

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File:  
Records, 1981-1985

**Folder Title:** Memorandums of Conversation –  
President Reagan (11/21/1983-12/01/1983)

**Box:** 52

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 8/30/2011

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (11/21/1983-12/01/1983)

**FOIA**

M10-351/M10-371

**Box Number** 52

JAUVERT/BROWER

30

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117704	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND RR <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	11/17/1983	B1
117706	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND RR <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	11/17/1983	B1
117707	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH SUDAN PRESIDENT GAAFAR NIMEIRI <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	11/21/1983	B1
117728	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING BETWEEN RR AND SUDAN PRESIDENT GAAFAR NIMEIRI [SAME TEXT (W/NOTATION AND MARK) AS DOC. 117707 PG. 1] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	11/21/1983	B1
117717	CABLE	STATE 338447 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	10	11/29/1983	B1
117719	CABLE	STATE 341399 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	6	12/1/1983	B1
117720	CABLE	STATE 341398 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	12/1/1983	B1
117722	CABLE	STATE 341396 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	12/1/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 8/30/2011

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (11/21/1983-12/01/1983)

**FOIA**

M10-351/M10-371

**Box Number** 52

JAUVERT/BROWER

30

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117723	CABLE	STATE 341397	5	12/1/1983	B1
117724	CABLE	STATE 341397 [SAME TEXT AS DOC. 117723; W/NOTATION]	3	12/1/1983	B1
117725	CABLE	STATE 341396 [SAME TEXT AS DOC. 117722] <b>R 6/22/2015 M371/</b>	2	12/1/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
RW 8304  
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 22 NOV 83 14

TO POINDEXTER

FROM COBB

DOCDATE 21 NOV 83

KEYWORDS: CANADA

ARMS CONTROL

TRUDUEAU, PIERRE

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 22 NOV 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION  
POINDEXTER

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( CL )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	12/5	Poindexter Approved		CO
Kimmitt	S 12/5	For Further Action	12/5	CO
Cobb	S 12/5	Memo Kimmitt → Hill	12/5	
	C 12/20	Kimmitt's Agd memo		CO, PK

DISPATCH ✓ 12/20

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

2

~~National Security Council~~  
**RECEIVED** The White House

83 DEC 20 P 2: 49

System # I  
Package # 8444

Add on

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>ka</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	<b>A = Action</b>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	-------------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date:Time)

National Security Council  
The White House

RECEIVED

83 DEC 6 AIO: 58

System # I  
Package # 8444  
CT

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Cobb</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>A</u>

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	-------------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

Ty: We don't want state to get these verbatim transcripts. Please prepare a memo that appears taken by a notetaker. [Signature]

870

4

National Security Council  
The White House

RECEIVED

System # I

83 NOV 22 AIO: 25

Package # 8444

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

*Send as to  
State Dept*

I = Information to further Action

cc: VP M

COMMENTS

ate/Time)

*12/5  
NSC's —  
RCM would  
like eye to  
State —  
KMS*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~


SENSITIVE

December 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (C)

Attached at Tab A is the transcript of the November 17 telephone conversation between the President and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. Given the sensitivity of the subject we recommend very limited distribution of this transcript. (S)

  
Robert M. Kimmitt,  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Tab A Memcon

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, etc.  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 2003  
BY NARA, RW DATE 8/30/11



117704

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

8444 Add-On

DECLASSIFIED

will 371  
ALRR #14591 #117704

BY FW

6/22/15  
6

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Transcript of Conversation between Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada and President Ronald Reagan

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 17, 1983, 11:35 a.m.-11:40 a.m.  
Oval Office

The President greeted Prime Minister Trudeau and indicated he was pleased to be able to hear from the Prime Minister on his peace initiatives. (C)

The Prime Minister thanked the President for taking the call and noted that he was just about ready to embark on a trip to the Orient where he would discuss his peace plan and attend the Commonwealth Summit. He indicated that he had discussed many aspects of his program with our NATO Allies and would be getting back to the President with a fuller report. (C)

Prime Minister Trudeau stated that the main purpose of his call was to discuss one aspect of his peace plan that he had only raised with Margaret Thatcher, who had shown some interest. Trudeau added that he thought that it would be a good idea to open the CDE at the level of Heads of State, not only at the Foreign Minister level. Since this was destined to be a long Conference, having high-level representation might force Andropov to appear. This would present the opportunity for a summit meeting between the Soviet and American leaders, not one where great disputes would be solved, but at least one where we could demonstrate that the West was prepared to give a strong political impulse to the improvement of East-West relations. He noted that he realized that the President had a busy January, including the State of the Union address and wasn't sure if Andropov were well enough to attend. Still, Trudeau indicated, he wanted to tell the President that he was pushing the issue and had received a favorable reaction from Mrs. Thatcher. (S)

The Prime Minister continued that coming to the CDE at the highest level would be akin to Sadat's trip to Jerusalem and would indicate clearly that we in the West were prepared to go that extra mile to promote peace. He indicated that he did not

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

wish to put this concept in the form of a letter addressed to all of the other Allies, but did want to raise it with the President and report on Mrs. Thatcher's reaction. (S)

The President thanked the Prime Minister for taking the time to call and for his initiative designed to promote better East-West relations. The President indicated that he would talk with George Shultz and Ken Dam about it, but did agree that January was a particularly difficult month for him to leave Washington. (C)

The Prime Minister agreed and added that if it were not possible to have Heads of State representation at the opening session that we might consider having a ceremonial opening of the Conference later on. This is a subject that we could talk about more later, Trudeau indicated. The Prime Minister thanked the President for taking the call and indicated that he was on his way to Japan and the Commonwealth Conference where he hoped to discuss his peace initiatives. (C)

The President wished the Prime Minister well on his trip to the Orient and thanked him again for taking the time to call. (C)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

December 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Revised Transcript to be Sent to State

Attached at Tab A is a transcript of the telephone conversation between PM Trudeau and President Reagan revised per your instructions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Kimmitt to Hill memorandum attached at Tab I and forward the transcript to State.

Approve   K   Disapprove       

Tab I Kimmitt to Hill  
Tab A Transcript

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, (a) (1)  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003  
BY NARA   RW   DATE   8/30/11

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

9

November 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *twc*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

Attached is the transcript from the telephone conversation the President had with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau on November 17.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the telephone conversation transcript.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab A      Memcon

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

10

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau  
(calling from Ottawa)

DATE, TIME November 17, 1983  
AND PLACE 11:35-11:40 a.m. Oval Office

The President: Pierre?

PM Trudeau: Yes, Ron.

The President: Well, good morning.

PM Trudeau: Good morning. You are very kind to take my call.

The President: I'm pleased to.

PM Trudeau: Very busy coming back from a successful trip to Japan. Congratulations.

The President: Thank you very much.

PM Trudeau: I won't take much of your time. You know I've been visiting our colleagues in Europe, a lot of the NATO heads on this peace initiative. I'm very grateful for your letter that you sent me and I do hope we will find time to meet.

I'm going to be writing to all of the NATO Heads, just giving a bit of the results of my visit, and I will be writing to you. There is one matter that I thought I should talk to you directly: a matter I only raised with Margaret Thatcher and none of the others. It has to do with the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament which is starting in January. I think I can say that Margaret was very interested. I thought that we might consider having that conference meet not only at the Foreign Minister level, but at Head of Government level. The reasoning being that it is the beginning of a long process, which will go on for years in Stockholm. I thought that if you could consider being at the beginning, or near the beginning, of that Conference, it might be an occasion where we could force Andropov, assuming that he can come out of the Soviet Union, to come to that kind of a Summit. We wouldn't be expected to deliver any great agreement because it's only the beginning of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, but we would at least show our side, the NATO side, is

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
BY RW  
TE 6/22/15  
#117706  
NLRR 11/59/1

prepared to give it a strong political impulse. I know you have the State of the Union Address in January and I don't even know if Andropov is well enough to leave the Soviet Union. McEachen raised it with Kenneth Dam actually when he visited us a couple of days ago and he might be putting it in the mill. All I wanted to tell you, in confidence, is that Margaret Thatcher was quite enthusiastic about it in the sense that it would permit us to draw Andropov out of the Soviet Union and say that from our side, we are prepared to give it a ceremonial opening. If it were half-way through the meeting we would have to come up with results but if it is at the beginning, it would be a kind of testimony that we are prepared to go the extra mile to talk peace. Like when Sadat went to Jerusalem. If it meant the President of the United States going to the beginning of the Stockholm Conference surrounded by his NATO Allies, I think it would be a gesture to look at. But for obvious reasons, I did not want to put that in the letter to the other Heads. I only raised it with Margaret to get her reaction, and since it was good, I thought I would just put it to you and let you mull it over.

The President: I'll do that. I'll talk to Ken and of course Secretary Shultz about it. It is true that January is a particularly difficult time here the way our government is set up.

PM Trudeau: For that reason, if it couldn't be done in January we could let it start at the official level and we could have a ceremonial opening a few weeks later, or something like that, to give them time to set up the conference in Stockholm. It's something I wanted you to think about. I don't know if Margaret will be touching base with you on it. I'm off to Japan myself and to the Commonwealth conference. I'm leaving in a couple of minutes. I'm very grateful that you were able to answer my letter and return the call.

The President: I thank you for your letter and I'll talk to our crew about this suggestion.

PM Trudeau: OK, Ron. Good wishes to you. Thanks again for calling back.

The President: The same to you. Good to hear from you. Good bye.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8308494

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

EW 8/30/14

RECEIVED 23 NOV 83 19

TO HILL, C

FROM KIMMITT

DOCDATE 23 NOV 83

KEYWORDS . SUDAN

AP

NIMEIRI, GAAFAR M

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PRE NIMEIRI 21 NOV

ACTION: KIMMITT SCD MEMO

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

WETTERING

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( VL VL )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8494


November 23, 1983

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's November 21, 1983  
Meeting with President Gaafar Nimeiri of Sudan

Attached for your information is a copy of the Memorandum of  
Conversation covering the President's November 21 meeting with  
President Gaafar Nimeiri of Sudan.

