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**Folder Title:** Memorandums of Conversations,  
President Reagan [11/02/1981-11/14/1981]

**Box:** 49

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 8/15/2011

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (11/01/1981-11/14/1981)

**FOIA**

M10-351/M10-371

**Box Number** 49

JAUVERT/BROWER

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
116590	MEMO	JAMES LILLEY TO RICHARD ALLEN RE. MEMCON RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH VICE PREMIER HUANG HUA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	11/2/1981	B1
116591	MEMCON	RE. SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CIE PREMIER HUANG HUA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	10/29/1981	B1
116592	MEMCON	RE. MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT MITTERAND <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	10/18/1981	B1
116593	PAPER	RE. RECOMMENDED PHONE CALL TO AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB [COPY OF DOC. 116594] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	11/25/1981	B1
116594	PAPER	RE. RECOMMENDED PHONE CALL TO AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	11/25/1981	B1
116595	MEMO	RAYMOND TANTER TO RICHARD ALLEN RE. NEXT HABIB MISSION <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	11/24/1981	B1
116596	MEMO	ALLEN TO ALEXANDER HAIG RE. NEXT HABIB MISSION <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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JAUVERT/BROWER

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
116597	MEMO	ALLEN TO ALEXANDER HAIG RE. NEXT HABIB MISSION <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
116598	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. NEXT HABIB MISSION <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	11/20/1981	B1
116599	MEMO	HAIG TO RR RE. NEXT HABIB MISSION <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	11/13/1981	B1
116600	MEMO	ALLEN TO MIKE DEEVER RE. PROPOSED MEETING OF RR AND HABIB <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
116601	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. NEXT HABIB MISSION [W/NOTATIONS] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
116602	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. NEXT HABIB MISSION [COPY OF DOC. 116598] <i>R 7/2/2015 M371/</i>	1	11/20/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8106354

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 02 NOV 81 16

TO ALLEN

FROM LILLEY

DOC DATE 02 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

HUA HUANG

SUBJECT: MEMCON & ANALYSIS OF PRES MTG W/ VICE PREMIER HUANG HUA ON OCT 29

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8106068

NSCIFID

( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

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*12/2*

*noted by RVA*

*Allen, CJE*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

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116590

MEMORANDUM

6354

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 2, 1981

2

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES LILLEY *W*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation - President's Meeting  
with Vice Premier Huang Hua, 29 October 1981 at  
11:50 a.m. (U)

There follows my comments and analysis of the President's meeting  
with Huang Hua.

First, this is obviously a tough message from the Chinese.

-- Deng believes he must act decisively at this critical  
juncture to arrest the drift towards a more independent Taiwan.  
The Chinese probably know that our Administration has already  
taken moves to improve our relations with Taiwan which include  
a resumption of arms sales, opening a new office and upgrading  
the level of contact.

-- Deng believes that if he makes the cost high enough, a  
pragmatic U.S. President will accommodate the Chinese. Experience  
tells the Chinese that tough tactics can work on Americans. The  
Chinese believe they have a strong constituency in the U.S.  
Government, in the press, among academics who will support the  
strategic relationship with Peking at the expense of Taiwan. The  
Chinese believe our current Administration leaders want it both  
ways and the Chinese are trying to force a choice -- Peking or  
Taiwan. They want to restore the strong Peking tilt which has  
existed since 1971.

-- Another reason the Chinese are talking tough is they  
are trying to compensate for their own weaknesses. They know  
Taiwan far outstrips them economically and socially, and this trend  
will continue. They see little hope for their own modernization  
success in the short term. Militarily, they can do little. A  
humiliation on Taiwan, on top of all these other problems, would  
cause the top leadership to look impotent and helpless to the  
outside world and to their own lower-level cadre leadership.

-- There is also the historic Chinese drive shared by the  
current regime to eliminate the remnants of a fallen dynasty which,  
in this case, is still a claimant for power over all China. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review on 11/2/2011  
Extended by Richard Allen  
Reason: NSC 1.13(a)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 # 116590

BY *RW* NARA DATE *6/22/15*

-- As for Huang Hua, he was delivering a prepared message and was clearly under instructions from the highest level, Deng Xiaoping. 3

-- In taking this tough position in the current talks, Deng is covering himself by preempting the hard-line from his critics. He will now tell these critics a tough message was delivered directly to our President.

-- Deng, a hard and often unsubtle bargainer, is staking out an initial bargaining position. Later there will be give on their part, although Huang Hua did not show this during these talks. In my view, their target is the FX (advanced aircraft) sales. They want to block this. They can live with other sales eventually no matter what they say now.

-- The Chinese introduced one new angle with the President. They have insisted that we start talks on Taiwan and suspend all arms sales while these are underway. This, they know, is unacceptable.

-- This kind of Chinese behavior in confronting and harranguing our top leaders should stop. They did this to our Vice President in August of last year, and they have now tried to do it again with our President. This connotates on their part a certain disrespect for our leadership. We must be more careful in our advanced preparatory talks so that this is not repeated in the future.

-- Having said this, there is a therapeutic affect for them to bang gongs or "fire empty cannons". Rhetoric and reality are two different things. They can be allowed to deliver a "commercial", but they cannot go beyond certain understood limits.

-- On our side, we must quietly but persuasively point out the realities to them in our future discussions on Taiwan. We cannot any longer accept their basic premises -- i.e., all Taiwanese want to rejoin the mainland except for a flakey or recalcitrant few. They claim Taiwan's progress is a hoax -- it is riddled with corruption, etc. They say arms to Taiwan will make Taiwan stubborn and unwilling to negotiate. None of this is really correct, yet for the most part they repeatedly say it unchallenged by the U.S.

