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President Reagan (October 1983)

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

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RBW 8/30/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (OCTOBER 1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 52

JAUVERT/BROWER

28

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117601	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH CAPE VERDE PRESIDENT ARISTIDES PEREIRA [W/MARK AND NOTATIONS] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	10/3/1983	B1
117602	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH CAPE VERDE PRESIDENT ARISTIDES PEREIRA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	10/3/1983	B1
117603	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FRG PRESIDENT KARL CARSTENS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	7	10/4/1983	B1
117605	MEMCON	RE. CALL FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT BETANCUR OF COLOMBIA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	10/5/1983	B1
117608	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER WU XUEQIAN <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	10/11/1983	B1
117616	MEMCON	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERAND <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	10/24/1983	B1
117619	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH TOGO PRESIDENT GNASSINGBE EYADEMA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	10/24/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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DOC DATE 03 OCT 83

1

TO

CLARK

FROM WETTERING

KEYWORDS

CAPE VERDE

SUBJECT

MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PRES PEREIRA 3 OCT

ACTION

FOR DECISION

DUE 05 OCT 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

CLARK

COMMENTS

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The White House

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John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

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SEQUENCE TO

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Executive Secretary

I

K

John Poindexter

Bud McFarlane

Jacque Hill

Judge Clark

John Poindexter

Executive Secretary

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

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D-Dispatch

N-No further Action

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cc: VP

Meese

Baker

Deaver

Other

COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

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117601
~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
RADM John Poindexter, Military Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador John Yates
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Fred Wetters, NSC
Sophia Porson, Interpreter

Assistant to

President Aristides Pereira
Foreign Minister Silvino Da Luz
Ambassador Jose Luis Fernandes Lopes

DATE AND TIME: Monday, October 3, 1983
11:30 A.M. - 12:00 Noon

PLACE: Oval Office

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Cape Verde President
Aristides Pereira (u)

The President opened the meeting by welcoming President Pereira. He noted the large number of Americans of Cape Verdean descent and asked President Pereira how his New England visit went. (U)

President Pereira expressed his appreciation at his reception by the President. He stated he was very impressed by his warm reception in New England and to meet with the Cape Verdeans living in the U.S. These warm receptions are an indicator that Cape Verde should continue in its course of building solid, cordial bilateral relations with the U.S. He intends to continue this course, and this is the message he is bringing to the U.S. (U)

The President stated his appreciation of President Pereira's constructive role in the search for peace in Southern Africa. He also noted his gratitude for Cape Verde denying transit rights to Libyan arms carrier aircraft en route to Central America. He noted that we shared a great interest in bringing peace to Namibia, but added that the remaining obstacle is the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. The removal of these Cuban troops is a firm South African requirement, and the only remaining issue before a Namibia settlement. He invited President Pereira's views. (S)

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BY RW 11/22/81

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 4, 1983


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MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's October 3, 1983
Meeting with Cape Verde President Pereira

Attached for your information is a copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation covering the President's October 3 meeting with
President Aristides Pereira of Cape Verde.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

RW 8/22/11

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117602

7032

6

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
RADM John Poindexter, Military Assistant
to Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador John Yates
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Fred Wettering, NSC
Sophia Porson, Interpreter

President Aristides Pereira
Foreign Minister Silvino Da Luz
Ambassador Jose Luis Fernandes Lopes

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President Pereira responded that it is both his duty and in Cape Verde's self interest to work for peace, and much effort has gone into the problems of Southern Africa. He noted he had recently visited Angola and Mozambique, and was dismayed to find the situation had deteriorated from the previous year. There is a climate of distrust between Angola and South Africa, he added. We must all work hard to rebuild a feeling of trust between these two states so that they can resume their dialogue for peace. That is what Cape Verde is trying to do. (S)

The President replied by noting that the US would make every effort as well. We shared President Pereira's goals in this. (U)

President Pereira expressed his gratitude for the unselfish U.S. assistance and stated he was pleased at the state of bilateral relations. He noted that assistance was needed now more than ever. He advised that he had observed an overall decline in assistance to Africa, and expressed the hope that in the case of Cape Verde the U.S. could review its position. He was convinced that Cape Verde could become viable and self-sustaining. He added he was encouraging U.S.-Cape Verdean citizens to invest in Cape Verde. (S)

The President assured President Pereira that we would certainly continue with our assistance, and would consider any specific new requests. He stated that we value our good relations with Cape Verde. (S)

President Pereira returned to the subject of Southern Africa, noting that at one time South Africa did not insist on Cuban troop withdrawal as a precondition, but now they do. So there is a deadlock. He stated it would be better if UNSCR 435 were implemented, then the Cubans would withdraw. (S)

Acting Secretary Dam declared that the Cuban troop issue is the major outstanding issue. Cuban and South African withdrawals must happen together. As a practical matter, these issues can and must be resolved by negotiation. That is why we are grateful that Cape Verde has worked to bring parties together and lent its weight to further the peace process through negotiations. We all agree that if South Africa would drop the Cuban issue as a condition, things would go easier - but the reality is they will not, as near as we can tell. (S)

The Vice President asked if President Pereira thought that MPLA leader Dos Santos was afraid to move because of Savimbi? (S)

President Pereira responded that we must not put these problems together. We should separate the issues - South African

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withdrawal, Cuban withdrawal, MPLA-UNITA reconciliation. Pooling them together has complicated matters, he added. President Dos Santos is convinced that Savimbi is an agent of the South Africans, and that Savimbi's offensive means that South Africa does not want peace. (S)

