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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File:  
Records, 1981-1985

**Folder Title:** Memorandums of Conversation –  
President Reagan (06/20/1984-08/16/1984)

**Box:** 52

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 8/31/2011

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (06/20/1984-08/16/1984)

**FOIA**

M10-351/M10-371

**Box Number** 52

JAUVERT/BROWER

37

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117844	MEMO	JACK MATLOCK/TYRUS COBB TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE. MITTERRAND 1982 MEMCON <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	6/20/1984	B1
117845	MEMO	JAMES RENTSCHLER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. MITTERRAND VISIT AND RECORD <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	3/11/1982	B1
117846	MEMCON	RE. CALL BETWEEN RR AND PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	6/25/1984	B1
117847	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER WOERNER <i>R 4/13/2012 M351/1</i>	3	7/13/1984	B1
117848	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER WOERNER [COPY OF DOC. 117847; W/NOTATIONS; PGS. 1-2] <i>R 4/13/2012 M351/1</i>	2	7/13/1984	B1
117849	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GUILIO ANDREOTTI <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	8/13/1984	B1
117850	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GUILIO ANDREOTTI [COPY OF DOC. 117849; W/NOTATIONS] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	8/13/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

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RBW 8/31/2011

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (06/20/1984-08/16/1984)

**FOIA**

M10-351/M10-371

**Box Number** 52

JAUVERT/BROWER

37

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117851	MEMCON	DRAFT RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GUILIO ANDREOTTI <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	6	8/13/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED ON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 21 JUN 84 08

TO POINDEXTER

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 20 JUN 84

COBB

20 JUN 84

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

CENTRAL AMERICA

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

ARMS TRANSFLRS

SUBJECT: MITTERRAND 1982 MEMCON

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 22 JUN 84 STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( EF *JK* )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C JUN 21 1984</i>	<i>Poindexter noted</i>		<i>CO</i>

National Security Council  
The White House

1216

8F

System # I

Package # 4936

8 JUN 20 P 5:40

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>IC</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

Information   
 A = Action   
 R = Retain   
 D = Dispatch   
 N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

117844

4936

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

June 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

*JM ATWC*

NOTED

FROM: JACK MATLOCK/TYRUS COBB

SUBJECT: Mitterrand 1982 Memcon

We have searched the files (as has the Secretariat) and there is no record of a memcon from the Mitterrand-Reagan working visit in March of 1982 here or at State. Interestingly, Jim Rentschler apparently foresaw a problem developing in this area and sent the attached memo to Clark regarding the advisability of having a notetaker there.

On the specific issue of the French pledge on terminating arms deliveries to Nicaragua, you may have some record in the West Wing files. However, in the exchange with the French in April over Cheysson's reputed offer of French assistance to Managua in Mine-clearing operations, the French tacitly endorsed the non-transfer of arms commitment by underlining that the Cheysson proposal did not violate the Mitterrand pledge.

Attachment

cc: Oliver North  
Constantine Menges

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M3711 #117844  
BY *RW* NARA DATE *6/22/15*

~~SECRET~~

117845

MEMORANDUM

90158

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 11, 1982

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *Jim*

SUBJECT: Mitterrand Visit and the Record

DECLASSIFIED 4  
NLRR m3711 #117845  
BY RW NARA 6/22/15

Despite what I gather is some enormous sensitivity over the Mitterrand visit and the need to keep the Frenchman's exchange with the President as restricted as possible, I send you the following comment out of professional staff conscience (I hope that is not a contradiction in terms), just to be sure in my own mind that the issue has been raised.

This concerns the record of what is going to be said during the Reagan-Mitterrand talks and the formal basis for follow-up actions, if any. Last October's meeting between the two Presidents at Yorktown/Williamsburg remains very fresh in my mind, if nobody else's. A great many things were said there, in rather elliptical fashion, for which there is no known summary; while I cannot prove it, I have a gut feeling, as a long-time Mitterrand-watcher, that much of the seeming French insensitivity to our concerns in Central America and other places took hold on the heels of that meeting, and for a fairly basic reason: the French did not have the impression that we were all that exercised about such matters, an impression reinforced by the absence of any systematic follow-up, or even agreed notes.

Mitterrand is a shrewd and crafty operator; not for nothing is he known as "the Florentine". If, as I gather, all the pressure is coming from the French side to keep these discussions down to a small handful of people, I would view French motives for that format with the profoundest of mistrust. You can be dead sure that the reasons they may have for wanting such privacy are very little related to any excessive solicitude concerning our own particular interests. We have growing divergencies with the Mitterrand government, which happens to be a government increasingly hard-pressed inside its own country. Back home and among his European partners, Mitterrand will seek to use his talks with the President in ways that we may not necessarily find congenial, or even tolerable (Middle East, Central America, and economics come readily to mind).

In these circumstances I urge that some participant on our side ensure that copious notes are taken throughout the talks. Moreover, I think it will be a major mistake not to give that job to our Ambassador. Van Galbraith has good French, knows the issues, and will be the guy who will have to carry out, live with, or otherwise address whatever develops in that meeting. To leave him out will, at the very least, deprive the principals of a detailed written record (unless you or the Secretary take on the chore, which I do not recommend). Perhaps most important, Galbraith's absence will make it exceedingly difficult for him to talk later with any authority to Mitterrand or his people on

~~SECRET~~

Review on 3/11/88

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

exactly what transpired during the talks (nothing beats being able to say "But you and President Reagan said such and such on that issue, I heard you"). Being in a position to talk authoritatively can in itself have a deterrent effect vis-a-vis later French moves we might not like (and may be a key reason why Mitterrand wants to limit the attendance).