-- The President reassured the Chinese in his statement supporting reunification. He was not pushing a 2-China policy, something that has been troubling them in the past.

-- Peking's nine-point program for reunification, which Huang continuously referred to, is a propaganda blitz aimed largely at the U.S. and targetted at blocking arms sales. In my view, the way for Peking to make real progress with Taiwan is a quiet incremental approach which has worked before and will probably work in the future. (S)

In summary:

-- This exaggerated move by the Chinese to block all arms sales to Taiwan is unacceptable to a wide-range of Americans and our allies. Even the bureaucracy is behind a tough U.S. line on this issue. A focus on an FX sale, on the other hand, could have been divisive.

-- We should resume arms sales quietly to Taiwan after several weeks on a graduated schedule, releasing some items Taiwan has requested.

-- We should be in no hurry to start up talks with Peking on Taiwan.

-- We should encourage a broad range of contacts on other fronts, Secretaries Regan and Weinberger should go to China, and we should tempt their military by encouraging exchanges of personnel, technology and methods.

-- We should proceed to examine carefully the pros and cons of an FX sale, and we should involve all relevant departments -- State, DOD and CIA, and come up with a decision before the end of the year. (S)

NOTE: This memo was prepared without access to the details of Secretary Haig's talks with Huang Hua in Washington on 29-30 October. (U)

Attachment:

Tab A MemCon of President's mtg with Huang Hua

~~SECRET~~

116591

6354

5

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with  
Vice Premier Huang Hua of China

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
Vice President George Bush  
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
John Holdridge, Assistant Secretary of State  
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
James Lilley, Staff Member, National Security  
Council  
Vivian Chang, Interpreter

Huang Hua, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister  
Pu Shouchang, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Han XU, Director of the Americas and Oceania  
Department  
Chai Zemin, Chinese Ambassador to the United  
States  
Zhang Zai, Deputy Director of the Americas  
and Oceania Department  
Yang Jiechi, English Interpreter

DATE, TIME Thursday, October 29, 1981  
AND PLACE: 11:50 a.m. - 12:25 p.m.  
The Cabinet Room

~~SECRET~~  
Review on 11/2/2011  
Extended by Richard Allen  
Reason: NSC 1.13(a)

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M3711/#116591  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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After some small talk and the cleaning out of the press, the President started by saying that we were delighted to have Huang Hua here; you have already talked with Secretary Haig and you know that I take a personal interest in technology transfer to China and on removing restrictions that exist concerning trade. I have just learned that among the 7,000 students that are here, some of them are family members of all of you and I hope they are giving you a good report on us. (S)

Huang Hua: We hope they do well in their studies and that they will help in the modernization of China. (C)

The President then commented that he had learned of the exchange of students between China and the United States, and this had gone back to the Boxer Rebellion. He mentioned that our country was the only country not to get reparations but started the exchange of students so that friendship would expand. (C)

Huang Hua answered these reparations were used to finance our exchange students in the U.S. Quite a few of the older generation received their education in China and the funds came from these reparations. (C)

The President then said: You must have certain points that you want to raise with us. (C)

Huang Hua, in answer, said that at Cancun you discussed this with Premier Zhao and I talked about this with Secretary Haig, and this morning we also discussed these matters with the Secretary. Haig and I, representing our leaders, had this discussion. We were entrusted to do so, in fact, by our leaders. I conveyed to you through Secretary Haig important words which Premier Zhao would have conveyed to you at Cancun had he had the time. Now I am continuing with these talks. We are pleased to note the frank and cordial spirit of our talks with a view towards strengthening Sino-US relations, and working together against Soviet hegemonism. Now Sino-US relations are at a critical juncture. They can move forward or retrogress. Therefore, it is meaningful for top leaders to have discussions of this at this time. (S)

Pu Shouchang (Vice Foreign Minister) then added our discussions were very friendly and Huang Hua echoed this. Huang then goes on, I just now talked with Haig and the contents were very profound. As you are aware, Mr. President, Premier Zhao expounded in detail on Chairman Yeh Jianying's nine points for peaceful reunification, which he made towards the end of September this year. This would welcome Taiwan back into the embrace of the Motherland. The Taiwan question is, in fact, important, and China's recent efforts in this respect have brought about an entirely new situation re Taiwan. The US should use this to thoroughly settle arms sales to Taiwan. It is precisely that proceeding from a view to strengthen Sino-US ties and to develop our strategic set-up against the Soviets that this new policy of ours derives. (S)

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It is in this spirit that we propose talks on settling the Taiwan issue and on settling the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. We do not want to put the United States in a difficult position. It is our desire to promote strategic relations. This is the best time to settle this. You, Mr. President, as a statesman and strategist will seriously handle arms sales to Taiwan in a way favorable to Sino-US relations and our strategic relationship. We believe you will pay attention to the firm basis of Sino-US relations which is based on mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other. It is only on this basis that our relations can progress. (S)

To safeguard the strategic set-up, China has adopted strict measures when the Dutch sold submarines to Taiwan. People cannot accept that China would adopt a double standard. If China adopted a double standard, then the international community would say we bully small countries while fearing big ones. Our dignity will not allow us to do this. Talks between China and the US on the Taiwan issue, particularly US arms sales to Taiwan, began in Cancun and have continued here. I hope they will have fruitful results. (S)

Haig: We have had very extensive talks on this difficult subject and we have much more to say. After I discussed with you the two points raised by the Vice Premier in Cancun, we recognized that there are still differences, but we will continue the discussions. We are looking forward to a positive outcome from this visit and our discussions, and I hope this will be the case. (S)

