

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject
File: Records, 1981-1985

Folder Title: Memorandums of Conversations,
President Reagan [08/15/1983-09/25/1983]

Box: 51

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/29/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (08/15/1983-09/25/1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 51

JAUVERT/BROWER

26

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117538	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH SENEGAL PRESIDENT ABDOU DIOUF <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	6	8/10/1983	B1
117540	CABLE	STATE 233272 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	8/17/1983	B1
117541	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH ZIMBABWE PRIME MINISTER ROBERT MUGABE <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	6	9/13/1983	B1
117544	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH ZIMBABWE PRIME MINISTER ROBERT MUGABE [COPY OF DOC. 117541; PARTIAL PG. 2; W/MARKS AND POST-IT] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	9/13/1983	B1
117545	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT ANTONIO EANES <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	7	9/15/1983	B1
117546	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRI9NCE SIHANOUK AND SON SANN [KAMPUCHEA] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	6	9/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

ID 8305616

~~SECRET~~
RW 8/30/11
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 15 AUG 83 18

TO HILL, C

FROM KIMMITT

DOCDATE 15 AUG 83

KEYWORDS SENEGAL

DIOUF, ABDOUF

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ DIOUF 10 AUG

ACTION: KIMMITT SGD MEMO TO HILL DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

WETTERING

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8304401

NSCIFID

(J / F)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

8/15

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

System #

I

Package#

5016

RA

83 AUG 15 P 4: 33

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	mm	
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	2		D
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

System # I
Package# 5616
CA

jd

83 AUG 15 12:07
SEQUENCE TO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>		
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Westerning</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Small typo, page 3 of Tab A

*Dove 8/15/83
Dw*

*↑
Capital S
Anchorage Warning
Control System*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5616

4

August 15, 1983

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's August 10, 1983
Meeting with Senegal President Abdou Diouf

Attached for your information is a copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation covering the President's meeting and luncheon
with President Abdou Diouf of Senegal.

Robert M. Kimmitt

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Memcon

cc:
Vice President

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

RMJ
8/30/83

~~SECRET~~

117538

5616

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED 5

NLRR M37111 #117538

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State George Shultz
Edwin Meese III, Counsellor to the President
William P. Clark, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, Agency for
International Development
James M. Beggs, Administrator, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
Ambassador Charles Bray
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Frederick L. Wattering, NSC
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
Carol Wolter, Interpreter

President Abdou Diouf
Foreign Minister Moustapha Niasse
Minister of Economy and Finance, Mamadou Toure
Minister of Planning and Cooperation, Cheikh
Hamidou Kane
Vice President of the National Assembly,
Falilou Kane
Ambassador Abdourahmane Dia

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, August 10, 1983
11:30 A.M. - 1:15 P.M.

PLACE: Oval Office/State Dining Room

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Senegal President
Abdou Diouf

The President extended a warm welcome to President Diouf.

President Diouf began by thanking the President for an unforgettable welcome. He expressed pleasure at the talks held with senior USG officials, including ones held in the past year with the Vice President and Ambassador Kirkpatrick. He expressed admiration for the President's policies, characterizing them as dynamic, inspiring actions in the service of the Free World. He noted that the US and Senegal shared ideals, objectives and basic values. (U)

President Diouf stated he was here to bear witness to the friendship and alliance between the US and Senegal. He noted the need to intensify the struggle for freedom, truth and democracy. He also remarked on the plight of the Third World in problems of poverty and development. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

The President praised bilateral relations, noting that they were important and very valuable to us. He expressed gratitude toward the courtesies Senegal has extended to us, including the support to NASA and the availability of Dakar airfield to our aircraft. He noted that both nations faced similar economic problems and the President expressed admiration for the courage of President Diouf in taking on these economic problems head-on. He asked President Diouf for his views on the Chad situation and what it would mean if Qadhafi were successful in his aggression. (S) 6

President Diouf supported US actions, characterizing them as well done and necessary. He noted that his government had pressed the French to act in defense of Chad against aggression and continue to bolster the legitimate government of Chad. He stated that Qadhafi's efforts to secure a foothold must be annihilated. He added that if Chad falls to Libyan aggression many African states will be threatened and some would be easy prey to Libya. He recalled that at one point he thought Qadhafi would be satisfied with just the Aozou Strip (of Chad), but now he believed that his ambitions went beyond that. President Diouf restated his support for US actions in Chad and pledged Senegal's support - anything we can do to help in implementing these measures, Senegal will do to the limit of its capabilities, he averred. He added that Senegal wants our joint ally, France, to do what it began to do yesterday (send troops). (S)

President Diouf recalled the June (1983) OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He noted that it took quick footwork on his part to get Ethiopian leader Mengistu elected as OAU Chairman rather than Qadhafi - the "lesser of two evils." (S)

President Diouf called the President's attention to the situation in Upper Volta. He noted that the new leader (Captain Sankara) has the label of a pro-Libyan stooge. But he added that Sankara had sent him a message of friendship and there appeared the possibility that if we do not close our minds we might be able to keep him from sliding into the Libyan embrace. (S)

President Diouf added that in regard to Senegal's relations with Libya, Qadhafi has been trying to charm him. Qadhafi actively courted him at the Addis OAU Summit. (S)

The President welcomed President Diouf's suggestion on Upper Volta. (U)

The Vice President recalled that Captain Sankara had made an encouraging statement in the last couple of days. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7

~~SECRET~~

3

Secretary Shultz remarked that the advice that we should not have a knee-jerk reaction to events in Upper Volta is sound. We are taking a wait-and-see approach to the new regime. Meanwhile, he added, the situation in Chad is grave. It seems that Faya Largeau has fallen. (S)

The President said that we have been watching the Chad situation closely. He recalled that in the past the French had let us know this was in their sphere of influence. In response to a French request we sent our AWACS, but the French have not moved. He added that we are not sure what the French are intending to do in Chad and raised a concern that there might be a de facto partition. (S)

President Diouf responded that it would be an illusion if the French were to try and deal with Qadhafi. Military means must precede any language of conciliation. As long as the Goukouni rebel forces have the powerful Libyan support, the only answer is to give the Habre forces equal or more powerful support in order to ensure compliance with the legal situation. Once the military aggression is ended the question of national reconciliation can be addressed, and also the question of Libya's claim to the Aozou Strip, which could be referred to international agencies. (S)

President Diouf asked what the US would like the French to do.

