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**Folder Title:** Memorandums of Conversations,  
President Reagan [April 1983]

**Box:** 51

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 5/6/2011

**File Folder** MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (APRIL 1983)

**FOIA**

M10-361

**Box Number** 51

BIRD

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
109086	MEMCON	RE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT MAGANA OF EL SALVADOR <i>R 10/12/2012 M361/2</i>	4	4/5/1983	B1
109093	NOTE	BILL CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE A CALL TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK <i>R 3/21/2012 M361/1</i>	1	4/11/1983	B1
109087	MEMCON	BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK <i>R 10/12/2012 M361/2</i>	3	4/11/1983	B1
109089	TALKING POINTS	FOR TELEPHONE CALL TO MUBARAK <i>R 10/12/2012 M361/2</i>	3	ND	B1
109088	MEMCON	SAME AS 109087 <i>R 10/12/2012 M361/2</i>	3	4/11/1983	B1
109090	MEMCON	RE PRESIDENT REAGAN AND KING HUSSEIN <i>R 10/12/2012 M361/2</i>	2	4/25/1983	B1
109091	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS <i>R 10/12/2012 M361/2</i>	3	4/26/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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UNCLAS

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 3

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 01

RELEASER UB

PRIORITY

DEX #     

DTG 022200Z APR 83

ROUTINE

TTY #     

FROM/LOCATION/

1. ADM POINDEXTER / SANTA BARBARA

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. MILAIDE FOR THE PRESIDENT / RANCH / TOR: 022211Z APR 83

2.     

3.     

4.     

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.     

2.     

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

*President call  
made on April 2*

UNCLAS

CLASSIFICATION

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1983

Military Aide:

Jim Baker approves this proposed telephone call if the President has time. The Prime Minister should be reachable on the telephone number in the attached memo until about 3:00 p.m. this afternoon. If the President decides to call, please let me know. It's not necessary to have SITRM monitor the call. It would be a non-substantive call.

  
John M. Poindexter

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3


April 2, 1983

Mr. President:

The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, R. Premadassa is in Los Angeles. On Monday he will address the World Affairs Council. Mayor Tom Bradley has called recommending you call the Prime Minister to welcome him. State, NSC Staff, Jim Baker and I recommend you call him. Premadassa is forty-five years old, very conservative and pro-U.S. He takes the self-help, free enterprise approach to government and admires you very much.

We are trying to schedule a fifteen minute meeting for you with him next week in Washington if we can find the time. If you decide to call him this afternoon, he can be reached at the Beverly Hilton, Telephone: 213-274-7777, Ext. 7724 or 7726.

Talking points are attached.

  
John M. Poindexter

Attachment:

Talking Points.

TALKING POINTS  
FOR TELEPHONE CALL  
TO PRIME MINISTER PREMADASSA OF SRI LANKA

- Welcome to the United States Mr. Prime Minister.
- I hope you are having a pleasant stay in California.  
I know Secretary Shultz is looking forward to seeing you next week.
- Please give my regards to the President. We are glad relations between our two countries are so good. I hope this will continue.
- I'd like to thank you all for the hospitality you have given our Seventh Fleet when it has visited Sri Lanka.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SIT ROOM--DACOM TO ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

John

Subject: Call From Premadassa

Attached are talking points for use in the event the President agrees to receive the call.

Geoff believes it is a good idea as do I.

The unknown is whether or not we can get time (15 min) for a meeting. I can't find Chuck Tyson. We have a request in for 15 minutes but no one is in today.

If needs be, we could use part of the Judge's morning time late in the week. State believes he will be here all week since part of the purpose is medical treatment.

He is seeing Shultz Tuesday.

In short, I recommend that the President take the call and express the hope that "we can work out a time to get together."

But  




TALKING POINTS

7

-- Welcome to the United States Mr. Prime Minister.

(If Tyson has confirmed a White House meeting:)

-- I look forward to seeing you in Washington next week.

(If no White House meeting has been confirmed:)

-- I hope you are having a pleasant stay in California. I know Secretary Shultz is looking to seeing you next week.

-- Please give my regards to the President. We are glad relations between our two countries are so good. I hope this will continue.