The President then said: May I add, first, we are pleased that China is stressing peacefully resolving differences between China and Taiwan and we hope this will result in reunification. I am sure Secretary Haig is aware of our position pending that result. We are committed by law and are honor-bound to carry out our laws, the Taiwan Relations Act, which was passed by Congress. This calls for delivery of purely defensive arms. And as you proceed with peaceful efforts there will be a decrease in the need of weapons. But the Soviets are such a great threat to all of us that minor disagreements between the US and China cannot be as important as standing firm in the face of Soviet expansion. (S)

Huang Hua: Being a statesman, you will consider that the obstacle to Sino-US relations is, in fact, arms sales which are not in the overall strategic interest. You will also consider the norms pertaining to relations between our two large countries. These are: mutual respect and non-interference. We hope you can come to a correct understanding of the Chinese position and make decisions favorable to the strategic set-up. There are still differences, and we will not go into details here but will go into them later with Secretary Haig. (S)

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The President: Yes. (C)

Huang Hua: In-depth discussions are called for in order to settle this issue. As long as the US makes its decisions which are responsive to China's demands, the Chinese will act in coordination with you and relations will be smooth. One talk session will not be enough to settle the issue, and we need continuing talks to settle the issue. We point out that while the two sides are meeting in seeking a settlement of arms sales to Taiwan, if the US in defiance of this situation unilaterally makes weapons available to Taiwan, no matter what the level of the arms are, or no matter what the quantity or quality of these arms, or whether they are up to the Carter level of arms, China is bound to act strongly and that relations will stagnate and retrogress cannot be avoided. Just now I mentioned China cannot accept a double standard. In presenting the above attitude, Chinese leaders proceed from a sincere desire to safeguard Sino-US relations and our strategic cooperation against the USSR. (S)

The President: These talks will continue. I want you to know we are sensitive to your needs and will be prudent and discreet with what we have to do. This cannot be settled here, especially when you are due at the Vice President's for lunch. (S)

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~~SECRET~~

# 6354

RECEIVED

81 OCT 2 P 1: 45

JANET COLSON	<u>          </u>		
BUD NANCE	<u>          </u>		
DICK ALLEN	<u>          </u>		
IRENE DERUS	<u>          </u>		
JANET COLSON	<u>          </u>		
BUD NANCE	<u>          </u>		
PETER	<u>          </u>		
CY TO VP	<u>          </u>	SHOW CC	<u>          </u>
CY TO MEESE	<u>          </u>	SHOW CC	<u>          </u>
CY TO BAKER	<u>          </u>	SHOW CC	<u>          </u>
CY TO DEAVER	<u>          </u>	SHOW CC	<u>          </u>
CY TO BRADY	<u>          </u>	SHOW CC	<u>          </u>

Comments:

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 05 NOV 81

10

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

VISIT

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PRES MITTERRAND ON OCT 18 AT WILLIAMSBURG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 09 NOV 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8131267

LOG 8103733

NSCIFID

( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Allen</i>	<i>X 11/00</i>	<i>for decision</i>		
	<i>- 11/13</i>	<i>Allen approved Recum</i>		
<i>Zenz</i>	<i>S 11/13</i>	<i>Notify State</i>	<i>11/13</i>	
	<i>C 11/13</i>	<i>Zenz sgd memo to Bremer</i>		<i>RE</i>

DISPATCH

*11/13 chm*

W/ATTCH FILE

*PA (10)*

*cen*

~~SECRET~~ /NODIS

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: October 18, 1981  
TIME: 4:30 p.m.  
PLACE: Williamsburg

SUBJECT: Meeting between President Reagan and President Mitterrand

## PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.The President  
Vice President Bush  
Secretary Haig  
Richard Allen  
Ambassador-designate  
GalbraithFRANCEPresident Francois Mitterrand  
Foreign Minister Cheysson  
Minister of Defense Hernu  
Ambassador de Laboulaye  
Jacques Attali, Economic Adviser  
to the President

## DISTRIBUTION:

The President asked Secretary Haig to lead off, saying there was no formal agenda for the meeting. The Secretary reviewed the matters discussed at his morning meeting with Mitterrand. (See memcon of that meeting.)

The President then began his exchange with Mitterrand by expressing pleasure at the French decision to participate in the Sinai multinational force. Mitterrand said Italy had also agreed to join and that UK Foreign Secretary Carrington had agreed in principle but was awaiting a final green light from Prime Minister Thatcher. The President and Mitterrand agreed there should be no announcement until the UK was on board.

Mitterrand said security cooperation between France and the U.S. was very strong and would continue to improve. France supports the Reagan Administration's decision to build up its defenses to restore the balance between East and West. Mitterrand noted that there was no difference between the US and French views regarding the need to rebuild Western defenses.

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RDS-3 11/4/01

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NLRR M37111 # 116592  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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The President and Mitterrand agreed that the Sinai turnover should proceed as scheduled and that a delay or default would be disastrous. The President expressed the view that Saudi Arabia should be of help in seeing that the peace process continues.

Mitterrand said he felt the Camp David accords were not adequate to solve matters in the Middle East; some additional work or mechanism is required. It brought about peace between Egypt and Israel, but it is not going to solve the Palestinian problem. France wishes to help. The initiative of Prince Fahd is good even though France does not accept all eight points. They do set the base for further discussions. The President agreed with Mitterrand's analysis of the eight points.

There was a discussion of Arafat. The President asked Mitterrand's view as to whether or not there could be another Palestinian leader to deal with. Mitterrand thought it unlikely. There is a group of West Bank mayors, one of whom Mitterrand has talked to, who was pro-PLO but not inclined toward Arafat. Although Arafat is not a moderate in most uses of the term, he is looked upon as a moderate by most Arabs. Any other Palestinian leader would probably be more radical; Arafat is probably the best we can hope for. The President acknowledged he is prejudiced by Arafat's extreme statements which may have been tailored to fit his constituents.

