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Folder Title: Memorandums of Conversation –
President Reagan (12/06/1983-02/03/1984)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/30/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (12/06/1983-02/03/1984)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 52

JAUVERT/BROWER

31

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117754	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND PRIME MINISTER KENNEDY ALPHONSE SIMMONDS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	12/6/1983	B1
117756	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND PRIME MINISTER KENNEDY ALPHONSE SIMMONDS [NOTATIONS; SAME TEXT AS DOC. 117754] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	12/6/1983	B1
117758	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND PRIME MINISTER KENNEDY ALPHONSE SIMMONDS [COPY OF DOC. 117754] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	12/6/1983	B1
117760	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND PRIME MINISTER KENNEDY ALPHONSE SIMMONDS [COPY OF DOC. 117754] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	12/6/1983	B1
117762	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND PRIME MINISTER KENNEDY ALPHONSE SIMMONDS [COPY OF DOC. 117754] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	12/6/1983	B1
117765	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT HERZOG'S MEETING WITH RR <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	11/22/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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REAGAN (12/06/1983-02/03/1984)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 52

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31

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117767	CABLE	STATE 365387 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	7	12/27/1983	B1
117771	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	2/6/1984	B1
117774	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH YUGOSLAV PRESIDENT MIKA SPILJAK <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	10	2/1/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECEIVED 08 DEC 83 13

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM MENGES

DOCDATE 06 DEC 83

KEYWORDS CARIBBEAN

SIMMONDS, KENNEDY

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PM SIMMONDS

ACTION: KIMMITT APPROVED RECOM

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

MENGES

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

December 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: CONSTANTINE C. MENGES *Com*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between President Reagan and Prime Minister Kennedy Alphonse Simmonds of St. Christopher-Nevis

Attached is a summary of the President's meeting with Prime Minister Simmonds.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab I.

Approve *RMK* Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Summary of conversation between President Reagan and Prime Minister Simmonds

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/30/11*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117754

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3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between President Reagan and Prime Minister Kennedy Alphonse Simmonds of St. Christopher-Nevis

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne A. Motley
Special Assistant to the President Constantine C. Menges

Prime Minister Kennedy Alphonse Simmonds of St. Christopher-Nevis

DATE, TIME

AND PLACE:

December 6, 1983; 11:30-12:00 PM; Oval Office

President Reagan and Prime Minister Simmonds met today, as scheduled, from 11:30-12:00 PM. The President warmly welcomed the Prime Minister who responded by thanking the President for taking decisive and correct action in responding to the invitation of the OECS countries to restore order and democracy in Grenada.(U)

The Prime Minister noted that the security situation was still somewhat tense because there was a need for a careful process of identifying "fanatic" supporters of the previous dictatorship. He also noted that most members of the previous army were not hard core revolutionaries and that there was a need to make this distinction in determining how individuals would be treated. He saw this as an important and time-consuming process.(U)

The Prime Minister mentioned that the prosecution of General Austin and Mr. Cord presented some interesting constitutional and legal issues. However, he saw a possible precedent in an earlier multinational tribunal established by Trinidad to deal with an army revolt.(C)

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NLRR M3711 #117754
BY RW 6/22/15

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Acting Secretary Dam raised the issue of events at the recent meeting of British Commonwealth countries. Prime Minister Simmonds informed President Reagan that OECS countries had made progress in convincing many Commonwealth members that the recent operation was justified and constructive. This included Prime Minister Thatcher whose more positive attitude was shown by her commitment to provide help for training the new police force.(C)

Mr. McFarlane noted that in nine years we would be commemorating the 500th anniversary of the discovery of the new world by Christopher Columbus. Mr. McFarlane raised the question of whether St. Christopher-Nevis had done some thinking about a form of commemoration which might involve some ongoing institution for education on science or medicine. Prime Minister Simmonds responded that they had a preliminary conference on this in 1980 and that he agreed this was an important opportunity for some type of initiative and continuing endeavor. Acting Secretary Dam agreed, and Assistant Secretary Motley agreed and indicated that some attention will be given to this idea.(U)

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	2		N
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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The White House

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NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Meese</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>redo</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

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(Date/Time)

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7

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 6, 1983

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The Prime Minister mentioned that the prosecution of General Austin and Mr. Cord presented some interesting constitutional and legal issues. However, he saw a possible precedent in an earlier multinational tribunal established by Trinidad to deal with an army revolt.

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BY RW

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

December 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: CONSTANTINE C. MENGES *CCM*

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DECLASSIFIED
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/30/14*

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8844 117758

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1983

10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between President Reagan and Prime Minister Kennedy Alphonse Simmonds of St. Christopher-Nevis

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam
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Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne A. Motley
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Prime Minister Kennedy Alphonse Simmonds of St. Christopher-Nevis

DATE, TIME

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NLRR M3711 # 117758
BY RW NARA TEL 6/22/15

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

December 6, 1983

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Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as am
White House Guidelines, Sept. 1, 1998
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/30/11*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1983

13

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

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Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 1997
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/30/11*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1983

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Assistant Secretary of State -
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NLRR M37111 # 117762

BY RW NARA

6/22/15

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fw 8/30/11

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 16 DEC 83 15

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C

DOC DATE 15 DEC 83

KEYWORDS ISRAEL

VISIT

HERZOG, CHAIM

SUBJECT: MEMCON BETWEEN PRES & PRES HERZOG 22 NOV

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 21 DEC 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

DUR

TYSON

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COMMENTS

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DIST:

S NSC/Mr. McFarlane ✓

D S/SN

P NEA

S/S RR:rw

S/S-S SUBJECT: President Herzog's Meeting with President Reagan,
November 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

After Reagan's introductory comment that he was continuing to work for the sake of peace in the whole Middle East, Herzog presented his condolences on the loss of our Marines and his personal congratulations over Grenada.

He then moved directly to his principal preoccupation: the very serious developments in Syria, where "a tank force half that of the United States Army" and the heavy involvement of the Soviets confronted Israel with an unprecedented problem. Unlike earlier times in Egypt, Soviet officers are directly responsible to their superiors for the standards achieved by the Syrian units. These are the "only fighting units outside of the Soviet bloc." Syria has decided on having the option of war and will have reached the point of carrying this out within one to two years. It wants a greater Syria and no independence for either Jordan or the PLO. The Syrian Army is now 750,000 troops and is predicted to rise to one million. Syria will pause in this course only when it is clear that it will have to deal with more than Israel, when the U.S.-Israeli relationship is clear and formalized.

Herzog noted that those few shots from the Sixth Fleet saved Lebanon and the Gemayel regime. Syria got the message. He said he had the unhappy feeling that Washington was not taking advantage of the great potential of its relations with Israel. Israel is providing solutions and bankrupting itself for the benefit of the whole Western world in developing a technological reply to Soviet weaponry. While it is carrying the ball in the Middle East and we are on the same team, "there is no huddle or game plan." The time has come, he repeated, for us to "formalize" our relationship. Anyone who suggests this will antagonize the Arabs does not understand the Middle East. The fact is that the Egyptian Embassy in Israel has been absorbed and forgotten by the Arabs. This year, 3,500 Israeli Arabs went on the pilgrimage to Mecca. All these are small indicators of a better atmosphere through a shift in Arab attitudes.