The President noted that a recent visitor stated that he felt that Dos Santos wanted the Cubans to go, but kept them to guard against Savimbi's forces. If assurances could be provided, perhaps he would see things differently. The President then remarked on the fact that Cuban forces in Angola have recently been reinforced. He stressed this was a real problem. (S)

President Pereira replied that the Angolans say the Cuban reinforcements are due to South African aid to Savimbi, a vicious circle. (S)

The President asked President Pereira how he saw the prospects for talks between the MPLA and UNITA. (S)

President Pereira replied that he did not rule this out. He noted in 1974-75 the MPLA and UNITA sat down together, and recalled that the late President Neto had planned to conduct talks with UNITA before his tragic death. President Pereira again called for movement by stages as the best chance of success. (S)

The President stated that we have the impression that the South Africans have made the decision on Namibia, but are fearful of a Cuban presence on the border. (S)

President Pereira agreed, noting this was a late-blooming concern developed largely in the last year. He recalled that the first round of South African-Angolan talks (on Cape Verde) went well, but then SWAPO mounted a big offensive. This seemed to convince South Africa that the MPLA was not sincere in wanting peace. Now there are new South African aggressions and UNITA moves, and now the MPLA feels that South Africa does not want peace. (S)

The President turned to the Western Sahara problem, noting the U.S. commitment to the OAU efforts to peacefully resolve this issue through ceasefire and referendum. He asked for President Pereira's views. (S)

President Pereira noted that all of Africa supported the OAU plan and Morocco accepted it in principle. He pledged his efforts to carry through on this issue. (S)

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The President noted humorously that, with all the problems we have been discussing, did President Pereira ever give thanks that his nation is an island nation? (Laughter) (U)

President Pereira, amused, replied yes. (U)

The Vice President asked if there had been any rain in Cape Verde to break the drought? (U)

President Pereira replied that there was no good news. In the four-month rainy season it had only rained one day. (U)

The President noted the extraordinary weather pattern in the U.S. this year, with floods in Arizona and tornados in California. He asked President Pereira the duration of the drought. (U)

President Pereira replied 14-15 years, the worst in history. But, he added with some pride, in colonial times when such droughts hit, 40,000 people died. Since independence, only one Cape Verdean has died of starvation and malnutrition, so Cape Verde has been able to manage and the people are gaining confidence. (U)

The meeting concluded with pleasantries. (U)

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MEMORANDUM

UNCLASSIFIED WITH NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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7032

October 3, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: FRED WETTERING *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Cape Verde: Memorandum of Conversation Covering
the President's October 3 Meeting with President
Pereira

Attached is my memcon summarizing the President's meeting with
Cape Verde President Aristedes Pereira on October 3, 1983.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve memcon; approve Kimmitt/Hill memo of
transmittal.

APPROVE

RMK

DISAPPROVE

Attachments

Tab I

Kimmitt/Hill Memo

A Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
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FW
8/30/11

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RW 8/30/11

ID 8307158

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RECEIVED 07 OCT 83 14

TO CLARK

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 06 OCT 83

KIMMITT

11 OCT 83

KEYWORDS GERMANY F R

CARSTENS, KARL

SUBJECT MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ FRG PRES CARSTENS 4 OCT

ACTION FOR DECISION

DUE 10 OCT 83 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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(CL MR)

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Clark X 10/8 For Decision
C 10/11 Kimmitt Sgd memo PS, RK

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October 11, 1983

Bob -

The memo you signed
is on WTH memo paper.
Shall I have it re-done
or just type Ex Sec of
National Security Council.

Have re-done _____

Add National Security Council ✓

Just let go _____

good catch! Carol ✓

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National Security Council
The White House

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John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	3		D
Situation Room			
Sommer	2	✓	Redo Tab I

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

Typos corrected.

Peter Sommer

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7158

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

October 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and FRG President Carstens

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with FRG President Karl Carstens on October 4.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
National Security Council

RW 8/30/11
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

October 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Paer*
SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Meeting with German
President Carstens

Attached for your approval is the memorandum of conversation from the President's meeting with German President Karl Carstens on October 4. There are no controversial items.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab I.

Approve RMK Disapprove _____

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward a copy of the memcon to State.

Approve RMK Disapprove _____

Tab I Memcon
Tab A Kimmitt to Hill

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DECLASSIFIED
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW, DATE 8/30/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7158

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with FRG
President Karl Carstens

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
William P. Clark
Edwin Meese
Ambassador Arthur Burns
USIA Director Wick
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt
Peter Sommer, NSC Staff
Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Niles

President Karl Carstens
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Ambassador Peter Hermes
State Secretary Hans Neusel
State Secretary Berndt von Staden
Dr. Juergen Sudhoff, Deputy Spokesman
Mr. Horst Osterheld, Chief, Division for
Foreign Affairs, Chancellery
Graf von Finckenstein, Director, Protocol

DATE, TIME: October 4, 1983, 10:45 a.m.-11:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: Cabinet Room

The President opened the Cabinet Room meeting by welcoming President Carstens to the United States. He stressed the significance of the visit, both as a symbol of U.S.-German friendship during the tricentennial year and as a contribution to the management of major issues during this critical period. He expressed gratitude for the lasting contributions of German-Americans to America's development. In regretting that his schedule would not permit him to join Carstens in Philadelphia, the President wished him a pleasant journey across America. He also praised Carstens' years of public service and personal contributions to peace and freedom. (U)