Mitterrand raised the idea of a small Palestinian state, probably linked with Jordan. He thought this should be explored; Jordan might accept it. Sadat favored this approach. Any support from Arafat will have to be indirect or he will be regarded as selling out. Saudis could be helpful here.

Mitterrand recounted the story of Ben Bella and how the French searched for another Algerian to deal with, but finally were obliged to stick with him.

Mitterrand informed the President that he had been approached by Angolan President dos Santos who said Angola is going broke and needs help. Dos Santos had said that his Soviet allies were unwilling to provide economic assistance.

Mitterrand said he was convinced that several commodities markets are rigged by a few inside speculators who are making money at the expense of Third World commodity producers. He cited the case of coffee as told him by Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Mitterrand said he knew Houphouet-Boigny well, since 1944 or 1945.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

13

Mitterrand thought this was an area where we and France might be of useful service to some Third World producers. It would be something concrete to come from Cancun, for example, if we agreed to look into a price support system for raw materials prices. Mitterrand said we cannot just hand over money and watch it dissipate.

Mitterrand said he had received a letter from Tom Clausen of the World Bank which set forth several possible solutions to the Third World energy problem. He urged the President to review this.

As for Global Negotiations, Mitterrand said the G and the N should both be lower case. We don't want a new institution but we must be seen to be willing to help. Mitterrand said the President won at Ottawa by retreating as the French did in the Marne in 1914, but any retreat had to be carefully done. Schmidt would be helpful; nobody in the West wanted to create or adopt a mechanism or an institution to hand over money.

Mitterrand said Cancun would last for 2-1/2 days and there would be 22 speakers. There would be little time for discussion, and no time for decisions. A good positive tone setting out a willingness to do something was the best the West could do. We must not let the Soviets benefit from a split between the Third World and the West.

The President said he would listen at Cancun and set forth some views. He wanted to help the Third World to help themselves, citing the success stories of South Korea (versus North Korea), Singapore, etc. He also cited our Caribbean Plan. The President said he was pleased to hear Mitterrand's views on Global Negotiations. They should not be a euphemism for handouts. The President referred to a few of the positive things he would say at Cancun.

Mitterrand said he and the President were not far apart on Cancun. They would help each other. The President welcomed French help.

Mitterrand noted that in November representatives of approximately 20 African states would be in France for a Francophone summit. Only five or six African leaders would not be able to attend this meeting.

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-4-

14

Mitterrand said France was going to renew relations with Madagascar. Mitterrand had told their "progressive" leader that the Soviet base must first go and the leader agreed.

The President pointed out that the Marshall Plan had worked because the countries could help themselves. Many in the Third World cannot; they don't have developed markets. We have a difficult problem and our record of success through economic assistance is spotty.

Mitterrand said Papandreou is difficult, proud, manic depressive, intelligent, cultivated and patient. He is not an adventurist and one can speak with him. Mitterrand said he knows him and will try to fortify his sense of responsibility.

Mitterrand said more than once that we should not be upset if he differs with us publicly. Disagreement does not mean indictment. France recognizes that alliance with the US is essential for France. Nevertheless, France will continue to pursue an independent foreign policy.

~~SECRET~~

*Carol*  
*where are*  
*the copies*  
*at. al.*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10 November, 1981

To: Jim Rentschler *Allen*

From: Allen Lenz *Allen*

Please revise the memo to Bremer to include the request cited in Janet's note.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Allen Key

① No memo or  
summary of  
morning meeting  
has been received here.

② memo to Bremer  
should request it.

③ RIM won't have time to  
review in detail. If  
Jim says it's A, it probably is A

MEMORANDUM

6510  
*efh*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 12, 1981

17

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN *J.W.*

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: October 18 Memcon of Reagan-Mitterrand Meeting  
in Williamsburg, Virginia

State has provided a memorandum of conversation covering the President's October 18 p.m. meeting in Williamsburg with French President Francois Mitterrand (Tab A). If you approve, the material can be returned to State with White House clearance; the memo from Allen Lenz to Bremer at Tab I has been prepared for that purpose.

Note that the memcon refers to an earlier summary covering a morning meeting on October 18 between the same principals; I have not seen such a memcon and have not yet been able to identify anyone who has.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review the attached memcon, clear it, with whatever changes may be appropriate, and authorize Allen Lenz to sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I Memo to L. Paul Bremer  
A - Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*RW 8/15/11*

6510

NODIS

S/S 8131267  
XR S/S 8130815



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

18

UNCLASSIFIED  
(with ~~SECRET~~/NODIS attachment)

November 5, 1981

81 NOV 5 PJ0: 27

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation Between  
President Reagan and President  
Mitterrand

Attached for your clearance is the memorandum of  
conversation between President Reagan and French President  
Mitterrand which took place at Williamsburg.

*L. Paul Bremer III*  
L. Paul Bremer III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Memcon with President

UNCLASSIFIED  
(WITH ~~SECRET~~/NODIS attachment)

RW  
8/15/81

NODIS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of October 18 Meeting Between  
the President and Mitterrand at Williamsburg

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard V. Allen has reviewed and approved the October 18 memorandum of conversation covering the President's October 18 (p.m.) meeting in Williamsburg between the President and French President Francois Mitterrand. This memo conveys formal White House clearance on a close-hold basis.

Allen J. Lenz  
Staff Director

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT

RW  
8/15/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

November 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of October 18 Meeting Between the  
President and Mitterrand at Williamsburg

The NSC staff has reviewed and approved the October 18 memorandum of conversation covering the President's October 18 (p.m.) meeting in Williamsburg between the President and French President Francois Mitterrand. This memo conveys formal White House clearance on a close-hold basis, but at the same time requests a copy of the earlier memcon (presumably covering the President's luncheon meeting with Mitterrand) referred to in the first paragraph of the attachment. The White House has not received any summary of that meeting.