  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

RW  
8/30/11



~~SECRET~~

117707

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8494

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State George Shultz  
Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan  
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger  
Robert McFarlane, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, Agency for  
International Development  
Ambassador Hume Horan  
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker  
Frederick L. Wettering, NSC  
Zaki Aslan, State Department (Interpreter)

President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri of Sudan  
Assistant to the President Hasan A. El Turabi  
Dr. El Sharif El Tuhami, Minister of Energy and  
Mining  
Mohamed El Hasan El Haj, Minister of the Council  
of Ministers  
Mohamed Mahgoub, Press Secretary to the President  
Ambassador Omer Salih Eissa  
Ibrahim M. Mansour, Minister of Finance and  
Economic Planning  
Lieutenant General Yusuf Hasan El Haj, Assistant  
Minister of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Monday, November 21, 1983  
11:30 AM - 1:30 PM

PLACE: Oval Office/Family Dining Room

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Sudan President  
Gaafar Nimeiri (S)

The President opened the substantive discussion by stating his appreciation for President Nimeiri's most recent message which concerned the Augusta incident. He noted our deep appreciation of President Nimeiri's strategic support over specific matters in the Middle East and Africa, as well as overall, and expressed his thanks for this. (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLR # 117707  
BY LW NAR  
# 41107  
6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

President Nimeiri thanked the President for inviting him. He characterized the US-Sudan relationship as two friends. He noted our common cause in resisting aggression from certain powers, and expressed admiration for the President's efforts for peace. He favorably compared US assistance, which involves economic aid and technology against the aid of others, which is just heavy weaponry. Responding to the opening lighter conversation, President Nimeiri described the peace movement as being used by the communists. (S)

The President asked for President Nimeiri's views on Ethiopia.  
(U)

President Nimeiri stressed his efforts to persuade Colonel Mengistu away from the communists. He stated that the Soviets used the Libyans to press him in the other direction. He digressed to describe Libyan terrorist and subversive efforts against Sudan and others. He blamed the recent hostage-taking in Southern Sudan on the Libyans, who trained the terrorists. He noted the large number of Ethiopian refugees in Sudan and obliquely implied that these movements, which sought Mengistu's overthrow, could be supported in retaliation. He described a recent mission he had sent to Mengistu which asked Mengistu to revise his policies, but this request was denied, and Mengistu accused Sudan of supporting dissidents which kill Ethiopians. And this from a man who personally did away with his three predecessors. (S)

The President noted that we shared President Nimeiri's views on Libya.

President Nimeiri noted that Qadhafi is not completely mad, that he is always scheming. When he came to power he was not so bad, but every year he gets worse, President Nimeiri added. He jokingly added that perhaps heads of state should be given a probationary period. He then talked about Qadhafi's green book, noting that this is a distortion of Islam, like Iran ("green cover - red inside", he remarked). He then noted how Ambassador Eissa had to intervene to enable orthodox Muslims to control the local mosque in Washington and oust Iranian fanatics. (S)

The President asked if Qadhafi was stopped effectively in Chad.  
(S)

President Nimeiri replied that he is not, he is waiting. He added that Qadhafi has studied the French and they are shaky in Chad. The French succumbed to blackmail and released a Libyan terrorist held in France. Qadhafi will do something for the French and then they will leave Chad, he predicted. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

President Nimeiri went on to state that he had met with Goukouni in Paris and that he had called a meeting to reconcile factions to take place in Khartoum. That is why his foreign minister is not present - he is working on this. (S)

Minister El Turabi asked for the US assessments of Chad and Ethiopia. (S)

The President expressed our concern about Libyan intentions to expand to the south, and noted that we are not sure what was going on with the French and Libyans. The President then reviewed our Namibia policy, noting our commitment to Namibian independence. Returning to Libya, the President noted that the Libyans were even involved in Grenada. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted the orchestrated pattern of activity among the Soviets and Soviet surrogates, including Libya, almost a division of labor. He stated our collective need to be alert to these moves and frustrate them where possible. (S)

In Chad, Secretary Shultz remarked, that if the French had moved quicker the problem might now be smaller. He added his appreciation of Sudan's responsiveness to our aircraft movement in August. (S)

Minister El Turabi remarked that the French were very ambiguous. (S)

Secretary Shultz returned to the subject of Ethiopia and asked whether Ethiopia was "gone". He noted that we receive periodic feelers from the Mengistu government but nothing seems to come from them. He asked if there was any way to divorce Ethiopia from the Soviet camp. (S)

President Nimeiri related that he had often counselled Colonel Mengistu to send the Soviets away. He added that he had even approached the Gulf States to find petrol for Ethiopia (to replace the Soviet supply) but was unsuccessful. He blamed Ethiopian-Somali tensions on machinations of the Soviets, Cubans and Libyans to foment such tensions, and that he had cautioned President Siad against any attacks. President Nimeiri then related an exchange he had with Mengistu at the Addis OAU summit. There he told Mengistu that the Soviets were using Dahlak Island as a base. Mengistu denied this but Nimeiri urged him to look into it. Mengistu did and reportedly discovered that it was. (S)

(At this point the venue was changed to lunch).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

12

~~SECRET~~

4

President Nimeiri asked the President what was happening in Lebanon. (S)

The President replied that we were still hopeful but the Syrians were still being unhelpful. He added that the group which undertook recent terrorist actions appeared to be sponsored by the Iranians. The President then deplored the factional strife among the Palestinians currently going on in Tripoli, Lebanon. He added his horror at seeing photos of innocent children falling victim to the fighting. (S)

Secretary Shultz repeated a remark of King Hussein's - if the Syrians take over the PLO, who then does the PLO represent? (S)

The Vice President asked President Nimeiri's views on the Iran-Iraq conflict. (S)

President Nimeiri noted the religious connection between Iran and the Syrian leadership - both Shiites. (S)

The Vice President noted that many states, including those in the Maghreb, periodically try to resume good relations with Libya only to get bitten by Libyan actions. (S)

Minister El Turabi, responding to a Vice Presidential anecdote about Qadhafi's female bodyguards, termed them "revolutionary nuns." (S)

President Nimeiri thanked the President for US support and development assistance. He noted that the major oil strike would come on stream in two years, but until then there is a critical energy shortage. He noted that (because of the Continuing Resolution) some of the assistance for Sudan, which Congress asked for last year, fell away, and asked for more help. He also touched on the need for security assistance, and mentioned the need for helicopters (and he also mentioned a dam). (S)

(NOTE: The notetaker and other US attendees had some difficulty understanding this portion of President Nimeiri's remarks).

Administrator McPherson noted that we had delivered over \$150 million in assistance last year. He praised President Nimeiri for courageous reforms and noted that the US would continue to help but that we wanted to avoid big capital projects such as dams. (S)

Minister Mansour somewhat wryly noted that the size of the reforms taken by Sudan was not matched by the size of assistance from friends. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

Minister Mansour, Minister El Turabi, and Administrator McPherson then debated assistance for a few minutes, then agreed to postpone that discussion until the meeting on Tuesday that Mr. McPherson was to have with President Nimeiri and his ministers. (S)

Ambassador Eissa noted that the Sudan government was being "democratized", and that nine parliaments were being created, one in each province. (S)

The President asked Secretary Regan to say a few words about macro-economic trends. (S)

Secretary Regan noted that an OECD study found that in 1984 the recovery will be better than expected, and this will pass through to the underdeveloped world in slightly better prices for commodities. (S)

Ambassador Eissa asked about the US position on IDA VII. (S)

Secretary Regan responded that Congress was balking at foreign aid. The previous Administration overpromised. He added this Administration does not want to promise more than it can deliver, so we are being cautious to hold down expectations. He added that the Congress added an unwelcome rider to the IMF funding bill which the President was forced to sign. If we ask Congress for too much they will also load that request with more unwelcome add-ons. So, for IDA VII our opening position is \$9 billion. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted the conclusion of the work of the Carlucci commission and that this report, with a respected panel authoring it, should create more bipartisan support for economic and security assistance. He agreed with Secretary Regan on IDA, noting that we want to make promises that we can fulfill. (S)

At this point the working luncheon concluded. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

November 23, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: FRED WETTERING *FW*

SUBJECT: Sudan: Memorandum of Conversation Covering  
the President's November 21 Meeting With  
President Gaafar Nimeiri

Attached is my summary of the relevant conversations during the President's meeting with President Nimeiri of Sudan on November 21, 1983.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve memcon; approve Kimmitt/Hill memo at Tab I transmitting the memcon to the State Department.

APPROVE RMK

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Kimmitt/Hill Memo of Transmittal  
A Memorandum of Conversation

cc:

Kemp/Teicher  
Fornier

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*RW*  
*8/30/11*

National Security Council  
The White House

RECEIVED

83 NOV 23 P 5: 28

System # I  
Package # 8494  
CT

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>111</u>		
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

National Security Council  
The White House

RECEIVED

83 NOV 23 P 3: 10

System # I  
Package # 8494  
CT

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Wetterling</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>Need Job A</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



~~SECRET~~

117728

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8494

~~SECRET~~

22

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
 The Vice President  
 Secretary of State George Shultz  
 Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan  
 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger  
 Robert McFarlane, Assistant to the President  
 for National Security Affairs  
 M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, Agency for  
 International Development  
 Ambassador Hume Horan  
 Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker  
 Frederick L. Wettering, NSC  
 Zaki Aslan, State Department (Interpreter)

President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri of Sudan  
 Assistant to the President Hasan A. El Turabi  
 Dr. El Sharif El Tuhami, Minister of Energy and  
 Mining  
 Mohamed El Hasan El Haj, Minister of the Council  
 of Ministers  
 Mohamed Mahgoub, Press Secretary fo the President  
 Ambassador Omer Salih Eissa  
 Ibrahim M. Mansour, Minister of Finance and  
 Economic Planning  
 Lieutenant General Yusuf Hasan El Haj, Assistant  
 Minister of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Monday, November 21, 1983  
 11:30 AM - 1:30 PM

PLACE: Oval Office/Family Dining Room

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Sudan President  
 Gaafar Nimeiri (S)

The President opened the substantive discussion by stating his appreciation for President Nimeiri's most recent message which concerned the Augusta incident. He noted our deep appreciation of President Nimeiri's strategic support over specific matters in the Middle East and Africa, as well as overall, and expressed his thanks for this. (S)

~~SECRET~~  
 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

BY RW ?  
 NLRR 103711 # 117728  
 6/22/15

↑  
 ? to of for?

117717

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 433

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

23

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE687  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHC #8447 3332212  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 292159Z NOV 83 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 338447

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD), KS

SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 13 MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND CHUN.