The President responded that he did not want to pose as a military tactician, but recalled that we were under the impression the French were actively considering making their air power available to counter the Libyans. Either this has been delayed or another course is being pursued. The President agreed with President Diouf on the problem of negotiating with Qadhafi. (S)

The Vice President asked if President Diouf saw any possibility of a partition of Chad.

President Diouf responded that in his last contact with the French government he did not get the impression that they favored this, but noted that he had heard this view expressed in certain French circles. President Diouf stated his categorical opposition to such an idea and noted that the territorial integrity of Chad must be preserved. Such a deal would create a horrendous precedent for Africa, he added. (S)

Secretary Shultz remarked that the more often the Senegal government's views on Chad are stated to President Mitterrand and also stated publicly, the better it will be. The Secretary also noted that the UNSC would meet on Chad on August 11 and stated that a strong statement from Senegal would have a positive impact. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8

~~SECRET~~

4

President Diouf replied that he would contact his permanent UN Representative and give him instructions to participate and act constructively on this matter. (S)

The President thanked President Diouf. (U)

(The remainder of the conversation took place at the working luncheon).

The President asked President Diouf for a description of the situation in Senegal. (U)

President Diouf stated that his government must take drastic measures due to drought, the world trade drop-off, the fall in prices of Senegal's commodities, the rise in cost of imports, etc. These will be the most difficult measures in Senegal's history and result in a drop in the standard of living, a rise in prices of basic foodstuffs and fuel, elimination of certain subsidies. No one will be immune. He expressed the hope that measures taken by Senegal's friends will help but said first Senegal must do its part, must set an example. All these sacrifices are based on normal rainfall, and unfortunately, the rains are late. Thus, these stern measures may not be enough and Senegal would then have to look to its friends. He was not sure how the people would react to this, but he is counting on their maturity. (S)

Ambassador Bray noted that in a good year Senegal got 15-20 inches of rain. This year the rains are good in the south but catastrophically low in the north. (U)

The President asked AID Administrator McPherson to comment.

Mr. McPherson stated that Senegal has done a particularly good job in facing the problems, and he was impressed by the leadership addressing the tough decisions. He pledged that we would watch the situation closely and we want to be as helpful as we can. He cited the generous level of current US assistance. (S)

The President stated he viewed Senegal's plight with great sympathy. He noted a Jefferson saying to the effect that if one gives the people the facts they will do what is right. (U)

President Diouf stated he personally planned to explain the facts to the people. (U)

President Diouf noted he bore two messages from other African leaders: the problems of development and security, and the need for a solution to the debt problem by rescheduling or forgiveness. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9

Secretary Shultz noted we are engaged with both problems and trying to contribute to their solution. On debt rescheduling, Secretary Regan and Paul Volker are working with de la Rosiere of the IMF to develop programs to get around, to bridge debt problems, but without depressing the world economy at the same time. He noted that the House just voted approval of an IMF funding of \$8 1/2 billion dollars, but the President had to fight hard for it. He added that the interplay between security and development was the crux of the problem everywhere. We see this particularly in Central America. (S)

The President noted opposition to IMF, IBRD funding in Congress, but stated that these institutions were in our national interest. (S)

President Diouf noted that he had just written the President on the IDA replenishment, but he had arrived here in advance of the letter. He added that the IDA VII replenishment is vital to Africa. (S)

The President noted we want to do that but first we must finish IDA VI. (U)

Secretary Shultz invited President Diouf's views on Namibia/Angola, Western Sahara, and the OAU. (U)

The President noted that the key to a Namibian settlement is withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. (S)

President Diouf stated that on Angola he shared our objective. He added that the Angolans must be given a sense of security because they are facing attacks from both UNITA and the South Africans. If guarantees on security can be given a solution is possible. On Namibia, the solution must be consonant with UNSCR 435. Pressure must continue on South Africa. On Western Sahara, the OAU resolution made at the June Addis summit must be implemented. Morocco should go through with the census and referendum. Talks with the Polisario, with Algeria, can be held secretly to create modalities for these. Morocco will win a referendum, President Hassan should not hold back. If there is no solution at the time of the next OAU summit, the issue could irrevocably split and destroy the OAU. (S)

The President asked how could reconciliation talks go forward in Angola between the MPLA and UNITA with the Cubans still present? (S)

~~SECRET~~

10

~~SECRET~~

6

President Diouf suggested that it might be possible as a third stage, after a Namibia settlement. The MPLA has said it will accept all Angolans except Savimbi, but this may only be an opening position. (S)

The luncheon then concluded.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5616

11

August 12, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: FRED WETTERING *FW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Covering the President's August 10 Meeting with President Diouf of Senegal

Attached is a memcon covering the President's Oval Office meeting and working lunch with President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, August 10, 1983. I thought it was an excellent meeting. (S)

As customary, I believe we should send a copy to State for their information. (U)

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the attached Kimmitt/Hill memo of transmittal to the State Department.