  
Allen J. Lenz  
Staff Director

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

AWO  
9/15/11

RECEIVED

81 NOV 9 A 9: 20

JANET COLSON \_\_\_\_\_

BUD NANCE \_\_\_\_\_

DICK ALLEN \_\_\_\_\_

IRENE DERUS \_\_\_\_\_

JANET COLSON \_\_\_\_\_

BUD NANCE \_\_\_\_\_

PETER \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO VP \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO MEESE \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BAKER \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO DEAVER \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BRADY \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

Comments:

TO PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 13 NOV 81

22

**URGENT**

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST SAUDI ARABIA HABIB, PHILIP  
SYRIA AP  
CM

SUBJECT: TIMING SCOPE & OBJECTIVES OF HABIB NEXT MISSION TO MIDDLE EAST  
27 NOV

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 13 NOV 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
KEMP	FEITH	TANTER
		TYSON
		COLSON
		LENZ

COMMENTS *please observe 3hr turnaround*

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( D / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>KA</i>	<i>IV 11/13</i>	<i>La</i>	<i>Info</i>	
<i>Pres</i>	<i>P 11/20</i>	<i>for decision</i>		
	<i>11/23</i>	<i>Pres apvd recom</i>		<i>SK, CT</i>
<i>RT</i>	<i>S 11/24</i>	<i>Weno Allen to King</i>	<i>11/25</i>	
<i>RUAD</i> <i>Tanker</i>	<i>X 11/24</i> <i>12/1</i>	<i>For Signature</i> <i>for further action, per Colson</i>	<i>11/27</i> <i>12/2</i>	
DISPATCH	<i>C 12/8</i>	<i>W/ATTCH FILE</i> <i>W/ATTCH FILE</i>		<i>HA (C)</i> <i>RA</i> <i>dam</i>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

RW 8/15/11

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MODE

PAGES four

23

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DACOM # 48-SB

24 - RANL11

RELEASER DA

DEX # \_\_\_\_\_

DTG 251445Z NOV 81

TTY # \_\_\_\_\_

FROM/LOCATION/

1. Situation Room

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

- 1. Military Aide for the President / Ranch / TOR 251458Z
- 2. Mr. Deaver / Santa Barbara /
- 3. \_\_\_\_\_
- 4. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

- 1. \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Ranch: Deliver w/ morning ~~ATTACHMENT~~ package.  
 S.B: Deliver ASAP w/o

DACOM BACK TO RICHARD DARMAN - NO SPECIM MADE - "CALL REMARKS" MADE - Kline

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

1981 OCT 25 10 45

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PRESERVATION CLASSIFICATION COLLECTION RD/FRD NATO SAP

FROM:

Collection Exec. Sec., NSC: Subject File

Series \_\_\_\_\_

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # Memorandums of Conversation - President Reagan (11/02/81 - 11/13/81)

Box Number 49

Description of Material:

- memo, Richard Allen to RR, re. recommended telephone call to Amb. Philip Habib, 11/25/81, 1 pg.

TO:

Collection: Historical File

Series: \_\_\_\_\_

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # \_\_\_\_\_

Box Number: \_\_\_\_\_

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MEMORANDUM

6633 add-on

24

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

November 25, 1981

*Call memo  
RR*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*  
SUBJECT: Recommended Telephone Call  
to Ambassador Philip Habib  
Wednesday, November 25  
between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 Noon  
(California Time)

Attached at Tab A are talking points and background information for a recommended telephone call to Phil Habib. He will be departing for the Middle East as your personal envoy on Friday, November 27.

RECOMMENDATION

That you telephone Phil Habib.

RR Approve  
\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

Attachment

Tab A - Talking Points

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

*aw 11/25/81*  
cc: Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

**Historical File**

116593

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

6633 Add-on

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

25

DECLASSIFIED

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

NLR #116593  
M371/1

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/85

TO: Ambassador Philip Habib

DATE/TIME/  
PLACE: November 25, 1981, between 11:00 a.m.  
and 12:00 Noon (California Time), when  
Habib will be with Secretary Haig in  
the Secretary's Office

RECOMMENDED BY: Richard V. Allen

PURPOSE: To reaffirm your commitment to the  
Habib Mission.

BACKGROUND: Habib successfully defused a missile  
crisis between Israel and Syria during  
May, helped effect a ceasefire between  
Christians and Syrians in June, and  
facilitated a cessation of hostilities  
along the Israel-Lebanon border during  
July. Since tensions are growing, it  
is opportune for Habib to make another  
trip as your personal envoy.

TALKING POINTS: Itinerary. It is my understanding that  
you intend to make only one stop in each  
country--Lebanon, Syria, Saudia Arabia,  
Israel and Jordan--before returning to  
Washington. Depending upon what you  
discover, I may want you to return after  
the New Year. (C)

Ceasefire in Lebanon. We believe that  
the ceasefire is in everyone's interest.  
Please underscore our view with all  
leaders you meet. (C)

Israel

-- Please reaffirm to Prime Minister Begin  
what I said to him during his visit: Israel  
should not unilaterally break the ceasefire  
unless there is a clear provocation from  
the Palestinians. (C)

-- Phil, you should reaffirm to Begin that  
removal of the surface-to-air-missiles Syria  
introduced into the Bekaa Valley last spring.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review 11/24/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Historical File

remains the most important objective of your mission. We believe, however, that the presence of the Syrian missiles in the Bekaa is not, in itself, sufficient provocation to break the ceasefire at this time. (C)

