussing these more fully with the Secretary of State.

The meeting then adjourned to the Cabinet Room.

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#### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: October 13, 1981 TIME: 11:15 a.m. PLACE: Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: President's Meeting in the Cabinet Room

DECLASSIFIED NLRR M371/1 #116585

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

President Reagan Secretary Haig Mr. Meese Mr. Baker Mr. Deaver Richard Allen Ambassador Todman Mr. Rentschler, NSC SPAIN

King Juan Carlos
Ambassador Llado
General Sabino F. Campo,
Secretary General of His
Majesty's Household
Mr. Jorge del Pino, Director
General for North American
and Pacific Affairs
Mr. Soignie, Chef de Cabinet,
Foreign Ministry

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At the request of the President, the Secretary opened the discussion.

Bilateral Negotiations - The Secretary noted that the time for concluding the negotiations had been delayed and credit was due to the Spanish for their agreement to this. He promised that the U.S. would seek the highest possible level of assistance for the modernization of the Spanish armed forces but he would avoid giving any figure now because to do otherwise could be counter-productive. The process is still under way and Congress tends to want to. cut the amount presented by the Executive. However he was hopeful that the final figure would be substantial. The Secretary stressed that it was important not to have too many limitations on the U.S. use of the Spanish facilities. The use we made of them would always be in consultation with Spain. However if restrictions were established in advance, that would make it more difficult for us on the Hill in securing the level of assistance we were seeking.

SECRET /NODIS

- 2 -

<u>EEC</u> - <u>The Secretary</u> asked if there was anything we could do to help with regard to Spain's application for entry into the EEC. He noted that the President would be seeing Mitterrand this weekend.

The Foreign Minister then responded to the following points.

NATO - He said as soon as there was a final decision in Spain, he hoped that there would be no problem with the European allies. Any delay or creation of any problem would be very harmful to Spain and very dangerous.

EEC - The Minister repeated that the big problem was with France although the French position was slowly improving. It would be important for the European Summit on November 29 to make a strong political statement indicating that they are happy to have Spain as a member of the EEC and, if possible, setting a target date for entry. Following that, the details could be worked out. He had spoken to the Germans, Italians and some others and had received favorable reactions but he needed support from the French. He said that one obstacle had now been removed by the Spanish decision to accept the value-added tax and submit legislation to the Spanish Cortes. This would create domestic problems for the government but they realized it was an important step to take. The King added that progress on entry into the EEC was very important because it would be difficult for some Spaniards to understand why Spain was joining NATO to help defend interests which were not available to it while it was kept out of the EEC.

<u>Bilateral Relations - The Minister</u> stated that the postponement for 8 months was a joint decision and was needed by both sides. He understood the U.S. budget problem. He wished however to note that the U.S. was asking much of Spain in the military field. Spain was making a major effort and was increasing its budget by 17% in real terms. It was also seeking entry into NATO. In exchange for these important moves by Spain to strengthen Western defense, Spain needed to be able to show that it was receiving a "just" return from the U.S. There had been many delays in the past in the delivery of military materiel which had been promised. He hoped this could be improved quickly and could be avoided under the new bilateral arrangement.

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Military Industrial Cooperation - The Minister said another area where Spain looked to the U.S. for cooperation was in the sector of military industrial development. In 1982 Spain would be the second biggest cash buyer of U.S. military supplies after Saudi Arabia. He felt that some arrangements should be made, once Spain is a member of NATO for the U.S. to be more forthcoming and generous in its treatment of Spain.

- 3 -

Flexibility - The Minister said the question of flexibility in the use of Spanish bases would be less of a problem since the bilateral treaty would fall within the scope of NATO. The U.S. could be confident that Spain would be flexible within that context.

<u>Spanish-U.S. Trade</u> - <u>The Minister</u> said there is a serious need for something to be done to improve the trade balance between Spain and the U.S. which has been becoming progressively more unfavorable to Spain. A large percentage of Spanish goods were subject to U.S. countervailing duties. This reduced Spain's ability to export to the U.S. and created a very bad impression in Spain. Anything the U.S. could do in the trade field would be helpful.

