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Folder Title: Middle East Trip (McFarlane)
CHRON Cables (08/10/1983)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/8/2008

File Folder MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES
[8/10/83]

FOIA

M10-370/1

Box Number 91407

BROWER

34

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
57858	CABLE	100020Z AUG 83 R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #111	1	8/10/1983	B1
57859	CABLE	091437Z AUG 83 R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #112	1	8/9/1983	B1
57860	CABLE	100022Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #113	2	8/10/1983	B1
57861	CABLE	100026Z AUG 83 D 11/5/2002 F98-008/1 #114; R 5/24/2010 M08-099/3 #57861	9	8/10/1983	B1
57862	CABLE	100556Z AUG 83 R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #115	1	8/10/1983	B1
57863	CABLE	100750Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #116	15	8/10/1983	B1
57864	CABLE	101237Z AUG 83 R 2/28/2001 NLSF98-008/1 #117	1	8/10/1983	B1
57865	CABLE	101436Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #118	1	8/10/1983	B1
57866	CABLE	101505Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #119	23	8/10/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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57867	CABLE	101507Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #120	1	8/10/1983	B1
57868	CABLE	101515Z AUG 83 PAR 4/19/2006 F98-008/1 #121; PAR 5/24/2010 M08-099/3 #57868; PAR 4/5/2013 M370/1	11	8/10/1983	B1
57870	CABLE	101645Z AUG 83 R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #122	1	8/10/1983	B1
57871	CABLE	101750Z AUG 83 R 5/24/2010 M099/3	3	8/10/1983	B1
57872	CABLE	102133Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #124	1	8/10/1983	B1
57873	CABLE	102137Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #125	2	8/10/1983	B1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BEIRUT 8714

VZCZCBLI
OO RUEHEG
DE RUEHBL #8714 222 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZB
O 100020Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0552
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 08714

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CHRG: PROG: 8/9/83
APPRV: RFAIRBANKS
DRFTD: CWSROSS
CLEAR: RMC FARLANE (SUBSTA
E)
DISTR: RMC FARLANE (4)
AMB

EXDIS

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP, EG, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

REF: CAIRO 23153

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I AM KEENLY CONSCIOUS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF VISITING EGYPT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH I WILL BE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS AT LEAST THROUGH SATURDAY, DICK FAIRBANKS AND I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SCHEDULE A STOP IN EGYPT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. DILLON

BT
#8714

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BEIRUT 8714

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1#111

BY LOS NARA, DATE 11/5/02

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

CAIRO 023153

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

/VZCZGBLO131
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHEG #3153 2211438
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091437Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0155
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7423
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

LOC: DISK 11 291
09 AUG 83 1439
CN: 06509
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 23153

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP, EG, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN
ALI ASKED ME AGAIN THIS MORNING WHEN THE GOE MIGHT HOPE TO
SEE YOU IN CAIRO. I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD NO SCHEDULE YET
BUT WOULD KEEP HIM ADVISED. I REPORT THIS BECAUSE IT IS
A DAILY OCCURRENCE HERE. THE EGYPTIANS ARE KEENLY
DESIROUS OF HAVING A DISCUSSION WITH YOU AT THE FIRST
AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT YOU ARE
PRESENTLY PREOCCUPIED WITH LEBANON MATTERS AND IT MAY BE
SOME TIME BEFORE YOU ARE ABLE TO WORK IN A TRIP TO CAIRO.
NEVERTHELESS, SEEING YOU, AND PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY TO
BE SEEN WITH YOU, HAS BECOME EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR THE
GOE FOR A VARIETY OF POLITICAL REASONS. IF YOU CAN GIVE
ME AN IDEA WHEN YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO COME, IT WILL BE MOST
WELCOME NEWS. PRECHT

BT
#3153

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

CAIRO 023153

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F98-008/r#112

BY

HS

NARA, DATE

11/5/02

PRESERVATION COPY

VZCZCBLI *
 OO RUEHDM
 DE RUEHBL #8715 222 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 100022Z AUG 83
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0800
 BT
~~S E C R E T~~ BEIRUT 08715

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRGE: PROG: 8/9/83
 APPRV: CWSROSS
 DRFTD: CWSROSS
 CLEAR: RMCFARLANE
 DISTR: MCFARLANE (4)

AMB
 DCM
 POL
 P-M

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-00811 #113

Oil NARA, DATE 4/19/01

EXDIS

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SY, LE, IS, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH
 KHADDAM, AUGUST 6

REF: DAMASCUS 6036

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE TRANSMIT REFTEL, WITH HEADINGS AS ABOVE AND
 MINOR CHANGES AS NOTED BELOW, TO ADDRESSEES LISTED
 BELOW FROM MCFARLANE. IT IS AN EXCELLENT REPORT, AND
 I APPRECIATE THE EFFORT THAT WENT INTO IT.

3. ADDRESSEES:

ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
 INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY AMMAN, IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT, IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY CAIRO, IMMEDIATE
 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM, IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY JIDDA, IMMEDIATE
 USELO RIYADH, IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

4. MINOR CHANGES:

-- PARA 15, LINE 8: "CONDUCT" VICE "DIRECT" AND
 "RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS" VICE "AFFAIRS."

-- PARA 29, LINE 2: INSERT "HUNDRED" BETWEEN "FEW" AND
 "METERS."

-- PARA 29, LINE 8: ADD "(I.E., SYRIA)" AT END OF
 SENTENCE.

-- PARA 38, LINES 5-9: REWRITE AS FOLLOWS: "...HAD
 TOLD KHADDAM THAT HE HAD STRESSED TO GEMAYEL THAT THE

LEBANESE PEOPLE DID NOT WANT A PHALANGE STATE AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT CREATE TWO STATES -- ONE OF THE FATHER (PIERRE GEMAYEL/PHALANGE) AND ONE OF THE SON (AMIN GEMAYEL/GOL). KHADDAM NOTED WITH A TWINKLE IN HIS EYE THAT HIS FRIEND HAD FORGOTTEN TO MENTION THE STATE OF THE "HOLY GHOST" (ISRAEL)."

-- PARA 46, LINE 2: INSERT "(TO THE PRESS IN BEIRUT)" AFTER "OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS."

-- PARA 49, LINE 8: ADD "(E.G., SYRIA'S 1974 AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL)" AT END OF SENTENCE.

-- PARA 50, LINE 7: ADD COMMA AND "CERTAINLY MORE THAN MANY" AT END OF SENTENCE, AND GO ON TO ADD "(AT THIS POINT IN THE ARABIC INTERPRETATION, KHADDAM FROWNED OPENLY.)"

-- PARA 50, LINE 5: ADD "IT IS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. BEFORE "IF SARG."

5. IN VIEW OF WASHINGTON'S STRONG INTEREST IN THE RESULTS OF OUR MEETINGS IN SYRIA AND ELSEWHERE, I WOULD APPRECIATE THE MOST RAPID POSSIBLE RETRANSMISSION OF THIS REPORTING TELEGRAM. DILLON

57861

Rem 920

VZCZCBLI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHEG RUEHDM RUEHJM
 RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHTV RUEHDT
 DE RUEHBL #8716/01 222 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 100026Z AUG 83
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2146
 RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0597
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0553
 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0801
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0723
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0576
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0512
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0747
 RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0127
 BT
 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF * BEIRUT 08716

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRGE: PROG: 8/10/83
 APPRV: RMC FARLANE
 DRFTD: RFAIRBANKS
 CLEAR: CWSROSS
 DISTR: RMC FARLANE (4)
 AMB

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SA, LE, IS, US, SY
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH
 KING FAHD, AUGUST 8-9

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. DURING FIVE HOURS OF MEETINGS IN TAIF, AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE RECEIVED VERY STRONG EXPRESSIONS OF KING FAHD'S PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. FAHD CALLED GEMAYEL "THE BEST PRESIDENT OF LEBANON I HAVE SEEN" AND PLEDGED SAUDI SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED RECONCILIATION EFFORTS BETWEEN GEMAYEL AND ASSAD. ARAB ARGUMENTS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHENED BY ISRAELI ACTION AND STATEMENTS MAKING CLEAR THEIR INTENTION TO LEAVE LEBANON. MCFARLANE AGREED THAT CONFIDENCE BY OTHERS IN ISRAEL'S INTENTION TO WITHDRAW WOULD STRENGTHEN GEMAYEL AND PUT PRESSURE ON ASSAD. WITH RESPECT TO RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON, FAHD SAID IT IS "THE SAUDI MISSION NOW." HE WILL MEET WITH WALID JUMBLATT SOON AND SEEK HIS COOPERATION, INCLUDING IN ARRANGING A JUMBLATT-GEMAYEL MEETING, WHILE WORKING ON OTHER CONFESSONAL LEADERS. ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, FAHD CONFIRMED THAT KHADDAM HAD SAID THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS TO ISRAEL'S DEPARTURE. IN RESPONSE TO MCFARLANE'S PROPOSAL FOR A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MATN, FAHD WAS OBLIQUE, WHILE IT WAS A GOOD IDEA, A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REQUEST SHOULD AWAIT A NEW ISRAELI STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL AND FAHD'S MEETING WITH JUMBLATT. THE PROSPECTS FOR AND IMPLICATIONS OF EARLY PLO WITHDRAWAL WERE REVIEWED, BUT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-099/3 #57861

BY RW NARA DATE 5-24-10

FAHD SAID SYRIA WOULD NOT LET THE PLO FIGHTERS LEAVE. IN CLOSING, FAHD STRESSED HE WOULD DO ALL HE COULD TO HELP GEMAYEL DIPLOMATICALLY, WHILE EXUDING CONSIDERABLE OPTIMISM REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SYRIAN-LEBANESE DIALOGUE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

3. ON THE EVENING OF AUGUST 8-9, AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE, FAIRBANKS AND MURPHY, AND ROSS (ACTING AS INTERPRETER) MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD AND PRINCE BANDAR FOR TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS. KING FAHD THEN JOINED THEM AND THE MEETING CONTINUED FOR ADDITIONAL TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS.

4. DURING THE FIRST MEETING WITH SAUD AND BANDAR, AMBASSADOR MURPHY GAVE A VERBAL RESPONSE TO SAUD ON THE QUESTIONS HE HAD RAISED ON BEHALF OF THE KING DURING SECRETARY SHULTZ'S LAST VISIT TO THE KINGDOM REGARDING CONSULTATIONS WITH ARAMCO. MURPHY USED THE DRAFT LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY THAT HAD BEEN PREPARED AS TALKING POINTS. SAUD SEEMED SATISFIED AND NO FURTHER ACTION APPEARS TO BE CALLED FOR ON THE OIL LIFTING SITUATION AT THIS TIME.

5. DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE TIME BEFORE THE KING'S ARRIVAL, MCFARLANE BRIEFED SAUD ON HIS TRIP TO DATE, FOCUSSED ON NEEDED STEPS TO SUPPORT THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT AND ON LONGER TERM EFFORTS TO BRING APPROPRIATE PRESSURE TO BEAR FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. MCFARLANE ALSO EXPLORED THE FEASIBILITY OF EARLY PLO DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON (BEFORE SYRIAN FORCES) AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE GULF STATES FOR SYRIA. SAUD AND BANDAR BOTH REPORTED TWO NEWS ITEMS THEY HAD HEARD ON BBC ON THE AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 8. THE FIRST CONCERNED A REPORT THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD REAFFIRMED THE INTENTION TO LEAVE LEBANON, HAD INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS, SUBJECT TO EARLY PLO DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON, TO BE RESPONSIVE TO IDEAS FROM MCFARLANE, AND HAD (IN THE SAUDI VIEW) POINTEDLY FAILED TO MENTION ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION, THE TWO PRINCES REPORTED IN A HUMOROUS ASIDE THAT THE BBC HAD CHARACTERIZED MCFARLANE AS HAVING "FAILED" IN DAMASCUS AND HAVING BEEN "SNUBBED" ON ARRIVAL IN TAIF

BECAUSE HE WAS NOT MET BY SAUD. SAUD REMARKED IN A JOCLAR WAY THAT HE HAD NEVER MET HABIB AT THE AIRPORT, THAT HE HAD IN ANY EVENT BEEN TIED UP ALL DAY WITH HIS COUNTERPARTS FROM KUWAIT AND TANZANIA, AND THAT THE SAUDI MINISTER OF INFORMATION HAD CALLED ALL THE U.S. NETWORKS AND WIRE SERVICES TO OFFER FILM OF THE MCFARLANE PARTY'S ARRIVAL AND LATER MEETING WITH KING FAHD TO GIVE THE LIE TO THE BBC STORY.