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John M. Poindexter

*Call made -  
He very much wants to meet  
with me in Wash.  
lets do our best to  
see he does,  
RR*

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


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- I'd like to thank you all for the hospitality you have  
given our Seventh Fleet when it has visited Sri Lanka.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8302385

RECEIVED 13 APR 83 09

DOCDATE 08 APR 83

TO CLARK FROM SAPIA-BOSCH

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*AS 5/10/11*

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

MAGANA, ALVARO

SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT OF PRES TELEPHONE CONVERSATION W/ PRES MAGANA ON 5 APR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
CLARK		NORTH
		FONTAINE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 4/19</i>	<i>Noted by Clark</i>		<i>SB</i>

619

National Security Council  
The White House

Package # 2385

'83 APR 13 AIO:19

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

~~SECRET~~

WPC HAS

B

MEMORANDUM  
~~SECRET~~  
INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH *ALB*

SUBJECT: Transcript of President's Telephone Conversation with  
President Magana of El Salvador; April 5, 1983,  
12:22-12:30 P.M.

Attached at Tab I is a transcript of the above subject conversation.

Attachment

Tab I Transcript

SECRET  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept 11, 2008  
BY NARA *AW*, DATE *5/12/11*



~~SECRET~~

2385

109086

14

~~SECRET~~

President Reagan's Telephone Conversation with President Magana of El Salvador on April 5, 1983, 12:22-12:30 P.M.

President Reagan: Mr. President.

President Magana: Hello.

President Reagan: Hello there. Mr. President, I'm calling you because we've got some problems that have to be discussed.

President Magana: I'm glad to hear you.

President Reagan: What's that?

President Magana: I'm glad to hear you.

President Reagan: Well, I'm glad to be talking to you. Mr. President, you know that we're heart and soul behind you--our Administration. The efforts that you are making to insure the free and open elections and your Peace Commission and your draft amnesty law will really be well received and I know every place when they are at full operation. You have also made progress on human rights, and I know that you intend to continue this. And, we have gone to our Congress, of course, with the request for the help that we must provide for you if you are to be successful in regard to the training of your troops and equipment, and ammunition, and so forth. But

President Magana: I'm really very grateful.

President Reagan: Well, Mr. President, here's my problem. Over the next three months we're going to face some critical votes in the Congress on this assistance. In fact the first of these votes will probably be coming up in about ten days, and we're meeting some great opposition. The propagandists that have continued to attack your government in this war that's going on have been more successful than they should be with our Congress; and as you know, unlike your parliamentary system, I don't have a majority on my side or a majority party in the one house of our Congress. And there are great concerns that they are giving back to me and threatening the success of these measures that we want for help to you. And the amnesty that just must be approved by the Constituent Assembly--here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to tell you now what are the things that they are saying to us in the Congress as justification for their not voting this assistance.

President Magana: Yes.

President Reagan: One. The amnesty must be approved by your Constituent Assembly and see some evidence of political prisoners being released.

President Magana: Yes.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM10-261/2#109086

BY CW NARA DATE 10/12/12



~~SECRET~~

SECRET

2

President Reagan: Second, they keep attacking us on the basis of Lopez Sibrian, and it's impossible for us to explain to them why he is free and not in jail.

President Magana: Yes.

President Reagan: Then, they bring up the International Red Cross maybe a man should have the right to make unannounced visits to all prisoners in detention centers. This is a particular area of concern to some of the key members of Congress. They ask also that the Peace Commission show some action; that is, maybe in the next few days it could announce a work program for the next 30 days in which it would contact all political elements inside and out of El Salvador. And they're very disturbed about the slow pace of progress in the churchwomen's case--that thing of the trial going forward--not going forward now, and they feel that it should with regard to those women who were killed.

President Magana: Yes.

President Reagan: And we just--anything that you can do to get these things under way is most important to us.

President Magana: Yes.

President Reagan: They want some evidence that those in the military who violate the law will be punished. They say that isn't being done. I know you've got complex problems, and your admirable leadership that you've shown so far trying to resolve these problems--I do understand the complexity of what you're up against. But, I have to work within a political reality just as you do, and they're giving us a bad time on whether we're going to get this help for you.

President Magana: I'm conscious of all these problems. I have been working together with Ambassador Hinton.

President Reagan: Aha.

President Magana: I have to say first off of a letter that I plan to send to you tomorrow where I make a specific reference to all these points that you make, sir--trying to explain that we are ready to go ahead in solving all these problems. For instance, the amnesty law-- I am going to press to have it approved next week.

President Reagan: Oh, that's great. Well, I shall look forward to your letter.

President Magana: I want to be ready to start working, and we need to organize two commissions that they're supposed to supervise the people that decide not to continue fighting.