Fishing - The Minister said Spain also needed some help from the U.S. in the area of fishing allocations.

<u>Nuclear Cooperation - The Minister</u> said more favorable U.S. actions were also needed in the nuclear field. Spain ranked first in purchases of nuclear supplies from the U.S. In fact of 53 plants the U.S. assisted in building abroad, 13 of these were in Spain. Spain had hoped to be able to get better treatment in obtaining supplies of nuclear material from the U.S. It would appreciate and welcome greater cooperation in this area.

<u>Gibraltar - The Minister</u> said Spain had been speaking to the British and some progress was being made in understanding each other's position. However the issue was very important domestically for Spain. The government had voted against a resolution saying that Gibraltar should be returned to Spain before Spain joined NATO. It was prepared to do so again but it did need help from the U.S. in dealing with Gibraltar issue. Specifically, he understood that the British could no longer fully utilize the dock yards in Gibraltar and had been hoping the U.S. would use them instead and thus help out in the situation. He hoped that the U.S. would not agree to the British request and would not increase its acitivty in Gibraltar.

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The Secretary said he was pleased that the Minister understood the importance of flexibility in the use of the bases. He reiterated that he was strongly in favor of providing the Spanish as much support as he could. He noted that the President was very much in favor of free trade and would not wish to see any unnecessary obstacles put in the way of more Spanish trade with the U.S. On the nuclear issue, he stated that the President felt that it is very important to develop nuclear power for peaceful uses. Spain could therefore look forward to greater cooperation with the U.S. in this field. On Gibraltar, the Secretary said that he is sensitive to the apparent contradiction in the situation. On one hand it was important to keep some semblance of the status quo. At the same time perhaps there was the possibility of a Spanish command in Gibraltar once Spain enters NATO. In any case the Minister could be sure we would resist taking over the Gibraltar dock yards.


In response to a request from Mr. Allen for more information on the nuclear power question, the Minister explained that there is a major national nuclear program which has been approved under which Spain is committed to operate 13 nuclear plants. Spanish firms have had some difficulty in getting the necessary supplies from the U.S. Spain had now complied with all the safeugard requirements which had been previously cited as obstacles. Thus he thought that the cooperation should increase without any difficulty.

The Minister re-emphasized that Spain's major need now is for help; in the area of defense improvement and in trying to correct the large trade imbalance.

The President noted that with the change in the U.S. attitude toward nuclear power, we will be able to go forward much faster and better with cooperation in this area. He was already getting rid of many of the regulations which hinder development and close cooperation in this area.

The King said that for Spain the need for nuclear power plants is a matter of survival. Therefore U.S. cooperation would be vital. He said that the Gibraltar issue is a very sensitive one which he noted, by the way of anecdote, had kept him from going to the wedding of Prince Charles. He considered it very important that a

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solution be found to this issue. At the same time he recognized that the Gibraltar issue was tied to the question of Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish enclaves on the African coast next to Morocco. He felt certain that a settlement of the Gibraltar issue would lead the Moroccans to increase their pressures to take over Ceuta and Melilla. The legal and historical situation of the enclaves is totally different but because of the geographical situation it was inevitable that comparison would be made between them.

Trade - Ambassador Todman explained that the countervailing duties to which the Minister referred were applied under U.S. law because of the subsidies which the Spanish exporters were granted under the cascade system of taxes. Over a long period of time we had encouraged the Spanish to change the system or remove the subsidies so that we would not have to countervail. As long as the subsidy continues, our legislation left us no choice. In any event Secretary of Commerce Baldrige was taking a helpful and positive approach to the question and had just sent a team to Spain to investigate the affected industries to see whether the new Spanish tax increases had eliminated the subsidies and would allow us to reduce the countervailing duties to a level of zero. Amb. Todman noted, however, that the problem was not so much the countervailing duties which were in fact very low, but rather the increase in prices of Spanish products and the Spanish approach to sell to buyers and their lack of promotion of various Spanish products in a very competitive market. Regardless of what was done about countervailing duties, there would be little increase in Spanish sales until Spain improved its sales practices in the U.S. He also said that the Spanish adoption of the Value Added Tax would help greatly in the solution of the problem.