6. KING FAHD JOINED THE OTHERS IN THE FORMAL MEETING ROOM AT HIS RESIDENCE AT 2315 HOURS AND APOLOGIZED FOR A BUSY DAY HAVING DELAYED HIS ARRIVAL. HE BEGAN BY DELIVERING A HOMILY ON THE NEED FOR PATIENCE IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION GENERALLY AND THE LEBANESE SITUATION IN PARTICULAR. FAHD NOTED HIS UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT FOR THE GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHICH WENT BEYOND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ASSURED MCFARLANE OF HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ENVOYS IN DEALING WITH THIS REGION, COGNIZANT AS HE IS OF OUR OTHER PRESSING PROBLEMS IN LATIN AMERICA, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ETC. COMMENTING ON THE COUP IN UPPER VOLTA AND REPORTED GOVERNMENT CHANGES IN GUATEMALA, FAHD REMARKED THAT NEW PEOPLE ALWAYS ALLEGE THAT THEY CAN DO BETTER THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS, BUT THE FACTS ARE THAT YOU MIGHT SIMPLY REPLACE THE BAD WITH WORSE (THIS WAS NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF SPECIAL ENVOYS!). THIS LED THE KING TO DISCUSS QADDAFI. REMARKING ON THE CAPTURE OF A LIBYAN PILOT IN CHAD, HE OBSERVED THAT QADDAFI DOESN'T WANT STABILITY AND WILL NOT CHANGE HIS INTRUSIVE WAYS, BUT FOR THIS REASON HE WILL SOONER OR LATER MAKE AN EGREGIOUS MISTAKE AND CANNOT LAST IN POWER.

7. MCFARLANE BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION BY EXPRESSING THE PRESIDENT'S APPRECIATION FOR THE KING'S SUPPORT FOR OUR COMMON GOAL OF SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF ANECDOTES ABOUT SOVIET LEADERS, MCFARLANE CONTINUED THAT WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN LOSING SUPPORT. THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND ITS TERRITORY AND SHOW ITS ABILITY TO DEAL FAIRLY IN THE INTRA-COMMUNAL CONTEXT MAKE THE MOVE BY THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO 'ALEYH AND SHUF A CRUCIAL TEST. THE U.S. IS TRYING TO HELP BY ENSURING THAT THE ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT BE PRESENTED AS THE BEGINNING OF A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL PROCESS

8. FAHD RESPONDED AT LENGTH AND WITH EMOTION ABOUT HIS PERSONAL FEELINGS OF RESPECT AND AFFECTION FOR AMIN GEMAYEL. HE CALLED HIM "THE BEST PRESIDENT OF LEBANON I HAVE EVER SEEN" AND SAID THAT HE AND HIS MOTHER HAD KNOWN AMIN FOR YEARS AND BELIEVED THAT GEMAYEL HAS FEELINGS OF FRIENDSHIP AND RESPECT FOR ALL LEBANESE. HE RECALLED THAT NO ONE (NOT EVEN THE PALESTINIANS OR SYRIANS) HAD OPPOSED GEMAYEL'S ELECTION AND THAT IT IS INCREDIBLE TO HIM THAT A MAN LIKE GEMAYEL WOULD BE UNDER ATTACK BY OTHER ARABS NOW. FAHD REMARKED THAT THIS MAKES UNDERSTANDING ASSAD DIFFICULT BECAUSE HE APPEARS NOT TO COMPREHEND THE NEED FOR ALL ARABS TO

02/03

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF * BEIRUT 08716

HELP GEMAYEL PULL HIS COUNTRY TOGETHER. FAHD PLEDGED THAT HIS COUNTRY HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO ARGUE FOR RECONCILIATION ON THE PART OF ASSAD TOWARD GEMAYEL TO OVERCOME ASSAD'S "ERRONEOUS IMPRSSIONS." FAHD BELIEVES THE CONTINUATION OF THE U.S.-SYRIAN DIALOGUE IS THEREFORE USEFUL, EVEN WITHOUT IMMEDIATE POSITIVE RESULTS. FAHD SPECULATED THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE ON ASSAD MAY BE GREATER THAN HE HAD BELIEVED, EVEN OVERCOMING THE GENERAL ARAB (AND, IN PARTICULAR, SAUDI) POSITION THAT HE HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK WITH GEMAYEL AND WITHDRAW HIS FORCES FROM LEBANON.

9. FAHD THEN OBSERVED THAT ISRAEL ALSO HAS AN

02/03

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF * BEIRUT 08716

IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON ASSAD'S ACTIONS AND GEMAYEL'S INTERNAL POSITION AND THAT ISRAEL MUST BE CLEAR IN ACTION AS WELL AS RHETORIC ABOUT ITS INTENTION TO DEPART THE COUNTRY. IN THE ABSENCE OF ISRAELI FORCES, SAID FAHD, THE ARAB WORLD WOULD OPPOSE A CONTINUED SYRIAN PRESENCE "WITHOUT LIMITS." HE STATED THAT ALL TWENTY-ONE OTHER ARAB STATES (INCLUDING THE PLO) WOULD OPPOSE SYRIA IF THE ISRAELI "PRETEXT" WERE NOT THERE. FAHD SAID THAT THE ISRAELI-U.S. FRIENDSHIP WAS UNDERSTOOD BY HIM AS "NATURAL", BUT THAT ISRAEL SHOULD REALIZE THAT THE PROBLEMS IT CAUSES FOR US CREATE PARALLEL OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIETS. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT, "THERE HAS TO BE PRESSURE ON BOTH PARTIES (SYRIA AND ISRAEL), BUT THE AGGRESSOR (ISRAEL) MUST LEAVE FIRST." THIS DILEMMA MADE THE MCFARLANE MISSION ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT IN THE WORLD. MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT WE AGREE THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ISRAELI INTENTION TO WITHDRAW IS CRUCIAL BOTH TO STRENGTHEN GEMAYEL INTERNALLY AND TO BUILD PRESSURE ON SYRIA. THE MOVE OUT OF 'ALAYH AND SHUF MUST BE SEEN AS THE BEGINNING OF A CONTINUOUS PROCESS AND NOT A CONCLUSION PRESAGING PARTITION.

10. AFTER A DISCUSSION OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE PLANNED ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT, FAHD SAID THAT HE HAS SET A MEETING IN JIDDA IN THE NEAR FUTURE WITH WALID JUMBLATT. IN A LONG DISCUSSION OF HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH JUMBLATT, FAHD STRESSED THAT HE WOULD APPEAL TO THE DRUZE LEADER TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE GOL FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY AND TO WEAN HIM AWAY FROM THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS A TOOL OF SYRIA. FAHD STRESSED THAT DEALING WITH JUMBLATT FACE-TO-FACE WAS MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE THAN WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS OR INTERMEDIARIES, AND HE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS WORKING TO HELP LEBANON AND ITS PRESIDENT: "THIS IS OUR MISSION NOW." FAHD GENERALIZED FURTHER TO SAY THAT THE SAUDIS WERE GIVING THE SAME MESSAGE TO ALL CONFESSIONAL LEADERS AND DISPARAGED THE "MICROBES" (UNSPECIFIED) WHO LIVE ON THE MONEY OF OTHERS AND TEAR DOWN THEIR FELLOW LEBANESE.

11. MCFARLANE OUTLINED THE TWO REQUIREMENTS TO ACHIEVE TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL: ADEQUATE SECURITY GUARANTEES AND A COMMITMENT OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. FAHD REJOINED THAT KHADDAM HAD PROMISED AGAIN ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO THE KINGDOM "SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT ASSAD" THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS. MCFARLANE SAID THAT EITHER THE PRIOR REMOVAL OF THE PLO OR U.S. ASSURANCES ON TIMING WOULD PROBABLY BE REQUIRED TO FINALIZE THE DEAL WITH THE ISRAELIS ON PRESENTATION OF THEIR INTENDED MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN LEBANON. FAHD DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN "OLD" PALESTINIANS WHO HAVE BEEN IN LEBANON SINCE 1948 AND THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS, WHO ARE READY TO GET OUT AS SOON AS SYRIA DOES AND "WON'T EXPLOIT THE SITUATION." MCFARLANE POINTED TO THE ISRAELI OFFER TO SUPPORT THE LEBANESE CIVIL ADMINISTRA-

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TION IN THE SOUTH AND AN EARLY LEBANESE ARMY PRESENCE AS EXAMPLES OF THEIR GOOD FAITH, BUT REPORTED THAT ASSAD HAD TOLD HIM THAT SYRIA DOUBTED GEMAYEL'S SINCERITY IN ACHIEVING INTERNAL RECONCILIATION. FAHD AGAIN STRONGLY SUPPORTED GEMAYEL AND SAID THAT SUCH DOUBTS ARE MISPLACED AND THAT HE WANTED GEMAYEL TO GAIN CONFIDENCE BY FEELING THAT OTHER ARABS ARE "RALLYING AROUND HIM." SPEAKING AGAIN OF HIS PROJECTED MEETING WITH JUMBLATT, HE PROMISED TO GET TO THE BOTTOM OF WHATEVER JUMBLATT'S PROBLEMS ARE WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OR THE PHALANGE BECAUSE "SAUDI ARABIA SEEKS TO HELP AMIN GEMAYEL." FAHD CONCLUDED BY PROMISING THAT HE WOULD TRY TO ARRANGE A DIRECT MEETING BETWEEN JUMBLATT AND GEMAYEL. MCFARLANE REPLIED THAT THIS

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WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO THE LEBANESE. SPEAKING EMOTIONALLY, FAHD PROMISED TO REMOVE BARRIERS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE DRUZE LEADER "IN OUR OWN QUIET WAY. WHAT INTERESTS US (SAUDIS) IS NOT PUBLICITY, BUT GOOD RESULTS."

12. MCFARLANE NEXT RAISED THE QUESTION OF A MOVE BY SYRIA OUT OF THE METN, DESCRIBING IT AS IMPORTANT BOTH TO THE LEBANESE INTERNAL SITUATION AND TO THE CREDIBILITY OF SYRIA'S INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. ALTHOUGH FAHD DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY, HE REJOINED THAT EVERYTHING MCFARLANE HAD RAISED WITH ASSAD WAS CORRECT AND WOULD BE USEFUL. WHEN MCFARLANE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED NO ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ASSAD EITHER ON HELPING RECONCILIATION OR UNDERTAKING WITHDRAWAL AND HAD INSTEAD BEEN GIVEN STRONG AND UNEQUIVOCAL NEGATIVE REACTIONS, THE KING REJOINED THAT "'NO' IS AN EASY WORD TO SAY, BUT I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT (OVER TIME) WE CAN GET A YES." MCFARLANE REITERATED U.S. PATIENCE AND RESOLVE AND SAID THAT OUR STRATEGY FOR LEBANON INCLUDED CONTINUING BILATERAL TALKS WITH SYRIA AS ONE PILLAR AND PROGRAMS TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND CONSIDERATION OF "INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE ASSAD TO COMPROMISE" AS THE OTHER. IN THAT CONTEXT MCFARLANE ASKED THE KING IF, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, THE TIME HAD COME FOR GEMAYEL TO FORMALLY ASK FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL OR AT LEAST A REDEPLOYMENT OUT OF THE METN. FAHD REPLIED SOMEWHAT OBLIQUELY THAT A LETTER ON THE METN MOVEMENT WOULD BE "EASIER," BUT THAT THAT SHOULD AWAIT AN AGREEMENT ON THE CHARACTERIZATION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND FAHD'S TALKS WITH JUMBLATT.

13. MCFARLANE THEN STRESSED THAT PLO DEPARTURE, EVEN ABSENT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, WOULD BE A GREAT HELP IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS. SAUD INTERJECTED A POINTED QUESTION ASKING IF THIS MEANT THAT, IF THE PLO LEFT FIRST, ISRAEL WOULD NOT DEMAND SYRIAN DEPARTURE PRIOR TO ITS FULL WITHDRAWAL. MCFARLANE ANSWERED THAT THIS WAS POSSIBLE AND WOULD AT A MINIMUM REMOVE THE NEED FOR ISRAELI-SYRIAN SIMULTANEITY. FAHD SIDE-STEPPED A DIRECT RESPONSE BY SAYING THAT THE PROBLEM NOW IS NOT THE PLO, BUT SYRIA AND ISRAEL, AND THAT THE PLO WOULD BE HAPPY TO LEAVE IF SYRIA WOULD LET IT. HE ALSO SPECULATED THAT, IF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IS SEEN AS THE BEGINNING OF A TOTAL MOVEMENT, "ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE" AND THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD HELP WITH BOTH SYRIA AND THE PLO.

