Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

Folder: Memorandums of Conversation-President Reagan (08/09/1982) Box: 50

To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW

8/24/2011

File Folder

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT

FOIA

REAGAN (08/09/1982)

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number

50

JAUVERT/BROWER

					16	
ID Doc Type	Docu	ıment Descriptio	on	No of Pages		Restrictions
117231 MEMCON		RESIDENT'S MEE TER YIZHAK SH	TING WITH FOREIGN AMIR	4	8/2/1982	B1
	R	6/22/2015	M371/			
117232 MEMO	FROM SHAM		K RE. MEETING WITH	2	8/2/1982	B1
	R	6/22/2015	M371/			
117233 TALKING PTS.		EETING WITH SE OC. 117232]	HAMIR [ATTACHED	2	ND	B1
	R	6/22/2015	M371/			
117234 TALKING PTS.		RE. MEETING WITH SHAMIR [SAME TEXT AND ATTACHED TO DOC. 117233]		1	ND	B1
	R	6/22/2015	M371/			
117235 REPORT				. 1	2/15/1977	B1 B3
	D	8/30/2012	M371/1			
117236 REPORT				2	3/12/1980	B1 B3
	PAR	8/30/2012	M371/1			
117237 REPORT		:		1	6/26/1979	B1 B3
	D	8/30/2012	M371/1			
117238 TALKING PTS.				1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy ((b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW

8/24/2011

File Folder

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT

FOIA

REAGAN (08/09/1982)

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number

50

JAUVERT/BROWER

BOX NUITIBEI	50		JAU 16	VER1/BROWER
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117239 MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YIZHAK SHAMIR [COPY OF DOC, 117231]	4	8/2/1982	B1
•	R 6/22/2015 M371/			
117240 CABLE	STATE 213728 R 6/22/2015 M371/	5	7/31/1982	B1
117242 MEMO	GEOFFREY KEMP/HOWARD TEICHER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHAMIR	1	7/30/1982	B1
	R 6/22/2015 M371/			
117244 MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR RE. LEBANON AND RR'S TALK WITH SHAMIR	2	8/1/1982	B1
	R 6/22/2015 M371/			
117246 MEMO	PAUL BREMER TO CLARK RE. APPOINTMENT REQUEST FOR PRESIDENT FROM SHAMIR	1	7/27/1982	B1
	R 6/22/2015 M371/			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

National Ser rity Council 187 The White House Package # 5435 APP

	82 A	₿2 pg	: 47.	
		QUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindex	ter _		***************************************	
Bud McFarlan	ie _		-m	
Jacque Hill				
Judge Clark				
John Poindex	ter _			www.comedicarrented.comedicarrente.com
Staff Secretar	у		Mwg	
Sit Room				
I-Information	Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch	N-No further Action
DISTRIBUTION				
cc: VP	Meese	Baker De	eaver Othe	· ·
		COMMENTS	3	



no folder % modarlane approved recom

5435

MEMORANDUM

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 9, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHARL O. WHEELER

FROM:

HOWARD J. TEICHER

SUBJECT:

Memcon for the President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel,

August 2, 1982

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Bremer transmitting the subject memcon.

Attachments

Tab I - Memo to Bremer A - Shamir Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET **ATTACHMENT**

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5435

August 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III

Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT:

Memcon for the President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel,

August 2, 1982

Per your request, we are forwarding the approved subject memcon for your information.

Michael O. Wheeler Staff Secretary

5435

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

Summary of the President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ronald Reagan Vice President George Bush Secretary of State George Shultz Edwin Meese, III, Counsellor to the President

James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff and

Assistant to the President

William P. Clark, Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

Robert C. McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Sam Lewis, State

Nicholas Veliotes, Assistant Secretary for

NEA, State

Ambassador Richard Fairbanks, State

Geoffrey Kemp, NSC

Howard Teicher, NSC (Notetaker)

Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir Ambassador Moshe Arens Deputy Director General Chanan Bar-On Minister Jacob Neuhushtan Yosef Ben-Aharon

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE:


Monday, August 2, 1982; 9:45-10:10 a.m.;

The Cabinet Room

SECRET

Review on August 2, 2012 Extended by William P. Clark Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13 (a) (f)





SECRET

SECRET

MINUTES

President Reagan said I want to discuss the situation in West Beirut where successive breaches of the cease-fire are making it impossible for Phil Habib to reach agreement for departure of the PLO. At the outset, let me make clear my full support for Ambassador Habib personally and for his mission. want to reaffirm the central components of U.S. policy toward Lebanon: strong central government, territorial integrity of Lebanon, and the removal of all foreign forces. Of the greatest significance to the success of our policy is the removal of the PLO from Beirut by diplomatic means. The concept of a cease-fire is becoming discredited by disproportionate Israeli bombing and artillery attacks which are not only extracting unacceptable human costs, but are making negotiations impossible. Israel's massive attacks go far beyond any possible retaliation and the periodic cutoff of electricity, water, food, and medical supplies have entailed severe diplomatic and humanitarian costs. Should Israeli practice continue, it will become increasingly difficult to defend the proposition that Israeli use of U.S. arms is for defense purposes. Furthermore, I want to reiterate what I said to Prime Minister Begin: that an Israeli invasion of Beirut would have grievous consequences for U.S.-Israeli relations. Now let me reassure you that we are prepared to help Israel in Lebanon. But our help must be matched by greater Israeli flexibility and understanding for the consequences of Israeli actions for U.S. interests in the Middle East. Finally, please inform Prime Minister Begin of my strong views on this issue. We must come to the diplomatic table for a solution and not through the use of military means. The slaughter of innocent civilians must stop.

