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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/26/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (OCTOBER 1982)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 50

JAUVERT/BROWER

18

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117378	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT RICARDO DE LA ESPRIELLA OF PANAMA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	10/1/1982	B1
117379	MEMCON	RE. PLENARY SESSINO WITH PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT DE LA ESPRIELLA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	1/1/1982	B1
117380	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S PLENARY MEETING WITH KING HASSAN AND THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	10/22/1982	B1
117381	MINUTES	RE. PRESIDENT'S PLENARY MEETING WITH KING HASSAN AND THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION [COPY OF DOC. 117380 PGS. 16-19] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	ND	B1
117382	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S PLENARY MEETING WITH KING HASSAN AND THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION [WITH MARKINGS] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	10/22/1982	B1
119047	NOTE	MANNY TO BRUCE <i>R 12/21/2015 351/1</i>	1	10/28/1982	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117383	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S PLENARY MEETING WITH KING HASSAN AND THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION [COPY OF DOC. 117380 PGS. 16-19] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	ND	B1
117385	CABLE	RE. PRESIDENTIAL REPLY TO KING HASSAN'S LETTER <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	2/15/1983	B1
117386	LETTER	GENERAL WALTERS TO HASSAN <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
117388	LETTER	HASSAN TO RR [IN FRENCH; ATTACHED TO DOC. 117386] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
117390	LETTER	HASSAN TO WALTERS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
117391	LETTER	HASSAN TO RR [ENGLISH; ATTACHED TO DOC. 117390] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ID 8206804

RECEIVED 06 OCT 82 10

TO CLARK

FROM SAPIA-BOSCH

DOCDATE 05 OCT 82

TYSON

05 OCT 82

KEYWORDS: PANAMA

CBI

DE LA ESPRIELLA

CUBA

NICARAGUA

CANAL ZONE

AP

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 1 OCT PLENARY SESSION W/ PRES DE LA ESPRIELLA

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 08 OCT 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

FONTAINE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8206900

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

- OCT 0 9 1982 Ponderexter approved CT
Sapia-Bosch S OCT 0 9 1982 prepare memo Wheeler to Bremer
C 10/14 Wheeler St memo to Bremer SB, CT
mw

DISPATCH

A.W. 10/14

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA *H.*
(C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED

w/~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

RU 8/26/11


October 14, 1982

2

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the Plenary
Session Between President Reagan and
Panamanian President de la Espriella on
October 1, 1982

This memorandum of the subject conversation has been
approved for distribution to the appropriate officials
at the Department.


Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment

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6804

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 13, 1982

NOTE FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH *ASB*

Please sign the attached transmittal memorandum to State Department forwarding the summary of the October 1 meeting between President Reagan and President de la Espriella of Panama.

Attachment

Tab I Your memorandum to State Dept.

372

**National Security Council
The White House**

RECEIVED

Package # 6804

82 OCT 5 P 6: 15

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1982

822001 66 A10:55

6804

5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: DONALD T. REGAN

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH MEXICAN PRESIDENT-ELECT
MIGUEL DE LA MADRID

There are a number of financial and economic issues which you may wish to raise with President-elect de la Madrid when you meet on Friday, October 8, in San Diego. Proposed talking points are at Tab A. Background on the emergency financial assistance being provided and under negotiation is at Tab B. A brief discussion of the financial issues follows:

I. Economic Situation and Outlook (Tab C)

Economic Situation/IMF Program

- o Currently, the most pressing international financial problem is the Mexican financial situation.
- Negotiations with the IMF appear to be progressing, but slowly. Reports on the negotiations are mixed, and it remains precarious.
- Although de la Madrid's people are participating, those negotiations are exclusively with President Lopez Portillo's Administration and the IMF. We must neither interfere with nor be perceived to be interfering with those negotiations.
- Mexico needs to agree as quickly as possible to a sound IMF stabilization program. Negotiations are scheduled to continue through October 7.
- An IMF program is mandatory to restore private sector confidence and will determine commercial banks' willingness to: (1) roll over Mexican debt coming due beyond the 90-day "standstill" period ending November 21; (2) provide new money; and (3) restructure debt to lengthen maturities.
- I suggest that you impress upon the President-elect the importance of quickly reaching and adhering to an IMF stabilization program. This, alone, will assure Mexico of access to foreign credit to finance continued growth and development.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Shaw to Leonard 14.8/22/06
BY RW NARA DATE 8/26/11



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation

Attached is a memorandum of conversation between
the President and President de la Expriella of Panama.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

with ~~SECRET~~ attachment
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY RW NARA, DATE 8/26/11

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: President Reagan
President Ricardo de la Espriella of Panama
Acting Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam
National Security Advisor William P. Clark
Assistant Secretary Thomas O. Enders, ARA

Date & Place: Friday, October 1, 1982, White House
Washington, D. C.

