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President Reagan (12/04/1984-12/11/1984)

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 11/15/2007

File Folder MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS (MEMCONS) --
PRESIDENT (12/04/1984-12/11/1984)

FOIA

F03-025-1

Box Number 53

LAMMERSDORF

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
45199	MEMCON	MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JAIME LUSINCHI OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, DECEMBER 4, 1984 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	6	ND	B1
45200	MEMCON	MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, NOVEMBER 30, 1984 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	9	11/30/1984	B1
45201	MEMCON	MEETING WITH BISHOP DESMOND TUTU OF SOUTH AFRICA, DECEMBER 7, 1984 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	ND	B1
45202	MEMCON	MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SENYI KOUNTCHE OF NIGER, DECEMBER 11, 1984 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	ND	B1
45203	MEMCON	ORIGINAL EDITED PAGE 1, 4 OF #45202 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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ENCLOSURE(S)

dh
11/15/07

TO MCFARLANE FROM MENGES

DOCDATE 04 DEC 84

KEYWORDS: VENEZUELA

LUSINCHI, JAIME

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES & PRES LUSINCHI

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 07 DEC 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSC/FID (DW)

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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (c)

National Security Council 1466
The White House

System # I

Package # 8836

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>A</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>JK</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>JK</u>	<u>A</u>
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

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8836

45199

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Jaime Lusinchi
of the Republic of Venezuela (U)

4

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
George Landau, U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela
Harry W. Shlaudeman, Ambassador-at-Large and
President's Special Envoy for Central America
Constantine Menges, National Security Council
Roger Robinson, National Security Council

President Jaime Lusinchi
Foreign Minister Isidro Morales Paul
Ambassador Valentin Hernandez
Minister of the Presidency Simon Alberto Consalvi

DATE, TIME December 4, 1984
AND PLACE: 10:50-11:50 a.m., Cabinet Room

Presidents Reagan and Lusinchi met briefly in the Oval Office
and then joined the group in the Cabinet Room at 10:50 a.m. (U)

President Reagan welcomed the President of Venezuela and made a
joke about finding talking points in his coat pocket for a
previous royal visitor. (U)

President Lusinchi expressed his appreciation for the generous
and warm welcome. (U)

President Reagan said that the United States is honored to have
President Lusinchi as a visitor. Among the issues for discussion
a very important one is Central America, where U.S. policy
continues with four mutually reinforcing elements: support for
democracy; economic help to improve living conditions; security
assistance; and, active diplomacy. The United States would feel
much more comfortable if Venezuela would take the leading position
among the four Contadora countries in an effort to define a
workable treaty. (U)

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BY RW DATE 6/22/15

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President Lusinchi said Venezuela is willing to do more but must be careful and prudent. Last week there were discussions with Ambassadors Landau and Shlaudeman about the Contadora process, and it seems that in the last few days there are new international possibilities for Central America in the attitude of the Contadora countries and the United States. I agree with what you said in your earlier welcoming remarks that the elections in Nicaragua were not true elections, but it is a political fact which strengthens in some way the Nicaraguan government and gives it--in the view of some governments--international legitimacy which it did not have before. There should not be a communist regime in Nicaragua; and there can be an opening of the regime because, unlike Cuba, it is not an island or the producer of one crop. I believe the Nicaraguan leaders are communist and want to create a communist state, but there are more possibilities in Nicaragua. I believe the Nicaraguan leaders will not be able to impose communism and that contradictions will appear. At the same time, there cannot be a military solution, since that would have negative side effects. In the discussions with Ambassadors Landau and Shlaudeman, we talked about the creation of the constituent assembly in Nicaragua as providing some way for the democratic opposition to participate in drafting a new constitution. If there had been fair democratic elections in Nicaragua, I think the Sandinistas would have lost and there certainly are opportunities now for political possibilities to open up the Sandinista regime. What is your view? (C)

President Reagan said I believe we have a situation in Nicaragua like that in Eastern Europe. The government is marxist-leninist, it does not care what the people think, and it can hold onto power. If the people were free to speak they would want the government that was promised by the original revolution--a genuinely democratic government. But, just like Castro did in Cuba to the democratic groups which believed him and united to overthrow a rightist dictator, the Sandinistas have betrayed the democratic Nicaraguans who joined with them against Somoza. I do not think that any of us who believe in democracy can allow the Sandinistas to consolidate themselves and continue as a center for the subversion of other countries. That is why pressure has to be kept on Nicaragua. This is just what you did in Venezuela--you kept the pressure on the communist guerrillas while providing amnesty for those willing to lay down their weapons and participate in their democratic elections. (C)

President Lusinchi said the most difficult international problem is the Nicaraguan export of subversion and alliance with the USSR and Cuba, and, in this respect, we must impose pressure on the Sandinistas. The Contadora draft Acta can be modified, the observations of the other Central American countries can be taken more into account. We agree fully with you that it is not

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permissible to tolerate the export of the Nicaraguan revolution to other countries nor can we allow Nicaragua to become the focus of military imbalance in the region. Nicaragua says it does not have offensive military equipment. They told us recently they would be willing to start international inspections. They say the Soviet ships did not carry supersonic or offensive weapons. A Nicaraguan official told us recently that they would permit Venezuela to have complete information for this trip to Washington so we could share this with you and the State Department, but Nicaragua has not sent this information to us. (C)

President Reagan said I can give you an example of how difficult it is to inspect what is coming into Nicaragua. Some time ago a Soviet-bloc ship was in the Panama Canal with a cargo which included military helicopters and we said so publicly. The Sandinistas denied this and said they would invite the international press to inspect the ship's cargo when it docked. The only press they invited was the Cuban press, and we don't put much faith in what they report. Concerning the recent ships we suspected might have MIG jet fighters, it did seem strange that this ship went all the way around South America instead of going through the Panama Canal. They know we can often tell what's on the ship if it goes through the Panama Canal. Right now we still do not know for sure whether there were MIGs, yes or no? I doubt that Nicaragua would give any of us a real look at the weapons they have. If all of us stay firm and indicate what we want is a restoration of the democratic institutions that the revolution was designed to achieve, then, the other things would follow and work out well. (C)

President Lusinchi said yes the Sandinistas made those original promises of democracy and a mixed economy. We have complained publicly in a telegram to Nicaragua that they are not carrying out those democratic promises. We are certainly willing to continue making efforts to compel Nicaragua to fulfill its commitments. In the Contadora treaty and outside we identify ourselves with your views; there is no disagreement between us. (C)