Saudi Arabia. We are gratified by Saudi Arabia's commitment to help resolve problems in Lebanon and believe it is very important that the Saudis remain actively engaged in the Lebanese peace process. If you can do so, solicit help again from the Saudis in working to resolve the missile problem. (C)

Jordan. We are very pleased with King Hussein's visit. Please tell the King this and reiterate my strong belief that we can work together constructively to reduce tensions in the area. (C)

Syria. Is it true that there is some possibility that the Syrians have become suspicious and may not agree to receive you on this trip? I hope, of course, that the Saudis can intercede on our behalf with the Syrians. (C)

Date of Submission November 25, 1981

Action Call made

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

November 25, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*  
SUBJECT: Recommended Telephone Call  
to Ambassador Philip Habib  
Wednesday, November 25  
between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 Noon  
(California Time)

Attached at Tab A are talking points and background information for a recommended telephone call to Phil Habib. He will be departing for the Middle East as your personal envoy on Friday, November 27.

RECOMMENDATION

That you telephone Phil Habib.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve  
\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

Attachment

Tab A - Talking Points

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

*RW 8/15/11*  
cc: Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

116594

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

6633 Add-on

28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 #116594

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

BY RW NARA DATE 4/22/15

TO: Ambassador Philip Habib

DATE/TIME/  
PLACE: November 25, 1981, between 11:00 a.m.  
and 12:00 Noon (California Time), when  
Habib will be with Secretary Haig in  
the Secretary's Office

RECOMMENDED BY: Richard V. Allen

PURPOSE: To reaffirm your commitment to the  
Habib Mission.

BACKGROUND: Habib successfully defused a missile  
crisis between Israel and Syria during  
May, helped effect a ceasefire between  
Christians and Syrians in June, and  
facilitated a cessation of hostilities  
along the Israel-Lebanon border during  
July. Since tensions are growing, it  
is opportune for Habib to make another  
trip as your personal envoy.

TALKING POINTS: Itinerary. It is my understanding that  
you intend to make only one stop in each  
country--Lebanon, Syria, Saudia Arabia,  
Israel and Jordan--before returning to  
Washington. Depending upon what you  
discover, I may want you to return after  
the New Year. (C)

Ceasefire in Lebanon. We believe that  
the ceasefire is in everyone's interest.  
Please underscore our view with all  
leaders you meet. (C)

Israel

-- Please reaffirm to Prime Minister Begin  
what I said to him during his visit: Israel  
should not unilaterally break the ceasefire  
unless there is a clear provocation from  
the Palestinians. (C)

-- Phil, you should reaffirm to Begin that  
removal of the surface-to-air-missiles Syria  
introduced into the Bekaa Valley last spring

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review 11/24/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

remains the most important objective of your mission. We believe, however, that the presence of the Syrian missiles in the Bekaa is not, in itself, sufficient provocation to break the ceasefire at this time. (C)

Saudi Arabia. We are gratified by Saudi Arabia's commitment to help resolve problems in Lebanon and believe it is very important that the Saudis remain actively engaged in the Lebanese peace process. If you can do so, solicit help again from the Saudis in working to resolve the missile problem. (C)

Jordan. We are very pleased with King Hussein's visit. Please tell the King this and reiterate my strong belief that we can work together constructively to reduce tensions in the area. (C)

Syria. Is it true that there is some possibility that the Syrians have become suspicious and may not agree to receive you on this trip? I hope, of course, that the Saudis can intercede on our behalf with the Syrians. (C)

Date of Submission November 25, 1981

Action \_\_\_\_\_

954

MEMORANDUM

6633 Add-on #2

UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WITH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ATTACHMENT

30

ACTION

November 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *cp*

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Recommended Presidential Telephone Call  
to Ambassador Philip Habib

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum  
to the President recommending a telephone call to  
Phil Habib.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*RT for*  
Geoff Kemp concurs.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to President  
A Talking Points

*Copy to*  
*Mull*  
*Baker*  
*Heaver (in Calif)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

*RW 8/15/11*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

12/1  
6633  
address #1

Ray Lantier

Is this OBT'd?

J:  
yes

In need for  
update?

NO

JMB

116595

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

6633 Add-on #1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

agf

32

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

November 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission (U)

At Tab I for your signature is a memorandum to the Secretary of State. It informs the Secretary that the President approves the Secretary's memorandum of November 13 concerning timing, objectives, and plan for the next Habib Mission. (U)

The Secretary implies that Phil Habib may seek to allay Prime Minister Begin's apprehensions concerning Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's eight-point plan in addition to facilitating the peace process for Lebanon. (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I communicating the President's approval of the Secretary of State's timing, objectives, and plan for Lebanon. It questions the advisability of Habib discussing the Saudi plan.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Alternatively, that you sign the memorandum at Tab II. It more strongly states the President's doubts as to whether the Secretary's instructing Habib to discuss the Saudi plan is advisable.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*RT for*  
Geoff Kemp concurs.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to SecState
- II Alternative memo to SecState

~~SECRET~~  
Review 11/24/87

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M37111 # 116595  
BY *RW* NARA DATE *6/22/15*

116596

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

6633

33

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission (U)

The President approves the recommendation in your memorandum of November 13, 1981 concerning the next Habib mission. He approves the timing and objectives for the next mission. The President reaffirms his approval of your Plan of Action for Lebanon. (S)

The President has some doubts as to whether you intend to instruct Phil Habib to discuss Fahd's eight-point plan in addition to facilitating the peace process for Lebanon. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Review 11/24/87

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

EXEMPT M37111 #116596  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

116597

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

6633

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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission (U)

The President approves the recommendation in your memorandum of November 13, 1981 concerning the next Habib mission. He approves the timing and objectives for the next mission. The President reaffirms his approval of your Plan of Action for Lebanon. (S)

The President questions whether it is advisable for Phil to get into discussions about the Saudi plan in addition to facilitating the peace process for Lebanon. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Review 11/24/87

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M37111 # 116597  
BY RW REVIS DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

116598

MEMORANDUM

6633

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1981

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

35

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Duke*

SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission

At Tab A is a memorandum from Al Haig requesting your approval for the timing and objectives for the next Habib Mission. Al proposes that Phil Habib visit the Middle East in December and that he meet with you prior to departure. Although Al originally recommended November 23-25, he has now advised us by phone that he will not be able to be in California at that time and, therefore, will be recommending different dates at a later time.