Subjects: CBI, Panama Canal, USSR

President de la Espriella opened by expressing strong support for the Caribbean Basin Initiative and offering to do whatever he could to help its progress. The CBI, he said, would not lead to immediate results. But in the long term it could provide just the kind of opportunity the Panamanians were seeking. President Reagan welcomed his support, saying that we have never done enough to develop our ties with our neighbors in the Hemisphere, and that he is committed to obtaining passage of the legislation.

Turning to the Canal, President de la Espriella thanked President Reagan for his support in carrying out the Treaties. He recognized that the President had opposed the Treaties prior to his election, and was all the more admiring of the President's resoluteness in applying them so correctly now. President Reagan replied that although he did not wish to criticize President Torrijos after his death, the fact is that Torrijos appeared to threaten consequences if the U. S. did not reach agreement. Given the state of the world at that time and the growing challenges from the USSR, he had thought it unwise to give in to menaces anywhere. President de la Espriella said that he and the Panamanians had deep respect for that position, and that he would have taken the same position had he been in the President's position.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 117378 #117378

BY RW DATE 6/22/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MW

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *ent*
FROM: ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH *AB*
SUBJECT: Plenary Session with Panamanian President
de la Espriella, October 1, 1982

Attached is a memorandum of conversation summarizing the President's meeting with Panamanian President de la Espriella.

RECOMMENDATION

That this memorandum (Tab I) be distributed to those persons at State Department with whom you wish to have a detailed record of the October 1 meeting.

Approve *J* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation dated October 1, 1982

cc: Roger Fontaine

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12853, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/26/11*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6804

117379

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 1, 1982

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Plenary Session with Panamanian President de la Espriella, the Cabinet Room, October 1, 1982, 11:45 - 12:00 P.M.

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary of State
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Everett E. Briggs, Ambassador-designate to Panama
William Gianelli, Chairman of the Board of the Panama Canal Commission
Stephanie van Reigersberg, State Department Interpreter
Roger W. Fontaine, National Security Council
Alfonso Sapia-Bosch, National Security Council (note taker)

President Reagan: I am most grateful for the warm expressions of our relationship. I want you to know that we pledge a working partnership with Panama. I am also delighted to know of the warm support for the CBI. You know we are having some problems with our Congress, so any help you can give us on this in your speeches while you are here would be greatly appreciated. We realize that a healthy economy is important to Panama. You know of our support for the Central American Democratic Community and that there will be a meeting soon. I hope your country will be represented there. It will strengthen us against Cuba and Nicaragua. We pledge to work with you on Canal issues. (C)

President de la Espriella: I have an idea, Mr. President, it may be possible that you meet--you have already met with the rich in Cancun--with the less rich in the Caribbean and Central America. We offer you our country. We have facilities for you. When the CBI is in effect, you could meet with the leaders of the beneficiary countries. We are at your disposal and will try to promote the CBI. (C)

Minister Amado: Mr. President, for you to meet with the beneficiary countries of the CBI, the poor people. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NR 117379
BY RW DATE 6/22/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Reagan: We know you share our belief that private enterprise is the way to improve the standard of living. (U)

President de la Espriella: People need the opportunity you are offering them; it is a real opportunity you offer, and the people will work with it. Maybe we can hear about the Panama Canal Company. (U)

Mr. Manfredo: Mr. Gianelli, the Chairman of the Board of the Panama Canal Company could tell you better. The three years under the Treaty have been the most successful years for the Panama Canal in tonnage, revenues. With our own resources, we have been able to meet our costs; we have maintained the Canal well, and the morale of US and Panamanian workers is high. (U)

President Reagan: When I was Governor of California, Mr. Gianelli was in charge of our water system. He completed a very important program through imaginative leadership. (U)

Mr. Manfredo: You could not have chosen a better person to be Chairman of the Board for the Canal Company. (U)

Mr. Gianelli: Mr. President, the problems of the Canal are different from those of California. (U)

President Reagan: He had to invent pumps to move the water over the mountains, but he sold the electricity generated by the water going down the other side, which paid for the whole thing. (U)

President de la Espriella: You chose a very good person to be your Ambassador to Panama. We will get along very well with Ambassador Briggs. (U)

We have a small problem--that of the wage system that I forgot to mention to you earlier. The two wage systems for the Panamanians and the US workers could be taken advantage of by a small group of leftists and made an issue of against the Panamanian Government and the Canal. Please consider this when you have some time. (C)

The main reason to come and see you, Mr. President, is to tell you the people of Panama and the Government support you; you may feel among friends. We are looking for better friendship and cooperation; we are very fond of the relationship we have developed. (U)

President Reagan: We feel the same way about you, and we won't let the mischief makers in Cuba and Nicaragua affect us. (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12
President de la Espriella: We are carrying out some reforms. We have to have free elections in 1984 for Panama to choose its president freely and this be respected. (C)

Acting Secretary Dam: We have had excellent meetings; this has been a splendid occasion--we have a joint recognition of the problem in Nicaragua. If there is anything we can do to help with democratization, we will do as much as we can. (C)

President de la Espriella: We have invited Acting Secretary Dam to visit Panama when you allow him to travel. He will know he is among friends. (C)