The PLO, Herzog commented, has become irrelevant; its leadership is incapable of doing anything. At the same time West Bank Arabs are beginning to think independently, to recognize Syria's action is not just against the PLO but

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MADE IN S/S-I
Date DEC 16 1983

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against Jordan as well. There is a new picture in the area with great possibilities. It is very important that union between us be seen and recognized. The Arabs may react rhetorically against it but will come to accept it. The United States is the only force in the Middle East. The Europeans have shown their bankruptcy over the problem. He expressed the hope that the Shamir visit will lead to some definite agreements.

Reagan replied that he felt we deserved some credit for the change in Arab attitudes. They used not even to recognize Israel's right to exist as a nation. Syria, while the bad boy on the block, is a pragmatic bully. The other Arabs, however, apparently do not wish to burn all their bridges should Syria turn out to be the top man in the area. We are trying to do things with Jordan. We have tried to help and been criticized for it, but we are basically trying to bring Jordan into the process. Should Jordan try to use our help against Israel, we would never permit this. "We need a little trust from you."

Herzog replied that Jordan's problem is leadership. Hussein is not the leader he once was. He is dragging his feet and looking over his shoulder at Arafat. In an earlier time, he would have moved. Sadat had once commented to Herzog that he was unenthusiastic about Hussein and had said that Egypt should handle the autonomy issue and present results to Jordan on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Jordan now has a golden opportunity to join in. Much time has been lost. By now the West Bank could have been enjoying full autonomy and engaged in final status negotiations.

The Secretary said that certainly Hussein feels himself under pressure. He wants to negotiate as the leader of Jordan but needs a legitimate Palestinian delegation with him. Negotiations to a large degree will be over the conditions of Palestinian life. There should be something for that community. The PLO as such is ruled out. We should look for a legitimate Palestinian spokesman. The Israelis had created some Palestinian leaders and legitimized them ("not that I agree with your way of doing so"). Shultz said he had been struck by Hussein's Kuwait interview and wanted to talk about this with Shamir.

Herzog responded that Hussein's idea to reconvene Parliament was a very interesting one. Fifty percent of Jordan

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is Palestinian. Hussein's message to Syria through such a move is that the Palestinians "are mine." The Arafat-Hussein talks have made Damascus very nervous. Herzog went on to say that a new Palestinian leadership is emerging and we should discuss this with Arens next week. None of them are great friends of Israel, but they are much more realistic. They will put the extremists aside. Arens has been having good talks with West Bank leaders. On the ground in Lebanon, there are physical limits. The Shiites are key in the situation. We hope we will be able to work out something. There is a good Israeli dialogue with the Druse in the Shuf which has created a cordon sanitaire. The quick return of the Israeli pilot by the LAF was a good sign. These are all indicators of change in the situation.

McFarlane asked how Herzog would view the threat to Israel if the PLO fighters in Tripoli were soundly defeated. Herzog replied that the PLO fighters had never been a threat to Israel, only "a nuisance, a thorn in the side." The only change would be increased predictability if Syria takes over the PLO, because "Syria is reasonably predictable." Militarily it would mean 6-8,000 more troops for Syria. It would have the advantage of adding to the extreme frustration of West Bankers and open up possibilities, but he did not wish to be optimistic. Herzog said the Arabs had given Arafat his credibility and are now taking it away. Nothing positive had been gained by the PLO.

The Secretary, commenting on the return of the pilots, said it was a sign of an instinctive reaction that it had been done so quickly. This was a plus.

Herzog concluded with expressing thanks to Reagan for U.S. efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry and on Syrian POWs and MIAs in Syria. Reagan assured him we are with Israel heart and soul in those matters.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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TAGS: PREL, PARM, CA

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
PRESIDENT AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU,
DECEMBER 15

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE FOLLOWS CLEARED TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF
CONVERSATION PREPARED BY NSC ON THE PRESIDENT'S
DECEMBER 15 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU.

3. PARTICIPANTS:

US - THE PRESIDENT; VICE PRESIDENT; SECRETARY OF STATE
GEORGE SHULTZ; SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER;
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ROBERT C. MCFARLANE,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
RICHARD BURT; AMBASSADOR PAUL H. ROBINSON; TYRUS W.
COBB, NSC.

CANADA - PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU; DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER ALLAN J. MACEACHEN; AMBASSADOR ALLAN GOTLIEB;
ROBERT FOWLER, FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER TO THE PRIME
MINISTER.

4. BEGIN TEXT: THE PRESIDENT WELCOMED CANADIAN PRIME
MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU TO WASHINGTON AND COMMENTED
THAT HE WAS VERY PLEASED THAT THEIR BUSY SCHEDULES
FINALLY PERMITTED THEM TO GET TOGETHER. HE NOTED THAT
HE WAS FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE INITIATIVES THAT THE
PRIME MINISTER HAD UNDERTAKEN TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN
EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND TO PROMOTE A MORE DURABLE
PEACE.

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5. THE PRIME MINISTER THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS WARM WELCOME AND FOR HIS INTEREST IN THESE INITIATIVES. TRUDEAU EMPHASIZED THAT HE DID NOT SEE HIMSELF AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, NOR WAS HE THERE TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR STRATEGY. HIS PURPOSE WAS TO FIND WAYS TO "MAKE MORE EFFICIENT" THE QUEST - FOR PEACE THAT OUR PEOPLES HAVE EXPRESSED. HE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD RECENTLY SENT STRONG SIGNALS TO THE EAST THAT WE ARE IN AN EXCELLENT POSITION FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE: THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IS STRONG AND VITAL, IN FULL RECOVERY; US MILITARY MIGHT IS BEING STRENGTHENED AND AREAS OF SOVIET ADVANTAGE WERE BEING ERASED; THE SUCCESSFUL INF DEPLOYMENT SENT A - FIRM MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY COULD NOT DISRUPT THE COHESION OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

6. HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT OTHER SIGNALS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SENT HAVE NOT BEEN RECEIVED SO WELL OR HAVE BEEN IMPROPERLY UNDERSTOOD. TRUDEAU PRAISED THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TO THE JAPANESE DIET, PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW THAT NUCLEAR WAR COULD NOT BE WON AND MUST NOT BE FOUGHT. FURTHER, THE CLEAR STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT-SEEK SUPERIORITY AND IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO-NEGOTIATIONS TO FIND EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS IS COMMENDABLE. MORE RECENTLY, THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FROM THE NATO MINISTERIALS WAS VERY POSITIVE IN THAT, ALONG WITH A REAFFIRMATION OF THE NEED FOR STRENGTH AND ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, IT INDICATED THAT WE ARE OPEN TO AND ENCOURAGE A GENUINE DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST. -

7. THE PRIME MINISTER WONDERED WHY THEN WAS "REAGANISM" PERCEIVED SO POORLY IN THE WORLD ARENA? THESE RECENT SIGNALS HAVE NOT BEEN PROPERLY RECEIVED LARGELY BECAUSE THEY TEND TO COUNTER EARLIER AMERICAN STATEMENTS THAT UNDULY AGITATED MANY CONCERNED INDIVIDUALS, PARTICULARLY AMERICAN OFFICIALS TALKING OF ACHIEVING SUPERIORITY AND ACTUALLY FIGHTING A NUCLEAR WAR. TRUDEAU INDICATED THAT HE FELT A NEED TO GO OVER TO THE SOVIET UNION AND EMPHASIZE THAT THE

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS IN TOKYO AND THE NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE MORE ACCURATELY REFLECTED THE THINKING OF THIS ADMINISTRATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. WE MUST SHOW, HE SAID, THAT IT IS NOT ONLY THE PEOPLE, BUT THE GOVERNMENTS, TOO, WHO DESIRE PEACE. WE MUST COUNTER

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THE PREVAILING IDEA THAT ALL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BOGGED DOWN. HE NOTED THAT IN THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT LETTER TO HIM (TRUDEAU) THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN INDICATED THAT THE US IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING A NEW MBFR PROPOSAL. THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE A VERY POSITIVE STEP FORWARD.

8. THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED THE THRUST OF HIS TOKYO SPEECH AND ENCOURAGED TRUDEAU TO EMPHASIZE IN HIS FUTURE MEETINGS THAT THIS CLEARLY REFLECTS THE POLICY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION. HE NOTED THAT MANY OF THE PROPOSALS WE HAD FORWARDED WERE DESIGNED TO BRING A STABLE AND LASTING PEACE AND PROVIDED THE STARTING POINT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MUTUALLY PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR. THE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT THAT WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY CALLED FOR NOT ONLY ARMS LIMITATIONS, BUT REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING A "ZERO/ZERO" OPTION IN THE INF TALKS THAT WOULD ELIMINATE A WHOLE CLASS OF WEAPONS. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT SOVIET PROPAGANDA HAD SUCCEEDED IN DISTORTING OUR POSITIONS AND THAT THEIR DISINFORMATION EFFORTS HAD GOTTEN MORE ATTENTION THAN OUR GENUINE PROPOSALS. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE PRESS OFTEN ASSUMES AN ADVERSARY ROLE AND ONCE HAVING ADOPTED THIS POSTURE SIMPLY WILL NOT REPORT FAIRLY NEWS THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO HEAR.

9. SECRETARY SHULTZ ADDED THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE HAVE THE FEELING THAT THE SOVIETS JUST DON'T WANT TO LISTEN. HE WAS NOT SURE WHY, BUT SPECULATED THAT THEIR FAILURE TO PRECLUDE OUR INF DEPLOYMENTS, A MAJOR OBJECTIVE, HAS CAUSED THEM TO RETRENCH. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT THEY TRIED TO BULLY OTHER NATIONS, TO SCARE PEOPLE, AND TO INTIMIDATE US, AS THEY DID IN TRYING UNSUCCESSFULLY TO BREAK UP THE WILLIAMSBURG MEETING. SECRETARY SHULTZ INDICATED THAT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIETS WILL GO TO STOCKHOLM WITH HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATION, BUT MIGHT CONTINUE THEIR INTRASIGENT POSE. THEY HAVE A MIND-SET THAT THEY CAN GAIN A SUPERIOR POSITION THROUGH INTIMIDATION. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET LACK OF RESPONSE MAY ALSO BE CAUSED, IN PART, BY ANDROPOV'S FAILING HEALTH AND THE ASCENDING ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN MOSCOW DECISION-MAKING.

10. THE PRESIDENT REITERATED THAT, IN THE INF TALKS,

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WE PLACED THE ZERO/ZERO OPTION ON THE TABLE AND FURTHER INDICATED THAT WE WERE WILLING TO ENTERTAIN BALANCED DEPLOYMENTS AT OTHER LEVELS, BUT WE RECEIVED NO SATISFACTORY RESPONSES FROM THE SOVIETS.

11. SECRETARY WEINBERGER INDICATED THAT OUR SINCERE DESIRES TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WERE NOT FAIRLY REPORTED IN THE PRESS. HE STRESSED THAT IT WAS OUR POLICY THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO FIGHT A NUCLEAR WAR, THAT IT CAN'T BE WON AND THAT IT SHOULDN'T BE FOUGHT. HE ADDED THAT WE WERE NOT PLANNING TO CONDUCT A PROTRACTED NUCLEAR CONFLICT, DESPITE PRESS STORIES TO THE CONTRARY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIET UNION, THROUGH ITS PREPARATIONS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REFIRE CAPABILITY FOR ITS MISSILES, APPEARS TO BE PURSUING PREPARATIONS TO GIVE THEM THE CAPABILITY TO FIGHT A NUCLEAR WAR.

12. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE PRESS HAD BUILT AN IMAGE OF HIM THEY REFUSED TO MODIFY; THEY TAILOR THE FACTS TO FIT THIS PRECONCEIVED IMAGE AND WON'T ADMIT THEY ARE WRONG.

13. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED AND NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT CAME INTO OFFICE AND INHERITED A NUMBER OF POLICIES WITH WHICH HE IS NOW IDENTIFIED -- THE 1979 "DUAL-TRACK DECISION," THE HARMEL REPORT OF 1967, AND THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS WISELY SOUGHT TO CORRECT AMERICAN MILITARY DEFICIENCIES WITH RESPECT TO THE USSR AND, FURTHER, TO OVERCOME A SENSE OF FRUSTRATION THAT DEVELOPED FOLLOWING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS IN TEHRAN AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THUS, HE ADDED, THE PRESIDENT HAD "BEEN DEALT A TOUGH HAND." HOWEVER, AS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANTED, THE PRESIDENT EXHIBITED STRENGTH AND RESOLVE AND DID NOT BACK DOWN. TO A GREAT EXTENT THIS EXPLAINS WHY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP DOES NOT LIKE THIS ADMINISTRATION.

14. STILL, THE PRIME MINISTER ADDED, THE SOVIETS ARE GENUINELY AFRAID NOW. AS MUCH AS THEY WOULD LIKE TO SPREAD THEIR IDEOLOGY, THEY DO NOT WANT WAR. THEY HAVE A SENSE OF INFERIORITY. IT IS IMPERATIVE NOW THAT WE SHOW THE WORLD JUST WHO ARE THE DEFENDERS OF FREEDOM, WHO REALLY WANTS PEACE. WE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT WE SINCERELY DESIRE DETENTE AND MODERATION IN

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GLOBAL POLITICS. IN DOING SO THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN PRESSING AN IMAGE OF THEM AS PEACELOVERS. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT IF HE GOES TO THE USSR HE WILL STRESS THAT THEY SHOULD READ PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TOKYO SPEECH CAREFULLY, THAT THEY SHOULD COME BACK TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND APPEAR IN STOCKHOLM READY TO DO BUSINESS. THEY HAVE LOST THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE.

15. THE VICE PRESIDENT REQUESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT EXPLAIN TO TRUDEAU THE DEPTHS OF HIS REAL-FEELINGS ON THESE ISSUES.