APPROVE

RMK

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

Tab I

Kimmit/Hill Memo

A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *8/30/11*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117540

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

[Handwritten signature]

12

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 3272
SIT957 AN004551

DTG: 172143Z AUG 83 PSN: 023992
TOR: 229/2247Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP VP SIT EOB /005

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #3272 2292239
O 172143Z AUG 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 2820

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 233272

E. O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: OPDC, NI, US

REF: LAGOS 9196

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM PROVIDED BY THE WHITE HOUSE OF THE AUGUST 13 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT SHAGARI.

3. QUOTE: THE PRESIDENT: MR. PRESIDENT, PLEASE ACCEPT MY PERSONAL HEARTFELT CONGRATULATIONS AND THOSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THE SUCCESSFUL FIRST STAGE OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA WHICH HAVE RETURNED YOU TO OFFICE. I KNOW THAT YOU MUST HAVE A DEEP SENSE OF PERSONAL GRATIFICATION AT THE OUTCOME, AND AT THE SAME TIME FEEL THE HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY WHICH YOU ONCE AGAIN WILL ASSUME.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 #117540

BY LW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

13

PAGE 02 OF 03

SECSTATE WASHDC 3272

DTG: 172143Z AUG 83

PSN: 023992

PRESIDENT SHAGARI: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. PRESIDENT.
I AM VERY GRATEFUL AND EXTREMELY APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR CALL.

THE PRESIDENT: I RECOGNIZE THAT THE TERM AHEAD WILL BE A
DIFFICULT ONE AS NIGERIA, ALONG WITH OTHER NATIONS,
STRUGGLES TO EMERGE FROM THE WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC SLUMP. I
WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT YOU HAVE A FIRM FRIEND IN THE UNITED
STATES AS YOU MOVE AHEAD WITH YOUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP YOUR
COUNTRY ECONOMICALLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS.

PRESIDENT SHAGARI: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. I AM PROUD THAT
WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HAVE THIS EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY IN
NIGERIA AND WE ARE SETTING EXAMPLES FOR OTHER AFRICAN
COUNTRIES. I CHERISH OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH THE UNITED
STATES AND AM PROUD THAT WE USED YOUR SYSTEM, WHICH I
THINK IS THE ONLY SYSTEM THAT CAN WORK IN AFRICA. THANK
YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR INTEREST.

THE PRESIDENT: WHAT IS HAPPENING THIS MONTH IS A PRECIOUS
AND ALL TOO RARE EVENT IN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. THE
NIGERIAN PEOPLE ARE ONCE AGAIN AFFIRMING THE CHERISHED
VISION, WHICH WE SHARE WITH YOU, THAT LEADERSHIP DERIVES
ITS POWER FROM THE FREELY GIVEN CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED.
IT IS FROM THIS ACTIVE CONSENT THAT OUR DEMOCRATIC INSTI-
TUTIONS DERIVE THEIR STRENGTH AND FLEXIBILITY. I CONGRAT-
ULATE YOU AND THE NIGERIAN PEOPLE IN THIS DEMONSTRATION OF
DEMOCRACY IN ACTION.

PRESIDENT SHAGARI: ON BEHALF OF THE NIGERIAN PEOPLE,
THANK YOU MOST SINCERELY, MR. PRESIDENT. WE SHALL
CONTINUE PUTTING DEMOCRACY ON A SOUND FOOTING IN NIGERIA.

THE PRESIDENT: ONCE AGAIN, CONGRATULATIONS, AND GOODBYE.
END QUOTE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

14

PAGE 03 OF 03

SECSTATE WASHDC 3272

DTG: 172143Z AUG 83

PSN: 023992

DAM

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8306408

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 14 SEP 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM WETTERING

DOC DATE 14 SEP 83

15

KEYWORDS ZIMBABWE

HS

MUGABE, ROBERT

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PM MUGABE 13 SEP

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 16 SEP 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(S /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Wettering	X 9/14	For Further Action		
CLARK	X 9/15	FOR DECISION		
	SEP 19 1983	PO index...		
	C SEP 19 1983	Kimball sp		WEV, R.K.

DISPATCH

MJR 9/19

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)MR

National Security Council
The White House

GC

I 806

RECEIVED

System #

Package# 6408

83 SEP 15 12:10

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	K	
John Poindexter	2		I
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	3		D
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

System # I

Package# 6408

CS

83 SEP 14 12:16

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

Wettering 2 Typo page 2 ^{Total}

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

cc Lilac
Teicher
Sopra Bosch
Bailey
McMinn

(Handwritten signature)

9/15

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

18

6408

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

September 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's September 13, 1983
Meeting with Zimbabwe Prime Minister Mugabe

Attached for your information is a copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation covering the President's September 13 meeting with
Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

RW 8/30/11

~~SECRET~~

117541

6408

20

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary of State George Shultz
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, Agency for
International Development
Ambassador Robert Keeley
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Frederick L. Wettering, NSC

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe
Foreign Minister Witness Mangwende
Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and
Development, Bernard Chidzero
Minister of Manpower Planning, F. Shava
Ambassador E. Chipamaunga
Deputy Minister of Information, N. Nhiwatiwa
A.T. Mugomba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
P.T. Chanetsa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, September 13, 1983
11:30 A.M. - 1:30 P.M.