While there is still a need to induce Israel to refrain from military action, it is very important not to overlook your commitment to Prime Minister Begin -- that we will work hard to get the Syrian missiles out of Lebanon. Al's plan is to work on the Saudis and Syrians to effect a basic change in the political-military situation within Lebanon that would reduce Syria's need to have missiles in Lebanon.

Al also suggests that Phil Habib seek to allay Begin's concerns about Crown Prince Fahd's eight point plan. Lebanon's problems are so difficult, however, that it may be best to refrain from mixing Lebanon with the wider Arab-Israel peace process.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the request at Tab A for the overall planning for Habib's next mission.

Approve ✓ RR

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~  
DRV CL BY STATE  
REVIEW 11/11/01

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M3711 # 116598  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED

11 NOV 13 12:29

~~SECRET~~

36

NODIS

November 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. ~~AMH~~  
SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission

THE ISSUE

Your approval is needed with regard to the timing, scope, and objectives of Phil Habib's next trip to the Middle East.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Timing. It would be best to send Phil to the area after the forthcoming Arab Summit in Morocco, November 25-26. While Phil would be ready to travel before the summit, Lebanon and other friends in the area have suggested that a trip before the Arab Summit would be viewed as unwelcome pressure in some quarters. On the other hand, the Israelis have been indicating their impatience with certain area developments and the failure of Habib to return. Assuming you agree to a Habib trip after the summit (and Thanksgiving here), we would want to alert the Israelis to our planning as soon as possible.

Meeting with You. It is important that Phil have a short meeting with you in the period November 23-25, so that he can proceed to the area the day following Thanksgiving (Friday, November 27).

Basic Objectives. It is important that we not raise expectations of any major breakthrough during Habib's visit. Our underlying--but unspoken--objective should be to defuse Israeli interests in exercising the military option in Lebanon while he works on the Saudis and Syrians to help bring about basic changes in the political and security situation. This would supplement efforts we have been making recently to induce the Palestinians--through the help of the UN--to remove their heavy weapons out of range of Israel. The PLO is considering the UN proposal; their acceptance could open the way for future progress.

~~SECRET~~

RDS-1,2,3 11/11/01

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 #116599

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

37

Public Position. We believe a low-key public position along the following lines would be suitable:

"The U.S. is pleased that the Lebanon-Israel area has remained relatively quiet and stable since the July cessation of hostilities. The U.S. remains committed to reinforcing that situation. For that reason, the President has asked Ambassador Philip Habib to return to the region to determine how the U.S. could be helpful in reducing tensions further and in improving basic conditions in Lebanon."

Possible Complications. The Arab Summit probably will produce statements or resolutions on the Lebanon problem as well as on Fahd's eight-point peace plan. Phil will be in a good position to allay Begin's possible concerns.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you agree to the foregoing planning, as well as to a short meeting with Phil in the period Monday, November 23 through Wednesday, November 25.

Approve ✓ RA Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

November 18, 1981

38

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON *CPT*

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting Between The President  
and Ambassador Philip Habib

Inasmuch as the President will be in California during the requested time frame (of which State was aware) -- I spoke to Mike Deaver about this proposed meeting to alert him to that fact. His response was that the President wants very much to meet with Habib -- and that it could be worked in the President's schedule in California for a meeting at the Ranch.

You may want to make a note of this for your own scheduling purposes next week.

*Gene*  
*OBE'd meeting not*  
*going to be held in California.*  
*J*

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

*RW*  
*8/15/11*

*af*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

39

ACTION

November 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memo for the President transmitting Secretary Haig's incoming at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

*To be amended  
per conversation  
with Chuck  
Syon 11/19*

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- A Memorandum to the President from Haig

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*RW  
8/15/11*

#6633

RECEIVED

81 NOV 13 P 8: 06

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

*[Handwritten signature]*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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*OFF'D*

*Final Staffing  
memo has  
come in.*

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

*[Handwritten signature]*  
11/19/81

Comments:

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED  
SECRET ATTACHMENTS

41

ACTION

November 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CPT*

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting Between the President  
and Ambassador Philip Habib

At Tab I, for your signature, is a memorandum to Michael Deaver proposing a meeting between the President and Phil Habib. At Tab A is a Schedule Outline from Mike Deaver to Joe Canzeri and Greg Newell. The incoming from Secretary Haig to the President is at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Deaver at Tab I and transmit the Schedule Outline.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - Memo to Deaver
- Tab A - Schedule Outline
- Tab B - Haig Memorandum to the President

UNCLASSIFIED  
SECRET ATTACHMENTS

*RW*  
*8/15/11*

*BB'd  
per Chuck Tyson;  
meeting will not  
take place in  
California.*

116600

6633

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

42

~~SECRET~~  
ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE DEEVER

FROM: DICK ALLEN *Dick*

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting of the President with  
Ambassador Philip Habib During the Period  
of November 23-25

At Tab A, for your signature, is a Schedule Outline for Joe Canzeri and Greg Newell. Al Haig requests a meeting with the President for Phil Habib, who is scheduled to resume his Mission as the President's Personal Emissary. Al's request is at Tab B.

