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File: Records, 1981-1985
Folder Title: Middle East Trip (McFarlane)
CHRON Cables (08/02/1986-08/04/1983)
Box: 53

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 11/6/2008

File Folder MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES
[8/2/83-8/4/83]

FOIA

M2008-098/12

Box Number 91407

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8 56634	CABLE	031632Z AUG 83 [0 - 0]	3	8/3/1983	B1
	D	11/24/2008	M2008-098/12		

10 56635	CABLE	0410427 AUG 83 [0 - 0]	2	8/4/1983	B1
	R	11/24/2008	M2008-098/12		

11 56636	DRAFT PAPER	RE. LEBANESE POSITION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS [0 - 0]	6	ND	B1
	R	11/24/2008	M2008-098/12		

12 56637	DRAFT PAPER	RE. LEBANESE CONCESSIONS RE. REDEPLOYMENT [0 - 0]	2	ND	B1
	R	11/24/2008	M2008-098/12		

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES
[8/2/83-8/4/83]

FOIA

M2008-098/12

Box Number 91407

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
56638	DRAFT PAPER	RE. OUTLINE OF TALKS IN BEIRUT [0 - 0] R 11/24/2008 M2008-098/12	7	ND	B1
56639	CABLE	041632Z AUG 83 [0 - 0] R 11/24/2008 M2008-098/12	3	8/4/1983	B1
56640	CABLE	041804Z AUG 83 [0 - 0] R 11/24/2008 M2008-098/12	8	8/4/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE:

Archivist: dlb

Records

File Folder: Middle East Trip (McFarlane) Chron Cables [8/2/83-8/4/83] Box 9140753

Date: 11/30/99

Bowditch F98-008-1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	Cable #011518Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #64</i>	8/1/83	P1/F1
2. Cable	No Cable #, re: McFarlane/Fairbanks Mission: Travels of Das Nassif, 1 p. <i>R " " #65</i>	8/2/83	P1/F1
3. Cable	Cable #020844Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R " " #66</i>	8/2/83	P1/F1
4. Cable	No Cable #, re: McFarlane/Fairbanks Mission: Coordination with Saudi Arabia, 2 p. <i>R " " #67</i>	8/2/83	P1/F1
5. Cable	Cable #020914Z Aug 83, 5 p. <i>R 4/19/06 " #68</i>	8/2/83	P1/F1
6. Cable	Cable #021913Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R " " #69</i>	8/2/83	P1/F1
7. Cable	No Cable #, re: McFarlane/Fairbanks Mission: Meetings with President Gemayel, August 2, 3 p. <i>R " " #70</i>	8/2/83	P1/F1
8. Cable	Cable #031632Z Aug 83, 3 p. <i>D 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #71</i>	8/3/83	P1/F1
9. Cable	No Cable #, re: McFarlane/Fairbanks Mission: Mission for Wadia Haddad, 1 p. <i>R 4/19/06 " #72</i>	8/3/83	P1/F1
10. Cable	Cable #041042Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>D 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #73</i>	8/4/83	P1/F1
11. Draft Paper	re: Lebanese Position on Israeli Withdrawal, 6 p.	n.d.	P1/F1
12. Draft Paper	re: Lebanese Concessions Regarding Deployment, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/F1
13. Draft Paper	re: Outline of Talks in Beirut, 7 p.	n.d.	P1/F1
14. Cable	Cable #041632Z Aug 83, 3 p. <i>D 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #77</i>	8/4/83	P1/F1
15. Cable	Cable #041804Z Aug 83, 8 p. <i>D " " #78</i>	8/4/83	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

VZCZCBLI *

OO RUEHTV RUEHJM RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHEG

RUEHDM RUEHJI RUEHRH

DE RUEHBL #8382 214 **

ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK

O 020359Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 0691

RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 0668

INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1983

RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0552

RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0513

RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0732

RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0521

RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0470

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 08382CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHRG: PROG 8/2/83

APPRV: CWSROSS

TD: CWSROSS

CLEAR: NONE

DISTR: ROSS (4) AMB DCM PO
DAO P-M 9

EXDIS

TEL AVIV FOR CHARGE

FROM AMB. MCFARLANE AND AMB. FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/1/84

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETINGS IN ISRAEL

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SEPTELS ADVISE OF 1900/1915 LT ARRIVAL OF MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS TEAM AUGUST 2. AMB. MCFARLANE WOULD LIKE HIS FIRST MEETING WITH ISRAELIS MORNING OF AUGUST 3 TO BE A PRIVATE MEETING WITH DAVID KIMCHE. HE INVITES YOUR SUGGESTIONS ON THE FORMAT AND TIMING OF SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, HE WOULD LIKE TO PUT OFF ANY LARGE PLENARY-STYLE MEETING UNTIL LATER IN THE SCHEDULE OF THIS FIRST VISIT.

3. THE MEMBERS OF THE TRAVELLING TEAM ARE:

- AMBASSADOR ROBERT MCFARLANE
- MRS. JONDA MCFARLANE
- AMBASSADOR RICHARD FAIRBANKS
- CHRISTOPHER ROSS
- HOWARD TEICHER
- PHILIP DUR
- WILMA HALL
- PAT MEYER
- DAVID HAAS (SY)
- JAMES CROWE (SY)

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 11/30/97

4. ACCOMODATIONS IN JERUSALEM ARE LEFT UP TO YOUR DISCRETION, WITH A SLIGHT PREFERENCE FOR THE PLAZA OVER THE KING DAVID.

5. PLEASE LEAVE THE REMAINDER OF THE EVENING AFTER ARRIVAL FREE.

6. PRESS GUIDANCE ON THE TEAM'S MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES
SHOULD FOLLOW THE SAME LOW-KEY APPROACH AS IN THE PAST.

DILLON

BT

#8382

NNNN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~/EXDIS

BEIRUT 8382

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

BEIRUT 8385

VZCZCBLI *
OO RUEHJI RUEHC RUEADWW
DE RUEHBL #8385 214 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 020406Z AUG 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0522
INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1985
RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
CHRG: PROG 8/1/83
APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE
DRFTD: HTEICHER
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08385

NODIS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY EYES ONLY
DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ EYES ONLY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, JO, UNSC
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR

REF: (A) JIDDA 6176 (B) 6126

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN LIGHT OF BANDAR'S INABILITY TO TRAVEL TO BEIRUT,
I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH BANDAR IN SAUDI ARABIA AT
THE END OF THIS WEEK ALTHOUGH THE SPECIFIC DATE FOR OUR
ARRIVAL IN SAUDI ARABIA IS NOT YET CERTAIN.

3. RECOMMENDATION ON THE TIMING OF A KHADDAM-SALEM
MEETING RAISED IN PARA (6) REF (A) WILL DEPEND UPON
DEBRIEF OF BANDAR'S MEETING IN DAMASCUS.

4. NOW PLAN TO HAVE WADIA HADDAD ACCOMPANY PARTY TO
JIDDA LATE THIS WEEK. DILLON

BT
#8385

NNNN

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

BEIRUT 8385

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12/1/99

~~SECRET~~

JIDDA 006176

(9) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHERON

NUFOVZCZCBL0071

OO RUEHBL

DE RUEHJI #6176 2131518

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

O 011518Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0159

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2028

BT

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 06176

LOC: DISK 07 351

01 AUG 83 1518

CN: 05491

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

NODIS

BEIRUT FOR MCFARLANE PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, SA, LE

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR IN BEIRUT

REF: (A) STATE 214009 (B) JIDDA 6067 (C) JIDDA 6126

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. CHARGE CONTACTED PRINCE BANDAR ON AFTERNOON AUGUST 1. BANDAR SAID HE HAD RETURNED FROM DAMASCUS ONLY THIS MORNING AND THEN GONE DIRECTLY INTO KING FAHD'S MEETINGS WITH KING HUSSEIN, WHICH HAD JUST FINISHED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUESTION, BANDAR SAID HE WILL NOT RPT NOT BE ABLE TO MEET MCFARLANE IN BEIRUT. HE SAID THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN LIGHT OF AN-NAHAR STORY ALLEGING MCFARLANE-HADDAD-BANDAR TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE TO MEDIATE WITH SYRIANS.

4. BANDAR ASKED ABOUT MCFARLANE TRAVEL PLANS AND CHARGE REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOT YET AWARE OF PRECISE ONWARD SCHEDULE BEYOND CURRENT BEIRUT STOP. CHARGE ASKED IF BANDAR WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR MEETING MCFARLANE AT AN ALTERNATIVE LOCATION AND BANDAR REPLIED HE WAS OPEN TO MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION.

5. BANDAR SAID HE WILL CONTACT CHARGE LATER TONIGHT TO GIVE A READ-OUT ON HIS SYRIAN VISIT, WHICH WE WILL CABLE TO MCFARLANE IN BEIRUT AND DEPARTMENT.

6. IN CLOSING, BANDAR ASKED IF MCFARLANE HAD ANYTHING FURTHER ON POSSIBILITY OF A KHADDAM-SALEM MEETING AND CHARGE SAID HE WOULD INQUIRE. PLEASE ADVISE, IF YOU WISH TO PASS ON ANY INFORMATION IN THAT REGARD.

7. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

SUDDARTE

BT

reply sent

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F98-008/1#64

BY

LOT

NARA, DATE

11/5/02

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

FEL EXT.

PAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROG 8/2/83

AMB MCFARLANE

AMB FAIRBANKS

NONEANCES

MCFARLANE-4

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA, IMMEDIATE

USELO RIYADH, IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: TRAVELS OF
DAS NASSIF

REF: STATE 215283

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REF A DETAILS VARIOUS NON-GOL CONTACTS IN BEIRUT
CONTEMPLATED BY DAS NASSIF ON HIS ORIENTATION TRIP.

3. GOL SENSITIVITY TO NON-GOVERNMENT CONTACTS,
PARTICULARLY IN COUNTRY, IS HIGH AND LIKELY TO REMAIN SO.
PLEASE DO NOT REPEAT NOT SCHEDULE ANY MEETINGS WITH
PALESTINIANS OR CONFESSIOAL GROUP LEADERS OR MEMBERS
UNLESS COORDINATED IN ADVANCE WITH MCFARLANE TEAM.

4. LOOK FORWARD TO THOROUGH REVIEW OF SITUATION HERE
AND IN OTHER AREA STOPS WITH DAS NASSIF EITHER IN
WASHINGTON OR IN AREA. DILLON##.

INITIALS:
AUTH m

DRAFT RZ

1 CLEAR.

2

3

4

5

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1#65

BY LDS, NARA, DATE 11/5/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

JIDDA 006191

(10) ACTION ROSS-4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

DZTVZCZCBL0171

00 RUEHBL

DE RUEHJI #6191 2140849

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 020844Z AUG 83

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0162

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2034

RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 06191

LOC: DISK 07 747
02 AUG 83 0855
CN: 05587
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

NODIS

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE EYES ONLY
DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ EYES ONLY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK EYES ONLY

FROM CHARGE

REF: (A) BEIRUT 8385 (B) JIDDA 5496

1. (~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. REFTTEL MENTIONED MCFARLANE'S PRESENT PLAN TO HAVE
LEBANESE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER WADIA HADDAD ACCOMPANY
MCFARLANE PARTY ON VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA LATER THIS WEEK.