President Reagan: Aha.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

President Magana: And so, I want to be ready. I could press to have it approved this week, but I am taking another week to be ready with this commission organized. In the case of Lopez Sibrian, we are pressing to have the officials of the court of appeals. In the case of the International Red Cross, we have already authorized that visit. In the case of a working program for the Peace Commission, we are also working. And the only problem that we have, as you know, we organized the Peace Commission two weeks ago, and we have holiday for the Holy Week.

President Reagan: Yes, yea.

President Magana: So we lost that week. In the case of the nuns, there is no problem, we are presently escalating the procedures. But in a very detailed letter, I'm referring to all these points on, I think, in a way that will be satisfactory for the kind of work that I plan to accomplish in the next three months.

President Reagan: Oh, well, I will look forward to getting that then, that will be of great help.

President Magana: I'm sure of that, sir, because all points are covered well and very clearly, and I'm planning on sending that letter not later than tomorrow.

President Reagan: Well, thank you very much.

President Magana: No, thank you very much to you. I am conscious of the problems that you are facing over there, but are probably more important than the problems that I am facing here.

President Reagan: I know.

President Magana: But, we share common views, I am sure, if we get along with these, Mr. President.

President Reagan: Alright. Well, bless you and I wish you well.

President Magana: Thank you very much for calling, sir, and don't worry that I am trying to do my best, and I am sure that I have the support of most of the people. And this letter, I'm sure, will be of very much help in the development on things over there in Washington.

President Reagan: Well, I'll look forward to receiving it, and I know what you're trying to do, and how hard it is. And my heart is with you.

President Magana: Thank you very much, and the same to you. I want to take this opportunity to thank you again in the name of the government and my people.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17

4

President Reagan: Well, it's--I enjoy our working together.

President Magana: Thank you very much. I really appreciate.

President Reagan: Alright.

President Magana: Bye.

President Reagan: Alright. Goodbye. God bless you.

President Magana: Thank you sir.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

109093

PRESCRIPTION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1983

Mr President;

Subject: A call to President Mubarak?

Yesterday after returning from Camp David you indicated that you wanted to bring President Mubarak into the effort to support Hussein and rekindle the effort at accomodation with Arafat.

Mubarak is now in Pakistan on the way home from his China trip. He would surely welcome a call from you; indeed he may feel a little left out if, after 48 hours (tomorrow) he has not heard anything.

There are two options for reaching Mubarak. If you were to call tonight at about 9:00pm after you return from the Holocaust Ceremony, you would catch Mubarak at breakfast.

If you wish to wait until tomorrow, you could call at about 5:00pm by which time he would have arrived back in Cairo.

Let's do it tonight ✓ PR

Let's Wait until tomorrow \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_

Bill Clark ✓ Call made

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR MID-361 #109093  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/12

No distribution  
other than by  
to Geoff Kemp.

WPG HAS SEEN

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'WPK' with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

~~SECRET~~

109087

20

SECRET

WFO HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN  
AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK  
(April 11, 1983)

President: Hello, Mr. President.

Mubarak: Hello, Mr. President.

P: Well, listen have I caught you some place awkward or interrupting you in something you're doing?

M: No.

P: Well, alright.

M: It's just early in the morning here.

P: Oh, I hope I didn't wake you.

M: I'm a wake up, I'm a wake up.

P: Well, alright. I just, given the special nature of our relationship, I just wanted to tell you personally that the news stories you may have read or heard about King Hussein's decision on the peace process aren't accurate. I can assure you that our peace initiative remains active. And Hussein (few words inaudible) that he is still with us and King Fahd has also reiterated his support and they each urged us to proceed. The stories in the press are based only on a Jordanian cabinet statement and what they were about is the king himself has said nothing publicly about this for the time being. But what had happened was he and Arafat had essentially agreed on terms of the kings' entry into the peace process, but Arafat had to take it to the Palestinian Council and the radical elements there, I believe, attempted to sabotage this agreement by insisting on unacceptable changes. Now, when it first was reported to King Fahd they just said they'd made a few minor changes. When King Fahd found out the changes they made he said it was unacceptable and of course, Hussein did also and so do we, now that we have seen it. And Fahd has told me that he is going to be working hard on the PLO to drop the unacceptable changes in the agreement and I know that Hassan has been or is trying to get together with Arafat on this also. I deeply appreciate the support you have given to the

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR M10-361/2 #109087  
BY CW NAR. DATE 11/17/12

initiative which has brought us as far as we are, but I need your help even more and I hope you'll continue to support King Hussein and encourage the Saudis to stand firm and convince the Palestinians that it is imperative to move forward now. And, yes, go ahead.