14. FAHD SAID THAT THE NEXT TWO WEEKS MIGHT BRING GOOD NEWS AND THAT A SYRIAN-LEBANESE DIRECT DIALOGUE WOULD HELP BREAK THE DEADLOCK. MCFARLANE SAID THAT GEMAYEL WOULD DRAW SUPPORT FROM MORE VISIBLE VISITS BY ARAB LEADERS AND THE RETURN OF ARAB AMBASSADORS AND THAT THE ARAB AMBASSADORS IN LEBANON COULD BE OF GREAT HELP IN FOSTERING SUCH A DIRECT GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT DIALOGUE. FAHD PROMISED THAT THE NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR WILL BE DISPATCHED TO LEBANON "SHORTLY," AND SAUD

POINTED OUT THAT OTHER ARAB AMBASSADORS ARE ALREADY THERE. (COMMENT: IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH BANDAR, MCFARLANE NOTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON TO TAKE THE LEAD IN INTRA-ARAB DEALINGS IN BEIRUT AND FOR SAUD IN HIS TRIPS THROUGH THE GULF STATES IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS TO GET THEM TO UPGRADE FROM CHARGE'S TO AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT. BANDAR AGREED TO UNDERTAKE BOTH OF THESE CHORES. END COMMENT.)

15. IN CONCLUSION, BOTH THE KING AND MCFARLANE EXCHANGED COMMITMENTS TO PERSISTENCE AND CLOSE COORDINATION AND TO EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN GEMAYEL

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SA, LE, IS, US, SY

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH

WHILE WORKING ON ASSAD. THE KING ASKED MCFARLANE
TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN HIS CONTINUED OPTIMISM
AND DEDICATION TO SUPPORT OUR JOINT EFFORTS.
DILLON

05/05

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 5 BEIRUT 08716

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

UGUMVZCZCBL0220

PP RUEHBL

DE RUEHDM #6088 2220559

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 100556Z AUG 83

FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3158

INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0691

RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0667

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 5650

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 8286

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DAMASCUS 06088

LOC: DISK 11 627

10 AUG 83 0610

CN: 06598

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

EXDIS

FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, SY, LE, IS, PLO, ICRC

SUBJECT: PROGRESS IN SYRIA/MIA ISSUE?

1. ICRC DAMASCUS DELEGATE GAUTIER (PROTECT) TOLD US AUGUST 9 THAT THE FORMAL REQUEST HE HAD MADE FOR THE EXHUMATION OF THE FOUR BODIES BURIED IN THE JEWISH CEMETERY JULY 4, 1982 APPEARED TO BE MOVING FORWARD WITHIN THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. HE EXPRESSED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM THAT AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE, THE SYRIANS WOULD ALLOW THE ICRC TO EXHUME THE BODIES FOR IDENTIFICATION. SINCE THE IDF MAINTAINS DENTAL RECORDS ON ALL OF ITS SOLDIERS (ACCORDING TO GAUTIER) IDENTIFICATION OF THE REMAINS WOULD NOT BE A MAJOR PROBLEM.

2. GAUTIER CONFIRMED THAT ICRC OFFICIALS BASED IN BEIRUT HAD VISITED ON JULY 15 THE SIX PRISONERS HELD BY FATAH IN TRIPOLI AFTER A HIATUS OF FOUR MONTHS, AND FOUND THEM TO BE IN GOOD SHAPE. AS FOR THE TWO POWS HELD BY THE PFLP-GC, HE AGAIN EVINced SOME OPTIMISM THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO VISIT THEM IN THE NEAR FUTURE. REGULAR VISITS WERE CONTINUING TO THE THREE ISRAELI POWS HELD BY THE SYRIANS.

3. GAUTIER ADMITTED THAT THE BAD RELATIONS BETWEEN FATAH AND THE PFLP-GC COMPLICATED INDIRECT ISRAELI-PLO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PRISONER EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, HE IMPLIED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS THROUGH NON-ICRC CHANNELS.

4. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

BT

#6088

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1-#115BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

UVKVZCZCBL0239
 OO RUEHBL
 DE RUERDM #6097/01 2220845
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 100750Z AUG 83 ZFF-4
 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3163
 INFO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0416
 RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0694
 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8530
 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5651
 RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6489
 RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2354
 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8287
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2553

LOC: DISK 11 705
 10 AUG 83 0851
 CN: 05617
 CHRG: PROG
 DIST: ROSS

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1 #116

NARA, DATE 4/19/06

BT
SECRET DAMASCUS 06097

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SY, LE, IS, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH
 - KHADDAM, AUGUST 6

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: IN TWO AND HALF-HOUR MEETING WITH KHADDAM EVENING AUGUST 6, AMB MCFARLANE PRESENTED OVERVIEW OF USG GLOBAL PRIORITIES AND OF THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE BASE OUR APPROACH TO LEBANON. ALTHOUGH KHADDAM TOOK PAINS TO STRESS SYRIA WELCOMES RESUMPTION OF OUR BILATERAL DIALOGUE, HE PROVIDED STANDARD SYRIAN HARD LINE -- GEMAYEL'S PRO-PHALANGIST POLICIES ARE "DIMINISHING" GOL LEGITIMACY; SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL DEPENDS ON UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND "RESCINDING" OF THE AGREEMENT; USG'S PRO-ISRAELI BIAS FATALLY VITIATES ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAYER IN THE MIDDLE EAST. KHADDAM SAID MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION OF A SYRIAN PULLBACK FROM THE METN WOULD EXPOSE ITS INHABITANTS TO MASSACRE, BUT DID FORMALLY AGREE TO A USG/SARG CLAUSE-BY-CLAUSE REVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT. ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT WAS CORDIAL AND KHADDAM ENDED WITH UPBEAT REFERENCE TO "A USEFUL START".
 END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS MET WITH SYRIAN FONMIN KHADDAM FROM 1800-2100 LOCAL AUGUST 6. AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI, ROSS, TEICHER, DUR AND GLASPIE ACCOMPANIED. ON THE SYRIAN SIDE WERE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN

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AFFAIRS FARUQ AL-SHAR, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER RASHID KAYLANI, MFA AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR SAMI GLAIEL, INTERPRETER SAMIH ABU FARIS, AND TWO NOTETAKERS.

4. KHADDAM OPENED THE MEETING BY EXPRESSING HIS HOPE THAT THE VISIT WOULD LEAD TO BETTER AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION. SARG/USG BILATERAL CONTACTS HAD PROVEN USEFUL IN THE PAST, AS THE FACT OF THE CURRENT MCFARLANE VISIT BORE WITNESS.

5. MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH A NEWCOMER TO THE AREA, HE WAS "VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE IMPERATIVE OF CONSULTING CLOSELY" WITH SARG, LKKNOWLEDGED THE HISTORIC ROLE YRIA MK T CONTINUE TO PLAY IN THE AREA, AND NOTED COMPLEX PROBLEMS REQUIRE TIME AND DISCUSSION FOR SOLUTION. HAVING WORKED FOR DR. KISSINGER FOR FIVE YEARS, MCFARLANE HOPED TO EMULATE HIS PATIENCE AND HIS ABILITY TO LISTEN AND LEARN.

6. MCFARLANE EXPLAINED PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD ASKED HIM TO PROVIDE SARG WITH AN OVERVIEW OF USG GLOBAL PRIORITIES AND OF THE APPROACH THE USG REGARDS FRUITFUL IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SPECIFICALLY IN LEBANON.

7. MCFARLANE RECALLED THAT WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN CAME TO OFFICE HE HAD DEFINED MORE THAN A DOZEN ISSUES TO WHICH THE U.S. MIGHT CONTRIBUTE SO AS TO INCREASE STABILITY AND IMPROVE HUMAN WELFARE. DURING THE PAST YEAR HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT IN THE TERM OF OFFICE WHICH REMAINS TO HIM HE COULD HOPE TO EFFECT STRATEGIC IMPROVEMENTS IN ONLY TWO OF THESE AREAS, TO WHICH HE WILL ACCORDINGLY DEVOTE A MAXIMUM OF HIS TIME AND RESOURCES. THE AREAS HE HAS CHOSEN ARE EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS CHOICE DOES NOT INDICATE A DENIGRATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF OTHER AREAS SUCH AS CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND ARMS CONTROL, BUT RATHER IS A RECOGNITION THAT THE VOLATILITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST NECESSITATES THAT THE U.S. DO WHAT IT CAN TO LESSEN INSTABILITY AND IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

8. USG INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MCFARLANE ACKNOWLEDGED, ARE NOT PURELY ALTRUISTIC BUT INCLUDE SUCH GOALS AS PEACEFUL ACCESS TO AREA RESOURCES BY ALL. FURTHER,

THESE INTERESTS AND COMMITMENTS ARE NOT SHORT TERM --
THEY ARE ENDURING.

9. MCFARLANE EMPHASIZED THAT THE USG IS ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO ISRAELI SECURITY. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE PAST YEAR U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS HAVE PASSED THROUGH A STORMY PERIOD BECAUSE THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE RELATIONSHIP IS BASED HAS BEEN STRETCHED TO ITS LIMITS -- I.E., WHEN ONE OF TWO "ALLIES" TAKES A STRATEGIC STEP IT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO CONSIDER THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER. PRESIDENT REAGAN NOW BELIEVES THIS BILATERAL PROBLEM HAS BEEN OVERCOME AND A PERIOD OF RESTORATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS HAS BEGUN.

10. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT IN THE COMING DAYS AND WEEKS OF THE U.S.-SYRIAN DIALOGUE IT MIGHT BE ACADEMICALLY INTERESTING TO DISCUSS ISRAELI SECURITY STRATEGY. AT PRESENT HE WOULD SIMPLY OFFER ONE CONCLUSION, I.E., ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO REGARD ITS OWN SECURITY AS ITS FOREMOST NATIONAL GOAL, AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER CAN RALLY THE POPULATION AS ON NOTHING ELSE. HENCE, ALTHOUGH ISRAEL CAN PROTECT ITS SECURITY IN MANY WAYS, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS OVERWHELMING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR MAINTENANCE OF ISRAELI FORCES WHEREVER NECESSARY TO PROTECT AGAINST FOREIGN THREATS. MCFARLANE ADDED THAT HE DID "NOT ESPOUSE OR PROMOTE" THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS; IT IS A FACT WE MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION.

11. TURNING TO LEBANON, MCFARLANE OFFERED HIS VIEWS ON HOW SARG AND THE USG MIGHT JOIN IN THE PROCESS OF CREATING GREATER STABILITY. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GOALS, ESTABLISHED IN COORDINATION WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, ARE TO SECURE THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN FORCES, TO FACILITATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOL'S SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT LEBANON, AND TO INSURE A STABLE SECURITY SITUATION ON LEBANON'S BORDERS, INCLUDING WITH ISRAEL AND SYRIA.

12. THE FIRST GOAL, EVACUATION OF FOREIGN FORCES, SEEMS TO THE USG A REASONABLE PRIORITY GIVEN THE INSTABILITY OF FORCES IN DIRECT CONFRONTATION AND THE FACT OF DAILY VIOLENCE. ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE, E.G., BETWEEN PLO UNITS OR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO, CAN ULTIMATELY INVOLVE SYRIAN UNITS AND BECOME WIDE IN SCALE. FORCE CONCENTRATION AND CAPACITY ON BOTH SIDES HAVE RISEN IN THE PAST YEAR. SYRIAN STRENGTH IS EXTREMELY IMPRESSIVE, AS ISRAEL IS AWARE. HOWEVER, FROM HIS OWN TALKS WITH ISRAELIS AND FROM INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, MCFARLANE HAS CONCLUDED THERE IS NO DOUBT ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT MAJOR LOSSES IF ITS SECURITY IS IN JEOPARDY.

13. THE SECOND GOAL, ESTABLISHING GOL CONTROL THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, REQUIRES THE COOPERATION OF ALL OF LEBANON'S NEIGHBORS. NOTING THAT SYRIA IS BETTER INFORMED ON LEBANESE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES THAN IS THE USG, MCFARLANE NEVERTHELESS POINTED TO THE FACT THAT CONFSSIONAL DISAGREEMENTS ARE COMPLICATED BY SUCH OTHER PROBLEMS AS

INCIPIENT ECONOMIC DISASTER. CLEARLY, MCFARLANE STRESSED, GOL POLICIES MUST BENEFIT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY OR THEY WON'T WORK.

14. MCFARLANE STRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT GEMAYEL RECOGNIZES THIS FACT. HE IS IN INTENSE DIALOGUE WITH ALL FACTIONS, INCLUDING SOMETIMES BITTER EXCHANGES WITH THE PHALANGE. AS A MILITARY EXPERT, MCFARLANE SAID, HE WAS STRUCK BY THE JUDGMENT AND WISDOM WITH WHICH COMMAND BILLETS ARE CURRENTLY BEING ASSIGNED.