PLACE: Oval Office/State Dining Room

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Zimbabwe Prime
Minister Robert Mugabe

The President welcomed Prime Minister Mugabe. He began substantive remarks by noting certain encouraging developments in Zimbabwe, including the GOZ support to private investment and private enterprise. (S)

Prime Minister Mugabe opened his remarks with thanks for the warm reception and the positive relations with the US. He remarked that when the President was elected he had some anxieties as to whether US assistance and support to Zimbabwe would be sustained, but these were unjustified. The US is the largest aid donor and has the deep appreciation of the GOZ. The US has enabled the GOZ to sustain the pace of rural development and economic transformation. Prime Minister Mugabe expressed his satisfaction with bilateral political-diplomatic relations. (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

BY

NLRRM37111 # 117541

NARA DATE

6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

21

~~SECRET~~

2

Prime Minister Mugabe noted that US aid has been put to good use in resettlement of peoples, in training programs to increase skills, and on commodity imports to help farmers. He noted that \$15 million fell out of the FY 83 assistance request for Zimbabwe and hoped it could be restored. (S)

Regionally, Prime Minister Mugabe stated that our good bilateral relations could be used to help promote peace. He described South Africa as the architect for destabilization in the area. He remarked he had spoken to Assistant Secretary Crocker of his fears and anxieties regarding South Africa. He stated that his government felt that South Africa should not be given any encouragement in its continuing aggression against neighbor states. Zimbabwe has given South Africa no cause for the acts of sabotage for which South Africa is responsible, he declared. He cited attacks by South African armed and supported oppositionists in Mozambique on ports and railways in Mozambique as indirect attacks on the Zimbabwe economy. These attacks force Zimbabwe to use South African ports and railways. He added that South Africa has armed and dispatched small groups of dissidents in Zimbabwe, and South Africa was active in a major way in Mozambique and Angola. He appealed to the President to do what he could to help. (S)

Prime Minister Mugabe noted that in other issues we might disagree in approach but not in goals. He referred to the apartheid system of South Africa in that vein, noting that we all are repelled by its racism. But positive action through economic measures is needed, he advocated, to compel changes. (S)

On Namibia, Prime Minister Mugabe expressed his appreciation of the US zeal in trying to resolve this problem. He hoped that now the UN Secretary General has been engaged in this matter, it will not be allowed to fail. He noted that we do not see eye to eye on linkage, and the GOZ position is that this should not interfere with a Namibia settlement. The Cuban troop issue should be dealt with in bilateral discussions in a separate exercise, he believed. (S)

Prime Minister Mugabe noted that in most other issues we saw eye to eye. The GOZ has condemned the Soviets over Afghanistan and Vietnam over Cambodia. He expressed his dismay at events in Central America which he thought was causing the US to negate its admirable position of non-interference in affairs of other states, but on other issues we have been together in the common struggle for human rights, development and non-interference. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

22

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

The President began his response by commenting on Namibia. There we want a settlement to reflect the views of the people of Namibia, and the Cubans threaten and intimidate. The Cubans in turn are an arm of the Soviets. Should they not be compelled to leave, there could be another Soviet surrogate installed ignoring the will of the people. (S)

On Central America, the President responded at length. He noted that in El Salvador, many did not understand the facts. It was a poor country oligarchy. The oligarchy was thrown out by the revolution. We do not automatically oppose revolution, he added. This new revolutionary government called for and held free elections with international observers. Cuban-trained guerrillas opposed the elections and tried to intimidate the people to stay away from the polls, but 80% voted. One Congressman who was an observer told of a wounded woman patiently waiting in line to vote despite her wound inflicted by the guerrillas. The new government has offered amnesty and called for new elections, but the guerrillas want to shoot their way into power. Over three-fourths of our aid is economic, helping with land reform. In Nicaragua, a reverse situation applies. Somoza was a dictator but allowed more freedoms than the Sandinistas. We did not initially oppose the Sandinistas. When they took over we sent extensive aid. The Sandinistas made solemn promises to the Organization of American States on taking power promising elections, free press, civil liberties. They have violated every one of these commitments. Non-communist members of the liberation movement have been ousted, and gone into opposition. It is these that have our sympathies. They want their revolutionary goals implemented. We are not intervening or sending in armed force. (S)

Prime Minister Mugabe remarked that the Cubans came to Angola on invitation because the South Africans had invaded, and remain because the government is insecure. Their presence does not seem to the GOZ to threaten Namibia. (S)

(At this point the meeting moved to the State Dining Room for the working lunch).

The President opened this session by noting that we disagree on how one views the Cubans, but that is beside the point. The South Africans insist that the Cubans be withdrawn. (S)

Assistant Secretary Crocker was invited to give an update on negotiations. He stated that we are seeking a parallel withdrawal of Cubans from Angola and South Africans from Angola and Namibia. Currently, we have been in close touch with the Angolan regime and are awaiting an opening proposal from them.

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Prime Minister Mugabe asked if the proposal required prior Cuban withdrawal or parallel withdrawal. (S)

Dr. Crocker replied the latter. (U)

Prime Minister Mugabe remarked on Chad that the GOZ position coincides with the OAU position - no outside interference. (S)

The President noted the Chad problem was due to Libyan leader Qadhafi's meddling, and noted recent US actions on Chad. (S)

Prime Minister Mugabe recalled recent Chadian history. He regretted that a settlement has become more difficult now that Libya and France are actively supporting their candidates. He then noted he had watched US television news last night and wondered if the US would intervene in Lebanon. (S)

The President, after cautioning the Prime Minister on a reliance on television news, described our peace efforts in the Middle East. In Lebanon, he noted that we accepted an invitation to join a multi-national force to keep order in Lebanon while the foreign forces withdrew. Now Syria has reneged on an earlier commitment to withdraw and is supporting an intensification of factional fighting. Our role is currently that of self defense. We are not eager to take sides or get involved. We are trying to bring about a ceasefire and broaden the base of the government. (S)

