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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/26/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (12/27/1982-01/31/1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 51

JAUVERT/BROWER

21

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117427	MEMCON	RE. MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER FRANCISCO PINTO BALSEMAO <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	9	12/16/1982	B1
117430	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI PRESIDENT NAVON <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	1/5/1983	B1
117432	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI PRESIDENT NAVON <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	1/5/1983	B1
117433	MEMCON	RE. MEETING BETWEEN RR AND HANS-JOCHEN VOGEL <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	1/7/1983	B1
117435	MEMCON	RE. RR'S TE-A-TET WITH PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	1/18/1983	B1
117439	MEMCON	DRAFT RE. SHULTZ-NAKASONE MEETING <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	1/17/1983	B1
117441	MEMCON	RE. MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	1/14/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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21

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117449	MEMO	GASTON SIGUR TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. MEMCON OF MEETING BETWEEN RR AND NAKASONE <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	1/28/1983	B1
117450	MEMCON	RE. RR AND NAKASONE MEETING <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	1/18/1983	B1
117452	MEMCON	RE. MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL [COPY OF DOC. 117441] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	1/25/1983	B1
117453	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND PRESIDENT DE LA MADRID <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	1/20/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TO POINDEXTER

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 27 DEC 82

rw 8/26/11
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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

KEYWORDS: PORTUGAL

AP

BALSEMAO, FRANCISCO

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF DEC 16 MTG BTW PRES & BALSEMAO

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 30 DEC 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
-	12/29	JP approved recon		
Wheeler	S 12/29	for signature	12/29	
C	12/29	Wheeler 8bd memo		B, MC

H.W. 12/29

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FILE

PH

H.
(C)

National Security Council
The White House

480

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Package # 8725

82 DEC 29 P 4: 41

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John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information **A-Action** R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 28, 1982

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with Portuguese Prime Minister Balsemao. Its distribution within the Department should be restricted to those whose duties require them to know its contents.

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment:

Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

(Unclassified upon removal of attachment)

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/21/11*

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting between the President and Portuguese Prime Minister Francisco Pinto Balsemao

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador H. Allen Homes

Prime Minister Francisco Pinto Balsemao

DATE, TIME December 16, 1982, 11:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President expressed his pleasure over the excellent state of relations between Portugal and the United States, and invited the Prime Minister to raise any issue he might have on his mind. (C)

Prime Minister Balsemao said he wished to discuss the question of Portuguese candidacy for membership in the European Community. Portugal has been waiting a long time to enter the Community. In the meantime, the Common Market has been deteriorating and is facing a serious economic crisis. Portugal does not wish to be an eternal candidate, and the longer its admission is delayed, the more he is thinking of Portugal's "Atlantic option." (S)

With respect to the European Community, the President said that the United States has had extensive meetings with the Community leadership, and that we have differences on trade. It is important, however, for us to make headway together in resolving those differences. (S)

Acting Secretary Dam said that we were making progress, that we had reached a concrete agreement with the French and that we had succeeded in settling the steel issue. We also have a good understanding with the Italians and the French regarding our joint endeavor in Lebanon. (S)

Returning to the question of Portuguese candidacy for EC membership, the Prime Minister said that pressure was growing in Portugal for his country to get into the Common Market. He reiterated, however, that Portugal with its group of islands in the Azores cannot overlook its "Atlantic option." (C)

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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NLRR M3711 #117427

BY LW NARA DATE 6/22/15

Returning to the question of U.S.-European trade, the President said that the United States strongly supports free trade but that it must also be fair trade. Some of America's trading partners had resorted to restrictions which had distorted our trade patterns somewhat. Noting the growing protectionism, the President drew a parallel with the protectionism phenomenon that preceded the Great Depression, and emphasized how important it is today to resist protectionist pressure. (S)

Acting Secretary Dam noted the differences we have with the Community on agriculture, particularly in view of the substantial subsidies the Community uses to protect its farmers. (S)

Once again Prime Minister Balsemao adverted to the dilemma facing Portugal: the pressure to join the Community (the "European option"), and the importance of strengthening relations with the United States and Canada (the "Atlantic option"). (S)

In conclusion, the Prime Minister briefly explained Portugal's complicated form of government. The President of Portugal is a former military man, not a politician. It may seem to the United States from time to time that there are two governing authorities in Portugal, but in reality, he emphasized, it is the government which conducts the business of the Republic of Portugal. (S)

The meeting moved to the Cabinet Room, and the following participants joined:

U.S.	Secretary Weinberger
	Secretary Regan
	Secretary Block
	Deputy Defense Secretary Carlucci
	Robert McFarlane
	Robert Blackweill
	Adm. Jonathan Howe
	Alan H. Flanigan
Portuguese:	Foreign Minister Futscher-Pereira
	Finance Minister Salgueiro
	Portuguese Ambassador to the U.S. Mathias
	Joao Bosco da Mota Amaral, President of the
	Regional Government of the Azores
	Carlos Pardal, Deputy Minister of Defense
	Ambassador Antonio Vaz Pereira, Director General
	for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The President opened the expanded meeting with Prime Minister Balsemao by saying that the United States wants to continue the close cooperation and friendship that exists between the two countries. The American side would like to hear Portugal's views on several issues such as Southern Africa, the Middle East and developments in Spain. He was sure the Portuguese side had issues it would like to raise. (S)

Prime Minister Balsemao said that the President of the United States does not have very much time to think about Portugal. He would therefore like to take the opportunity to explain internal developments of Portugal. In 1974 Portugal began a new experience which was not an easy one. For 40 years it had lived under a right-wing dictatorship. After the 1974 Revolution it almost fell under the power of a communist dictatorship. Portugal survived as a democracy. As a result of this unique experience the people of Portugal had concluded that they did not want either right-wing dictatorship or a communist dictatorship; they wanted democracy. In the past year Portugal had completed the transition period. The 1976 Constitution had been revised; the military had been brought under civilian control. The Portuguese success story has not gotten the world attention it deserved because it had to compete for news attention with many world problems. (S)

Prime Minister Balsemao said Portugal is a candidate for Common Market membership. It is also a founding member of NATO and it wants to play a more active role. To do so it needs to modernize its military forces. Prime Minister Balsemao said he had already discussed with Acting Secretary of State Dam the bilateral security negotiations and explained that the renewal of the Lajes agreement and the question of expanded facilities must be considered separately. (S)

Prime Minister Balsemao said Portuguese support for the United States has been strong and unswerving, for example on Poland and Afghanistan. There are those in Portugal who argue that the United States takes Portugal for granted. This belief is given substance when one compares the assistance the United States provides Portugal with assistance provided other countries some of whom are not even in NATO. (S)

The Prime Minister noted that Portugal has cooperated with the United States in Southern Africa where it has a special role. The people of five countries in Africa speak Portuguese. (S)

With regard to Spain, Prime Minister Balsemao said the situation was not yet clear and would bear watching closely. Problems could develop, although he did not consider the new Spanish government to be "anti-Western." (S)

Prime Minister Balsemao said that he would appreciate hearing from the President his views about the Soviet Union after

Brezhnev and developments in the Middle East and Southern Africa. He would also be very interested in the President's views on the world economic situation. He said Portugal suffers from the strength of the dollar. (S)

The President said his Administration certainly did not take Portugal for granted. He pointed out that it was the Congress that had refused to provide the levels of assistance the Administration had requested. He also said that the Administration had submitted a request to increase the FY-83 assistance levels and would do so in FY-84 and future years. (S)

With regard to the economic situation, the President said that when he had come to office interest rates had skyrocketed and inflation was at a double digit level. He had set out to cure these problems. The interest rate has now dropped to half of what it was two years ago; inflation is down to less than 5% annually; and there is growing evidence of economic recovery. One of the hardest hit sectors, housing, is up 30% from last year. There is still a major unemployment problem, but the program is succeeding, and the Administration intends to continue. (S)