3. BASED ON MY READING OF CURRENT SAUDI POSTURE, THIS
COULD POSSIBLY BE A PROBLEM HERE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF
THE RECENT BEIRUT DAILY "AN NAHAR" STORY CLAIMING THAT A
TRIPARTITE MCFARLANE-BANDAR-WADIA HADDAD "COMMITTEE" HAD
BEEN CONSTITUTED TO RESOLVE THE LEBANESE-SYRIAN PROBLEM.
SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAS PUBLICLY DENIED THAT SUCH A GROUP
EXISTS. BANDAR YESTERDAY MENTIONED NAHAR STORY AS ANOTHER
REASON FOR NOT TRAVELING TO BEIRUT. THE PRESENCE OF
WADIA HADDAD ON MCFARLANE MISSION WILL LEND CREDENCE TO
THE "TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE" STORY AND WILL RISK THE KIND
OF PUBLIC VISIBILITY THAT THE SAUDIS CURRENTLY FIND SO
UNCOMFORTABLE IN THE NAHAR STORY. ALSO, I NOTE THAT ASSAD
IN HIS MESSAGE YESTERDAY TO THE SYRIAN ARMED FORCES
CRITICIZED THE FACT THAT THE U.S. IS NOW MEDIATING
"BETWEEN ARAB COUNTRIES" AS WELL AS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
THE ARAB COUNTRIES. THIS WILL PUT FURTHER NEGATIVE
PRESSURE ON THE SAUDIS REGARDING HADDAD-MCFARLANE VISIT.

4. SAUDIS RADICALLY TRANSFORMED SECRETARY'S PROPOSAL TO
KING FAHD DURING SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT HERE FOR
BANDAR-HADDAD-HABIB MEETINGS INTO A "FOUR STAGE" PROCESS
(REFTTEL B): (1) BANDAR-HADDAD MEETING; (2) BANDAR-SYRIA
MEETING; (3) LEBANESE-SYRIAN-SAUDI MEETING; AND (4) U.S.-
SAUDI-SYRIAN-LEBANESE MEETING. ONLY FIRST TWO STEPS HAVE
NOW OCCURRED. BASED ON THIS SCENARIO SAUDIS THEREFORE
MAY WELL ARGUE THAT MCFARLANE-BANDAR-HADDAD MEETINGS,
WHICH HADDAD PRESENCE ON AIRCRAFT WOULD IMPLY, WOULD BE
PREMATURE, EVEN IN TERMS OF THE PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-0081 #66

BY 105 NARA, DATE 11/5/02

~~SECRET~~

JIDDA 006191

~~SECRET~~

JIDDA 006191

SAUDI SCENARIO.

5. I RECOGNIZE THAT, FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, HADDAD PRESENCE ON MCFARLANE VISIT HERE MAY BE INTENDED TO BRING PRECISELY SAME KIND OF PUBLIC SAUDI IDENTIFICATION WITH LEBANESE PROBLEM AS BANDAR VISIT TO BEIRUT WAS INTENDED TO DO (AND WHICH SAUDIS SIDESTEPED). I AM AFRAID, HOWEVER, THAT IF WE PRESENT HADDAD'S INCLUSION ON VISIT HERE AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI WITHOUT A CAREFULLY REASONED PRESENTATION TO SAUDIS THIS COULD UPSET THE SAUDIS AND ADVERSELY AFFECT ATMOSPHERE FOR MCFARLANE VISIT.

6. I THEREFORE SUGGEST, IF MCFARLANE WISHES TO PROCEED WITH HADDAD VISIT IDEA, THAT: (1) MCFARLANE AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR MURPHY (WHO RETURNS TO JIDDA THIS EVENING) TO MAKE THE PROPOSAL TO BANDAR AND PROVIDE HIM WITH OUR RATIONALE FOR HAVING HADDAD ALONG, THE SAUDI "FOUR STAGE" SCENARIO NOTWITHSTANDING. (2) IF KING FAHD SHOULD AGREE TO HADDAD'S INCLUSION (WHICH IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN), SAUDIS WOULD PROBABLY NOT WISH HADDAD TRAVELING ON SAME AIRCRAFT AS MCFARLANE AND SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THAT REGARD ON OUR PART WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE. PLEASE ADVISE.

7. BANDAR HAS NOT YET GIVEN ME THE READ-OUT ON HIS VISIT TO DAMASCUS. I WILL NOT RPT NOT BRING UP THE HADDAD ISSUE WITH HIM WHEN I SEE HIM (HOPEFULLY TODAY), AND WE WILL AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY TO PRESENT AFTER HIS RETURN HERE TONIGHT.

8. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

SUDDARTH

BT

#6191

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

JIDDA 006191

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

PAGE 1

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

PROG 8/2/83

AMB MCFARLANE

AMB MCFARLANE

NO ENANCES

MCFARLANE-4

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE, IMMEDIATE

INIT RCM:
AUTH

DRAFT

1 CRR.

2

3

4

5

NODIS

JIDDA FOR AMB. MURPHY, EYES ONLY
DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: COORDINATION
WITH SAUDI ARABIA

REF: JIDDA 6191

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1#67

BY NOT NARA, DATE 11/5/02

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2

2. PROPOSALS THAT BANDAR VISIT BEIRUT AND, AS THAT BECAME IMPROBABLE, THAT HADDAD TRAVEL TO JIDDA WERE DESIGNED AS MUCH TO ENGENDER TANGIBLE REASSURANCE OF SAUDI SUPPORT FOR GOL, AND ASSURE CLOSE TRIPARTITE COORDINATION (A GOAL STRESSED BY GOL), AS FOR DEBRIEF OF BANDAR-ASSAD EXCHANGES. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT AN-NAHAR STORY ALTERS THE CLIMATE FOR REALIZING THIS GOAL. THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF PRETEXT IN THE SAUDI POSITION GIVEN THEIR EXCELLENCE AT PRIVATE DIPLOMACY. THIS IS PARTICULARLY SO AS THE VENUE IS SHIFTED TO SAUDI ARABIA.
3. UNDERSTANDING THE POTENTIAL FOR EMBARRASSMENT IF HADDAD ARRIVED VISIBLY WITH ME (EVEN THOUGH OUR 2 AIRCRAFT MAKE PRIVATE ARRIVAL EASILY MANAGEABLE), I DO NOT WANT TO INSIST ON THIS APPROACH, BUT WOULD STILL PREFER IT.
4. NEVERTHELESS, I WANT TO STRESS THROUGHOUT MY MISSION THE PRIME IMPORTANCE OF REINFORCING LEBANON. CONSEQUENTLY WOULD APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR MAKING THIS POINT IN MY BEHALF AND URGING PROMPT SAUDI DEBRIEF FOR LEBANESE. WHETHER THIS IS ARRANGED PRIVATELY AS PART OF MY PARTY OR SEPARATELY IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN ITS TIMELINESS.
5. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR MAKING POINT THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO CLOSE TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS (AS OPPOSED TO SAUDI "FOUR STAGE" SCENARIO). AN-NAHAR SPECULATION WAS VERY EMBARRASING AND ANGERING TO GOL AND YOU MAY TELL SAUDIS WE HAVE BEEN PRIVATELY AND FORCEFULLY ASSURED THAT THERE WILL BE NO REPETITION OF SUCH INDISCRETION AND THAT "THOSE RESPONSIBLE HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH" (FYI ONLY, THIS APPEARS TO MEAN, INTER ALIA, THAT GHASSAN TUENI, PUBLISHER OF AN-NAHAR, WILL BE REMOVED FROM PRIVATE DECISION-MAKING CHANNEL.)
6. MY CURRENT EXPECTATION IS TO SPEND WEDNESDAY AND AT LEAST HALF DAY THURSDAY IN ISRAEL. IF RESULTS WARRANT, WOULD THEN MAKE BRIEF RETURN VISIT TO BEIRUT AND PROCEED JIDDA THURSDAY NIGHT OR FRIDAY MORNING. DILLON##

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CONTINUATION FORM

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

VZCZCBLI *
OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHEG RUEHDM RUEHJM
RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHDT
DE RUEHBL #8396/01 214 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020914Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1989
INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0553
RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0514
RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0735
RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0670
RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0523
RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0471
RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0116
BT

CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: PROG 8/2/83
APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE
DRFTD: HTEICHER/PDUR
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4

*RCM
Chron*

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08396

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK EYES ONLY
USUN FOR AMB KIRKPATRICK EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MEETINGS AUGUST 1
REF: BEIRUT 07557

DECLASSIFIED
NLS
F98-00811 768
NARA, DATE 4/19/02

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: TWO MEETINGS WERE HELD ON AUGUST 1 BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HADDAD AND MCFARLANE-FAIRBANKS TEAM. FOLLOWING REVIEW OF U.S. GOALS, REPORT ON ARENS-SHAMIR VISIT, AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PLAN BY MCFARLANE, THE LEBANESE PROVIDED THEIR VIEWS ON REDEPLOYMENT AND POSITIONS FOR DISCUSSION IN ISRAEL, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT, SYRIA. LATER MEETING, LIMITED TO PRINCIPALS, RESULTED IN AN AGREED GOL POSITION WHICH WE WILL DISCUSS IN JERUSALEM. FINALLY, MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS HAD BRIEF ENCOUNTER WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN BUT DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. MCFARLANE TEAM WILL MEET WITH GEMAYEL IN BIKFAYAA AUGUST 2. END SUMMARY.

3. MORNING MEETING AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE BEGAN WITH MCFARLANE RESTATING USG COMMITMENT TO LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AND SECURITY OF LEBANESE BORDERS. HE NOTED U.S. BELIEF THAT PHASED ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENTS ALONG LINES DESCRIBED BY SHAMIR AND ARENS ARE CONSISTENT WITH STATED GOALS. MCFARLANE CONVEYED ISRAELI DESIRE TO COORDINATE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF REDEPLOYMENT AND US READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COORDINATION EFFORT AS NECESSARY. DURING MCFARLANE'S PRESENTATION SALEM NOTED THAT ISRAELI

REDEPLOYMENT AND PLO WITHDRAWAL WERE MERELY QUOTE
FOOTNOTES UNQUOTE ON THE LEBANESE AGENDA. FOR THE
LEBANESE OBTAINING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS THE TOP PRIORITY.

4. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM HADDAD, MCFARLANE
EXPLAINED USG EFFORTS TO OBTAIN TIMETABLE FOR SUBSEQUENT
--- PHASES OF REDEPLOYMENT AND THE ISRAELI UNWILLING-
NESS TO AGREE OR DISAGREE PENDING CABINET CONSIDERATION.
HADDAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE CENTRAL CONDITION FOR POLITICA
COORDINATION WITH ISRAEL ON THE FIRST PHASE OF REDEPLOY-
MENT WAS AGREEMENT ON A QUOTE CONTEXT FOR ISRAELI
ACTIONS UNQUOTE (I.E. AGREEMENT ON A TIMETABLE FOR A
COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL), IN WHICH CASE LEBANESE COULD
CONSIDER PHASED REDEPLOYMENT AS QUOTE AD HOC IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE AGREEMENT UNQUOTE. WITHOUT SUCH A CONTEXT,
LEBANESE WOULD REGARD ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT TO THE
AWWALI AS A UNILATERAL ACTION. IN ANY EVENT LEBANESE
WOULD COORDINATE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE REDEPLOYMENT.
SALEM ADDED THAT IT WAS FRUITLESS FOR LEBANON TO DISCUSS
PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL UNLESS THERE WAS SOMETHING TO DISCUSS
WITH SYRIA. HE STRESSED REPEATEDLY THE NEED FOR PARALLEL
DISCUSSIONS WITH SARG EVEN AS THE LEBANESE DISCUSS
SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS OF REDEPLOYMENT WITH ISRAEL.
SYRIA COULD EXPLOIT REDEPLOYMENTS, AND THE USG, SAUDIS
AND OTHERS MUST PERSUADE SYRIA NOT TO INTERFERE IN
AREAS VACATED BY THE ISRAELIS. MCFARLANE ACKNOWLEDGED
THE IMPORTANCE OF PARALLEL APPROACH TO SYRIA. FAIRBANKS
NOTED THAT ISRAELIS VIEW PHASED REDEPLOYMENT AS A MEANS
OF PRESSURING SYRIA AND HE PROVIDED WRITTEN US SUMMATION
OF THE ISRAELI POSITION. SALEM COMMENTED THAT THE
REFERENCE TO PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS INCONSISTENT WITH
WHAT IS ENVISAGED IN THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT AND
THAT ISRAEL SHOULD RESTATE ITS READINESS TO WITHDRAW
COMPLETELY AS SYRIA WITHDRAWS. HE ADDED THAT A LETTER
TO ASSAD FORMALLY REQUESTING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS READY
TO BE SENT, BUT AS WITH THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF
RATIFICATION, THE QUESTION OF TIMING IS STILL OPEN.

5. MCFARLANE THEN ATTEMPTED TO DETERMINE CONCRETE
LEBANESE POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO ISRAELI PLANS AND
ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS AS CONVEYED BY ARENS AND SHAMIR.
HE SAID WE NEED TO TURN ISRAELI DETERMINATION TO
REDEPLOY INTO A PROCESS WHICH WOULD REINFORCE THE
AUTHORITY OF THE GOL. HE REQUESTED THAT THE LEBANESE

REINVIGORATE THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNEL AT THE TANNOUS-LEVY LEVEL, IN ADDITION TO THE POLITICAL CHANNEL. HADDAD RESPONDED THAT THE MILITARY CHANNEL IS NOT A PROBLEM BUT THAT OPEN POLITICAL COORDINATION WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE ABSENT AN AGREED TIMETABLE. HADDAD STRESSED THAT A GOL MOVE INTO THE ALEY AND SHOUF WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO GEMAYEL'S POSITION. HADDAD AND SALEM REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT UNLESS THIS REDEPLOYMENT WAS CAREFULLY MANAGED, GOL COOPERATION COULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE SYRIANS TO THE DETRIMENT OF ALL.

6. SALEM SUMMARIZED LEBANON'S PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENT. FIRST THE NEED FOR ISRAELI COMMITMENT NOT TO INCITE FACTIONS AFTER THEY LEAVE THE SHOUF. SECOND, THE NEED FOR THE US, GOL AND SAUDI ARABIA TO PRESSURE THE SYRIANS TO INSURE THAT THEY DON'T TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BY INCITING THEIR OWN SURROGATES OR INTERVENING WITH THE SYRIAN ARMY. THIRD, THE GOL MUST WORK OUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO ALLOW FOR THE PEACEFUL ENTRY OF THE LAF INTO THOSE AREAS VACATED BY ISRAEL. GOL IS COMMITTED TO AN EARLY SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM.

7. SALEM OUTLINED THE CONDITIONS FOR LEBANESE COOPERATION WITH AN ISRAELI PLAN FOR SUCCESSIVE REDEPLOYMENTS CULIMATING IN WITHDRAWAL FROM LINES OPPOSITE SYRIAN FORCES IN THE EAST. THESE CONDITIONS WERE REDUCED TO WRITING BY THE US SIDE AND REVIEWED DURING EVENING DISCUSSION WITH THE LEBANESE:

-- LEBANESE NEED TO LINK ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT TO PROGRESS ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

-- GOL WILL COORDINATE FULLY AND PROCEED TO AN AD HOC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT IF GOI PUBLICLY STATES TARGET DATES FOR ALL REDEPLOYMENT PHASES.

-- TO FORESTALL ADVERSE SYRIAN RESPONSE TO REDEPLOYMENT SYRIAN CONCESSIONS MUST BE EXACTED IN EXCHANGE FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL UNDERTAKEN OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT.

-- AN ANNOUNCED TIMETABLE FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL IS ESSENTIAL WHICH SHOULD NOT EXCEED 4-5 MONTHS. TARGET DATES FOR EACH PHASE ARE NEEDED.

-- ISRAEL MUST LEAVE QUOTE CLEAN UNQUOTE LEAVING NO QUOTE TIMEBOMBS UNQUOTE.

-- WHILE LAF WILL SHOULDER INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES, MNF WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT SUPPORTING ROLE.

8. IN RETURN FOR ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF ABOVE GOL CONDITIONS, THE LEBANESE AGREED TO SEVERAL CONCESSIONS:

-- MAINTENANCE OF ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE IN GREATER BEIRUT AREA.

-- AD HOC IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
FOLLOWING EACH PHASE OF REDEPLOYMENT.

-- ACCEPTANCE OF LENGTHY WITHDRAWAL PERIOD SHOULD BE
VIEWED BY GOI AS TACIT LEBANESE AGREEMENT TO ISRAELI
SIDE LETTER REGARDING SIMULTANEOUS SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

9. ONE ISSUE WHICH REMAINS UNRESOLVED IN BEIRUT IS GOL
VIEW OF MNF ROLE IN REDEPLOYMENT. HADDAD'S BRIEFING,
CORRESPONDED EXACTLY WITH QUOTE THE PLAN UNQUOTE
TABLED IN THE 7 JULY MNF COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING
(SEE REFTTEL) HOWEVER GENERAL VESSEY REPORTED THAT
GENERAL TANNOUS DISCOUNTED QUOTE THE PLAN UNQUOTE AND

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BEIRUT 8396

SAID HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO OCCASIONAL US PRESENCE ON
THE SIDON ROAD. IN SUBSEQUENT MEETING, MCFARLANE ASKED
FOR CLARIFICATION OF GOL POSITION ON MNF ROLE. LEBANESE
PROMISED CLARIFICATION BY 2 AUGUST. POSITION OF OTHER
MNF CONTRIBUTORS WILL BE CLARIFIED AT 2 AUGUST MEETING
WITH MNF AMBASSADORS. DILLON

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(6) ACTION ~~AND~~ INFO DCM ROSS 4POL PM CHRON

NDOXVZCZCBL0177
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHTV #0372 2140959
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
O 020959Z AUG 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 3253
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5297
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3182
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6599
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9558
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1034
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7868
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4251

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TEL AVIV 10372

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/2/84
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETINGS IN ISRAEL

REF: BEIRUT 8382

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY WELCOMES MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS ARRIVAL THIS EVENING. AMBASSADOR LEWIS WILL BE BACK LATE THIS AFTERNOON, AND EITHER HE OR CHARGE WILL MEET THE GROUP AT 1900 AND ACCOMPANY TO JERUSALEM.

3. WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE OUTLINE: THE FIRST FORMAL MEETING AT 0930, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, COURTESY CALL ON MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHAMIR. THIS WILL BE PRECEDED BY AN INFORMAL BREAKFAST PRIVATELY WITH DAVID KIMCHE AT THE HOTEL AT 0800. FOLLOWING THE CALL ON SHAMIR, A WORKING LEVEL MEETING AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BEGINNING ABOUT 1015; MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MFA PERSONNEL AS WELL AS LUBRANI, THE COORDINATOR FOR LEBANESE AFFAIRS, WOULD PARTICIPATE ON ISRAELI SIDE. ON OUR SIDE WE SUGGEST MCFARLANE, FAIRBANKS, ROSS, TEICHER, AMB. LEWIS AND A NOTETAKER. WE WOULD SUGGEST THE ISRAELIS HAVE A SIMILARLY SMALL DELEGATION. THIS SUGGESTION IS BASED ON OUR ASSUMPTION THAT PRACTICAL QUESTIONS ON REDEPLOYMENT AND COORDINATION WILL BE MAJOR AGENDA ITEMS. THESE FIRST THREE SESSIONS HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED WITH THE MFA. IF THE ISRAELIS FOLLOW THEIR NORMAL PRACTICE, THEY WOULD THEN HOST A LUNCHEON FOR THE PARTY FOLLOWING THE FIRST SESSION.

LOC: DISK 07 764
02 AUG 83 1001
CN: 05593
CHRG: PROG
DIST: EXDI

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DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 11/20/97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TEL AVIV 010372

4. WE SUGGEST A CALL ON MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARENS EITHER WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON IN JERUSALEM AT HIS KNESSET OFFICE, NOT RPT NOT IN EAST JERUSALEM, OR A CALL THURSDAY MORNING IN TEL AVIV. WE SUGGEST DEFERRING A CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER UNTIL THE END OF THE STAY HERE, EITHER LATE THURSDAY OR POSSIBLY FRIDAY MORNING. THIS COULD BE EITHER A COURTESY CALL OR A LARGER SESSION INCLUDING THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE, DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF EARLIER DISCUSSIONS.

5. ADDITIONAL WORKING MEETINGS CAN BE SCHEDULED FOLLOWING THE MEETING TOMORROW MORNING. WE WILL WANT TO CONFIRM YOUR INTEREST IN CALLS ON MINISTERS SHAMIR AND ARENS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THOSE MEETINGS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ANNOUNCED AS SOON AS CONFIRMED. WE WOULD EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO ALSO MAKE PUBLIC THE WORKING LEVEL MEETING TOMORROW MORNING BECAUSE OF THE VERY HIGH PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION HERE.

6. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. FLATEN

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TEL AVIV 010372

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 006230

ACTION ~~██████████~~ *McFarlane Only*

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FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 3492

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 1936

BT

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 06230

02-AUG-83

TOR: 20:07

CN: 25059

CHRG: PRDG

DIST: EXDI

EXDTS

TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM FOR MCFARLANE EYES ONLY
FROM AMBASSADOR MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL SA SY

SUBJ: PRINCE BANDAR REVIEW OF REAGAN-FAHD LETTER WITH
ASSAD.

REF: JIDDA 6228

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. WE ARE SENDING BY THIS EYES ONLY MESSAGE THAT PART
OF BANDAR'S DISCUSSION WITH CHARGE (REFTEL) BEFORE MY
RETURN WHICH REFERRED EXPLICITLY TO BANDAR'S REVIEW
WITH ASSAD OF LATEST REAGAN-FAHD LETTER.

3. BANDAR WISHES YOU TO KNOW THAT HE SHARED SOME BUT
NOT ALL OF THE LETTER WITH ASSAD. HE SPECIFIED THAT HE
HAD GIVEN ASSAD THE "TWO PRINCIPLES" BUT HAD NOT
REVEALED THE LAST PARAGRAPH RELATING TO WITHDRAWAL
ARRANGEMENTS.