The President again expressed his great pleasure at the King's visit to this country and said he looked forward to continuing the conversation with him later and to strengthening the very close relations between Spain and the U.S.

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#### MEMORANDUM

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 12, 1981

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Clearance of Juan Carlos Memcons

Your memo to Bremer (Tab I) conveys official White House clearance for the memoranda of conversation (Tab A) covering the President's October 13 meetings with Spanish King Juan Carlos I.

#### **RECOMMENDATION:**

That you sign the memo to Bremer at Tab I.

Approve As Amended

Tab	I	Memo to	Bremer
Tab	Α	Memcons	

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT AW 8/15/11

**MEMORANDUM** 

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENTS November 2, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLERJMR

SUBJECT: Memcons From Meetings Between the President and King Juan Carlos I of Spain (October 13, 1981)

Attached for your clearance are two memoranda of conversation (Tabs A and B) covering the President's October 13 meetings (Oval Office restricted and Cabinet Room plenary) with Spanish King Juan Carlos I. (I have carefully reviewed both and find them in order).

#### **RECOMMENDATION:**


That you approve the memcons at Tabs A and B.

Approve V As Amended

Tab AMemcon from Oval Office MeetingTab BMemcon from Cabinet Room Meeting

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENTS 35

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October 13, 1981 Oval Office

/ DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 #116586 AW NARA DATE 6/22/15

SUBJECT; The President's Meeting with the King of Spain

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

#### SPAIN

DATE:

PLACE:

The President Secretary Haig Richard Allen Amb. Terence Todman King Juan Carlos Foreign Minister Perez Llorca Ambassador Llado General Sabino F. Campo, Secretary General of His Majesty's Household Mr. Jorge del Pino, Director General for North American and Pacific Affairs

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The President said he was very pleased to welcome the King and to have this opportunity to express his great admiration for the King's outstanding and impressive job in bringing democracy to Spain and consolidating it. He would be pleased to discuss any agenda that the King might wish.

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The King said the Prime Minister had asked to convey his regards to the President and to give assurances of the Spanish Government's determination to strengthen its ties with the West and to continue a strong Western orientation. Spain was determined to seek entry into NATO. The Communist and Socialists were trying to delay the process and obliging

> -<u>SECRET/NODIS</u> RDS-1,3 10/22/01

the Foreign Minister to spend a long time in debate but they would not be able to prevent a favorable decision on entry. Spain was also determined to enter the European Common market although it was facing some difficulties and would need help.

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SECRET/NODIS



Europeans would realize this and avoid meddling in the situation. He said the President had asked for us to be active in the Middle East process and for us to participate fully in the multilateral force for the area. The Europeans are not helping and are even in some cases making us nervous. Some of the initiatives that they are talking about may be fine in principle but in many cases are naive and even dangerous.

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
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The King said the Saudis want to be helpful but also must save face. He inquired whether we expected to sit down soon with the PLO. The Secretary responded that, despite the great publicity that had been given to this issue recently because of the statements of two former Presidents, the U.S. position is that if the PLO is prepared to recognize the existence of Israel and its right to live in peace and to recognize UN Resolution 242 and 238, then we would welcome finding a way to deal with them. The King asked to be kept informed and would be pleased to help in any way he could. The President agreed and said he would be pleased to call on the Spanish.

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The Secretary said he saw nothing on the horizon that could upset the balance. He knew that under the previous U.S. Administration some arms which had been promised to Morocco, had been held up. The President had decided to move ahead with delivery of these arms now. This was merely replacement of some minor items and would do nothing to upset the balance.

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Equatorial Guinea-The King said Spain was concerned at this time with Equatorial Guinea. He had visited the country twice and Spain was spending \$50 million there to try to get the present regime on the right road. Spain was helping to develop the Equatorial Guinean police. The Guineans were already were already getting rid of the Russians. The Chinese were there but were not creating problems. However, the help needed by Equatorial Guinea was more than Spain could provide. It would be most welcome and useful if the U.S. could do some more to help Equatorial Guinea in the diplomatic and assistance fields.