All too often in past years we have drastically reduced the effectiveness of our Ambassadors - those "personal representatives of the President" - by cutting them out of our most important business. Perhaps there is some compelling reason to do so during tomorrow's Mitterrand visit. But if we are doing so on our own turf primarily to suit French convenience, it might be well to reconsider that format at this complex moment in the Franco-American love affair and be clear in our own minds whose interest we really need to protect.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8405026

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*RW 8/3/11*

RECEIVED 26 JUN 84 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM COBB

DOCDATE 25 JUN 84

KEYWORDS FRANCE

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES JUN 25 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION W/ MITTERRAND

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 28 JUN 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8405017

NSCIFID

( CM )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	JUL 03 1984	<i>Poundstone approved</i>		
	JUL 03 1984	<i>Kummitt sfd</i>		<i>CB RK</i>

DISPATCH

*7/3/84*

W/ATTCH FILE

*PA* *(C)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5026

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 3, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of Telephone Call Between the President  
and French President Francois Mitterrand (C)

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's  
telephone call to French President Francois Mitterrand on June  
25, 1984. (C)

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A - Mitterrand Memcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003  
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *8/30/11*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117846

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5026

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call Between the President and French President Francois Mitterrand (U)

DATE, TIME: June 25, 1984 -- 11:32-11:42 a.m.  
AND PLACE: From the White House to Fontainebleau, France

The President greeted President Mitterrand and said how personally pleased he was to learn of Mitterrand's strong presentation of the Western position to the Soviets. The President stated that he felt Mitterrand eloquently expressed our common concern over the Soviet intransigent stand on arms control, and their harsh violations of human rights. (C)

President Mitterrand responded that he wished to say good morning to his dear friend, Ron, and how happy he was to hear from the President. Mitterrand noted that he arrived back in Paris only yesterday. He added that the atmosphere during his first day in Moscow was extremely tense, but became much more relaxed thereafter. Although the discussions were useful, they led to no breakthrough. (C)

The President applauded Mitterrand's willingness to raise publicly the Soviet treatment of Sakharov. President Reagan asked if Mitterrand had received any indication as to how the Soviets plan to handle this situation. President Mitterrand noted that at the moment he uttered the name Sakharov, the room became quite tense. President Reagan interjected how he could imagine that that would have been the case. Mitterrand commented that the entire Soviet political leadership was there listening to his remarks. He added that he received no indication, however, as to how the Kremlin planned to handle the Sakharov case. (C)

President Reagan stated that he was very pleased with Mitterrand's strong defense of the NATO Pershing and Cruise Missile deployments, and the French President's challenge to Moscow to return to the nuclear negotiations. The President asked Mitterrand if he received the impression that the Soviets were preparing a shift in their START or INF positions. (C)

President Mitterrand said he told the Soviet leadership that the root cause of the military competition in Europe lay in the deployment of its SS-20 missiles facing Western Europe. The deployment of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR M3711 # 117846  
BY RW NARA 6/22/85

were a necessary and prudent response to the continuing deployment of the SS-20. Mitterrand noted that his raising this point with the Soviets created no serious difficulties in the atmosphere of the discussions, although Chernenko and the others denied the logic of his assertion. He did not feel that the Soviets were preparing any modification to their stand. To sum up, Mitterrand said he found the Soviet leadership much less harsh in their rhetoric than he expected, and he was particularly impressed by the relatively moderate manner in which they discussed American policies. (C)

As for human rights, Mitterrand pointed out that he relied more on legalistic arguments than he did on humanitarian rationales. Mitterrand said that he argued that the Helsinki Accords represented a contract that bound all sides. If certain provisions were not followed, then he indicated that it should come as no surprise to Moscow that other provisions of the agreement would not be implemented. Mitterrand added that other than this tough exchange on human rights, his visit went exceedingly well. He felt the Soviets extended him a very courteous welcome and pursued discussions in a frank and candid fashion. (C)

President Reagan asked for Mitterrand's impression of Chernenko. Did he appear to be fully in charge and what role did Foreign Minister Gromyko play in the sessions? Mitterrand responded that he had the distinct impression that this was a genuine collective leadership; that is, in the meetings many of the Politburo members actively participated. Chernenko, Mitterrand noted, read only from prepared statements, and seldom deviated or showed any inclination to move forward beyond his stated position. Mitterrand added that he found Chernenko to be shrewd and intelligent, but also, as expected, to be in rather poor health. As for Gromyko, Mitterrand characterized him as being very influential and difficult during the discussions. His role should not be underestimated, the French President concluded. (C)

The President reiterated his deep appreciation to Mitterrand for his adroit handling of his fascinating visit to Moscow. He added that he would be very interested in receiving further impressions of his discussions. The President added that we were still trying to talk the Soviets into a Summit if it could be arranged. President Mitterrand thanked the President for his call and indicated that he would be preparing a lengthy message on his Moscow discussions for the President. (C)

The President said that he would look forward to receiving the message, and wished the French President good luck in the EC Conference over which he was presiding. (C)

The call concluded at 11:42 a.m. (U)

National Security Council  
The White House

1227 w l  
System # I  
Package # 5026

ED

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	8 1 JUN 26	P 11 43	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	4	<i>[Signature]</i>	A
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<del>5</del>		<del>A</del>
Bob Kimmitt	<del>5</del> 5	K	
NSC Secretariat	6		D
Situation Room			
<del>6</del> Rosie	3	✓	Conventions

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5026

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

June 25, 1984

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between  
the President and French President Francois  
Mitterrand

Attached at Tab A is the memcon from the President's telephone  
call to Mitterrand on June 25, 1984.