15. TURNING TO IDEAS ON HOW BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS MIGHT

APPROACH IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR SHARED GOALS, MCFARLANE CITED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VIEW THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED FROM TWO PRINCIPLES. FIRST, EVERY SOVEREIGN STATE OUGHT TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE AUTONOMOUSLY ITS OWN SECURITY INTERESTS AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE DEFENDED. SECOND, EVERY COUNTRY OUGHT TO HAVE THE SOVEREIGN ABILITY TO DECIDE HOW TO CONDUCT ITS OWN RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

16. THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES IS CREATING MAJOR DIFFICULTIES FOR THE GOL IN IMPLEMENTING THE FIRST PRINCIPLE. FURTHER, THE GOL IS CONCERNED THAT IF THOSE FOREIGN POWERS LEAVE, THE GOL MUST BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE CARE OF THE SECURITY ISSUES WHICH HAVE CONCERNED THE OCCUPYING POWERS. THE GOL, WHICH MUST BE ABLE TO RESOLVE INTERNAL POLITICAL FACTIONAL DISPUTES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY, IS WORKING POLITICALLY (THROUGH OUT-REACH TO THE CONFESSIONS) AND MILITARILY (BY DEVELOPING A MILITARY ARM CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL ORDER AND SECURE BORDERS). THE GOL ALSO FACES THE PROBLEM OF THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE CAUSED BY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN FOREIGN FORCES AND THE INTERPLAY OF THOSE FORCES WITH DOMESTIC PARTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE USG BELIEVES THE GOL'S PROGRESS TOWARD ITS BASIC GOALS WILL BE ENHANCED IF WE CAN FIND A BASIS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE FOREIGN FORCES.

17. TURNING TO THE ISRAELI POSITION, MCFARLANE SAID IT WAS HIS SENSE THAT THE GOI WILL WITHDRAW, BUT IT IS VERY CLEAR IT WILL NOT WITHDRAW ENTIRELY AS LONG AS THE SYRIAN PRESENCE (IN LEBANON) CONTINUES TO POSE A RISK. MCFARLANE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IS NEITHER ANALOGOUS NOR HISTORICALLY CONGRUENT, BUT STRESSED THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER INVOLVING THE STABILITY OF LEBANON, THE DEPARTURE OF BOTH IS INTER-RELATED. MCFARLANE ASSERTED THAT IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL COMMENCE. FIRST STEPS TAKEN IN ALAY/SHUF WILL ENABLE THE REESTABLISHMENT OF GOL AUTHORITY IN A GREAT PART OF THE COUNTRY, AND THAT IS GOOD.

18. MCFARLANE THEN ASKED KHADDAM A QUESTION. SINCE THE USG BELIEVES IT USEFUL TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE EXPANSION OF GOL AUTHORITY, WOULD KHADDAM CONSIDER THE VALUE OF MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN FORCES, FOR EXAMPLE OUT OF THE MATN, TO PROVIDE A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR THE GOL TO REASSUME CONTROL. THE USG BELIEVES SUCH A SYRIAN MOVEMENT WOULD NOT ONLY BE CONSTRUCTIVE BUT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE "GREATER STABILITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD."

19. SMILING, KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT MCFARLANE'S PRESENTATION HAD TAKEN LESS TIME THAN HE HAD BEEN EXPECTING (PRSUMABLY A REFERFNCE TO THE STEADY STREAM OF MEDIA REPORTS FROM ISRAEL AND LEBANON ABOUT "NEW IDEAS"). HE THANKED MCFARLANE FOR HIS EXPOSE OF USG VIEWS, SAYING THAT BEFORE HE CLARIFIED THE SYRIAN POSITION HE WOULD POSE SOME QUESTIONS.

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20. KHADDAM ASKED FIRST WHETHER THE PRESENT U.S. "MOVE" IS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT, I.E., "IS THE USG CONVINCED OF THE FUTILITY OF THE AGREEMENT" AND THE NECESSITY THAT IT BE "RESCINDED"?

21. MCFARLANE RECALLED THAT THE GOL HAD ENTERED AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL TO WHICH THE U.S. WAS A PARTY. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE AGREEMENT IS NOT PRESENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED. THE PROPOSED ISRAELI MOVEMENT OF FORCES IS A MATTER IN AND OF ITSELF. MCFARLANE STRESSED THAT THE IDEAS HE HAD PROPOSED HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE AGREEMENT.

22. KHADDAM THEN ASKED, "WHAT IS THE FATE OF THI AGREE-

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MENT IN SUCH A CASE?", TO WHICH MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT THE GOL HAS CHOSEN FOR THE MOMENT NOT TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT. THE USG BELIEVES THE AGREEMENT TO BE REASONABLE BUT THE GOL AND SARG (SIC) -- (MCFARLANE MEANT GOI AND KHADDAM UNDERSTOOD THIS) -- WILL DECIDE WHETHER TO MOVE FORWARD AS IS THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHT. MCFARLANE ADDED THAT HE WOULD ANTICIPATE BOTH GOVERNMENTS MUST CONSIDER HOW THEIR ACTIONS WOULD RELATE TO THE SARG.

23. KHADDAM ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE POSITION OF THE USG AND GOI "IF" THE GOL ANNOUNCES IT IS RESCINDING THE AGREEMENT. NOTING HE CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE GOI, MCFARLANE SAID HE WOULD EXPECT HIGH TENSION AND A CONTINUING ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON.

24. KHADDAM CITED MCFARLANE (INCORRECTLY) AS HAVING DECLARED USG'S TOP PRIORITY IS ISRAELI SECURITY. HE ASKED WHAT THE USG "CONCEPT" IS BOTH OF ISRAELI SECURITY AND OF THE SECURITY OF OTHERS IN THE REGION. MCFARLANE SAID ISRAEL'S SECURITY IS BEST ACHIEVED BY FINDING A BASIS FOR POLITICAL GUARANTEES WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS. WE ENCOURAGE THAT PROCESS, AND UNTIL IT IS COMPLETED THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO ASSIST IN ASSURING THE GOI CAN DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST FOREIGN ATTACK.

25. KHADDAM ASKED WHO WILL GUARANTEE OTHER STATES AGAINST ATTACKS BY ISRAEL. MCFARLANE SAID JUST, LASTING AGREEMENTS RECOGNIZING THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS IS THE BEST WAY FORWARD. THERE COULD BE GUARANTEES INVOLVING THE PRINCIPLE OF MILITARY BALANCE AND MEASURES TO INSURE THIS BALANCE IS MAINTAINED. KHADDAM ASKED AGAIN HOW ARAB SECURITY WOULD BE GUARANTEED IN THE INTERIM WHILE THE U.S. GUARANTEES ISRAELI SECURITY. MCFARLANE STATED THAT THE U.S. "DOES NOT ENDORSE OR CONDONE ANY AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL OR BY ANY OTHER STATE".

26. ISRAEL, KHADDAM RETORTED, DESTROYED AND OCCUPIED THE CAPITAL OF LEBANON. WHAT DID THE U.S. DO ABOUT THAT AGGRESSION AND WILL IT DO THE SAME THING AGAIN. RESPONDING TO HIS OWN RHETORICAL QUESTION, KHADDAM ANSWERED THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS' RESPONSE WAS 500 MILLION DOLLARS OF INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL.

27. THE USG DID NOT ENDORSE ISRAELI ACTION, MCFARLANE RESPONDED, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO IGNORE THAT OVER A COURSE OF YEARS VIOLENCE WAS PERPETRATED OVER ISRAELI BORDERS. WITH REGARD TO THE CURRENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, PRESIDENT REAGAN DID NOT CHANGE PROGRAM LEVELS FROM LAST YEAR. FURTHER, THE USG RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS OF ARABS AS IS EVIDENCED BY THE SAUDI AND EGYPTIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO ISRAELI AID IN SCALE AND DIMENSION AND WHICH ARE LIKELIKE EXPECTED TO EXPAND IN THE FUTURE.

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28. KHADDAM TOOK STRONG ISSUE, INSISTING THAT ISRAEL RECEIVES MORE AND THIS ASSISTANCE IS WHAT ENCOURAGES THE

GOI IN ITS AGGRESSION. MCFARLANE ALLUDED AGAIN TO THE FIRST PRINCIPLE HE HAD SKETCHED OUT. ANY COUNTRY -- GREECE, SYRIA, LEBANON -- IS ENTITLED TO DECIDE WHAT IS A THREAT TO IT AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THAT THREAT. PRACTICALLY, THIS MEANS SYRIA, FOR EXAMPLE, CAN UNDERTAKE MEASURES TO PROTECT ITS SECURITY INTERESTS.

29. KHADDAM ASKED WHAT FREEDOM OF DECISION THE GOL HAS WHEN ISRAELI TANKS ARE ONLY A FEW HUNDRED METERS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S RESIDENCE. MCFARLANE SAID HE TOOK KHADDAM'S POINT THAT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER FOREIGN OCCUPATION CAN COLOR THE OUTCOME. BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, SUCH NEGOTIATIONS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST IN THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN

ISRAEL AND AN ARAB COUNTRY, PROVIDING A RESULT WHICH THE LATTER FOUND VERY ACCEPTABLE (I.E. SYRIA).

30. KHADDAM ASKED IF THOSE ARRANGEMENTS HAD PROVIDED REGIONAL SECURITY TO WHICH MCFARLANI SAID YES, POINTING TO THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN SEPARATION OF FORCES AS AN INSURANCE OF STABILITY. WHILE HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR SYRIA'S VIEW OF THE ARRANGEMENTS SYRIA HAD CONCLUDED WITH ISRAEL TO EFFECT SIMILAR SEPARATION, MCFARLANE NOTED THAT HISTORICALLY THERE HAVE BEEN FEW UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENTS DO PROVIDE FOR THE RETURN OF ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORY, A SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENT.

31. KHADDAM THEN PRESENTED THE SARG POSITION ON USG AREA POLICY. ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM, HE SAID, ALIENATES ANY POSSIBILITY OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. UNLIMITED U.S. SUPPORT IS WHAT PERMITS ISRAEL TO EXPAND, ANNEX ARAB LAND, AND CREATE NEW AREA TENSION. IF ISRAEL, THE AGGRESSOR STATE, FINDS ITS SECURITY A BASIC NATIONAL INTEREST, AXIOMATICALLY THE ARABS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO ISRAELI AGGRESSION REGARD THEIR SECURITY AS EVEN MORE BASIC.

32. WE HOPE, KHADDAM SAID, WE WILL SEE THE DAY WHEN THE USG WILL BE BALANCED; THEN U.S. POLICY WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AND THE U.S. WILL FIND FRIENDS. PEOPLE IN THE AREA WILL SEE USG PRACTICES ACCORD WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUPERPOWER PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNSC. THE USG'S ATTEMPT TO LOOK AT THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH AN ISRAELI LENS CONTRADICTS ARAB ASPIRATIONS "IRRESPECTIVE OF WORDS OF FLATTERY YOU MAY HEAR" (I.E., FROM OUR ARAB FRIENDS).

33. I WANT TO STRESS, SAID KHADDAM, SYRIA WANTS A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE CONTEXT OF UN RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR (A) THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND (B) ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. (COMMENT: FROM THE CONTEXT IT IS NOT CLEAR IF KHADDAM WAS REFERRING TO 242 AND 338 IN ADDITION TO 508 AND 509.) A MIDDLE EAST PEACE WILL HAVE POSITIVE EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. U.S. BALANCE IS NOW NON-EXISTENT AND CANNOT BE IMPLIED BY POINTING TO AIRPLANE DELIVERY TO EGYPT AND TANKS TO JORDAN WHILE ISRAEL BOMBS AND DESTROYS LEBANON AND THREATENS SYRIA AND ALL THE ARAB NATION.

34. NEVERTHELESS, KHADDAM DECLARED, "I THINK CONTINUATION OF DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS A POSITIVE THING."

35. TURNING TO LEBANON, KHADDAM AGREED WITH THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED BY MCFARLANE, STRESSING THAT IN ALL PAST USG CONTACTS WITH SARG, INCLUDING MESSAGES FROM VARIOUS U.S. PRESIDENTS TO ASSAD, THE U.S. HAS STATED LEBANESE SURVIVAL DEPENDS ON ITS INDEPENDENT, UNITED AND SOVEREIGN STATUS. HOWEVER, U.S. APPLICATION OF THESE

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PRINCIPLES LEAD TO MAJOR DIFFERENCES WITH SARG. THE AGREEMENT IMPOSED ON LEBANON IS AN EXAMPLE OF NON-OBJECTIVE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES.

36. IF THE U.S. IS TRULY COMMITTED TO THESE PRINCIPLES, KHADDAM SAID, SYRIA IS READY TO DISCUSS WAYS TO IMPLEMENT THEM. LET'S READ THE AGREEMENT CLAUSE BY CLAUSE AND OMIT ANYTHING CONTRADICTING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. RESTRICTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON LEBANON ARE GREATER THAN THOSE IMPOSED ON NAZI GERMANY. ISRAEL HAS ASKED LEBANON TO PAY THE COST OF HER VICTORY, A WAR IN WHICH LEBANON DID NOT EVEN FIGHT. LEBANON IS TRANSFORMED INTO AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE; THE SECURITY AND INTERESTS OF

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SYRIA AND ALL ARABS ARE CONTRAVENED.