16. IN EXPRESSING AGREEMENT WITH TRUDEAU'S ANALYSIS, THE PRESIDENT REITERATED THAT THE TOKYO SPEECH - REFLECTED ADMINISTRATION POLICY. THE PRESIDENT THEN PRESENTED A SPIRITED DEFENSE OF HIS STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAM, WHERE, HE EXPLAINED, WE HOPE TO SHIFT WAY-FROM OUR RELIANCE ON THREATENING TO DESTROY AN ADVERSARY'S SOCIETY OR FORCES AND, INSTEAD, TO BUILD A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM THAT PREVENTS INCOMING -MISSILES FROM STRIKING TARGETS. AT THIS POINT WE COULD;ENTERTAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF DESTROYING OFFENSIVE-MISSILES AND MOVE OUR PEOPLE AWAY FROM A DEPENDENCE-ON THE-TYRANNY OF THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

17. THE PRIME MINISTER UNDERSTOOD THE PRESIDENT'S SINCERE DESIRES, BUT WONDERED IF SUCH -A SYSTEM WOULD BE DESTABILIZING. HE ADDED THAT THE WORLD IS MORE INTERESTED IN KNOWING NOW WHY WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF "NO FIRST USE," ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT IT-WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE TO DO SO. -THEY ALSO CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY SO LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AT MBFR. WE NEED TO FIND WAYS TO EQUALIZE-THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE, TO IMPROVE OUR CONVENTIONAL-FORCES TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN SAY, "NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT BE USED."

18. THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT WE WERE READY TO GO DOWN THE ROAD OF NEGOTIATIONS WHEREVER IT ;MIGHT BE; FRUITFUL. HE NOTED THAT IN THE POST-WAR YEARS WHEN WE WERE THE ONLY COUNTRY TO POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS,-WE - OFFERED TO GIVE THEM UP, BUT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT - ACCEPT THIS TRULY BENEFICIAL SCHEME. -THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT HE AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS FEARED-WAR-TODY AND THAT ALTHOUGH EVERY LEADER HAS AT ONE TIME OR

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ANOTHER REAFFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET GOAL REMAINED THE SPREAD OF A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION -WORLDWIDE, THE SOVIET PEOPLE DO NOT WANT WAR. THEY HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY - INVADED AND THREATENED IN THEIR PAST, -BY THE MONGOLS, BY NAPOLEON WHO REACHED MOSCOW, AND TWICE BY THE GERMANS IN THIS CENTURY. THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE HAVE EXPERIENCED THE HORRORS OF WAR AND DO NOT WANT TO HAVE THAT EXPERIENCE AGAIN. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT IT IS DISTURBING THAT MILITARY LEADERS SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN SO PROMINENT A ROLE IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING. IT MAY BE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, BECAUSE OF THEIR SENSE OF INFERIORITY AND PREOCCUPATION WITH SECURITY CONCERNS, HAVE CREATED A FRANKENSTEIN WITH THEIR LARGE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THEY HAVE PLACED SO MUCH EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE THAT THE MILITARY HAS TOO MUCH AUTHORITY.

19. THE PRIME MINISTER STRONGLY AGREED, BUT SUGGESTED THAT NOW WAS THE TIME TO TEST THEM. WE SHOULD NOW REAFFIRM THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S DIET SPEECH IN TOKYO, SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO GO THE EXTRA MILE TO REACH AGREEMENTS, TO ARDENTLY PURSUE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, TO PLACE LESS EMPHASIS ON OFFENSIVE MISSILES, AND TO TRY TO FIND AREAS OF AGREEMENT INSTEAD OF DIFFERENCES. OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE WOULD BE A DEMONSTRATION OF A WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH ANDROPOV, PERHAPS AT A SUMMIT, BUT NOT NECESSARILY. SUCH A SUMMIT NEED NOT BE THE OCCASION OF SIGNING A MAJOR AGREEMENT, BUT CAN BE USEFUL AS A GET-ACQUAINTED SESSION. THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT SUCH AN OVERTURE COULD GO A LONG WAY IN CHANGING THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT. HE ADDED THAT SUMMITS CAN BUILD FALSE EXPECTATIONS, BUT, IF PROPERLY HANDLED, COULD BE USEFUL. THIS COULD PUT POLITICAL ENERGY INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE PRIME MINISTER ADDED THAT AT SUCH A MEETING BOTH LEADERS COULD REAFFIRM STATEMENTS THAT THEY HAVE MADE THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT WINNABLE. THIS WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT WAY OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON MOSCOW.

20. THE PRESIDENT INDICATED THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO SUMMITS, BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE SUCH THAT THEY CREATE FALSE EXPECTATIONS. IN THE PAST WE HAVE MADE NUMEROUS EFFORTS TO KEEP THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE OPEN, TO FIND NEW CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION. WE HAVE TRIED TO STRESS THAT NO ONE IN THIS COUNTRY WANTS WAR AND- THAT THE SEARCH FOR A DURABLE, GENUINE PEACE IS AT THE

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TOP OF OUR AGENDA. WE HAVE TRIED TO KEEP MUCH OF OUR EFFORT OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE AND NOT TRY TO CONDUCT THE DIALOGUE THROUGH THE WORLD PRESS. THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT HE WAS READY TO DO MORE, IF THE - OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED ITSELF, TO MOVE IF THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF MOVEMENT. WE WILL KEEP TRYING TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND TO BUILD A SOUND DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS.

21. THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THE TIME HE HAS TAKEN TO ADDRESS- THE PEACE INITIATIVES. TRUDEAU INDICATED THAT HE KNEW THAT THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE FOR SUCCESS FOR MANY OF- THESE, PARTICULARLY THE FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE WHICH WAS NOT RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY ABROAD. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT HAVING HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATION AT THE CDE WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT THE RECENT SIGNALS THE PRESIDENT HAD SENT, INCLUDING THE DECISION TO SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE CDE, THE VERY POSITIVE SPEECH HE GAVE IN TOKYO, THE NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE AND THIS - MEETING, WILL ALL CONTRIBUTE TO A POSITIVE REVISION OF THE PRESIDENT'S IMAGE. MOST FOREIGN LEADERS HAVE AN ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND TRUDEAU INDICATED HE WOULD STRIVE TO SEE THAT THIS FALSE IMAGE WAS CORRECTED.

22. THE PRESIDENT THANKED THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HIS EFFORTS TO SECURE GLOBAL PEACE AND A REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AND WISHED HIM WELL ON HIS FUTURE ENDEAVORS.
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KEYWORDS. NETHERLANDS

VISIT

LUBBERS, RUUD F M

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SUBJECT. BRIEFING PAPERS & PARTICIPANTS LIST FOR PRES 19 JAN MTG W/ PM LUBBERS

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

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<i>McFarlane</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>FOR DECISION</i>		
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National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

rw 2/30/11

February 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers (C)

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers on January 19, 1984.

William T. Kimmitt
for Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A - Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting
with Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Vice President
Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer
Acting Assistant Secretary John Kelly
Peter R. Sommer, NSC

Dutch Prime Minister Rund Lubbers
Ambassador Jan Hendrik Lubbers
Press Spokesman Van der Voet
Foreign Policy Advisor Holtslag

DATE, TIME January 19, 1984, Oval Office
AND PLACE 11:30 a.m. - 12:05 p.m.