President Reagan: You were kind when you spoke of my previous career. (The President then related the story of a writer doing a movie script of Kings Row and his passage through the Panama Canal.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8207478

RW 8/26/11
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 28 OCT 82 10

TO CLARK

FROM TEICHER

DOCDATE 27 OCT 82

TEICHER

28 OCT 82

13

KEYWORDS: MOROCCO

MIDDLE EAST

HASSAN II

SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR PRES 22 OCT PLENARY MTG W/ KING HASSAN & ARAB LEAGUE
DELEGATION

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 29 OCT 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

KEMP

WETTERING

DUR

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8207190 8207290 NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	OCT 29 1982	<i>McFarlane approved</i>		
	X 10/29	<i>that Kemp approved to Reed</i>		MT, GK, CT

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (CIV)

MEMORANDUM

7478 redo

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 28, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HOWARD J. TEICHER *gjcw*

SUBJECT: Memcon for President's Plenary Meeting with
King Hassan and the Arab League Delegation
October 22, 1982, Cabinet Room, 11:05 p.m.

The attached subject memcon is forwarded for your review and approval for file.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A for filing.

APPROVE

RCm/for

DISAPPROVE _____

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

RVJ
8/26/11

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11738D

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

7478

15

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Plenary Meeting
with King Hassan and the Arab League Delegation
October 22, 1982, Cabinet Room, 11:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State George Shultz
James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff and
Assistant to the President
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert C. McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Richard Fairbanks, Special Negotiator for the
Middle East Peace Process, State
Ambassador Joseph Reed, State
Nicholas Veliotis, Assistant Secretary for
NEA, State
Vernon Walters, Ambassador at Large, Interpreter
Geoffrey Kemp, National Security Council
Howard J. Teicher, National Security Council

Arab League Delegation:

Morocco - King Hassan II
Ambassador Ali Bengelloun

Saudi - Foreign Minister Saud
Arabia Ambassador Alhegelan

Tunisia - Foreign Minister Essebsi
Ambassador Ben Yahia

Algeria - Foreign Minister Ibrahimi
Ambassador Layachi Yaker

Syria - Foreign Minister Khaddam
Ambassador Jouejati

Jordan - Foreign Minister Kasim
Ambassador Majali

Chedli Klibi, Secretary General of the Arab League
Clovis Maksoud, Arab League Representative to
the United Nations

DATE, TIME,
AND PLACE:

Friday, October 22, 1982; 11:05-12:00 noon;
The Cabinet Room

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 103111 # 11738D

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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16

MINUTES

President Reagan. I'd like to welcome you all here to Washington. I know how important your mission is. We very much look forward to a detailed exchange of views. First, I'd like to ask King Hassan to begin the discussion.

King Hassan. Mr. President, we are here today in this hospitable and great country and especially in the White House in front of a man who is known for his honesty and sincerity. We are here as representatives of the Arab world and our purpose without exception is to open the doors of peace and coexistence in order to achieve justice and honesty. The Arabs have wasted tens of years of valuable time and effort in participation and discussions that went nowhere. In trying to build a peace in Arab countries there is a historical need to appear to be in a position befitting itself of logic and seriousness. For forty years the Arabs have been prevented from achieving their noble objectives. Instead the Arabs have been the target of attacks and their lands have been usurped. This tragedy needs serious work to be undone, and we are striving to find a resolution to this tragedy. We recognize that it cannot be achieved in a month or two or in a few weeks but a strong will can enable all of us to achieve what we aspire. We have come representing the Fez Summit. For the first time in our history the Arabs have laid down a plan bringing them and others to justice. The Arabs have come out of the negative to adopt a positive course but destiny just before Fez brought Mr. Reagan to announce his peace plan. We see in this coincidence a good omen but we should be frank and confess that President Reagan's plan and the Fez decisions have differences between them without any bridges which can bring the two sides together. So, we have come to explain and to hear. We want to interpret the Fez communique article by article and to propose to the President himself some of the questions that all of us know we may agree or disagree upon. But most important is for all of us to take the initiative to move as a result of the sincerity of our noble aims. Lastly, we ask the Almighty to give us the inspiration we need to move forward and to see light. Let me once again express my personal appreciation for all of your hospitality and understanding.

President Reagan. Let me make some remarks about my peace initiative, what it is and what it is not. The positions I put forward on September 1st are those that the U.S. will press in negotiations. I do not expect you or the Israelis to agree to them in advance. This is a real world not an ideal one and if either or both sides press for ideal results there will be no peace and the Palestinians will be losers. We've studied the Fez communique very carefully and we find positive elements in it. However, if point seven is meant to include recognition of Israel, it needs to be stated explicitly. Failure to do this creates more problems than you can

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imagine. Without direct negotiations there can be no peace and the Palestinians will be the losers. We understand your concerns about Camp David, but Camp David commits Israel to a negotiated solution and takes into account Palestinians' rights. We do not want to lose that commitment but Israel will not negotiate with the PLO. Negotiations will not go anywhere with the PLO. West Bank and Gaza Arabs seem willing to negotiate for transitional arrangements which would end the Israeli occupation and a future beyond that of an association with Jordan. There is a need for widespread Arab support for King Hussein to begin negotiations with Israel. That is the only possible way to end Israeli occupation and the only realistic way that Palestinian rights can be achieved. The President then asked King Hassan for his comments.