37. KHADDAM RECALLED THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SYRIA'S ENTRY INTO LEBANON. ON ONE SIDE, THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT (KAMAL JUMBLATT AND THE PALESTINIANS), WHOSE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES WERE LARGELY IN ACCORD WITH SYRIA'S, WAS FIGHTING THE PHALANGE-BASED LEBANESE FRONT WITH WHICH SYRIA HAD NO COMMON POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. IN 1976 AS THE WAR ESCALATED, SYRIA ACTED TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL BALANCE BY ENTERING ON THE SIDE WITH WHICH IT HAD NO COMMON POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. SYRIA ENTERED AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHRISTIAN PRESIDENT AND MOST LEBANESE TO PREVENT THE DOMINATION OF ANY ONE SIDE AND THE DISMEMBERMENT OF LEBANON.

38. TWO THINGS NOW THREATEN LEBANON, KHADDAM ASSERTED: POPULAR OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT AND OPPRESSION OF MUSLIMS AND OTHER LEBANESE PATRIOTS. PREVIOUS DAY, KHADDAM SAID, A MARONITE FRIEND CLOSE TO GEMAYEL (PRESUMABLY JEAN OBEID) HAD TOLD KHADDAM THAT HE HAD STRESSED TO GEMAYEL THAT THE LEBANESE PEOPLE DID NOT WANT A PHALANGE STATE AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT CREATE TWO STATES -- ONE OF THE FATHER (PIERRE GEMAYEL/PHALANGE) AND ONE OF THE SON (AMIN GEMAYEL/GOL). KHADDAM NOTED WITH A TWINKLE IN HIS EYE THAT HIS FRIEND HAD FORGOTTEN TO MENTION THE STATE OF THE "HOLY GHOST" (ISRAEL).

39. KHADDAM THEN ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THE PHALANGE IS ESTABLISHING "HEGEMONY" OVER ALL OF THE STATE INSTITUTIONS. EVEN THE MODERATE MUFTI HAD SAID SO PUBLICLY. PHALANGE MILITIA ARE OPPRESSING AND KILLING IN WEST BEIRUT. THE RESULT IS A STATE OF NATIONAL IMBALANCE. GEMAYEL, "BY CONTINUING THIS POLICY, IS INVALIDATING GOL'S LEGITIMACY."

40. KHADDAM STATED THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY WOULD DEPEND ON (A) UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT BENEFIT FOR ISRAEL PER UNSC RES. 508 AND 509; THIS MEANS RESCINDING OF THE AGREEMENT, AND (B) COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

41. RESPONDING TO MCFARLANE'S COMMENT ON CONFSSIONAL BALANCE OF NEW MILITARY BILLETTS, KHADDAM SAID THE REAL QUESTION IS WHO MAKES THE DECISIONS. THE WHOLE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT, HE INSISTED, IS IN PHALANGIST HANDS -- THE ARMY COMMANDER, THE HEAD OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE, THE HEAD OF PUBLIC SECURITY, AND THE HEAD OF THE GENDARMERIE. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS ARE NOW ALSO PHALANGE DOMINATED.

42. TURNING TO MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION FOR A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE METN, KHADDAM RECALLED SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT RESULTED IN PHALANGIST MASSACRES. SARG CANNOT EXPOSE LEBANESE CITIZENS TO NEW MASSACRES.

43. SUMMARIZING THE SYRIAN POSITION, KHADDAM SAID THAT SARG'S COMMITMENTS TO A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN LEBANON AND TO THE MAINTENANCE OF SYRIAN SECURITY ARE INTEGRAL AND COMPLEMENTARY.

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44. TURNING TO SARG CONTACTS WITH THE GOL, KHADDAM SAID SYRIA MAINTAINS ITS STANDARD POSITION. SARG IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING BENEFICIAL TO LEBANON WITH THE GOL AND IS PREPARED TO COMPLY WITH LEBANESE REQUESTS FOR WITHDRAWAL "IN A VERY SHORT TIME" IF REPEAT IF ISRAEL

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WITHDRAWS WITHOUT GAINS SUCH AS THOSE GUARANTEED IN THE AGREEMENT. FURTHER, SYRIA DOES NOT WANT A MILITARY CLASH, BUT "IF IT IS IMPOSED BY ISRAEL," SYRIA WILL INFLICT GREAT CASUALTIES, REALIZING THAT SYRIA WILL TAKE GREAT CASUALTIES ITSELF.

45. A LEBANESE SOLUTION CANNOT PROCEED FROM A FAIT ACCOMPLI; THE AGREEMENT IS ILLEGAL AND ILLEGITIMATE, CONTRAVENING THE GENEVA CONVENTION BY WHICH "ANY AGREEMENT IMPOSED BY FORCE OR THREAT OF FORCE IS INVALID."

46. CONCLUDING HIS PRESENTATION, KHADDAM SAID MCFARLANE'S "OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS" (TO THE PRESS IN BEIRUT) HAD LED HIM TO ANTICIPATE NEW U.S. IDEAS, WHICH HE HAD NOT YET HEARD. DID THE U.S. INTEND SIMPLY TO CREATE AN OPTIMISTIC ATMOSPHERE OR PRODUCE SOMETHING TANGIBLE -- "WHAT IS NEW FROM YOU?"

47. MCFARLANE OFFERED COMMENTS ON FOUR OF KHADDAM'S POINTS. HE NOTED KHADDAM HAD CALLED INTO QUESTION USG'S FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ALLEGING EXCLUSIVE ORIENTATION TO ISRAEL RATHER THAN COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AS OUR GOAL. THIS POINT IS "TERRIBLY IMPORTANT" SINCE THERE IS NO HOPE FOR AGREEMENT IN OTHER AREAS IF CONFIDENCE CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED ON THIS ISSUE. MCFARLANE POINTED OUT THAT HIS JOB INVOLVES DAILY MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM WHICH HE HAS GARNERED A SENSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MOTIVES AND HIS VIEW OF WHAT IS RIGHT AND WRONG. THE PRESIDENT'S VERY STRONG FEELING IS THAT WE MUST BREAK OUT OF THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WHICH SERVES NEITHER OUR INTERESTS NOR THE INTERESTS OF JEWS OR ARABS.

48. MCFARLANE AGREED KHADDAM MAY BE CORRECT THAT THE USG

IS PERCEIVED AS EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSED ON ISRAELI SECURITY. BUT KHADDAM IS WRONG ABOUT THE U.S. POLICY GOAL, WHICH IS PEACE WITH JUSTICE FOR ALL, AS ENUNCIATED ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1982. TIME AND AGAIN MCFARLANE HAS HEARD THE PRESIDENT EXPLAIN TO ISRAELI LEADERS THAT THEIR INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY ACHIEVING A JUST PEACE BASED ON 242 AND 338. MCFARLANE EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE THAT AT FEZ SYRIA AND OTHER ARABS HAD FOUND POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SEPTEMBER 1 INITIATIVE.

49. REBUTTING KHADDAM'S ALLEGATION THAT THE AGREEMENT IS UNBALANCED, MCFARLANE SUGGESTED AN EXHAUSTIVE STUDY AT STAFF LEVEL. HE NOTED TWO OBVIOUS BENEFITS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON: PROVISION FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL (AND THEREFORE A CONDITION OF CONTROL BY THE GOL WHICH HAS NOT EXISTED FOR TEN YEARS) AND ISRAELI RECOGNITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, A BENEFIT WHICH SUCH AGREEMENTS DO NOT ALWAYS PROVIDE (E.G., SYRIA'S 1974 AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL).

50. ON GOL LEGITIMACY, A POINT WHICH RELATES TO THE EQUITY OF THE AGREEMENT, MCFARLANE POINTED OUT THAT THE GOL, SEEKING TO PROVIDE FOR ALL ITS CITIZENS, HAD EXERCISED ITS SOVERIGN RIGHT AND DETERMINED TO EMBARK ON THE AGREEMENT. IT IS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. IF SARG DISAGREES ABOUT THE GOL'S LEGITIMACY, "THERE IS LITTLE BASIS FOR DIALOGUE." INDEED, GOL LEGITIMACY IS SOMEWHAT OF A MODEL FOR THIS AREA, CERTAINLY MORE THAN MANY. (AT THIS POINT IN THE ARABIC INTERPRETATION, KHADDAM FROWNED OPENLY.)

51. FINALLY, MCFARLANE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON IS NOT PERFECT BUT GEMAYEL'S CONCERN FOR ALL THE LEBANESE IS MANIFEST, NOT ONLY IN DAILY CONTACTS WITH ALL THE SECTS BUT IN THE CONFSSIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY FOR WHICH VOLUNTEERS FROM EACH SECT ARE NOW GREATER THAN CAN BE ABSORBED.

52. MCFARLANE CLOSED BY CHARACTERIZING THE EXCHANGE AS "WORTHWHILE" AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE WE CAN CARRY ON CLARIFYING AND DEFINING DISAGREEMENTS WHERE THEY EXIST AND MAKE PROGRESS TOGETHER.

53. KHADDAM, RETURNING TO THE AGREEMENT, ASSERTED THAT SOUTH LEBANON IS NOW UNDER LEBANESE-ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION AND THE LEBANESE ARE DOMINATED BY THE ISRAELIS. ISRAEL IS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT BORDERS, IT HAS IN PRACTICE ANNEXED THE SOUTH.

54. HE AGREED TO MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION THAT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES MEET AND DISCUSS THE "SCORES OF SYRIAN OBJECTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT."

55. AS FOR THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOL, KHADDAM RECALLED ASSAD'S PROPOSAL TO THE SECRETARY OF A REFERENDUM, TO TAKE PLACE AFTER THE DISARMING OF ALL SIDES, AFTER SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A NEUTRAL COUNTRY. NEITHER GEMAYEL NOR THE AGREEMENT WOULD GET FIVE PERCENT OF THE LEBANESE VOTE.

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56. IN CLOSING, KHADDAM AGAIN THANKED MCFARLANE FOR THEIR "USEFUL" EXCHANGE, SAYING THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF DIVERGENCE OR NON-DIVERGENCE OF VIEWPOINTS, THEY HAD TOGETHER MADE A USEFUL START.

57. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

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CTF SIX ONE 000003

(6) ACTION PM INFO AMB DCM ROSS POL CHRON

LHUIJVZCZCBL0272
 ZZ RUEHBL
 DE RUFRRSGG #5513 2221237
 ZNY CCCCC
 Z 101237Z AUG 83
 FM CTF SIX ONE
 TO RUEKJCS/NMCC WASHINGTON DC
 RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUFRRJQ/COMSIXTHFLT
 RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEOAJA/NOSIC SUITLAND MD
 RUCBSAA/COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA
 RUEOLFA/CG FMFLANT
 RUFRRMKA/RUTKAMC/CTF SIX TWO
 RUQMAD /AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
 RUCBSAA/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
 RULYVKA/COMPHIBGRU TWO
 RUFRRMDA/CTF SIX ZERO
 RUEHBI /AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 TF SIX ONE

LOC: DISK 11 841
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 CN: 06646
 CHRG: PROG
 DIST: POL

PAGE 02 RUFRRSGG5513 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OPREP 3 PINNACLE FRONT BT

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1. (C) INCIDENT. ATTACK ON MARINE POSITIONS.
6. (C) REMARKS: ROCKET AND MORTAR FIRE CONTINUES IN VIC OF BIA. MORTAR FIRE IMPACTING NEAR ROCK BASE AND ALPHA COMPANY POSITIONS. LAF ARE RETURNING FIRE WITH HEAVY ARTILLERY. MAJOR FIREFIGHTS ARE OCCURRING IN THE CITY AND SURROUNDING HILLS BETWEEN LAF/PSP AND OTHER MILITIAS. AMPLIFYING INFO TO FOLLOW.