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE MEMCON TEXT OF THE EXPANDED BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT CHUN AT THE BLUE HOUSE IN SEOUL, KOREA AT 6:00 P.M., NOVEMBER 13, 1983. (PREPARED BY FSO DAVID STRAUB, INTERPRETER.)

3. US PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY SHULTZ, AMBASSADOR WALKER, E. MEESE, J. BAKER, M. DEEVER, R. MCFARLANE, R. DARMAN, P. WOLFOWITZ, R. MCNAMAR, G. SIGUR.

KOREAN PARTICPANTS: PRESIDENT CHUN; MR. SHIN, BYUNG-HYUN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER; H.E. LEE, WON-KYUNG, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; MR. KIM, MAHN-JE, MINISTER OF FINANCE; H.E. LEW, BYONG-HION, AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE U.S.A.; H.E. KANG, KYONG-SHIK, SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT; MR. KIM, PYONG-HOON,

(INTERPRETER), SENIOR PROTOCOL SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT; MR. CHUNG, SOON-DUK, SENIOR SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; MR. SAKONG, IL, SENIOR SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS; MR. HWANG, SUN PIL, SENIOR PRESS SECRETARY AND SPOKESMAN TO THE PRESIDENT; MR. PARK KUN-WOO, DIRECTOR GENERAL, US DIVISION, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

CHUN: I WOULD LIKE TO WELCOME ONCE AGAIN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HIS PARTY TO KOREA. I THINK IT WAS A VERY

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 # 117717  
BY RW NAR DATE 6/22/15

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 434

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SURPRISING AND EVEN UNPRECEDENTED EVENT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN VISITED THE GUARDPOST. PRIVATELY SPEAKING, I TOLD MY SECURITY PEOPLE TO TRY TO AVOID SENDING PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE DMZ IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, BUT PRESIDENT REAGAN VISITED ANYWAY. YOU KNOW THE GUARDPOST IS THE AREA CLOSEST TO NORTH KOREA. THE TROOPS THERE ARE EXPOSED TO DANGER BOTH DAY AND NIGHT. THERE HAVE BEEN ENEMY INFILTRATORS WHO HAVE SLIT OUR TROOPS' THROATS THERE. IT'S A VERY DANGEROUS AREA. GENERAL SENNEWALD ISN'T HERE TONIGHT, BUT EVEN GENERALS MUST GET SPECIAL PERMISSION BEFORE THEY CAN VISIT THE GUARDPOST AREA. THEY MUST ALSO WEAR A SPECIAL GUARDPOST UNIFORM TO MINIMIZE THE DANGER INVOLVED. SO AS I SAID EARLIER, THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT ENTERED WAS IN FACT A BIG EVENT. FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM, IT IS MARVELOUS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SUCH COURAGE. BY THE WAY, WHILE YOU WERE AT THE FRONT I ORDERED OUR FORCES TO BE PREPARED AT ALL TIMES TO PLACE AN ARTILLERY BARRAGE BETWEEN YOU AND THE ENEMY, IF NECESSARY. I RECEIVED SITUATION REPORTS EVERY MINUTE; IT REMINDED ME OF THE TIME DURING THE KOREAN WAR WHEN I WAS SITUATION OFFICER. I WAS VERY TENSE, BUT WHEN I GOT THE WORD THAT YOU HAD FINISHED LUNCH AT CAMP LIBERTY BELL, I RELAXED AND HAD LUNCH MYSELF. GENTLEMEN, LET'S GIVE A ROUND OF APPLAUSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FOR HIS COURAGE IN DEFENSE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM.

REAGAN: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. I THINK I AM A LITTLE MORE CONCERNED NOW THAN WHEN I WAS THERE, BECAUSE I DIDN'T KNOW AT THE TIME THAT I WAS CAUSING SO MANY PROBLEMS. BUT TODAY HAS BEEN TRULY INSPIRING TO SEE YOUR FORCES AND OUR FORCES WORKING TOGETHER, AND THEIR HIGH MORALE AND SPIRIT. I BELIEVE THE MOST DANGEROUS THING I SAW WAS WHEN YOUR FINE FORCES PUT ON A MARTIAL ARTS DEMONSTRATION. IT ENDED WITH THEM BREAKING STACKS OF 15 ROOF TILES. I WOULD HAVE NEEDED A SLEDGE HAMMER TO BREAK THAT MANY. I FELT PRETTY SAFE AFTER WATCHING THAT DEMONSTRATION.

CHUN: WHEN THE KOREAN PEOPLE HEAR ON THE NEWS THAT YOU VISITED THE GUARDPOST, THEY WILL BE VERY EXCITED AND SURPRISED. I AM CONCERNED THOUGH THAT AMERICANS MAY HAVE THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE GUARDPOST IS SIMPLY A TOURIST ATTRACTION, THAT THEY DON'T REALIZE HOW DANGEROUS IT REALLY IS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF YOUR VISIT THERE. I AM CERTAIN THAT ALL OF THE SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS THERE FEEL EVEN MORE CONFIDENT AND ENCOURAGED BECAUSE OF YOUR

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 435

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

VISIT. THEY WILL SAY TONIGHT, "WE ARE NOT LONELY OR AFRAID, BECAUSE HOW CAN WE BE AFRAID WHEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES VISITED HERE." SO AGAIN, I THINK YOUR VISIT WAS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. OTHER PRESIDENTS HAVE VISITED THE FRONT. PRESIDENT EISENHOWER WENT TO THE FRONT, BUT NOT TO THE MOST DANGEROUS AREAS. IT IS SO DANGEROUS IN FACT THAT I HAVE NOT EVEN VISITED IT SINCE MY INAUGURATION, SINCE BECOMING PRESIDENT. AND I SHOULD KNOW HOW DANGEROUS IT IS BECAUSE I WAS A DIVISION COMMANDER OF THAT SECTOR AT ONE TIME. YOUR VISIT THERE WILL GO DOWN IN HISTORY OF NOT ONLY U.S.-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS, BUT ALSO OF THE HISTORY OF THE FREE WORLD.

REAGAN: I DIDN'T GO ALONE, THE OTHERS HERE TONIGHT WENT WITH ME. WE DID SEE THE AREA AND WE SAW OFF A PATROL THAT WAS ALREADY PREPARED TO LEAVE. I COULD TELL FROM THE WEAPONS THEY WERE CARRYING AND THEIR CAMOUFLAGE THAT THEY WERE NOT GETTING READY TO TAKE A WALK IN THE COUNTRY. IT WAS VERY REAL. I DON'T THINK WE WERE BEING FOOLISH, BUT WE DIDN'T FEEL UNPROTECTED. THAT WAS BECAUSE OF THE SPIRIT OF THE MEN WE MET THERE. I KNOW WE HAVE SOME THINGS TO TALK ABOUT, BUT BEFORE WE DO THAT LET ME JUST SAY ONE THING. DURING WORLD WAR II THE ALLIES HAD TO COOPERATE VERY CLOSELY TO ACHIEVE VICTORY. BUT I DON'T BELIEVE I HAVE EVER SEEN CLOSER COOPERATION TOWARD A SINGLE PURPOSE THAN I SAW TODAY BETWEEN THE US AND SOUTH KOREAN FORCES.

CHUN: I BELIEVE YOU ALL HAD VERY CORDIAL TALKS IN THE BILATERALS YESTERDAY. IN ORDER TO USE THIS PRECIOUS TIME TO THE FULLEST I'D LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MAKE ANY REMARKS HE'D LIKE TO MAKE NOW, THEN I'LL SAY A FEW WORDS THEN I'D LIKE TO TAKE PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SPULTZ ALONG WITH MY FOREIGN MINISTER TO MY STUDY FOR A PRIVATE MEETING, WHILE THE REST OF YOU GENTLEMEN CONTINUE WITH THE BILATERAL.

REAGAN: I DON'T KNOW THE DETAILS OF WHAT HAS BEEN ARRIVED AT BETWEEN OUR OFFICIALS SO FAR, BUT WE ARE INTERESTED IN BECOMING A SUPPLIER OF COAL AND NATURAL GAS TO YOUR COUNTRY. WE DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT IN JAPAN. WE DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT IN JAPAN, AND I BELIEVE WE ARE ON OUR WAY TO AN ARRANGEMENT THERE. WE ALSO HAVE A PROBLEM: IF IT'S NOT TOO DIFFICULT, WE WOULD LIKE TO BASE A VOICE OF AMERICA TRANSMITTER TO THE SOVIET UNION HERE IN KOREA. I BELIEVE THAT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED.

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SHULTZ: I WAS HOPING YOU WOULD RAISE THAT MR. PRESIDENT. IN GRENADA WE FOUND DOCUMENTS SHOWING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS VERY CONCERNED BECAUSE THE PEOPLE WERE RESTIVE. THE DOCUMENTS BLAMED IT ON THEIR LISTENING TO VOA BROADCASTS. I BELIEVE THE VOA BROADCASTS HAVE GREAT IMPACT, SO I HOPE YOU WILL LOOK FAVORABLY ON THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST.

CHUN: WHAT'S THE STATUS OF THAT?

FON MIN LEE: THE MATTER IS UNDER DISCUSSION. THE CONCERNED AGENCIES ARE LOOKING AT IT VERY CAREFULLY. I BELIEVE IT WILL REQUIRE CERTAIN CHANGES IN OUR DOMESTIC LEGISLATION, BUT THESE ARE NOT IMPOSSIBLE. ANYWAY, IT'S BEING CAREFULLY STUDIED.

SAKONG IL: ON THE ENERGY QUESTION, WE HAVE A FIVE-YEAR PLAN ENCOMPASSING BITUMINOUS AND ANTHRACITE COAL, LNG, AND ALASKAN CRUDE OIL. WORKING-LEVEL U.S. AND KOREAN OFFICIALS WILL MEET TO DISCUSS IT LATER. I THINK CERTAIN CHANGES WILL BE REQUIRED IN OUR LONG RANGE PLAN, BUT THESE ARE NOT INSURMOUNTABLE. THEY ALSO HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR PLANS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.

CHUN: AREN'T WE USING U.S. COAL AT POHANG IRON AND STEEL?

SAKONG IL: YES, AND THE AMOUNT CAN BE INCREASED.

SHULTZ: THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND I HAVE DISCUSSED A VERY IMPORTANT SECURITY ISSUE, THAT IS OUR JOINT DIPLOMATIC REACTION TO THE INCIDENT IN BURMA. WE WANT TO INCREASE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR SOUTH KOREA AND ISOLATE NORTH KOREA. I THINK WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS, AND I BELIEVE THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WILL PROBABLY VISIT WASHINGTON AROUND MID-DECEMBER. THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE.