President Reagan said if we keep pressing for democracy then things will work out in Nicaragua. The first two drafts of the Contadora treaty did not meet the Contadora 21 objectives. Those drafts left some big gaps which Nicaragua could use to accomplish its purposes. A former Sandinista official said in a newspaper article a few days ago that Nicaragua is actually an occupied country with Cuba and the Soviet bloc being the occupation forces. That person pointed out that if you take the 9,000 Cuban and Soviet-bloc personnel and the 250,000-man army which the Sandinistas have said they want to build in Nicaragua and translate that in proportion to the U.S. population, it would be the same as though in the U.S. there were 300,000 Cuban military and security advisors, 300,000 Cuban technical advisors, 300,000 Soviet-bloc personnel, and as though we had an army of 25 million. (C)

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President Lusinchi said you are right. We have a full coincidence of views. If we use most of the suggestions made by the Central American countries, we could force the Contadora draft to be acceptable. I am optimistic that we can propose a modified Contadora treaty that will provide for democratization and the other goals. (S)

President Reagan said, in our view if Venezuela, rather than some other country, took a leading role in producing the draft Contadora treaty, we would feel better about it. (S)

President Lusinchi said yes, but we must be discreet. We do not want to go against the sensibilities of any other country. We do want to arrive at a better Contadora treaty, and, you can be certain that this will be our behavior. If we combine this with the Manzanillo talks, which are well-led by Ambassador Shlaudeman, then there may be a better chance for a solution. Another situation of interest in Latin America is the Southern Cone where the signature of the treaty between Argentina and Chile will definitely help the democracy in Argentina. And, we have to take into account that in Chile there has been a strengthening of opposition to the democratic transition. I think that U.S. action with discretion would help the democratic transition to occur in Chile. There is an opportunity for this democratic transition based on the Christian Democratic Party and certain parts of the Socialist Party, not including those elements which are cooperating with the communists. A dramatic situation also exists in Bolivia where a number of political groups are cornering President Siles with their irrational behavior. The President himself is acting somewhat irrationally, and I have information that he is thinking of committing suicide. The government is opposed by communist groups and communist trade unions. Elements of the military are pulling in different directions, and the economic situation is the worst ever. Perhaps we can find a way to send additional food supplies to Bolivia because the economic situation is dramatically serious. Some military personnel are trying to overthrow Siles, but what will come after? Some of the armed forces are penetrated by the narcotics traffickers, and they would use the power of government to increase the narcotics problem. (S)

On drug trafficking, we have prepared some information items for you. The situation in Venezuela is more serious than many people think, and we are concerned not only about Venezuela but also about Latin America as a whole. There is an increasing connection between drugs and subversion and terrorism as we are seeing in Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. Vice President Bush showed (in Quito, Ecuador) documents and photos illustrating the relationship between drugs and Nicaragua and Cuba. Perhaps

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we should take the Cuban government into the international court because of its connection with the illegal drug traffic. This is all part of the internationalization of subversion. For us it is a matter of legitimate self defense, and we would like you to help us with all the knowledge you have about methods to fight the drug traffic. The chief of the Venezuelan Navy recently went to Puerto Rico for naval maneuvers and told me there are useful opportunities for cooperating with the United States Navy. There is a U.S. program, IMET (International Military Education and Training), through which you give support to military students from Latin America, but we have been excluded along with Mexico, due to a lack of U.S. funds. Before, there was a budget of \$1 million for 153 Venezuelan students. Now, we are able to send only 20 students on a budget of \$150,000. Colombia received \$750,000, and we would like to train more of our military through this program and train our pilots for the F-16 fighter aircraft. (C)

Turning to foreign trade, you have been handling the foreign trade laws of the U.S. well, but we think it would be helpful if you could adapt several aspects of this law to the Venezuelan situation. Also, we ask the United States to support Venezuela in obtaining financing from the Inter-American Bank, the World Bank and commodity credit. We have important priority needs which we have explained to those organizations, and we would welcome your support. We want to exchange views with you and the State Department on the international debt problem. We have successfully refinanced our debt, and urge that the United States take the lead to readjust interest rates, which, although they have gone down recently, might go up again in the future. (C)

Yesterday I received your letter on EXXON and the refinery in Aruba. You are correct in your approach, and I would like to see if we could find a way to contribute to economic development in those islands since they are right off our coast. Due to lack of time, I won't discuss specific solutions but, together, we should be able to find solutions. I will be leaving an Aide Memoire with you which will give you details. (C)

President Reagan noted that the U.S. is very eager to cooperate with Venezuela on narcotics issues. On Chile, I shall leave the discussion to you and Secretary Shultz. About the EXXON refineries, I agree that solutions must be found. On interest rates, we're doing everything possible so that they do not go up again. (C)

Secretary Shultz said that he would have to leave soon in order to be at the State Department to welcome President Lusinchi for lunch. (U)

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President Lusinchi said, perhaps I talk too much, but Latin Americans like to talk and Spanish does not lend itself to synthesis as does English. We are totally willing to be of assistance in having harmonious, friendly, and cooperative relations. We are admirers of your country and of you, personally, and we believe that the second Reagan administration will be fruitful for the United States and its friends. (U)

President Reagan commented that there are no problems which cannot be solved if we talk to each other rather than talking about each other. (U)

President Lusinchi said, at the risk of embarrassing the individual, I want to tell you how pleased we are to have Ambassador Landau as your Ambassador. He is doing an excellent job and knows our country well, and we hope you keep him in Venezuela for the entire second term. (U)

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UPON REMOVAL OF
CLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 10 DEC 84 16

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 06 DEC 84

10

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

VISIT

KOHL, FELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ KOHL NOV 30

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 12 DEC 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

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REF#

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
PA (C)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
W/SECRET ATTACHMENTUNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *db 11/15/87*

December 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL,
Executive Secretary
Department of StateCOL R. J. AFFOURTIT
Executive Secretary
Department of DefenseSUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of FRG Chancellor
Kohl's Visit, November 30, 1984Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation from the
President's meeting with FRG Chancellor Kohl on November 30,
1984.
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive SecretaryAttachment
Tab A - Memorandum of ConversationUNCLASSIFIED
W/SECRET ATTACHMENT