<u>Cuba - Mr. Allen</u> said that surveillance of the flow of arms from Cuba through Nicaragua to El Salvador showed that the arms originated in the Soviet Union. With this assistance Nicaragua had developed an enormous military strength. It now has about 2.5 percent of its population under arms making it the strongest country in the area.



SECRET/NODIS

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The King stated that it would be most important when Spain joins NATO for there to be some immediate positive reaction from the allies which would show their full endorsement of the Spanish move. The Foreign Minister said he had some ideas on what steps would be taken and he would be discussing these more fully with the Secretary of State.

The meeting then adjourned to the Cabinet Room.

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#### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: Oct TIME: 11: PLACE: Cab

October 13, 1981 11:15 a.m. Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: President's Meeting in the Cabinet Room

DECLASSIFIED NLRR M37111#116587 NARA DATE lo

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

President Reagan Secretary Haig Mr. Meese Mr. Baker Mr. Deavers Richard Allen Ambassador Todman Mr. Rentschler, NSC

SPAIN

King Juan Carlos
Ambassador Llado
General Sabino F. Campo,
 Secretary General of His
 Majesty's Household
Mr. Jorge del Pino, Director
 General for North American
 and Pacific Affairs
Mr. Soignie, Chef de Cabinet,
 Foreign Ministry

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SECRET /NODIS

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The Foreign Minister then responded to the following points.

NATO - He said as soon as there was a final decision in Spain, he hoped that there would be no problem with the European allies. Any delay or creation of any problem would be very harmful to Spain and very dangerous.

EEC - The Minister repeated that the big problem was with France although the French position was slowly improving. Tt. would be important for the European Summit on November 29 to make a strong political statement indicating that they are happy to have Spain as a member of the EEC and, if possible, setting a target date for entry. Following that, the details could be worked out. He had spoken to the Germans, Italians and some others and had received favorable reactions but he needed support from the French. He said that one obstacle had now been removed by the Spanish decision to accept the value-added tax and submit legislation to the Spanish Cortes. This would create domestic problems for the government but they realized it was an important step to take. The King added that progress on entry into the EEC was very important because it would be difficult for some Spaniards to understand why Spain was joining NATO to help defend interests which were not available to it while it was kept out of the EEC.

Bilateral Relations - The Minister stated that the postponement for 8 months was a joint decision and was needed by both sides. He understood the U.S. budget problem. He wished however to note that the U.S. was asking much of Spain in the military field. Spain was making a major effort and was increasing its budget by 17% in real terms. It was also seeking entry into NATO. In exchange for these important moves by Spain to strengthen Western defense, Spain needed to be able to show that it was receiving a "just" return from the U.S. There had been many delays in the past in the delivery of military materiel which had been promised. He hoped this could be improved quickly and could be avoided under the new bilateral arrangement.

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Military Industrial Cooperation - The Minister said another area where Spain looked to the U.S. for cooperation was in the sector of military industrial development. In 1982 Spain would be the second biggest cash buyer of U.S. military supplies after Saudi Arabia. He felt that some arrangements should be made, once Spain is a member of NATO for the U.S. to be more forthcoming and generous in its treatment of Spain.


Flexibility - The Minister said the question of flexibility in the use of Spanish bases would be less of a problem since the bilateral treaty would fall within the scope of NATO. The U.S. could be confident that Spain would be flexible within that context.

Spanish-U.S. Trade - The Minister said there is a serious need for something to be done to improve the trade balance between Spain and the U.S. which has been becoming progressively more unfavorable to Spain. A large percentage of Spanish goods were subject to U.S. countervailing duties. This reduced Spain's ability to export to the U.S. and created a very bad impression in Spain. Anything the U.S. could do in the trade field would be helpful.

Fishing - The Minister said Spain also needed some help from the U.S. in the area of fishing allocations.

Nuclear Cooperation - The Minister said more favorable U.S. actions were also needed in the nuclear field. Spain ranked first in purchases of nuclear supplies from the U.S. In fact of 53 plants the U.S. assisted in building abroad, 13 of these were in Spain. Spain had hoped to be able to get better treatment in obtaining supplies of nuclear material from the U.S. It would appreciate and welcome greater cooperation in this area.