Concerning the Middle East, the President said that he had sent Ambassador Habib back to try to stimulate progress. The time for action is now. It is necessary to get all foreign forces out of Lebanon. (S)

The President then asked Secretary of Defense Weinberger to comment on the defense aspects of the bilateral relationship. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that the base in the Azores is very important. The U.S. has invested a large amount of money in it, and it helps both countries. The U.S. is anxious to work out a long-term arrangement so that the Portuguese military will have some idea of what kind of assistance they can expect and be able to plan their modernization program. He acknowledged that it is sometimes difficult to get the Congress to go along with the Administration's assistance proposals, and he re-affirmed the intention of the Administration to make a strong effort to get the assistance Portugal needs. He concluded by saying that it is important that the bilateral negotiations result in an agreement which both sides believe beneficial to them. (S)

The Prime Minister said there are two types of problems - one of principle and one of spirit. With regard to principle, the negotiations must proceed on the basis of renewal of the present agreement. Expansion would be complicating. With regard to spirit, Portugal and the U.S. should have a strong cooperative relationship, should work together for their mutual benefit. It is for this reason that the idea of a Luso-American foundation is a positive one. The two countries

must work together: their relationship must go beyond grants and loans. Grant and loans are important but spirit is more important. Portugal is a reliable friend. It has proved that it is reliable. If the U.S. agrees then the spirit of mutual cooperation must be better developed. (S)

Acting Secretary Dam returned to the question of separation of the renewal of the Lajes agreement from the rest of the negotiations. He said that this question had been discussed in his earlier meeting with the Prime Minister. He wanted to reiterate that the security assistance levels he had presented to the Prime Minister in that meeting had been predicated on a global approach. The Administration's ability to get increased funding from the Congress would be affected by what we could tell the Congress about expanded facilities. (S)

At the Prime Minister's invitation, President Amaral of the Azores Regional Government emphasized the importance of the economic development of the Azores. He pointed out that the 1979 Lajes Agreement had a special provision for such development. He said that the stability of the Azores is important to Portugal and the U.S. For this reason it is vital that such economic development efforts be continued. (S)

The meeting resumed over lunch in the White House. (U)

The Vice President said that on his recent trip to Africa he had discussed American efforts to solve the Namibian problem. He had explained what the United States is trying to do and at each of his stops had asked the government leaders with whom he met if they had any better ideas. None of them suggested a better way to proceed, and he had the feeling that they hoped the United States would succeed even though they could not say as much in public meetings. The Vice President during his trip had openly acknowledged that one aim of the United States in southern Africa was the Cuban withdrawal in the context of a peaceful solution. In general, he was not discouraged by the reaction he encountered to his presentation of U.S. policy. He had called the Secretary General of the United Nations after his trip, and the Secretary General had expressed understanding for the American position.

Prime Minister Balsemao responded that Portugal was interested both in the economic development of southern Africa and bringing peace. The area was potentially rich in natural resources, and Portugal's traditional ties would be beneficial in its trade with the region. He agreed with the American view that the Cubans should leave Angola, but his advice was to let Angola bring about the withdrawal itself rather than imposing it on them. Angola, however, needed to be reassured that if the Cubans left, the South Africans would not conduct further raids into Angola and that the Angolan government would not be besieged by an internal revolt. The Prime Minister

pointed out that the Cubans were not well accepted in Angola; that they were better fed and better treated than the natives who resented their presence. Dos Santos, in the Prime Minister's estimate, was probably pro-West, but he did not speak for the entire MPLA.

Foreign Minister Futscher-Pereira said that in his opinion an eventual withdrawal of Cubans from Angola would be seen as a major Soviet setback in Africa. The Soviets had worked very hard at increasing their influence in Africa and their plans have been largely a failure. The application of Marxism/Leninism in Africa has been a disaster. Because this removal of Cuban troops would be the final blow to Soviet plans for Africa, it will be difficult to achieve. It was important to encourage those African leaders in countries who believed that they should open their societies to the West. This was Portugal's goal. He had noted that many African countries were saying nasty things to the Portuguese government, but they were saying them in Portuguese. The Foreign Minister mentioned a recent meeting he had held with the Economic Minister of Mozambique in which the Economic Minister had said that Mozambique was open to investment by Western countries, even South Africa, although they preferred that investment be joint South African-Portuguese ventures. Although the Mozambique government was Marxist, the leaders were not "practicing Marxists," and the countries of the West should deal with them pragmatically. In response to a question from the Vice President, the Foreign Minister said that he did not believe that the Cubans would enter Mozambique. The Mozambique government knew that if they did the South Africans would probably follow.

In response to a question from the President, Foreign Minister Futscher-Pereira said that it would be difficult for the governments of Angola or Mozambique to form governments which would include those parties now opposed to them and sometimes fighting against them. For example, the Angolan government was willing to include UNITA in the government, but not with the participation of Savimbi. The Foreign Minister said that the Angolan government would be afraid of the Savimbi opposition movement even if there were a pledge that the South Africans would not invade Angola. With the Cubans supporting them, there was a standoff between the Angola government and the UNITA forces.

In summary, Foreign Minister Futscher-Pereira said that the tragedy of Mozambique and Angola was that both governments were prevented from action by resistance movements but neither resistance movement was strong enough to govern itself as a replacement for the present governments.

The conversation turned to economic subjects.

Finance Minister Salgueiro said that there was little cause for optimism in the world economy. Portugal was facing all of the old economic shocks which were afflicting other Western countries and, in addition, had a large relocating population to deal with. In addition, the previous left-wing governments had nationalized key industries--banking and the larger production industries--and there were debts to be paid for these nationalizations. The current government was attempting to denationalize, but with the two-thirds majority required, was not having much success. The current government had inherited large debts. It had reduced the budget deficits 20% in real terms over the past three years. At present the entire budget deficit equaled the interest payment on the national debt, which was down to 8-1/2% of the gross national product. Although the Portuguese government did not believe in wage and price controls, it had been necessary a short time ago to devalue the currency and institute a short freeze on wages and prices because of the second French devaluation. The Portuguese economy was an open economy, and a member of the European Free Trade Association. For a major recovery it was necessary to await the overall world recovery, but in the meantime it was important to reduce the government's debt and the budget deficits. Finance Minister Salgueiro went on to discuss the political situation. In the recent municipal elections the governing coalition had dropped a little bit and the Socialists had come up somewhat. The Communist vote did not increase as a percentage of the electorate, but the Communists had taken control of six towns. The Communists in Portugal were not presenting themselves as Communists but, in fact, they were the most "Sovietized" in Europe. They had good organization, controlled several trade unions, and had both above ground and an underground organizations. They were following a long-term plan to take power, but as long as the world economic crisis did not get worse and the non-Communist governments kept their majority, they would not succeed in their plans. The Communist party in Portugal had also been hurt by the events in Poland and by the Bulgarian connection with the assassination attempt on the Pope.

In response to a question from Agriculture Secretary Block, Prime Minister Balsemao said that a quarter of the land in Portugal was in large government-owned farms, and the rest private. Secretary Block said that the United States was willing to give Portugal technical assistance for its agricultural sector in addition to the sales of food which it was currently making. He asked that the Agricultural Minister meet with him to discuss these subjects.