3. LATER IN CONVERSATION, BANDAR SAID HE THOUGHT
ASSAD WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW IF THE "TWO PRINCIPLES"
COULD BE CONSTRUED AS REPLACING THE ISRAELI-
LEBANESE AGREEMENT.

MURPHY

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~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 006230

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1, #69

BT CN NARA, DATE 4/19/06

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

PAGE

~~SECRET~~ CLASSIFICATION

PROG 8/2/83

AMBO MCFARLANE

HT/ET/CHER

NONEANCES

MCFARLANE-4

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA, IMMEDIATE

USELO RIYADH, IMMEDIATE

US MISSION USUN, IMMEDIATE

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETINGS
WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, AUGUST 2

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

INITIALS: RCM
AUTH

DRAFTER HT

1 CLEAR. RF

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NLS F98-008/1, #70

BY: CH NARA, DATE 4/19/06

CLASSIFICATION
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PAGE

2. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL MET PRIVATELY AT PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT IN BIKFAYYA NEARLY ONE HOUR FOLLOWED BY A HALF HOUR MEETING WITH ALL OF THE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS TEAM PLUS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER WADIA HADDAD.

3. PRIVATE MEETING FOCUSED ON LEBANESE SUPPORT FOR APPROACH TO PARTIAL REDEPLOYMENT OUTLINED YESTERDAY TO AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS AND REAFFIRMATION OF GEMAYEL'S COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY OF LEBANON. GEMAYEL MADE CLEAR THAT HE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE BREAK-UP OF LEBANON INTO ENCLAVES. THE VARIOUS COMMUNITIES MUCH REACH A POLITICAL AGREEMENT TO WORK TOGETHER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MUTUAL STRENGTHS. GEMAYEL IS CONFIDENT OF THE ABILITY OF GOL TO ACHIEVE FACTIONAL RECONCILIATION.

4. WITH RESPECT TO REDEPLOYMENT, GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THAT FURTHER ACCOMMODATION BY GOL MIGHT BE NECESSARY AND HE COULD ENVISAGE THE EVENTUAL UTILITY OF PRIVATE POLITICAL EXCHANGES WITH THE ISRAELIS, HOWEVER HE URGED AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE TO USE THESE CARDS JUDICIOUSLY. MCFARLANE MADE CLEAR THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT POLITICAL EXCHANGES ARE AN IMPORTANT CARD THAT CANNOT BE USED LIGHTLY. GEMAYEL EMPHASIZED HIS CONCERN THAT WE MAKE MAXIMUM EFFORT TO KEEP SUCH MEETINGS PRIVATE. AT THE SAME TIME HE ACKNOWLEDGED PROBABILITY OF THEIR BECOMING PUBLIC. FOR THIS REASON HE STRESSED ONCE MORE THAT ISRAELI QUID -- AGREEMENT TO FULL WITHDRAWAL PLAN -- HAD TO BE WORTH IT.

IN CLOSING, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL REQUESTED THAT U.S. OFFICIALS WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND NOT WITH THE LEADERS OF VARIOUS COMMUNAL GROUPS WITHOUT COORDINATING WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

5. IN LARGER MEETING GEMAYEL REITERATED THAT HE VIEWS OUR PROPOSAL VERY SERIOUSLY AND IS READY TO WORK WITH IT. HE WANTS TO MEET AGAIN AFTER WE STOP IN ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA. HE FELT THAT THE MEETINGS YESTERDAY WENT VERY WELL BETWEEN AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS AND THE LEBANESE DELEGATION. AMB. MCFARLANE EXPRESSED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DEEP PERSONAL COMMITMENT THROUGH ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO FACILITATE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT LEBANON, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AND THE SECURITY OF ALL LEBANON'S BORDERS. HE NOTED HOW PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS INSPIRED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S LEADERSHIP AND HIS ROLE IN PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND

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PAGE 3

STABILITY IN LEBANON. MCFARLANE REAFFIRMED HIS OWN COMMITMENT TO THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS. HE EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD PRESENT THE LEBANESE POSITION IN ISRAEL BUT EXPECT SOME RESISTANCE ON THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR ACCOMMODATION IN THE DAYS AHEAD. MCFARLANE CONTINUED THAT HE WOULD POSSIBLY HAVE TO COME BACK TO LEBANON BEFORE WE WENT ON TO SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA WHERE WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO PURSUE A STRATEGY THAT CONTAINS POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INCENTIVES. WHILE WE WILL ACKNOWLEDGE AND RESPECT SYRIAN INTERESTS, WE WILL ALSO TRY TO BRING ARAB PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SYRIA. U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO COORDINATE WITH LEBANESE UNTIL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS ACHIEVED. MCFARLANE THEN PROPOSED THAT HIS TEAM BE HEADQUARTERED IN BEIRUT DURING LATER ROUNDS. GEMAYEL EMPHASIZED THAT AGREEMENT IS NEEDED QUICKLY AND THAT TIME IS AS IMPORTANT AS SUBSTANCE; OTHERWISE THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING EROSION OF THE CONSENSUS. GEMAYEL NONETHELESS BELIEVES THAT NINETY-NINE PERCENT OF THE LEBANESE WANT TO REBUILD THEIR NATION BUT THAT SOME LEADERS ARE FORCED TO WORK FOR THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS AGAINST THEIR WILL. ONCE WITHDRAWAL IS COMPLETED, LEBANON CAN BE REBUILT AND "BECOME A MASTERPIECE OF U.S. STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST." GEMAYEL CLOSED HIS REMARKS BY REITERATING THAT THE LEBANESE WILL TAKE NO INDEPENDENT ACTIONS THAT MIGHT EMBARRASS THE U.S. MCFARLANE REITERATED THAT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE NATIONAL UNITY THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL SPEAKS OF WE MUST FIRST GET ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT. THIS PROCESS CAN LEAD TO RESTORATION OF A STABLE, PROSPEROUS LEBANON. HE ASSURED PRESIDENT GEMAYEL OF OUR COMMITMENT TO FULL COORDINATION. DILLON##

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CONTINUATION FORM

CLASSIFICATION
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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER ~~610~~⁸ LISTED ON THE
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT

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~~SECRET~~

PROG 8/3/83

AMB MCFARLANE

RF AIRBANKS

RMCFARLANE

CONGEN; MCFARLANE-4

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT, NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE, IMMEDIATE

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR DILLON, EYES ONLY

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FR

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O.: 12356

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MESSAGE FOR

WADIA HADDAD

REF: JERUSALEM

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. PLEASE INFORM WADIA HADDAD OF MY PLANS TO RETURN TO BEIRUT TOMORROW AFTERNOON, AUGUST 4, AND MY TENTATIVE ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS PER REF (A). ALSO INFORM HIM THAT, WHILE WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO THE LEBANESE POSITION, WE HAVE MADE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS TO WARRANT CONTINUED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE TRIPARTITE POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING. ACCORDINGLY, I PLAN TO JOIN ROSS AND KIMCHE AT THE MEETING TOMORROW EVENING WITH QASSIS. WOULD APPRECIATE THE CHANCE TO DEBRIEF HADDAD PRIOR TO THAT MEETING AFTER MY ARRIVAL TOMORROW AFTERNOON.

CLUVERIOUS##

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1 #72

CU NARA, DATE 4/19/06

INITIAL
AUTH RCM

RF

SECRET

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

KUEWVZCZCBL0431

OO RUEHBL

DE RUEHJI #6277 2161042

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 041042Z AUG 83 ZFF-6

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2072

INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0172

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 3157

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1943

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3500

BT

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 06277

LOC: DISK 08 836

04 AUG 83 1113

CN: 05843

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

NODIS

FOR MCFARLANE MISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, SA, SY, LE, IS

SUBJ: FURTHER BANDAR COMMENTS ON ASSAD-BANDAR MEETING

REF: (A) JIDDA 6228

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. MUCH OF BANDAR'S DISCUSSION WITH ME ON AUGUST 3 WAS A REHASH OF MAIN POINTS OF HIS MEETING WITH ASSAD REPORTED IN REFTEL. THE ONLY ADDITIONAL POINTS TO EMERGE WERE THE FOLLOWING.

3. BANDAR SAID THE SAUDIS HEAR A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE FROM THE LEBANESE THAN THEY DID FROM HABIB ON THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. HABIB HAD STATED THAT THE GOL HAD "INSISTED" ON KEEPING THE AGREEMENT INTACT, WHEREAS THE LEBANESE HAVE INDICATED TO THE SAUDIS THEY HAVE NO INHIBITION IN CHANGING IT. BANDAR USED THIS TO ILLUSTRATE HIS POINT THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE U.S., SAUDIS AND LEBANESE TO BE "ONE TEAM" AND TO TALK TO EACH OTHER FROM THE SAME SHEET OF MUSIC. OTHERWISE THE ALL IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF MUTUAL TRUST WILL BE BROKEN. (IT WAS CLEAR THAT BANDAR WAS APPLYING THIS GENTLE ADMONITION TO THE LEBANESE RATHER THAN THE U.S..) I REPLIED THAT TO ANYONE WHO THOUGHT THE U.S. WAS AMENABLE TO ANNULLING THE AGREEMENT, THE ANSWER IS "NO."

4. BANDAR SAID ASSAD TOLD HIM THAT THE LINKAGE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITH SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL HAD "BAILED ASSAD OUT." ASSAD HAD WORRIED ABOUT HOW HE COULD EFFECTIVELY OPPOSE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BUT THE ABOVE MENTIONED LINKAGE HAD PROVIDED HIM A HANDY EXCUSE.

5. BANDAR SAID HE PURSUED LINE WITH ASSAD THAT NASSER'S ADVENTURISM IN 1967 WAR HAD BEEN A DISASTER

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BY *Am* NARA DATE 11/24/08

AND THAT ARABS SHOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE TO AVOID REPEATING THAT MISTAKE. BANDAR SAID ASSAD AGREED THAT SYRIA DOES NOT WISH A WAR WITH ISRAEL. ASSAD HOWEVER COUNTERED WITH ASSERTION THAT, IF ISRAELI PM BEGIN STAYS IN OFFICE, A WAR IS INEVITABLE SOONER OR LATER. THE ARABS MUST THEREFORE INCREASE THEIR MILITARY READINESS IMMEDIATELY AND ALSO WORK TO MOVE THE U.S. IN THE DIRECTION OF A MORE EVEN HANDED POLICY. ASSAD HAD STATED THAT THE U.S. HAS "NO GUTS" IN ITS DEALINGS WITH ISRAEL. BANDAR SAID HE COUNTERED THAT SYRIA SHOULD WORK WITH THE U.S. TO PROVIDE IT THE "MECHANISM" FOR NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH WHICH IT COULD MAKE AN EFFECTIVE EFFORT VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL. IF THE U.S. CAN GET AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN LEBANON ARABS WILL ALL OWE U.S. A DEBT.