Prime Minister Mugabe noted he had recently recognized the PLO and wondered why the US had not. (S)

The President responded that we could not sit down with a group that did not recognize Israel's right to exist. There was some movement in the right direction in the PLO, he added, until the recent PLO split, again abetted by the Syrians. (S)

Judge Clark asked Prime Minister Mugabe to explain Zimbabwe's UN Security Council vote yesterday on the KAL shutdown. (S)

Prime Minister Mugabe responded that the GOZ views its Security Council seat as held in trust for all states in the region. The GOZ consulted with seven states and the unanimous feeling was to abstain. He was aware that the US believed that Zimbabwe opposed the US at the UN; this is not true, he averred. There are merely differences on issues. He stated that the KAL shutdown was a horrifying act, but the debate at the UNSC took on overtones of a US-USSR question. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Prime Minister Mugabe noted that US aid has been put to good use in resettlement of peoples, in training programs to increase skills, and on commodity imports to help farmers. He noted that \$15 million fell out of the FY 83 assistance request for Zimbabwe and hoped it could be restored. (S)

Regionally, Prime Minister Mugabe stated that our good bilateral relations could be used to help promote peace. He described South Africa as the architect for destabilization in the area. He remarked he had spoken to Assistant Secretary Crocker of his fears and anxieties regarding South Africa. He stated that his government felt that South Africa should not be given any encouragement in its continuing aggression against neighbor states. Zimbabwe has given South Africa no cause for the acts of sabotage for which South Africa is responsible, he declared. He cited attacks by South African armed and supported oppositionists in Mozambique on ports and railways in Mozambique as indirect attacks on the Zimbabwe economy. These attacks force Zimbabwe to use South African ports and railways. He added that South Africa has armed and dispatched small groups of dissidents in Zimbabwe, and South Africa was active in a major way in Mozambique and Angola. He appealed to the President to do what he could to help. (S)

Prime Minister Mugabe noted that in other issues we might disagree in approach but not in goals. He referred to the apartheid system of South Africa in that vein, noting that we all are repelled by its racism. But positive action through economic measures is needed, he advocated, to compel changes. (S)

On Namibia, Prime Minister Mugabe expressed his appreciation of the US zeal in trying to resolve this problem. He hoped that now the UN Secretary General has been engaged in this matter, it will not be allowed to fail. He noted that we do not see eye to eye on linkage, and the GOZ position is that this should not interfere with a Namibia settlement. The Cuban troop issue should be dealt with in biateral discussions in a separate exercise, he believed. (S)

Prime Minister Mugabe noted that in most other issues we saw eye to eye. The GOZ has condemned the Soviets over Afghanistan and Vietnam over Cambodia. He expressed his dismay at events in Central America which he thought was causing the US to negate its admirable position of non-interference in affairs of other states, but on other issues we have been together in the common struggle for human rights, development and non-interference. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

↑
Bilateral

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8306742

RW 8/30/11
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 27 SEP 83 14

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 23 SEP 83

27

KEYWORDS PORTUGAL

HS

EANES, ANTONIO R

AP

SUBJECT MEMCON OF EANES VISIT 15 SEP

ACTION: KIMMITT SGD MEMO TO HILL

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

Kimitt

Sommer

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(VL VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH

FILE _____

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

83 SEP 26 P 4: 46

System # I
Package# 6742

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Sommer</u>	<u>2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker DISTRIBUTION Deaver Other

COMMENTS

cc Wethering
Fortier
Myer
Bailey

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Peter :
good memo.
Small typo, page
2 of Tab I. Send
copy to those
listed. Bob

Done
Peter

September 27, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Portuguese President
Eanes' Visit, September 15, 1983

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with Portuguese President Eanes on September 15, 1983.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Tab A Memcon

rw 8/30/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

Declassify on: OADR

117545

30

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6742

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with Portuguese President Antonio Eanes

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Regan
Secretary Weinberger
Ambassador Allan Holmes
Charles P. Tyson
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt
Peter Sommer, NSC
Director, EUR/WE Robert Peck

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M3711 # 117545
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

President Antonio Ramalho Eanes
Foreign Minister Jaime Gama
President of the Regional Government of the Azores
Joao Bosco da Mota Amaral
Ambassador Leonardo Mathias
Chief of the Civil Household of the President
Jose Caldeira Guimaraes
Admiral Henrique Silva Horta, Chief of the
Military Household of the President
Ambassador Antonio Vaz Pereira, Director General
for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Adviser to the President on Foreign Relations
Luis Filipe de Castro Mendes

DATE, TIME September 15, 1983
AND PLACE: 11:00 - 11:55 Cabinet Room

The President said that he and President Eanes had been discussing a number of important issues in the Oval Office. He wanted to preface this meeting by noting the economic problems of both countries and the rest of the world. The U.S. recognizes the tremendous efforts being made by the Portuguese Government in the economic field. This obviously takes great political courage. The Portuguese are on the right course, just as is the U.S. (C)

President Eanes opened by expressing appreciation for the very cordial manner in which he and his party had been welcomed to the U.S. Portugal very much appreciates U.S. efforts to manage the political and military situations between the East and the West

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

and to create conditions for a dialogue between the East and the West. Eanes said he would like to emphasize the leadership role played by President Reagan. Portugal is pleased that the U.S. is taking on the responsibilities incumbent on the leader of the western world. Eanes continued that, based on Portugal's domestic experience, he would like to emphasize their feeling that it was possible to deal with the Communists. This required that the Communists be made to respect the established power relationships and, secondly, that the government's policies be clear and well defined. Peripheral NATO countries such as Portugal had security concerns not only within the NATO context, but also relating to problems of internal defense. These countries have relatively weak economies. In the case of Portugal, this was as a result of the long years of dictatorship. During the revolutionary years, there was massive dislocation. Thus the Portuguese believe that this economic situation and the need for recovery require concentration on the domestic economy and the needs of the people. (C)