M: I sent a special envoy to King Hussein and I had all this information and special envoy yesterday here from King Fahd. And I spoke, I told him to tell King Fahd that he should support the peace initiative.

P: Oh, well, bless you. I should have let you talk first and I would have found out that you know all what I was telling you.

M: Yes, I had this information and we are trying hard with the Palestinian faction and we expected what Arafat did and his radical people did. We expected that. We are supporting the same thing. We are trying hard while doing the maximum effort which we could do in this direction.

P: Oh, well Mr. President I am so grateful I just can't let someone exercise a veto over peace and ..."

M: And I am asking you Mr. President to be a little bit more patient with them.

P: Alright, we will be, although it's dragged on so it's very frustrating.

M: Yes.

P: But, we will then and I'm so glad to hear you're informed and you are altogether on this. I believe - I don't know if that terrible tragedy in Portugal...

M: Yes.

P: ...was that a warning to Arafat from those radicals?

M: It was expected because it pushed by the Syrians. The Syrians are pushing the radical Palestinian element of that, just to make a threat to Arafat and the other Arabs also.

P: We're going to have to convince Arafat that we can provide security for him if he will stick with us. I



~~SECRET~~

22

SECRET

-3-

have to believe that, you know more about this than I do. I have to believe that the majority of the Palestinian people just want a resolution and are willing to go forward.

M: That's right, Mr. President, that's right. And I urged the Saudis yesterday to be firm with the Palestinians.

P: Alright.

M: And I believe in like this and we should go ahead in your initiative.

P: Oh, well that's great. I'm so pleased to hear that.

M: The last, the golden, and last opportunity for the solution of the problem.

P: Well, I'm so glad that you're informed on this now and that you're taking the course and I thank you very much.

M: I made the contacts right away yesterday.

P: Well, that's wonderful, well we'll stay with it.

M: Yes, thank you - but be a little bit more patient with them.

P: Okay, alright.

M: Until we finalize something.

P: Alright, we will.

M: Thank you, Mr. President.

P: Well, thank you.

M: Thank you very much.

P: Alright, good-bye.

M: Good-bye.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

109089

23

TALKING POINTS  
FOR TELEPHONE CALL TO MUBARAK

-- Given the special nature of our relationship, I wanted to tell you personally that the news stories you may have read or heard about King Hussein's decision on the peace process are not accurate.

-- I can assure you that my peace initiative remains active. Hussein told me Sunday that he is still with us; King Fahd has also reiterated his support; and each has urged us to proceed.

--The stories in the press are based only on a Jordanian cabinet statement. The King himself has said nothing publicly and will not for the time being.

-- Let me briefly summarize where we are. Hussein and Arafat had essentially agreed on the terms of the King's entry to the peace process. Radical PLO elements attempted to sabotage this agreement by insisting on unacceptable changes.

-- Hussein has rejected these changes. Fahd told me he will be working hard on the PLO to drop the unacceptable changes in the Hussein-Arafat agreement.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M10-36112 #109089  
BY ON NARA DATE 11/12/12

~~SECRET~~

-- I deeply appreciate your support of my initiative, which has helped us come as far as we have. I will need your help even more now.

-- I hope you will continue to support King Hussein, encourage the Saudis to stand firm, and convince the Palestinians that it is imperative to move forward now.

-- In addition, it would be most helpful if you would contact King Hassan and impress on him how crucial it is for us all to support Hussein at this sensitive stage and to remain firm with the PLO.

-- This is the moment of truth. We must not let anyone exercise a veto over peace.

~~-- When I see Minister of State Ghali this week I will bring him up to date on the situation and our thinking on next steps. I understand he is bringing a message from you and I look forward to receiving it.~~

~~SECRET~~

Note

-- Mubarak may ask you to receive Minister of State Boutros Ghali, who is in Washington carrying a message for you. If he raises the matter, you should say you will see Ghali.

WHSR  
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

STAFF	C/O
Clark	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
McFarlane	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Poindexter	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>
Merchant	<input type="checkbox"/>
NSC S/S	<input type="checkbox"/>

RCM HAS SEEN

*Copy provided  
to Jeff Kemp*

C : Copy

O : Original

~~SECRET~~

109088

27

~~SECRET~~

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AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK  
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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M10-301/7 #109488  
BY LN NARA DATE 10/12/12

~~SECRET~~

-2-

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M: I sent a special envoy to King Hussein and I had all this information and special envoy yesterday here from King Fahd. And I spoke, I told him to tell King Fahd that he should support the peace initiative.