6. BANDAR STILL WAS GROPING FOR A WAY TO MEET ASSAD'S POSITON, REAFFIRMED IN HIS MEETING WITH BANDAR, OF DEMANDING ANNULMENT OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT YET STILL OBTAINING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. BANDAR RETURNED TO THE FORMULA OF ONLY APPLYING, PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL, "SECURITY" CONSIDERATIONS (STATING ASSAD HAD NOT SPECIFIED WHAT THESE WERE OR HOW, IF AT ALL, THEY RELATED TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT). AFTER WITHDRAWAL EACH PARTY WOULD BE FREE TO DECIDE WHAT IT DID OR DID NOT DO WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. BANDAR IMPLIED THAT LEBANESE COULD HOPEFULLY THEN, THROUGH APPLICATION OF THIS "PRINCIPLE," GO THROUGH WITH THEIR CURRENT AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, WHICH WOULD HAVE - BEEN PUT ON ICE UNTIL WITHDRAWAL. THE ESSENCE OF THE EXISTING AGREEMENT COULD BE PRESERVED WITH PERHAPS "COSMETIC REARRANGEMENT OF PARAGRAPHS." (SIC). BANDAR FELT THIS WOULD OBTAIN THE SAME RESULTS AS THE CURRENT AGREEMENT, BUT IMPLIED IT WOULD BE DONE WITHOUT FORMALLY ASKING THE SYRIANS TO DO MORE THAN SUBSCRIBE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ANY COUNTRY'S RIGHT TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

MURPHY
BT
#6277

NNNN

(6) ACTION USIS INFO AMB DCM POL ROSS4 PM

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OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHTV #0501 2161114
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHFO/USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5328
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3553
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3258
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1051
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6608
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7873
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9563
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3189
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DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS
NSC FOR WILLIAM CLARK
WHITEHOUSE FOR LARRY SPEAKES
USINFO FOR P/PPN, VOA NEWS/CA, NEA, P/RC, R/P, P/FW

E.O. 12356:N/A

SUBJECT: PRESS REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT MCFARLANE

1. FOLLOWING ARE REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
TO THE PRESS AFTER MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM
BEGIN, JERUSALEM, AUGUST 4, 1983:

BEGIN REMARKS:

MCFARLANE: AS ALWAYS, IT IS A PLEASURE TO RETURN
TO ISRAEL. ON THIS OCCASION IT IS AN EXPRESSION
OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COMMITMENT TO LENDING UNITED
STATES EFFORTS TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE, MOST
URGENTLY IN LEBANON, THROUGH THE WITHDRAWAL OF
ALL FOREIGN FORCES, THE ORDERLY RESTORATION OF
LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS COUNTRY, AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY, FULLY EFFECTIVE SECURITY,
ON LEBANON'S BORDERS PARTICULARLY ON ISRAEL'S
NORTHERN BORDER. AND IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF
ADVANCING THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE, OUR DELEGATION
HAS VISITED BEIRUT AND NOW, OUR EXCHANGES HERE IN
JERUSALEM AND TEL AVIV. WE MET THIS MORNING WITH
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. THESE EXCHANGES WERE
EXTREMELY WORTHWHILE, THEY FACILITATED A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST, AND
THEY HOLD A PROMISE OF PROGRESS. I'LL CARRY THESE
IDEAS BACK TO BEIRUT. WE'LL LOOK FORWARD TO
VISITING ARAB CAPITALS IN THE DAYS AHEAD. A MATTER
OF URGENT PRIORITY IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN
FORCES FROM LEBANON. WE APPRECIATE THE TRADITIONAL WARM

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HOSPITALITY WE HAVE RECEIVED HERE, THE VERY
CONSTRUCTIVE VIEWS AND PROPOSALS, IDEAS, CRITICISMS
THAT WE HAVE GOTTEN.

THANK YOU.

Q: ARE YOU CONFIDENT THAT YOU CAN SUCCEED WHERE
AMBASSADOR HABIB FAILED?

MCFARLANE: NO. (LAUGHTER)
END REMARKS

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT.

LEE

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SECRET - DRAFT

LEBANESE POSITION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS

The Lebanese Understanding of Israeli Intentions

Israel has announced its intention to withdraw (redeploy) its forces from the general area of the Alayh and Shul districts as a first step in its complete withdrawal from Lebanon. As its plans are now understood, the IDF will leave the area bounded (a) on the north by the Beirut-Damascus highway, including advanced Israeli positions in the Bayt Mari/Monteverde localities north of that highway, (b) on the west by the sea, (c) on the south by the Awwali River and its extension, the Baruq River, and (d) on the east by the western slopes of Jabal Baruq and the road between Batlun and Ayn Dara, of which it will retain control. In addition, Israel is prepared to discuss a minor extension of the zone from which it departs to include the village of Mukhtara.

This redeployment will take six to eight weeks, take the form of one continuous operation, and is to be completed before the advent of the winter snows, roughly October 15.

Following this redeployment, Israel wishes to retain an MFA liaison presence in the Beirut area, preferably near the coast north of the city, and to station security personnel similar in function to Marine Security Guards on its premises. It is prepared to discuss the nature and size of this security force with the Lebanese. It recognizes that primary responsibility for the security of this office rests with the Lebanese.

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Israel would further like this redeployment to occur in the context of the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement, which it hopes will be brought into force as soon as possible. Meanwhile, it wishes the Lebanese to coordinate this redeployment fully with it at both the political and military levels.

As a tangible way of demonstrating that it has absolutely no territorial ambitions in southern Lebanon and that the area south of the Awwali River will not become an Israeli protectorate, Israel is anxious to promote as great a return of Lebanese governmental authority to that area as is consistent with its security concerns.

Subsequently, as the Lebanese army demonstrates its capacity to take larger missions, Israel would be prepared to withdraw in stages from the rest of southern Lebanon west of the Biqa Valley down to the international border. A last stage -- withdrawal from the Biqa -- would occur only in conjunction with Syrian withdrawal.

The Lebanese Position

The Lebanese position on this first withdrawal, which is shaped by a desire to make it a part of an overall strategy to obtain Syrian withdrawal, is as follows:

SECRET -3-

-- If Lebanon and Israel, working with the U.S., can define a public presentation of the first withdrawal that includes a notational or target date for full withdrawal, Lebanon is prepared to undertake full tripartite coordination of the successive operations and proceed to ad hoc implementation of the security arrangements foreseen in the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement as Israel departs from areas south of the Awwali. The purpose of this coordination and of the implementation of ad hoc security arrangements would be to facilitate withdrawal and ensure that it took place in a stable political environment. Otherwise, Lebanon intends to deal with the planned withdrawal as a unilateral action.

-- In order to forestall Syrian exploitation of the planned Israeli withdrawal as constituting evidence of an intention to partition Lebanon, the U.S., Lebanon, and other Arab states must engage Syria in substantive discussions concurrently with Lebanese-Israeli-U.S. discussions on the planned Israeli withdrawal. In part, these discussions should seek to prevent the Syrians from activating surrogates in the areas from which the Israelis withdraw or infiltrating Syrian or Palestinian personnel from areas under their own control. Syria should be prepared

to pay a price for the political gains it will receive from an Israeli withdrawal that occurs outside the scope of the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement and without a parallel Syrian withdrawal.

-- To minimize further the danger of Syrian exploitation of the planned Israeli withdrawal, an announced target date for completion of a full Israeli withdrawal is essential. This should not exceed four to five months. Israel can also state that it remains willing to effect a full withdrawal in eight to twelve weeks in accordance with the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement if Syria will agree to withdraw.

-- Furthermore, the successive phases of withdrawal from Lebanon west of the Biqa Valley must be implemented according to a definite timetable with specific target dates for each phase conditioned only by the commitment of the Lebanese to maintain security in the areas from which the Israelis depart.

-- Lebanon for its part has been working and will continue to work intensively to achieve the kind of political/security agreement that will provide the best possible conditions for the entry of the Lebanese army into the areas from which the Israelis depart.

-- To facilitate the emergence of stability in any area from which they depart, the Israelis must depart cleanly, without residual presence or movement. No "time bombs" must be left behind. Following withdrawal, the various Israeli agencies must adopt a hands-off policy in these areas.

-- While the Lebanese army will shoulder full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order throughout the areas evacuated, the MNF will have an important supporting role to play in the area north of the Awwali River. MNF association with the Lebanese army and its precise form are still under discussion.

-- The Lebanese government will undertake all necessary measures to restore all appropriate functions of the civil administration in southern Lebanon south of the Awwali River. Coordination of these measures will take place in the tripartite political forum.

** -- The Lebanese remain committed to the entry into force of the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement as soon as the full withdrawal of all foreign forces can be arranged.

**NOTE: This point was added after the August 1 evening session.

~~SECRET~~ -6-

ORAL EXPANSION OF THIRD POINT IN LEBANESE POSITION

If necessary, the target date for final withdrawal can be conditioned upon Syrian withdrawal.

LEBANESE CONCESSIONS REGARDING REDEPLOYMENT

- "Unconditional" Concessions

-- Political Coordination: GOL is prepared to use the existing Kimche-Qassis-(Ross) channel to coordinate political aspects of Israeli redeployment from the Shouf. This "committee" could meet frequently.

Although frequency was not defined with precision, it was reaffirmed that meetings could be on a daily basis if that was required. The GOL could ensure that Qassis has full and timely access to highest policy officials.

-- Military Coordination: Lebanese have agreed to continue meetings at Tannous-Levy level to establish terms of reference for coordination of military aspects of IDF withdrawal. General Tannous has specifically tabled concept of Redeployment Supervisory Committee (1-2 Star General Officer Level) which would work out specific details. This committee could include MNF participation.

- Conditional Concessions: Conditions bearing on these concessions are that Israel agrees to a complete withdrawal with a target date certain for the completion of each phase including the final phase, even if the last phase is contingent on Syrian withdrawal.

[-- Maintenance of Israeli Liaison Office in Greater Beirut. Provided certain conditions were met, GOL will permit continuation of a civilian Israeli office in greater Beirut area as envisaged in the May 17 Agreement.]

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-- Ad Hoc Implementation of Security Arrangements.

GOL would consider ad hoc implementation of security arrangements for each phase of Israeli withdrawal. This might permit, for example, the establishment of prototype joint teams to satisfy the GOI that LAF security in the successively vacated zones is adequate to verify the commitments of the GOL.

-- The GOL is prepared to accept an extended timetable for Israeli withdrawal not to exceed five months and thereby implicitly recognizes the Israeli position stipulated in the side letter and its requirement for simultaneous withdrawal.

Chron Beirut 8/4/83

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

-- The Government of Israel has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and does not covet a single square inch of Lebanese soil. This concept was one of the key elements of the Agreement of May 17.

-- The Government of Israel respects Lebanon's independence and hopes that the Government of Lebanon will be able to assert its sovereign authority throughout all its territories as soon as possible through the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

-- The Government of Israel regards the forthcoming redeployment of its military forces to the Awali River Line as the first stage in a process of withdrawal. This redeployment is fully consistent with all elements in the Israeli-Lebanese Agreement of May 17 and will be carried out in the context of that Agreement.

-- The Government of Israel of course expects that the Agreement will come into force as soon as possible.

-- Further withdrawals are contemplated as the security situation permits.