Shamir extended greetings from Prime Minister Begin and thanks for the birthday note. The Government of Israel admires President Reagan's strong leadership and toughness. We have common goals of defeating PLO terrorism. We have to cooperate in achieving these goals. With regard to Habib, the GOI is also interested in Habib's success in finding a diplomatic solution. Israel does not want any more blood shed. PLO won't leave unless they are convinced that they have no choice but to leave. They will use the negotiations to procrastinate. If we are interested in a peaceful solution, we must warn them and make them understand that there is no alternative to their departure. Israel always prefers a diplomatic There are no differences between us on this. Turning to the cease-fire, we were the first to proclaim a cease-fire. But the PLO never accepted it. They are taking advantage of it to kill our soldiers. Israel cannot tolerate this. The ceasefire must be absolute and total. If the PLO accepts it, we will honor it. It is not in our interest to fight. But we have sensitive information that the PLO leadership are not intending to leave Beirut. They are determined to continue discussions but not to leave. Pardon my insults, but we have





intercepted their remarks, saying that they need Habib only for ensuring a supply of water and electricity. In the next few days they will use Habib and the President to help remove garbage from West Beirut. The PLO is far from ready to leave. There is no other way to make them understand than through pressure. The Prime Minister instructed me to say that he begs you not to accept advice which calls for Habib to conduct negotiations with the PLO in the same house. This would be counterproductive and interpreted as a step by the United States in the direction of recognition of the PLO. This would be contrary to U.S. commitments. We understand that it would be more convenient for Habib's negotiations but Habib must not be in the same house. For our cooperation we ask for this U.S. position. Furthermore, we don't think that cease-fire breaches are stopping Israel is ready at any and all times to honor the negotiations. But the current situation must not last forever. The Prime Minister has ordered water and other things to be allowed in. The population is suffering. The situation must be brought to an end as soon as possible. We ask your cooperation to reach a quick solution. The accomplishment of our goals in Lebanon will lead to a new political solution that will create new horizons and opportunities for peace. Lebanon will become part of the free world without Syrian or PLO domination. U.S. has the most important position in the region. It is as if the Soviet Union does not exist, thanks to the removal of the I hope you understand our position. Let us cooperate to achieve these goals.

President Reagan answered that in reality Russia has profited the most from recent events in Beirut. I understand the need to return fire, but in modern society a policeman chasing a criminal does not fire into a crowd to apprehend him. The nature of Israeli retaliation, 15 hours of other means. bombing, is excessive. The fact that the PLO shoots first is lost on world opinion. The television is showing the human results of the use of phosphorous bombs: burned babies, such as the seven-month old baby with its arms burned off. This benefits the Soviet Union. Perhaps they instigate the PLO to take a few shots in order to bring on a holocaust. Even if it entails some sacrifice, Israel should show greater forbearance. We understand your concerns regarding Habib not being in the same house with the PLO. There will be no contact with Arafat. An adjacent building is okay. The arrangements are still to be worked out. But you must know that there is an erosion in the Congress and among the American public of the warm U.S. support for Israel. This could eventually be reflected in our policies and their support for them.

Shamir answered with thanks for agreeing that Habib will not be in the same building as the PLO. Public opinion has a short memory. People forget what the PLO has done to the Israeli people. They also forget that Israel gave up Sinai for the sake of peace. Israel can be generous and moderate. But on Beirut, we have to take a firm position to put an end to this situation as quickly as possible. There needs to be a solution that will

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

be good for the U.S. Shamir then turned to the U.S. letter in response to the Franco-Egyptian draft in the UN Security Council. Israel is worried that the U.S. may be trying to change UNSC Resolution 242. Israel sees danger for the future of negotiations. We don't believe it is productive or useful to link the PLO and Beirut to the peace process and Israel's problems with the other Arabs. Israel is eager to resume peace talks and has plans to discuss. But first of all we must finish the Beirut problem. Regarding the use of U.S. arms, Israel is using all its arms, including those from other countries, only for defensive purposes. Israel is eager for peace.

President Reagan said there has been no change in our position on 242. Secretary Shultz will take up the UN issue in the afternoon. He stated that he had to leave shortly on a trip so time was up. Thanked the Minister for the opportunity to exchange views.

Prepared by Howard J. Teicher





5435 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET
ATTACHMENT

August 2, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

HOWARD J. TEICHER 197

SUBJECT:

Memcon for President's Meeting with

Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel

Please review and approve the subject memcon for file.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A.

APPROVE (

DISAPPROVE

Attachment

Tab A - Memcon for Shamir Meeting with the President

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET POON (NO. 1)

10

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5435 Add-on

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET
ATTACHMENT

August 2, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

HOWARD J. TEICHER

SUBJECT:

Memcon for President's Meeting with

Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel

Please review and approve the subject memcon for file.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A.

PROVE DISAPPROVE

Attachment

Tab A - Memcon for Shamir Meeting with the President

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET () () () () ATTACHMENT

NSC/S PROFILE ID 8205435 RECEIVED 27 JUL 82 12 DOCDATE 27 JUL 82 FROM BREMER CLARK WHEELER 29 JUL 82 29 JUL 82 SADLEIR, W AP . SHAMIR, YITZHAK KEYWORDS: ISRAEL LEBANON SYRIA SAUDI ARABIA SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR FOMIN SHAMIR W/ PRES 2 AUG & MEMCON OF MTG ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 04 AUG 82 STATUS C FILES PA FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO KEMP TYSON TANTER NORTH COMMENTS LOG 8204588 8205012 NSCIFID REF# 8221918 (H/N) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED COPIES TO ACTION OFFICER (S) W/ATTCH

DC/DE EROF IND	SC #S	PROFILE
	DC/ Da	r mr.
		*.