King Hassan. The comment on the Fez communique can be summarized as follows: If the Arab countries consider that the Camp David framework was still valid to solve the present problem, then the Arabs would have referred to it in some way. We recognize that Camp David may have sometime been good, but because of its limited objectives and aims, it doesn't answer our needs individually or collectively. I know Hussein very well. He has courage and a desire for peace. If King Hussein had had any hope that the only way to enter the peace process was to join the Camp David process, he would have been the first to propose it and to enter into negotiations with the Israelis. We understand and appreciate the position of the United States on Camp David. It is for U.S. policy a measure of the continuation of U.S. policy and this continuity may take different shapes or forms but not its modality. Our second point is that the Arabs have reiterated that the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians is the PLO. We decided this in 1974 in the presence of the late President Sadat, may God bless his soul, and while he negotiated within the Camp David framework, he did not object to the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. Here is a basic point of difference between the U.S. and Arab League. We are considering what you have said that we have to help the Palestinians to seek salvation, but we do not believe that someone who does not have something can give anything up. The Palestinians have wasted no opportunity to declare that the PLO is their representative and that only the PLO can negotiate their destiny. There is hope within us. We hope serious talks have taken place between Hussein and the PLO. The only way to not contradict us is to bless these Jordanian-Palestinian steps and we should nourish it as the only bridge that will be a link between your plan and our position.

The last point which we consider essential is article seven in the Fez communique. It insures for all states in the area to live in peace and security under the UN Security Council. I have been

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asked by the media does this mean recognition of Israel? Article Seven with all of its positive elements means to take the area from war into peace in the first stage, but in a second stage there would be exchange of interests, exchange of Ambassadors, and normalization which would all come later. And, we have to prepare point seven as a point where we are committed to peaceful coexistence in the area; if we find the right response especially regarding the PLO and Palestinians rights, then it is possible to come up with further clarity. Our brothers the Palestinians are honestly determined to coexist peacefully with all their neighbors when they have their own nation, this we have not seen before. The Palestinians may give guarantee directly perhaps under some kind of supervision. My team agrees and accepts this interpretation. The Jordanian-Palestinian action must be blessed. Palestinians are Jordanians and Jordanians are the brothers of the Palestinians. King Hussein is willing for everything except to negotiate the rights of the Palestinians now or in the future.

As partners with King Hussein, this will lead us out of the problem but we cannot reach any result unless we take a moderate course. We should not take any extreme course. Saying that the PLO must be kept under some kind of supervision. We are not here to lie; it is not in our character. Lying would not help us in the pursuit of peace. There are time bombs in the Middle East--the Arab-Israel conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, the Indian-Pakistan conflict, which is quiet now, and conflict between China and the Soviet Union. It is not in our interest to lie to you or to ourselves in order to achieve peace. We must be honest and you must help us remove these bombs. I believe firmly that somehow we must make direct contact without an interpreter. If you ask the Palestinians about their real intentions, you will come up with a different idea. We hope to create an atmosphere of trust. If we are able to agree on the real problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict, then what was impossible will become possible. We will be able to convert our dreams into a reality; but we must be convinced that we are together in a ship that seeks peace and justice.

Why have we come to America the Soviets asked us? I told the Soviet Ambassador that if our disagreement was with Czechoslovakia, for example, then we would come to Moscow, but it is with Israel so we go to Washington. We realize that Israel is arrogant and it does not pay attention to the United States the way it used to. Lebanon typifies this arrogance. No one believes that Israel is completely independent of the United States. The U.S. still has some leverage on Israel. Maybe the situation in Israel today and its Government makes us more afraid of Israel than necessary. We have come to reiterate that we are confident of ourselves and believe in our rights. We have come to reiterate that our interest is in peace no less than yours. We are willing to build all kinds of logical bridges between our views.

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President Reagan. We trust your sincerity, honor and honesty. The difference is we find ourselves as an honest broker. Point seven's reference is not deliberately misleading and I did not mean to suggest that it was. I did my best to convince Israel that point seven contains implicit recognition of sovereignty, but I am concerned that you are charging Israel with no right to exist. We want to hear "yes" to recognition of Israel. We want to remove a roadblock on their part. Regarding the PLO, if King Hussein sits at the table as the negotiator necessarily empowered, the PLO should be a party and final decisions should be checked with them. But there are many bloody wounds and scars and it would be impossible for Israel to sit at a table with the PLO. This is why we call on King Hussein to step forward. A little healing must take place. Not that Palestinian interests should not be represented, but PLO presence would prevent there even being a table. We want to be absolutely fair that the solution does justice and brings about fairness. If we can be of help, we will but we are not an advocate for anyone.

At 12:00 noon the meeting adjourned.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 29, 1982

SITUATION ROOM:

Please LDX to State Op Cntr
and have them cable. Thank you.