DECL: OADR
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CTF SIX ONE 000003

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 BY CAS NARA, DATE 2/28/01

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(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

OBV BVZCZCBL0261
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHJI #6506 2221436
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 101436Z AUG 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0207
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2169
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3530
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1975
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3189
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 6220
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ JIDDA 06506

LOC: DISK 11 796
10 AUG 83 1440
CN: 06635
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

EXDIS

FOR MCFARLANE FROM MURPHY

E.O.12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, MARR, LE, SA, US
SUBJECT: REQUESTED DEMARCHE TO SAG

REF: MCFARLANE/SUDDARTH TELCON 8/10

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~
2. I REACHED SAUD MID-AFTERNOON AUGUST 10 TO RELAY YOUR SHARP CONCERN ABOUT LAST NIGHT'S DRUZE-INSPIRED INCIDENTS AND REQUESTED THAT SAG CONTACT JUMBLATT ASAP: (1) TO COMPLAIN ABOUT DESTABLIZING NATURE OF THESE ATTACKS AND (2) TO URGE HIS RECONCILIATION WITH GOL. I SAID WE WOULD BE URGING GOL TO MAKE SIMILAR CONCILIATORY APPROACH TO JUMBLATT. I EMPHASIZED THAT SAG SHOULD NOT AWAIT JUMBLATT'S VISIT HERE, HOWEVER SOON THAT MAY BE.
3. SAUD PROMISED TO RELAY OUR RECOMMENDATION TO FAHD AND ADVISE ME OF KING'S REPLY.
4. BEING UNABLE TO CONTACT BANDAR AS YET RE HADDAD'S KEEN INTEREST IN FACE-TO-FACE MEETING, WHICH ROSS HAD SPOKEN ABOUT TO ME EARLIER TODAY, I RELAYED THIS MESSAGE ALSO TO SAUD. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD "POSE NO PROBLEM." I EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO REACH BANDAR HIMSELF THIS EVENING AND WILL ADVISE.

MURPHY
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#6506

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 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2161
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0606
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0560
 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0810
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0733
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0584
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0519
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0758
 RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0132

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: PROG 8/10/83
 APPRV: RMC FARLANE
 DRFTD: CWSROSS
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: MCFARLANE-4
 AMB DCM POL
 CHRON

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SECRET BEIRUT 08742

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH
- ASSAD, AUGUST 7

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN VIEW OF THE INTEREST OF ADDRESSEES IN THE
SUBSTANCE AND TONE OF MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD
AUGUST 7, WE ARE PROVIDING BELOW THE NEAR-VERBATIM TRANS-
SCRIPT OF ASSAD'S SUBSTANTIVE PRESENTATION AND THE
RESULTING DISCUSSION. IT PROVIDES AN INTERESTING GLIMPSE
INTO ASSAD'S STYLE AND CONCERNS. ROSS WAS THE NOTETAKER.
A SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR POINTS FOLLOWS BY SEPTEL.

3. THE MEETING BEGAN AT 11:30 A.M. WITHOUT A NOTETAKER.
UNTIL 1:45 P.M., THE DISCUSSION CONSISTED OF MY PRESEN-
TATION OF MY PREPARED TALKING POINTS, AS WELL AS A VARIET
OF NON-SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS. AT 1:45 P.M., THE NOTETAKER
JOINED THE MEETING. IT ENDED AT 5:15 P.M.

4. BEGIN TRANSCRIPT.

ASSAD: WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
SITUATION IN LEBANON IS MORE CORRECT AND REALISTIC THAN
THAT OF THE U.S. BECAUSE OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO
SYRIA ON THE BASIS OF HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY.

I NOTICED FROM MCFARLANE'S STATEMENTS THAT HE SPEAKS OF TH
CHRISTIANS ON THE ONE HAND AND THE DRUZE ON THE OTHER.
LATER HE SPEAKS OF CHRISTIANS, DRUZE, SUNNIS AND SHI'ITES.
THEN HE GOES ON TO SPEAK ABOUT THE STATE AS IF IT IS A
CHRISTIAN STATE. THE LISTENER WOULD GET THE IMPRESSION
THAT THE GOVERNMENT MEANS THE CHRISTIANS AND THAT THE

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CHRISTIANS MEAN THE PHALANGE.

5. MCFARLANE: THERE MUST BE SOME MISTAKE. WHAT I SAID WAS THAT WE MUST AVOID AT ALL COSTS A STATE THAT IS CHRISTIAN OR PHALANGE.

6. ASSAD: WHAT IS THE REALITY IN LEBANON? SPEAKING FROM A RELIGIOUS POINT OF VIEW, THERE ARE CHRISTIANS. SPEAKING FROM AN (ARAB) NATIONALIST POINT OF VIEW, THE ENTIRE POPULATION OF LEBANON IS ARAB. FROM A RELIGIOUS POINT OF VIEW, THERE ARE TWO PARTS, BUT NOT AS MCFARLANE HAS DESCRIBED THEM. IT IS NOT THE CHRISTIANS VS. THE DRUZE, THE SUNNIS OR THE SHI'ITES. THERE ARE ALSO MANY DENOMINATIONS OF CHRISTIANS -- MARONITES, CATHOLICS, ORTHODOX, SYRIAC, PROTESTANT, PURITAN (SIC), ETC. THE MUSLIMS ARE COMPOSED OF THE DRUZE (PERHAPS MCFARLANE DOESN'T KNOW THAT THE DRUZE ARE ALSO MUSLIM), SUNNIS, SHI'ITES, ETC. WHEN LEBANON IS ANALYZED ON A RELIGIOUS BASIS, IT SHOULD NOT BE CHRISTIANS VS. DRUZE, BUT CHRISTIANS VS. MUSLIMS.

THIS BEING THE CASE, ANY IDEA THAT THE SHUF IS SEPARATE FROM WEST BEIRUT OR THE BIQA' OR THE SOUTH OR TRIPOLI IS IMPRACTICAL. ANY ATTEMPT TO DIVIDE LEBANON ALONG SUCH LINES WILL NOT SUCCEED. THE ISRAELIS AND THE PHALANGE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DO THIS. USING SUCH A SLOGAN, ISRAEL TRIED TO CALL FOR A DRUZE STATE, BUT THIS LOGIC WAS REJECTED, BECAUSE A DRUZE STATE IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE ISRAELIS, NOT THAT OF THE LEBANESE DRUZE.

IF WE LOOK AT THE MATTER FROM A POLITICAL AND PARTY ANGLE, WHICH IS THE REALITY IN LEBANON, THERE ARE NATIONALIST FORCES AND PARTIES, AND FORCES CALLED ISOLATIONIST, I.E., THE LEBANESE FORCES, WHICH, PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, ARE THE PHALANGE PARTY. ON ONE SIDE STANDS THE PHALANGE. ON THE OTHER SIDE STAND ALL THE NATIONALIST FORCES, PARTIES AND PERSONALITIES. FROM THE RELIGIOUS POINT OF VIEW, THESE ARE A MIXTURE OF ALL THE DENOMINATIONS THAT EXIST IN LEBANON. THE PHALANGE IS A NARROW SECTARIAN ORGANIZATION. FROM THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, THE DIVISION IN LEBANON TOOK PLACE DURING THE CIVIL WAR, WHICH LASTED FOR YEARS. THIS WAS THE DIVISION: THE PHALANGE VERSUS THE NATIONALIST FORCES, PARTIES, AND PERSONALITIES.

THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT SPRINGS FROM THIS AS THE AUTHENTIC, EFFECTIVE FORCE OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. THIS FRONT IS THE ONLY ONE THAT CAN TAKE DECISIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE LEBANESE PEOPLE IN THE VARIOUS AREAS OF THE NATION -- IN ALL OF LEBANON EXCEPT THOSE AREAS THAT THE PHALANGE PARTY DOMINATES. THIS FRONT IS LED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL BY FRANJIYYA, KARAMI, AND JUMBLATT. DOESN'T MCFARLANE SEE WITH ME THAT THIS FRONT REPRESENTS ALL THE SECTS OF LEBANON? WHAT MAKES THESE LEADERS COME TOGETHER? IT IS THAT THEY ARE LEBANESE AND PAN-ARABS. THE PHALANGE IS A CONFESSORIAL, SECTARIAN PARTY. OF COURSE, I HAVE MENTIONED ONLY THREE LEADERS. WITH THESE LEADERS ARE OTHERS WITH DIFFERENT IDEOLOGIES IN THE LEBANESE ARENA.

ANY EFFORT TO IMAGINE HOW THE CHRISTIANS MAY DEAL WITH THE SHUF AREA IS IMPRACTICAL AND WILL NOT LEAD TO ANY RESULT. IN SAYING THAT IS IS A TEST CASE FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS ALREADY BEING TESTED IN WEST BEIRUT. DOES THE EXISTING LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENT WEST BEIRUT? WE WOULD BE IGNORING REALITY COMPLETELY IF WE THOUGHT THAT THE LEBANESE REGIME NOW REPRESENTS WEST BEIRUT, EVEN THOUGH THE LEBANESE ARMY IS PRESENT THERE. WHY ARE WE TRYING TO GUESS AND STUDY FOR OURSELVES WHAT THE SITUATION IN THE SHUF WILL BE? HAVE NOT THE NATIONALIST FORCES, WITH WALID JUMBLATT AT THEIR HEAD, ANNOUNCED WHAT THE SITUATION WILL BE? THESE ARE THE HISTORICAL FORCES OF THE SHUF. THEY WERE NOT BORN YESTERDAY. THEY ARE YEARS AND YEARS AND DECADES OLD. WHY NOT BELIEVE THEM AND ACCEPT THEIR STATEMENTS? THEY HAVE SAID THEY WOULD FIGHT ANY PHALANGE IN THEIR AREA. THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED THIS IN THE VARIOUS MEDIA THEY HAVE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE STATE CANNOT BE A PHALANGE REGIME.

THEREFORE, THERE IS NO WAY TO UNIFY THE STATE AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXCEPT THROUGH A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. IT CANNOT BE DONE BY TRYING TO BRING SOME PEOPLE DOWN IN ORDER TO FRAGMENT THE LEBANESE NATIONAL FRONT.

FORCE HAS NOT RESOLVED THE MATTER IN THE PAST. IN WEST BEIRUT, FORCE WAS USED BY THE PHALANGE AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND WE KNOW THE RESULT. THEY KILLED AND MASSACRED PEOPLE, BOTH LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS. IN SPITE OF THAT, IN WEST BEIRUT THERE IS A STATE OF EMOTION AND TENSION WHOSE EXISTENCE WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR ANY REGIME TO BE STABLE. IN BRIEF, ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE THE PHALANGE ON LEBANON WILL NOT SUCCEED.

MCFARLANE: I AGREE

ASSAD: THE REGIME TODAY IS A REGIME OF THE PHALANGE, NOT OF LEBANON. MCFARLANE ASKED ME ABOUT THE REGIME IN LEBANON AND ITS LEGITIMACY. I SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES EXIST FROM A FORMAL POINT OF VIEW. BUT THIS GOVERNMENT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, AND ITS ABILITY TO REACH ANY AGREEMENT IS LIMITED.

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IN MCFARLANE'S PRESENTATION, HE SPOKE OF SYRIA'S ROLE AND INTERESTS. IN FACT, IN THE LIGHT OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THIS SYRIAN ROLE -- WHICH IS TO SERVE ARAB INTERESTS IN LEBANON, SYRIA, AND THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES-- WE HAVE ADOPTED OUR POSITION ON LEBANON AND ON THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT.

MCFARLANE SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD MADE CERTAIN COMMITMENTS IN THE PAST AND HAD THEN NOT IMPLEMENTED THEM. WHAT I HAVE SEEN UP TO NOW IS THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN UNABLE TO MOVE ISRAEL ONE HAIR'S BREADTH AWAY FROM ITS PLAN TO OCCUPY AND EXERCISE HEGEMONY OVER LEBANON. EVEN MORE, I SEE THE U.S. WORKING TO MAKE ISRAEL LOOK GOOD. THIS IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. FOR EXAMPLE, ISRAEL IS WITHDRAWING FROM THE

SHUF FOR ITS OWN REASONS AND ITS OWN INTERESTS, NOT TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT, STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OR LIBERATE THE LEBANESE POPULATION. IT IS DOING SO ONLY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ITS TROOPS. THIS IS WHAT ISRAEL HAS BEEN PROCLAIMING DAY AND NIGHT, AND EVERY STATE IN THE WORLD KNOWS THIS. DESPITE ALL THIS, THE U.S. WANTS TO PORTRAY THIS AS AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FOR THE BENEFIT OF LEBANON.

ALSO, MCFARLANE PROPOSED THAT WE WITHDRAW FROM CERTAIN MOUNTAIN AREAS IN WHICH WE NOW ARE, SO AS TO MAKE IT APPEAR AS IF THE WITHDRAWALS ARE BALANCED AND IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. THIS IS NOT A NEW PROPOSAL. AS I HAVE SAID, IT WAS AROUND EVEN IN THE TIME OF PHILIP HABIB.

I DO NOT WANT TO DEBATE OR SPEAK AT LENGTH (EVEN THOUGH I HAVE BEEN SPEAKING AT LENGTH SO FAR) BECAUSE MCFARLANE HAS REFERRED TO MANY THINGS THAT WE CLARIFIED IN OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS. HOWEVER, I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE FOR LEBANON'S UNITY AND INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF ITS ARAB AFFILIATION. FROM THIS FLOWS OUR POSITION ON THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, WHICH MAKES LEBANON AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE. THIS IS SOMETHING WE CANNOT AGREE TO. THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF LEBANON IS AN ARAB STATE WHICH STANDS WITH US AND FOR US. WE CANNOT AGREE TO ITS TRANSFER FROM OUR REGION TO THAT OF ISRAELI HEGEMONY.