RECOMMENDATION

Following your review of the memcon, that you authorize Bob  
Kimmitt to forward it to State by memo (Tab I).

Approve           

Disapprove           

Attachment

Tab I - Kimmitt to Hill Memo  
Tab A - Memcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA RW DATE 8/13/11

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8405432

RW 8-31-11  
DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFICATION ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 16 JUL 84 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 13 JUL 84

KEYWORDS GERMANY F R

WOERNER, MANFRED

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & GERMAN DEPMIN ON 13 JUL

*de.*

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 19 JUL 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8405298 NSCIFID ( CT )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	← JUL 19 1984	<i>Kinnitt approved</i>		
	⊙ JUL 19 1984	<i>Kinnitt sgd</i>		<i>754</i>

DISPATCH

*✓ HW. 7/19*

W/ATTCH FILE

(C) *4*

National Security Council  
The White House

System #

Package #

1259  
Cdh  
I  
5432

ED

JUL 16 P 4: 41

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	✓		
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	4	K	
NSC Secretariat	5		D
Situation Room			
Sommer	3	done by [unclear]	Conventions

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

July 19, 1984


UNCLASSIFIED  
w/~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COLONEL R. J. AFFOURTIT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and  
German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's  
meeting with German Defense Minister Woerner on July 13, 1984.

  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A - Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED  
w/~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

R/W 8/21/84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117847

THE WHITE HOUSE

5432

WASHINGTON

15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with German Defense Minister Woerner (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Vice President  
Secretary of Defense Weinberger  
Edwin Meese, III  
Robert C. McFarlane  
RADM John M. Poindexter  
Peter R. Sommer, NSC  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,  
Ronald Lauder

German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner  
Ambassador Van Well  
Hans Ruehle, MOD Planning Director

DATE, TIME AND PLACE July 13, 1984, 9:40 a.m.  
Oval Office

Following a welcoming exchange, Defense Minister Woerner said Chancellor Kohl had asked him to convey the Chancellor's special greetings to the President. Woerner stated he was pleased that the President found time to meet with him, and praised the President for returning firm, steady leadership to the Alliance. (U)

The President thanked Woerner for his generous words and underscored his high regard for Chancellor Kohl. The President said he understood that the Minister and Secretary Weinberger had had useful and important talks yesterday that had resulted in a mutually beneficial agreement. (U)

Secretary Weinberger interjected that since Woerner has taken over as Defense Minister there is a better, more cooperative attitude within the Alliance and the atmosphere at NATO Ministerial meetings is warmer. The Secretary continued that the air defense agreement he and the Minister had signed yesterday was a truly cooperative arrangement, whose benefits went beyond just the Germans and the Americans. He believed it would help smooth the way for other cooperative agreements. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MID-351#117847

BY RW NARA DATE 4/13/18

Noting that many Europeans, because of their parliamentary system of government, simply do not understand that we cannot control the U.S. Congress, the President discussed the recent attempt by a leading U.S. Senator to legislate troop withdrawals from Europe. He said he had called the Senator personally, but given that it is election year and the Senator is from the opposition party, the Senator in question would not back off his negative proposal. (C)

Woerner replied that he knows Senator Nunn well; he is Alliance-minded and while his objectives are laudable, his methods -- especially the threat tactic -- were wrong and sent the wrong signal to the Soviet Union. The President agreed and reiterated that while there is real Congressional concern, there was also a certain amount of election year politics involved in Nunn's proposal, particularly since in the past Senator Nunn had been supportive on a number of key defense issues. (C)

Turning to the situation in Germany, Woerner underscored the Kohl government's firm determination to proceed with INF deployments. There are still some problems with the peace movement, but recent polls indicate that fear of war has declined in Germany since the deployments took place. This shows, asserted Woerner, that when a government exercises leadership, it can carry and influence public opinion and do something good for the country and peace. The President replied that he wished U.S. pollsters would ask similar sorts of questions. For example, at the time of Grenada, the immediate reaction of most of the media and indeed many of our Allies was negative. But here in America, the media's perspective was not shared by the American public. It turned out that the general public's reaction was highly supportive of our Grenada rescue mission. (C)

Woerner asked for the President's view of the Soviet leadership and U.S.-Soviet relations. The President thanked Woerner for asking this important question and underlined that when the U.S. stated that it was willing to meet with the Soviets in Vienna we were not playing political games. It is in mutual U.S.-Soviet interest to improve relations. We are determined to keep after them and hope to engage the Soviets in serious arms control talks, continued the President. We have not set pre-conditions for the talks nor should they be allowed to do so. (C)