President Carstens said he viewed his visit as a great opportunity to express the thanks of his countrymen, as well as his own thanks, to the United States for the great assistance the U.S. provided Germany in the post-war period. Stressing the absolute necessity of the U.S.-FRG alliance, Carstens noted the strong popular support in the FRG for the alliance and the

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BY RW NAC 6/22/15

friendly feelings of Germans toward the U.S. soldiers stationed there. Before he left Germany he had spoken with two key SPD leaders, who authorized him to make this same statement in their names as well. This was a very important point since there was one question on which there were deep differences in Germany, namely INF. In explaining that his constitutional role was quite different from that of the President's, Carstens added that Foreign Minister Genscher could correct him if he made an error in stating German positions on foreign policy issues. Turning to the INF issue, Carstens expressed appreciation for the way in which the United States has conducted the talks and its close consultations with the FRG and other Allies, citing in particular Ambassador Nitze's visits to Bonn. He said he strongly supported the INF proposals which the President made in his September 26 UNGA speech. The President's speech had made a profound and positive impression in Germany. He also expressed appreciation for the fact that the United States went ahead with the arms control negotiations despite the KAL incident, which he called an inhuman event. Carstens suggested that there was always a chance of a surprise move by the Soviets at Geneva -- which could make an agreement possible. Having followed the USSR for 30 years, he recognized that the Soviets could make such adjustments more easily than the West. He asked whether the President saw any chance of a breakthrough in the INF talks, but added that, realistically, it is very unlikely that an agreement will be achieved by mid-November. Reflecting this fact, Carstens emphasized that Chancellor Kohl had asked him to tell the President that the NATO decision would be carried out by the FRG. (C)

President Carstens continued that looking ahead to the November 21 Bundestag debate, he was sure that the government would have solid support, although there will be considerable opposition and the SPD will come out against deployment. He added that even if an agreement were reached in Geneva based on the "interim solution" proposal, the SPD would split, with some members opposing deployment under any circumstances. Deployment, of course, would be strongly opposed by the peace movement, which he characterized as a disparate group of church leaders, teachers, and media figures, plus the small Green Party. There was some communist participation, but he stressed that it would be an error to assume that the peace movement is under the control of the communist party. Peace movement leaders had assured him, said Carstens, that there would be no violence in the anti-INF demonstrations leading up to the Bundestag debate; he hoped they were right. Continuing, he said he wished to pose two questions to the President: (1) Does the United States plan to implement the proposals announced September 26, and (2) are there any plans for a U.S.-Soviet summit? On this latter point, Carstens said he understood this was a delicate issue and added that he was not proposing such a meeting, but emphasized that this topic is of great interest to the German government. (C)

The President replied that he had instructed Paul Nitze to show flexibility in the areas which he had discussed in his September 26 speech and to develop these ideas with the Soviets. We are seeking common ground. He added that he would be seeing START negotiator Rowny shortly after this meeting, and would be sending him off with additional flexibility. As far as a summit is concerned, the President recalled his previous efforts to establish a channel of communications with his Soviet counterpart, which included a long-hand letter he had written to former President Brezhnev. He added that he was fully prepared to meet with Soviet President Andropov when it was clear that such a meeting would result in something concrete. In this connection, the President referred to the 1967 meeting in Glasboro between President Johnson and Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, which led to high hopes and great disappointments. It amounted to nothing more than a get-acquainted session. (C)

The President continued that he was delighted to hear what President Carstens had said about the government's attitude on the INF deployment issue, adding that he had long felt that derailing the December 1979 NATO dual-track decision was the Soviet Union's main goal. Only when the Soviets realized that they had failed to halt this decision will they negotiate seriously. (C)

President Carstens said he was inclined to agree, noting that if he were a Kremlin leader his attitude would be that the USSR had nothing to lose from holding off and waiting to see if the NATO Allies were unable to proceed with deployment. Of course, added Carstens, no one is ever sure how the Kremlin will react. (C)

The President emphasized that the United States would continue on the course which he had established, seeking balanced, verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. In this connection, he noted the important role played by the Scowcroft Commission. Referring to Carstens' point on the peace movement in Germany, the President said that the peace movement in the United States had essentially the same composition, and employs similar tactics. (C)

Picking up on Carstens' point that the Soviets had nothing to lose from waiting to see if the Allies could carry through with the deployment decision, Secretary Shultz noted that the NATO Allies had a great deal to gain from successfully proceeding with both tracks of the December 1979 decision. More than anything else, this would demonstrate the strength of the Alliance and the ability of the NATO countries to implement a decision that they had taken together. (C)

President Carstens agreed, adding each time the United States had made proposals in Geneva, the consistently negative attitude of the Soviet Union had become clearer. At the same time, however, there had been negotiating successes in the East-West area during the 1970's; he cited the FRG-USSR Treaty of 1971 and the 1975 Helsinki Final Accord in which the Soviets made important concessions on human rights. (C)

Foreign Minister Genscher noted that the Soviets also agreed in Helsinki to the principle, of great interest to the FRG, that borders could be changed by peaceful means. (C)

The President said that the KAL incident had provided an important lesson regarding the nature of the USSR. There was a tendency in the United States, and probably in the FRG as well, to see the USSR as just another country. He observed that former Senator McGovern had said, a few days before the KAL massacre, that the Soviets were essentially just like the West and that the United States was being much too harsh in its approach to the USSR. These people now see that the Soviets are not just like us and have been very quiet. This does not mean that we should not deal with the Soviets, said the President, but only that we should deal with them as they are. (C)

President Carstens agreed and expressed regret that people tend to forget about the true nature of the Soviets and the KAL incident much too soon. (C)