CHUN: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ELSE TO SAY MR. PRESIDENT?

REAGAN: I DON'T KNOW THAT I HAVE ANYTHING PARTICULAR TO ADD. I SHOULD SAY THAT AS A BELIEVER IN THE FREE MARKET AND AS AN ENEMY OF PROTECTIONISM, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE IMPEDIMENTS TO TRADE BE REMOVED AND TRADE MADE EVEN MORE OPEN.

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 437

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SHULTZ: THERE ARE A COUPLE OF OTHER THINGS THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION. WE ARE VERY PLEASED THAT IN MR. MCNAMAR'S DISCUSSIONS ABOUT HELP FOR THE PHILIPPINES, PARTICULARLY THEIR FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES, THE KOREAN SIDE AGREED TO HELP MAKE A BRIDGING LOAN. THE JAPANESE HAD EARLIER AGREED WITH TIM MCNAMAR ABOUT PARTICIPATING IN THIS BRIDGING LOAN. SO WE BELIEVE THE SOUTH KOREAN DECISION TO HELP THE PHILIPPINES IS VERY CONSTRUCTIVE, AND WE ARE VERY PLEASED ABOUT IT. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE ARE GOING TO SPEAK OF A PACIFIC COMMUNITY, WE MUST ALL HELP IN SITUATIONS LIKE THIS.

REAGAN: I WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR ABOUT YOUR FINANCE MINISTER'S REACTION ON THIS. AS THE SECRETARY SAYS, IF WE REALLY WANT TO HELP THE ASIAN COMMUNITY AND THE ASIAN EFFORT AGAINST THE THREAT CONFRONTING THE AREA, THIS STEP IS VERY NECESSARY.

SAKONG IL: (TO PRESIDENT CHUN). THE PHILIPPINES NEEDS SOME FINANCIAL AID. THE US SIDE ASKS ABOUT PARTICIPATING. WE CAN'T DO MUCH, BUT WE WANT TO DO WHAT WE CAN IN THE INTEREST OF STABILITY.

CHUN: ARE WE GOING TO BE ABLE TO GIVE THIS ASSISTANCE? OUR OWN DEBT IS HIGH.

SHIN: IT'S ONLY NOMINAL.

CHUN: OKAY.

MCNAMAR: I WOULD HOPE WE CAN KEEP THIS POINT PRIVATE, NOT RELEASE IT TO THE PRESS.

SHULTZ: AMBASSADOR WALKER WANTS TO GET INTO THE CONSTRUCTION BUSINESS, MR. PRESIDENT. HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A NEW CHANCERY BUILT HERE BEFORE THE OLYMPICS IN 1988.

CHUN: IS THAT NOT ARRANGED YET?

LEE: WE'RE STILL WORKING ON IT. I DON'T THINK IT WILL BE A GREAT PROBLEM.

LEW: WE ALSO WANT TO BUILD A CHANCERY IN WASHINGTON. I'D LIKE TO ASK FOR U.S. HELP ON THIS QUESTION WITH THE D.C. AUTHORITIES.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 438

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CHUN: YES, WE'D LIKE TO ASK SECRETARY SHULTZ'S COOPERATION ON THIS.

WALKER: PERHAPS WE COULD HAVE A JOINT SIGNING CEREMONY.

MEESE: YOU KNOW, AT THE FRONT I SAW A PICTURE OF PRESIDENT CHUN, THEN A MILITARY OFFICER, GIVING A BRIEFING TO U.S. OFFICIALS ABOUT THE TUNNEL.

CHUN: I'D LIKE TO SAY JUST THREE MORE THINGS. PRESIDENT REAGAN MENTIONED THAT HE IS OPPOSED TO PROTECTIONISM AND IN FAVOR OF FREE TRADE. I COMPLETELY AGREE. KOREA HAS NO NATURAL RESOURCES, SO WE MUST TRADE. AS YOU KNOW, IN THE 1930'S PROTECTIONISM MADE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION EVEN WORSE. THE ECONOMIC EXPERTS TELL ME THAT TRADE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF BARTERING. AS THE WORLD'S LEADING ECONOMY, THE U.S. SHOULD FIGHT PROTECTIONISM. HERE IN KOREA WE HAVE PROGRESSED FROM AN UNDERDEVELOPED TO A DEVELOPING COUNTRY. SOME SAY THAT WE ARE A NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY. IN ANY EVENT, WE ARE AT THE UPPER RANGE OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. BY 1986 WE HOPE TO HAVE LIBERALIZED 90 PERCENT OF OUR IMPORTS. THAT WOULD BE EQUAL TO THE LEVEL ACHIEVED BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TODAY.

SECOND, SINCE WORLD WAR II KOREA HAS BEEN AN EXAMPLE OF THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE FREE AND THE COMMUNIST WORLDS. THIS IS THE BEST PLACE TO JUDGE WHICH OF THE TWO SYSTEMS IS SUPERIOR. AFTER 1945 AND OUR LIBERATION, WE WERE UNDER THE U.S. AND AFTER THE KOREAN WAR, OUR COUNTRY LAY IN RUINS. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN MENTIONED AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THE UNITED STATES GAVE US MUCH AID AND HELPED TO MAKE KOREA A MODEL COUNTRY. I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES CAN TAKE GREAT PRIDE IN THIS. KOREA IS A GOOD PLACE TO COMPARE THE SYSTEMS. NORTH KOREA IS IN A VERY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION, BUT EVEN THOUGH THE WORLD ECONOMY IS BAD, WE'RE STILL DOING RELATIVELY WELL. WE BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES CAN POINT TO SOUTH KOREA AS A MODEL. I'VE BEEN IN OFFICE NOW FOR TWO YEARS AND NINE MONTHS. DURING THAT TIME, I HAVE MET WITH THE KINGS, PRESIDENTS, PRIME MINISTERS, AND MINISTER OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ON 565 DIFFERENT OCCASIONS. I POINTED TO OUR SUCCESS AND TOLD THEM THAT IT WAS DUE TO OUR COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. I URGE THEM TO FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE. THEIR REACTION WAS VERY POSITIVE. MY VISIT TO

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 439

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BURMA AND MY INTENDED VISIT TO INDIA, SRI LANKA, AND THE OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES WAS PART OF THIS, MY DIPLOMACY TO NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. YOU KNOW, WITHOUT U.S. INFLUENCE IN KOREA, OUR SITUATION IN THE WORLD AT LARGE WOULD BE HOPELESS.

THIRD, I KNOW THAT THE TIME IS GETTING AWAY FROM US, BUT I'D LIKE TO SAY ONE OTHER THING. MANY PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES AND PERHAPS EVEN SOME IN THIS ROOM THINK OF SOUTH KOREA AS ANOTHER JAPAN. JAPAN'S GNP IS OVER ONE TRILLION TWO HUNDRED BILLION DOLLARS, BUT THEY SPEND ONLY ABOUT 1 PERCENT OF THEIR GNP ON DEFENSE. THEY HAVE NO FOREIGN DEBTS. IN FACT THEY ARE A LOANER NATION, I BELIEVE. WE'RE JUST NOW A CHILD LEARNING TO WALK ECONOMICALLY SPEAKING. OUR GNP THIS YEAR IS ABOUT 67.5 BILLION DOLLARS. OUR DEFENSE BUDGET AMOUNTS TO 6 PERCENT OF OUR GNP. THIS IS A HUGE FIGURE. WE ALSO HAVE 38.2 BILLION DOLLARS IN FOREIGN DEBTS. SOUTH KOREA IS IN A TOUGH SITUATION. SO IF YOU THINK OF US AS JAPAN, IT WILL BE AWFUL. PLEASE KEEP THIS POINT IN MIND.

REAGAN: DON'T WORRY, WE DON'T MAKE THAT MISTAKE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT KOREA AND JAPAN HAVE MANY DIFFERENCES. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN SAYING TO FOREIGN HEADS OF STATE. AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL NOT VIOLATE THAT TRUST. WE SEEK NO TERRITORY OR DOMINATION OF OTHERS. WE SEEK THE FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL, BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT PROSPERITY COMES FROM THE TALENTS AND THE ENTREPRENURIAL SPIRIT OF INDIVIDUALS. THERE WOULD BE A BETTER CHANCE FOR PEACE IF ALL WERE PROSPEROUS. AGAIN, WE WON'T VIOLATE YOUR TRUST IN US. AND THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE YOU ARE SPREADING.

(PRESIDENT CHUN LEADS PRESIDENT REAGAN, SECRETARY SHULTZ, THE KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AND INTERPRETERS TO HIS STUDY FOR A PRIVATE MEETING AT ABOUT 7:05 P.M. THE BILATERALS CONTINUE.)

SECOND PRIVATE MEETING

CHUN: LET ME TELL YOU ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA, ESPECIALLY POLITICAL STABILITY. PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT OPINIONS, OF COURSE, BUT IN MY TWO YEARS AND NINE MONTHS OF OFFICE, I BELIEVE SOUTH KOREA HAS BECOME MORE STABLE THAN IT EVER HAS BEEN SINCE LIBERATION. WITHOUT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC PROGRESS

SENSITIVE



SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 440

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

IS NOT POSSIBLE. THE PEOPLE MUST FEEL CONFIDENT IF THEY ARE TO GO ABOUT THEIR BUSINESS. OF COURSE, OUR NATION HAS FIGURES WHO OPPOSE THE GOVERNMENT. OUR BIGGEST PROBLEM HAS BEEN NORTH KOREAN SLEEPER AGENTS, WHO AGITATE OUR STUDENTS AND INSINUATE THEMSELVES WITH DISSIDENTS. THIS PROBLEM, HOWEVER, WHILE NOT ENTIRELY ABSENT, CAN BE SAID TO BE NEGLIGIBLE. I WANT A FREE AND OPEN SYSTEM. THAT'S WHY I ABOLISHED THE CURFEW AND SHORT HAIR CUTS AND UNIFORMS FOR OUR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS. WE'RE TRYING TO PERSUADE RELIGIOUS DISSIDENTS AND OTHERS THROUGH DIALOGUE. THIS PROBLEM IS ONE I ACQUIRED FROM PAST ADMINISTRATIONS. WE HAVE ALSO INCREASED THE FREEDOM TO TRAVEL. BEFORE I CAME TO OFFICE, KOREAN-AMERICAN CRITICS WERE NOT ALLOWED TO VISIT SOUTH KOREA. THEY CAN TODAY. AS I TOLD KOREAN AMERICANS IN LA AND NEW YORK DURING MY VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, THEIR CRITICISM OF THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT IS NO BAK TO THEIR VISITING THEIR HOMETLAND. WE ALSO MADE IT EASIER FOR KOREANS TO GO ABROAD, BUT WE'RE HAVING SOME PROBLEMS. ONE OF THOSE IS THE DAMAGE IT'S CAUSING TO OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SITUATION. A MORE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT NORTH KOREAN AGENTS, LIKE THOSE IN THE CHOCHONGNYON IN JAPAN, ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT SOUTH KOREAN CITIZENS. IN THE PAST THIS WAS DONE MOSTLY BY KOREANS LIVING IN JAPAN. NOW IT'S BEING DONE IN THE U.S. TOO, AND WE MUST BE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT IT, PARTICULARLY DURING THE 1984 LOS ANGELES OLYMPICS. PRESIDENT PARK'S WIFE WAS KILLED BY A KOREAN RESIDENT OF JAPAN WHO HAD BEEN RECRUITED IN THIS WAY.