With regard to the Soviet leadership, no one really knows who is making the decisions said the President. The situation is murky; Chernenko is apparently the leader but we have the impression that decisions are taken collectively by the Politburo. The President continued that President Mitterrand, with whom he had spoken after his Moscow visit, had the same impression. Indeed, on foreign policy questions, Gromyko often interrupts and even corrects, or puts a

different emphasis on what Chernenko had said. Woerner observed that when Genscher had been in Moscow the Soviet interpreter translated not what Chernenko said, but rather what Gromyko said in correcting Chernenko. The President said Woerner's remarks were most interesting and noted they again agreed with Mitterrand's observations. Mitterrand had indicated that Chernenko closely followed his briefing notes, i.e., there was no free exchange with Mitterrand. Woerner interjected to characterize Chernenko as a party functionary. (C)

The President reemphasized that we will continue to pursue arms reduction talks with the Soviets. It is not right for the world to live under a nuclear threat. We will enhance our military strength, but we are eager to build a more stable peace. The President continued that he does not believe the Soviets can keep pace with us militarily without severe damage to their economy; he hoped that this would be an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate reductions. Woerner agreed with the President's observation saying the Soviets believed that they cannot compete with the West. The President commented that we in the West assume the Soviets are the aggressor. But given their historical perspective the Soviets seems to believe that the rest of us want to attack them. It is our job, said the President, to disabuse them of this false thought. The U.S. does not want to attack anyone. And we want to make this absolutely clear when we meet with the Soviets. Woerner thought this would be helpful and said the President should convey that in a personal meeting after the elections. (C)

Following several jokes about the upcoming U.S. election campaign, the meeting adjourned at 9:55 a.m. (U)

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED  
W/CONFIDENTIALACTION

July 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the  
President and German Defense Minister Manfred WoernerAttached at Tab A is the memcon from the President's July 13 meeting  
with German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner.RECOMMENDATIONFollowing your review of the memcon that you authorize Bob Kimmitt to  
forward it to Defense and State.Approve   K   Disapprove       

## Attachments

Tab I - Kimmitt Memo to Hill  
Tab A - Memorandum of ConversationUNCLASSIFIED  
W/CONFIDENTIAL *rw 8/31/11*  
Declassify on: OADR

Book —  
Per Peter,  
Baker was  
not at the  
meeting.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117848

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5432

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with German Defense Minister Woerner (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

RADM

Wasnt  
Baker  
there also?  
(He was from  
930 - 940)

- The President
- Vice President
- Secretary of Defense Weinberger
- Edwin Meese, III
- Robert C. McFarlane
- Admiral John M. Poindexter
- Peter R. Sommer, NSC
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ronald Lauder
- German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner
- Ambassador Van Well
- Hans Ruehle, MOD Planning Director

DATE, TIME AND PLACE July 13, 1984, 9:40 a.m.  
Oval Office

Following a welcoming exchange, Defense Minister Woerner said Chancellor Kohl had asked him to convey the Chancellor's special greetings to the President. Woerner stated he was pleased that the President found time to meet with him, and praised the President for returning firm, steady leadership to the Alliance. (U)

The President thanked Woerner for his generous words and underscored his high regard for Chancellor Kohl. The President said he understood that the Minister and Secretary Weinberger had had useful and important talks yesterday that had resulted in a mutually beneficial agreement. (U)

Secretary Weinberger interjected that since Woerner has taken over as Defense Minister there is a better, more cooperative attitude within the Alliance and the atmosphere at NATO Ministerial meetings is warmer. The Secretary continued that the air defense agreement he and the Minister had signed yesterday was a truly cooperative arrangement, whose benefits went beyond just the Germans and the Americans. He believed it would help smooth the way for other cooperative agreements. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MID-351#117848

BY RW NARA DATE 4/13/12

Noting that many Europeans, because of their <sup>lower cost</sup> Parliamentary system of government, simply do not understand that we cannot control the U.S. Congress, the President discussed the recent attempt by a leading U.S. Senator to legislate troop withdrawals from Europe. He said he had called the Senator personally, but given that it is election year and the Senator is from the opposition party, the Senator in question would not back off his negative proposal. ~~WT(C)~~

Woerner replied that he knows Senator Nunn well; he is Alliance-minded and while his objectives are laudable, his methods -- especially the threat tactic -- were wrong and sent the wrong signal to the Soviet Union. The President agreed and reiterated that while there is real Congressional concern, there was also a certain amount of election year politics involved in Nunn's proposal, particularly since in the past Senator Nunn had been supportive on a number of key defense issues. ~~WT(C)~~

Turning to the situation in Germany, Woerner underscored the Kohl government's firm determination to proceed with INF deployments. There are still some problems with the peace movement, but recent polls indicate that fear of war has declined in Germany since the deployments took place. This shows, asserted Woerner, that when a government exercises leadership, it can carry and influence public opinion and do something good for the country and peace. The President replied that he wished U.S. pollsters would ask similar sorts of questions. For example, at the time of Grenada, the immediate reaction of most of the media and indeed many of our Allies was negative. But here in America, the media's perspective was not shared by the American public. It turned out that the general public's reaction was highly supportive of our Grenada rescue mission. (C)

Woerner asked for the President's view of the Soviet leadership and U.S.-Soviet relations. The President thanked Woerner for asking this important question and underlined that when the U.S. stated that it was willing to meet with the Soviets in Vienna we were not playing political games. It is in mutual U.S.-Soviet interest to improve relations. We are determined to keep after them and hope to engage the Soviets in serious arms control talks, continued the President. We have not set pre-conditions for the talks nor should they be allowed to do so. (C)