<u>Gibraltar</u> - The Minister said Spain had been speaking to the British and some progress was being made in understanding each other's position. However the issue was very important domestically for Spain. The government had voted against a resolution saying that Gibraltar should be returned to Spain before Spain joined NATO. It was prepared to do so again but it did need help from the U.S. in dealing with Gibraltar issue. Specifically, he understood that the British could no longer fully utilize the dock yards in Gibraltar and had been hoping the U.S. would use them instead and thus help out in the situation. He hoped that the U.S. would not agree to the British request and would not increase its acitivty in Gibraltar.



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The Secretary said he was pleased that the Minister understood the importance of flexibility in the use of the bases. He reiterated that he was strongly in favor of providing the Spanish as much support as he could. He noted that the President was very much in favor of free trade and would not wish to see any unnecessary obstacles put in the way of more Spanish trade with the On the nuclear issue, he stated that the President U.S. felt that it is very important to develop nuclear power for peaceful uses. Spain could therefore look forward to greater cooperation with the U.S. in this field. On Gibraltar, the Secretary said that he is sensitive to the apparent contradiction in the situation. On one hand it was important to keep some semblance of the status quo. At the same time perhaps there was the possibility of a Spanish command in Gibraltar once Spain enters NATO. In any case the Minister could be sure we would resist taking over the Gibraltar dock yards.

In response to a request from Mr. Allen for more information on the nuclear power question, the Minister explained that there is a major national nuclear program which has been approved under which Spain is committed to operate 13 nuclear plants. Spanish firms have had some difficulty in getting the necessary supplies from the U.S. Spain had now complied with all the safeugard requirements which had been previously cited as obstacles. Thus he thought that the cooperation should increase without any difficulty.

The Minister re-emphasized that Spain's major need now is for help in the area of defense improvement and in trying to correct the large trade imbalance.

The President noted that with the change in the U.S. attitude toward nuclear power, we will be able to go forward much faster and better with cooperation in this area. He was already getting rid of many of the regulations which hinder development and close cooperation in this area.

The King said that for Spain the need for nuclear power plants is a matter of survival. Therefore U.S. cooperation would be vital. He said that the Gibraltar issue is a very sensitive one which he noted, by the way of anecdote, had kept him from going to the wedding of Prince Charles. He considered it very important that a

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solution be found to this issue. At the same time he recognized that the Gibraltar issue was tied to the question of Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish enclaves on the African coast next to Morocco. He felt certain that a settlement of the Gibraltar issue would lead the Moroccans to increase their pressures to take over Ceuta and Melilla. The legal and historical situation of the enclaves is totally different but because of the geographical situation it was inevitable that comparison would be made between them.

Trade - Ambassador Todman explained that the countervailing duties to which the Minister referred were applied under U.S. law because of the subsidies which the Spanish exporters were granted under the cascade system of taxes. Over a long period of time we had encouraged the Spanish to change the system or remove the subsidies so that we would not have to countervail. As long as the subsidy continues, our legislation left us no choice. In any event Secretary of Commerce Baldrige was taking a helpful and positive approach to the question and had just sent a team to Spain to investigate the affected industries to see whether the new Spanish tax increases had eliminated the subsidies and would allow us to reduce the countervailing duties to a level of zero. Amb. Todman noted, however, that the problem was not so much the countervailing duties which were in fact very low, but rather the increase in prices of Spanish products and the Spanish approach to sell to buyers and their lack of promotion of various Spanish products in a very competitive market. Regardless of what was done about countervailing duties, there would be little increase in Spanish sales until Spain improved its sales practices in the U.S. He also said that the Spanish adoption of the Value Added Tax would help greatly in the solution of the problem.

The President again expressed his great pleasure at the King's visit to this country and said he looked forward to continuing the conversation with him later and to strengthening the very close relations between Spain and the U.S.