Treasury Secretary Regan said that at the recent meetings he had held with the Commissioners of the European Community, the Europeans had been uniformly discouraged about the prospects for economic recovery in 1983 and were hopeful for recovery in 1984. The Europeans were looking to the United States, but the Secretary said he did not believe in the "locomotive theory." He said that despite its disadvantages, the current disinflationary period

might be healthy in the long run. It was destroying the inflationary expectations which had become part of the thinking of government, businessmen and politicians alike. Many Latin America countries had decided it was possible to live with inflation. Even the Germans with whom the Secretary had talked agreed that they had allowed themselves to become less productive because of inflationary expectations. In the United States most people had gotten used to it. The Secretary said that although the American recovery would be slow, it was his expectation that it would be a solid recovery. 1983 would be not a great year but a good year. Past recoveries since World War II had been quick, "snap-back" recoveries. The current recovery would be slow but it would be more durable and sustained. In order to ensure the recovery was durable, the United States had not raised the money supply. In the Secretary's opinion, the other major industrialized countries were about 6-8 months behind the United States. He noted that the dollar had recently dropped in value about 10% compared to other major currencies. In the next few months he expected the drop to continue. The Secretary concluded by noting that protectionism seemed to be increasing in the world. It was true in the European Community, and there was pressure within the United States through such legislation as the domestic content bills.

Secretary Weinberger said that the protectionist mentality also caused problems for the United States in some of its overseas defense facilities. Although the Defense Department would like to increase the amount of maintenance and repair work done at Lajes by the Azoreans, it was difficult to get authorization from Congress.

Prime Minister Balsemao said that Portugal was "the South of the North" and had a low standard of living compared to northern European countries. If conditions became much more austere in Portugal, democracy itself would be threatened. He said that the unemployment levels in Portugal, while not unmanageable at the moment, had the potential to become so.

Treasury Secretary Regan said that in his opinion the U.S. dollar would go back to about the level it had been in 1981 compared to other currencies. At the end of 1981 and in early 1982 a great deal of "flight capital" had come into the country, keeping the value of the dollar high. This capital would leave and the value of the dollar should fall. This should help the oil import bills of countries like Portugal.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, President Reagan said it was still too early to tell what changes in policy would be made by the new Soviet government. Because the Soviet system was led by a small group of men in the Politburo, it was difficult to think that there would be drastic changes in policy. The Vice President added that it was the U.S. hope that Andropov, saddled with problems in Poland, Afghanistan, and with discontent among his people, might change the policies of the past. He said that it

~~SECRET~~

was possible that Andropov's KGB background had given him a wider knowledge of the West than other Soviet leaders, and that he might have a better understanding of the policies of Western countries. However, the Vice President said that the best policy now was to remain firm. So far there had been no visible change in the Soviet positions. The President added that one positive indication from the Soviet Union had been that they were staying at the arms negotiations tables and that they were involved with the United States in more intensive arms reduction negotiations than there ever had been before between the two countries.

Prime Minister Balsemao said that there were some worries that, beset by problems, the Soviet Union might lash out beyond its borders.

The meeting ended with exchanges of pleasantries at 1:30 p.m.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ACTION

December 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Portuguese
Prime Minister Balsemao

Attached for your approval is a memcon of the President's meeting with Portuguese Prime Minister Balsemao. It is straight-forward and non-controversial, and once you approve Mike Wheeler's memo at Tab I, we will transmit it to State.

RECOMMENDATION
 OK
 NO

That you approve the attached memcon and its transmission to State.

Attachments:

Tab I Memo from Mike Wheeler
Tab II Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET

(Unclassified upon removal of attachments)

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 18, 2009
BY NARA RW DATE 8/21/11

NSC/S PROFILE

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RU 8/21/11

ID 8300233

RECEIVED 11 JAN 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM TEICHER

DOCDATE 11 JAN 83

14

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

AP

NAVON, YITZHAK

SUBJECT: MEMCONS FOR PRES MTG W/ NAVON 5 JAN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 14 JAN 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8208922

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National Security Council
The White House

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JAN 1 1 1992

Package # 0233

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN .	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>AI</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>AI</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

Information
 Action
 Retain
 Dispatch
 No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MW

MEMORANDUM

233

16

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RW
8/20/11

January 11, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HOWARD J. TEICHER *HJT*

SUBJECT: Memcons for President's Meetings with
President Navon, January 5, 1983, in the
Oval Office and Cabinet Room

The attached subject memcons are forwarded for your review
and approval for file.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcons at Tab A and B for filing.

APPROVE

[Handwritten Signature]

DISAPPROVE _____

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

RW

117430

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

233

17

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting
with Israeli President Navon
January 5, 1983, Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State George Shultz
William P. Clark, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis

Israelis

President Yitzhak Navon
Ambassador Moshe Arens
Deputy Chief of Mission Benjamin Netanyahu

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Wednesday, January 5, 1983; 11:40 a.m.-
11:55 a.m.; the Oval Office

Minutes

After a photo opportunity for President and Mrs. Navon with President Reagan, and general photo opportunities for both Presidents, President Reagan welcomed President Navon to the White House and said he would like to speak for a few moments about the background for his September 1st initiative. He said he had been concerned and worried about the misunderstandings which seemed to have developed in Israel about his intentions. He assured President Navon that his dedication to the security and well being of Israel was as great as ever, that he continues to regard Prime Minister Begin as a friend, and that his September 1st initiative is grounded in the conviction that only peace can bring lasting security to Israel, a view he knows is shared by a vast majority of Israelis.

The President went on to describe the way in which the U.S. commitment to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Lebanese problem, as demonstrated in the U.S. commitment to the Multinational Force, was a further and parallel demonstration of the purpose for his September 1st peace initiative. In both cases, the President said, our policies reflect the conviction that territory alone cannot assure peace but that we would not accept anything less for Israel than genuine security for its people.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLR # 117430

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/01

The President added that his stress in his September 1st initiative on the need for a settlements freeze reflected his conviction that this issue had to be brought to the negotiating table where the future of the settlements had to be agreed, rather than leaving it as a unilateral decision by any party.

The President concluded his initial remarks by describing briefly his conversations recently with King Hussein. He said that King Hussein had made clear he wants to participate in the peace process but that he has to present his ideas to some of his fellow Arab leaders before he can give us a final response.

At this point President Navon asked: "Did King Hussein condition his participation on PLO participation?"

The President responded that King Hussein knows very well, and that we had made it abundantly clear to him, that the PLO cannot expect to be at the negotiating table if there is to be a negotiation. Rather, it must be once or twice removed from the negotiations, though King Hussein would undoubtedly want to keep PLO leaders informed, and he would include West Bank leaders along with his delegation.

President Navon then explained that because of his essentially ceremonial position, he is "paid not to speak his mind". However, he said that he might perhaps give the President a sense of the mood in Israel across the political spectrum about President Reagan's peace initiative of September 1st, which he stressed encompassed in Israeli minds both the President's letter to Begin and talking points together with the President's speech to the American public. President Navon said that in the Knesset debate following President Reagan's initiative, a large percentage of the major opposition party supported the initiative as a basis for negotiations, while the Government rejected it as an overall package which was not seen as providing acceptable assurance for Israel's national security. Yet, President Navon stressed, across the political spectrum people on both sides acknowledged President Reagan's good intentions and his good will toward Israel, as well as his dedication to helping achieve peace for Israel and its neighbors. President Navon stressed this attitude of confidence in President Reagan's intentions and basic good will for Israel, regardless of the reactions to his specific proposals.

President Navon then went on to say that there is in Israel a national consensus on certain questions which he would try to describe: Borders. Practically no Israeli can accept a return to the 1967 borders which are indefensible. President Navon stressed that Israel wants peace above all, but that peace alone is an insufficient guarantee for Israeli security. (Navon quoted Henry Kissinger's remark that "all wars break out from a state of peace.") President Navon went on to mention the small size of

Israel, only 8,000 square miles, and the even smaller size of the disputed territories, only another 2,000 square miles). Recalling the initial breakthrough made by the Syrians on the Golan during the 1973 war, President Navon stressed that had that war broken out with the Arabs on the 1967 lands, Israel would have been cut in two by the initial Syrian thrust. "For us, a few kilometers difference in our borders can be crucial, and I hope that the Arabs do not believe there is any way we can be brought to return to the 1967 borders which are indefensible." President Navon quoted from a remark in President Reagan's speech of September 1st to the effect that he would not ask Israel to live again within artillery range of enemy territory.