AFTER LIBERATION, DEMOCRACY GOT OFF IN THE WRONG FOOT HERE IN SOUTH KOREA. PRESIDENT RHEE, OUR FIRST PRESIDENT, CHANGED THE CONSTITUTION TO ALLOW HIMSELF TO STAY IN OFFICE FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. THE STUDENTS TOOK TO THE STREETS AND USED VIOLENCE TO FORCE HIM OUT OF OFFICE. PRESIDENT PARK ALSO EXTENDED HIS TERM OF OFFICE AND HIS TERM WAS ALSO ENDED BY VIOLENCE. THUS THE PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT A CHANGE OF PRESIDENTS IS POSSIBLE ONLY THROUGH VIOLENCE. THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS WAY OF THINKING. OF COURSE, WE CAN'T AND SHOULDN'T TRY TO IMITATE U.S. OR OTHER FOREIGN DEMOCRACIES, BUT I AGREE COMPLETELY WITH WHAT YOU SAID AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. MY TERM IS SCHEDULED TO END IN 1988 AND IT WILL. THE BIGGEST PROBLEM IN KOREA TODAY IS THAT IF SOMEONE BECOMES A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY FEEL THEY DON'T HAVE TO OBEY THE LAWS, TRAFFIC LAWS, FOR

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EXAMPLE. THEY THINK THEY'RE PRIVILEGED. DURING MY TERM OF OFFICE, I'M GOING TO TRY TO EDUCATE THE PEOPLE TO CHANGE THIS. IT MUST APPLY ALL THE WAY TO THE TOP. EVEN IF I VIOLATE A LAW, I SHOULD BE PUNISHED. THIS IS BECAUSE DEMOCRACY MEANS A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS.

REAGAN: THE SOUL OF DEMOCRACY IS FREEDOM UNDER LAW. THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE ELECTED TO OFFICE ARE OUR SERVANTS, NOT OUR MASTERS. THOSE LEGISLATORS MUST LEARN THAT. IN THE UNITED STATES ALL ARE FREE TO DENOUNCE THE GOVERNMENT, TO APPEAL TO VOTERS, AND TO MAKE CHANGES. THEY CANNOT, HOWEVER, USE FORCE TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT. WHILE I WAS GOVERNOR IN CALIFORNIA, PRESIDENT NIXON WAS FORCED TO RESIGN FROM OFFICE, SOMETHING UNPRECEDENTED IN AMERICAN HISTORY. BUT WE DIDN'T SEE ANY TANKS OR SOLDIERS ON TV BECAUSE A PEACEFUL CHANGE OF OFFICE IS SO ENGRAINED IN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THE MAN HE APPOINTED VICE PRESIDENT SUCCEEDED HIM IMMEDIATELY, WITHOUT AN HOUR OF WORK LOST, DESPITE THE CHANGE AT THE TOP. THIS IS BECAUSE WE CHOOSE OUR GOVERNMENTS BY BALLOT. IF DISSIDENTS CAN'T WIN ELECTIONS BY PERSUADING THE PEOPLE, THAT'S FINE, BUT HE CAN STILL HAVE HIS SAY. YOU MENTIONED COMMUNIST INFILTRATORS. WHEN I WAS PRESIDENT OF THE ACTORS' GUILD IN HOLLYWOOD, COMMUNISTS TRIED TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE UNION FOR ITS PROPAGANDA VALUE. THEY DIDN'T SAY THEY WERE COMMUNISTS, OF COURSE, AND I COULDN'T SAY IT EITHER. BUT I OPPOSED THEM VERY STRONGLY. SO I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH WHAT YOU'VE SAID. WE'LL GO TO THE U.S. AND BE MISSIONARIES FOR SOUTH KOREA AND REBUT SOME OF THE ACCUSATIONS MADE THERE. WE'RE WAY BEHIND SCHEDULE BUT GEORGE HAS SOMETHING TO SAY I BELIEVE.

SHULTZ: WE HAVE A GOOD JOINT STATEMENT BUT WE'VE HAD SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH ONE PARAGRAPH.

LEE: (TO PRESIDENT CHUN) I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO TELL YOU ABOUT THIS.

SHULTZ: I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST ONE SENTENCE THAT I BELIEVE WILL CORRECT THE PROBLEM. TO BORROW YOUR WORDS MR. PRESIDENT (CHUN), I SUGGEST THAT THE DISPUTED SENTENCE READ AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN QUOTE: THE TWO PRESIDENTS AFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFENDING AND STRENGTHENING FREEDOM AND INSTITUTIONS

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 442

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT SERVE FREEDOM, OPENNESS AND POLITICAL STABILITY. END  
QUOTE.

CHUN: IT SOUNDS OKAY TO ME. (TO FOREIGN MINISTER LEE)  
WHAT DO YOU THINK?

LEE: (TO PRESIDENT CHUN) OURS IS A LITTLE DIFFERENT.

SHULTZ: SINCE WE HAVE NO MORE TIME, THIS IS SOMETHING  
FOREIGN MINISTER LEE AND I CAN DO SEPARATELY, IF  
PRESIDENT CHUN AGREES WITH THE SENTENCE.

(PARTY LEAVES PRESIDENT CHUN'S STUDY FOR TOASTS WITH THE  
OFFICIAL PARTY AT ABOUT 7:35 P.M.)

SHULTZ

BT

#8447

NNNN

SENSITIVE

117719

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 417

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

33

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE560

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHC #1399 3351733

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 011726Z DEC 83

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 341399

NODIS

E.O. 12356DECL:OADR

TAGS: OVIP (RONALD REAGAN), PREL, ECON, JA, US, ETRD

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PM NAKASONE: GLOBAL ISSUES

1. GENERAL

THE PRESIDENT OPENED THE MEETING BY REMARKING THAT HE WAS CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR A STABLE PACIFIC BASIN, THAT THE ARMS TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS CONTINUED, UUT, THE SOVIETS WERE NOT FORTHCOMING. THE US AND JAPAN SHOULD CONSIDER WHAT THEY COULD DO TO ASSIST THE PHILIPPINES ECONOMICALLY.

2. KOREA

THE PRESIDENT SAID HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO DESCRIBE HIS FEELINGS ABOUT THE MURDERS COMMITTED AGAINST THE PASSENGERS OF KAL FLIGHT 0,7, AND ABOUT THE INCIDENT IN RANGOON, BURMA. NAKASONE RESPONDED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT INITIATED STRINGENT MEASURES AGAINST NORTH KOREA, WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD AFFECT FUTURE

JAPANESE-NORTH KOREAN REACTIONS SEVERELY, BECAUSE OF THEIR IMPACT ON PERSONNEC EXCHANGE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOJ ALSO URGED THE ROK TO RESTRAIN ITSELF AT THIS JUNCTURE. THE PM COMMENTED THAT BECAUSE PRESIDENT CHUN HAS WISHED TO EXPAND KOREAN INFLUENCE ON GLOBAL DIPLOMACY THROUGH HIS RANGOON VISIT, JAPAN WOULD DO WHATEVE IT COULD TO HELP CHUN REALIZE HIS OBJECTIVES. WITH THIS IN MIND, CONTINUED NAKASONE, JAPAN CONTACTED PRESIDENT ZIA OF PAKISTAN AND MUBARAK OF EGYPT TO URGE THEIR ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE ROK. EGYPT HAD NOT ACTED FAVORABLY, BUT PAKISTAN IS MOVING AHEAD ON THIS MATTER.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MB711 #117719  
BY RW NAR ATE 6/22/15

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

34

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

### 3. CHINA

PM NAKASONE STATED THAT LONG-TERM STABLE RELATIONS, MUTUAL BENEFIT, AND PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP ARE THE GOALS OF JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. FEASIBILITY STUDIES WERE UNDER WAY FOR THE SECOND YEN LOANS TO PRC. ON 23RD OF NOVEMBER SECRETARY GENERAL HU YAO BANG OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY WILL BE VISITING JAPAN, MARKING HIS FIRST VISIT TO A FREE-WORLD COUNTRY. NAKASONE EMPHASIZED THAT CONTINUED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE PRC WERE IMPORTANT FOR THE STABILITY OF ASIA THAT CONTRIBUTES TO PEACE IN THE WORLD, AND ALSO FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES AND INF NEGOTIATIONS.

THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE US'S RELATIONS WITH PRC HAVE HAD SOME PROGRESS, PARTLY BECAUSE THE US HAD CHANGED RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE. HE SAID HE EXPECTED CHAIRMAN ZHAO ZIYANG TO VISIT THE US IN JANUARY, AND HE WOULD VISIT CHINA PROBABLY IN APRIL.

NAKASONE RESPONDED THAT HE ALSO PLANNED TO VISIT THE PRC, PROBABLY SOON AFTER THE VISIT OF HU YAO BANG, AND PERHAPS THEREFORE PRIOR TO MR. REAGAN'S VISIT. THESE VISITS NO DOUBT WOULD CONTRIBUTE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FREE WORLD NATIONS AND CHINA.

THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE ONE POINT IN THIS REGARD. THE CHINESE KEEP BRINGING UP THE TAIWAN ISSUE, OBSERVED THE PRESIDENT, "PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY FEEL THEY HAVE TO." HE HAD REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR TO CHINESE LEADERS THAT THE US WOULD NOT GIVE UP AN OLD FRIEND IN A EFFORT TO GAIN A NEW ONE. THAT, SAID THE PRESIDENT, SHOULD BE A COMFORTING THOUGHT ALSO FOR THE PRC.

### 4 ASEAN AND KAMPUCHEA

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT JAPAN ENJOYED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH ASEAN NATIONS AND KAMPUCHEA, AS A RESULT OF CLOSE US-JAPANNSE RELATIONS. HE MAINTAINED THAT EVEN THOUGH THOSE NATIONS ARE IN THE NONALIGNED GROUP, THEY IN REALITY WELCOME THE US PRESENCE IN THE REGION. IT WAS HIS PLEASURE, SAID THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT HE MET WITH PRINCE SHIHANOUK AND ENCOURAGED HIM.

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NAKASONE ALSO SAID THAT ANOTHER OF THE FRUITS OF THIS SPRING VISIT ON THOSE NATIONS WAS TO INVITE THE ANNUAL REGULAR MEETING OF THE ASEAN MINISTERS IN CHARGE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION TO MEET IN TOKYO. THE MEETING WILL CONVENE ON 2ND OF DECEMBER. HE ADDED THAT NEXT YEAR SOME 150 STUDENTS FROM EACH OF THE SIX NATIONS WILL BE INVITED ANNUALLY BY GOJ TO VISIT JAPAN FOR TWO MONTHS TO OBSERVE THIS COUNTRY FIRST HAND.

THE PRESIDENT REMARKED, "WONDERFUL;" NAKASONE CONTINUED THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PHILIPPINES, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF PRESIDENT MARCOS' HEALTH, AND THE SENTIMENT OF THE MASSES OF THE PEOPLE. NAKASONE OBSERVED THAT ON THE PHILIPPINE POLITICAL SCENE, NO OTHER MAN AS EXCELLENT AS MARCOS IS FOUND. HE PROMISED THAT ON THE MATTER OF THE PHILIPPINE DEBT RESCHEDULING, HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CLOSELY COOPERATE WITH THE USG.

SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID THAT THE US HAS THE SAME ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE PHILIPPINES AS NAKASONE JUST DESCRIBED. MARCOS, SAID SHULTZ, IS THE MAN BEST ABLE TO BRING ABOUT STABILITY. HOWEVER, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR MARCOS TO CONDUCT A CREDIBLE INVESTIGATION OF THE AQUINO MURDER, AND ALSO TO HOLD ELECTIONS NEXT MAY.

ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTINUED MR. SHULTZ, AS THE PRIME MINISTER KNEW, THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY, WHILE TOUCHY, IS ESSENTIALLY A SHORT TERM CRISIS THAT COULD BE BRIDGED TO RESTORE HEALTHY CONDITIONS. THUS, THE US IS DOING ALL IT CAN WITHIN THE GOVERNMENTAL FRAMEWORK TO HELP THE PHILIPPINES, PARTICULARLY AS THE PHILIPPINES ATTEMPT TO PUT TOGETHER A PROGRAM THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE IMF. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT JAPAN ALSO HELP STABILIZE THE ECONOMY BY SUCH MEASURES AS RESCHEDULING THE 250 MILLION DOLLAR LOAN.

PM NAKASONE CONCURRED WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ, SAYING HE TOO FELT THAT IF THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY OVERCOMES THE SHORT TERM PROBLEMS, MUCH OF ITS DIFFICULTIES CAN BE OVERCOME. HE SAID THAT HE WAS RESOLVED TO COOPERATE FULLY ON THE PHILIPPINES.

5. MIDDLE-EAST

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

36

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PRESIDENT REAGAN CALLED ON HIS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR MCFARLANE TO COMMENT ON THE MIDDLE-EAST REGIONAL SITUATION, AS PM NAKASONE WISHED A BRIEFING FROM THE US DELEGATION. MR. MCFARLANE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S GOALS IN LEBANON WERE TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND TO COUNTER THE INFLUENCE EXERTED BY FORCES BACKED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WAS EFFECTIVE IN PRODUCING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, BUT SYRIA FAILED TO EFFECT A CORRESPONDING MOVE. THE SYRIANS HAD A PREVAILING FORCE PRESENCE WITH SOME 60,000 TROOPS.

MR. MCFARLANE CONTINUED THAT THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES IN THE EFFICACY OF THE STRATEGY IN WHICH THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE CABINET WOULD CONTAIN MEMBERS THAT COULD REASONABLY SPEAK FOR SYRIAN INTERESTS, WHEN SUCH INTERESTS ARE JUSTIFIABLE. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES, ACCORDING TO MR. MCFARLANE, THAT IT WOULD BE UNSTABILIZING TO EXTEND THE MARONITE CONTROL OVER THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND ITS ARMED FORCES. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AGREES. SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN SEEN IN BRINGING THE SHIITE AND THE SUNNI LEADERS TO ACCEPT POSITIONS IN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH THE DRUSE ARE HOLDING OUT. THE ARMED FORCES ARE DEVELOPING VERY WELL, AND WOULD SOON BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE SOUTHERN BORDERS SECURE. MR. MCFARLANE CONCLUDED THAT IF SYRIAN INFLUENCES ARE TOO STRONG, LEBANON WOULD TEND TO UNITE IN REACTION TO THEM AND THUS, THE PRESENT SITUATION IS UNCERTAIN, BUT HE REMAINED HOPEFUL.

PM NAKASONE ASKED WHAT THE FINAL OBJECTIVES OF SYRIA WERE REGARDING LEBANON AND WHAT ROLE THE PLO PLAYED, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE RECENT OFFENSIVE AGAINST ITS OWN LEADER, ARAFAT.

MR. MCFARLANE SAID THAT THE OUTCOME SYRIA WOULD PREFER WAS TO HAVE DIRECT CONTROL OVER ENTIRE LEBANON, MEANING A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW REGIME ENTIRELY SYMPATHETIC TO SYRIA'S INTERESTS. HOWEVER, SYRIA MAY BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A REGIME IN WHICH ALL THE CONFESSIONAL LINES ARE REPRESENTED, WHICH THEN WOULD CONTAIN PRO-SYRIAN ELEMENTS. HE SAID THAT SYRIA APPEARS TO WISH THAT THE MODERATE ELEMENTS OF THE PLO BE DESTROYED, AND THE LEADERSHIP BE ASSUMED BY THE MORE EXTREME ELEMENTS. YESTERDAY, MODERATE ARAB STATES CONFERRED WITH EACH OTHER TO BRING ABOUT A MEDIATION

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

37

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BETWEEN WARRING PLO FACTIONS. IF SOMETHING OF THIS NATURE DOES NOT SUCCEED, THE MODERATE FACTION COULD FACE TOTAL DEMISE IN TRIPOLI WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK.

NAKASONE THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR THIS BRIEFING, AND SAID THAT HE HOPED BOTH THE REAGAEPROPOSAL AND THE FEZ CHARTER WOULD SOMEHOW LIVE.

PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT THE FANATICISM OF KHOMEINI IS TRULY UNSETTLING, AND THAT NO DOUBT HE WAS BEHIND ;HE INCIDENTS OCCURRING IN LEBANON. HE IS THE KIND, COMMENTED THE PRESIDENT, THAT WOULD BRING THE TEMPLE DOWN AND HIMSELF WITH IT. NAKASONE RESPONDED T;AT THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ IS OF VITAL INTEREST TO JAPAN.

## 6. IRAN-IRAQ WAR

PM NAKASONE SAID THAT JAPAN WAS ABOUT THE ONLY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRR THAT STILL HAD RELATIONS WITH BOTH OF THESE WARRING NATIONS. THE GOJ INITIATIVES DURING THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THIS ISSUE HAD THAT BACKGROUND. HE COMMENTED THAT THE IRAQIS APPEARED TO WISH FOR PEACE, BUT THE IRANIANS, UNDER KHOMEINI'S LEADERSHIP IS BENT ON CONTINUING THE WAR.

IRAN IS ISOLATED, OBSERVED THE PRIME MINISTER, AND THUS STRONGLY DESIRES TO MAINTAIN ITS CONTACTS WITH JAPAN. THE CAPPING OF AN OIL WELL IN THE GULF WAS A TANGIBLE EXAMPLE OF SUCH CONTACTS, THAT COULD BE BENEFICIAL. IRAQ, ACCORDING TO THE PRIME MINISTER, INFORMED JAPAN OF ITS INTENTIONS TO BOMB THE IJPC FACIL,IES. JAPAN RESPONDED BY DISPATCHING A SPECIAL ENVOY TO DISSUADE THEM. NAKASONE CONCLUDED THAT JAPAN WOULD CONTINUE TO EXERT AMELIORATING INFLUENCE ON BOTH NATIONS, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO CONCILIATE BETWEEN THE TWO.

## 7. OTHER MATTERS

PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE SAID THAT BECAUSE THE TIME HAD NEARLY RUN OUT, HE WOULD LIKE THE LDC ISSUE TO BE REGARDED AS DISCUSSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TENENTS OF THE WILLIAMSBURG DECLARATION, I.E., BOTH LEADERS AGREED TO COOPERATE ON THAT MATTER.

FONMIN ABE ADDED THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE LDC ISSUE.



SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 422

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

3.

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HE WISHED TO ASK THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE  
REPLENISHMENT OF THE IMF AND IDA FUNDS.

THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE AGREED TO INCLUDE THOSE  
POINTS. SHULTZ

BT  
#1399  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

117720

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 412

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84/003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

39

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE561  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHC #1398 3351739  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 011725Z DEC 83  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 341398

NODIS

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD), PREL, ECON, JA, US, ETRD

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSION WITH PM NAKASONE:

-- BILATERAL ISSUES

, (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT REAGAN HELD HIS FIRST BILATERAL WITH PM NAKASONE NOVEMBER 9. HE THANKED NAKASONE FOR SUPPORT ON GRENADA, DISCUSSED BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES, NEW GATT NEGOTIATIONS, THE YEN-DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE, AND UNITARY TAX. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PM NAKASONE HELD NOVEMBER 9 AN EXPANDED BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON BILATERAL ISSUES. THE PRESIDENT WAS JOINED BY SECRETARY SHULTZ, AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD, PRESIDENTIAL AD;ISORS MEESE, BAKER, DEEVER, NSC ADVISOR MCFARLANE AND DR. GASTON SIGUR, AND STATE EA ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ. PM NAKASONE WAS JOINED BY FONMIN ABE, AMBASSADOR OKAWARA, DEPUTY MINISTER NAKAJIMA, DIRGEN NA AFFAIRS BUREAU KITAMURA, AND OTHERS.