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl
of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Burns
Assistant Secretary Burt
Assistant Secretary Perle
Jack Matlock, NSC
Ron Lehman, NSC
Peter Sommer, NSC
Harry Obst, Interpreter

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Ambassador Guenther van Well
Hans Klein, CSU Member of Bundestag
Uwe Ronneburger, FDP Member of
Parliament
Peter Boenisch, Chief/Federal Press
and Information Office
Horst Teltschik, Deputy Chief of Staff
Dr. Friedrich Ruth, Commissioner for
Arms Control Policy
Major General Rolf Huettel, Ministry of
Defense
Heinz Weber, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 30, 1984
11:35 a.m. - 12:15 p.m., Oval Office,
12:15 p.m. - 1:20 p.m., Working
Lunch, Family Dining Room

In greeting Chancellor Kohl, the President noted the importance he attached to the close working relationship between the FRG and the U.S. and to his warm personal relationship with the Chancellor. The President added he had tried hard to emulate the Chancellor's

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BY RW DATE 6/22/15

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election success and was gratified that our two electorates support the same policy direction. He was especially pleased with the joint statement worked out by our staffs, and particularly welcomed German support for a NATO mandate to improve our conventional forces. We will need specific and substantial actions if we are to have effective programs able to deflect critics like Senator Nunn -- who is as bothersome to us as to you -- and to contain the growing Soviet threat. The President observed that he remained hopeful on improving US-Soviet relations and noted he had emphasized his determination to break the arms control logjam in his September meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Last week we saw our efforts begin to pay off. George Shultz will meet with Gromyko in Geneva on January 7 and 8. The President then asked Chancellor Kohl what was on his agenda. (C)

Chancellor Kohl thanked the President on behalf of his entourage for his warm welcome and noted that while he will only be in Washington for a few hours it is not necessary among friends to have lengthy meetings involving great protocol. He repeated what he told Secretary Shultz at breakfast. These are challenging times, and he wished to congratulate the President on his tremendous election victory. The President's office is not just another electoral office, said Kohl. Anyone who knows the history of the President's office and its occupants will understand when I wish you "God's blessings" in undertaking your important endeavors. There is a heavy load on the President's shoulders and the people of the world, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, look on the President's second term with hope and anticipation. We in the West have a great opportunity before us. Time is working in our favor. You, Mr. President, said Kohl, have all of Europe behind you. He commented that in the last two weeks he had spoken to Mrs. Thatcher, President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Craxi and they are all unanimous in support for the President's policy. He said he had also spoken to his Belgian and Dutch colleagues and they agreed that now is the time to move forward in our relations with the East. (C)

Kohl said he wished to emphasize three points important from Germany's viewpoint in dealing with the Soviets. First, we must remain realistic and not set our expectations too high. Second, close consultations among Allies are essential. The beautiful communique our assistants have worked out properly stresses this point. Third, it is imperative to consider the psychology and prestige of both sides. Time is not working in the Soviets' favor. They played high stake poker in trying to derail NATO's INF deployment and their hand did not carry. Indeed, their tactics had the opposite effect; instead of dividing the Alliance, its solidarity was enhanced. You and I, said the Chancellor, were targets of the Soviet propagandist offensive; but it was the Soviet Union that lost prestige, not we. (S)

The Chancellor continued that since he last saw the President he had received high level visitors from Budapest and Bucharest, and they confirmed that people living inside the Iron Curtain want success in disarmament just as much as the people in the West. The visitors from the East said tell your American friends not to embarrass

the Soviets by making them lose face. It is a difficult step for the Soviets to return to the negotiating table without the West accepting their preconditions for returning. We in the West need to be magnanimous. This fits the President's personality, said Kohl, and he was optimistic that the President's approach would obtain results, if we stick to our basic resolve. (C)

Germany is doing its part in sending a signal of strength and firmness, continued Kohl. Because of our demographic curve, Germany needs to extend the draft period in order to maintain the Bundeswehr's manpower levels. This must be done by the early 1990's, but for technical reasons the laws extending the conscription period must be in place by 1988. His government, emphasized the Chancellor, has decided to take the necessary steps ahead of time in order to send a special message about Germany's resolve. Furthermore, his government agrees on the need to raise the nuclear threshold by strengthening conventional forces. There will be much yelling in the Bundestag about the conscription plan, but we will get the same positive results we obtained on INF, predicted the Chancellor. (C)

On the domestic front, said Kohl, Germany was making economic progress. We are holding down inflation and have achieved real GNP growth. There continues to be great concern about the U.S. budget deficit and trade with the U.S. The Chancellor underscored that he highly values his close and frequent communications with the President as well as those between the Secretary and Foreign Ministers, and our assistants. All in all we are on a steady course. He then praised the joint communique, saying he was in full agreement with the text and opined that it included all the points essential to both sides. (C)

The President complimented Kohl on the draft extension, noting it was obviously necessary, but calling it an act of political courage. He welcomed the Chancellor's remarks on improving U.S.-Soviet relations and added that it would make it more difficult to negotiate with the Soviets, should it appear that any of our Allies have tried to persuade us to make concessions. We need a unified approach. My meeting with Gromyko was a good start, said the President. We now need to build on this meeting. The President said he had made it clear to Gromyko that he didn't like the arms build-up any more than the Soviets do. The signs are that the Soviets are getting ready for serious talk; we will have to wait and see. (S)

Secretary Shultz traced Gromyko's week in the U.S., which began with a brief hello to the President at the UN reception in New York and included meetings with a number of Foreign Ministers, plus of course the meeting with the President. We hoped that his visit set the stage for progress. The Secretary then asked the President to tell the marvelous story involving Mrs. Reagan. (C)

Calling it one of the highpoints of the visit, the President said Mrs. Reagan had come downstairs to greet Gromyko personally before

the two delegations entered the Family Dining Room for lunch. Gromyko asked Mrs. Reagan if he could really believe all the President's professions about wanting peace and improving relations. Mrs. Reagan had emphatically answered yes. Gromyko then suggested that Mrs. Reagan whisper the word "peace" in the President's ear before going to bed at night. The conversation continued for a few minutes and as the parties proceeded to the dining room, the President gleefully recounted that Mrs. Reagan leaned over and whispered "peace" in Gromyko's ear. (U)