Director Wick noted that the Tricentennial celebrations in the United States had been a great success, and he reviewed the status of the various events. (U)

Secretary Weinberger stressed the repercussions of any delays in INF deployment, arguing that we must not give the Soviets this encouragement. Any delay in deployments in the FRG would have a very bad impact elsewhere, such as in Italy. He noted that the schedule for carrying out deployment-related work was very tight. (C)

Foreign Minister Genscher replied that there was no reason for concern. He called attention to the Greek proposal for a six-month delay in deployment, which had been strongly rejected by the Federal Government and other European Allies. Even if the Soviets make a major move on the 20th of November, Genscher said, the Federal Government will carry through with the beginning of deployment. (C)

Secretary Weinberger said he was pleased to hear this, and observed that he had heard that Willy Brandt was pressing for a postponement. (C)

The Vice President asked how the question on deployment would be posed in the November 21st debate. (U)

Foreign Minister Genscher recalled that at the June 1983 NATO Ministerial, he had insisted that the communique contain language stating that the issue of deployment had been decided in the original December 1979 decision. Thus, the issue will not be whether to deploy. Rather, Chancellor Kohl will give a report on the INF talks. In the worst case, where there was no agreement, the Bundestag will then approve a resolution supporting deployment. (C)

President Carstens underlined the importance of the March 6 elections in the FRG, where the government parties got 55 percent of the vote. He also said it was extremely important that the DGB, the FRG trade union federation, had refused to participate as an organization in anti-deployment demonstrations or to seek to disrupt deployment. This is a most encouraging development, although he added that the process of deployment will not be easy in the FRG. (C)

The President said he was pleased with the FRG position, and speaking of Parliaments was delighted that President Carstens would be addressing a joint session of Congress tomorrow. (U)

President Carstens said he considered this a great honor and added that he planned to use this address to make the FRG position clear, although he would do so in somewhat less specific terms than he had used here because of his constitutional position in the Federal Republic. (U)

Noting that Foreign Minister Genscher had been in Central America immediately prior to coming to Washington, where he had met with FRG regional ambassadors, Secretary Shultz asked whether Genscher had any impressions he would like to share. (U)

Foreign Minister Genscher asked that State Secretary von Staden, who had participated in the entire meeting in San Jose, brief the President on its conclusions. (C)

Secretary von Staden said the meeting of German Ambassadors in San Jose had come up with several conclusions:

-- All concerned were extremely impressed with what the United States was doing, both in terms of its economic aid and its presence in the area. Regarding the latter point, von Staden indicated that the large number of U.S. officials in the area -- such as, for instance, 200 people in the U.S. Embassy in Jamaica -- clearly shows how much importance the U.S. attaches to the area. It was the unanimous view of the German ambassadors that

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the FRG should do all it could, together with its European friends, to cooperate with the United States, especially in the economic field.

-- The FRG should support the Contadora initiative and through aid to the countries involved seek to give it an "economic underpinning." Whatever the FRG does, whether bilaterally or through the EC, should be done in closest consultation with the United States.

-- The other conclusion was a general feeling that Nicaragua was the biggest problem in the area. But there was also agreement that it was a bad idea to cut off ties with the Sandinistas entirely. The FRG and the other Western countries should keep a foot in the door in Nicaragua. The German ambassadors had emphasized that it would be a mistake to isolate the Sandinistas. (C)

The President said that Central America posed a major problem for the United States. As far as Nicaragua was concerned, the coalition which had made the revolution against Somoza had been quickly taken over by the Communists after Somoza's fall. Groups in the country now fighting against the Sandinistas are under the direction of defectors from the anti-Somoza movement. The revolutionaries who fought against Somoza had requested the assistance of the Organization of American States, and had given the OAS pledges that, once successful, they would hold free elections, recognize the freedom of trade unions, establish a free press and other democratic rights. These pledges were not carried out, and, instead, the Sandinistas sought to overthrow the Government of El Salvador. What the United States wants from Nicaragua, said the President, is that they return to their original promises to the OAS rather than continue their current course which includes a very close alliance with Cuba. In this connection, he recalled the case of the Soviet ship which the United States said was carrying arms, a claim rejected by the Sandinistas. To dispute the U.S. claim Nicaragua promised to invite the international press when the ship docked. However, the Sandinistas did not carry through with their pledge; only Cuban journalists were allowed.

Picking up on the President's last point, Secretary von Staden said that the FRG regional ambassadors had been unanimous in their recommendation that any further FRG aid to Nicaragua should be made dependent upon fulfillment of the original pledges. He also noted that FRG aid to Nicaragua will be significantly reduced. (C)

Foreign Minister Genscher advised that the Federal Government had now announced that an FRG ambassador will be sent back to San Salvador before the end of 1983. (C)

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The President observed that many U.S. Congressmen who visit Central America go there with very critical attitudes toward the Administration policies. However, most come back agreeing with the Administration's approach. This was particularly true, he said, of one group which met with a senior Nicaraguan official who confirmed that the Nicaraguan revolution was being carried out "without borders" and predicted that the United States would soon find the revolution on its Mexican border. (C)

The President noted that he would have to conclude the meeting as he was scheduled to meet with a group of Congressional leaders to brief them on his new START proposals. (U)

In closing, President Carstens again expressed his great appreciation to the President for his invitation and for the extremely warm reception accorded the German delegation. (U)

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RW 8/30/11

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TO

CLARK

FROM SAPIA-BOSCH

DOCDATE 11 OCT 83

KEYWORDS COLOMBIA

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BETANCUR, BELISARIO

SUBJECT PRES CALL TO COLOMBIAN PRES BETANCUR

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE 14 OCT 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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National Security Council
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Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>R</u>
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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I do not believe we should send these transcripts to State, unless we do so in summarized form.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7253

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH *W.*

SUBJECT: President's Call to Colombian President Betancur

Attached is the record of the President's call to President Betancur.