4. GRENADA. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT EVEN THOUGH PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE, FONMIN ABE, SECRETARY SHULTZ, AND HE DISCUSSED SOME BILATERAL SUBJECTS, INCLUDING TRADE, HE WISHED FIRST OF ALL TO EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE LATTER'S PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES OPERATION IN GRENADA TO RESCUE ITS CITIZENS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IT IS NOW EVEN CLEARER THAT WE CHOSE THE RIGHT COURSE OF ACTION. A GROUP OF U.S. CONGRESSMEN BELONGING TO THE OPPOSITION PARTY WENT TO GRENADA IN ORDER TO SCRUTINIZE THE SITUATION FROM A VERY CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW. THE PRESIDENT SAID, HOWEVER, UPON THEIR RETURN, THEY

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 # 117720  
BY RW NARA DATE: 6/28/85

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OFFICIALLY AND UNANIMOUSLY REPORTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONDUCT THE OPERATION IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE LIVES OF THE MEDICAL STUDENTS. THEY CONCLUDED THAT THE ACTION WAS PROPER. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER NEED NOT HAVE ANY CONCERN THAT HE HAD SPOKEN UP TOO SOON IN SUPPORT OF HIS FRIENDS.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT REGRETTED THE SITUATION, BUT FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE OPERATION TO BE FOR THE PROTECTION OF LIVES OF THE U.S. CITIZENS, AND THAT IT WAS IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST BY THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT EXPRESSED ITS STRONG WISH FOR AN EARLY NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT FRIENDS ARE FOR HELPING ONE ANOTHER IN TIMES OF NEED.

6. TRADE. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE TRADE IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS A PROBLEM, AND THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE SOME REMAINING RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO JAPANESE MARKETS, NOT MATCHED BY THOSE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE UNITED STATES IS WITNESSING A GROWING PROTECTIONIST TIDE WITHIN ITS POPULATION AND IN ITS CONGRESS. TO EXACERBATE FURTHER THE SITUATION, A NUMBER OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ARE ENGAGED IN DEMAGOGUERY, REPRESENTING JAPAN FALSELY AS THOUGH IT WERE NOT A TRUE FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES. THEREFORE, THE PRESIDENT HAD TO BE CONCERNED, AND ESPECIALLY BECAUSE, UNLIKE THE JAPANESE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, IN THE UNITED STATES ONE OF THE TWO LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS IS DOMINATED BY THE OPPOSITION PARTY. THIS FACT HAMPERS THE ADMINISTRATION AS IT TRIES TO DO THE RIGHT THING WITH REGARD TO THE TRADE IMBALANCE AND THE YEN-DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES. THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANY OTHER BILATERAL

RELATIONSHIP IN THE WORLD THAT IS AS IMPORTANT FOR THE PEACE AND PROSPERITY OF THE ENTIRE WORLD, AS THAT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.

7. THE PRIME MINISTER RESPONDED THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS, AND THAT HE FAVORED MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUES MENTIONED. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO SAID THAT IF "BOTTLE NECKS" DEVELOP, THE TWO LEADERS WILL CONFER WITH EACH OTHER CLOSELY IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT SOLUTIONS.

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

8. NAKASONE-KOHL DECLARATION. MR. NAKASONE SAID THAT WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL AND HE MADE A "TOKYO STATEMENT" A FEW DAYS EARLIER ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE WILLIAMSBURG DECLARATION IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN THE WORLD, AND IN PROMOTING GREATER HARMONY OF THE WESTERN NATIONS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE VERY MUCH IF PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD ENDORSE THE "TOKYO STATEMENT."

9. PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT HE ENDORSED THE STATEMENT.

10. NEW JAPANESE GATT INITIATIVES. PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE SAID THAT THE TOKYO ROUND OF TARIFF CUTS IS NEARING ITS CONCLUSION, AND A NEW ROUND APPEARS TO BE DESIRABLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREAS OF THE SERVICE INDUSTRY, NORTH-SOUTH EXCHANGES, AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR. SUCH A NEW ROUND WOULD HELP STIMULATE THE WORLD FREE TRADE SYSTEM. WHEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF GATT VISITED HIM A SHORT TIME AGO, HE URGED THE PRIME MINISTER TO ASK THE PRESIDENT TO SUPPORT THE CALL.

11. PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD CERTAINLY SUPPORT SUCH AN INITIATIVE, KNOWING THAT THESE ARE DELICATE ISSUES FOR JAPAN, AND, MOREOVER, BECAUSE THE U.S. WISHES THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP TO CONTINUE TO BE CLOSE.

12. UNITARY TAX. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED THAT JAPANESE FIRMS THAT WISH TO LOCATE THEIR PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE UNITARY TAX ISSUE. HE ASKED FOR THE PRESIDENT'S LEADERSHIP IN REDRESSING THE SITUATION.

13. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, AS THE NAME THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IMPLIES, HIS COUNTRY CONSISTS OF AUTONOMOUS STATES FEDERATED TO FORM A COUNTRY. CONSTITUTIONALLY THE RIGHT OF TAXATION IS ONE OF THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE OF THE STATE, AND IS EFFECTED BY STATES, NOT BY THE NATION. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE JAPANESE CONCERN ON THIS MATTER AND HAS APPOINTED A SPECIAL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ISSUE.

14. SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ABE AND HE WOULD ADDRESS FURTHER THIS ISSUE DURING DINNER THAT NIGHT. SECRETARY SHULTZ SUGGESTED TO THE JAPANESE THAT

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

JAPANESE FIRMS COULD HELP THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION BY MEETING WITH THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES WHERE THEY WOULD LOCATE THEIR PLANTS, AND BY ASKING THEM WHETHER UNITARY TAX EXISTED IN THAT STATE, OR WHAT THE FUTURE PROSPECTS WOULD BE ON THE UNITARY TAX ISSUE. MR. SHULTZ SAID THAT THAT WOULD MAKE THE GOVERNORS THINK.

15. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT APPROACH HAD BEEN TRIED. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT APPROACH WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR THE FIRMS ALREADY LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES WHERE UNITARY TAX IS LEVIED. THE PRIME MINISTER JOKINGLY ASKED IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD PAY FOR THE RELOCATION COST.

16. SECRETARY SHULTZ SUGGESTED THAT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THE JAPANESE FIRMS COULD APPROACH THE GOVERNORS SAYING THEY WERE THINKING ABOUT EXPANDING THE EXISTING PLANT FACILITIES, BUT WERE APPREHENSIVE BECAUSE OF THE UNITARY TAX.

17. THE YEN-DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE. THE PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT THE STABILIZATION OF THE YEN-DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE WAS DESIRABLE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE YEN'S STRONG PERFORMANCE VIS-A-VIS THE DEUTSCH MARK.

18. SECRETARY SHULTZ RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A VERY PROFOUND, DIFFICULT ISSUE. ON THE ONE HAND, SAID THE SECRETARY, THE RATES ARE RELATED TO THE INTEREST RATES. HOWEVER, THAT WAS NOT THE ONLY ELEMENT AFFECTING THE RATES, AND THE TENDENCY OF THE MONEY TO SEEK SAFE HAVENS WAS ANOTHER FACTOR. SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID THAT IF JAPAN OPENED ITS CAPITAL MARKET THAT WOULD ALSO HELP EASE THE SITUATION PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE JAPANESE DESIRE TO MAKE THE YEN AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY.

19. PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE ADMITTED THAT LIBERALIZATION OF THE CAPITAL MARKET WOULD HELP EASE THE SITUATION, AND THEREFORE THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS

CONSIDERING HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. HE PRODUCED A CHART, ONE HE SHOWED TO EVERY VISITING AMERICAN ECONOMIST, ILLUSTRATING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FLUCTUATIONS OF THE YEN-DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE AND THE UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL RATE. MR. NAKASONE ASKED "PROFESSOR SHULTZ" TO EXAMINE THE EVIDENCE, HANDING HIM THE CHART.

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 416

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

20. SECRETARY SHULTZ SUGGESTED THAT IN A DAY OR TWO, WHEN THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND THE JAPANESE FINANCE MINISTRY ISSUED A NEGOTIATED STATEMENT REGARDING THE CAPITAL MARKET AND STUDIES ON THE EXCHANGE RATE, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT MIGHT PLACE THEIR WEIGHT BEHIND THE STATEMENT BY PUBLICLY APPROVING IT?

22. THE PRIME MINISTER CONCURRED.

SHULTZ  
BT  
#1398  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 410

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

44

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE563  
OO RUEHC RUEHUL  
DE RUEHC #1396 3351755  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 011723Z DEC 83 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 8157

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 341396

NODIS

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD), KS  
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE MEMCON TEXT OF THE PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT CHUN AT THE BLUE HOUSE IN SEOUL, KOREA AT 2:30 P.M., NOVEMBER 12, 1983 (PREPARED BY FSO DAVID STRAUB,INTERPETER.)

3. BEGIN TEXT:

PRESIDENT REAGAN: AS I TOLD YOUR WIFE AT THE LUNCH TABLE, WE AND THE WHOLE WORLD ADMIRERED YOUR RESTRAINT IN THE FACT OF THE PROVOCATIONS IN RANGOON AND OVER SAKHALIN ISLAND. , HAD THE SAME FEELING REGARDING THE BEIRUT SITUATION. YET TO DO WHAT SOME WANTED US TO DO WOULD HAVE MEANT WAR. I WAS PLEASED WHEN I TALKED WITH NAKASONE TO LEARN THAT THEY ARE DOING WHATEVER THEY CAN TO PUNISH THE NORTH KOREANS.

PRESIDENT CHUN: AS I SAID DURING LUNCH, WE'VE SUFFERED TRAGEDIES TWICE THIS YEAR. IN BOTH INSTANCES YOUR SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WAS TRULY APPRECIATED BY KOREANS. WHEN I MET YOU IN 1981 I NOTED THAT TODAY'S INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS VERY UNCERTAIN. TODAY IT IS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS. THE TIMES CALL FOR A GREAT STATESMAN OF COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP. WE ARE GRATEFU TO HAVE A LEADER SUCH AS YOURSELF. I SUPPORT YOUR POLICY OF PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH.