Chron

Beirut 8/4/83

DRAFT STATEMENT

IN ORDER TO MOVE FORWARD ON A NATIONAL AND VIGOROUS PROGRAM OF RECONCILIATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON, OUR FOREMOST OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND STABILITY THROUGHOUT OUR LAND. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS GOAL REQUIRES WITH THE UTMOST URGENCY THAT THE LAND OF LEBANON BE FREED OF OCCUPATION OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

AS PART OF THIS COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVE THE RENEWAL OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, THE GOVERNMENT HAS RECEIVED NEW ASSURANCES AND UNDERTAKINGS FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.

-- ISRAEL HAS PUBLICLY REAFFIRMED ITS SOLEMN WRITTEN AGREEMENT TO ~~REMOVE~~^{WITHDRAW} ALL OF ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON WITHIN EIGHT TO TWELVE WEEKS AS SOON AS SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE FOR THE ~~REMOVAL~~^{WITHDRAWAL} FROM LEBANON OF ALL OTHER FOREIGN FORCES.

-- IN THE MEANTIME, ISRAEL WILL BEGIN SHORTLY THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OF ITS MILITARY FORCES IN THE COASTAL AREA OF LEBANON TO POSITIONS SOUTH OF THE AWWALI RIVER. THIS WITHDRAWAL WILL BE TIMELY AND CONTINUOUS, AND THE SECURITY AND JURISDICTION OF THIS AREA WILL ~~IMMEDIATELY~~^{CONCURRENTLY} BECOME THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ASSUMPTION OF CONTROL WILL BE CONCLUDED IN TALKS BETWEEN ISRAELI AND LEBANESE AUTHORITIES.

-- FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS SOUTH OF THE AWWALI

RIVER [ARE CONTEMPLATED SUBJECT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE SECURITY IN THE EVACUATED AREAS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN FOUR TO FIVE MONTHS] WILL BE ARRANGED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. IN PREPARATION OF THESE WITHDRAWALS, THE GOL WILL MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO TAKE OVER FULL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL CIVIL AND GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS IN ALL AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION. ISRAEL WILL NOT ESTABLISH ANY GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES ON ANY PORTION OF LEBANESE SOIL.

OUTLINE OF TALKS IN BEIRUT

I
-- Reaffirm the commitments made by President Reagan
to President Gemayel.

- Remain committed and resolved to assist with:
 - + Restoration of GOL Sovereignty throughout Lebanon.
 - + Total withdrawal of all foreign forces, promptly.
 - + Promoting appropriate security arrangements for all Lebanon's borders, especially the Southern border with Israel.
- We will help with accelerated LAF modernization as discussed in detail during General Vessey's visit.
- As discussed in Wash, we are considering what additional measures might be taken to facilitate reconstruction and redevelopment assistance.

II
-- Brief the Lebanese on Arens-Shamir visit.

Redeployment
7 Israel is prepared to cooperate with and assist
in a political agreement involving the Druze, the LF
and other factions. *No w/d until marginal*

III - Egypt
IV - PLO
V - Syria
VI
-- Israel is prepared to discuss which side of the line
Muktara will fall on.

-- No occupation gov't in the south.

-- Military presence as low as feasible.

-- Seeking political cooperation between central government
and municipal gov't.

-- Israel wants to maintain office in Beirut.

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BY Amx NARA DATE 11/24/08

Our use of ² Leb pts

*
western
w/d

- Israelis remain committed to total withdrawal; no partition.
- Described in detail the redeployment plan to be completed by October 15.
- Are considering USG request for a presentation of how this initial redeployment to Awali line would be associated with further redeployments and complete withdrawal. Review public presentation document agreed with Israelis.
- Expressed their views that this redeployment would afford opportunity to demonstrate capacity of GOL to expand authority beyond current area.
- We made clear our view that Israelis must help facilitate and cooperate with Lebanese efforts to resolve political disputes between factions and to terminate armed hostilities between militias.
- We stressed and the Israelis acknowledged that the USG would not pressure the GOL to exchange instruments of ratification at this time. The Israelis remain nonetheless convinced that prompt implementation of the agreement would put added pressure on Syria (Query GOL desire on this point about logic for their refusal).
- Israelis believe GOL needs to demand Syrian withdrawal in a formal way. We need to discuss the timing and context of such a demarche and how USG and others might help.

Different view.

- USG understanding of Israeli rationale (refer to State summary). In this context, How do you view the closing of the LF's barracks in the South?
- The Israelis are also interested in a 2-10 km disengagement with the Syrians in the Bega. We would like your thinking on this.

-- Explain how we might take advantage of Israeli redeployment.

- Machinery to coordinate redeployment, maintain security and facilitate extension of GOL authority.

Hope you can agree to establishment of a military channel for this coordination -- we may be able to help here as well. We think that Tannous and Levy should meet to agree to a TOR for staff level coordination right away.

Likewise, can the Kimche-Qassis work to coordinate political issues relating to redeployment?

- GOL thinking and action to date to reach interim accord with both Druze and Christian communities and to stop the fighting between the PSP militias and the LF. What assistance from third parties might be useful (such as witnesses to status quo and agreed territorial adjustments in Shuf/Aley)?

- Depending on your deliberations, we may be able to table in Jerusalem subject of plans for subsequent phases in IDF redeployment.
- Finally, how do you see the MNF assisting in this redeployment process?

Beyond this level

-- Encourage GOL to negotiate withdrawal of PLO fighters
(Arafat feelers).

- Our view of Arafat/Syrian split and implications for withdrawal of loyalist elements.
- Ascertain Lebanese thinking on prospects for the concurrent resettlement of exposed Palestinians in camps.
- I hope to find out more about the PLO intentions in the course of my trip. Welcome your thoughts.
- In this regard, you should know that Shamir ^{again} intimated[^] that PLO withdrawal was the priority. Following the PLO withdrawal, the Israelis hinted they might be more flexible about terms of Syrian withdrawal.

-- Emphasize tough posture towards Syria.

- As you know, we are continuing to articulate and elaborate our plans for Syria.
- We are convinced that the USG must provide a credible backdrop. This could include enhanced military presence in and around Lebanon. Would appreciate your thoughts.

(Brief Bud on backsliding)

- We also believe that a credible Israeli military threat adjacent to Syrian lines is a valuable form of pressure.
- Israeli planning for subsequent phases in the redeployment of the IDF includes continuous pressure on Syria in the mountains and the Bekaa even as the coastal plain is evacuated.

Under any of the ~~foregoing~~ ^{following} options:

-- Israel will insist in particular that arrangements for maintaining an Israeli liaison office in the Beirut area as well as privileges and immunities for Israeli personnel will be honored during this interim period.

-- Returning to the particular problems associated with the initial Israeli redeployment to the Awali River Line, Israel is prepared in principle to cooperate with and assist in a political agreement involving the Druze, the Lebanese forces, and other factions and elements in the Alayh Shuf regions, a political agreement which will have to be negotiated and completed primarily by the Lebanese Government.

-- Similarly, Israel undertakes not to provide military equipment or support to any factions or groups in these regions after the Lebanese Army and Government have asserted authority there.

-- Israel will not establish any military or occupation government in the territory it holds pending final withdrawal.

-- Israel will be prepared in principle to keep its presence in this area as low as feasible consistent with security needs and will cooperate and foster any efforts by the central Lebanese Government to assert its civil authority, to make appointments of local officials, to carry out economic and development projects, to provide humanitarian services, etc.

-- Israeli authorities will conduct themselves so as to keep one communal group from asserting authority or domination over another in the areas where it maintains control.

-- The overall objective of the Israeli authorities will be to allow the central government to exercise as much civil authority as it wishes, consistent with preserving security and on condition that there be full cooperation between civilian officials of the Lebanese Government in the areas under Israeli control and the Israeli authorities.

Description of Israeli position on the forthcoming redeployment which can be used publicly:

-- The Government of Israel has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and does not covet a single square inch of Lebanese soil. This concept was one of the key elements of the Agreement of May 17.

-- The Government of Israel respects Lebanon's independence and hopes that the Government of Lebanon will be able to assert its sovereign authority throughout all its territories as soon as possible through the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

- The Government of Israel regards the forthcoming redeployment of its military forces to the Awali River Line as the first stage in ~~the withdrawal envisaged in the Israeli - Lebanese Agreement of May 17, 1983.~~ This redeployment is fully consistent with all elements in the Israeli-Lebanese Agreement of May 17 and will be carried out in the context [of all parts] of that Agreement, ~~thus allowing the Government of Lebanon to restore its sovereign authority over a significant portion of its territory.~~

a process of
-- The Government of Israel has reiterated its position previously expressed authoritatively and at the highest levels. This is that the projected redeployment of Israeli forces is in no way intended to bring about a division of Lebanon. Division of Lebanon would clearly be against the national interest of Israel, which foresees as in its best interests a free and independent Lebanon, with a strong central government capable of maintaining security throughout its sovereign territory, thereby assuring the security of Israel's northern border and fulfilling the objectives of the Agreement.

-- The Government of Israel of course ^{expects} hopes that the Agreement will come into force as soon as possible.

Isr should say 'we will cut up黎 zones if Syr will cut up' or w/ 6 months

-- Further withdrawals are contemplated as the security situation permits.

OBJECTIVES FOR MEETINGS IN BEIRUT

(1) -- Lebanese agreement in principle to work constructively with GOI and USG in promoting orderly transfer of authority in Shuf.

- Tri-lateral Redeployment Coordination Committee

(2) -- In return for this we could indicate intentions to work on agreement for second phase of redeployment before first phase is underway.

(3) -- USG commitment to use own good offices and encourage other MNF/UNIFIL contributing countries to help resolve factional dispute in Shuf/Aleg.

- Witnesses to status quo and negotiated political agreements between factions. Rekindle the spirit of cooperation which is the history of modern Lebanon.

(4) -- GOL commitment to a direct appeal for Syrian commitment to withdraw in the context of phased Israeli redeployment.

- Recognize possible need for GOL to simultaneously appeal to other parties for assistance in facilitating complete withdrawal of all foreign forces.

-- In wake of the damaging leak and the Saudi response, we must redouble our security efforts.

(5) ACTION ROSS4 INFO CHRON

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OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHTV #0538/01 2161633
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O 041632Z AUG 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5337
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3193
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3259
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6612
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9567
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1056
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7877
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4259
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3031
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SECRET TEL AVIV 10538

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CN: 05902
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

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DEPT PASS MARSEILLE FOR AMB KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

DEPT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
USUN FOR AMB KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

FROM AMB MC FARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJ: MC FARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH
SHAMIR, AUG 4 1983

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING MCFARLANE'S CLARIFICATION
OF CONTINUING U.S. INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENT OF FORMULA
FOR COMMITMENT TO CONDITIONAL TARGET DATE FOR IDF
WITHDRAWAL, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AGREED TO CONSIDER
ANY FORMULAE WHICH LEBANESE MIGHT PROPOSE. SUBJECT
WILL BE DISCUSSED AT TRIPARTITE MEETING IN BEIRUT
TONIGHT. END SUMMARY.