President Reagan acknowledged the passage in his speech meant that the borders had to be negotiated. He said that this has always been his conviction, and that the purpose of the negotiation had to be over the necessary adjustments which must be made between Israel's view and that of the Arabs.

At 11:55, the President suggested that the group adjourn to the Cabinet Room to continue the discussion with additional participants.

Prepared by
Ambassador Samuel Lewis

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

233

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

117432
20

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting
with Israeli President Navon
January 5, 1983, Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State George Shultz
William P. Clark, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Robert McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis
Nicholas Veliotos, Assistant Secretary for
NEA, State
Geoffrey Kemp, National Security Council
Howard J. Teicher, National Security Council

Israelis

President Yitzhak Navon
Ambassador Moshe Arens
Deputy Chief of Mission Benjamin Netanyahu
Colonel Yarkoni, Director of the
President's Office
Chief of North American Division
Eitan Bentsur, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Political Counselor Robbie Sabel

DATE, TIME, Wednesday, January 5, 1983; 11:55 a.m. -
AND PLACE: 12:15 p.m.; the Cabinet Room

Minutes

President Reagan welcomed President Navon to the Cabinet Room and told the President that absolutely nothing had changed regarding the security commitment of the United States to Israel. The President pledged U.S. friendship.

President Navon continued the Oval Office discussion. He wanted to try to give the President an idea regarding what positions are shared in common by the governing coalition and the opposition. He had already spoken of borders, and now he would turn to Jerusalem. He digressed briefly to comment on the tragedy

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DECL: OADR

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NLR 13711 #117432
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

of President Sadat's assassination. Sadat had broken many taboos and truly showed bold vision. But with respect to Jerusalem, Sadat had spoken of a united not divided Jerusalem. He spoke about this in confidence with President Navon. Perhaps there could be a Jerusalem principality with a separate department for East Jerusalem. There would need to be some sort of a symbol such as a flag. A year later, however, President Sadat began speaking of a Jerusalem with two sovereignties. This would mean that Jerusalem would be divided. Whether it's Likud or the opposition there is no discrepancy that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and it must remain undivided. There is also no possibility of Israeli support for a Palestinian state. It would be pro-Soviet and irredentist. When I hear PLO declarations regarding Israel's right to exist it is insulting. Who are they to say that we have a right to exist. We want peace and security. What would be significant would be their changing the Palestinian covenant. But right now they are still a terrorist organization. Unfortunately, the tragedy of Beirut did not change the article of the covenant that calls for the destruction of Israel. Regarding peace with Egypt, there is hope and real trauma. Israel gave up the Sinai. Unfortunately, Israel had gotten used to having the Sinai. The Sinai itself is three times the size of Israel. It has oil and airfields. Settlers moved there with pioneering spirit. But, the moves of President Sadat represented a breakthrough and the beginning of a new era. Comprehensive peace was not possible but there are so many hopes and expectations. Unfortunately, we now have a frozen peace. What is most disturbing is the press criticism from Egypt. It is increasingly an attack on the Jewish people, on the Jewish faith and their character comparing the Jews with the Nazis. President Navon continued that he sent a message to President Mubarak asking him to please do something about the press. The continued propaganda imperils the peace between Egypt and Israel. What is most disturbing to President Navon regarding the downturn in Egyptian-Israeli relations is the effect that this change is having on the mood of Israelis toward making peace. If the peace with Egypt is not good, then Israelis will lose faith that it can achieve real peace with the other Arabs. Navon said that he was worried. Increasingly the peace is void of any substance. He referred to an incident in Brazil regarding a ping-pong tournament when the Egyptian team was told that it could not compete with the Israeli team. Even more significant, the Government of Egypt warned the Lebanese not to reach agreement with Israel on normalization and not to give up too much to the Israelis. This is very disturbing. This increasingly calls into question Egypt's commitment to Camp David. Navon is not only worried about Egyptian-Israeli relations but if it is the model for peace between Israel and the Arabs it is not very encouraging. He continued that there are as yet no results of President Reagan's effort and asked whether permanent peace, real peace, can be made with the Arabs. With

the Egyptians there are fifty agreements that are not being respected in a practical manner. He asked the President to discuss these problems with Mubarak. Why are the Egyptians doing this? Perhaps it is to return to the Arab fold or to clean the "black spot of peace from the Egyptian image". Sadat described Egypt as the mother Arab and was convinced that the other Arabs would come crawling to Egypt. It doesn't seem to be happening that way.

President Reagan said that we will talk to Mubarak when he comes here. There must be a real peace. We are not flying blind nor are we naive.

The meeting broke up at 12:15 and adjourned for lunch.

Prepared by
Howard J. Teicher

UNCLASSIFIED SECTION
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 14 JAN 83 12

TO POINDEXTER

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 11 JAN 83 23

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

AP

VOGEL, HANS-JOCHEN

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ VOGEL

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 17 JAN 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	8861 A T NWC JAN 17 1983	Poindexter approved		
Wheeler	5 JAN 17 1983	for signature		
	1/17	Wheeler go memo	DWB	DB, MW

DISPATCH ed 1/17 MW W/ATTCH FILE OK (CW)

CONFIDENTIAL


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Meeting with Hans-Jochen Vogel

Attached is the memorandum of the conversation between the President and SPD chancellor-candidate Hans-Jochen Vogel. The memorandum's distribution in the Department should be restricted to those whose duties require them to know its contents.



Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Tab A Memcon

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 8.4(b) Exempt from automatic
White House Declassification
BY NARA RW 8/26/11

117433

0241

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

25

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting between the President and SPD
Chancellor-Candidate Hans-Jochen Vogel

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
The Vice President
National Security Advisor William P. Clark
Deputy National Security Advisor
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs Designate Richard R. Burt
NSC Staff Member, Commander Dennis C. Blair, USN

FRG
Hans-Jochen Vogel
FRG Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission,
Hans-Theodor Wallau

DATE, TIME January 7, 1983, 9:37-10:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President welcomed Chancellor-Candidate Vogel to the United States and said that he was sure the Chancellor-Candidate was interested in the American position on the INF negotiations. The President stated that the United States was dedicated to the zero proposal it had made in Geneva as the best means to ensure that there was no need to deploy NATO's missiles, but if the Soviets were unwilling to negotiate then the United States intended to go ahead with the second track and deploy the missiles. (C)

Chancellor-Candidate Vogel thanked the President for receiving him at the White House and said that he brought a message with three parts. First, he emphasized the common ground and common values between the German and American people which formed a strong basis for their alliance. The second part of his message was that an increasing number of people in Germany were concerned about the arms race and about the possibility of nuclear catastrophe. There was a particularly active dialogue among churches on this point. Understanding the great burdens that were on the President's shoulders, Chancellor-Candidate Vogel said that he appreciated that President Reagan had resumed the START talks and that of course Germans appreciated and knew the importance of INF. Concerning INF, the Chancellor-Candidate wished to point out two positive aspects of the

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLR # M37111 #117433
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

of the latest Andropov proposals: For the first time the Soviets had offered to reduce their missiles, and, for the first time, the Soviets had presented a plan in which missiles were balanced against missiles, and airplanes against airplanes. The Chancellor-Candidate "begged" that the United States reach an agreement with the Soviet Union which would reduce the systems. The third part of the message was that he was pleased that the United States was interested in increasing international cooperation to reduce unemployment and to bring back economic and with it, social stability. The Chancellor-Candidate said that after March 6 he could well be Chancellor of Germany and that on the basis of the policies in this message he would be conducting his relations with the United States. He asked the President to remember the many in Europe who were strongly opposed to communism and were still concerned about the arms race. The Chancellor-Candidate had discussed these concerns with many other foreign leaders including the Pope. In conclusion, concerning the Geneva INF talks, he hoped that the first American position would not be the last position. In many arms talks, beginning and final positions were different. (C)