IN ADDITION, THE AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES A DANGER TO SYRIA, AND WE CANNOT AGREE TO AN AGREEMENT THAT CONSTITUTES A DANGER BOTH TO US AND TO LEBANON.

AS A COMMENT ON MCFARLANE'S STATEMENT ABOUT HOW CONFIDENCE BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE U.S. IS MISSING, I WOULD SAY THAT THIS IS SO BECAUSE OF REASONS OF PAST PRACTICE, AND HE HIMSELF MENTIONED THIS. IF WE WANT CONFIDENCE TO COME INTO BEING AND GROW, THERE MUST BE PRACTICAL STEPS TO HELP THIS OCCUR. ON SUCH STEPS, I HEARD NOTHING FROM MCFARLANE. HOW DOES HE IMAGINE THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT SNATCHES ONE OF OUR BROTHERS FROM US FOR ISRAEL TO TAKE -- AN AGREEMENT SPONSORED BY THE U.S., WHICH DEMANDS ITS IMPLEMENTATION -- CAN REASSURE US ON THE FUTURE OF OUR RELATIONS? LET US SUPPOSE THAT IN THE PAST THE U.S. WAS UNABLE TO DO WHAT IT WANTED BECAUSE IT DID NOT WANT TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. WHY CAN IT NOT DO SO NOW? ISRAEL ENTERED LEBANON AS AN INVADER AND MUST GET OUT WITHOUT LINKING THIS IN THEORY OR IN PRACTICE WITH ITS RELATIONS WITH LEBANON OR THE RELATIONS OF LEBANON WITH ANY OTHER ARAB STATE.

WE SPOKE OF THE RIGHT OF EVERY STATE TO DETERMINE ITS INTERESTS AND SECURITY, AS MCFARLANE POSITED IT. I SAID YES, WE ARE FOR THIS PRINCIPLE. LEBANON DOES HAVE THE FULL RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS INTERESTS AND SECURITY, BUT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ITS ARAB AFFILIATION AND ITS ARAB COMMITMENTS.

THE U.S., FRANCE, BRITAIN, AND WEST GERMANY ARE NOT ONE

NATION, BUT A GROUP OF NATIONS WHICH SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES AND HAVE A DIFFERENT HISTORY -- I MEAN EACH HAS A HISTORY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE OTHER. THEY ALSO HAVE AN ALLIANCE AMONG THEMSELVES. IN SPITE OF THIS, THE U.S. REBELS FROM TIME TO TIME, PROTESTS, AND PREVENTS (TO THE EXTENT THAT IT CAN) MANY SUBJECTS OR AREAS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN ONE OF THESE NATIONS AND THE SOVIET UNION. THIS HAPPENS EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE NOT IN A STATE OF WAR, AND NEITHER HAS FOUGHT THE OTHER NOW OR IN THE PAST. (DURING THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION, ASSAD ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT WISH THIS TO HAPPEN.) ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARABS ARE ONE NATION WHICH SPEAKS ONE LANGUAGE, HAS ONE HISTORY, AND HAS ONE ARAB LEAGUE THAT BRINGS US TOGETHER. WE HAVE RESOLUTIONS THAT ARE BINDING ON US ALL. WE ARE ALL IN A STATE OF WAR WITH ISRAEL, AND

THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL WARS BETWEEN US AND ISRAEL. DOES NOT THIS COMPARISON SHOW THAT SYRIA IS RIGHT IN ITS POSITION?

THUS, WE CANNOT BUT EMPHASIZE THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW FULLY FROM LEBANON IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509. AS FOR WHAT IS BETWEEN US AND LEBANON, THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE WE SEE IT AS IN OUR INTEREST THAT LEBANON BE STRONG AND INDEPENDENT. FOR THIS REASON, WHEN THERE IS NO LONGER ANY FOREIGN OCCUPATION OR ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, WE WILL WITHDRAW IF LEBANON SO WISHES. BUT IN ANY CASE, WE WILL NOT LINK ANY ARAB PRESENCE IN LEBANON, INCLUDING THAT OF SYRIA, WITH THAT OF ISRAEL EITHER IN THEORY OR IN PRACTICE.

I SAID I WOULD NOT SPEAK AT LENGTH, SO I WILL STOP HERE. I DON'T THINK MCFARLANE HEARD ANYTHING NEW FROM ME. OUR PREVIOUS TALKS TOOK THIS DIRECTION IN THEIR FRAMEWORK.

WE WANT THE U.S. TO TAKE A JUST POSITION AND MAKE US FEEL THAT IT DOES NOT APPEASE ISRAEL AT OUR EXPENSE. I KNOW IT MAY BE EASY FOR MCFARLANE TO SAY THAT IT DOES NOT DO THAT. BUT I ASK MYSELF, UNLESS THIS IS THE CASE, HOW CAN ISRAEL SAY IT WANTS THINGS FROM LEBANON THAT IT HAS NOT ACHIEVED?

NOW, LET'S LOOK AT THE FINAL MAP AND SUPPOSE THAT THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED. LET MCFARLANE LOOK AND ENUMERATE FOR HIMSELF WHAT ISRAEL HAS GAINED, WHAT LEBANON HAS GAINED, AND WHAT SYRIA HAS GAINED. MCFARLANE WILL SEE THAT SYRIA, OR -- BETTER YET -- SYRIA'S LEADERSHIP, IF IT HAD AGREED TO SIGN SUCH AN AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENT IT, WOULD NOT HAVE PROTECTED ITS PEOPLE, ITS COUNTRY, THE ARABS, OR THE LEBANESE. BECAUSE WE ARE NOT LIKE THIS, WE WILL NOT COMMIT SUCH A MISTAKE.

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENTS ARE VERY CLEAR. THE AMERICANS SAY THEY WANT THREE THINGS AND KEEP REPEATING THEM: THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON, A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE SECURITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL. WE, MEANWHILE, ARE TREATED JUST AS ONLOOKERS. IT IS AS IF SYRIA IS FARTHER AWAY FROM LEBANON THAN THE U.S. IS. PRESIDENT REAGAN REPEATS THESE GOALS, AND THEY ARE A REALITY. HE IS HONEST IN WHAT HE SAYS.

ON THE LEBANESE DOMESTIC SUBJECTS THAT MCFARLANE SPOKE ABOUT, THOSE ARE INTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR THE LEBANESE TO SOLVE. I ASKED MY QUESTION ON THE OUTSIDE FORCES BECAUSE I THOUGHT HE MIGHT BELIEVE THAT SYRIA WAS FIRING THE ARTILLERY. OF COURSE WE HAVE FRIENDSHIPS AND RELATIONS WITH NATIONALIST POLITICAL LEADERS AND FORCES IN LEBANON. BUT HE SHOULD NOT SUPPOSE THAT THEY ARE ALWAYS UNDER OUR CONTROL. IT IS NOT SO. THEY HAVE HAD FIRM CONVICTIONS FOR YEARS. THIS IS NOT NEW. THERE ARE MANY ELEMENTS OF DIFFERENCE AMONG THEM, AND THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT HAS BECOME ANOTHER ELEMENT -- ONE WHICH DID NOT EXIST IN

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THE PAST.

I BELIEVE THAT AMIN GEMAYEL, IF HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT THE UNITY OF LEBANON, MUST SEARCH FOR AUTHENTIC WAYS TO REACH A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THERE IS NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT AMIN GEMAYEL DOES NOT HAVE THE STRENGTH REQUIRED TO DO THIS. EVEN THE LEBANESE HAVE SAID TO US THAT, DURING THE LEBANESE-ISREALI NEGOTIATIONS, THEY WERE POWERLESS TO DO ANYTHING. ELIE SALEM AND THE OFFICER WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM TO DAMASCUS TOLD ME THAT, EVERY TIME THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS DEBATED A POINT, THE ISRAELI WOULD SAY THAT THEY HAD WON THE WAR AND THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO IMPLEMENT THEIR CONDITIONS. LEBANON SAYS THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS IMPOSED, WHATEVER ITS OFFICIAL PUBLIC POSITION MAY BE. ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, WE

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HAVE COME TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE U.S. WAS MERELY A WITNESS. THE WHOLE THING, THEREFORE, DEPENDED COMPLETELY ON ISRAEL'S WILL. WE DO NOT WANT TO HAVE ANYTHING IMPOSED ON US OR TO BEAR WITNESS TO INJUSTICE.

IN ANY CASE, I GO BACK TO WHAT MCFARLANE SAID ABOUT SYRIAN SECURITY. INDEED, WE TOO HAVE SECURITY NEEDS. AT THE VERY LEAST, WE TOO CAN SAY THAT WE NEED 45 KM. IF WE SUPPOSE THAT WE ARE A FOREIGN COUNTRY INVADING LEBANON, LIKE ISRAEL, WE SHOULD DO LIKE ISRAEL, I.E., DEFINE A 45 KM ZONE. MIND YOU, THESE ARE ONLY HYPOTHETICAL REMARKS.

MCFARLANE: GOOD.

ASSAD: IN ANY CASE, MCFARLANE IS NOT THE ONLY AMERICAN EMISSARY FOR WHOM ISRAEL HAS CREATED DIFFICULTIES. WE CAN SAY IN THE LIGHT OF OUR EXPERIENCE -- ESPECIALLY SINCE 1973, I.E., FOR THE LAST TEN YEARS -- THAT THESE THINGS HAVE HAPPENED REPEATEDLY. WE WOULD HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH A U.S. OFFICIAL, HE WOULD GO TO ISRAEL, AND HE WOULD COME BACK EMPTY-HANDED. AS AN EXAMPLE, I MENTION VANCE, A FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, OF WHOM MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT HE WAS SINCERE IN HIS DEALINGS. HE CAME AND WE DISCUSSED CERTAIN MATTERS. OF COURSE, WE DID NOT AGREE. HE WENT TO ISRAEL, CAME BACK TO US, AND TOLD US WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO HIM IN ISRAEL. WE ASKED HIM WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF SYRIA. HE SAID, "NOTHING," BECAUSE ISRAEL HAD GIVEN HIM NOTHING. THERE ARE OTHER EXAMPLES.

ONE THING REMINDS ME OF ANOTHER. IN ONE CHAPTER OF HIS MEMOIRS, PARTS OF WHICH I HAVE READ IN THE NEWSPAPERS AND WHICH I WILL READ FULLY SOMEDAY, MY ATTENTION WAS DRAWN TO ONE THING. IN SPEAKING ABOUT BEGIN AND THE WAY HE USED TO TRY TO SCORE A POINT AND THEN RETREAT, HE SAYS, "I LOVED HIM." ALTHOUGH I HAVE MENTIONED THAT VANCE WAS SINCERE, I DOUBT THE SINCERITY OF THIS STATEMENT (LAUGHTER). THE TEMPER OF THE TWO MEN ABSOLUTELY DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO THIS NOTION OF LOVE. I AM SUSPICIOUS ABOUT THIS KIND OF LOVE.

MCFARLANE: IT HAS BEEN VERY WORTHWHILE AND VERY VALUABLE TO HAVE HAD THE BENEFIT OF YOUR PERSPECTIVE ON THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS FACING LEBANON AND ON THE ROLE THAT EXTERNAL FORCES, PRIMARILY ISRAEL, PLAY WITH THESE INTERNAL FORCES, TO UNDERSTAND THE HISTORICAL SETTING IN WHICH WE MUST DEAL AND MOST IMPORTANTLY TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THESE PROBLEMS AFFECT SYRIA.

CERTAIN TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ARE POSSIBLE: (1) IT IS ESSENTIAL (AND WE AGREE) THAT ANY GOVERNMENT IN BEIRUT NOT BE A NARROW GOVERNMENT OF ONE PARTY CONCERNED ONLY WITH THE NARROW INTERESTS OF ONE GROUP, BUT THAT IT MUST BE A GOVERNMENT DEVOTED TO MEETING THE NEEDS OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY. THIS IS CLEAR.

NEITHER OF US CAN JUDGE YET WHETHER THIS GOVERNMENT WILL FULFILL THE REQUIREMENT OF MEETING THE NEEDS OF ALL THE

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PEOPLE. THE ONLY WAY WE CAN LEARN IS TO GIVE IT A CHANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT WATCHING THEM TRY TO ESTABLISH CONTROL AND RESPOND TO THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF THE DRUZE IN THE SHUF AND METN IS A TEST WHICH WILL DEMONSTRATE ITS MOTIVES AND ITS ABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE AND COMPROMISE. THIS WILL GIVE US AN INDICATION OF THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE. YOU HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS ON THE ABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH ALL THE TRADITIONAL CONFESSIONAL GROUPS. THIS IS HARD TO DO AFTER EIGHT YEARS OF CIVIL WAR AND CONFLICT. THERE ARE SIGNS OF PROGRESS AND A CONSCIOUS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES, LEADERSHIP, CABINET OFFICERS AND SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS MUST TRULY REPRESENT ALL OF THE CONFESSIONS. IN PARALLEL, THE MILITARY MUST NOT BE A CHRISTIAN MILITARY IT MUST REPRESENT ALL FAITHS.