The President said he appreciated Kohl's strong statement endorsing our upcoming talks with the Soviets and then turned to apparent Belgian wavering on INF deployments. He noted that he had sent a letter earlier in the week to Prime Minister Martens stressing that INF is an Alliance decision and that any deployment delay would undercut our negotiating efforts. It is crucial that the Allies stand together. He urged the Chancellor to also weigh-in with our Belgian friends. The President continued that his long range goal remains the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; a breakdown in Alliance solidarity would be harmful to our overall efforts. Shultz intervened to say he had received a message from his office that the Belgian Cabinet had just announced that it reaffirms its commitment to NATO's 1979 dual-track decision and implied that the Government would have more to say following Martens' meeting with the President in January. It appears, said the Secretary, that the Belgian situation is still under control but we need to keep a close eye on it. (S)

Kohl replied that he had spoken yesterday with Martens, an old friend, and had sensed that the Cabinet statement would be positive. The Washington visit will be an important step in the Belgian process and it is important for it to go well. On INF and other security issues it is crucial for America's European Allies to feel that their views are being heard in Washington and that the Europeans have a feeling of being firmly tied to the U.S. We Europeans, suggested Kohl, have various sensitivities and require special handling. He said, jocularly, that one needs -- for example -- to salute the French flag three times; one only needs to salute the German flag once. He underlined that he remained ready to do whatever he could to help with the Belgian situation, which he said had heavy overtones of a domestic political struggle. He understood this even included jockeying by one leading politician to replace another as Foreign Minister. Shultz emphasized that in our dealings with the Soviets that we be prepared to be patient and not have exaggerated expectations about achieving immediate success. We must not create a situation where time puts pressure on us, continued the Secretary. (S)

Kohl said he had three specific topics he wished to address: VE Day; the recent U.S. steel decision; and the U.S. budget. Turning to VE Day the Chancellor emphasized that for Germany May 8 is not just another anniversary. It represents the depth of our deepest valley; it was zero hour; our country was completely vanquished; and we all suffered the great shame brought on the German people by the Nazis. This included concentration camps and vast numbers of refugees,

many of whom died. As we look back 40 years later one tends to forget that 56 percent of the people in West Germany were born after World War II. They have no personal experience or knowledge of these horrors, which nonetheless still remain deeply imbedded in many Germans. The fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II will once again break open old wounds. (S)

It is important, continued the Chancellor, that our friends stand by us, especially those who were our enemies 40 years ago. It is inevitable that these events should and will be commemorated. The American people will go to Arlington Cemetery to look at the soldiers' names and the battles in which they died. The Chancellor underscored that his request is a simple one. Whatever you plan to do, please remind the people on both sides: We in Germany have deep personal memories. Everyone on our side of the table has lost a member of their family during the war. In my case it was my brother. (S)

The Chancellor went on to say he had a special request to make of the President. He asked that the President, following the Bonn Summit, stay on in Germany for a special visit on Sunday and Monday, i.e., May 5 and 6. Such a visit would clearly demonstrate the friendship between our countries. We could, continued Kohl, visit a military cemetery. This would be especially moving and would probably send a clearer signal if there were no speeches. The Chancellor said he had done this with President Mitterrand at the Verdun cemetery in France. The message delivered by our joint visit was more profound than any speech could have made. It is also important that the President, while in Germany, meet with young Americans and Germans. We may also wish as well to consider the President attending a religious service involving all denominations. A picture of the President praying in God's House, for example in Cologne -- which was 80 percent destroyed by the war -- would send a clear signal of renaissance. The Chancellor reiterated his desire for the President to be a guest following the Bonn Summit. Kohl observed that this visit would offer a chance for Europeans to see the strength of the President's personality and his personal warmth. It would also be good for U.S.-German relations and would help counter criticism from a minority about the President's policies. (S)

The President replied that he is well aware of the Soviet Union's propaganda barrage aimed at West Germany. He indicated that he liked Kohl's idea about staying on in Germany following the Summit, but could not commit himself at this time because of overall questions about his schedule. We in the West, continued the President, have a great opportunity to use these anniversary ceremonies to stress the themes of reconciliation, peace, and friendship. The President said he was personally determined to see that these events are well handled, wished to be helpful, and hoped to participate. (S)

Kohl responded that he would play a personal role in assuring that the President's visit would be a success. Kohl stressed its importance both because of his personal relationship with the

President and because of the historical ties between our two countries. He reiterated that the Verdun ceremony -- 70 years after this tragic battle -- had been a moving experience and especially effective, without a word being spoken. The Chancellor again underlined his request for the President to extend his stay in Germany. (C)

Secretary Weinberger interjected to praise the extraordinary eloquence with which the Chancellor spoke. He called the Chancellor's remarks on VE Day a truly moving statement. Shultz added that with the President's permission he would work closely with the Germans on developing a visit which reinforced our mutual interests. (C)

Noting that the Chancellor may have noticed that the Secretary of Defense had been called out of the meeting several times, the President recounted that a privately-owned U.S. oceanographic vessel had had a power failure and drifted within Cuba's 12-mile territorial sea limit. We asked for permission to send a U.S. Coast Guard cutter that was in the area to tow the stricken vessel out of Cuban waters. The Cubans insisted on sending a fast patrol boat without responding to our request. The President observed that Secretary Weinberger has just handed him a message reporting that our cutter is towing the stricken vessel, without interference from the Cuban patrol boats. Smiling, the President said it was now time to move to lunch where we could continue our discussions. (C)

The meeting adjourned for lunch at 12:15 p.m. (C)

At the outset of lunch, the President said the Vice President had volunteered to discuss our budget and the steel question in greater depth at his afternoon meeting with the Chancellor. (The Chancellor nodded agreement). The President said he had met with the new Congressional leadership yesterday, and one of the Democrats wore a small U.S. flag in an upside-down position on his suit lapel. The President said he had jokingly asked him if this was a distress signal. In a broader sense it suited the occasion because we do have some major budget and deficit problems. The Vice President added that it also demonstrated a greater Congressional understanding about the seriousness of the problem, as well as a determination, which we fully share, to do something about these problems. He then promised to take this question up at his afternoon meeting with the Chancellor. (C)

Kohl asked for the President's assessment of the new line-up in Congress.