President Eanes observed Portugal's willingness to cooperate in the defense of the West in the context of NATO was total. Portugal hoped that its allies and friends, especially the U.S., would continue to show understanding and democratic solidarity. This was required to permit Portugal to continue to build democracy and be able to perform its role in the defense of the West reliably and effectively. Eanes added that he hoped the U.S. would be forthcoming in both the economic and military areas. He pledged to the President, as the leader of the Western world, Portugal's most reliable cooperation. (C)

The President replied that the U.S. wanted to be as helpful as it could both in the military area and in response to Portugal's economic problems. He noted that we all share these economic problems. He was greatly encouraged that the U.S. had begun its economic recovery. This could be beneficial to other countries as well. (C)

The President noted he had been most interested in what President Eanes had said to him earlier about Mozambique and Angola. He was particularly interested in Mozambique because he had not felt before that the Mozambicans were desirous of breaking with the East and aligning with the West, that is, particularly with Portugal. President Eanes had also said that Angola wanted to be non-aligned and was eager to get out from under Eastern influence. The U.S. was trying to bring about a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. We are seeking South African cooperation in order to bring this about as well as to secure independence for Namibia. The latter goal was dependent on the Cuban withdrawal. He observed that President Eanes had told him as well that Angola was totally dominated by the Soviets. (C)

President Eanes observed that what he had told the President earlier was a mere summary. If he wished to hear a detailed discussion Eanes would give the floor to his Foreign Minister. (C)

Secretary Shultz interjected that before the visit ended we hoped to have a good exchange on Africa and to develop a systematic pattern for working together in the future. (C)

Foreign Minister Gama prefaced his remarks with a reference to the long years of Portuguese dictatorship and the revolutionary circumstances in which decolonization took place. Neither the West nor even Portugal was properly prepared for the changes which occurred. The left wing was in a dominant position following the revolution in Portugal. The left was rejected in Portugal, but the former colonies fell under Communist influence. Now that democracy had been firmly established in Portugal, the Portuguese felt the need to extend their achievement to their former colonies. (C)

Gama said that the Portuguese have very effective links -- one might say roots -- in the former colonies. They had, however, no economic means to influence effectively political developments. Thus Portugal felt the need to cooperate in a trilateral way with other states. They are already doing so with European countries and wanted to do so with the U.S. These countries (Mozambique and Angola) wished to move to a neutralist position. For political reasons it would be easier for this evolution to take place if Portugal was the link. They understood that Portugal would not provide support if they maintained their links with the Soviet Union. (C)

Gama added that Portugal was very conscious of its status as a Southern European country. Democracy had only recently been established in Greece, Spain, and Portugal. They had struggled with the Communists in Portugal; they had had to concern themselves with the East-West balance within Portugal itself. The maintenance of democracy in Portugal was very important in global terms. The U.S. should see an important interest in supporting the Portuguese economic recovery and the renewal of the Portuguese Armed Forces. If there were deterioration of the economic and social situation or destabilization of the Armed Forces through the influence of left wing elements -- and in the present pluralistic system if the political parties were undermined -- the Soviet Union would have a chance to gain influence internally. Portugal's links with NATO and the U.S. would thus be weakened. (C)

President Reagan noted that President Eanes had told him of the need to reorganize the Armed Forces away from its historical role in fighting colonial wars toward new NATO missions. He underlined that the U.S. wanted to be of help. (C)

Secretary Weinberger said Portugal's contribution is a vital part of NATO's total capability. We had talked with the Portuguese about ways to strengthen both the Navy and the Army. And these talks were continuing. He noted these matters could be discussed in detail over lunch at the Pentagon the following day. (C)

The President noted he had told President Eanes we would work with the Congress to see about increasing the amount of aid the U.S. provides to Portugal. (C)

President Eanes said that he had discussed with Secretary Shultz the previous day the desirability of moving forward on the Azores negotiations. He said the President of the Azores Regional Government was present and could provide details. (C)

President Mota Amaral pointed out that Portuguese-U.S. relations were over two centuries old and that the first link between the two nations was a consulate established in Ponta Delgada immediately after the war of independence. The air base on Lajes was a very important facility. The previous agreement expired last February. It was politically most helpful that negotiations are now going forward. Yesterday, President Eanes had expressed his expectation that the agreement would be reasonable and fair, just as the U.S. had dealt with other allied countries in recent months. Portugal, he stressed, is a good friend and ally. The Portuguese feel sensitive that they are at the end of the line of the base renewals. Since 1979 a significant proportion of the economic aid received by the Azores has come to them as a result of the earlier agreement. The Azores Government has been working toward political stability in this geopolitically important island. (C)

Secretary Shultz noted that he had recently made a brief stopover in Lajes. He had been shown a port development project which would be useful for the Azores as well as our own armed forces. He asked about the personal relations between the Azores people and the American troops. (C)

President Mota Amaral replied that the Azores people had an extremely friendly attitude toward the American presence. Almost all Azoreans have relatives in the U.S., including himself. These Azoreans are a very important community in this country and are even involved in American politics at high levels. The Azoreans felt as if they were deserving of special attention from the U.S. since they are not only good friends, but almost part of the family. (C)

The President commented that that was a mutual feeling. (U)