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P: Alright, we will be, although it's dragged on so it's very frustrating.

M: Yes.

P: But, we will then and I'm so glad to hear you're informed and you are altogether on this. I believe - I don't know if that terrible tragedy in Portugal...

M: Yes.

P: ...was that a warning to Arafat from those radicals?

M: It was expected because it pushed by the Syrians. The Syrians are pushing the radical Palestinian element of that, just to make a threat to Arafat and the other Arabs also.

P: We're going to have to convince Arafat that we can provide security for him if he will stick with us. I

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have to believe that, you know more about this than I do. I have to believe that the majority of the Palestinian people just want a resolution and are willing to go forward.

- M: That's right, Mr. President, that's right. And I urged the Saudis yesterday to be firm with the Palestinians.
- P: Alright.
- M: And I believe in like this and we should go ahead in your initiative.
- P: Oh, well that's great. I'm so pleased to hear that.
- M: The last, the golden, and last opportunity for the solution of the problem.
- P: Well, I'm so glad that you're informed on this now and that you're taking the course and I thank you very much.
- M: I made the contacts right away yesterday.
- P: Well, that's wonderful, well we'll stay with it.
- M: Yes, thank you - but be a little bit more patient with them.
- P: Okay, alright.
- M: Until we finalize something.
- P: Alright, we will.
- M: Thank you, Mr. President.
- P: Well, thank you.
- M: Thank you very much.
- P: Alright, good-bye.
- M: Good-bye.

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— 26 Sept

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Admiral *J*

FYI - a

Copy of transcript  
of yesterday's  
telephone  
conversation

Murray



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CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND KING HUSSEIN  
April 25, 1983

HUSSEIN: Hello sir, good afternoon.

PRESIDENT: Well, good afternoon to you, and I want to congratulate you and Queen Nur, on the birth of your daughter.

H: Thank you sir, so very very much. Indeed sir. I'm deeply touched.

P: You must feel very good about this. Nancy and I send you our very warmest greetings on this happy time.

H: Thank you very very much sir, I'm relaying this to Nur right away. Both she and I can never thank you enough for all your many kindnesses and for remembering us at this time. She is fine and the baby is fine. We've called her Iman which is (safe) ?, which is very appropriate at this time.

P: Oh. You've answered my question. I knew the spelling but I didn't know how to pronounce the name and now you have done it for me. Iman.

H: Imanus. We are so happy with her. Everything is wonderful.

P: Well, again congratulations and give our very best to the Queen. And incidently I want you to know I wrote to you yesterday about George Shultz's visit. He really, his primary purpose is to try and solve this Lebanon crisis. And if he can he will visit your capital. But he must give priority of course to that withdrawal of the forces over there. He doesn't know how long that will take.

H: I understand fully sir, and I wish him every success. So much can happen as a result of that and I really hope that you will succeed.

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BY CL NARA DATE 10/12/12

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P: Well, I'm saying a little prayer for that myself. Incidentally, I also offered you, Your Majesty my condolences over the Karen House articles. She's that kind of a reporter and I can see why you were suprised at how much detail she published.

H: Yes sir, I was really was very very shocked. I wouldn't have imagined this kind of thing to happen. It really was very very sad.

P: Our press can be very prying. And one has to be on --- H: its nothing - - - INAUDIBLE.. Well, on the broader peace process. I think we both have to hang in there tough. I'm certain that sooner or later there's going to be movement and we can't let this opportunity to slip backward or away for us.

H: Oh how I know that. And in any event sir, we are hoping and we'll do all we can towards that end.

P: Alright. Well, again, good to talk to you.

H: (INAUDIBLE) to Mrs. Reagan as well. Take care and God bless you as well.

P: Thank you very much.

H: Thank you sir.