With regard to the Soviet leadership, no one really knows who is making the decisions said the President. The situation is murky; Chernenko is apparently the leader but we have the impression that decisions are taken collectively by the Politburo. The President continued that President Mitterrand, whom he had spoken with after his Moscow visit, had the same impression. Indeed, on foreign policy questions, Gromyko often interrupts and even corrects, or puts a

NSC/S PROFILE

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CLASSIFIED BY 2/3/11  
~~SECRET~~

ID 8406162

RECEIVED 16 AUG 84 18

TO MCFARLANE FROM COBB

DOCDATE 16 AUG 84

22

KEYWORDS: ITALY AP ANDREOTTI, GIULIO

SUBJECT: MEMCON BETWEEN PRES & FM ANDREOTTI

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: 17 AUG 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( DW )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

CAUG 17 1984 POW dexter disappeared Co

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

1300

System #

I

Package #

6162

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Handwritten mark]</i>	A
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	
NSC Secretariat	4		N
Situation Room			

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

John: As we discussed, recommend we not send this to State. After your review, return to me and I will close out for Pres files.

National Security Council  
The White House

WML

24

System # I

Package # 6162

1300

SEQUENCE TO \_\_\_\_\_ HAS SEEN \_\_\_\_\_ DISPOSITION \_\_\_\_\_

8: AUG 18 P 3: 31

Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Rosie</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>done</u>	<u>Corrections</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

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(Date/Time)

National Security Council  
The White House

System # I

Package # 6162

D

AL 16 P 1: 37

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*Card - see my info at table A - correct*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6162

26

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
W/SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION

August 16, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti

At Tab A is the memcon from the President's meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti on August 13, 1984.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you have Bob Kimmitt forward the memcon to State after your review.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Presidential files only*

Attachments

- Tab I Kimmitt to Hill Memo
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation - August 13, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
W/SECRET ATTACHMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY *RW*, DATE *8/31/11*

27

TAB  
I

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

25

SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President  
and Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti

At Tab A is the memcon from the President's meeting with Italian  
Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, August 13, 1984.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memcon, August 13

SECRET ATTACHMENT

RW  
8/31/11

DECLASSIFIED  
U.S.G. 1988, as amended  
by the Office of Management and Enterprise Services

TAB  
A

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Italian Foreign Minister  
Guilio Andreotti (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
U.S. Ambassador to Italy Maxwell Rabb  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant Secretary of State for European  
and Soviet Affairs Richard R. Burt  
Robert M. Kimmitt, NSC Staff (Notetaker)  
Neil Seidenman, State Department Interpreter  
  
Foreign Minister Guilio Andreotti  
Ambassador to the United States  
Rinaldo Petrignani  
Christina DiPietro (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME Monday, August 13, 1984 -- 1:39-2:03 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Century Plaza Hotel, Los Angeles, California

The President and Foreign Minister Andreotti began the meeting by exchanging congratulations on the performance of American and Italian athletes at the Olympics. (U)

Foreign Minister Andreotti stated that it was important from a political point of view that the Olympics went so well, since the success demonstrates the utter failure of the Soviet boycott. The President agreed, saying that more countries than ever before participated in these Olympics and that many world and Olympic records were broken. Foreign Minister Andreotti noted, too, the warm welcome given to the Romanian and Chinese teams and said that the success these teams enjoyed added to the failure of the Soviet refusal to participate. (C)

Andreotti then turned to the substantive portion of his remarks, congratulating the President on the policy of firmness and confidence pursued by the United States. He noted approvingly the President's adoption of a policy of strength, while also pursuing peaceful resolution of international differences. He passed on the greetings of President Pertini and Prime Minister Craxi and said that recent discussions among the governing parties in Italy had led to a resolve, which he shares, to maintain a steady, stable government. He stressed that there were no differences among the various Italian political parties on questions of foreign policy. (C)

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NLRR M3711 # 117849  
BY RW NA 6/22/15

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W

The President thanked the Minister for his kind words and expressed our appreciation to Italy for being such a staunch ally of the United States, including INF. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti replied that Italy would pursue a steady political line and would especially follow through on Alliance commitments. He believed this to be the best way to deal with the Soviets, contrary to the opinion expressed in some Alliance countries. The Foreign Minister also expressed his appreciation for the stance taken by the United States on the question of outer space weapons. The U.S. willingness and readiness to discuss this question was important, particularly with regard to public opinion in Europe. (C)

The President responded that he feels as strongly as ever that we and the Soviets must find a way to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. However, recent Soviet behavior makes one wonder if the Soviets were really serious about their Vienna proposals. We have no preconditions for these talks, but it is now apparent that the Soviets had some. We will, however, persist in our efforts. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti noted that the Soviets do not want to give the President any success before the election. After the election, however, he believes they will see the need to discuss arms control and other issues. He also stated that the precise line of response among the Soviet leadership might not yet have been decided, particularly in light of the confusion caused by the immediate U.S. response to the initial Soviet proposal. (C)