D. Moore

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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7478

October 29, 1982

FOR: THE HONORABLE
AMBASSADOR JOSEPH REED
American Ambassador
Morocco

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CPT*

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

Attached are the Minutes of the President's meeting with King Hassan and the Arab League Delegation held in the Cabinet Room on October 22, 1982. Our records are classified SECRET. The version attached is unmarked and provided for your use in presenting to King Hassan.

Attachment
As stated

MINUTES

President Reagan. I'd like to welcome you all here to Washington. I know how important your mission is. We very much look forward to a detailed exchange of views. First, I'd like to ask King Hassan to begin the discussion.

King Hassan. Mr. President, we are here today in this hospitable and great country and especially in the White House in front of a man who is known for his honesty and sincerity. We are here as representatives of the Arab world and our purpose without exception is to open the doors of peace and coexistence in order to achieve justice and honesty. The Arabs have wasted tens of years of valuable time and effort in participation and discussions that went nowhere. In trying to build a peace in Arab countries there is a historical need to appear to be in a position befitting itself of logic and seriousness. For forty years the Arabs have been prevented from achieving their noble objectives. Instead the Arabs have been the target of attacks and their lands have been usurped. This tragedy needs serious work to be undone, and we are striving to find a resolution to this tragedy. We recognize that it cannot be achieved in a month or two or in a few weeks but a strong will can enable all of us to achieve what we aspire. We have come representing the Fez Summit. For the first time in our history the Arabs have laid down a plan bringing them and others to justice. The Arabs have come out of the negative to adopt a positive course but destiny just before Fez brought Mr. Reagan to announce his peace plan. We see in this coincidence a good omen but we should be frank and confess that President Reagan's plan and the Fez decisions have differences between them without any bridges which can bring the two sides together. So, we have come to explain and to hear. We want to interpret the Fez communique article by article and to propose to the President himself some of the questions that all of us know we may agree or disagree upon. But most important is for all of us to take the initiative to move as a result of the sincerity of our noble aims. Lastly, we ask the Almighty to give us the inspiration we need to move forward and to see light. Let me once again express my personal appreciation for all of your hospitality and understanding.

President Reagan. Let me make some remarks about my peace initiative, what it is and what it is not. The positions I put forward on September 1st are those that the U.S. will press in negotiations. I do not expect you or the Israelis to agree to them in advance. This is a real world not an ideal one and if either or both sides press for ideal results there will be no peace and the Palestinians will be losers. We've studied the Fez communique very carefully and we find positive elements in it. However, if point seven is meant to include recognition of Israel, it needs to be stated explicitly. Failure to do this creates more problems than you can

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1#117381
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

imagine. Without direct negotiations there can be no peace and the Palestinians will be the losers. We understand your concerns about Camp David, but Camp David commits Israel to a negotiated solution and takes into account Palestinians' rights. We do not want to lose that commitment but Israel will not negotiate with the PLO. Negotiations will not go anywhere with the PLO. West Bank and Gaza Arabs seem willing to negotiate for transitional arrangements which would end the Israeli occupation and a future beyond that of an association with Jordan. There is a need for widespread Arab support for King Hussein to begin negotiations with Israel. That is the only possible way to end Israeli occupation and the only realistic way that Palestinian rights can be achieved. The President then asked King Hassan for his comments.

King Hassan. The comment on the Fez communique can be summarized as follows: If the Arab countries consider that the Camp David framework was still valid to solve the present problem, then the Arabs would have referred to it in some way. We recognize that Camp David may have sometime been good, but because of its limited objectives and aims, it doesn't answer our needs individually or collectively. I know Hussein very well. He has courage and a desire for peace. If King Hussein had had any hope that the only way to enter the peace process was to join the Camp David process, he would have been the first to propose it and to enter into negotiations with the Israelis. We understand and appreciate the position of the United States on Camp David. It is for U.S. policy a measure of the continuation of U.S. policy and this continuity may take different shapes or forms but not its modality. Our second point is that the Arabs have reiterated that the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians is the PLO. We decided this in 1974 in the presence of the late President Sadat, may God bless his soul, and while he negotiated within the Camp David framework, he did not object to the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. Here is a basic point of difference between the U.S. and Arab League. We are considering what you have said that we have to help the Palestinians to seek salvation, but we do not believe that someone who does not have something can give anything up. The Palestinians have wasted no opportunity to declare that the PLO is their representative and that only the PLO can negotiate their destiny. There is hope within us. We hope serious talks have taken place between Hussein and the PLO. The only way to not contradict us is to bless these Jordanian-Palestinian steps and we should nourish it as the only bridge that will be a link between your plan and our position.