ID 8205435

TO

CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 27 JUL 82 /2

RECEIVED 27 JUL 82 12

WHEELER

29 JUL 🕰

SADLEIR, W

29 JUL 82

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

AP

SHAMIR, YITZHAK

LEBANON

SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR FOMIN SHAMIR W/ PRES 2 AUG & MEMCON OF MTG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 04 AUG 82 STATUS X/P FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

TANTER

TYSON

NORTH

COMMENTS

REF# 8221918

LOG 8204588 8205012 NSCIFID

(H/)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

RECEIVED 27 JUL 82 12 a

DOCDATE 27 JUL 82 13

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

AP

SHAMIR, YITZHAK

LEBANON

SYRIA

SAUDI ARABIA

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR FOMIN SHAMIR W/ PRES 2 - 3 AUG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 28 JUL 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

TANTER

TYSON

NORTH

COMMENTS

REF# 8221918 LOG 8204588 8205012 NSCIFID (H /

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 8/4 OBE per Kemp

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)N

5435

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Meeting with Israeli

Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir

Monday, August 2, 1982

Time:

9:55 a.m.- 10:10 a.m.

Oval Office Place:

From: WILLIAM P. CLARK UK

I. PURPOSE

To hear the Government of Israel's views on solving the Beirut problem. To reaffirm U.S. policy toward the War in Lebanon, the consequences of an Israeli invasion of Beirut for U.S.-Israel relations, and the need for greater Israeli flexibility with respect to humanitarian considerations.

II. BACKGROUND

Shamir's visit to Washington will contribute significantly to whether Israel continues to support Phil Habib's efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution in Beirut. The Begin Government may soon decide that it can no longer afford a "no win" war of attrition or a political outcome that its adversaries will cast as a victory for the PLO. The Israeli leadership may therefore opt for a military solution, and they are anxious to determine how the U.S. Government would react to such a move.

You should reaffirm U.S. policy on Lebanon and repeat your message to Begin of the grievous consequences for U.S.-Israeli relations of an Israeli invasion of Beirut. We are convinced that the PLO can be extracted by political means, but Israeli flexibility is needed. While we agree on objectives we disagree on tactics. This includes adjustments in the Israeli lines, the inclusion of UN observers in the multinational force (MNF), and the timing of MNF deployment. Moreover, we fundamentally oppose certain inhumane Israeli pressure tactics, particularly indiscriminate bombardments and the periodic curtailment of food, water and power supplies. Finally, it is important that Shamir be aware of the key point you made to Prime Minister Begin during his June visit. We do not know whether Begin revealed the specifics of your demarche to his Cabinet colleagues, and Shamir will be an important ally of Begin should a confrontation with Sharon occur. You should therefore inform Shamir that, as you told

SECRET

Review on July 30, 1988





-2-

Begin, our willingness to help Israel in Lebanon is linked to commitments of greater flexibility in the autonomy negotiations and an easing of restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza. In this regard, you could point out that the recent dismissal of Gaza Mayor Rashid Shawwa, (as well as earlier dismissals of mayors popularly elected and municipal councils) was singularly unhelpful and unacceptable in the context of our forthcomingness in Lebanon.

III. PARTICIPANTS

United States - President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State George Shultz
James Baker
William P. Clark

Ambassador Sam Lewis Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes Ambassador Richard Fairbanks

Geoffrey Kemp, NSC Howard J. Teicher, NSC

Israel - Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir Ambassador Moshe Arens Deputy Director General Chanan Bar-On

IV. PRESS

The meeting will be announced; White House photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- o Greet Foreign Minister Shamir.
- o Receive Israeli views on Beirut problem.
- o Reaffirm U.S. policy.

Attachments

Tab A - Talking Points and 3X5 cards

Tab B - Bios


Prepared by Howard Teicher





SECKET

TALKING POINTS FOR OVAL OFFICE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR 9:55 a.m. - 10:10 a.m.



- O WELCOME MR. MINISTER. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR
 VIEWS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN BEIRUT AND ON ISRAEL'S
 POLICY IN LEBANON MORE GENERALLY.
- O I WANT TO REAFFIRM MY STRONG SUPPORT FOR PHIL HABIB'S EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE BEIRUT PROBLEM.
- O I ALSO WANT TO REAFFIRM THE CENTRAL COMPONENTS OF U.S.

 POLICY TOWARD LEBANON: STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, TERRITORIAL

 INTEGRITY OF LEBANON, AND THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.
- O HOWEVER, OF THE GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR LEBANON POLICY IS THE REMOVAL OF THE PLO FROM BEIRUT BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS. I THEREFORE WANT TO REITERATE WHAT I WROTE PRIME MINISTER BEGIN: THAT AN ISRAELI INVASION OF BEIRUT WOULD HAVE GRIEVOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS.
- O FURTHERMORE, WE BELIEVE THAT YOUR USE OF CERTAIN PRESSURE

 TACTICS -- INDISCRIMINATE BOMBINGS, CURTAILMENT OF FOOD,

 WATER AND POWER SUPPLIES -- IS INHUMANE AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

 TO OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.
- o FINALLY, LET ME REASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO HELP ISRAEL IN LEBANON. BUT AS I TOLD PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, I EXPECT OUR HELP TO BE MATCHED BY LESS REPRESSION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.



O IN THIS REGARD, YOUR RECENT DISMISSAL OF GAZA MAYOR SHAWWA WAS VERY UNHELPFUL.

TALKING POINTS FOR SHAMER MEETING

- -- WELCOME, HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON BEIRUT AND ISRAEL'S POLICY IN LEBANON.
- -- REAFFIRM STRONG SUPPORT FOR HABIB'S EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.
- CENTRAL COMPONENTS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD LEBANON: STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON, AND THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.
- -- DIPLOMATIC REMOVAL OF THE PLO IS VERY
 IMPORTANT. AN ISRAELI INVASION OF BEIRUT
 WOULD HAVE GRIEVOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S.-

2.