The President responded that we, too, wondered if the Soviets had come to a firm decision on this issue. At this point, the President digressed to state how highly he thought of the performance in Washington of Ambassador Petrignani. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti thanked the President for these kind words and responded that Ambassador Rabb and Mrs. Rabb both were doing a splendid job in Rome. Andreotti then turned the conversation to Mediterranean issues. He said the Egyptians had asked Italy to help in mine-clearing operations in the Red Sea, and indicated that the government would probably decide within a week to approve this request. In the same region, however, much still needed to be done on the question of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. He opined that now may be a good time for the Arab nations to recognize Israel's right to exist behind peaceful, secure borders. He said that without movement on the Palestinian question, friends of the United States such as Hussein and Mubarak would be hurt. He also thought it was in Israel's interest for there to be movement on the Palestinian question, if not now, then after the U.S. election. He noted that the potential new coalition government in Israel could help in this regard. (C)

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The President responded that our proposals were based on the premise that the Arabs would come together and agree on Israel's right to exist, then sit down and negotiate with Israel on specific issues such as the return of territory currently held by the Israelis. He said, however, that it was hard to sit down to negotiate with someone who does not even recognize your right to exist. (U)

Foreign Minister Andreotti agreed, saying that recognition would have to be simultaneous and mutual. In this connection, he said he wanted to mention briefly to the President his recent discussions with Qadhafi, noting that he would go into greater detail during his subsequent meeting with Secretary Shultz. He said that midway through their meeting, Qadhafi asked all aides to leave the room. Qadhafi then said to Andreotti that he wanted President Reagan to know that he was not a communist; indeed, that his philosophy was built on the doctrine of fighting Marxism. To emphasize this point, Qadhafi gave Andreotti two books on his personal philosophy for the President. Qadhafi also told Andreotti that he was seeking a channel to the President through which he would explain that he really wanted to be non-aligned and not pro-Soviet. Andreotti said he was simply passing this message and not vouching for Qadhafi's veracity or sincerity. He also said that he had told no one of the details of this exchange with Qadhafi. (S)

The President responded that we needed actions as well as words on the part of Qadhafi to convince us of his interest in improving relations. Events in London and Chad, as well as assassinations around the world, would seem to cut against what Qadhafi was saying. At the same time, we would always prefer to have friendly relations with other nations, so long as their deeds matched their words. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti noted that when terrorism was at its peak in Italy, the Red Brigades asked Qadhafi for assistance, which he refused. The President said he would read the books given by Qadhafi with interest and that we would "proceed from there." (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti then noted that there would soon be a meeting in Costa Rica involving the members of the EC, the Contadora countries, and the five local countries. He stated that it was very important in his view for the EC countries to take a position similar to that of the United States, especially in an area so close to our interests. Stating that he was speaking not only as a Christian Democrat, Andreotti said he appreciated the help that we were giving to President Duarte in El Salvador. (C)

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Secretary Shultz said that the President had a major victory in Congress last week with the approval of additional funding for our economic and military assistance to Central America. Foreign Minister Andreotti replied that such funding was very important; indeed, it was the only way for Duarte to succeed. He noted that the Italians had invited Duarte to Italy in October, when they would be prepared to announce a large package of aid to El Salvador. (C)

Secretary Shultz interjected that he was pleased that the Italians would respond favorably to Mubarak's request for mine-clearing assistance. (C)

The meeting ended at 2:03 p.m. with an exchange of pleasantries.  
(U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

34

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Italian Foreign Minister  
Guilio Andreotti (U) Maxwell

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
U.S. Ambassador to Italy ~~Max~~ Rabb  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant Secretary of State for European  
and Soviet Affairs Richard R. Burt  
Robert M. Kimmitt, NSC Staff (Notetaker)  
Neil Seidenman, State Department Interpreter  
  
Foreign Minister Guilio Andreotti  
Ambassador to the United States  
Rinaldo Petrignani  
Christina DiPietro (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME Monday, August 13, 1984 -- 1:39-2:03 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Century Plaza Hotel, Los Angeles, California

The President and Foreign Minister Andreotti began the meeting by exchanging congratulations on the performance of American and Italian athletes at the Olympics. (U)

Foreign Minister Andreotti stated that it was important from a political point of view that the Olympics went so well, since the success demonstrates the utter failure of the Soviet boycott. The President agreed, saying that more countries than ever before participated in these Olympics and that many world and Olympic records were broken. Foreign Minister Andreotti noted, too, the warm welcome given to the Romanian and Chinese teams and said that the success these teams enjoyed added to the failure of the Soviet refusal to participate. (C)

Andreotti then turned to the substantive portion of his remarks, congratulating the President on the policy of firmness and confidence pursued by the United States. He noted approvingly the President's adoption of a policy of strength, while also pursuing peaceful resolution of international differences. He passed on the greetings of President Pertini and Prime Minister Craxi and said that recent discussions among the governing parties in Italy had led to a resolve, which he shares, to maintain a steady, stable government. He stressed that there were no differences among the various Italian political parties on questions of foreign policy. (C)

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NLRR M37111 # 117850

BY RW N

6/22/15

The President thanked the Minister for his kind words and expressed our appreciation to Italy for being such a staunch ally of the United States. He thanked the Foreign Minister for his personal assistance on issues of concern to the United States, ~~(H)~~ including INF. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Andreotti replied that Italy would pursue a steady political line and would especially follow through on Alliance commitments. He believed this to be the best way to deal with the Soviets, contrary to the opinion expressed in some Alliance countries. The Foreign Minister also expressed his appreciation for the stance taken by the United States on the question of outer space weapons. The U.S. willingness and readiness to discuss this question was important, particularly with regard to public opinion in Europe. (C)