The last point which we consider essential is article seven in the Fez communique. It insures for all states in the area to live in peace and security under the UN Security Council. I have been

asked by the media does this mean recognition of Israel? Article Seven with all of its positive elements means to take the area from war into peace in the first stage, but in a second stage there would be exchange of interests, exchange of Ambassadors, and normalization which would all come later. And, we have to prepare point seven as a point where we are committed to peaceful coexistence in the area; if we find the right response especially regarding the PLO and Palestinians rights, then it is possible to come up with further clarity. Our brothers the Palestinians are honestly determined to coexist peacefully with all their neighbors when they have their own nation, this we have not seen before. The Palestinians may give guarantee directly perhaps under some kind of supervision. My team agrees and accepts this interpretation. The Jordanian-Palestinian action must be blessed. Palestinians are Jordanians and Jordanians are the brothers of the Palestinians. King Hussein is willing for everything except to negotiate the rights of the Palestinians now or in the future.

As partners with King Hussein, this will lead us out of the problem but we cannot reach any result unless we take a moderate course. We should not take any extreme course. Saying that the PLO must be kept under some kind of supervision. We are not here to lie; it is not in our character. Lying would not help us in the pursuit of peace. There are time bombs in the Middle East--the Arab-Israel conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, the Indian-Pakistan conflict, which is quiet now, and conflict between China and the Soviet Union. It is not in our interest to lie to you or to ourselves in order to achieve peace. We must be honest and you must help us remove these bombs. I believe firmly that somehow we must make direct contact without an interpreter. If you ask the Palestinians about their real intentions, you will come up with a different idea. We hope to create an atmosphere of trust. If we are able to agree on the real problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict, then what was impossible will become possible. We will be able to convert our dreams into a reality; but we must be convinced that we are together in a ship that seeks peace and justice.

Why have we come to America the Soviets asked us? I told the Soviet Ambassador that if our disagreement was with Czechoslovakia, for example, then we would come to Moscow, but it is with Israel so we go to Washington. We realize that Israel is arrogant and it does not pay attention to the United States the way it used to. Lebanon typifies this arrogance. No one believes that Israel is completely independent of the United States. The U.S. still has some leverage on Israel. Maybe the situation in Israel today and its Government makes us more afraid of Israel than necessary. We have come to reiterate that we are confident of ourselves and believe in our rights. We have come to reiterate that our interest is in peace no less than yours. We are willing to build all kinds of logical bridges between our views.

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At 12:00 noon the meeting adjourned.

MEMORANDUM

7478

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 27, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HOWARD J. TEICHER *HJ*
SUBJECT: Memcon for President's Plenary Meeting with
King Hassan and the Arab League Delegation
October 22, 1982, Cabinet Room, 11:05 p.m.

The attached subject memcon is forwarded for your review and approval for file.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A for filing.

APPROVE *RCM*

DISAPPROVE _____

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

RW
8/24/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

117382
7478

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Plenary Meeting
with King Hassan and the Arab League Delegation
October 22, 1982, Cabinet Room, 11:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State George Shultz
James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff and
Assistant to the President
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert C. McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Joseph Reed, State
Nicholas Veliotis, Assistant Secretary for
NEA, State
Vernon Walters, Ambassador at Large, Interpreter
Geoffrey Kemp, National Security Council
Howard J. Teicher, National Security Council

Arab League Delegation:

Morocco	-	King Hassan II Ambassador Ali Bengelloun
Saudi Arabia	-	Foreign Minister Saud Ambassador Alhegelan
Tunisia	-	Foreign Minister Essebsi Ambassador Ben Yahia
Algeria	-	Foreign Minister Ibrahimi Ambassador Layachi Yaker
Syria	-	Foreign Minister Khaddam Ambassador Jouejati

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Friday, October 22, 1982; 11:05-12:00 noon;
The Cabinet Room

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M371/1 #117382
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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MINUTES

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**National Security Council
The White House**

RECEIVED

Package # 7478

02 OCT 28 P 6: 20

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>✓</u>	<u>MW</u>	
Sit Room			

☒ I-Information
 ☐ A-Action
 ☐ R-Retain
 ☐ D-Dispatch
 ☐ N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

THIS package Replaces EARLIER
Memcom

401

**National Security Council
The White House**

RECEIVED

Package # 7478

82 OCT 29 A10: 51

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>#</u>	<u></u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>M</u>	<u></u>
Jacque Hill	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Judge Clark	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
John Poindexter	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Staff Secretary	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Sit Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

119047

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Bud

Request approval/
disapproval for
transmission of
attached per Geoff
Kemp.

assume it should
go via CIA back channel
via State channels?

Manning

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 # 119047

BY RW NARA DATE 12/21/15

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 28, 1982

TO: SITUATION ROOM

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP

Please LDX the attached
Memorandum of Conversation
to Ambassador Reed at the
American Embassy in Morocco.

36

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 28, 1982

FOR: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH REED
American Embassy
Morocco

THRU: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *JK*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

Attached are the Minutes of the President's meeting with King Hassan and the Arab League Delegation held in the Cabinet Room on October 22, 1982.