In reply, The President said that the United States was negotiating in Geneva in good faith and that there were some signs of progress in the negotiations. He noted in jest that the Soviets had come half-way to the U.S. position: they had agreed to the part of the zero proposal that entailed no missiles for the United States. The President assured Chancellor-Candidate Vogel that the goal of the United States was peace. In the President's mind there was no alternative. The United States would do all it could. Its immediate goal was to reduce the most destabilizing systems as far as they possibly could be reduced and he noted that the best chance to reach this goal was to convince the other side that unless they cooperated, the alternative would be the deployment of the NATO systems. (C)

At the end of the meeting the Chancellor-Candidate and the President posed for pictures in the Rose Garden. (U)

502

National Security Council The White House

Package # 0241

'83 JAN 14 ~~11:33~~
1250

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information **A-Action** R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MW

28

MEMORANDUM

0241

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

January 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ADM. POINDEXTER

FROM: DENNIS J. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Meeting with Hans-Jochen Vogel

Attached for your approval is the memorandum of the President's conversation with German SPD chancellor-candidate Hans-Jochen Vogel. Once you approve the memcon, Mike Wheeler's memo at Tab I will forward it to State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A.

Approve

Disapprove

Tab A Memcon
Tab I Wheeler to Bremer memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(D), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 21, 2009
BY NARA rw DATE 8/26/11

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8300485

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED EMBELLISHMENTS

RECEIVED 19 JAN 83 18

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 19 JAN 83 28

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

NAKASONE, YASUHIRO

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PM NAKASONE 18 JAN

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO DUE: 21 JAN 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8800403

NSCIFID

(J /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	JAN 21 1983	Clark disapproved		8u

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(PA) (C)

**National Security Council
The White House**

1725P

Package #

509
485

JAN 19 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	2		
Bud McFarlane	1	m	A
Jacque Hill	3	g	
Judge Clark	2	✓	
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

~~SECRET~~

0485

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31

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 19, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *JS*

SUBJECT: Memcon - President's Tete-a-tete with Prime Minister Nakasone, Oval Office, January 18, 1983 and Memo from You to President

I am forwarding to you the Memcon on the President's principle meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone prepared by Cornelius Iida, the interpreter for the President. It is very well done and gives us the flavor of this excellent meeting. I have prepared a memo from you to the President forwarding this on to him (Tab I). I have also sent a copy of the Memcon to Paul Wolfowitz for him and the Secretary to have.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ *[scribble]*

Disapprove _____ *[checkmark]*

Attachments:

- Tab I Clark memo to President
- Tab A Memcon of 1/18 meeting

Approved
for the record

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
ON 04/01/83 BY [unclear]
BY NARA RW DATE 8/26/11

~~SECRET~~

0485

32

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK ~~WPC~~

SUBJECT: Memcon on Your Meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone
in the Oval Office, January 18, 1983

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation on your meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone in the Oval Office on January 18, 1983. It was prepared by the interpreter.

Attachment:
Tab A Memcon

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Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2009
BY NARA RW DATE 8/26/11

~~SECRET~~

117435

33

MEMCON: President's tet-a-tet with PM Nakasone
Oval Office, January 18, 1983

The President officially welcomed the Prime Minister, and said that he had been looking forward to the visit. He complimented the Prime Minister's leadership in Japanese foreign policy matters as evident from the latter's recent visit to Korea. He stated that a strong alliance between the U.S. and Japan is vital for the peace and economic recovery of the entire world.

PM Nakasone responded with a clear agreement.

The President said that he wished to point out that the American people saw imbalance in the US-Japan trade relations. He noted the steps the Prime Minister had taken, and knew that those were politically difficult decisions to make. However, he himself also faced growing problems in his country, and the protectionism sentiments on the Hill were growing. Once the path to the protectionism is chosen, observed the President, that road is endless. The answer to the world's economic problems is in the freer market places.

The President met with the nation's business, labor and agricultural leaders yesterday, and they pressed for resolution of the difficulty in U.S. trade relations with Japan. Congressional leaders indicated the same need. The President said that unless the U.S. and Japan, the two of the foremost economies of the world cooperate and improve the trade relations, the collapse in the free trade system might result in conditions worse than the Great Depression in which both nations will suffer greatly. The President emphasized that he had to tell the Prime Minister that we needed more progress on the basis of the steps the Prime Minister had taken, particularly in the market access.

The President indicated that as the Prime Minister knew, 1984 is an election year in the U.S. And already several potential candidates are making fair trade an issue. If they return to the leadership positions, U.S. will go protectionist.

Mr. Nakasone responded that he heard of these pressures yesterday when Secretary Shultz talked with him. He said that the essential situation surrounding his inauguration as Japanese Prime Minister is quite similar to that prevailed at President Reagan's assumption of the office. Both previous administrations were drifting, and stagnating without decisive policies on important issues. As Mr. Reagan succeeded in breaking down the wall of indecision with firm determinations. And he himself similarly succeeded in these two months to break down political taboos and set up a new track for Japanese policies.

He said he would not dwell in details what he had accomplished in setting new tracks for coping with the economic frictions and defense needs. Only would he emphasize that the free trade system alone is

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NLRR M3711 #117435

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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34

the path of salvation. He looked forward to mutual consultations through which to solve matters one by one. He said that just as the President has 1984 looming ahead, so does two elections in Japan as well as the new session of the Diet loom ahead for Nakasone. At the Diet session, he was expecting to have strong opposition of the non-ruling parties against his decision of the military technology exports to the U.S., because he had defied the Diet resolution prohibiting such exports. However, he was determined to persuade the people of Japan so that the nation will return to the "normal course." He intends to deliver his first State of the Nation address on January 26th, on the theme of "Japan, opened to the world." So, concluded the Prime Minister, though differences in policies might exist between the President and himself, the perceptions are perfectly in harmony, and the sense of mutual trust existed.

He then described in some detail some improvements he initiated in safety standards and in the Office of Trade Ombudsman. He said that with regard to beef and citrus working-level specialists' meetings should continue to deal with the problem.

The President said that he appreciated all that the Prime Minister had done in the fields of defense and technology transfer. The Soviet Union represented a threat to the Pacific region. Demonstration of the Free World's determination to defend itself would provide deterrence to the Soviets. And when the Soviets become willing to reduce their arms, we would relax our defense increase. However, for now the leverage resulting from our firm determination tangibly demonstrated was important.

The President noted that he and the Prime Minister had the same problems facing them, and that they could ill afford to have the front page of newspaper supplant the close personal relationship in which these problems must be discussed. The President said he was delighted that the Prime Minister brought his family with him to Washington, and invited all the family to breakfast with the First Lady and him the following morning. Mr. Nakasone promptly accepted the invitation, saying it was a great honor and pleasure for him.

The President then said that he wished the U.S. and Japan to cooperate in the field of energy, and suggested that a working group on energy cooperation might be established. Nakasone eagerly accepted the idea, saying that along with the ODA and defense, energy alone received budgetary increase in the new proposed Japanese budget, because of its extreme importance.