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



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October 30, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED (With SECRET/NODIS Attachments)

> MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President's Meeting with King Juan Carlos

Attached, for clearance, are the memoranda of conversation involving the President and King Juan Carlos during the latter's state visit.

Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Memoranda of Conversation

MEMCON

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Subject: President's Meeting in the Cabinet Room

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OTHER PARTICIPANTS (Cont'd.)

US

Mr. Rentschler, NSC

## SPAIN

Mr. Jorge del Pino, Director General for North American and Pacific Affairs Mr. Soignie, Chef de Cabinet, Foreign Ministry

DECLASSIFIED Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997 NARA, DATE 8/5



D	ECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b),	E.O. 12958, as amended
White House	Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA	DATE

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		SECRET/NODIS
	s/s	NUMBER 81: 955 DATE: 10/22/81
	•	MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 48
	I.	PRINCIPAL: The President
	•	DATE: 10/13/81 TIME: 11:15 a.m. PLACE: Cabinet Room
		NOTETAKER: Ambassador Terence A. Todman
	2.	OTHER PARTICIPANTS:SPAINU.S.SPAINSecretary HaigKing Juan CarlosMr. MeeseAmbassador LladoMr. BakerGeneral Sabino F. Campo,Mr. DeaversSecretary General of HisRichard AllenMajesty's HouseholdAmbassador TodmanMr. Jorge del Pino, DifectorSUBJECTS DISCUSSED (includenumber of attached cables if
	••	US/Spain bilateral negotiations
		Spain's Entry into EEC and NATO
•	•	Spain-US Trade Issues
		Gibraltar
•	з.	ACTION COMMITMENTS:
		1. The Secretary's assurance that the US would resist ar taking over Gibraltar dock yards in wake of British withdrawal.
		2. (General) The Secretary's commitment to provide highest possible level of assistance for upgrading Spain's military forces.
		3. (General) The President's commitment for improved US/Spanish cooperation in nuclear power.
	4.	FOLLOW-UP:
		1. Under Secretary Stoessel's telcon with (DOD) Under to Secretary Carlucci.ry Carlucci.
	8	2. No specific follow-up required.
•		3. No specific follow-up required.
		DECLASSIFIED
•	BY	NLRR M371/14/14588 LW NARA DATER CLASSIFICATION RDS-1,3 10/22/01

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THE STATES

s/	'S	NUMBER	8130550
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SECRET /NODIS

DATE: 10/22/81

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

I. PRINCIPAL: The President

DATE: 10/13/81 TIME: PLACE:

CE: Oval Office

116589

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NOTETAKER: Ambassador Terence Todman

## OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

U.S. Secretary Haig Richard Allen Amb. Terence A. Todman

. <u>SPAIN</u> King Juan Carlos Foreign Minister Perez Llorca Ambassador Llado Gen. Sabino F. Campo, Secretary General of His Majesty's Household

- 2. <u>SUBJECTS DISCUSSED</u> (include number of attached cables if appropriate):
  - -- Middle East events (including Lebanon, PLO, Israel, Saudi Arabia

- .-

-- Morrocco/Spain Relations

-- Caribbean

-- Equatorial Guinea

-- Cuba

3. ACTION COMMITMENTS:

NONE

4. FOLLOW-UP:

NONE

DECLASSIFIED # 116: NLRR M37

SECRET/NODIS CLASSIFICATION RDS-1,3 10/22/01



MEMCON

Subject: The President's Meeting with the King of Spain

PARTICIPANTS (Cont'd)

U.S.

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## SPAIN

Mr. Jorge del Pino, Director General for North American and Pacific Affairs

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#6392 Jim Rentschler RVA wird not have time to 52 read in ditail. G you nink Thuj're aremate, we'll take your word for it ' Jane your word for it ' 11981

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DICK ALLEN			
IRENE DERUS			
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PETER			•
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Comments:			

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED WITH

November 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT: Clearance of Juan Carlos Memcons

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard V. Allen has reviewed and approved the memoranda of conversation covering the President's October 13 meetings with Spanish King Juan Carlos I. This memorandum constitutes formal White House clearance.

Staff Dired or

Attachment:

Memorandum of Conversation