During the photo opportunity at the outset of the meeting, the President and Prime Minister Lubbers exchanged pleasantries and talked about the U.S. economic recovery. Lubbers applauded the U.S. recovery, emphasizing his hope that it would have a beneficial influence in Europe as well. An economic recovery is also important, added Lubbers, toward restoring political confidence in Europe. The European economic situation, he continued, remains difficult, but there are signs of improvement. High U.S. interest rates and the over-valued dollars also pose a problem.

The President quickly rejoined that the dollar is also a major problem for the U.S., impacting adversely on U.S. exports.

Prime Minister Lubbers replied that the current economic situation may bring even heavier pressures for increased protectionism. The President said he is a firm believer in free trade and would fight and oppose increased protectionism. Lubbers welcomed the President's assurances, noting that a U.S.-EC trade conflict would be disastrous.

Turning to Suriname, Prime Minister Lubbers noted that the U.S. and the Netherlands had consulted last spring when violence erupted. The Netherlands has special ties to Suriname and would like, he said, to keep open the possibility of working in concert with the U.S. There are several possibilities for cooperation. His biggest concern, he suggested, was for the safety of Dutch citizens living in Suriname.

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The Vice President asked if Bouterse would survive his labor difficulties. Lubbers thought not. Bouterse is strong and clever, but he will not, opined Lubbers, survive the current instability. The situation has simply gone too far. It is impossible to work with Bouterse. The Dutch, Lubbers added, will be keeping a close watch on the situation, particularly with so many Surinamese living in the Netherlands.

Prime Minister Lubbers then turned to NATO and the Netherlands defense effort. He noted that his government has proposed a ten year defense modernization program and predicted that it will be approved by Parliament. The modernization program calls for modest increases in defense spending, despite budget cuts in almost every other area. Nuclear armaments, and INF in particular, are however a much more complicated situation. Until now the situation has been more or less manageable. Since his government took office, continued Lubbers, the Cabinet has worked hard at developing a political strategy for managing the domestic INF debate. The Dutch, he said, had wanted to do everything possible to sustain the negotiating process. It is important, he added, that the Alliance present a united front to the Soviets. Now that INF negotiations have broken off, the task of managing the Dutch domestic debate has become increasingly difficult.

The Dutch, Lubbers noted, as part of sustaining the negotiating track had undertaken preparatory work for basing, such as site selection. While deployment is not scheduled until 1986, continued Lubbers, we need a parliamentary decision on funding the May/June timeframe. The vote is uncertain and the Dutch are worried about the impact of a "no" vote on surrounding basing countries, said Lubbers. The fact that deployment has begun in the West Germany, the U.K., and Italy is helpful. If the Netherlands waits much longer, he said, it will be interpreted by the opposition as a sign of weakness. Therefore, he added, his government is planning on taking a decision in the late spring.

Prime Minister Lubbers observed that when he goes to Parliament on an INF vote, he will be questioned about the number of missiles required to restore the balance. When negotiations are ongoing, it is easier to explain the need for 572 missiles. The Dutch situation is further complicated by the opposition's focus on the Netherlands other nuclear tasks. Short range nuclear systems, such as nuclear artillery, are especially controversial. But, continued Lubbers, nuclear artillery, which is based in Germany with Dutch troops, is important to NATO's deterrence posture. There is no doubt that NATO needs nuclear artillery, and it needs to be modernized. There is a serious risk, however, that if Parliament approved INF basing, it could be conditional on reducing other Dutch nuclear tasks.

The President replied that NATO had just announced plans to make great reductions in nuclear warheads, this followed an earlier reduction of 1000 warheads. He said he saw no special magic in the 572 number. I still believe, he continued, in my original zero-zero proposal, which would eliminate an entire class of weapons.

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When the Soviets would not accept the zero outcome, we made, as Lubbers knew, he said, other proposals. But the Soviets did not respond positively. The Soviets seem bent on addressing INF as a propaganda campaign. They continued to deploy, emphasized the President, throughout the negotiations. I still dream, he said, of getting the Soviets down the road of reductions. The President underlined that he was dedicated to this task. At the same time, we cannot, he said, allow the Soviets to have an INF monopoly. This presents a danger to peace. The President added that he hoped the Dutch Parliament would see the value of the Alliance remaining united on INF, while remaining dedicated to seeking reductions in nuclear weapons.

Prime Minister Lubbers underscored that he recognized the complexities of the INF negotiations. The maintenance of a common NATO position is essential if negotiations are to be eventually successful. Just as INF deployments had to begin before there was any chance of the Soviets negotiating seriously. The beginning of deployments in other countries should as well facilitate deployment in the Netherlands. For its parts, he continued, the Netherlands will have to analyze its options as they relate to cruise missile basing and other nuclear tasks. The number question, i.e., why 572, he again underlined, would be one of the key questions. Public attitudes were critical. In this regard, he said he didn't know the results of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting.

The President replied that Secretary Shultz would be home tonight. We have, he said, received preliminary reports. The talks lasted for 5 hours, which is much longer than planned. They got down to substantive discussions. All this talk of strained relations, or that we do not have a dialogue with the Soviets is exaggerated. We are in frequent communications with the Soviets, said the President, and we will continue to pursue an active dialogue.

The Vice President raised what he called state sponsored international terrorism, as practiced particularly by Syria. In this connection he wondered if the recent kidnapping of the Heineken beer heir had been motivated by international terrorism. Lubbers replied that the incident had been done only for money, but lamented over the general climate that more or less made terrorism an acceptable norm. He noted that there are bad signs in the Netherlands, but it is France that has an impossible situation. Lubbers stressed that he shared our concern over the spread of terrorism. The Iran-Iraq war poses a real threat to stability, and of course, the fundamentalism as preached by Khomeini was at the root of the problem.

The Vice President said Iranian fingerprints are everywhere in connection with acts of terrorism, be it our Marines in Beirut or the recent bombings in Kuwait. Syria is also implicated. We are, said the Vice President, groping to come to grips with terrorism. But at the UN one guy's terrorist is another's freedom fighter.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

Prime Minister Lubbers responded that the UN is not the proper instrument to fight terrorism. Without citing details, he said the West must augment its contacts with Arab countries.

The President rejoined that terrorism, as currently being practiced, is the most vicious of its kind. These terrorists blow up people without discrimination, without knowledge of who they are killing. They are, he emphasized, senseless acts of terror, without regard for civilization as we know it.

Prime Minister Lubbers replied that he fully and completely understood the President's and Vice President's concern and agreed that we need to heighten our efforts to combat terrorism. In Europe terrorism is no longer indigenous. It is directed from outside, especially from Iran. Lubbers added that he was not sure it was Khomeini himself, or other groups. The President observed that all these acts of killing are committed in the name of "their God."

Noting that the overall Middle East question is complex, Prime Minister Lubbers asked if the Dutch could be of some assistance. The Vice President asked if the Dutch had a relationship with Iran. Lubbers responded practically none, but at the same time the Dutch are not historically tied to either of the combatants, Iraq or Iran.

The President thanked Lubbers for the useful discussion.

The meeting concluded at 12:05 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

322
ADD ON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~W/CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

February 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: PETER SOMMER *PS*
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers

Attached at Tab A is a memcon from the President's meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Lubbers on January 19, 1984.

RECOMMENDATION

Following your review, that you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward the memcon to State.