The President commented that many of the newly elected Democrats had stressed campaign themes supportive of his policies. They obviously did not campaign in support of candidacy, but the thrust of their campaign positions in most cases did not oppose what he was trying to accomplish. As the Vice President said, we detect an increasing awareness of the seriousness of our budgetary problems. We now need to build a consensus on how to solve these problems. The President implied that the overall composition of the Congress had not been significantly altered. But if it proved necessary he said he would carry his message directly to the American people. (C)

The Vice President said he wished to say what the President could not. The Democrats did not run against the President personally or oppose his policies. The Congressional numbers did not change dramatically. This does not mean there is complete agreement, but the President won an overwhelming personal victory. In response to Kohl's query, The President agreed that the Democrats have tried to portray themselves as more supportive of disarmament than the President. (S)

The President expressed his appreciation for Germany's support for the Duarte Government and for the reopening of the FRG Embassy in San Salvador, which he characterized as an important endorsement for Duarte's effort to strengthen democracy. Kohl thanked the President for his supportive remarks and asked if the average age of the members of Congress came down as a result of the elections. The President jokingly replied that he was sure none of the newly-elected members were older than himself. (C)

The President then asked Kohl for his assessment of the leadership situation in Moscow. (S)

Kohl said that personalities and personnel structures carry great weight in Soviet decision making. Some elements appear to have a firmer grip on the hands of power than others. He was struck that Chernenko has accepted Mitterrand's invitation to visit Paris in the spring. Whether or not he goes, his acceptance is an important symbol. Kohl continued that he hoped once Chernenko started traveling the Soviets would allow the leaders in East Europe to also travel. With regard to the leadership struggle, Kohl doubted that one could predict with any accuracy whether Gorbachev would be Chernenko's successor. The older generation was not eager to pass the baton to a younger generation apparently intent on moving out the older generation once it assumed power. Moreover, we cannot plan our policies on the basis of the expected arrival of a new team. (C)

Kohl then asked for our views on developments in Poland. Saying that we generally solicit the views of Genscher -- the real Polish expert -- Shultz noted that we have seen a mix of positive and negative developments. On the one hand the Poles appear to have liberalized their policy on political prisoners; on the other hand a leading priest was just murdered. (C)

Foreign Minister Genscher agreed that it was an unusual and, hopefully, positive step that the Polish Government appears willing to have the priest's accused murderers stand trial. That it is to be a public trial is even more extraordinary. The three accused, however, appear confident, as if they are sure they will be acquitted. At the same time, if Jaruzelski had not put these three on trial, he would have faced a sizeable rebellion. Replying to the President's query, Genscher underlined that the three act as if they are going to receive a "not guilty" verdict; but if sentenced, Jaruzelski will have no choice but to send them to jail. Genscher opined that the cancellation of his recently planned visit to Poland caused special internal problems which explained why the Poles continue to issue statements regretting that his visit did not take place. (C)

Kohl said that Germany attached considerable significance to the events we have seen in Poland in the last few years. The Solidarity movement resulted in Poles having more individual rights than any other country in Eastern Europe. Hungary is lively economically but her human rights advances lag behind Poland. To the Soviets, it is the developments in Poland that are the most threatening. Romania manages to have a somewhat independent foreign policy, but it is the toughest police state in Eastern Europe. This explains why the Soviets allowed the Romanians to participate in the Olympics. Poland is sensitive -- in a sense it could become an agent provocateur, having an impact throughout Eastern Europe. Thus, Poland remains of special concern to the Soviets. He called the developments in East Germany seismographic. It is clear that the ideological basis for Communism is breaking down. The President observed that Americans are well versed on Poland's tragic history in the center of Europe.

(S)

The Vice President asked for Kohl's views on developments in the GDR. Recalling that Honecker's long-planned visit to West Germany had been called off at the last minute, Kohl observed that relations between the two Germanies in general terms are warmer than they have been. This is especially remarkable given all the dire predictions about a sharp decline in relations once INF deployments were initiated. Most significantly, over 40,000 East Germans have been allowed to immigrate to the West just this year. This matches the total number that have been allowed to immigrate since the wall went up in 1961 until the end of 1983. Kohl continued that his government is pleased that the East Germans continue to observe existing agreements to the minutest detail. This suggests that they do not want a breakdown in relations. There remains considerable pressure in the GDR for an even greater relaxation of immigration practices. In fact, there are over one hundred thousand applicants. Many have had their jobs downgraded because they applied to leave. Those over 62 have been given greater freedom to travel. But it is stifling to know that you can't travel until you reach a senior age. (S)

Kohl commented that a government's travel policy plays a major role in shaping a country's climate. His youngest son, who is 19, recently spent 6 weeks in East Germany. Contacts between youth are important. It is helpful when they can sit down together and exchange views. East German youth had a hard time accepting that the West Germans could travel to Paris and London whenever they wish. The Chancellor referred in very glowing terms to the benefits derived from the cheap train fare system in West Europe -- the Eurail pass. Advantages and opportunities for travel were hard for the East German youngsters to grasp. (S)

Noting that no one alive in the Soviet Union has ever really known true freedom, the President asked what is the explanation for the East Germans allowing so many to immigrate. Kohl replied that East Germany is like a steam pot and Honecker needed to release the pressure, which was becoming unbearable. These sorts of pressures mean that we must continue to demonstrate flexibility in our dealings with the East. (S)

Referring to reports of increasing religious freedom within the Soviet Union, the President said he found this to be an interesting phenomenon, and wondered what was Kohl's reaction. The Chancellor said we have seen a revitalization of religion around the globe. Even the Soviet Union has been touched, though it is difficult to know to what extent. Kohl partially attributed these religious stirrings in the East to western influences. For example it is a West German station that is the most listened to radio station in East Germany. The President lamented the lack of free flow of information in the East. Hans Klein observed that it was the Poles who had achieved the greatest individual freedoms, but the East Germans had arrived at the highest material well-being. (S)

In closing, the President said it was time for him and the Chancellor to make their departure statements. (S)

The meeting concluded at 1:20 p.m. (S)

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 8743

DEC 7 P 1:12

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Kathleen</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>done 12/11</u>	<u>Conclusions</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

December 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Meeting with Chancellor Kohl, November 30, 1984

Attached for your review and approval is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl on November 30, 1984 (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION:

Following your review of the Memorandum of Conversation, that you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward it to State and Defense.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Das for
Rm
Jack Matlock and Ron Lehman concur.