- YOUR USE OF CERTAIN PRESSURE TACTICS -- INDISCRIMINATE BOMBINGS, CURTAILMENT OF FOOD, WATER AND POWER SUPPLIES -- IS INHUMANE AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.
- -- WE ARE PREPARED TO HELP ISRAEL IN LEBANON.
 BUT AS I TOLD PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, I
 EXPECT OUR HELP TO BE MATCHED BY LESS
 REPRESSION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND
 GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE AUTONOMY
 NEGOTIATIONS.
- -- IN THIS REGARD, YOUR RECENT DISMISSAL OF GAZA MAYOR SHAWWA WAS VERY UNHELPFUL.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File 8/24/2011 RBW File Folder **FOIA** M10-351/M10-MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT REAGAN (08/09/1982) 371 JAUVERT/BROWER

Box Number

50

16

Withdrawer

ID	Document Type Document Description	No of Doc Date pages	Restric- tions
1172	35 REPORT	1 2/15/197	7 B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Yitzhak SHAMIR
(Phonetic: shaMEER)


ISRAEL

20

Minister of Foreign Affairs (since 9 March 1980)

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

Yitzhak Shamir, an associate of Prime Min-ister Menachem Begin's since the 1930s, is a well-known, popular member of the far right wing of the governing Likud coalition. Begin's appointment of Shamir to



the Cabinet strengthens rank-and-file support for the Prime Minister within the Herut Party (the largest faction in the coalition) and the National Religious Party (a small but crucial coalition partner). The political hawks in the Likud may support Shamir as a candidate to oppose Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman in a post-Begin leadership scramble.


Shamir has belonged to Begin's Herut Party since 1969 and has chaired its executive committee since 1975. He has served in the Knesset (parliament) since 1973 and was an active member of its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. As Speaker of the Knesset from June 1977 until assuming his present post, he tried to temper his rightwing predilections;

The Autonomy Issue

Shamir's appointment to the Foreign Ministry portends a hardening of the Israeli position in the Palestinian autonomy negotiations. He abstained from voting in the Knesset on the ratification of the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, explaining that he opposed the substance of the government's position but as a leading member of the coalition could not vote

(cont.)

CR M 80-11184



against them. An ardent supporter of Jewish settlements on the West Bank, Shamir is against the establishment of a Palestinian state within the occupied territories. As Foreign Minister, he apparently accepts Prime Minister Begin's concept

of limited Palestinian autonomy on the West Bank

Career

A native of Poland, Shamir emigrated to Palestine in 1935. He studied law at the University of Warsaw and at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. While attending Hebrew University, he earned a living as a construction laborer and as an employee in an accounting firm. Shamir joined the Irgun Zvai Leumi, Begin's preindependence underground organization, in 1936 but left it in 1940 to become operational commander of the Stern Gang. That group was responsible for many sensational anti-British terrorist operations in the Shamir was arrested and imprisoned by the British Mandate government twice in the 1940s and spent about two years in British prisons, including time in a detention camp in Eritrea. He sat out the last two years of the independence struggle in political exile in France.

Shamir returned home—to the new State of Israel—in 1948. He pursued several business ventures and then joined Mossad, the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service. He served in its upper ranks from 1955 to 1965. After leaving Mossad, he managed a rubber factory and joined the Council for Soviet Jewry, where he was involved in the emigration of Jews from the USSR.

Personal Data

Shamir, who is about 65, is married and has a son and a daughter. He speaks passable English and excellent French.

12 March 1980

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

Withdrawer

RB 8/24/2011

W

File Folder

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT

REAGAN (08/09/1982)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-

371

JAUVERT/BROWER

Box Number

50

16

ID	Document Type Document Description	No of Doc Date pages	Restric- tions
11723	37 REPORT	1 6/26/1979	9 B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
Withdrawer
Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File
RB 8/24/2011

W

File Folder FOIA

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT M10-351/M10-

REAGAN (08/09/1982) 371

JAUVERT/BROWER

Box Number

50

ID	Document Type Document Description	No of Doc Date pages	Restric- tions
117238 TALKING PTS.		1 ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy ((b)(6) of the FOIA)
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

5435 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

August 2, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

HOWARD J. TEICHER NJT

SUBJECT:

Memcon for President's Meeting with

Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel

Please review and approve the subject memcon for file.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A.

APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	

Attachment

Tab A - Memcon for Shamir Meeting with the President

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET AND ATTACHMENT

5435

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

Summary of the President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ronald Reagan Vice President George Bush

Secretary of State George Shultz

Edwin Meese, III, Counsellor to the President

James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff and

Assistant to the President

William P. Clark, Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

Robert C. McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Sam Lewis, State

Nicholas Veliotes, Assistant Secretary for

NEA, State

Ambassador Richard Fairbanks, State

Geoffrey Kemp, NSC

Howard Teicher, NSC (Notetaker)

Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir Ambassador Moshe Arens Deputy Director General Chanan Bar-On

Minister Jacob Neuhushtan

Yosef Ben-Aharon

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE:


Monday, August 2, 1982; 9:45-10:10 a.m.;

The Cabinet Room

SECRET

Review on August 2, 2012 Extended by William P. Clark Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13 (a) (f)





SECRET



MINUTES

President Reagan said I want to discuss the situation in West Beirut where successive breaches of the cease-fire are making it impossible for Phil Habib to reach agreement for departure of the PLO. At the outset, let me make clear my full support for Ambassador Habib personally and for his mission. I also want to reaffirm the central components of U.S. policy toward Lebanon: strong central government, territorial integrity of Lebanon, and the removal of all foreign forces. Of the greatest significance to the success of our policy is the removal of the PLO from Beirut by diplomatic means. The concept of a cease-fire is becoming discredited by disproportionate Israeli bombing and artillery attacks which are not only extracting unacceptable human costs, but are making negotiations impossible. Israel's massive attacks go far beyond any possible retaliation and the periodic cutoff of electricity, water, food, and medical supplies have entailed severe diplomatic and humanitarian costs. Israeli practice continue, it will become increasingly difficult to defend the proposition that Israeli use of U.S. arms is for defense purposes. Furthermore, I want to reiterate what I said to Prime Minister Begin: that an Israeli invasion of Beirut would have grievous consequences for U.S.-Israeli relations. Now let me reassure you that we are prepared to help Israel in Lebanon. But our help must be matched by greater Israeli flexibility and understanding for the consequences of Israeli actions for U.S. interests in the Middle East. Finally, please inform Prime Minister Begin of my strong views on this issue. We must come to the diplomatic table for a solution and not through the use of military means. The slaughter of innocent civilians must stop.