YOUR STEPS IN GRENADA WERE CRITICIZED BY SOME, BUT I BELIEVE THEY WERE THE BEST WAY TO PRESERVE PEACE IN THE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 #117722  
BY LW NARA DATE 6/22/15

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 411

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

LONG RUN. SO I'LL NOT SPARE SUPPORT FOR YOU. AND I BELIEVE ALL PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WILL UNDERSTAND YOUR MOTIVES AND THE JUSTICE OF YOUR ACTIONS.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. ONE DAY BEFORE I LEFT WASHINGTON SOMETHING HAPPENED THAT MAY HAVE TURNED OFF A LOT OF AMERICAN CRITICS. OVER 400 MEDICAL STUDENTS WHO WERE RESCUED IN GRENADA CAME TO THE WHITE HOUSE TO MEET WITH THE YOUNG SOLDIERS AND SAILORS WHO HAD SAVED THEM. THE MEDICAL STUDENTS ALL SAID, "YES, WE WERE IN DANGER. YES, WE ARE GRATEFUL." IT WAS QUITE AN EXPERIENCE TO SEE THOSE YOUNG PEOPLE TOGETHER. IN GRENADA WE FOUND WAREHOUSES FILLED WITH ALL KINDS OF SOVIET WEAPONS, MILLIONS OF ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION AND REVEALING DOCUMENTS. WE BROUGHT THEM TO ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE FOR PUBLIC EXHIBITION. WE ARE GOING TO SHOW THEM TO THE AMBASSADORS POSTED TO WASHINGTON FOR EVERYONE TO SEE. CAN YOU IMAGINE? THIS LITTLE ISLAND OF ONLY 100,000 PEOPLE HOUSED 15,000 MILITARY UNIFORMS. WE FOUND SOME DOCUMENTS THAT REFUTE THE CUBANS' INSISTENCE THAT THE SEVERAL HUNDRED CUBANS IN GRENADA WERE JUST CONSTRUCTION WORKERS. ONE DOCUMENT IS A ROSTER THAT IS SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL FOR A CONSTRUCTION CREW. THE MEN ARE LISTED BY COMPANIES. FIRST ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMPANY. SECOND MORTAR COMPANY, ETC. AND THE DESIGNATIONS IN THE BARRACKS WHERE THEY LIVED WERE ALL MILITARY DESIGNATIONS.

PRESIDENT CHUN: I BELIEVE IT IS TIME FOR YOU TO GO NOW AND GET SOME REST. BUT BEFORE YOU GO TO THE FRONT TOMORROW, I WOULD JUST LIKE TO ADD ONE FINAL WORD. OUR COMBINED FORCES COMMAND IS IN BETTER SHAPE TODAY THAN EVER BEFORE; IT IS VERY BATTLE-READY. MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR THAT MUST GO TO GENERAL SENNEWALD AND AMBASSADOR WALKER. THEY UNDERSTAND OUR CULTURE, OUR CUSTOMS, OUR SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. I'M VERY SATISFIED ABOUT THE CFC. I BELIEVE IT IS A COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENT UNIQUE BETWEEN ANY TWO ARMED FORCES IN THE WORLD.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: THANK YOU FOR CONFIRMING WHAT I'D ALREADY HEARD ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP.  
END TEXT. SHULTZ

BT  
#1396  
NNNN

SENSITIVE



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

*Withdrawer*

RB 8/30/2011  
W

*File Folder*

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (11/21/1983-12/01/1983)

*FOIA*

M10-351/M10-  
371  
JAUVERT/BROWER

*Box Number*

52

30

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
117723	CABLE  STATE 341397	5	12/1/1983	B1

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~  
RW 8/30/11  
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ID 8308747

RECEIVED 02 DEC 83 14

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 01 DEC 83

KEYWORDS JAPAN

EAST ASIA TRIP

ECONOMICS

INTL TRADE

SUBJECT MEMCON BETWEEN PRES & PM NAKASONE 9 NOV

-----  
ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

-----  
FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ROBINSON

MCMINN

COMMENTS \* LOGGED FROM CABLE

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( MR MR )

-----  
ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

-----  
DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)M

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

*Withdrawer*

RB 8/30/2011  
W

*File Folder*

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (11/21/1983-12/01/1983)

*FOIA*

M10-351/M10-  
371  
JAUVERT/BROWER

*Box Number*

52

30

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
117724	CABLE  STATE 341397 [SAME TEXT AS DOC. 117723; W/NOTATION]	3	12/1/1983	B1

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8308748

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

EW 4/30/11

RECEIVED 02 DEC 83 14

TO POINDEXTER FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 01 DEC 83

KEYWORDS. KOREA

EAST ASIA TRIP

GRENADA

SUBJECT. MEMCON BETWEEN PRES & PRES CHUN 12 NOV

-----  
ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

-----  
FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

COMMENTS \*LOGGED FROM CABLE

REF# LOG 8307878 8307620 NSCIFID ( MR MR )

-----  
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)M

~~SECRET~~

117725

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

8748

56

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1396 DTG: 011723Z DEC 83 PSN: 058131  
EOB003 AN004487 TOR: 335/2145Z CSN: HCE563

DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 FORT-01 SIGU-01 LAUX-01 TYSN-01 FILE-01  
VAN-01 /007 A3

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT: JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #1396 3351755  
O 011723Z DEC 83 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 8157

~~SECRET~~ STATE 341396

NODIS  
E. O. 12356 DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD), KS  
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

1.  - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE MEMCON TEXT OF THE PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT CHUN AT THE BLUE HOUSE IN SEOUL, KOREA AT 2:30 P.M., NOVEMBER 12, 1983 (PREPARED BY FSO DAVID STRAUB, INTERPETER.)

3. BEGIN TEXT:

PRESIDENT REAGAN: AS I TOLD YOUR WIFE AT THE LUNCH TABLE, WE AND THE WHOLE WORLD ADMIRER YOUR RESTRAINT IN THE FACT OF THE PROVOCATIONS IN RANGOON AND OVER SAKHALIN ISLAND. , HAD THE SAME FEELING REGARDING THE BEIRUT SITUATION. YET TO DO WHAT SOME WANTED US TO DO WOULD HAVE MEANT WAR. I WAS PLEASED WHEN I TALKED WITH NAKASONE TO LEARN THAT THEY ARE DOING WHATEVER THEY CAN TO PUNISH THE NORTH KOREANS.

PRESIDENT CHUN: AS I SAID DURING LUNCH, WE'VE SUFFERED TRAGEDIES TWICE THIS YEAR. IN BOTH INSTANCES YOUR SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WAS TRULY APPRECIATED BY KOREANS. WHEN I MET YOU IN 1981 I NOTED THAT TODAY'S INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS VERY UNCERTAIN. TODAY IT IS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS. THE TIMES CALL FOR A GREAT STATESMAN OF COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP. WE ARE GRATEFUL TO HAVE A LEADER SUCH AS YOURSELF. I SUPPORT YOUR POLICY OF PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH.

YOUR STEPS IN GRENADA WERE CRITICIZED BY SOME, BUT I BELIEVE THEY WERE THE BEST WAY TO PRESERVE PEACE IN THE LONG RUN. SO I'LL NOT SPARE SUPPORT FOR YOU. AND I BELIEVE ALL PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WILL UNDERSTAND YOUR MOTIVES AND THE JUSTICE OF YOUR ACTIONS.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. ONE DAY BEFORE I LEFT WASHINGTON SOMETHING HAPPENED THAT MAY HAVE TURNED OFF A LOT OF AMERICAN CRITICS. OVER 400 MEDICAL STUDENTS WHO WERE RESCUED IN GRENADA CAME TO THE WHITE HOUSE TO MEET WITH THE YOUNG SOLDIERS AND SAILORS WHO HAD SAVED THEM. THE MEDICAL STUDENTS ALL SAID, "YES, WE WERE IN DANGER. YES, WE ARE GRATEFUL." IT WAS QUITE AN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 #117725  
BY RW NARA E6/22

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02

SECSTATE WASHDC 1396

DTG: 011723Z DEC 83

PSN: 058131

EXPERIENCE TO SEE THOSE YOUNG PEOPLE TOGETHER. IN GRENADA WE FOUND WAREHOUSES FILLED WITH ALL KINDS OF SOVIET WEAPONS, MILLIONS OF ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION AND REVEALING DOCUMENTS. WE BROUGHT THEM TO ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE FOR PUBLIC EXHIBITION. WE ARE GOING TO SHOW THEM TO THE AMBASSADORS POSTED TO WASHINGTON FOR EVERYONE TO SEE. CAN YOU IMAGINE? THIS LITTLE ISLAND OF ONLY 100,000 PEOPLE HOUSED 15,000 MILITARY UNIFORMS. WE FOUND SOME DOCUMENTS THAT REFUTE THE CUBANS' INSISTENCE THAT THE SEVERAL HUNDRED CUBANS IN GRENADA WERE JUST CONSTRUCTION WORKERS. ONE DOCUMENT IS A ROSTER THAT IS SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL FOR A CONSTRUCTION CREW. THE MEN ARE LISTED BY COMPANIES. FIRST ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMPANY, SECOND MORTAR COMPANY, ETC. AND THE DESIGNATIONS IN THE BARRACKS WHERE THEY LIVED WERE ALL MILITARY DESIGNATIONS.

PRESIDENT CHUN: I BELIEVE IT IS TIME FOR YOU TO GO NOW AND GET SOME REST. BUT BEFORE YOU GO TO THE FRONT TOMORROW, I WOULD JUST LIKE TO ADD ONE FINAL WORD. OUR COMBINED FORCES COMMAND IS IN BETTER SHAPE TODAY THAN EVER BEFORE; IT IS VERY BATTLE-READY. MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR THAT MUST GO TO GENERAL SENNEWALD AND AMBASSADOR WALKER. THEY UNDERSTAND OUR CULTURE, OUR CUSTOMS, OUR SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. I'M VERY SATISFIED ABOUT THE CFC. I BELIEVE IT IS A COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENT UNIQUE BETWEEN ANY TWO ARMED FORCES IN THE WORLD.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: THANK YOU FOR CONFIRMING WHAT I'D ALREADY HEARD ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP.  
END TEXT. SHULTZ  
BT

~~SECRET~~