I would like permission to make it available to the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a transcript of the President's call be sent to State.

Approve _____ Disapprove *J*

Attachment:

Tab I Transcript of President's call to President Betancur

*I don't want anybody outside
the staff to know we have these
transcripts.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *ew*, DATE *8/30/11*

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Telephone Call from
President Reagan to President Betancur
of Colombia, October 5, 1983, 2:35-2:47 PM

President Reagan: Hello!

President Betancur: Mr. President!

President Reagan: Well, I just wanted to call and thank you for your thoughtful message of yesterday. I regret it wasn't possible to meet at this time but am pleased to invite you to Washington next May for a state visit.

President Betancur: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I feel honored, and I, therefore, accept this invitation you extend to me for the visit next May.

President Reagan: Oh, well, that's wonderful. I understand that you'll be going to Spain to receive a peace prize. Well, it's well deserved, and I'm more than pleased that our Senator Stone will be there to represent us.

President Betancur: If I should be absolutely sincere and clear with you, Mr. President, it is a fact that that prize is one that I should share with Senator Stone. I am very happy to have this opportunity to be present there with Ambassador Stone as your representative. This will give me an opportunity to tell him what I just mentioned to you, Mr. President, that I believe he deserves it as much as I do.

President Reagan: Well, you're very kind; but, let me say that we appreciate your energetic efforts to bring peace to Central America through the Contadora Group and your assistance to Senator Stone and the mission that we have him on has been most welcome and extremely valuable and, as I say, we are most grateful.

President Betancur: Thank you, Mr. President. Now the Contadora Group is about to turn over, either next week or the following to the Secretary General of the United Nations the final recommendations that it has arrived at and that are indeed extremely practical and pragmatic in terms of the problems that face the region of Central America. In addition, these recommendations have already been accepted by the heads of state of all the Central American countries. And, if they're implemented, they will significantly contribute towards bringing peace to the area of Central America because in these recommendations we can find both answers and solutions to each and every one of the acute problems that are faced in the countries of Central America, and these are treated and analyzed country by country in the region. And these topics

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that deserve consideration and suggested solutions include the issues of human rights, the issue of self-determination of peoples, the issue of seeking peaceful channels for the resolution of conflicts, the issue of advancing the democratization process in the area through free elections with the guidance of international organizations that insure such elections in these countries.

President Reagan: Well, I shall be looking forward to seeing those, studying those proposals very much because we do share the same goal and that is peace and prosperity there for that part of the Americas for all our neighbors south of our own border, so I'll be looking forward to that. Mr. President, I am just sorry that we couldn't have seen each other now, but I'll certainly look forward to next May.

President Betancur: I hope that will be the case. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

President Reagan: Alright. Well, vaya con dios.

President Betancur: Thank you very much, Mr. President, and may God lead your way.

President Reagan: Alright, thank you, goodbye.

President Betancur: Goodbye, Mr. President.

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MCFARLANE

FROM LAUX

DOCDATE 17 OCT 83

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KEYWORDS CHINA P R

VISIT

WU XUEQIAN

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SUBJECT MEMCON PRES MTG W/ FOMIN WU XUEQIAN 11 OCT

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Kimmett signed memo

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The White House**

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- ① Memcons do not go to ①, only to McF asking him to approve Kimmett → Hill transmitting them to State. Redo cover memo, and Tab A, and add a Tab II, Kimmett → Hill
- ② If you are certain that there are verbatim, quotes can be used. otherwise, delete quotation marks.
- ③ Page 1 - Hummel unexpelled Page 3 August 17, 1982
Page 5, TP 2, line 5: comes line 3, delete second period. line 9-

Guerrillas

National Security Council
The White House

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Bud,

I thought you might like to read this. J

Thanks

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 7, 1983

31

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Minutes of President's Meeting with Wu Xueqian,
Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China (S)

Attached at Tab A, EYES ONLY for Secretary Shultz and Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, are the minutes of the President's meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, on Tuesday, October 11, 1983. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Minutes

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW, DATE 8/30/11

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32

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 11371/1 #117608

BY

LW

11/22/15

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Chinese Foreign
Minister Wu Xueqian

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President

State

NSC

Secretary Shultz
Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz
Ambassador Arthur Hummel
Ms. Vivian Chang (Interpreter)

Gaston J. Sigur
David N. Laux

OSD

Secretary Weinberger

White House

Chinese

Edwin Meese, III
Michael K. Deaver
William P. Clark
Charles P. Tyson

Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian
Ambassador Zhang Wenjin
Assistant Minister Zhu Qizhen
Interpreter Shi Yanhua

DATE, TIME October 11, 1983
AND PLACE: 11:15 to 12:05; Oval Office/Cabinet Room

The meeting began with introductions and a photo opportunity in the President's Oval Office and after a few moments of pleasantries moved to the Cabinet Room for formal discussions.

The President opened the meeting by quipping about the just completed photo opportunity. He said the American reporters are not supposed to ask questions during such sessions but frequently do. He said, "it is a question and answer session with questions but no answers."

The President - I understand this is your first visit to the United States, and that you will be stopping elsewhere besides Washington. This should give you some opportunity to get to meet the American people and personally get a sense of their friendliness and warmth for the people of China. I wish you could stay longer in our country but hope there will be additional opportunities for that for you in the future.