There is a growing danger that Israel's patience is wearing thin regarding Syria's missiles in Lebanon. Also, the Lebanon-Israel border may heat up as a result of Palestinian reinforcements during the lull in fighting.

It is necessary for the Habib Mission to make another attempt to defuse tensions that might lead to war between Israel and Syria and to renew efforts to keep the Lebanon-Israel border quiet. Meanwhile, the political process led by the Saudis seeks to alter the political-military situation in Lebanon. State hopes that a gradual change in the situation may reduce Syria's need to have its missiles in Lebanon.

Before each trip to the area, Phil has met with the President. It is essential that Phil continue to be perceived as the President's envoy. Unfortunately, however, State proposes only November 23-25, a time in which the President plans to be in California.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting in principle, sign, and forward the Schedule Outline to Canzeri and Newell at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab A - Schedule Outline
- Tab B - Memo from Haig to the President

~~SECRET~~

**DECLASSIFIED**  
NLRR M3711C# 116600  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

**THE WHITE HOUSE**

WASHINGTON

43

SCHEDULE OUTLINE

TO: JOE CANZERI  
GREG NEWELL

FROM: MIKE DEAVER

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Philip Habib

PURPOSE: To reinforce Ambassador Habib's image as the President's envoy concerning Lebanon and to discuss Secretary Haig's plan of action regarding Lebanon.

BACKGROUND: Syria's missiles in Lebanon remain a source of tension that could spark a war between Israel and Syria.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: This will be the fifth visit of Phil Habib with the President, the last of which was on July 27.

DATE: During the November 23-25 period so that Habib can depart November 27.

LOCATION:

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Secretary Haig, Ambassador Philip Habib, Richard V. Allen and Raymond Tanter, NSC

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: 30-minute meeting

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunity before the meeting with a brief statement by Habib and the Secretary to the press after the meeting; visit will be announced.

RECOMMENDED BY: Dick Allen

OPPOSED BY: None

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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SECRET/NODIS ATTACHMENTINFORMATION

November 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*  
SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission: Interim Report

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President on the next Habib mission. In view of the late hour (1630, Friday) and the fact that it contains sensitive and controversial suggestions, I will be providing you with a detailed memorandum for transmittal to the President first thing on Monday morning.

Attachment

Tab I Haig memorandum to the President dated 11/13/81

SECRET/NODIS ATTACHMENT*RW*  
*8/15/14*

~~SECRET~~

116601

MEMORANDUM

6633

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

45

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Jik*  
SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission

At Tab A is a memorandum from Al Haig requesting your approval for the timing and objectives for the next Habib Mission.

Al proposes that Phil Habib visit the Middle East in December and that he ~~must~~ meet with you during the period November 23-25.

*quit to his departure. although he originally recommended November 23-25, he has now advised us by phone that ~~he will~~ he will not be able to be in California at that time & perhaps will be recommended different dates at a later time.*

While there is still a need to induce Israel to refrain from military action, it is very important not to overlook your commitment to Prime Minister Begin -- that we will work hard to get the Syrian missiles out of Lebanon. Al's plan is to work on the Saudis and Syrians to effect a basic change in the political-military situation within Lebanon that would reduce Syria's need to have missiles in Lebanon.

Al also suggests that Phil Habib seek to allay Begin's concerns about Crown Prince Fahd's eight point plan. Lebanon's problems are so difficult, however, that it may be best to refrain from mixing Lebanon with the wider Arab-Israel peace process.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
Under separate cover, via Mike Deaver, I am recommending a meeting between you and Phil Habib.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the request at Tab A for the overall planning for Habib's next mission.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~  
DRV CL BY STATE  
REVIEW 11/11/01

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711# 116601

BY *RW* NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

6633 addon  
11

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSC/S:

I assume the original Haig  
memo has not yet gotten to  
us?

Kathy, 11/17

I am assuming that the original  
is w/RVA in the interim  
pkg that was sent to him  
11/16/81

dsm 11/17/81

---

Allen Lenz

Good copy of what Ausident  
specifically ignored.

*Janet*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

30 NOVEMBER

1540 hr

JANET,

The attached original pkg bearing the P's "RR" was in the action folder I had on file on this. Is that what you are asking Allen Lenz for? (why it wasn't attached when pkg came over is beyond me). If this isn't what you need, let me know.

jcp

~~SECRET~~

116602

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MEMORANDUM

6633

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1981

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Duke*

SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission

At Tab A is a memorandum from Al Haig requesting your approval for the timing and objectives for the next Habib Mission. Al proposes that Phil Habib visit the Middle East in December and that he meet with you prior to departure. Although Al originally recommended November 23-25, he has now advised us by phone that he will not be able to be in California at that time and, therefore, will be recommending different dates at a later time.

While there is still a need to induce Israel to refrain from military action, it is very important not to overlook your commitment to Prime Minister Begin -- that we will work hard to get the Syrian missiles out of Lebanon. Al's plan is to work on the Saudis and Syrians to effect a basic change in the political-military situation within Lebanon that would reduce Syria's need to have missiles in Lebanon.

Al also suggests that Phil Habib seek to allay Begin's concerns about Crown Prince Fahd's eight point plan. Lebanon's problems are so difficult, however, that it may be best to refrain from mixing Lebanon with the wider Arab-Israel peace process.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the request at Tab A for the overall planning for Habib's next mission.

Approve *RR*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

DRV CL BY STATE  
REVIEW 11/11/01

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 # 116602

BY *RW* NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED

81 NOV 17 P 1: 48

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