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3. AMBASSADORS MC FARLANE, FAIRBANKS AND LEWIS AND
TEICHER MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, KIMCHE AND
BAR-ON FOR ONE HOUR AUGUST 4. MC FARLANE EXPLAINED
THAT EFFORT TO FIND FORMULA FOR COMMITMENT TO WITH-
DRAWAL PROCESS WITH ARBITRARY TARGET DATE WAS NOT
AIMED AT IMPOSING NEW OBLIGATIONS ON ISRAEL. RATHER,
WORKING TO DEVISE PUBLIC FORMULA WHICH WOULD HELP
GEMAYEL WITH THE LEBANESE FACTIONS. U.S. SIDE HAD NOT,
HOWEVER, DEVELOPED SATISFACTORY PROPOSALS FOR PRESENTA-
TION TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. SHAMIR, AWARE THAT SUBJECT
HAD BEEN RAISED EARLIER WITH PM BEGIN, EXPRESSED
SURPRISE THAT MC FARLANE HAD NOT BROUGHT A NEW FORMULA.

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BY smf NARA DATE 11/24/08

AT THIS POINT, AMBASSADOR LEWIS REVIEWED HISTORY OF RECENT WASHINGTON TALKS TO REMIND SHAMIR THAT EFFORT TO DEVISE THIS FORMULA HAD BEGUN IN WASHINGTON, I.E., SECRETARY SHULTZ'S INITIATIVE REGARDING THE SO-CALLED ARENS PLAN. SHAMIR HAD SAID IT "WOULD BE DISCUSSED UPON HIS RETURN TO JERUSALEM, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE USEFUL."

4. SHAMIR SAID THAT HE "WOULD BE OPEN TO ANY IDEAS OR PROPOSALS WHICH COULD BE USEFUL," BUT HE DID NOT SEE HOW THIS COULD CONTRIBUTE TO CHANGING THE SYRIAN MIND, OR WHY THE GOL REMAINS UNCONVINCED OF GOI INTENTIONS. LEWIS EXPLAINED SYRIAN DIMENSION BY REFERRING TO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL IN THE WEST VICE WITHDRAWAL IN THE BIQA.

MOREOVER, COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL TARGET DATE WOULD HAVE MAJOR POSITIVE EFFECT ON SHIA IN THE SOUTH. MC FARLANE ADDED THAT GOL DOESN'T DOUBT GOI INTENTION; IT IS A POPULAR PROBLEM WITH THE PUBLIC. FURTHERMORE, WHAT IS SOUGHT IS NOT A TIMETABLE IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE. INSTEAD, TRYING TO DEVISE "A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL WHICH COULD BE CONTEMPLATED IN 4-5 MONTHS THAT EXPRESSES A VISION OF THE FUTURE. THIS WOULD PERMIT GOL TO SAY HOW ISRAEL WILL WITHDRAW IN A NEW MANNER." SHAMIR RESPONDED, "LET THEM PROPOSE A FORMULA." KIMCHE SAID THERE ARE TWO CONDITIONS AND ISRAEL WILL LEAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE: ALL FOREIGN FORCES MUST LEAVE AND THERE MUST BE ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. IT COULD BE DONE IN THREE MONTHS IF SYRIANS LEAVE. FAIRBANKS EXPLAINED WE ARE NOT SEEKING CHANGE IN POLICY, RATHER A CHANGE IN THE PRESENTATION OF POLICY FOR TACTICAL REASONS.

5. SHAMIR SAID ANY DECLARATION MUST MENTION THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT. BUT REGARDING SEPARATE WITHDRAWAL IN THE WEST AND EAST, SHAMIR FOUND IT "HARD TO CONCEIVE ISRAEL COULD AGREE DUE TO SECURITY REASONS. PLO WOULD TRY TO GET AT THE IDF FROM THE WEST. THIS WOULD NOT BE A GOOD PROPOSAL." FAIRBANKS SAID THAT U.S. WOULD NOT CONTEMPLATE A PROPOSAL THAT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR SECURITY. GOL MUST MEET CONDITIONS OR NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN. SHAMIR AGAIN COMPLAINED THAT GOL IS NOT READY TO IMPLEMENT ITS SHARE OF AGREEMENT, BUT WANTS ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ANYWAY. MC FARLANE RE-

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PEATED HOW THE FORMULA WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH AGREEMENT AND WOULD HELP GEMAYEL. IT WOULD HELP BREAK THE MIND SET OF PARTITION."

6. KIMCHE THEN RECEIVED SHAMIR'S APPROVAL TO DISCUSS PROPOSAL AND TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A FORMULA AT TONIGHT'S TRIPARTITE MEETING IN BEIRUT. SINCE MC FARLANE WOULD REPRESENT U.S. SIDE, SHAMIR ASKED IF WADIA HADDAD COULD BE CONVINCED TO ATTEND, EVEN IF HE ONLY "DROPPED BY." WITH REGARD TO PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT, MC FARLANE AGREED FOR ITS NEED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BUT EXPRESSED VIEW THAT TONIGHT'S MEETING SHOULD REMAIN PRIVATE.

7. MC FARLANE HAS NOT REVIEWED THIS CABLE. LEWIS

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5343

INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3195

RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3262

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6615

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9569

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1061

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7879

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4261

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3033

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DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

USUN FOR AMB. KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH
- PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, AUGUST 4, 19831. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE, LEWIS AND FAIRBANKS
MET FOR ONE HOUR AUGUST 4 WITH PRIMEMINISTER BEGIN TO REVIEW MCFARLANE'S DISCUSSIONS
IN LEBANON AND TO OUTLINE OUR THINKING ON HOW TO
PROCEED WITH THE LEBANESE ON REDEPLOYMENT.MCFARLANE RE-EMPHASIZED LEBANON'S FIRM COMMITMENT
TO THE AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AS WELL
AS LEBANON'S RECOGNITION THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEM
FACING US NOW IS HOW TO ACHIEVE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.HE NOTED LEBANON'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ISRAEL'S
DECISION TO REDEPLOY, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THE FRAGILE
POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON MAKES IT IMPERATIVE
THAT REDEPLOYMENT TAKE PLACE IN A FASHION TO SERVE
OUR MUTUAL GOALS. MCFARLANE OUTLINED THE LEBANESE
DESIRE TO FIND A FORMULA WHEREIN REDEPLOYMENT WILL
BECOME PART OF A CONTINUOUS PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL
AND ONE WHICH CAN BE CAST WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF FULL
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE AGREEMENT AND IN RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. BEGIN RESPONDED WITH THREE
QUESTIONS: WHY DOES THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON REFUSE
TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION; WHY HAVE

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THE LEBANESE REFUSED TO CALL PUBLICLY FOR SYRIA'S WITHDRAWAL; AND HOW CAN ISRAEL BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT THE LEBANESE SUGGESTION FOR A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ON THE COAST TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER WHEN THIS CAN ENDANGER ISRAEL'S NORTHERN POPULATION WHILE ENHANCING SYRIA'S POSITION. FOLLOWING PROTRACTED DISCUSSIONS OF THESE ISSUES, BEGIN ASKED THAT MCFARLANE RE-EMPHASIZE ISRAEL'S CONCERNS TO THE LEBANESE. END SUMMARY.

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3. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE, LEWIS AND FAIRBANKS AND EMBASSY NOTETAKER MET FOR ONE HOUR AUGUST 4 AATH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IN HIS JERUSALEM OFFICE. BEGIN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MATITYAHU SHMUELEVITZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF HIS OFFICE; DAN MERIDOR, CABINET SPOKESMAN; AND URI PORAT, BEGIN'S PRESS ADVISOR. AT THE OUTSET MCFARLANE CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S WARMEST PERSONAL GREETINGS TO BEGIN. BEGIN TOOK NOTE OF WHAT HE TERMED FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON DURING THE SHAMIR/ARENS VISIT.

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4. REVIEWING HIS MEETINGS IN BEIRUT, MCFARLANE SAID THAT HE HAD DRAWN TWO IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS: FIRST, THE LEBANESE REMAIN FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THE MOST PRESSING CURRENT PROBLEM IS HOW TO ACHIEVE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. SECOND, HE SAID, THE LEBANESE ACKNOWLEDGE ISRAEL'S DECISION TO REDEPLOY BUT WANT TO ASSURE THAT IT TAKES PLACE IN A FASHION WHICH WILL SERVE THE DUAL GOALS OF ACHIEVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES WHILE REINFORCING THE POSITION OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. MCFARLANE SAID THAT THE U.S. IS CONVINCED OF LEBANON'S GOOD FAITH COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT. THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON THE TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION IS MOTIVATED BY LEBANON'S SENSE OF HOW THIS WILL AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO MOVE THE SYRIANS OUT. THE LEBANESE BELIEVE THAT THE EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION, THE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND A FORMAL, PUBLIC CALL ON SYRIA TO WITHDRAW WOULD INCREASE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S INTERNAL VULNERABILITY. MCFARLANE NOTED SINCERE LEBANESE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION WITH THE VARIOUS

CONFESSIONAL FACTIONS; WHILE WE MAY DESIRE MORE VIGOROUS ACTIVITY, THE LEBANESE ARE MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION. IN THIS CONTEXT, MCFARLANE NOTED, ISRAEL'S DECISION TO REDEPLOY HAS HELPED ACCELERATE LEBANESE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS IN THE SHUF. HE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD TASKED WADI HADDAD TO HOLD INTENSIVE TALKS WITH THE DRUZE LEADERSHIP, AND THAT HADDAD IS CONFIDENT HE CAN SUCCEED IN MEETING DRUZE INTERESTS AND REACHING AN ACCOMMODATION TO PREVENT CONFLICT IN THE SHUF. THE LEBANESE ALSO REAFFIRMED CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE THE COMPLIANCE OF THE LEBANESE FORCES IN THE SHUF AND TO INTRODUCE THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO THE AREA PEACEFULLY.

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5. MCFARLANE SAID THAT LEBANON'S MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM HAS REGISTERED MODERATE PROGRESS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THREE BRIGADES WHICH WILL BE ADEQUATE FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. HE SAID THAT WITHIN SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE LEBANESE CAN INSERT THE ARMY INTO THE SHUF TO PERFORM A DEFENSIVE MISSION IN A SUITABLE POLITICAL CLIMATE.

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6. DESPITE GEMAYEL'S COMMITMENT TO THE AGREEMENT, HE IS ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF RAPID POLITICAL DISINTEGRATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. OUTSIDE BEIRUT THERE HAS BEEN INTENSE PROPAGANDA BY THE SYRIANS AND OTHER ARAB ELEMENTS TO CREATE THE PERCEPTION THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE AND IS SUBSERVIENT TO THE WILL AND POWER OF ITS NEIGHBORS. THE PERCEPTION HAS ALSO BEEN FOSTERED THAT REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES MEANS LEBANON'S PERMANENT PARTITION. WHILE THE U.S. AND LEBANON'S LEADERSHIP UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S EMPHATIC COMMITMENT TO FULL WITHDRAWAL, FEARS AND DOUBTS PERSIST AMONG THE LEBANESE POPULATION.

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7. MCFARLANE SAID THAT GEMAYEL NOW ACCEPTS REDEPLOYMENT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON GOALS AND STRENGTHEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS THAT REDEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN FOISTED BY ISRAEL ON LEBANON AND THAT IT IS A PRELUDE TO PARTITION, GEMAYEL BELIEVES IT NECESSARY TO PORTRAY REDEPLOYMENT WITHIN A CONTEXT OF A PROCESS LEADING TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. THE QUESTION APPEARS TO BE ONE OF PUBLIC PRESENTATION. GEMAYEL HOPES WE CAN FIND A FORMULA WHICH WILL PRESENT REDEPLOYMENT IN SUCH A WAY SO THAT IT CAN HELP LEGITIMIZE HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS AND STRENGTHEN HIS AUTHORITY.