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President Reagan. We trust your sincerity, honor and honesty. The difference is we find ourselves as an honest broker. Point seven's reference is not deliberately misleading and I did not mean to suggest that it was. I did my best to convince Israel that point seven contains implicit recognition of sovereignty, but I am concerned that you are charging Israel with no right to exist. We want to hear "yes" to recognition of Israel. We want to remove a roadblock on their part. Regarding the PLO, if King Hussein sits at the table as the negotiator necessarily empowered, the PLO should be a party and final decisions should be checked with them. But there are many bloody wounds and scars and it would be impossible for Israel to sit at a table with the PLO. This is why we call on King Hussein to step forward. A little healing must take place. Not that Palestinian interests should not be represented, but PLO presence would prevent there even being a table. We want to be absolutely fair that the solution does justice and brings about fairness. If we can be of help, we will but we are not an advocate for anyone.

At 12:00 noon the meeting adjourned.

~~SECRET~~

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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83 FEB 17 P11:49

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

February 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reply by the President to the Letter from
King Hassan II of Morocco

The text of a letter to the President from King Hassan concerning the deferral of the February 7 visit to London of the Arab League's Committee of Seven was transmitted to you on February 4 (Tab 2).

A suggested Presidential reply is attached (Tab 1) which has been cast as a message of condolence on the death of General Dlimi, whose unexpected demise was cited by the King as the reason for the most recent deferral of the Committee's London visit.

After receiving approval, we will transmit the President's reply to Embassy Rabat for subsequent delivery to the King.

Charles Hill

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Suggested Message

Tab 2 - Letter to President from King Hassan

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State Guideline, July 21, 1997
BY RW NARA, DATE 8/26/11

117385

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRP M371/1 #117385
BY RW DATE 6/20/15

NEA/AFN:LSCHERMERHORN:RLD

02/15/83 X20279 EXT

NEA:DTSCHNEIDER NAME

NEA:WACLUVERIUS NAME

NEA/AFN:PSEBASTIAN NAME

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SPECIAL HANDLING

EXDIS, FOR AMBASSADOR REED AND GENERAL WALTERS

E.O. 12065: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, OVIP, MO

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REPLY TO KING HASSAN'S LETTER ON THE DEFERRAL OF FEBRUARY 7 LONDON MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN

REF: STATE {NODIS}

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO KING HASSAN'S LETTER DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON EARLY FEBRUARY BY GENERAL WALTERS FOLLOWS. AT DISCRETION, AMBASSADOR REED MAY WISH TO COORDINATE WITH GENERAL WALTERS DELIVERY OF RESPONSE DURING LATTER'S VISIT FOR TALKS WITH THE KING MARCH 2-4.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY:

GENERAL WALTERS CONVEYED TO ME YOUR LETTER ANNOUNCING THE DEATH OF GENERAL DLI MI AND ITS IMPACT UPON YOUR PLANNED VISIT TO BRITAIN.

I WELL REMEMBER THE GENERAL AND THE OCCASION OF MY

INITIALS

DTS

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Page 2

MEETING WITH HIM. I KNOW HOW MUCH YOU VALUED HIS LOYALTY, RELIED ON HIS JUDGMENT, AND DEPENDED ON HIM TO MANAGE MUCH OF THE IMPORTANT BUSINESS OF THE COURT. PERMIT ME TO OFFER MY MOST SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO YOU PERSONALLY, TO THE ARMY, AND TO GENERAL DILMI'S FAMILY AT THIS UNEXPECTED AND TRAGIC PASSING. I SHARE WITH YOU THE WISH THAT THE VOID WHICH HIS PASSING LEAVES MAY BE ADEQUATELY AND RAPIDLY FILLED SO THAT THE IMPORTANT WORK WHICH HE HAS UNDERTAKEN MAY CONTINUE TO BE CAPABLY AND LOYALLY CARRIED OUT.

I CERTAINLY UNDERSTAND YOUR DESIRE TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY MATTERS IN THE KINGDOM AT THIS IMPORTANT JUNCTURE. AS YOU REQUESTED, I IMMEDIATELY CONVEYED TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER WORD OF YOUR CONCERNS AND THEIR EFFECT UPON YOUR ABILITY TO VISIT LONDON.

LET ME REITERATE THE SENSE OF URGENCY I FEEL THAT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS MOVE FORWARD TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. I KNOW YOU SHARE MY CONCERN THAT THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY NOT BE ALLOWED TO ESCAPE US AND I COUNT ON YOUR CONTINUED AND VALUED ASSISTANCE IN THAT REGARD.

AGAIN, WITH MY DEEP CONDOLENCES AND SINCERE BEST WISHES FOR YOUR HEALTH AND WELFARE.

WITH ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION,

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN.

END TEXT.444

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

//-) L ATTENTION PARTICULIERE DE MONSIEUR LE GENERAL WALTERS

TEXTE:

MON GENERAL,

VOUS TROUVEREZ CI-JOINT UN MESSAGE DESTINE A NOTRE GRAND AMI
MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT DES ETATS-UNIS D AMERIQUE. NUL MIEUX QUE VOUS NE POURRAIT
LE COMMENTER ET NOUS COMPTONS SUR VOTRE CONCOURS TOUJOURS AUSSI DISPONIBLE
QU EFFICACE, AVEC NOS REMERCIEMENTS ET L EXPRESSION DE NOTRE SINCERE ET FIDELE
AMITIE.