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NSC/S PROFILE

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RU 2/26/11

ID 8300490

RECEIVED 19 JAN 83 17

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 19 JAN 83 *35*

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

NAKASONE, YASUHIRO

SHULTZ, G

SUBJECT: MEMCON ON SHULTZ - NAKASONE 17 JAN MTG AT MADISON HOTEL

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8300403, *8300485* NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C. JAN 21 1983

Clark noted

8u

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* *4* (C)

National Security Council
The White House

509

Package # 490

'83 JAN 19 P4:44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>T</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>g</u>	
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

ASAP

~~SECRET~~

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37

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 19, 1983

INFORMATION

REC'D SVN 10/11

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR ~~AS~~

SUBJECT: Memcon on Shultz-Nakasone Meeting, Madison Hotel,
January 17, 1983 -- 3:10-3:45 p.m.

Paul Wolfowitz has just passed on to me the draft Memcon written up by our interpreter, Cornelius Iida, of the Shultz-Nakasone meeting of January 17. I attach a copy for your information. (Tab A).

Attachment:
Tab A Memcon

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 1.4(f), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2000
BY NARA 8W DATE 8/21/11

~~SECRET~~

Draft Memcon: Shultz-Nakasone Meeting

117439 C. R. James 632-3492

At Suite 1531, Jan. 17, 1983, 3:10-3:45 p.m.

36

Sec. Shultz extended to the Japanese PM warm words of welcome to the US on behalf of the President, and indicated that the President considered the meeting to take place the next day to be of great importance, and that he was deeply appreciative of the telephone call the PM placed to him and this visit he undertook so soon after assuming the premiership.

Mr. Nakasone responded that he was very grateful that the President found time to meet with him amid his most busy schedule, and that he was looking forward to frank exchanges of opinions.

Sec. Shultz said that the President wished him to convey the following thoughts to the PM. The President was greatly impressed with what Mr. Nakasone accomplished since he assumed the office. As a fellow politician, he knows when he sees a strong performance. He saw how Mr. Nakasone took charge, dealt with the public, and developed a rapport not only with his supporters, but with his critics as well. He was also very impressed with the way the new PM acted decisively to solve the difficult diplomatic issues with Korea. He was also aware that there were political pressures in Japan, a democratic nation. Conversely, he was certain that Mr. Nakasone knew that the President was faced with political pressures here in the US. He recognized that the PM took steps to ease the problems in the defense and trade fields. He appreciates these steps. He saw in Mr. Nakasone a leader with whom he could work together. He wants, and hopes that out of this meeting close personal relations will emerge; and he suggested Mr. Shultz to develop similar relations with Minister Abe, so that the visit might result not just in a meeting of the heads of states, but also fruitful dialogues in personal contacts. In this connection the commendable quality of the ambassadorial representations both countries enjoy were most fortunate.

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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p.2

39

The President also felt that because the combined GNPs of the US and Japan amounted to 35 percent of the total global GNPs, the problems that beset the bilateral relationship have far reaching consequences to the rest of the world, and its economic wellbeing. He looked to Mr. Nakasone as US's partner to undertake the difficult task of putting the world economy back to its feet.

Sec. Shultz said he had just come from the cabinet room where the President was meeting with the US industrial, labor and agricultural leaders. These leaders also watch this important meeting, as we watched in the Japanese TV how the farmers, industrial leaders and political constituents presented their views.

It was therefore important to show that we can score progress in dealing with these important issues. We know there are deep and difficult problems in the trade relations, as we know what Mr. Nakasone had done with regard to similarly difficult defense issues. It is important to succeed in dealing with these issues, not just in private conversations, but also in the public expressions. All aspects must be covered, including citrus, beef and auto.

Sec. Shultz concluded that he wished to convey these important points of the President's thoughts to the welcome guest, so that the two leaders of the two most powerful economies of the Free World might join with each other to find solution to the world economic problems. He added that the presence of Mrs. Nakasone and their daughter here in Washington is most welcome and that they added to the personal touch.

Mr. Nakasone responded that he deeply appreciated the cordial words of welcome, and the hospitality extended to him and his party, including his family. He

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said that he was impressed with the words of the Secretary, because they were not conventional greetings. He admired the Presidents message that the-US and Japan not only have diffieult bilateral problems needing resolution, but are faced with responsibility to the world as two great nations to work together, and to lead the way for economic recovery. He thanked for the appreciation expressed of his achievements of these sixty days since he assumed the premirship. Describing himself as one that loathes personal financial debts, the PM said that he had for long been of the opinion that Japan owed the US psychological debt that needed to be repaid promptly, [Translator's Note: Pm thus intimated that he did what he did out of that conviction].

The PM discussed that the Japanese people as a whole admired the US, and wished deep in their hearts to have very strong relationship with the US, even though various expressions surface at times that might belie these facts. He said he was convinced that if a leader would show the way with courage, the people of Japan will by and by begin to follow the leader. Now, some 37 years after WWII, his avowed wish was to establish a path for Japan ^{to follow} [TN: the Japanese interpreter interpreted this statement as though the PM meant a new path . servin both US and Japan], the best he could to bring the two nations closer together, and fill the relationship with greater sense of trust.

The PM referred to the importance of the bilateral exchanges in parliamentary, financial and academic circles, but stressed that the personal relations of trust and friendship between top leaders was even more important. He appreciates that there will be opportunities for him through this visit to discuss and formulate common policies to deal with belateral and global issues.

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p. 4

41

As no doubt the secretary heard from Ambassador Mansfield, said the PM, the forthcoming Japanese Diet session was expected to be a stormy one, and the gubernatorial and Upper House elections to take place in April and July were very important to him. He said that that Diet session was of such importance that the "fate of the US-Japan relations will be determined" by its outcome. For this reason, continued he, he was intent on testing his own convictions on President Reagan, so that he might return to Japan with a strengthened moral conviction with which to deal with and persuade the people of Japan on these many issues. He looked very much forward to the meeting to take place tomorrow, short as it may be. He concluded by thanking the US for Amb. Mansfield whom he characterized as a kindly advisor, and a senior parliamentarian worthy of great respect.

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

ID 8300650

RECEIVED 26 JAN 83 17

TO POINDEXTER FROM GUHIN

DOCDATE 26 JAN 83

4

KEYWORDS: UN AP DE CUELLAR, PEREZ

SUBJECT: MINUTES FM PRES MTG W/ UN SECRETARY GENERAL ON JAN 14

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8300225 8300321 NSCIFID (M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	JAN 27 1983	<i>Clark approved</i>		MG

117441

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Meeting With UN Secretary General

Participants

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Kirkpatrick
William P. Clark
Assistant Secretary of State
Gregory Newell
Michael Guhin, NSC

Secretary General of the United Nations
Perez de Cuellar
Under Secretary General for Political and
General Assembly Affairs William Buffum

DECLASSIFIED
NLR 11/13/83 #117441
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/85

Date/Time: January 14, 1983 11:35 a.m. - 12:10 p.m.

Place: Oval Office

Minutes

After greetings, the Secretary General opened the discussion by noting that US-UN relations are getting better and, in this regard, praised Ambassador Kirkpatrick's efforts.

The President assured the Secretary General of continuing United States support for the UN and for its positive actions, such as the votes calling for withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. The President also noted that:

- o There is a need for greater financial restraint in the UN and its agencies.
- o The U.S. hopes that more attention can be given to hiring U.S. citizens and the Vice President will be following up on that.
- o The U.S. looks forward to a thorough and careful review of human rights in Poland.

In the Middle East, the President undelined the determination behind and importance of U.S. peace efforts and the importance of renewing UNIFIL. He added that further action by the UN at this time would not be helpful.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFY: ON OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Secretary General said he thought UNIFIL would be renewed for at least 3 months, if not 6 months (as the USSR had some reservations about a longer renewal), and that the terms of reference or mandate for UNIFIL would remain unchanged. He also noted that:

- o The progress in the Israel-Lebanon talks is very good, but too much focus on Lebanon could detract from the importance of a global solution to the broader Middle East problem. The UN would be an appropriate forum for broader talks and using it would avoid the time and problem of trying to find another forum.
- o He had found President Navon very reasonable.
- o While President Reagan has the Congress to deal with, he has the General Assembly and very little power on financial issues. However, he will personally take a very careful approach on expenses.
- o The timing of U.S. payments can present a problem and he will be discussing this with Secretary Shultz in more detail.
- o He will visit Andropov on March 28-29 and reads the Soviet invitation as a clear indication that Andropov is not ready to come to New York.
- o The press had distorted his comments on a US-USSR summit as he had not suggested one at the UN.
- o Later in January 18-20 his deputy will be in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran to review the situation and what might be done. He is personally skeptical about success and noted that the Soviets might be using delaying tactics.