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to State and Defense
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
 White House Guide
 By *dia* MIA, Date *11/15/07*

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Declassify on: OADR

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RECEIVED 13 DEC 84 14

TO KIMMITT

FROM RINGDAHL

11/15/07

DOCDATE 11 DEC 84

KEYWORDS: SOUTH AFRICA

TUTU, DESMOND

SUBJECT: MEMCON RE MTG BTW PRES & BISHOP TUTU 7 DEC

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 17 DEC 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	DEC 17 1984	<i>Kimmitt sgd</i>		PR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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December 17, 1984

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ON REMOVAL OF
SECURE(S) 11/15/87

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's December 7, 1984
Meeting with Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa

Attached for your information is a copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation covering the President's December 7th meeting with
Bishop Tutu of South Africa.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Memcon

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

45201 25

8995

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, December 7, 1984 (L)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State George Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Admiral John Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Edwin Meese, Counsellor to the President
James A. Baker III, Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President
Phillip H. Ringdahl, NSC Staff

Bishop Desmond Tutu
Mrs. Leah Tutu
Daniel Vaughn, Assistant Secretary-General, South African Council of Churches

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 7, 1984, 9:30 - 9:55 AM, Oval Office

The President expressed his pleasure at meeting Bishop Tutu, and congratulated him again on his receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize (noting he had sent a letter earlier). He said he was pleased to exchange views with Tutu, which would assist the U.S. in maintaining the proper course. He said he and all Americans consider apartheid repugnant, and have said so many times, but we cannot walk away from the problem or from the South African Government (SAG). To do so would be to lose influence in changing the situation for the better. Both the American government and the American private sector are helping South African blacks in an important way - the private sector, in over \$100 million in private investment which provides jobs and equal working conditions in the workplace - and the U.S. government which has given over \$10 million in the past year for black scholarships and related education programs. It would be a disaster for the U.S. to withdraw. We agreed that change must come, but we also realize it will be a slow process. (S)

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BY RW DATE 6/22/15

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Bishop Tutu said he could agree with some of the President's points, and that he appreciated the President's strong condemnation of apartheid. He and many people in South Africa want to see the system changed, and they are not suggesting that the U.S. should "stay away". In fact, U.S. pressure on the SAG is critical, but that after four years of the "carrot" represented by constructive engagement, he can say that the policy had not worked. The just published Catholic Bishops' report on police brutality in South Africa showed the SAG was using repressive tactics against all South African blacks, even women. The situation has worsened during the past four years. Tutu said he had five points he believed were essential to the non-violent end of apartheid, and which he hoped the U.S. would actively support:

- A Presidential call for an end to violence in South Africa;
- The release of all detainees;
- A lift on the bannings and forced population removal schemes;
- Amnesty for all political prisoners (including those such as Nelson Mandela, detained for many years under internal security laws), and;
- A national convention for whites and blacks to draw up a blueprint for a new, multi-racial, democratic South Africa. (S)

Bishop Tutu added the SAG is denationalizing all blacks, stripping them of their citizenship through its Homelands Policy, and turning them into aliens in a country they have lived in for generations. They are becoming desperate. (S)

The President thanked Bishop Tutu for his forceful views. The President noted that the U.S. maintains a friendly dialogue with the SAG because it believes it can persuade and be a force for positive change through quiet diplomacy. To confront, as happened during the Carter period, wastes what influence we have. We believe there is movement in the right direction. In the region, the Nkomati accord signaled the stopping of bloodshed between South Africa and Mozambique. We are making progress on eventual independence for Namibia, and working on getting both the South Africans and Cubans out of Angola. (S)

The President added we are not in favor of sanctions against South Africa. We have learned that in some cases, such as

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Poland, sanctions actually hurt the common man the worst, and we are convinced that economic sanctions or disinvestment against South Africa would hurt blacks there the most. (S)

Bishop Tutu said that he did not agree that the U.S. should adopt disinvestment. Rather, the U.S. public and private investment in South Africa should be used as pressure or leverage to enforce changes in SAG attitudes and policies. Quiet diplomacy is fine, but failure to express public outrage or to exert public pressure creates the impression among South African blacks that the U.S. is in collusion with the SAG. (S)

Bishop Tutu added that he fears that unless the system is changed soon, there will be a violent outbreak and much bloodshed in South Africa. He said he gave 18-24 months as the period where positive changes must be made to avoid this scenario. The new constitution has been rejected by South African blacks because it represents the politics of exclusion. (S)

The President said we are pressing the SAG for reform, but we are not doing so on the front page. Our experience is that once a government is seen publicly to be knuckling under to the U.S., all progress stops. (S)

The President thanked Bishop Tutu for his views, noting that we are already working on some of his suggestions and that the U.S. would consider his others. Our goal was to serve as a force for constructive change, and that he trusted the Bishop and others to believe in our sincerity. (S)

Bishop Tutu said that he had no quarrel with the President's remarks, and that many have legitimacy. The U.S. has produced some positive results in South Africa, but the problem is that its quiet persuasive tactics employed since the National Party's 1948 adoption of apartheid as the political anchor of its domestic policies have not achieved the desired results. The trail of repression actually goes back to 1912. The situation is growing worse. The U.S. will have to increase its public pressure on the SAG both to bring about faster changes and to change perceptions in South Africa that the U.S. is siding with the government. (S)

The President again thanked Bishop Tutu for his views, noted that he had another meeting to attend, and wished him well on his continued stay in our country. The Vice President volunteered to continue the conversation in his office, and Bishop Tutu agreed. The Bishop thanked the President for his cordial reception. (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

December 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT KIMMITT

FROM: PHILLIP RINGDAHL *PR*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Covering the Meeting
Between the President and Bishop Tutu, December 7

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation covering the President's meeting on December 7, 1984, with Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa.

I have attached a Kimmitt/Hill memo (Tab I) transmitting a copy of the memcon to the State Department for their information.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the memcon; forward the Kimmitt/Hill memo at Tab I.