Secretary Weinberger added that Lajes is a very important base. We are glad that the negotiations are going well. Americans stationed there felt it was a choice assignment because of the friendly relations they had with the people of the Azores. (C)

Foreign Minister Gama said he hoped the President would use his influence to move the negotiations along. The Portuguese wanted to complete a Lajes agreement and then consider the remaining facilities. (C)

Ambassador Holmes replied that this accords with the U.S. view. We have agreed to reconvene the negotiations on October 4 and we want to complete them rapidly. We felt we could be in almost continuous negotiations until it is done. (C)

Secretary Shultz recalled that he had already suggested they use an old labor negotiations technique of locking everyone in the room and not letting them out until they reached an agreement. While that might not be appropriate in diplomacy, our spirit was to get a quick conclusion and then to move on. (C)

Secretary Regan said that the U.S. would be as supportive as possible when the Portuguese IMF program comes up for approval in October. We are impressed by the courage of the Portuguese Government in taking strong measures. Austerity will not be easy on the people, but in the long run there is no alternative and the nation will be in better shape. He joked that he wished that another Portuguese speaking nation would act as forthrightly. The U.S. would try to be helpful in regard to trade and other issues as Portugal faced the difficulties of bringing about an economic recovery. (C)

President Eanes expressed appreciation for U.S. understanding of the situation in Portugal and of the steps taken by the government. The Portuguese felt gratitude for our support. (C)

In recalling President Eanes' opening comments regarding the Portuguese experience in learning to deal with Communists, Secretary Shultz said they seemed particularly appropriate. The lesson was that first you had better be strong, and secondly, you had better know what it is you want and be clear and definite about it. If one is strong and knows what one wants, you are going to prevail over the Communists. Those are good principles and are parallel to what the President has been doing here in the U.S. and within the NATO alliance, including in regard to INF. The Secretary recalled that in Madrid Foreign Minister Gama raised a strong voice for an appropriate response to the KAL disaster. The Portuguese actions have been consistent with the principles laid down by President Eanes. (C)

The President underlined that we appreciate and admire the position Portugal took on the airliner incident. (C)

President Eanes recalled that he had said the previous day that the KAL disaster could have been either an accident or something deliberately perpetrated. The subsequent actions of the Soviets, however, indicate that they do not consider it to have been an accident. They refuse to accept any responsibility. Since their response has been so aggressive, we must consider what they have done to be a political action. Thus the Portuguese response has been strong in banning Aeroflot landings and overflights for 30 days. Portugal very much appreciated President Reagan's role in responding with serenity and determination. He then congratulated the President for his speech on the KAL disaster which had been widely disseminated internationally. (C)

The President said he had been interested as to whether the incident caught the Soviets by surprise or if it had been something planned. He believed that, if it had been planned, the Soviets would have prepared a better story. Their first story was that the plane had simply disappeared from the radar. He continued that the Soviets have been caught in the act and their response has been even worse than the act itself, if that is possible. They have even claimed that they would do it again. (C)

Secretary Shultz asked what the reaction of Communist groups within Portugal had been? (C)

President Eanes replied that the Portuguese Communists have closely followed the Soviet position. They have practically reproduced verbatim the Tass story in their official organs. There has, however, been some grumbling in leftist circles that the Soviets had produced no satisfactory explanation. (C)

Secretary Shultz observed that the fact that Communist newspapers would take such a position would likely erode popular support in the long run. (C)

The President recalled a television interview of young Russians soldiers who had deserted in Afghanistan. Many gave as their reason for desertion that they had been ordered to shoot women and children. This makes one wonder how many people are also doing some rethinking as a result of this episode. (C)

President Eanes said the incident would have an impact both on the long and short run in the Christian West. In the USSR, it would be seen in a different light since they have different mental processes. He had no way to speculate on how the incident might affect Soviet attitudes. But he did think that it would have an impact on the utopian peace movements in the West. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President observed that we had received indications the Soviets were desperately stepping up their peace campaign in opposition to our proposals on INF. He suggested, however, that if we keep the heat on this would not be a problem. (C)

In concluding, President Eanes said he would like to thank the President once more for the very kind and remarkably warm reception the Portuguese party had received. The Portuguese truly and from the bottom of their hearts were grateful for the understanding and support expressed, particularly regarding military matters. On the basis of the sympathy, understanding, knowledge, and support demonstrated by the U.S., he felt we would be in a position to upgrade and strengthen our bilateral relations in the future. The U.S. welcome speaks eloquently of relations between the two countries. Portugal had assigned one of its best ambassadors to Washington, added Eanes. They had done this to assure that the development of relations would proceed on the basis of the importance which Portugal attributes to that relationship. He said he would also like once again to express Portuguese appreciation for the leadership of President Reagan and of the recent actions taken by the U.S. The Portuguese value very highly the friendship between our two countries. This would now be further enhanced by personal friendship. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 23, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*
 SUBJECT: Memcon of Eanes Visit

Attached for your approval is the memcon from Eanes' September 15 meeting with the President. There are no controversial items in the minutes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab I.

Approve RMK Disapprove _____

That you approve Kimmitt forwarding the memcon to State.