On Latin America, the Secretary General expressed deep concern about the whole continent where there is a difficult situation and the Cubans are very active. Nicaragua is becoming a second Cuba; Bolivia is in a very bad situation with an unstable government and a financial mess. Che Guevara had made Bolivia a target. He underlined the extremely serious situation and problem for all of South America, noting that the Caribbean Basin Initiative is the right idea, but not enough.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassador Kirkpatrick noted that the Secretary General is a valuable resource on these issues.

The President said he supports a strong role for the Secretary General.

The Secretary General remarked that he did not seek the job and does not wish reelection but, while he is in it he looks forward to close coordination with the U.S.

The Secretary General added that a dialogue needed to be developed with developing countries on economic problems and the North/South issues.

The President stated that the United States prefers to focus these problems in the already existing forums for dealing with them, and noted the need to preserve these forums and to concentrate on helping these countries help themselves.

The Secretary General noted that that focus was important and suggested that most countries may not be that far apart on this.

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National Security Council
The White House

518

Package # 650

JAN 26 1983

1615p

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0650

47

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 26, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM:

MICHAEL GUHIN *mg*

SUBJECT:

President's Meeting with UN Secretary General
Perez de Cuellar

Attached for information and record purposes are my minutes
from the subject meeting.

Attachment
As stated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12065, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW, DATE 2/26/11

fw 8/2/11
~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

ID 8300686

RECEIVED 28 JAN 83 20

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 28 JAN 83

48

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

VISIT

NAKASONE, YASUHIRO

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ NAKASONE 18 JAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8300350

8300403

NSCIFID

(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C JAN 29 1983 *Ponderata noted*

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DISPATCH

WATCH FILE

OK 10/1/

~~SECRET~~

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117449

mw

49

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 28, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK *Jed for*

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *GA*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation on the Meeting in
the Cabinet Room, January 18, Between President
Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone.

Attendees in addition to the President and Prime Minister:

U.S. - The Vice President
Secretary of State George Shultz
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
Secretary of Agriculture John Block
Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige
U.S. Trade Representative William Brock
William P. Clark
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Michael Mansfield
Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz
Deputy Secretary of Treasury R. T. McNamar
Donald Gregg
Gaston Sigur
Edwin Meese III
Albert Seligmann, State Department (notetaker)

Japan - Shintaro Abe, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Takao Fujinami, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
Yoshio Okawara, Ambassador to the U.S.
Toshijiyo Nakajima, Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs
Ryohei Murata, Director General, Economic Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hiroshi Kitamura, Director General, North American
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kazutoshi Hasegawa, Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
Yoshio Karita, Director, First North American
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (notetaker)
Interpreter

I attach, for your information, the notes taken by Al Seligmann
of the Japan Desk in State during the January 18 Cabinet Room

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Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 10371/1 # 117449
BY *RW* NARA DATE *6/22/15*

meeting between the President and Prime Minister Nakasone. Seligmann's notes are quite complete and I have little to add.

During the lunch that followed in the State Dining Room, discussions continued with Secretary Weinberger presenting our position on the defense issue and Ambassador Brock speaking of trade. Both emphasized that while we are pleased at the progress made in narrowing the positions between our countries on these issues since Prime Minister Nakasone has come to office, Japan still has a long way to go to live up to its international responsibilities and obligations. The Prime Minister did not disagree with this, but did stress the problems he has within Japan in accomplishing what needs to be done to fulfill Japan's defense requirements and to open Japan's markets.

Attachments:
Tab A Memcon

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Meeting Between President Reagan and PM Nakasone
Cabinet Room - January 18, 1983

The President said he had emerged from his private meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone with a sense of positive momentum in solving our outstanding disputes, particularly in regard to trade and defense. He and the Prime Minister had agreed that we had a strong relationship with great responsibility for the world economy and for world recovery, and was gratified to have the Prime Minister's personal support.

Asked to summarize the status of our bilateral relations, Secretary Shultz said that United States-Japanese relations were of the utmost importance, whether they concerned economic affairs, strategic affairs, business affairs, or financial affairs. For example, the reason the Secretary of the Treasury and the Finance Minister were not at the meeting was because they were discussing subjects of international weight in Paris. Our bilateral defense relationships were fundamental. In view of the strength and size of the Japanese economy, our two nations together had to take joint responsibility not only for the world economy but for support of the free-trading system, the strategic system, and the values we shared. To do this effectively we needed to stress bilateral problems.

Secretary Shultz said that when he greeted the Prime Minister the day before, he had been attending a meeting in the Cabinet Room, where he left the President surrounded by representatives of business and labor from all over the United States who were communicating their concerns to the President. We had to identify our concerns and talk them through. We were encouraged by the strength with which the Prime Minister had addressed these issues; we had to look at many problems. In the defense area, some steps had been taken, but we also had to compare what had been accomplished with the missions and goals we had set out to achieve.

Trade and defense were the central elements of our bilateral relationship, but beyond that we shared many interests in the world, for example our relationship with China, and the promotion of world peace.

The President said that there was one issue he had not had a chance to address with the Prime Minister as yet, law of the sea. The Prime Minister should know that we had been in touch with mining groups, who were interested in a consortium approach. If we worked outside the Convention, we should be able to work out a satisfactory approach to deep-sea-bed mining.

Secretary Block said that as the Prime Minister was aware, there was a considerable amount of concern about selling agriculture commodities to Japan. The United States appreciated the importance

of the Japanese market for American agricultural products which approached 7 billion dollars, and the United States was a reliable supplier. Nevertheless, we were concerned about trade barriers to some products, the most serious of these being citrus and beef, which were the focus of a good deal of political pressure. These had become a symbol for farmers in the United States, who might have Datsun pickup trucks and Sony TV sets, but could not sell citrus or beef. We were prepared to resume talks on these quotas as soon as it was apparent there were some possibilities of substantial progress.

Prime Minister Nakasone said he would like to address matters of principle, leaving details to the Foreign Minister. As he had told the President in their private meeting, our two countries on opposite sides of the Pacific shared a destiny and must discharge their responsibilities in accordance with their strength. He intended to observe the Joint Communique that the President and Prime Minister Suzuki had signed in 1981. While there were frictions in regard to defense problems and trade, we shared the same concepts, and our differences applied to the details of solutions. We had to continue to consult closely. The Prime Minister said that the President came from California and knew the Pacific Region. The United States also faced the Atlantic, and therefore was a two-ocean nation, but for Japan there was just the Pacific. As a Pacific nation, Japan could contribute to peace in that region; thus far, Japan and the United States were cooperating on economic measures directed at the Soviet Union, in regard to GATT, and in assisting the LDCs with their debt problems. This was good cooperation, which he wanted to continue whole-heartedly and sincerely. It was especially important, as the President had said, for both countries to preserve the free-trading system. If protectionism grew, we would repeat the experience of the 1930s. For that reason, his cabinet was making every effort to address trade and defense issues, not in response to US influence, but for Japan's own sake, to discharge its own responsibilities.