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Please extend my greetings and best wishes to Chairman Deng, President Li, General Secretary Hu, and Premier Zhao. I am looking forward to my visit to your country and hope to meet all of these leaders during my trip in April. Please tell Premier Zhao he will have a productive visit and a warm welcome when he comes to Washington in January. 33

Foreign Minister Wu - I am very grateful for the time you are taking out of your busy schedule for this meeting. I carry greetings and best wishes for you from Chairman Deng, President Li, General Secretary Hu, and Premier Zhao. I bring you a letter from Premier Zhao.

I believe my current visit will enhance the trust between our two countries so that our relations will develop more smoothly.

We are pleased to note that during Secretary Weinberger's trip to China our two countries reached agreement on the exchange of visits between yourself and the Chinese Premier. The Chinese government attaches great importance to such visits because they enhance mutual understanding. When you visit China in the spring the flowers will be in bloom and it will be a good time. You will meet with Chairman Deng and all of our top leaders. These meetings will help you understand better the views of Chinese leaders on important international issues.

Although China is a developing country, it can offer a lot for the President to see. Aside from scenic spots--more important--you will meet the industrious and brave Chinese people, who are working very hard on our 'four modernizations' program.

When I was preparing for this first visit of mine to the United States, I reviewed U.S./China relations over the past decade. On the whole, we should be satisfied with the way they have developed. Compared with the situation of ten years ago, there has been considerable progress in all areas. I believe that with further progress in removing the major obstacle to the development of our relations, we can make even further progress. By 'major obstacle' I refer to Taiwan, and I wish to draw the President's attention to this question. For China, it is a firm and unshakable national policy to bring back Taiwan--to embrace it and reunite it with the motherland. We intend to turn it into a special administrative region with special policies.

In his recent talk--I believe it was June 26, 1983 (with American/Chinese academician, Winston Yang)--Chairman Deng Xiaoping said that after its reunification with the mainland, Taiwan will still be able to retain its own character. Taiwan's economic system, political parties, and armed forces can continue to be administered by Taiwan itself. On the other hand, with respect to international affairs, only the People's Republic of China can represent the Chinese people. We believe that this policy is rational and practical. This is an internal affair. However we hope, Mr. President, that you will adopt policies in conformity with the

joint communique of August 17, 1982 which will not interfere with the reunification process. But, if the United States continues to regard Taiwan as a separate entity, and continues to sell Taiwan large amounts of weapons, this will only inflame the arrogance of a small handful of people in Taiwan who are adamantly opposed to reunification.

Thank you very much for your patience, Mr. President. I want to thank you again for taking time to sit down at the table and talk to us like this.

The President - Mr. Foreign Minister, this is all very interesting. Looking at the period of more than ten years since we have resumed relations--I say 'resumed' because at the turn of the century our relations with the Chinese people were always warm--we have made considerable progress. These trips by the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, and Secretary Weinberger to China, and your own visit here, have been good. We have increased our trade and cultural ties greatly, and also more recently expanded in the area of technology transfer. We are happy about this because a strong and prosperous China is not only in the interests of China, but also in the interests of the United States and the world.

With regard to the issue of Taiwan, our position remains as it has been. That is, that reunification is an internal affair of the Chinese people, to be settled between them. But we have a moral commitment to see that the settlement must be a peaceful one. We have a moral and now a legal obligation. Our position has not changed. We will do nothing to influence the people on Taiwan either way. I repeat again, our only concern is that the process be a peaceful one.

These have been a bad few weeks for the whole world with regard to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we have decided to continue our INF negotiations with them. I want you to know that in this process we do not intend to compromise the interests of our friends in Asia and our allies. The United States is determined to maintain its strength and its policies. There will be no weakening in that area in that regard.

Foreign Minister Wu - May I interject? I fully agree with and understand your position with respect to Soviet missiles. The number of SS-20s in Asia--I understand from our Japanese friends--is 108. At the U.N. I met with Japanese Foreign Minister Abe, and he said that he was opposed to any settlement which would allow missiles cut back in Europe to be redeployed in Asia. We are against the installations in Asia, and we are also against moving any missiles from Europe to Asia. During our talks with the Soviet Union we demanded that these missiles be cut down and dismantled on the spot.

Secretary Shultz - I wish you could report to us that your

Soviet counterpart said they would destroy these missiles right away, but I take it that is not the case."

Secretary Weinberger - Another point about this is that SS-20s are so mobile that even if the Soviets move them to Asia, they could be moved back to Europe within hours. So that is meaningless. They could move them very quickly if they chose to do so. So it is important that we insist that they be destroyed. This is also why the President has insisted that any agreement with them be a global one--that all missiles in both Europe and Asia be taken into account.

Foreign Minister Wu - Yes, I agree with you. In March or April of this year when Japanese Special Envoy Nikaido visited China, I told him that when the Soviets move their missiles out of Europe they cannot put them in Asia and increase the threat to Asia. So they must be destroyed.

The President - Our position is that these missiles must be destroyed. If they have their missiles in Asia, then we reserve the right to put our own missiles anywhere we want, to counter them. Our objective in this is to secure Soviet agreement to dismantle the missiles.

Secretary Shultz - This is all within the concept of a global limit on missiles.

Mr. President, I wonder if I could get you to help me out a little bit. I know that Foreign Minister Wu wants to talk about Central America, and I plan to discuss this at some length with him separately; but I would be grateful if you could explain the United States' view of the situation there to Foreign Minister Wu in your own words.