The President responded that he feels as strongly as ever that we and the Soviets must find a way to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. However, recent Soviet behavior makes one wonder if the Soviets were really serious about their Vienna proposals. We have no preconditions for these talks, but it is now apparent that the Soviets had some. We will, however, persist in our efforts. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti noted that the Soviets do not want to give the President any success before the election. After the election, however, he believes they will see the need to discuss arms control and other issues. He also stated that the precise line of response among the Soviet leadership might not yet have been decided, particularly in light of the confusion caused by the immediate U.S. response to the initial Soviet proposal. (C)

The President responded that we, too, wondered if the Soviets had come to a firm decision on this issue. At this point, the President digressed to state how highly he thought of the performance in Washington of Ambassador Petrignani. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti thanked the President for these kind words and responded that Ambassador Rabb and Mrs. Rabb both were doing a splendid job in Rome. Andreotti then turned the conversation to Mediterranean issues. He said the Egyptians had asked Italy to help in mine-clearing operations in the Red Sea, and indicated that the government would probably decide within a week to approve this request. In the same region, however, much still needed to be done on the question of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. He opined that now may be a good time for the Arab nations to recognize Israel's right to exist behind peaceful, secure borders. He said that without movement on the Palestinian question, friends of the United States such as Hussein and Mubarak would be hurt. He also thought it was in Israel's interest for movement on the Palestinian question, if not now, then after the U.S. election. He noted that the potential new coalition government in Israel could help in this regard. (C)

There to be

The President responded that our proposals were based on the premise that the Arabs would come together and agree on Israel's right to exist, then sit down and negotiate with Israel on specific issues such as the return of territory currently held by the Israelis. He said, however, that it was hard to sit down to negotiate with someone who does not even recognize your right to exist. (U)

Foreign Minister Andreotti agreed, saying that recognition would have to be simultaneous and mutual. In this connection, he said he wanted to mention briefly to the President his recent discussions with Qadhafi, noting that he would go into greater detail during his subsequent meeting with Secretary Shultz. He said that midway through <sup>their</sup> his meeting, Qadhafi asked all aides to leave the room. Qadhafi then said to Andreotti that he wanted President Reagan to know that he was not a communist; indeed, that his philosophy was built on the doctrine of fighting Marxism. To emphasize this point, Qadhafi gave Andreotti two books on his personal philosophy for the President. Qadhafi also told Andreotti that he was seeking a channel to the President through which he would explain that he really wanted to be non-aligned and not pro-Soviet. Andreotti said he was simply passing this message and not vouching for Qadhafi's veracity or sincerity. He also said that he had told no one of the details of this exchange with Qadhafi. (S)

The President responded that we needed actions as well as words on the part of Qadhafi to convince us of his interest in improving relations. Events in London and Chad, as well as assassinations around the world, would seem to cut against what Qadhafi was saying. At the same time, we would always prefer to have friendly relations with other nations, so long as their deeds matched their words. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti noted that when terrorism was at its peak in Italy, the Red Brigades asked Qadhafi for assistance, which he refused. The President said he would read the books given by Qadhafi with great interest and that we would "proceed from there." (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti then noted that there would soon be a meeting in Costa Rica involving the members of the EC, the Contadora countries, and the five local countries. He stated that it was very important in his view for the EC countries to take a position similar to that of the United States, especially in an area so close to our interests. Stating that he was speaking not only as a Christian Democrat, Andreotti said he appreciated the help that we were giving to President Duarte in El Salvador. (C)

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Secretary Shultz said that the President had a major victory in Congress last week with the approval of additional funding for our economic and military assistance to Central America. Foreign Minister Andreotti replied that such funding was very important; indeed, it was the only way for Duarte to succeed. He noted that the Italians had invited Duarte to Italy in October, when they would be prepared to announce a large package of aid to El Salvador. (C)

Secretary Shultz interjected that he was pleased that the Italians would respond favorably to Mubarak's request for mine-clearing assistance. (C)

The meeting ended at 2:03 p.m. with an exchange of pleasantries. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

8/13/84

Ty Cobb:

Please put these notes into final form and send to RCM through the System. Please make necessary changes as to spelling, format, etc.

I think we covered the points you and I discussed.

Thanks -

Bob Kinnitt

cc Paul Thompson

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Meeting with Italian Foreign Minister  
Guiliano Andreotti (U)

DATE, TIME Monday, August 13, 1984 -- 1:39-2:03 p.m. PDT  
AND PLACE: Century Plaza Hotel, Los Angeles, California

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

- The President
- Secretary of State George P. Shultz
- U.S. Ambassador to Italy Max Rabb
- Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Robert McFarlane
- Assistant Secretary of State for European and Soviet Affairs  
Richard Burt
- Robert M. Kimmitt, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
- Neil Seidenman, State Department Interpreter

**DECLASSIFIED**  
 NLRR M3711 #117851  
 BY RW MA = 6/22/15

Italy

- Foreign Minister Guiliano Andreotti
- Ambassador to the United States Rinaldo Petrignani
- Italian Interpreter

The President and Foreign Minister Andreotti began the meeting by exchanging of congratulations on the performance of American and Italian athletes at the Olympics. (U)