P: Goodbye

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8302856

RECEIVED 28 APR 83 18

DOCDATE 28 APR 83 33

TO POINDEXTER

FROM BLAIR  
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*as 5/6/11*

KEYWORDS: NATO

AP

LUNS, JOSEPH

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & LUNS OF MTG ON APR 26

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 29 APR 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

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*C 5/2 Poindexter sgd memo*

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W/ATTCH

FILE

*(Pa)*

*Hi*

National Security Council  
The White House

642

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Package # 2857

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS BEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information   A-Action   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

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COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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
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May 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of President's Meeting  
with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns

Attached for the Department's information is the memcon of the President's conversation with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns on April 26, 1983. Distribution of the memo should be restricted to those whose duties require them to know its contents. (C)

  
Michael O. Wheeler  
Staff Secretary

Tab A      Memcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2000  
BY NARA *CH* DATE *5/6/11*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
William P. Clark  
W. Tapley Bennett  
Charles P. Tyson  
Dennis C. Blair  
Robert D. Blackwill

NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns  
Assistant Secretary General Fredo Dannenbring

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 26, 1983, 11:45 - 11:57 a.m.  
Oval Office

Secretary General Luns opened the discussion by thanking the President for the personal efforts he had made in the arms control area. Arms control, he said, would be the biggest Alliance issue of 1984. The Secretary General then relayed a message from his recent consultations in Bonn. He said that Foreign Minister Genscher had emphasized the importance to the FRG of a CDE meeting before the end of the year. The Secretary General stated that he personally did not feel that the meeting was so important and in fact felt that it might be counter-productive. However, the German government clearly felt that the conclusion of the Madrid meeting and a CDE before the end of the year were an important political objective. Foreign Minister Genscher had asked that this message be relayed to the President and the Secretary General was therefore doing so. (C)

The President answered by reiterating his own serious commitment to reducing the level of nuclear weapons. He had said he was often frustrated at public perceptions that he was not committed to arms reductions. He emphasized the importance of Alliance support for the two track decision since the Soviets were unlikely to negotiate seriously until the Alliance was ready to make deployments. (C)

Secretary General Luns agreed that the President's commitment was not understood and that his statements were often misinterpreted or twisted. He emphasized that every word the President said, such as his recent speech in Florida, was replayed to European audiences often out of context. The Soviets, through their propaganda, were attempting to create the impression that the President believed arms control talks were

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BY C11 NARA DATE 10/17/12



only a cover for an arms buildup.

The President gave an example of Soviet misuse of his statements. He had recently said that he believed there were areas where the U.S. and the Soviet Union could work together but the quotations had been twisted to say that there were no areas for cooperation. (C)

Secretary General Luns said that the situation could be worse in Europe. In the Federal Republic of Germany for example which is the "linchpin" of the INF decision, the current government is firmly committed to deployment if necessary. In addition, unlike the previous government, the Kohl government is not insisting that other countries had to deploy. In the Secretary General's opinion, if the FRG deployed then Italy would certainly follow and with Belgium also deploying the Netherlands would feel isolated and would follow suit. (C)

In response to a question from the President, Secretary General Luns said that studies of economic relations with the Soviet Union being conducted by the NATO Economic Committee were nearly complete. The studies had concluded that it was difficult to change the Soviet Union through economic pressure. (C)

Assistant Secretary Dannenbring added that the experts had agreed on the facts of the situation: the vulnerabilities of both the Soviet Union and the West. (C)

Secretary General Luns said that there was unanimity among the experts and it was up to the governments to take the next steps. He said that for the upcoming ministerial meeting in Paris he was working on some initiatives which would appeal to NATO publics. One idea was a series of "confidence inspiring initiatives." He said that it was important in this year to take concrete actions to win public support and counteract Soviet propoganda. It was also necessary to deal with the unhelpful moves being made by "men of the cloth." Their statements, by calling deterrence into question, were in fact making war more likely rather than less. The same was true for the freeze movement. (C)

The President noted that we had had some success working with the American Catholic Bishops. (U)

Secretary General Luns said that he too was doing what he could, and mentioned the Dutch Bishops. He said that all of these church groups were playing on the fear of war when in fact NATO's arsenal existed to deter war. (C)

The President gave an example of another time when his words had been misquoted on the subject of whether a nuclear war could

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be won. He had said that the Soviets seemed to believe that they could win a nuclear war. This had been twisted to say that the President himself believed a nuclear war could be won.

In closing, The President thanked Secretary General Luns for the fine services he had contributed to the Alliance.

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MW

MEMORANDUM

2856

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

April 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ADM POINDEXTER

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR *DB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from NATO Secretary General Luns Meeting with the President, April 26

Attached for your approval is the memcon of the President's meeting with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns. Once you approve, Mike Wheeler's memo at Tab A will transmit the memcon to State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab I.

Approve *DB* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I Memcon  
Tab A Wheeler to Hill memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA *CL*, DATE *5/6/11*