The President - Alright. I have a feeling that with all our world interests we have not spent the time we should have on the problems in this hemisphere here with our good neighbors. There is much which needs to be done in the way of social and other reforms in a number of countries here. What is going on is a Soviet effort--through Cuba--to establish another Cuba right here in Central America. This would be hazardous to the world because of the Panama Canal, and Venezuelan oil.

Two countries are involved--El Salvador and Nicaragua. El Salvador was for many years a series of military dictatorships, but in the last two years this has all changed. It now has a democratic government, dedicated to the social reforms I spoke of and to free elections. The guerrillas in El Salvador are bent on overthrowing the government. They are trained, armed and helped by Cuba. During the recent election, the guerrillas' slogan was 'vote today and die tonight'. The guerrillas did their best to prevent voters from reaching the polls. They destroyed buses and trucks and did many other things to harrass the election process. We are doing our best to support the El Salvador government.

Nicaragua is the reverse situation. The revolution there overthrew the government. During the revolution, the revolutionary forces made promises to do many things--freedom for the people, for the press, and labor--but when they took power they violated these promises and did not live up to them. Many former government and revolutionary figures left the country, and they are now leading a resistance movement to reverse the situation and unseat the revolutionary government, and establish true freedom. We are backing these forces. The Nicaraguan government is getting their supplies from Cuba and retransferring them to the guerrillas in El Salvador, trying to overthrow the El Salvador government.

I know we are out of time, but let me sum up by saying this. Cuba is only the messenger. The real force--the backup--is the U.S.S.R. We know that definitely. The flow of arms to Cuba and from there to Nicaragua and to the guerrillas in El Salvador all comes from the Soviet Union or Soviet clients. This flow of arms has been increasing greatly in recent years. We know that when a ship leaves Cuba it's carrying MI-8 helicopters. Nicaraguan forces are being trained in Cuba, including pilots, and also El Salvador guerrillas. So it is a question of the U.S.S.R. establishing a base here in the Americas, and we are not going to allow it.

Foreign Minister Wu - Thank you, Mr. President. I learned something of this at the U.N. in my talks there with a number of other foreign ministers. You know also that we know little about Nicaragua since that country recognizes Taiwan and not us.

Thank you again for the generous amount of time you have given me this morning. I will convey your messages back to Premier Zhao, Chairman Deng, and other Chinese leaders.

The President - Thank you again. I hope your stay is a productive one, and I look forward to my own trip to China in the spring.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

DAVID N. LAUX 

SUBJECT:

Minutes of President's Meeting with PRC
Foreign Minister

Attached at Tab A are the minutes of the President's meeting with Wu Xueqian the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China.

I compiled these minutes from my own notes, and checked them with our interpreter, Vivian Chang and her notes.


Wu's remarks, and the President's on Taiwan, are the most important part of the discussion. As you know, we've had several reports that the Chinese were delighted the meeting went on for 50 minutes, instead of the scheduled 30.

After you have approved them I would recommend that we send them to State under cover of a memorandum from Kimmitt to Hill, EYES ONLY for Secretary Shultz and Assistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.

Gaston  Sigur concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memo at Tab I.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt to Hill Memo
Tab A Minutes

~~SECRET~~

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Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/30/11

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FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 26 OCT 83

KEYWORDS FRANCE

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT PRES TELECON W/ PRES MITTERRAND 24 OCT

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NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>N</u>
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Peter: Our policy is not even to discuss these transcripts, let alone pass them along.

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 26, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation with President
Mitterrand of FranceRECOMMENDATION

Attached for your review and approval is a summary of the
President's conversation with President Mitterrand on October 24.

Approve *RMK* Disapprove _____

Tab I Memcon of Phone Conversation

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White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *8/30/11*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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42

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
French President Francois Mitterrand

DATE, TIME October 24, 1983
AND PLACE: 3:00 - 3:10 p.m.

President Reagan: I hope you've received the message I sent last evening. But with all your traveling, maybe you haven't.

President Mitterrand: I was very pleased to hear from you. While in Beirut I met with your Ambassador, among others, as well as members of the Military High Command. I also met with U.S. soldiers and wish to express my feeling of solidarity with you and my very deep feeling of condolence at this very great loss that was suffered both by the Americans and the French. I actually received your message while I was in Beirut. It was the U.S. Ambassador, who delivered it to me sometime between 1300 and 1400 hours today. The important thing for the two of us at this point is to organize meetings between our Foreign Ministers and our Ministers of Defense. I have no words to tell you how deeply I feel about the sacrifice that was made by your American soldiers, as well as by the French soldiers. While in Beirut I saw some very tragic scenes, but sensed that there was a very high spirit of unity among the troops there.

President Reagan: I share your grief. I know how we both feel about the tragic loss to these young men of yours and ours. I'm glad to hear your views about going forward together. I have asked General Kelley, the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, who is leading our special mission to Lebanon to consult closely with your mission about the security in Lebanon for your men and ours and have already asked Secretary Shultz to discuss with his counterparts, the Foreign Ministers and so forth, the possibility of a Multinational Force Foreign Ministers meeting later this week to review the situation and discuss possible future steps. The Secretary has already gotten underway on that.

President Mitterrand: Yes. As far as your suggestion goes for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, I think this is a very good initiative. It is my understanding that you are thinking in terms of this meeting being held in Paris and we would be very happy to receive the Secretary of State here.