Approve WFM

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Kimmitt Memo to Hill
Tab A - Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~W/CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3A(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 21
BY NARA RW, DATE 8/30/11

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8400978

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 07 FEB 84 15

TO MCFARLANE FROM DOBRIANSKY

DOCDATE 03 FEB 84

KEYWORDS YUGOSLAVIA

VISIT

SPILJAK, MIKA

SUBJECT: MEMCON BETWEEN PRES & PRES SPILJAK 1 FEB

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 10 FEB 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8309176 8400414 NSCIFID (MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

FEB 10 1984

FEB 16 1984

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment


MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. CHRISTOPHER HICKS
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with the President:
Working Visit of Yugoslav President Mika Spiljak

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's meeting with Yugoslav President Mika Spiljak on Wednesday, February 1, 1984.

This memorandum, and others similar, are Presidential records containing sensitive information, including foreign government information. Further reproduction should be strictly limited, and any request, now or in the future, for access or release outside the Departments must be cleared by the NSC Staff.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

RUO
8/30/11

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117774
978

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 #117774
BY fw 1
3/6/22/15

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Meeting with
Yugoslav President Mika Spiljak

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

(Participants for all meetings)

President Ronald Reagan

Vice President George Bush

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam

Under Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger

United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia

David Anderson

Paula Dobriansky, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)

(Additional Participants/Cabinet Room/Residence)

Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Timothy McNamar

R. Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State

Roger Robinson, NSC Staff Member

Yugoslavia

(Participants for all meetings)

President Mika Spiljak

Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Lazar Mojar

Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States

Mico Rakic

Federal Executive Council Vice President

Zvone Dragan

(Additional Participants/Cabinet Room/Residence)

Ambassador Zivojin Jazic, Foreign Policy

Advisor to the President

Ambassador Dusan Marinkovic, Director for

North American Affairs, Federal Secretariat

Pavle Jevremovic, Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy

Colonel Nikola Novkovic, Military Assistant
to the President

Tea Tos, Staff Member, State Presidency

DATE, TIME

Wednesday, February 1, 1984; 11:30 a.m. -

AND PLACE:

1:40 p.m.; Oval Office, Cabinet Room, Old
Family Dining Room, and Diplomatic Entrance

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Photo Session - Oval Office 11:30 - 11:40 a.m.

President Reagan opened the meeting by welcoming President Spiljak to the United States and extending his best wishes for the success of this winter's Olympic Games. (U)

President Spiljak thanked the President and stated that the Olympic Games constitute a manifestation of friendship and rapprochement among all nations. (U)

President Reagan mentioned that the consultations between U.S. and Yugoslav officials on Olympic security have been useful. He noted that we deplore all terrorist attacks and would strive to do all that we could to prevent them from occurring in the future. (C)

President Spiljak added that his government wanted to avoid any crises during the Olympics and thus, it was essential to have these consultations. (C)

At this time, President Reagan commented on the origins of the Olympics. Specifically, he mentioned that the Olympic Games were always held even in times of war. (C)

President Spiljak asserted that all wars should stop so that the Olympics could take place. He then remarked that he is the first official visitor to meet with President Reagan since he made his reelection announcement. Thus, Spiljak congratulated the President and said that he was pleased to have accepted the President's invitation to visit the United States. The President also mentioned that despite changes in leadership in both countries, Yugoslavia wants lasting cooperation and good relations with the United States. (C)

President Reagan agreed with Spiljak's assertion and reaffirmed U.S. support of Yugoslavia's independence, unity and territorial integrity and respect for its policy of non-alignment. (C)

Cabinet Room Meeting -- 11:40 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

President Reagan congratulated President Spiljak on Yugoslavia's improvement in its balance of payments in 1983, and its efforts to implement economic reforms. He added that the U.S. will continue to give Yugoslavia its full support to stabilize and reform the economy. In particular, he mentioned that we intend to continue to play a leading role in the multilateral assistance package. (C)

President Reagan also commented that we value military consultations and cooperation with Yugoslavia. He stated that he was pleased to inform President Spiljak that we will be able to give a favorable response to the Yugoslav request for technical data on a U.S. jet engine for their planned supersonic fighter aircraft. The President added that Secretary Weinberger would discuss this issue in greater detail during his scheduled meeting with President Spiljak. (S)

At this time, President Spiljak noted that the world economic situation has become more grave. He mentioned that with the departure of President Tito, a new government structure arose in Yugoslavia -- a collective leadership. There is currently no disagreement over the present Yugoslav state system; yet, there is a considerable debate on broad economic issues and methods of leadership. These discussions are intended to foster new ideas and to help solve economic problems. The President stated that the government has worked out a new economic stabilization program. Although it has been hard to get a consensus in Yugoslavia on this issue, the implementation of the program has already begun. (C)

President Spiljak remarked that Yugoslavia has paid its interest costs and has been able to improve its balance of payments in 1983. He cited that in 1981, Yugoslavia's deficit totalled \$3.0 billion, and in 1982, it dropped to \$1.5 billion dollars. In 1983, there was a surplus of \$100 million. He stated that Yugoslavia's improvement in its balance of payments resulted from the austerity measures imposed last year. However, as a result of these measures, personal consumption and the standard of living were reduced. President Spiljak asserted that this was the price of economic stabilization necessary for long-term economic betterment. (C)

He also indicated that Yugoslavia needs to invest more in energy, raw materials and food. It is necessary for them to learn how to deal with the debts and losses of their various enterprises. He further mentioned that they want to impose still more severe measures to restructure the economy. Specifically, they would like to alleviate the problem of their large inflation rate. Toward this end, they have imposed a price freeze. (C)

President Spiljak then raised the issue of Yugoslavia's negotiations with the IMF on a new stand-by agreement. The negotiations are presently stalled due to disagreements over Yugoslavia's foreign exchange law. Specifically, the Fund wants to impose conditions on Yugoslavia which cannot be met. The President contended that the IMF's conditions are too rigid and thus, would trigger internal political and social problems. Moreover, it would lead to stagnation and a decline in production. The President remarked that if they capitulated to the IMF's terms, the Yugoslav leadership would not be able to maintain the support of its people. At this time, the President remarked that the State Presidency will still be kept to a one-year term of service. Thus, the rotational system will continue. (C)

President Spiljak went on further to discuss U.S.-Yugoslav bilateral relations. He mentioned that even though we have different social and economic systems, this has not hindered our bilateral relations. He asserted that our economic relations are very important. Yugoslavia wants a lasting balance of trade; it does not want increased U.S. imports unless Yugoslavia's

exports to the United States increase as well. He also expressed the hope that preferential tariffs would still be continued.