Shamir extended greetings from Prime Minister Begin and thanks for the birthday note. The Government of Israel admires President Reagan's strong leadership and toughness. We have common goals of defeating PLO terrorism. We have to cooperate in achieving these goals. With regard to Habib, the GOI is also interested in Habib's success in finding a diplomatic solution. Israel does not want any more blood shed. But the PLO won't leave unless they are convinced that they have no choice but to leave. They will use the negotiations to procrastinate. If we are interested in a peaceful solution, we must warn them and make them understand that there is no alternative to their departure. Israel always prefers a diplomatic solution. There are no differences between us on this. Turning to the cease-fire, we were the first to proclaim a cease-fire. But the PLO never accepted it. They are taking advantage of it to kill our soldiers. Israel cannot tolerate this. The ceasefire must be absolute and total. If the PLO accepts it, we will honor it. It is not in our interest to fight. But we have sensitive information that the PLO leadership are not intending to leave Beirut. They are determined to continue discussions but not to leave. Pardon my insults, but we have





SECRET

SECRET

intercepted their remarks, saying that they need Habib only for ensuring a supply of water and electricity. In the next few days they will use Habib and the President to help remove garbage from West Beirut. The PLO is far from ready to leave. There is no other way to make them understand than through pressure. The Prime Minister instructed me to say that he begs you not to accept advice which calls for Habib to conduct negotiations with the PLO in the same house. This would be counterproductive and interpreted as a step by the United States in the direction of recognition of the PLO. This would be contrary to U.S. commitments. We understand that it would be more convenient for Habib's negotiations but Habib must not be in the same house. For our cooperation we ask for this U.S. position. Furthermore, we don't think that cease-fire breaches are stopping negotiations. Israel is ready at any and all times to honor the cease-fire. But the current situation must not last forever. The Prime Minister has ordered water and other things to be allowed in. The population is suffering. The situation must be brought to an end as soon as possible. We ask your cooperation to reach a guick solution. The accomplishment of our goals in Lebanon will lead to a new political solution that will create new horizons and opportunities for peace. Lebanon will become part of the free world without Syrian or PLO domination. U.S. has the most important position in the region. It is as if the Soviet Union does not exist, thanks to the removal of the I hope you understand our position. Let us cooperate to achieve these goals.

President Reagan answered that in reality Russia has profited the most from recent events in Beirut. I understand the need to return fire, but in modern society a policeman chasing a criminal does not fire into a crowd to apprehend him. He uses other means. The nature of Israeli retaliation, 15 hours of bombing, is excessive. The fact that the PLO shoots first is lost on world opinion. The television is showing the human results of the use of phosphorous bombs: burned babies, such as the seven-month old baby with its arms burned off. This benefits the Soviet Union. Perhaps they instigate the PLO to take a few shots in order to bring on a holocaust. Even if it entails some sacrifice, Israel should show greater forbearance. We understand your concerns regarding Habib not being in the same house with the PLO. There will be no contact with Arafat. An adjacent building is okay. The arrangements are still to be worked out. But you must know that there is an erosion in the Congress and among the American public of the warm U.S. support for Israel. This could eventually be reflected in our policies and their support for them.

Shamir answered with thanks for agreeing that Habib will not be in the same building as the PLO. Public opinion has a short memory. People forget what the PLO has done to the Israeli people. They also forget that Israel gave up Sinai for the sake of peace. Israel can be generous and moderate. But on Beirut, we have to take a firm position to put an end to this situation as quickly as possible. There needs to be a solution that will

SECRET



be good for the U.S. Shamir then turned to the U.S. letter in response to the Franco-Egyptian draft in the UN Security Council. Israel is worried that the U.S. may be trying to change UNSC Resolution 242. Israel sees danger for the future of negotiations. We don't believe it is productive or useful to link the PLO and Beirut to the peace process and Israel's problems with the other Arabs. Israel is eager to resume peace talks and has plans to discuss. But first of all we must finish the Beirut problem. Regarding the use of U.S. arms, Israel is using all its arms, including those from other countries, only for defensive purposes. Israel is eager for peace.

President Reagan said there has been no change in our position on 242. Secretary Shultz will take up the UN issue in the afternoon. He stated that he had to leave shortly on a trip so time was up. Thanked the Minister for the opportunity to exchange views.

Prepared by Howard J. Teicher



31 July ep continuent of Starle 6 PUTGOING TELEGRAM

29

SECRET

NOD128

PAGE 01 STATE 213728 ORIGIN NODS-02

COP

COPY 8 OF 20 COPIES

INFO OCT-88 ADS-88

DRAFTED BY NEASCHILLSKM APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY NEASMAYELITTES PILEAGLEBURGER S/ DAMS 5/5-DINHCADY

O D 318424Z JUL 82 ZFFG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 213728

NODIS
E.O. 128651RDS-3 7/39/82 (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
TAGS1 IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FROM SECRETARY
SHULTZ

- i. Secret entire text.
- 2. CHARGE BROWN SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO PM BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- 3. BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

THIS IS MY FIRST MESSAGE TO YOU AND, WHILE THE PROBLEM OF WEST BEIRUT REMAINS OF THE GREATEST URGENCY, DANGER, AND COMPLEXITY, I AM PLEASED THAT THIS SEEMS TO BE A MOMENT SEGRET

NLRR M37/1/4/11724D BY RW MARA DATE 6/22/15 1 1



Department of State

OUTGOING TELEBRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02

STATE 213728

CONTAINING SOME HOPE FOR AN OUTCOME THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, LEAD TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLOFROM BEIRUT AND LEBANON, AND RESTORE PEACE TO THAT CAPITAL AGAIN.