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NLRR M37111# 117616
BY RW 6/22/15

President Reagan: Good. Now on the margins of this meeting, I would also like George Shultz to discuss with Minister Cheysson, in a most private manner, how we could cooperate more closely to prevent future attacks on our forces. I would also like for them to review closer collaboration with regard to the broader Middle East and Gulf security issues.

President Mitterrand: We have obviously been asking ourselves the same questions that you have as to the origin of this attack. It would seem to us that the inspiration behind it is Syrian, although I have no real scientific evidence to back that up. But nonetheless, our feeling is that the inspiration for this was Syrian, although it was probably executed by some religious groups, perhaps Shi'ite groups inspired by the Iranians, because essentially you would have to find fanatics who are willing to die. I mean this basically was like a kamikaze attack. What I am saying is basically hypothetical at the moment in the sense that we don't have any definite evidence. This is something you and I can discuss personally in confidence, but it is not something that we can tell the outside world.

President Reagan: I agree. May I say we have a great deal of circumstantial evidence that does suggest that the act was actually performed by a group of Iranian radicals, the same ones that destroyed our Embassy last April. Incidentally, on that, I just want you to know that if we can find and locate the perpetrators, I'm sure that we are together in wanting retaliation for it. I want you also to know that our position is firm. We are not going to let this terrorist act drive us out of Lebanon which it was obviously intended to do; and I hope you share that feeling.

President Mitterrand: I can tell you the same thing, Mr. President.

President Reagan: Great.

President Mitterrand: Thank you very much for your call. We can now leave things up to our Ministers to get organized about meeting and getting together to discuss this. I will ask that they maintain close contact over the coming hours and days and as soon as we have any worthwhile information to work with, we will be checking back with you to determine what are the appropriate conclusions to draw from this.

President Reagan: I thank you. It has been good to talk to you and that's where we will leave this, in their hands. We will stay in close touch and I think we are solidly together on this. Thank you very much.

President Mitterrand: Thank you very much for your call and we'll be in touch again very soon.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 27, 1983

7652

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
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MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's October 24, 1983
Meeting with Togo President Eyadema

Attached for your information is a copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation covering the President's October 24 meeting with
President Eyadema of Togo.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Memcon

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

NLRR 1137111#117619

BY LW NARA

6/22/15 46

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Edwin Meese III
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Howard Walker
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Fred Wattering, NSC
Sophia Porson, Interpreter

President Gnassingbe Eyadema
Foreign Minister Akakpo-Ahianyo
Minister of Information Amegbo Gbegnon
Ambassador Ellom-Kodjo Schuppius

DATE AND TIME: Monday, October 24, 1983
1:30 PM - 1:50 PM

PLACE: Oval Office

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Togo President
Gnassingbe Eyadema

The President opened the meeting by noting that we counted Togo among our great friends. He expressed his appreciation for Togolese support on matters of mutual concern, and singled out Togo's positive contributions in the UN Security Council on such matters as the Korean airline tragedy and Libya's Chad aggression as praiseworthy examples of this. (S)

President Eyadema began by expressing his deepest condolences for the loss of US forces in the Beirut atrocity. He firmly condemned this "barbarous attack". He stated that Togo wants peace and knows the United States is working for peace in the Middle East and elsewhere. He repeated that he was deeply saddened at the news from Beirut. (U)

The President responded by thanking President Eyadema for his condolences. He stated that we believe in our mission in Lebanon to bring peace there. He added that the tragedy of this is that we believe this act was perpetrated not by one of the Lebanese factions but by a small group of terrorists tied to a nation with no direct stake in Lebanon. He declared that we are not going to give up. (S)

Deputy Secretary Dam noted that President Eyadema had proclaimed a day of national mourning in Togo in sympathy with the loss of US life in Lebanon. (U)

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The President expressed his appreciation for this. (U)

President Eyadema expressed his pleasure in hearing that the US will continue in its efforts at peacemaking. (U)

The President replied that no terrorist act can make us turn and run. (U)

President Eyadema began a long statement by noting his thanks and the thanks of several of his brother West African chiefs of government in protecting small countries against the designs of certain larger countries who would destabilize them, would impose outside policies and foreign ideologies. My fellow leaders have asked me to say how much we appreciate your efforts in Chad, which would have fallen without your help. We are counting on the US for continuing assistance, including military, to safeguard what we have and have gained. In Togo, he went on to say, we have been doing what we can to develop and reform. We feel threatened but we will continue. We welcome private sector involvement in Togo. (S)

The President responded with thanks for his kind words. He stated we feel strongly about Qadhafi's efforts in Africa and are working to stop his activities in Chad. We also recognize that Qadhafi has ambitions elsewhere in Africa. The President declared that we value Togo's advice, and pledged continuing close consultation. He added that despite our own austerity program we want to maintain our assistance program. The President expressed his delight at hearing President Eyadema's words about the private sector; he added that private investment and encouragement of the private sector is the real way to prosperity and development. (S)

President Eyadema stated in closing that he wished to make a specific request for US military assistance for Togo, adding that Togo feels very threatened. (S)

The meeting ended with pleasantries. (U)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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October 25, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: FRED WETTERING *W*

SUBJECT: Togo: Memorandum of Conversation of the
President's Meeting with President Eyadema

Attached is my memcon of the President's meeting with Togo
President Gnassingbe Eyadema on October 24, 1983.

Also attached is a Kimmitt/Hill memo transmitting a copy of the
memcon to State, as is the usual practice.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve memcon; approve memo of transmittal.

APPROVE *RMK*

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

Tab I

Kimmitt/Hill Memo

A Memorandum of Conversation

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RW
8/30/11