Prime Minister Nakasone said the main task of his administration was to build a Japan open to the world; he wanted to guide and persuade the Japanese people toward this end. His predecessors had, of course, made their utmost efforts to behave as equal partners of the United States, but speaking frankly there were shortcomings in their performance in US eyes. The Prime Minister said that when he took office, his cabinet had many debts to repay; they could not be all repaid at once, but he would try. He and the President had both devoted their lives to politics, and he was sure they shared the view that they had to take party strategy into account. The President would understand that in order to pay debts, he had to have the support of his cabinet.

Prime Minister Nakasone said he was aware of the President's concern about law of the sea. His government had postponed signing the Convention at the end of last year at the behest of Ambassador

Rumsfeld. However, after careful consideration, the government had decided that Japan was associated with LDC group for LOS purposes, and had to look to its relationship with the LDC's. There were problems with deep-sea mining, but the other areas of the Convention brought much progress. His personal view was that once the Convention was in force, it would be possible to solve problems. As it stood now, it was as if nations were competing to occupy territory on the surface of the moon. The Prime Minister promised to consider the President's views on LOS when he returned to Japan, but he had just expressed his own opinion.

Minister Abe said that it was just 60 days since the Nakasone government came to power, but more than any other government it had been trying to make clear that relations with the United States were the most important for Japan. The Nakasone government was making every effort to solve United States-Japan problems. As Secretary Shultz had noted, the biggest issue was trade. In order to maintain and defend the free-trading system, the Japanese government was trying to discharge its responsibilities. In reducing tariffs on agriculture and manufactured goods, it had tried its best to meet the requests of Congress and other groups; tobacco for example, had been reduced by 15 percent, chocolate had been reduced appreciably, and tariffs on 27 other manufactured items had been reduced or eliminated. There was strong domestic opposition to these moves on the part of the industries affected, as well as within the LDP, but the Prime Minister had decided to accept the risk.

Prime Minister Nakasone said that Secretary Block had referred to beef and citrus. He was aware of the strong demand made by the United States in regard to these items in December, but Japanese farmers had become agitated. When he decided to reduce the tobacco tariff and expand the number of outlets for foreign tobacco products, he did so without obtaining the consensus of the Liberal Democratic Party. There was much criticism on the grounds that he was supposed to be a leader, and had no mandate to be a dictator. The Prime Minister said that just before his departure, beef and citrus farmers had presented him with a petition signed by about 9 million persons to make no concessions while in Washington, and 10,000 farmers had turned out for a demonstration. It was wise for both sides to let these issues cool off a while and then let the experts deal with quotas when they expired.

The Prime Minister said that when he went to Korea, President Chun had asked him to convey to the President his request that the President work to maintain the free-trading system. He also would like to convey the thought suggested by Prime Minister Trudeau in Tokyo, just before Nakasone left for Washington, that at the Williamsburg Summit it might be a good idea for Trudeau, the President, and himself to get together and discuss Pacific problems, as long as it could be done in a way that would not provoke the Europeans.

The President suggested that they continue discussion at lunch.

National Security Council
The White House

522

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Package # 686

JAN 2 8 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>R</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

rus 9/26/11
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC/S PROFILE

ID 8300732

RECEIVED 31 JAN 83 13

TO WHEELER

FROM GUHIN

DOCDATE 31 JAN 83 *53*

WHEELER

31 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: UN

DE CUELLAR, PEREZ

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ UN SECRETARY 14 JAN

ACTION: WHEELER SGD MEMO TO BREMER DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

WHEELER

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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DISPATCH *ed 1/31 2001* W/ATTCH FILE (C)

56

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 31, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with UN Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar, January 14, 1983

Attached is a memorandum of conversation for the subject meeting. Distribution of the memo should be restricted to those whose duties require them to know its contents.

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of
Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW, DATE 8/26/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117452

57

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Meeting With UN Secretary General

Participants

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Kirkpatrick
William P. Clark
Assistant Secretary of State
Gregory Newell
Michael Guhin, NSC

Secretary General of the United Nations
Perez de Cuellar
Under Secretary General for Political and
General Assembly Affairs William Buffum

Date/Time: January 14, 1983 11:35 a.m. - 12:10 p.m.

Place: Oval Office

Minutes

After greetings, the Secretary General opened the discussion by noting that US-UN relations are getting better and, in this regard, praised Ambassador Kirkpatrick's efforts.

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- o There is a need for greater financial restraint in the UN and its agencies.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED ON OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M3711 #117452
BY RW NARA DATE 6/28

The Secretary General said he thought UNIFIL would be renewed for at least 3 months, if not 6 months (as the USSR had some reservations about a longer renewal), and that the terms of reference or mandate for UNIFIL would remain unchanged. He also noted that:

- o The progress in the Israel-Lebanon talks is very good, but too much focus on Lebanon could detract from the importance of a global solution to the broader Middle East problem. The UN would be an appropriate forum for broader talks and using it would avoid the time and problem of trying to find another forum.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0732

60

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

January 31, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: MICHAEL GUHIN *MG*
SUBJECT: President's Meeting with UN Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar, January 14, 1983

Recommend that you sign the memo to Bremer at Tab I forwarding the memorandum of conversation at Tab A.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Bremer
Tab A Memcon

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 14, 2009
BY NARA *RJW*, DATE *8/26/11*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 31 JAN 83 17

TO CLARK

FROM SAPIA-BOSCH

DOCDATE 31 JAN 83

61

KEYWORDS: MEXICO

DE LA MADRID, MIGUEL

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & MEXICAN PRES 20 JAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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C FEB 04 1983

Response noted

SB

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W/ATTCH FILE

(PA)

(C)

~~SECRET~~

0733

NW
62

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

January 31, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

Alfa
ll.

NOTED

FROM: ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH

SUBJECT: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between
President Reagan and Mexican President de la Madrid
on January 20, 1983 at 6:15 P.M.

Attached for your information is the subject transcript. President de la Madrid told the President that according to the principle of rotation, he might well expect to see the President on Mexican territory in the course of this year.

President Reagan replied that he hoped he could do that--that he would look forward to see the Mexican President.

Attachment

Tab I Transcript of January 20, 1983

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/26/11*

~~SECRET~~

117453

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

63

Telephone Conversation Between President de la Madrid of Mexico and President Reagan on January 20, 1983 at 6:15 P.M.

President de la Madrid: President Reagan, I want to send you a New Year message, although it is somewhat late in January for that. And, also, I wanted to thank you for the very beautiful gift which I just received from you. I don't have any specific matter to raise with you now, Mr. President. Our colleagues and collaborators have been talking, and I think they have been making a good deal of progress on the matters that we have pending. So this is really just a friendly call to convey my warmest greetings to send you a big "abraso" and to wish you all the best for the New Year.

President Reagan: Well, let me just say, also, my greetings to you for the New Year, even though a little late. But still it's very pleasant to hear from you, and I am delighted you liked our gift; but it is very good to talk to you again and not have any serious problems to talk about.

President de la Madrid: This is the only reason I called you, Mr. President, I know that we are going to continue dealing very attentively with the problems before us, and I hope that during the course of the year I will have the opportunity to see you in person. I understand that according to the principle of rotation, I might well expect to see you this time on Mexican territory visiting us.

President Reagan: Well, I hope that we can do that. I would look forward to seeing you very much, Mr. President, and I enjoyed having this little visit on the telephone in the meantime.

President de la Madrid: I'd like to ask you to please convey my respectful greetings to your wife; it has been a delight to talk to you, and I would bid you goodbye.

President Reagan: I shall do that, and I send an "abraso" and goodbye to you.

President de la Madrid: Goodbye, President Reagan.

President Reagan: Goodbye.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

REF M371/1 # 117453

BY RW DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

524

Package # 733

'83 JAN 31 P5:55

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	I
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	2		R
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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**Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC:
Subject File**
**Folder: Memorandums of Conversation-
President Reagan (12/27/1982-01/31/1983)**
Box: 50

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<https://catalog.archives.gov/>