President Spiljak then raised other bilateral issues. He mentioned that Yugoslavia is interested in expanding scientific cooperation with the United States. He hailed our cooperation on the tourism agreement and also reported that presently Yugoslavia's foreign investment laws are being reexamined and some key legislation governing foreign investment should be passed soon. He expressed the hope that there will be continued expansion of economic cooperation with the United States. Finally, the President mentioned that Yugoslavia is appreciative of all U.S. efforts to deal with terrorism. (C)

President Reagan thanked President Spiljak for his remarks and asked Deputy Secretary of Treasury McNamar to comment on the economic issues raised. (C)

Deputy Secretary McNamar lauded the economic progress Yugoslavia has made thus far. In particular, he noted the potential changes in Yugoslav foreign investment laws. With regard to the trade imbalance, he asserted that approximately half of all Yugoslav imports to the United States come under a generalized system of preferences (GSP), and a large percentage of U.S. exports are tied to agricultural CCCs. He mentioned that we hope this subsidization of two-way trade will only be a temporary situation. (C)

On the issue of the IMF, Deputy Secretary McNamar stated that the Administration was pleased to hear that Federal Executive Council Vice President Zvone Dragan's conversations with Mr. De Larosiere (IMF Managing Director) on the IMF proposals have progressed well. The Deputy Secretary expressed the hope that the negotiations with the IMF will move more quickly and that Yugoslavia will be able to explain its position to the IMF with respect to interest rates, the dinar exchange rate and other matters of contention. In addition, he mentioned that although Yugoslavia has been very successful in its exports, its enterprises have held their money outside the country and have not reinvested it in Yugoslavia. He added that the United States cannot tell the IMF what to do. However, we will strive to be of as much assistance to Yugoslavia as possible. (C)

At this point, Acting Secretary of State Dam made several points. First, he indicated that he shared Deputy Secretary McNamar's views. He also stated that the commercial banks would act positively on the financial assistance package to Yugoslavia and reaffirmed the importance of concluding the standby agreement. (C)

On trade, Secretary Dam mentioned that President Reagan is for free and open trade. There are measures especially in the area of trade promotion that should be implemented to increase the

volume of bilateral trade. Secretary Dam indicated that we are pleased with the overall tenor of our bilateral relations and the lack of major contentious issues. He reaffirmed the desirability of further strengthening cooperation in a variety of areas and specifically mentioned terrorism as an example. (C)

President Spiljak replied that this is true.

Old Family Dining Room -- 12:20 - 1:20 p.m.

President Reagan opened the discussion by asking President Spiljak to share his views on U.S.-Soviet relations. He also commented that the U.S. is seriously committed to seeking a constructive relationship with Moscow and cited Secretary Shultz's recent exchange with Foreign Minister Gromyko as a positive development. However, he expressed regret over the unjustified Soviet decision to suspend INF talks which he contended should remain separate from both the START and MBFR talks. The President remarked that we are encouraged that the Soviets have agreed to set a date for the resumption of the MBFR talks. (C)

Finally, President Reagan stated that we have no reservations about making even the most far reaching disarmament proposals. The President cited President Eisenhower's admonition that the use of nuclear weapons would not lead to a victory by one side or the other, but would bring about the ultimate destruction of mankind. (C)

In response, President Spiljak asserted that the Soviet leadership is interested in cooperating with the United States. However, they mistrust U.S. intentions and view U.S. actions with suspicion. He commented that he has looked carefully at all of President Reagan's speeches and statements, and he believes that there are overlapping U.S.-Soviet interests which could serve as a basis for improved relations. In order to overcome mutual mistrust, there is a need for dialogue and lasting agreements. The President said whatever the U.S. may think of the Soviet system, it should realize that there is a desire in Moscow to attain peace with the United States. (S)

President Reagan responded that the United States is ready to resume negotiations at any time. He went on to say that the United States has always been drawn into wars and yet, we have never started any wars. He contended that the real source of U.S. mistrust of the Soviet Union and the subsequent difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations is the series of Soviet international aggressions. The record of Soviet expansionism and empire-building is the major stumbling block to improved relations and a menace to international peace. (S)

President Spiljak stated that he thinks the Soviet leadership realizes that the current situation cannot continue and acknowledges the need for contact and lasting agreements. He repeated, however, that due to a lack of trust, it will not be easy to improve bilateral relations. It is essential for both sides to persevere in negotiating efforts. He stated that if a summit evolves, it would foster better U.S.-Soviet relations. President Spiljak cited the example of how John F. Kennedy's exchange with Khrushchev affected U.S.-Soviet relations positively during that period. (S)

President Reagan replied that we are ready. He pointed out the existence of a Washington-Moscow back channel and noted that through this channel we have candidly informed the Soviets that we are looking for concrete deeds and not rhetoric on their part. He also mentioned that one result of the back channel operations was the lifting of the grain embargo. Yet, he referenced our disappointment that despite U.S. overtures to ease tensions, the Soviets have continued their military build-up and, in particular, their strategic nuclear build-up at an alarming rate. (S)

At this time, Secretary Dam posed a question to President Spiljak. He queried that given examples of Soviet aggressive behavior in Czechoslovakia, Cambodia and Afghanistan, how can such expansionist behavior be prevented in the future. He also asked whether the Soviets might want to reach an agreement not only on arms, but on moderating regional conflicts? (S)

President Spiljak replied by saying that today there is more willingness for dialogue on both arms control and regional issues. (S)

Foreign Minister Mojsov interjected at this time that the last Soviet aggressive action occurred in 1979 in Afghanistan. Before Afghanistan, the Soviets intervened into other countries on almost a yearly basis. However, from 1979 to 1983, they did not invade any new countries. For this reason, he asserted that Soviet behavior since 1979 has been restrained. He partially attributed this restraint to burdens associated with Afghanistan. He said that Soviet expansionism also appears to have stopped as a result of a feeling of greater confidence due to enhanced military strength. However, Moscow knows that unabated military buildup cannot go on forever. In fact, both Washington and Moscow agree that use of nuclear weapons would be suicide. Thus, the Foreign Minister asserted that there are very valid, logical grounds for dialogue and for some compromise in various areas. Nothing can be achieved by force. He pointed out that Stockholm represented a first step and confirmed the need to expand bilateral dialogue. (S)

At this point, Vice President Bush inquired about Andropov's health. He wanted to know to what extent his condition affected Soviet ability to deal with other countries. (S)

In response, Foreign Minister Mojsov remarked that the present state of Andropov's health is a grave state secret. His health, however, appears to be improving and he is in control of the system. From all the information they have, he is consulted on a daily basis, even though he has failed to be present in a number of ceremonial obligations. (S)

President Spiljak added that Andropov's domestic policies are very interesting. He began some things that if continued can constitute substantial changes within the Soviet Union. In fact, if these changes were continued, they would have a dramatic effect on the general state of international affairs. (S)

President Reagan went on to say that one reason as to why Soviet behavior may be somewhat restrained is because they are not doing well in Afghanistan. However, he noted that through surrogates, Moscow has been threatening the Western Hemisphere and has sought to spread revolution. In fact, he cited a recent case whereby the Soviets sent a ship laden with military supplies to Central America. Despite their promise to permit the press to be present during the unloading of the cargo, the Soviets allowed only the Cuban reporters to be observers. (S)

President Reagan went on to ask President Spiljak how much of Soviet aggressive policy should be attributed to the fact that the Russians have always maintained a suspicious attitude of the rest of the world. He stated that pre-revolutionary Russia had internal passports and permission was required to travel abroad. Yet, the unrelenting pattern of Soviet expansionism is hard to explain by alleged Soviet security. To Americans, it appears that the Soviet Union is seeking to dominate the world. (S)

President Spiljak answered by stating that we often ask ourselves that same question. He added that there is indeed continuity between Czarist Russian and Soviet foreign policies. (C)