THE DECLARATION OF THE ARAB LEAGUE COMMITTEE AT JIDDA

CONTAINS SOME CONSTRUCTIVE POINTS, SUCH AS WITHE PLO ANNOUNCES ITS DECISION TO TRANSFER ITS ARMED FORCES OUT OF BEIRUT, " ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES, AND ITS AVOIDANCE OF LINKAGE BETWEEN THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM AND OTHER ISSUES.

WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE ARRIVED AT A SIGNIFICANT POINT WHICH DESERVES OUR MOST SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE ATTENTION AND EFFORT. IT NOW SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT, WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT, AMBASSADOR MABIS WILL SE ABLE TO ENGAGE IN TALKS ON THE PRACTICAL DETAILS OF PRECISELY HOW AND WHEN THE DEPARTURE WILL TAKE PLACE. WHTLE FURTHER DIFFICULTIES AND SETBACKS MAY LIE AHEAD. THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS, IN MY VIEW, COULD PROVIDE THE TURNING POINT IN OUR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES WHICH ISRAEL AND THE U.S. SHARE. IN THIS REGARD: AMBASSADOR HABIS HAS TOLD ME THAT HE HOPES YOU WILL CONSIDER AUTHORIZING DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KINCHE OR SUCH OTHER OFFICIAL AS YOU WISH TO DESIGNATE TO BE IN THE AREA TO CONSULT WITH AMBASSADOR HABIS WHEN SUCH DETAILED PRACTICAL NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN.

MR. PRIME MINISTER, IT IS ALSO, IN MY VIEW, INDISPENSABLE TO OUR HOPES FOR SUCCESS THAT AN ENVIRONMENT EXIST IN AND AROUND BEIRUT WHICH IS CONDUCIVE TO PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS CANNOT BE THE CASE UNTIL A FIRM SECRET

36

3

SECRET

PAGE 83

STATE 213728

CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. WE ARE URGING ADHERENCE BY THE OTHER SIDE AND TRUST THAT ISRAELI FORCES WILL NOT FIRE UNLESS FIRED UPON AND. IN SUCH CASES, WILL CONFINE THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SOURCE OF THE VIOLATION WITH PROPORTIONALITY. ONLY IF THIS IS SO WILL WE HAVE ANY HOPE OF BRINGING THE FIRING TO A HALT IN A LASTING MANNER.

AM EQUALLY CONCERNED AS WELL THAT A CONTINUATION OF PRESENT CONDITIONS -- INADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY, NO ELECTRICITY, AND IMPEDIMENTS TO THE SHIPMENT OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN SERVICES -- WILL CAUSE THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATORS TO FOCUS ON THESE CONCERNS RATHER THAN ON THE SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS THAT HUST BE MADE. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE AT ALL, THUS WASTING THIS NEW OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS, WITH POTENTIALLY TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR COMMON LONG-TERM GOALS OF A PEACEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME.

THEREFORE, I MUST ASK YOU, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO GIVE THIS MATTER YOUR MOST SERIOUS AND URGENT CONSIDERATION. MY EARNEST MOPE IS THAT, IN THE CAUSE OF A RAPID AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION, YOU WILL INSTRUCT YOUR FORCES.

SURROUNDING WEST BEIRUT TO RESTORE FULLY WATER, POWER AND VITAL SERVICES TO THAT PART OF THE CITY.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO GOOD TALKS ON MONDAY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR. IT IS MY HOPE THAT THE PROMISING OPENING THAT NOW APPEARS BEFORE US WILL BY THAT TIME HAVE BEEN TAKEN SO THAT OUR TALKS CAN DEAL WITH PRACTICAL DETAILS OF THE PLOTS DEPARTURE AND POSITIVE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE.

WITH WARM REGARDS, GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 84

STATE 213728

END TEXT

4. IN DELIVERY THE ABOVE YOU SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS AS REFLECTING THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS:

THE ARE-CLEARLY AT A GRUCIAL POINT WITH REGARD TO WEST BEIRUT. WHAT HAPPENS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS CAN SPELL SUCCESSOR FAILURE.

-- WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE VARIOUS FORCES SEEKING TO DESTROY OUR HOPES FOR SUCCESS. THE U.S. IS NOT AND WILL NOT BE TAKEN IN BY THESE EFFORTS.

THERE IS NO DOUBT BUT THAT THE PLO WILL USE EVERY DEVICE TO TRY TO PROLONG THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO TURN THEM TOWARD THEIR ELEVEN POINT PROGRAM. THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO US. AMBASSADOR HABIB IS CONTINUING TO WORK WITHIN THE SAME FRAMEWORK OF HODALITIES FOR THE PLO DEPARTURE THAT WE HAVE PURSUED ALL ALONG. WE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY POINT THAT IS UNREASONABLE OR DISHONORABLE OR DESIGNED TO AVOID THE REALITY THAT THE PLO IN WEST BEIRUT MUST LEAVE LEBANON BY THE MOST RAPID MEANS POSSIBLE.

THAT RADICAL DIEHARD ELEMENTS -- WHICH ARE PROBABLY COMMUNIST INSPIRED -- ARE ATTEMPTING AT VIRTUALLY EVERY MOMENT WHEN PROGRESS APPEARS POSSIBLE TO DESTROY OUR EFFORTS BY VIOLATING THE CEASEFIRE THROUGH ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI FORCES. IT IS VITAL THAT THESE RADICAL ELEMENTS BE DENIED THEIR OBJECTIVES. TO PLAY THEIR GAME BY RETALIATING IN A DISPROPORTIONATE FASHION THAT RESULTS IN A BREAKDOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO WORK AGAINST OUR

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

23

SECRET

PAGE 25

STATE 213728

OWN INTERESTS.

-- THE COMPELLING FACT REMAINS THAT THIS IS A MOMENT FROUGHT WITH POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE POTENTIAL, AND THE

CHOICE IS OURS TO MAKE.