SIGNE: HASSAN II ROI DU MAROC.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 #117386
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

117388 45
SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR RONALD REAGAN
PRESIDENT DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE
WASHINGTON, DC

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT ET GRAND AMI,

LE GENERAL AHMED DLI MI, QUE VOUS AVEZ EU L'OCCASION DE CONNAITRE LORS DE NOTRE DERNIERE VISITE A WASHINGTON, ET QUE VOUS CONNAISSEZ SANS DOUTE DE REPUTATION EU EGARD AUX NOMBREUSES RELATIONS QU'IL ENTRETENAIT AVEC DIVERS SERVICES AMERICAINS, VIENT DE MOURIR DANS UN ACCIDENT DE CIRCULATION.

SA MORT TRAGIQUE ET BRUTALE CONSTITUE POUR NOUS UN VIDE PROFOND. DLI MI DIRIGEAIT EN EFFET LA DIRECTION GENERALE D ETUDES ET DE DOCUMENTATIONS (D. G.E.D.), L'EQUIVALENT DE VOTRE C.I.A., EN MEME TEMPS QU'IL ETAIT COMMANDANT DE LA ZONE DU SAHARA.

EN POURVOYANT A SON REMPLACEMENT, NOUS NOUS TROUVONS OBLIGE DE REVOIR TOUTE LA REORGANISATION ET LA MISE EN PLACE DU DISPOSITIF DE LA ZONE DU SAHARA, ET DE DONNER LES INSTRUCTIONS ET LES DIRECTIVES APPROPRIEES AU NOUVEAU RESPONSABLE DE CETTE ZONE.

CETTE TACHE IMPORTANTE ET DE PREMIERE URGENCE NECESSITE NOTRE PRESENCE AU ROYAUME PENDANT QUELQUES TEMPS ENCORE.

NOUS NOUS TROUVONS DES LORS CONTRAINT DE REPORTER LE VOYAGE QUE NOUS DEVIONS EFFECTUER A LONDRES LE 7 FEVRIER A LA TETE DU COMITE DES SEPT DE LA LIGUE ARABE.

EVIDEMMENT NOUS INFORMONS DIRECTEMENT MME TATCHER DE CE FACHEUX CONTRETEMPS.

CONNAISSANT CEPENDANT L AMITIE QUI VOUS LIE PERSONNELLEMENT A MME TATCHER, NOUS VOUS SERIONS VIVEMENT RECONNAISSANT SI VOUS VOULIEZ BIEN VOUS-MEME, DE VOTRE COTE, APPUYER NOTRE DEMARCHE POUR EXPLIQUER A MME TATCHER LES RAISONS PROFONDES QUI NOUS AMENENT A DIFFERER LA VISITE QUE NOUS DEVIONS LUI FAIRE, VOTRE DEMARCHE AUPRES D ELLE CONTRIBUERA, NOUS EN SOMMES CERTAIN, A ATTENUER LES EFFETS DE CE REPORT.

EN VOUS REMERCIANT A L'AVANCE DE LA COLLABORATION AMICALE QUE VOUS VOUDRIEZ BIEN NOUS PRETER, NOUS VOUS PRIONS D AGREER, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT ET GRAND AMI, L EXPRESSION DE NOTRE TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION.

SIGNE: HASSAN II ROI DU MAROC.

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NLR 11/37/11 #117388
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22

To the personal attention of General Walters:

My Dear General:

You will find herewith a message addressed to our great friend, the President of the United States of America. No one is better able than you to comment on this message and we are counting on your assistance, which has always been forthcoming and efficient.

With our thanks and the expression of our sincere and faithful friendship.

Signed,

Hassan II, King of Morocco

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NLR 11739D

BY EW NARA DATE 6/22/15

117391 47
To His Excellency Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President and Good Friend:

General Ahmed Dlimi, whom you met during our last visit to Washington, has been killed in a tragic accident. I am sure you know his reputation because of the numerous relations he had with different American services.

His tragic and brutal death constitutes for us a profound loss. Dlimi was the Director General of our equivalent of your CIA and was also the military commander of the Sahara zone.

In undertaking to replace him we have found ourselves obliged to review the whole reorganization and deployment of forces in the Sahara and to give the appropriate instructions and directives to the new commander responsible for this area. This very important and urgent task requires our presence in the Kingdom for some time yet.

We find ourselves compelled to postpone the trip which we were to make to London on the 7th of February at the head of the Committee of Seven of the Arab League.

Obviously, we are directly informing Mrs. Thatcher of this unfortunate accident. Knowing, however, the friendship between you and Mrs. Thatcher, we would be most grateful if you could on your side support our demarche to explain to Mrs. Thatcher the profound reasons which have compelled us to postpone the visit we were to pay to her.

DECLASSIFIED
NARR M371/1 # 117391
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

Your demarche will, I am sure, contribute to attenuate the effects of this postponement.

Thanking you in advance for your friendly help, I would ask you to accept, Mr. President and great friend, the expression of our highest consideration.

Signed,

Hassan II, King of Morocco

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