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8. IN RESPONSE TO MCFARLANE'S PRESENTATION, BEGIN POSED THREE QUESTIONS:

A) IF THE LEBANESE HAVE EXHIBITED "SO MUCH GOOD WILL", WHY HAVE THEY REFUSED TO EXCHANGE THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, IS NECESSARY TO BRING THE AGREEMENT

INTO EFFECT? BEGIN SAID THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE REFUSED TO DO THIS FOR FEAR OF PROVOKING THE SYRIANS, BUT HAVE NOT EXPLAINED HOW THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION WOULD NOT HELP ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF WITHDRAWING ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

B) IF THE LEBANESE HAVE ACCEPTED THAT ISRAEL'S FINAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE CONDITIONED ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OTHER FORCES, WHY HAVE THE LEBANESE REFUSED TO CALL ON THE SYRIANS AND PLO PUBLICLY AND DIRECTLY TO WITHDRAW?

C) BEGIN SAID THAT SHAMIR HAD REPORTED TO HIM A LEBANESE PROPOSAL THAT ISRAEL BEGIN EVACUATING THE WESTERN SECTOR TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER. IF ISRAEL WERE TO ACCEPT THIS, THE GALILEE WOULD BE IN GREAT DANGER AND THE IDF WOULD BE THREATENED BY ATTACKS FROM THE SYRIANS AND PLO ON ALL SIDES. BEGIN SAID THAT SHAMIR HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS PROPOSAL, SINCE IT HAD NOT BEEN RAISED DURING THE WASHINGTON TALKS.

9. LEWIS RESPONDED THAT THERE MUST BE SOME FAILURE

OF COMMUNICATION, SINCE THE IDEA HAD BEEN RAISED SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE TALKS IN WASHINGTON, BOTH BY SECRETARY SHULTZ AND IN MORE GENERAL TERMS BY THE PRESIDENT. LEWIS SAID THAT THE GOL HAS AN INTERNAL POLITICAL REQUIREMENT TO DEMONSTRATE TO ITS CITIZENS THAT REDEPLOYMENT IS THE FIRST OF SEVERAL PHASES OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE BORDER WITHIN SOME KIND OF TIMETABLE. THE LEBANESE RECOGNIZE THAT SYRIA WOULD ALSO HAVE TO WITHDRAW BEFORE ISRAEL WITHDRAWS COMPLETELY. THE PROPOSAL, THEREFORE, IS TO ESTABLISH A GENERAL TIME-TABLE FOR PHASED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WEST OF THE MOUNTAINS, WITH FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BEKA'A CONDITIONED ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. IF THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED, IT WOULD HELP LEBANON OVERCOME REAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS. LEWIS EMPHASIZED THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD RAISED THIS SEVERAL TIMES IN GENERAL TERMS, ALTHOUGH SHAMIR HAD EXPRESSED STRONG RESERVATIONS. WHEN THE FINAL MEETING WITH SHAMIR AND ARENS HAD ENDED BEFORE THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN ABLE TO COMPLETE THE DISCUSSION OF OUR SUGGESTED APPROACH, WE HAD CONTINUED TO EXPLAIN THE CONCEPT IN A FOLLOW-ON MEETING WITH ROSENNE, BAR-ON, NETANYAHU AND EINAN. MCFARLANE ADDED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD LEND CONCRETENESS TO THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL AND YET WOULD CONDITION FINAL WITHDRAWAL ON PLO AND SYRIAN RESPONSES AND ON THE ADEQUACY OF LEBANESE ARMY PERFORMANCE IN THE EVACUATED AREAS.

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10. REFERRING TO BEGIN'S QUESTIONS, MCFARLANE NOTED THE FRAGILITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND ITS SENSITIVITY TO ACTIONS WHICH, IF PROVEN INEFFECTIVE, WOULD DEMONSTRATE ITS IMPOTENCE. THE LEBANESE DO NOT WANT THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AND A PUBLIC CALL ON THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW TO BE A RHETORICAL EXERCISE. THEY BELIEVE THAT, AT THIS TIME, BECAUSE OF SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE, THESE ACTIONS WILL NOT CHANGE THE STATUS QUO. MCFARLANE SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE LETTER TO THE SYRIANS HAS BEEN WRITTEN, AND THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO SENDING IT AT A TIME WHEN IT WILL BE REINFORCED BY SUPPORT FROM ARABS AND OTHERS TO MOVE THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW. MCFARLANE SAID WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ISSUE OF TIMING CANNOT BE OPEN-ENDED, AND THAT HE SEES HIS MISSION TO WORK WITH THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS TO ACHIEVE RESULTS IN AS SHORT A TIME AS POSSIBLE.

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11. BEGIN REITERATED THE NEED TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION IMMEDIATELY SO AS NOT TO BACK AWAY FROM THE MUTUAL COMMITMENT OF BRINGING THE AGREEMENT INTO EFFECT. HE STRESSED THAT THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR ISRAEL, AND THAT ISRAEL SEES CONTRADICTION IN THE LEBANESE PROCLAIMING COMPLETE FAITHFULNESS TO THE AGREEMENT WHILE REFUSING TO PUT IT INTO EFFECT. HE ASKED MCFARLANE TO RAISE THIS ISSUE AGAIN DURING HIS NEXT VISIT TO BEIRUT.

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12. TURNING TO BEGIN'S SECOND QUESTION, MCFARLANE

REPEATED THAT THE LEBANESE BELIEVE THAT THE TIMING OF THEIR FORMAL CALL ON THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW SHOULD BE KEYED TACTICALLY TO THE POINT AT WHICH THEY CAN RALLY SUPPORT FROM OTHERS TO HELP INFLUENCE SYRIA'S DECISION. MCFARLANE SAID HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT GEMAYEL IS USING THIS AS A PRETEXT FOR INDEFINITE DELAY. THERE HAS BEEN SOME MOVEMENT IN ARAB CIRCLES IN AGREEING THAT SYRIA MUST WITHDRAW. TODAY A PUBLIC LEBANESE STATEMENT MIGHT HAVE NO POLITICAL EFFECT EXCEPT TO DEMONSTRATE ITS OWN WEAKNESS; AT THE PROPER MOMENT, IT COULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ELICIT BROADER SUPPORT.

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13. BEGIN CONTRASTED ISRAEL'S OPENLY DECLARED INTENTION TO WITHDRAW WITH SYRIA'S CATEGORICAL REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW. HE SAID THAT, IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MAKE PUBLIC ITS DEMAND OF THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW, IT COULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE THE MAIN IMPEDIMENT AND THAT THE LEBANESE ACQUIESCE TO SYRIA'S POSITION. HE PREDICTED THAT A LEBANESE DEMAND FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD REVERBERATE IN THE ARAB WORLD. MCFARLANE ACKNOWLEDGED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS

QUESTION, AND SAID THAT HIS TASK IS TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THIS TO HAPPEN SOON.

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14. RETURNING TO THE PROPOSAL FOR AN AGREED FORMULATION ON A WITHDRAWAL PROCESS, MCFARLANE EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOAL IS TO GET THE SYRIANS OUT, ASSURE ISRAELI SECURITY AND DEMONSTRATE LEBANON'S ABILITY TO ACT EFFECTIVELY, POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, IN EVACUATED AREAS. THE INTENTION IS NOT TO DEFINE PRECISE, SPECIFIC DATES, BUT RATHER TO PORTRAY A PROGRESSIVE PROCESS OF MOVEMENT WHICH WILL NEGATE THE APPEARANCE OF PARTITION. MCFARLANE SAID HE IS AWARE OF ISRAEL'S CONCERNS BOTH WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTIONS OF PRECISION ON TIMETABLES AND THE CONDITIONALITY OF ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL ON SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE GOALS WHICH ISRAEL AND LEBANON ALSO SHARE.

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15. IN RESPONSE TO BEGIN'S REPEATED EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR LEBANON TO CALL PUBLICLY ON SYRIA TO WITHDRAW, LEWIS DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN A FORMAL CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL AND THE COMMUNICATION THROUGH A VARIETY OF DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OF LEBANON'S DESIRE THAT THIS OCCUR. THE SYRIAN AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS NOW WILL KNOW THAT LEBANON WANTS SYRIAN FORCES TO LEAVE. THE QUESTION IS ONLY ONE OF DIPLOMATIC TACTICS, I.E., THE TIMING OF WHEN LEBANON SHOULD MAKE A FORMAL APPEAL TO THE SYRIANS. LEWIS SAID THAT WE ARE TRYING TO MOBILIZE ARAB PRESSURES ON SYRIA AND TO COORDINATE THE RIGHT MOMENT FOR GEMAYEL'S PUBLIC APPEAL TO THE SYRIANS. ONE WAY OF ENHANCING THE INCENTIVES FOR SYRIA TO WITHDRAW IS TO DEVELOP A PACKAGE OF LEBANESE, ISRAELI, ARAB AND U.S.-IMPLIED PRESSURES WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO CHANGE ASSAD'S MIND. LEWIS SAID THAT IT IS A MISPERCEPTION TO ARGUE, AS BEGIN DID, THAT THE ONLY ITEM ON LEBANON'S AGENDA IS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE RECALLED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM HAD GONE TO DAMASCUS ONLY TO BE REBUFFED, AND THAT, WHILE THE PUBLIC DIALOGUE HAS NOT APPARENTLY FOCUSED ON SYRIA, THE MAJOR ITEM IN PRIVATE DIPLOMACY HAS BEEN THE ISSUE OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. FAIRBANKS ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE, IN FACT, ASKED SYRIA TO WITHDRAW PUBLICLY IN SEVERAL FORA, INCLUDING THE FEZ SUMMIT. LEWIS SAID THAT THE LEBANESE TACTICAL JUDGMENT IS THAT THE MORE ASSAD IS CONFRONTED PUBLICLY, THE LESS LIKELY HE IS TO CHANGE HIS MIND.

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16. AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED BEGIN ASKED FOR MCFARLANE'S ASSESSMENT OF DRUZE-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS AND WHETHER THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO MOVE INTO THE SHUF FOLLOWING ISRAEL'S REDEPLOYMENT. MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT GEMAYEL IS WELL AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN THE SHUF. HADDAD HAS BEEN WORKING ON REACHING A FORMULA WHICH WILL DEAL WITH DRUZE POLITICAL INTERESTS WHILE

ASSURING THEIR SAFETY, AND HE IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT HIS CHANCES OF SUCCESS. THE GOL HAS THE COMMITMENT OF THE LEBANESE FORCES TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS WHEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ASKS; ITS GOAL IS TO GAIN A SIMILAR COMMITMENT FROM THE DRUZE. BEGIN WISHED MCFARLANE SUCCESS FOR HIS DIFFICULT MISSION.

17. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE HAS NOT SEEN THIS MESSAGE.

18. DEPARTMENT PASS MARSEILLE FOR AMB. KIRKPATRICK,
"EYES ONLY."

19. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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