-- PHIL HABIB MUST HAVE A CHANCE TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS MOMENT TO MAKE PRACTICAL PROGRESS. OUR INTENTION IS TO GET THE WORD TO THE PLO THAT HABIB IS IMMEDIATELY PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN NEW AND CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS VIA THE LEBANESE INTERMEDIARY, BUT ONLY ON CONDITION THAT THE PLO COME TO TERMS ON A DETAILED AGREEMENT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IT MAS TO BE RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE NEW AND CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE IF VITAL SERVICES ARE RESUMED.

SHULTZ

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR

THE PRESIDENT MET WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR THIS MORNING. THE FOCUS OF THE DISCUSSION WAS LEBANON. PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND HIS MISSION WHICH IS BASED ON THE POLICIES, EXPECTATIONS AND HOPES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THAT AN EARLY DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE CURRENT PROBLEM OF WEST BEIRUT IS THE ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP IN ENDING THE TRAUMA OF LEBANON, BEGINNING THE PROCESS FOR A BETTER FUTURE FOR THIS RAVAGED COUNTRY, AND MOVING ON TO THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS. THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THE NEED FOR A COMPLETE END BY ALL PARTIES TO THE HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND BEIRUT AS A PREREQUISITE TO ALLOW AMBASSADOR HABIB TO PURSUE HIS URGENT WORK. CAN NO LONGER ACCEPT A SITUATION OF CONSTANTLY ESCALATING VIOLENCE. THE PRESIDENT HIGHLIGHTED THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE LARGE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF WEST BEIRUT, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND TO ASSURE ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF FOOD AND MEDICINES.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø3 USMISSION USUN NEW 2127 DTG: Ø11935Z AUG 82 PSN: Ø28215 SIT633 TOR: 213/1950Z

DISTRIBUTION: WPC | WHLR VP SIT EOB KEMP /009

WHSR COMMENT: FYI

OP IMMED
STU1228
DE RUEHDT #2127 2131936
O Ø11935Z AUG 82
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3125

INFO USINT BAGHDAD 1124

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0031

AMEMBASSY BONN 0196

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 8711

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 4054

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 6101

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4103

USLO RIYADH 0258

AMEMBASSY ROME 0171

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0769

UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK Ø2127

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: UN, PORG, IS, LE

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 516 ON BEIRUT

ADOPTED AUGUST 1, 1982

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT 1330 AUGUST 1 UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED A RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING PREVIOUS SC CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE "WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

36

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø3 USMISSION USUN NEW 2127 DTG: Ø11935Z AUG 82 PSN: Ø28215

LEBANESE/ISRAELI BORDER", AUTHORIZING THE SYG TO DEPLOY UN OBSERVERS TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT AND REQUESTING THE SYG TO REPORT BACK TO THE COUNCIL ON COMPLIANCE WITHIN FOUR HOURS.

- 2. IN THE FORMAL SC MEETING, THE RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED WITHOUT DEBATE. IN EXPLANATIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE VOTE WHICH FOLLOWED, ISRAEL WAS CONDEMNED IN VARYING BUT FAMILIAR TERMS BY LEBANON, ZAIRE, EGYPT, USSR, AND THE PLO. IN A MEASURED STATEMENT, ISRAEL SAID THE PLO HAD COMMITTED A NUMBER OF CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS LATE ON JULY 31 BUT THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT RESPONDED UNTIL AFTER ARAFAT HAD TOLD HIS TROOPS TO PREPARE FOR BATTLE AND PLO HAD AGAIN VIOLATED CEASEFIRE. ISRAEL SAID THE IDF HAD NOT ADVANCED AND WOULD NOT ADVANCE INTO WEST BEIRUT, BUT WOULD RESPOND TO ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW CEASEFIRE WHICH TOOK PLACE AT 1100 (EDST). THE U.S. DID NOT SPEAK.
- 3. SC PRESIDENT (IRELAND) INFORMED THE COUNCIL THAT THE SYG'S REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE SENT TO MEMBERS AS SOON AS IT WAS RECEIVED LATER THAT AFTERNOON AND THAT HE (THE PRESIDENT) WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AS NECESSARY. SECRETARIAT PLANS IF POSSIBLE NOT TO RECONVENE FURTHER MEETING ON AUGUST 1.
- 4. TEXT OF RESOLUTION 516 ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT:
- THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
- REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982) AND 513 (1982),
- RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 515 (1982) OF 29 JULY 1982,
- ALARMED BY THE CONTINUATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN ANDAROUND BEIRUT.
- TAKING NOTE OF THE LATEST MASSIVE VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE IN AND AROUND BEIRUT,
- 1. CONFIRMS ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AND DEMANDS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

37

PAGE Ø3 OF Ø3 USMISSION USUN NEW 2127 DTG: Ø11935Z AUG 82 PSN: Ø28215

AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, AND A CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE/ISRAELIBORDER;

- 2. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO DEPLOY IMMEDIATELY ON THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN AND AROUND BEIRUT:
- 3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT BACK TO THE COUNCIL ON COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN FOUR HOURS FROM NOW. END TEXT.
- 5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. KIRKPATRICK BT

MEMORANDUM

5435 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 30, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH:

CHARLES P. TYSON GEOFFREY KEMP

FROM:

HOWARD J. TEICHER

SUBJECT:

The President's August 2 Meeting with

Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir

Attached at Tab I are the materials for the President's meeting with Foreign Minister Shamir. We have not yet received Secretary Shultz's memo to the President. In light of the pace of events in Beirut, it may be necessary to adjust the talking points to account for new developments that take place over the weekend. Monday morning's briefing will therefore be extremely important as it may be possible and/or necessary to use the meeting with Shamir to deal decisively with those developments.

Following today's lengthy session with Ali, the Israelis may seek equal time. However, unless something of dramatic consequence is discussed we believe the meeting should be kept to fifteen minutes.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the President.