President Reagan also remarked that during World War II, despite the U.S.-Soviet alliance, the Soviets did not allow U.S. aircraft to use Soviet territory on their return from bombing raids against Germany. (S)

President Spiljak then stated that Moscow clearly fears Western presence. For years, the Russians have lived in isolation. He mentioned that during World War II and the Cold War, the Soviet Union remained isolated. Presently, there are those within the USSR that feel the constraints of a closed system. Andropov has tried to address some of their concerns in his domestic programs. President Spiljak said there is a need for more positive steps. Small steps can have an impact on the way Moscow develops its overall policies. (S)

President Reagan commented that he never thought that popular sentiment in the Soviet system would engender changes in policies. Rather, only modifications in the leadership's perspectives would produce changes within the system. (S)

President Spiljak replied that he had visited the Soviet Union several times. During those visits, he noted that there were many changes within the government bureaucracy and within the country itself. He also sensed that at different levels, there were various dispositions and perspectives of U.S.-Soviet relations. He asserted that there were many people in the Soviet Union who want peace, democracy and cooperation with the entire world. If those elements within the USSR who want peace, democracy and cooperation are supported, this will have an impact on the leadership composition and Soviet policies. (S)

At this time, President Reagan commented that in 1981, when he was in the hospital, he wrote a letter to Brezhnev. It was a hand-written letter, in which he mentioned that the people of our two countries want the same things. He also said that when he was Governor of California he had met Brezhnev. He expected an answer that would be sympathetic to the appeals that he had made on behalf of the American people. Rather, Brezhnev's answer was not hand-written, and was the usual propaganda. The President added that maybe he should write another letter to Andropov. (S)

President Spiljak pointed out that the discussion thus far, had addressed small steps and gestures that could be taken to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. He stated that Yugoslavia wholeheartedly agrees that such small steps need to be taken in order to alleviate mistrust. Mistrust is a grey area which must be conquered. He said that maybe we are deceiving ourselves, but we still believe that something can be achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union. (S)

President Reagan commented that he didn't think there were any people who want war except in the Middle East. (C)

President Spiljak laughed, and said that the situation is very bad in the Middle East. He mentioned that Yugoslavia is very concerned about all Middle Eastern developments as that area is close to Yugoslavia. He asserted that if the situation becomes worse there would be more pressure applied on Yugoslavia. If only because of that, Yugoslavia will continue to strive to seek a solution to the Middle East crisis. (C)

President Reagan stated that this Administration will persist in finding a diplomatic solution. The present obstacle to that solution is Syria's policies. There is a need to overcome Syrian obstinance and let the Lebanese settle their internal problems. (C)

At this time, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane stated that small steps need to be taken in order to eventually arrive at broader solutions. He said that in Lebanon, Israel had already taken a small step which, in fact, should lead to further progress. He remarked that now the Soviets should try to influence the Syrians to make a reciprocal gesture in Lebanon. (C)

President Spiljak asked for the Administration's opinion of Arafat and its appraisal as to why he has turned lately to Jordan and Egypt. (C)

Mr. McFarlane replied that it is useful for the Palestinians to have others involved in their movement who are not of a radical persuasion. In particular, it is important to have the Palestinians cooperating with King Hussein. Frankly, Mr. McFarlane stated that Arafat's actions to date are not sufficiently forthcoming. Both King Hussein and Mubarak have been positive about prospects of greater Palestinian moderation, but thus far, it has not been reflected in Arafat's statements or actions. He commented that the experience of a generation of Palestinians growing up during three disastrous wars in 12 years apparently has not affected Arafat's approach. He has not strived to lead the Palestinian people out of this violence. Mr. McFarlane remarked that he hopes that Arafat will at some point have the courage to do so. (S)

Foreign Minister Mojsov mentioned that President Spiljak will soon visit the countries of this region and is very interested in U.S. views on these issues. He also said that he, too, hopes that Arafat will be bolder and will not use violence, but rather diplomatic channels to achieve his goals. The Foreign Minister added that it is necessary to solve the Palestinian problem first in order to resolve the overall Middle East crisis. He pointed out that the Palestinians are in a desperate situation, hence, they seek desperate solutions. Mojsov contended that we need to give the Palestinians a chance. (C)

Robert McFarlane commented that the U.S. did what it could to extract concessions from the Israelis on the territorial issue. He indicated that when the Administration announced its Middle East peace initiative in September 1982, Arafat had an opportunity to compromise. Presently, given the support from Hussein and Mubarak, Arafat has the same opportunity. If Arafat is able to reach a compromise with the support of Mubarak and Hussein, the United States will do what it can to induce reciprocal actions by the Israelis. He cited the case of when Arafat and Hussein appeared to be on the verge of agreeing to let Jordan represent the PLO in negotiations with the Israelis, but Arafat in the end succumbed to the pressures of radical Palestinians and broke off the talks. In fact, these radical Palestinians were the same ones who, supported by Syria, drove Arafat out of Lebanon. Arafat made the mistake of trying to win back this radical faction that had betrayed him when he was trying to help the Palestinian people. (C)

President Spiljak asserted that Arafat has turned recently to Egypt and Jordan in order to gain support for a moderate policy. He will strive to enhance his position with other moderate Arab countries. President Spiljak asked if there are any prospects for solving the Palestinian question. The President further mentioned that Hussein set forth a proposal which none of the

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other countries have so far supported. The proposal calls for the Palestinians to establish a federation with Jordan. This is a proposal which Yugoslavia supports. President Spiljak added that every perspective must be examined. If all doors are closed, the situation will become even more unfortunate. (C)

President Reagan mentioned again that in our September Middle East initiative, this Administration indicated that there must be a fair settlement of the Palestinian question. (C)

At this point, President Spiljak thanked President Reagan for the meeting and added that he looks forward to continuing his discussions with the President's Cabinet members. (U)

President Reagan thanked President Spiljak and closed by stating that the discussions had been mutually beneficial. (U)

Diplomatic Entrance -- 1:30 - 1:40p.m.

Upon conclusion of the departure ceremony, President Spiljak turned to President Reagan and invited him to visit Yugoslavia.

President Reagan replied that he would be delighted to do so.

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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

February 3, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Meeting with
 Yugoslav President Spiljak

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum of the President's conversations on Wednesday, February 1, with Yugoslav President Mika Spiljak. At Tab II for signature by Robert Kimmitt is a memorandum to his counterparts at State, Treasury and Defense, forwarding a copy of the memorandum of conversation.

RR
 Roger Robinson concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation.

Approve *RCM* Disapprove _____

2. That you approve sending a copy of the memcon to State, Treasury and Defense -- on a close-hold basis.

Approve *RCM* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation
 Tab II Forwarding memorandum from Robert Kimmitt

UNCLASSIFIED with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

RW
8/30/11

✓ 975

National Security Council
The White House

84 FEB 16 P 5:36

System #

Package #

I

0978

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	A
NSC Secretariat	4	_____	D
Situation Room	_____	_____	TAB II
Rosie	2	alone	Concurrence

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

975 uml
✓

RECEIVED
National Security Council
The White House
84 FEB 6 P7:14

System # I
Package # 0978

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>LFA</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>OK</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>		
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5</u>		
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

to Dick
Hall
men
a

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)