Approve RMK Disapprove _____

Tab I Memcon
 Tab A Kimmitt to Hill

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
 Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
 White House Guidelines, Sept. 21, 2000
 BY NARA *RS* DATE *8/30/11*

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

STAFF	C/O
-------	-----

Clark	
-------	--

McFarlane	
-----------	--

Poindexter	C
------------	---

C

83 SEP 27 P 5: 14

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Kimmitt	C
---------	---

C

Merchant	
----------	--

NSC S/S	C
---------	---

C

C : Copy

O : Original

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

39

'83 SEP 27 P4:55

all

83 SEP 27 P5:02

B

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE NO 687 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 7

FROM CHILL S/S 22540

(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MEMCON OF 9/25 MTG OF PRESIDENT, SECRETARY,

CLARK, KIRKPATRICK, TYSON, BROWN AND KAMPUCHEANS

(Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	BOB KIMMITT		

FOR CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS FOR YOUR ACTION

S/S Officer: *Bluck* *Quinn*

cdg

117546

40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: September 25, 1983

Place: Waldorf-Astoria Hotel

Time: 3:45 - 4:15 P.M.

Participants:

U.S. Side:

President Reagan

Secretary Shultz

Judge William P. Clark

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Mr. Charles Tyson

Mr. William A. Brown

Kampuchean Side:

Prince Sihanouk, Leader of the United Front for a Neutral,
Independent, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC)

Son Sann, President of the Khmer People's National Liberation

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR M3711/1 # 117546

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41

Front (KPNLF)

Ambassador John S. Sisowath, Democratic Khmer Deputy PerRep, UN

Sangwar delopez, Chief, KPNLF Informatin Office in Washington

The President said we have deep sympathy for the Khmer cause and keep in close touch with ASEAN regarding Kampuchean developments.

Sihanouk said the Khmer people appreciate all that the U.S. has done for them. Since 1979 the U.S. has never ceased to help the Kampuchians in their struggle for freedom and independence. At the UN the U.S. delegation has rendered such important assistance. The Khmer people owe profound thanks to the President and to the U.S. people.

The President said we will continue to support Kampuchea as we can, given our constraints.

Sihanouk stressed that his is not a government in exile. All of its ministers are in Kampuchea where it has many strongholds and where its armed forces are fighting well. There is no pretense of being about to win in a single day; the Vietnamese are too strong. However, the pressure has to be

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

42

maintained, otherwise the Vietnamese will reject all UN resolutions. Hopefully one day there will be an International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) with participation by the Vietnamese, who have thus far refused. This is not merely a "Kampuchean problem"; it is the creation of Vietnam. At present the Soviets support Vietnamese refusal to attend the ICK, so there is a deadlock. Therefore, U.S. efforts to help the Kampuchians in the process of getting a peaceful solution for Kampuchea are appreciated.

Secretary Shultz referred to his recent conversation in Washington with Son Sann who had mentioned Vietnamese settlement in the best areas of Kampuchea. This shows that the Vietnamese have permanent territorial aspirations.

Sihanouk said that the Vietnamese have more than 500,000 civilian settlers seizing Khmer land and exploiting Kampuchea's natural resources. This is a very dangerous situation; they are planning to Vietnamize the Khmer homeland.

Son Sann congratulated the President for his success in defending the freedom of the Lebanese people. He then read an aide-memoire in French:

"--We are in the front line of a struggle for liberty,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

peace and security in the region against the Vietnamese aggressors who are strongly supported by Soviet hegemonism.

--We have already struggled for years and the entire world knows this.

--We need your aid first on a matter of equilibrium and also because the Kampuchean people ardently appreciate the aid of the U.S. champions of liberty.

--The Kampuchean people know well the brutality of the Vietnamese who are in the process of intensifying the atrocities against the Kampuchean population, even against the troops of Heng Samrin, and of accelerating the Vietnamization of Kampuchea.

--By the thousands the inhabitants of the interior are coming to take refuge in our liberated zone. I have myself contacted at the end of August, 9-10 thousand of these inhabitants of the region of the northwest of Kampuchea (Siemreap Battambang, Oddor Meanchey) who fled the atrocities committed by the Vietnamese. Able-bodied men seek arms to go forth and combat the Vietnamese occupiers. We have actually, in addition to our armed forces, more than 5,000 trained men who await arms. The Kampuchean people listen daily to the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

transmissions of the VOA and await the good news of sufficient aid from the U.S.

--The majority of our combatants are former comrades in the struggle of American soldiers in Vietnam.

--The announcement of the audience which you have accorded us gives great hope to Kampucheans in the interior and abroad.

--Vietnam encroaches on Kampuchea. The people do not want these occupiers. Vietnam also has great internal difficulties in its own country.

--The dry season approaches and the battles will intensify. Help us urgently, please.

The President noted that we have some very great problems resulting from past involvement in the area; Vietnam created problems at home. We have certainly supported ASEAN and we will continue to do so. He wondered what has been the fate of former members of the South Vietnamese army. Have they become part of the communist Vietnamese army?

Son Sann replied that remnants of the former South Vietnamese army had been dispersed; none are now left. But

44

many South Vietnamese people are awaiting the opportunity to rise against their regime. The Khmer resistance is weak but it can serve as an example.

Secretary Shultz said that properly it was fair to say, based on the President's remarks before this meeting, that we support the non-communist Khmer resistance, that there are constraints, but that we are willing to test the limits of our constraints in rendering this support. It is hard to be precise, but that will be our basic attitude.

The President assured Sihanouk and Son Sann that our hearts are with them. He asked whether there were other factions which had not yet united.

Son Sann in reply said that recently 10,000 men from the interior (of Thailand) had gone back to the Thai/Kampuchean border. They wanted to leave their wives and children there so they could go back into Kampuchea to wage war.

Turning to Secretary Shultz, the President said he wanted us to explore to see to it that we do all that we can to help.

Secretary Shultz replied "Yes sir. I am glad to receive that order."

45

Son Sann closed by saying that there is sunshine outside;
"Now there is sunshine in our hearts because of your words."

cc: S/S:JCovey

WH:CTyson

WANG 0035Z