APPROVE W

DISAPPROVE

Attachments:

Briefing Paper for the President

A - Talking Points and 3X5 cards

B - Bios

Review on July 30, 1988

E.S. SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON



6/1/82 DFCI ACCINING

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

George P. Shultz

Subject:

From:

Lebanon: Your Talk with Israeli Foreign

Minister Shamir

I urge that you do the talking when you meet Israeli
Foreign Minister Shamir and that you limit your session to the
fifteen minutes scheduled. You will want to get across that
the Israeli disproportionate onslaughts on West Beirut must
end. The key statement for you to make in this regard will be
that it will be difficult to defend the proposition that
Israeli use of U.S. arms is for defensive purposes. Shamir and
Begin will understand that this is a careful reference to the
language of the Arms Export Control Act which requires
termination of military sales if you determine the equipment is
not being used for defensive purposes.

Events in Beirut have again taken a turn for the worse during the last twenty-four hours.

- -- Citing ceasefire violations by the Palestinians, the Israelis again opened massive fire on South Beirut early this morning and moved their forces northward so as to take control of the Beirut airport. After the usual round of negotiations, the Israelis agreed to a new ceasefire effective 5:00 p.m. Beirut time, giving them time to complete the present round of massive firing.
- -- Begin has sent a tough message to Phil Habib questioning the truth of what Habib told him about how he saw proximity talks with the PLO and strenuously objecting to such talks.
- --The Israelis in Jerusalem and Washington have hit us hard on our draft Security Council resolution, which is designed as a defense against the French-Egyptian resolution. In fact, our draft does not depart from existing U.S. policy.

Phil Habib is of the view that the continual Israeli practice of heavy shelling and bombing onslaughts, interrupted at Israeli convenience by ceasefires, has destroyed the prospect for a negotiated settlement and must stop. We agree, and Shamir's presence in Washington Monday gives us the opportunity to say so firmly.

In your talks with Shamir, I suggest that you not be drawn



39

-2-

into details regarding Beirut or other issues which he may wish to raise. I suggest you do this in regard to Beirut by indicating your strong support for my letter to Begin (attached). In regard to other issues -- Shamir may raise our draft Security Council Resolution and our authorization to Phil Habib, if necessary, to engage in proximity talks -- you should suggest that Shamir take these up with me.

I recommend that you reinforce your position and build public support for it by having the White House issue the attached press statement after your talk with Shamir.

Talking points for your use are attached.

Attachments:

- 1. Talking Points
- 2. Press Statement
- 3. Shultz to Begin Letter



5435

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 28, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH:

CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM:

GEOFFREY KEMP

SUBJECT:

Visit of Israe Yi Foreign Minister Shamir:

Possible Meeting with the President

The memorandum for your signature to Mike Deaver at Tab I forwards a schedule proposal for a meeting between the President and the Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir on August 2 or 3.

Mr. Shamir is coming primarily to meet officially with the new Secretary of State on August 2, scheduled for 10:00 a.m. Shamir places high priority on a meeting with the President due to the Lebanon crisis, and in view of the President's recent meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Syria and Saudi Arabia.

RECOMMENDATION:

That	you	sign	the	memorandum	to	Mike	Deaver	at	Tab	I.
------	-----	------	-----	------------	----	------	--------	----	-----	----

APPROVE		DISAPPROVE	
	The state of the s		

Attachments

Tab I - Memorandum to Mike Deaver A - Schedule Proposal from Deaver to Ryan

Review on July 28, 1988

Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12953, as emended White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006

THE WHITE HOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER

FROM:

WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT:

Visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir:

Possible Meeting with the President

The Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir is coming to Washington to meet officially with the new Secretary of State on August 2, at 10:00 a.m.

In view of the Lebanon situation and the President's recent meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Syria and Saudi Arabia, Shamir will place a meeting with the President high among his priorities.


A schedule proposal is attached at Tab A for you to forward to Fred Ryan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and forward the schedule proposal to Fred Ryan (Tab A).

APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	

Attachment
Tab A - Schedule Proposal



WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO:

FREDERICK J. RYAN

FROM:

MICHAEL DEAVER

REQUEST:

Meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister

Yitzhak Shamir

PURPOSE:

To continue a close dialogue with senior Israeli officials concerning Lebanon.

BACKGROUND:

Mr. Shamir is coming primarily to meet officially with the new Secretary of State on August 2, scheduled for 10:00 a.m. Because of the Lebanon crisis, Shamir also places high priority on a meeting with the President in view of the President's recent meeting with the Foreign Ministers of

Syria and Saudi Arabia.

PREVIOUS

PARTICIPATION:

The President last met with Foreign Minister Shamir during Prime Minister Begin's visit to the United States last September, 1981.

DATE:

August 2 or 3

LOCATION:

The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS:

The President Secretary Shultz Judge Clark Nicholas Veliotes Geoffrey Kemp

Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir

Ambassador Arens

OUTLINE OF EVENT:

15 minute meeting

MEDIA COVERAGE:

Photo opportunity; meeting will be announced.

RECOMMENDED BY:

Judge Clark and the Department of State

OPPOSED BY:

None

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on July 28, 1988



DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520

July 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT:

Appointment Request for the President: Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir

Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir will visit Washington on August 2 and 3. Mr. Shamir is coming, primarily, to meet officially with the new Secretary of State. That meeting is scheduled for 10:00 a.m., August 2. In the context of the Lebanon crisis, Shamir also places high priority on a meeting with the President in view of the President's recent meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Syria and Saudi Arabia.

We recommend that the President agree to see Shamir. Access to senior American officials, and especially the President, is a major concern for Israeli officials. inability of the President to meet with Shamir would undoubtedly be contrasted by the Israelis with his having met with the Saudi and Syrian Foreign Ministers and would be viewed quite seriously. Moreover, a meeting with Shamir would enable the President to continue a close dialogue with senior Israeli officials concerning Lebanon.

> L. Paul Bremer, III Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL GDS 7/26/88

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is the end of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

Folder: Memorandums of Conversation-President Reagan (08/09/1982) Box: 50

To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection

Contact a reference archivist at: <u>reagan.library@nara.gov</u>

Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing

National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/