APPROVE *K*

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

- Tab I Kimmitt/Hill Memo of Transmittal
- A Memorandum of Conversation (Bishop Tutu)

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

National Security Council
The White House

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System # I

Package # 8995

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Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Rosie</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>done</u>	<u>Correction</u>

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

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National Security Council
The White House

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System # I
Package # 8995

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Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>+</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>		
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Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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ON REMOVAL OF
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12/11/84

RECEIVED 13 DEC 84

TO KIMMITT

FROM RINGDAHL

DOCDATE 12 DEC 84

RINGDAHL

14 DEC 84

KEYWORDS: NIGER

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KOUNTCHE, SEYNI

AP

SUBJECT: MEMCON RL THE MTG BTW PRES & PRES KOUNTCHE 11 DEC

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 14 DEC 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

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National Security Council
The White House

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System # I
Package # 9032

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Rosie</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>None "lis" ✓</u>	<u>Correction</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

John: ① Do you want to see memcons for meetings you attend? Yes _____ No [initials]
 ② If no, should I send to Bud Yes _____ No [initials]
 ③ Do you want to see memcons for meetings you do not attend? Yes _____ No [initials]

Unless they are really significant.

9032

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12/14/84

TO: Rosie A
FROM: Dee Wilson

Revised.

On Page 2, 2nd para...1973 is
correct.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9032

December 17, 1984

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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ROYAL OR
date 11/15/87

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's December 11, 1984
Meeting with President Kountche of Niger

Attached for your information is a copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation covering the President's December 11 meeting with
President Kountche of Niger.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Memcon

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9032

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Seyni Kountche of Niger, December 11, 1984 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
Counsellor to the President Edwin Meese
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
Admiral John Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Ambassador to Niger William Casey
AID Administrator Peter McPherson
Peace Corps Director Loret Ruppe
Phillip Ringdahl, NSC Staff

President Seyni Kountche
Mr. Ide Oumarou, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lt Colonel Moumouni Djermakoye Adamou, Member of the Supreme Military Council
Ambassador to the U.S. Joseph Diatta
Mr. Daouda Diallo, Minister of Information
Mr. Ari Toubo Ibrahim, Minister of Rural Development
Mr. Sani Bako, Director of the Cabinet of the President
Mr. Abdou Hamani, Rector of the University of Niamey

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 11, 1984, 11:35 AM - 1:30 PM
Roosevelt Room/Cabinet Room

The President opened the substantive discussions by noting his pleasure at the cordial level of bilateral relations, and expressing his appreciation for Niger's support on international issues. He expressed the sympathy of the American people for Niger during the present drought, adding that the U.S. was pleased to announce an additional 45,000 MT of food assistance during his visit. (U)

President Kountche began lengthy remarks by expressing his thanks for the invitation to visit. He agreed with the President's remarks that bilateral relations are very good, and that cooperation between Niger and U.S. agencies - AID, Peace Corps, and a small but important military assistance program - was excellent. He expressed gratitude on the part of the Nigerien people for the drought relief and other assistance it was receiving from America. (S)

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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President Kountche said that Niger was experiencing many problems. As late as 1979, 79% of its export earnings were from uranium, but this has dropped to 13% because of the depressed world market. The closed border with Nigeria and the drought had compounded the problem. Niger was thus forced to look to friendly countries like the U.S., and international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and the EDF to fill the gap. Some donors had made mistakes in its policies regarding Niger; for instance, in favoring export crops to the detriment of food self-sufficiency, and agricultural or industrial schemes for which his country was not prepared. However, Niger also had made mistakes, but was now engaged in developing a new agricultural development strategy, a "new formula" to break the cycle of famine and drought. That strategy was to favor the peasant and personal initiative, so that each peasant would voluntarily produce to his maximum ability. (S)

President Kountche then addressed himself to some international issues. Western Sahara had blocked OAU actions for four years, but he doubted the recent OAU actions represent a solution to the problem. On Chad, he said Qadhafi does not like Chad or any of its leaders, including Goukouni, but what he wants is northern Chad. President Habre is a problem too, because he loves power too much, is too demanding, and can't get full support in his country. Yet in 1973 everyone knew Libyan intentions on Chad. The French did not then recognize the "Qadhafi problem." President Kountche said he respected France, but doesn't agree with the recent French-Libyan agreement because it puts Libya "on an equal footing with France" which is very worrisome to other Francophone countries. Another complication is the Libyan-Moroccan merger. President Kountche believed he and Hassan had agreed on Libya, but Hassan obviously changed his mind and has given Qadhafi the recognition that he was seeking, and a chance to consolidate his position in northern Chad in exchange for hollow Libyan support on the Western Sahara. (Kountche also said that his friend Hassan never informed him of his Libyan initiative). (S)

President Kountche said that he had warned President Mitterrand that he could not trust Qadhafi, but this advice obviously was not heeded. As for Niger-Libyan relations, because of its long border with Libya, Niger has been forced to sometimes turn a blind eye to Libyan intentions in the region, but "while one can choose his friends, one has no choice over his neighbors," and that Niger will continue to seek dialogue with Libya, however difficult. (S)

On southern Africa, President Kountche expressed the belief that South Africa's neighbors, including Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, and even Zambia cannot develop without some

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relationship with South Africa. This is why he believes the Nkomati is a very positive development for Mozambique. Angola, however, will be more difficult because Dos Santos has much less room for maneuver than Machel. He said there must be some evolution in how African leaders look at South Africa, but that this would not happen so long as President Nyerere was Chairman of the OAU. If Kaunda were chairman, perhaps African attitudes would change. All black Africans strongly condemn apartheid, but South Africa was a regional economic and industrial power that had to be considered. (S)

The President responded by expressing understanding of Kountche's problems and concerns. On Namibia and Angola, the President noted U.S. support for an independent Namibia under UNSC 435, and that Assistant Secretary Crocker had only recently achieved an Angolan commitment to withdraw the Cuban troops as another step toward achieving an overall settlement. Much negotiation still was needed, but progress was being made. The President expressed his opposition to apartheid in South Africa, and noted our efforts in working for constructive change. We have had racial problems in our own country, but had made much progress, and believed we could work with South Africa in assisting in their problems. Only yesterday he had made a Human Rights Declaration which condemned South Africa apartheid policies in very clear terms, but we also wanted to help solve that problem and not only criticize. (S)

Deputy Secretary of State Dam asked President Kountche's views on the East vs. West in Africa. Kountche said that East for most African nations has been very negative, even those such as Angola or Ethiopia which had very "privileged" relations with the East and were experiencing the worst problems. Most African nations had come to depend on the West for the assistance they needed to develop their countries. Too many African countries had realized too late that they had mortgaged their raw materials for arms, but this did not bring development or stability. He said the lesson for development in Africa was that progress is based on private initiative -- a man working to better himself works also for his country. Africa was still feudal, and although one cannot transplant socialist or capitalist systems to Africa, the lessons of private initiative and volunteerism are basic to the solution. (S)