Foreign Minister Andreotti stated that it was important from the political point of view for the Olympics to have gone so well, since the success demonstrates the utter failure of the Soviet boycott. (C)

The President agreed, saying that more countries than ever before participated in these Olympics and that many world and Olympic records were broken. (U)

Foreign Minister Andreotti noted, too, the warm welcome given to the Romanian and Chinese teams and said that the success of these

teams added to the failure of the Soviet boycott. He then turned to the substantive portion of his remarks, congratulating the President on the policy of firmness and confidence pursued by the United States. He noted approvingly the President's adoption of a policy of strength while also pursuing peaceful resolution of differences. He passed on the greetings of President Pertini and Prime Minister Craxi and said that growing out of recent discussions among the parties in Italy was a resolve, which he shared, to maintain a steady, stable government. He stressed especially that there was no difference among the various Italian political parties on questions of foreign policy. (C)

The President thanked the Minister for his kind words and stated our appreciation for Italy being such a staunch ally of the United States. He thanked the Foreign Minister for his personal assistance on issues of concern to the United States. (U)

Foreign Minister Andreotti replied that Italy would follow a steady political line and would especially follow through on Alliance commitments. He believed this to be the best way to deal with the Soviets, contrary to the belief in some Alliance countries. The Foreign Minister also expressed his appreciation for the stance taken by the United States on the question of outer space weapons. The U.S. willingness and readiness to discuss this question was important, particularly with regard to public opinion in Europe. (C)

The President responded that he feels as strongly as ever that we and the Soviets must find a way to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. But recent Soviet behavior makes one wonder if the Soviets were serious about their Vienna proposals. We have no preconditions for these talks, but it is now apparent that the Soviets had some. We will, however, persist in our efforts. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti stated his opinion that the Soviets do not want to give the President any success before the election. After the election, he believes they will see the need to discuss this and other issues. He also stated that the precise line of response among the Soviet leadership might not yet have been decided, especially in light of the immediate U.S. response to the initial Soviet proposal. (C)

The President responded that we, too, wondered if the Soviets had come to a firm decision on this issue. At this point, the President digressed somewhat to state how highly he thought of the performance in Washington of Ambassador Petrucci. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti thanked the President for these kinds words and responded that Ambassador Rabb and Mrs. Rabb both were doing a splendid job in Rome. Andreotti then moved on to other substantive issues, starting first with the Mediterranean. He said the Egyptians had asked the Italians to help in mine-clearing operations in the Red Sea. He said that he thought the government would decide within a week to approve this request. In the same

region, however, he noted that much still needed to be done on the question of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. He opined that now may be a good time for the Arab nations to recognize Israel's right to exist behind peaceful, secure borders. He said that without movement on the Palestinian question, friends of the United States such as Hussein and Mubarak would be hurt. He also thought it was in Israel's interest for there to be movement on the Palestinian question, if not now, then after the U.S. election. He noted that the potential new coalition government in Israel could help in this regard. (C)

The President responded that our proposals were based on the premise that the Arabs would come together and agree on Israel's right to exist, then sit down and negotiate with Israel on specific issues such as the return of territory currently held by the Israelis. He said, however, that it was hard to sit down to negotiate with someone who does not even recognize your right to exist. (U)

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Marxism. To emphasize this point, Qadhafi gave Andreotti two books on his personal philosophy for the President. Qadhafi also told Andreotti that he was seeking a channel to the President through which he could explain that he really wanted to be non-aligned and not pro-Soviet. Andreotti said he was simply passing this message and not vouching for Qadhafi's veracity or sincerity. He also said that he had told no one of the details of this exchange with Qadhafi. (S)

The President responded that we needed actions as well as words on the part of Qadhafi to convince us of his interest in improving relations. Events in London and Chad, as well as assassinations around the world, would seem to cut against what Qadhafi was saying. At the same time, we would always prefer to have friendly relations with other nations, so long as their deeds matched their words. (U)

Foreign Minister Andreotti noted that when terrorism was at its peak in Italy, the Red Brigades asked Qadhafi for assistance, which he refused. (C)

The President said he would read the books given by Qadhafi with great interest and that we would "proceed from there." (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti then noted that there would soon be a meeting in Costa Rica involving the members of the EC plus the Contadora countries plus the five local countries. He stated that it was very important in his view for the EC countries to

take a position similar to that of the United States, especially in an area so close to our interests. Stating that he was speaking not only as a Christian Democrat, Andreotti said he appreciated the help that we were giving to President Duarte in El Salvador. (C)

Secretary Shultz said that the President had a major victory in Congress last week with the approval of additional funding for our economic and military assistance to Central America. (U)

Foreign Minister Andreotti replied that such funding was very important. Indeed, it was the only way for Duarte to succeed. He noted tht the Italians had invited Duarte to Italy in October, when they would be prepared to announce a large package of aid to El Salvador. (C)

Secretary Shultz interjected that he was pleased that the Italians would respond favorably to Mubarak's request for mine-clearing assistance. (C)

The meeting ended with an exchange of pleasantries. (U)

Secret

RW 8/21/11

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~~Unclassified~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES

07

IMMEDIATE

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NON-SECURE FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

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140252

ROUTINE

TTY # \_\_\_\_\_

FROM/LOCATION/

1. Bob Kimmitt

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Ty Cobb

2. Paul Thompson

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Secret

~~Unclassified~~

CLASSIFICATION