(At this point the plenary meeting ended and discussion continued over lunch)

The President asked if the drought in Niger was still continuing. (U)

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President Kountche responded by saying that the drought had only begun. There were other problems such as population growth, and increased desertization which meant that only 12% of the land was now available for agriculture. (U)

The President asked about stock raising, and irrigation schemes, noting Kountche's earlier statement that the water table in some areas was only one meter deep (Kountche pointed out he was referring to basins, which offered much potential). There were many things Niger and other countries could do by themselves and with the help of outside donors, but the basic problem was "to take stock". Twenty years had passed with few results. Africans like to imitate, and too many preached socialism without knowing what it meant. Zimbabwe was the most recent African country to be making this mistake. (S)

The President noted that some countries like China, were correcting their path and promoting the private sector in some areas, and that this would pay dividends. (S)

Secretary Weinberger asked Kountche's views about the Libyan construction of an airfield on his border, and what he thought Libyan intentions were. (S)

President Kountche replied that the existence of the airfield had first been indicated by the American Ambassador in Niamey, and that the Nigeriens had discovered subsequently that he was entirely accurate. Kountche said the airfield when finished could handle long-range aircraft, and there was no doubt that the facility was not for use against Chad -- the Libyans no longer needed it -- but to support operations against Niger or possibly Algeria. He said it could also be used as a transit point for troops and equipment. (S)

The Vice President asked about Algeria's attitude, and President Kountche replied that he had seen President Bendjedid only last week. Both were concerned about threats to Mauritania flowing from the Qadhafi-Hassan accord, because neither liked Mauritania. (S)

President Kountche said he believed Algeria would help protect Mauritania in the way it was helping Niger. (S)

Secretary Weinberger then asked President Kountche's views on what U.S. disinvestment in South Africa would mean to Black Africa -- wouldn't it hurt the rest of Africa as much as South Africa? (S)

President Kountche replied that any U.S. program to disinvest in South Africa would only complicate the problem, and indeed would

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hurt all Africans. Kountche noted that twenty years ago President Bourguiba was castigated for advocating peace with Israel, and Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny was similarly criticized for saying that Africa had to settle with South Africa. Now both are seen to be right, and the peace effort cannot be abandoned. (S)

Deputy Secretary of State Dam commented that we agree with Kountche's comments on Qadhafi, but how can he deal with him? (U)

President Kountche replied that one cannot trust Qadhafi and should never negotiate with him. The tragedy of recent developments was that France and King Hassan had permitted Qadhafi to break out of his isolation. (S)

AID Administrator McPherson asked how Kountche planned to deal with the present drought. (U)

President Kountche replied that as in 1974, the question was to depend on will and determination of the people; allow them to grow indigenous foods and the government should do all possible to ensure that seeds and other inputs were available. The French had been helpful in providing seeds. Population programs were also available, and helped to bring down the number of mouths to feed, which was important given Niger's birth rate (3%), which meant there were 30,000 additional people to feed every year. (U)

AID Administrator McPherson then asked about desertization, and what the government was doing to combat it. (U)

President Kountche replied the government has planting programs to replace lost trees, and had begun a military/civil action program which included many measures to hold back the encroaching desert. (U)

Ambassador Casey noted that the diplomatic corps was even involved in planting trees. (U)

Peace Corps Director Loret Ruppe remarked that the Peace Corps volunteers in Niger, in conjunction with AID, was involved in several programs of reforestation and irrigation schemes, and that these programs appeared to be well received by the Niger government and people. The Peace Corps would continue these helpful programs. (U)

The luncheon concluded with mutual expressions of good will. (U)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
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9032

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SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

December 13, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT KIMMITT

SIGNED

FROM: PHILLIP RINGDAHL 

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Covering the Meeting
Between the President and President Kountche of
Niger, December 11, 1984

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation covering the
President's meeting yesterday with President Kountche.

I have attached at Tab I a Kimmitt/Hill memo transmitting a copy
of the memcon to the State Department for their information.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the memcon; sign and forward the
Kimmitt/Hill memo.

APPROVE K

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

- Tab I Kimmitt/Hill Memo of Transmittal
- A Memorandum of Conversation

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9032

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Seyni Kountche of Niger, December 11, 1984 (u)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
Counsellor ~~Assistant~~ to the President Edwin Meese
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
Admiral John Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Ambassador to Niger William Casey
AID Administrator Peter McPherson
Peace Corps Director Loret Ruppe
Phillip Ringdahl, NSC Staff

President Seyni Kountche
Mr. Ide Oumarou, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lt Colonel Moumouni Djermakoye Adamou, Member of the Supreme Military Council
Ambassador to the U.S. Joseph Diatta
Mr. Daouda Diallo, Minister of Information
Mr. Ari Toubo Ibrahim, Minister of Rural Development
Mr. Sani Bako, Director of the Cabinet of the President
Mr. Abdou Hamani, Rector of the University of Niamey

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 11, 1984, 11:35 AM - 1:30 PM
Roosevelt Room/Cabinet Room

The President opened the substantive discussions by noting his pleasure at the cordial level of bilateral relations, and expressing his appreciation for Niger's support on international issues. He expressed the sympathy of the American people for Niger during the present drought, adding that the U.S. was pleased to announce an additional 45,000 MT of food assistance during his visit. (u)

President Kountche began lengthy remarks by expressing his thanks for the invitation to visit. He agreed with the President's remarks that bilateral relations are very good, and that cooperation between Niger and U.S. agencies - AID, Peace Corps, and a small but important military assistance program - was excellent. He expressed gratitude on the part of the Nigerien people for the drought relief and other assistance it was receiving from America. (S)

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The President asked about stock raising, and irrigation schemes, noting Kountche's earlier statement that the water table in some areas was only one meter deep (Kountche pointed out he was referring to basins, which offered much potential). There were many things Niger and other countries could do by themselves and with the help of outside donors, but the basic problem was "to take stock". Twenty years had passed with few results. Africans like to imitate, and too many preached socialism without knowing what it meant. Zimbabwe was the most recent African country to be making this mistake. (S)

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✓ The Vice President asked about Algeria's attitude, and President Kountche replied that he had seen President Benjedid only last week. Both were concerned about threats to Mauritania flowing from the Qadhafi-Hassan accord, because neither liked Mauritania. (S)

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