IN SHORT, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE IS A CONTRADICTION IN YOUR POSITION. YOU SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS UNWILLING TO MEET THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF ALL THE PEOPLE -- OTHER THAN THE CHRISTIANS -- BUT YOU SEEM UNWILLING TO GIVE THE GOVERNMENT A CHANCE TO GO INTO THE SHUF AND THE METN SO THAT WE CAN TRY TO JUDGE.

ASSAD: ALL THE PEOPLE OTHER THAN THE PHALANGE! I DID NOT SAY I DID NOT WANT THIS, BUT THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT DO IT. IT DOES NOT MEET EVEN THE NEEDS OF THE CHRISTIANS. CHRISTIANS ARE IN THE FOREFRONT OF NATIONALIST OPPOSITION TO GEMAYEL'S GOVERNMENT.

MCFARLANE: THEY SHOULD ENTER THE PROCESS AND PARTICIPATE.

ASSAD: WHAT I SAID WAS THAT THIS IS A GOVERNMENT, NOT OF THE CHRISTIANS, BUT OF THE PHALANGE.

MCFARLANE: MY ANSWER IS THAT IT HAS TO BECOME A GOVERNMENT OF ALL THE LEBANESE, NOT JUST FOR THE PHALANGE.

ASSAD: ON THIS I AGREE, BUT THIS REQUIRES AN AGREEMENT AMONG LEBANESE. THIS IS NOT A PROCESS OF APPOINTING MINISTERS FROM HERE AND THERE. THE PARTIES AND FORCES MUST MEET AND AGREE. IN THIS AFFAIR, NEITHER THE U.S. NOR SYRIA CAN REPLACE THE LEBANESE. WE HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM FOR YEARS. WE TRIED TO SUPPORT EX-PRES. SARKIS.

THIS REMINDS ME OF A SITUATION WE ONCE FACED. WE TOOK A DECISION IN 1978 OR 1979 TO WITHDRAW OUR FORCES. WE NOTIFIED SARKIS THAT WE WOULD BEGIN IN ONE MONTH. THIS WAS A SERIOUS AND OFFICIAL DECISION. RIGHT AWAY, GOVERNMENT DELEGATIONS CAME FROM LEBANON (FU'AD BUTRUS WAS FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE TIME) ASKING US TO CANCEL THIS DECISION. PEOPLES' DELEGATIONS CAME AS WELL. DURING OUR FIRST VISITS, I REFUSED THIS DEMAND. THEN THEY INSISTED. I AGREED TO CANCEL OUR DECISION ON ONE CONDITION -- THAT THEY BEGIN SERIOUS WORK ON A RECONCILIATION AMONG THEMSELVES. WE TOLD THEM THAT WE COULD NOT STAY IN FOREVER AND, THAT IF THEY AGREED AMONG THEMSELVES, SECURITY WOULD BE ADEQUATE AND THEY WOULDN'T NEED OUR PRESENCE. WE TOLD THEM THAT, IF THEY UNDERTOOK SUCH EFFORTS, WE WOULD POSTPONE OUR DECISION UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY HAD ACHIEVED A RECONCILIATION AND WE COULD WITHDRAW. (AT THIS POINT THE INTERPRETER BROKE IN TO POINT OUT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND SEVERAL OTHER STATES HAD WRITTEN LETTERS ASKING SYRIA TO STAY.) WE TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT WE WOULD HELP THEM MAKE THEIR EFFORTS. INDEED, THEY PROMISED US THEY WOULD DO SO, AND SARKIS BEGAN CONVOKING THE PARTIES AND PERSONALITIES. WE OURSELVES SENT PEOPLE TO HELP CONTACT VARIOUS LEBANESE CIRCLES, BUT UNFORTUNATELY AFTER TWO OR THREE WEEKS THE MATTER WAS DROPPED. LATER, WE AGREED TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS AND SENT OUR FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER OFFICIALS TO COLLABORATE WITH SARKIS AND OTHERS. HOPES GREW. AT THAT TIME, WE WERE NOT MEETING THE PHALANGE. SARKIS ASKED

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THAT PHALANGE-SYRIAN MEETINGS TAKE PLACE TO HELP THE RECONCILIATION, AND WE MET MORE THAN ONCE. THE PROSPECTS REALLY SEEMED GOOD. BUT THEN THE PHALANGE RETREATED THANKS TO THE EFFORTS OF CERTAIN ISRAELI AGENTS IN THE PHALANGE. THEN FU'AD BUTRUS CAME ON A MISSION FOR SARKIS AND BEGGED US TO CONTACT THE PHALANGE IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE THEY WERE PSYCHOLOGICALLY READY FOR RECONCILIATION. THE NEXT DAY, WE SENT OUR FOREIGN MINISTER TO ATTEND A MEETING ON THAT DAY, WHILE HE WAS IN SHTAWRA ON THE WAY TO BEIRUT, ISRAEL SHOT DOWN TWO SYRIAN HELICOPTERS, AS A WARNING TO ITS AGENTS IN THE PHALANGE NOT TO AGREE TO RECONCILIATION. THAT NIGHT, WE PUT IN OUR MISSILES, AND A NEW CLIMATE WAS CREATED. ISRAEL'S AGENTS IN THE PHALANGE WERE ABLE TO STOP THE RECONCILIATION, AND OUR MEETINGS STOPPED. IF

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SARKIS EVER HAS THE COURAGE TO EVALUATE THESE DEVELOPMENTS HE CAN REVEAL A LOT. HOWEVER, HE WON'T DO IT BECAUSE THEY WOULD KILL HIM. AS HE KNOWS, THE PHALANGE DID TRY TO KILL HIM, AND HE WAS FORCED TO ALIGN HIMSELF MORE AND MORE WITH THEM. SO, WE HAVE WANTED TO WITHDRAW FOR YEARS, BUT ANY DECISION TO DO SO IS OUR DECISION AND WILL BE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF LEBANON-SYRIAN RELATIONS, NOT TO BENEFIT ISRAEL.

RECONCILIATION IS THE WAY. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THE APPOINTMENT OF MINISTERS FROM THE SHUF OR TRIPOLI. THE FORCES ACTIVE IN LEBANON HAVE TO AGREE TOGETHER. ONLY LEBANON CAN DO THIS. WE USED TO SAY THAT WE HAD COME AND GIVEN THE LEBANESE THEIR SECURITY. WE STOPPED THE CIVIL WAR PER SE. WE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE MUST ACHIEVE PEACE AMONG THEMSELVES. WE COULD HELP. BUT WE COULD NOT REPLACE THEM. THIS REMAINS VALID. THERE CAN BE NO STABILITY IN LEBANON WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT AMONG THEM. POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IS THE ONLY REMEDY FOR CIVIL WAR. WE HAVE WORKED HONORABLY AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORK HONORABLY FOR THIS. WE BELIEVE THAT LEBANON CANNOT HAVE STABILITY WITHOUT INTERNAL RECONCILIATION. CIVIL WARS HAVE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS -- THEY ARE GANG WARS. THEY CAN ONLY BE ENDED BY RECONCILIATION.

MCFARLANE: THIS IS TRUE. THE PRINCIPLE YOU PROPOSED TO THE LEBANESE IN 1978 WAS SOUND. THEY THEMSELVES HAVE TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, NOT JUST WITH ONE GROUP, BUT WITH ALL GROUPS. NO ONE CAN REPLACE THEM. STILL, CONFUCIUS SAYS THAT A JOURNEY OF ONE THOUSAND MILES BEGINS WITH A SINGLE STEP. THIS APPLIES HERE. THE OPPORTUNITY IS COMING FOR THEM TO REACH A COMPROMISE WITH THE DRUZE WHO LIVE IN THE SHUF. IT WILL BE A TEST FOR THE GOVERNMENT. BUT WE -- SYRIA AND THE U.S. -- BUT MOSTLY SYRIA -- CAN HELP BY GIVING THE GOVERNMENT THIS OPPORTUNITY WITHOUT SEEKING TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OURSELVES.

MORE GENERALLY, BEYOND THE DRUZE AND THE SHUF, ANY TALK OF RECONCILIATION AMONG THE SHI'ITES, SUNNIS, GREEK ORTHODOX, GREEK CATHOLICS, ETC., CAN PROCEED IN A BETTER MANNER WITHOUT OUTSIDE FORCES. THIS IS WHY WE THINK THAT THE FULL DEPARTURE OF THE ISRAELIS IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IT IS A BEGINNING. WE BELIEVE IT WILL CONTINUE, BUT -- FOR IT TO BE COMPLETE -- WE BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON ON PROTECTING THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS HAS TO BE REACHED THROUGH DIRECT CONTACTS. THE SYRIAN PRESENCE AND THE ISRAELI PRESENCE ARE VERY DIFFERENT FROM A HISTORICAL POINT OF VIEW, BUT IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT THEY ARE RELATED.

FINALLY, THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION IS ONE IN WHICH SYRIA IS IN A GOOD POSITION TO HELP. FOR THIS TO TAKE PLACE, THERE HAS TO BE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SYRIAN AND LEBANESE OFFICIALS. THIS IS IN YOUR INTEREST AND THEIRS. THEY CAN BENEFIT FROM YOUR ADVICE AND HELP. DO YOU THINK IT IS POSSIBLE FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO HOLD TALKS WITH LEBANESE OFFICIALS, TO MOVE THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION

TION ALONG?

ASSAD: IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS NOT A SUITABLE ATMOSPHERE. THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS FOR HELPING THIS KIND OF NEGOTIATION DO NOT EXIST. GEMAYEL HAS ACTED LIKE PHILIP HABIB. HABIB SAID ONE THING TO US AND DID ANOTHER. GEMAYEL HAS DONE EXACTLY THE SAME. GEMAYEL SAID DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT (1) HE WOULD NOT GIVE ISRAEL ANYTHING THAT COULD AFFECT LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY OR FREE WILL, (2) HE WOULD NOT GIVE ISRAEL ANYTHING THAT - CONTRADICTED THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION (I.E., THAT THE NATIONALIST GROUPS WOULD OBJECT TO), AND (3) HE WOULD NOT GIVE ISRAEL ANYTHING THAT WOULD CONTRADICT THE INTERESTS OF SYRIA AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES. HE DID JUST THE OPPOSITE -- ALL THREE THINGS TOGETHER.

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THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT HAS BECOME THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM THAT STANDS IN THE WAY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. LEBANON'S MASSES REFUSE TO BEFRIEND ISRAEL AND SELL SYRIA OUT. OUR POSITION ON THE AGREEMENT IS EXACTLY LIKE THAT OF THE NATIONALIST GROUPS.

MCFARLANE: WE AGREE THAT, FOR RECONCILIATION TO OCCUR, THE TWO SIDES HAVE TO TALK TO EACH OTHER. THE GOL BEGAN THIS PROCESS A FEW WEEKS AGO. UNDOUBTEDLY, IT SHOULD HAVE BEGUN LONG AGO.

APART FROM RECONCILIATION, WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT LEBANON MUST BE CONCERNED WITH SYRIA'S SECURITY INTERESTS AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE MET. FOR THIS TO OCCUR, THERE HAVE TO BE DISCUSSIONS AND EVEN ARGUMENTS, SO YOU CAN POINT OUT WHAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD DO TO MEET YOUR SECURITY NEEDS. IF YOU DON'T TALK, WE LOSE TWO THINGS: THE FIRST IS THE BENEFIT OF YOUR JUDGMENT AND WISDOM ON HOW THE INTERNAL PROCESS CAN PROCEED. THEY NEED THAT. SECOND IS THE BENEFIT OF YOUR VIEW OF YOUR SECURITY INTERESTS, SO THEY CAN KNOW WHAT TO DO TO SATISFY THEM. ONLY YOU CAN DO THIS. IF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT IS BADLY FLAWED, THEY NEED TO CORRECT THIS IN AN AGREEMENT WITH YOU. FOR THIS TO BEGIN, WE NEED TO START A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE.

ASSAD: THIS HAS BEEN HAPPENING. THERE HAS BEEN NO BREAK. CONTACTS THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS STILL EXIST. YESTERDAY, A LEBANESE PERSONALITY WHO IS CLOSE TO ALL PARTIES WAS HERE AND MET WITH KHADDAM. SALEM HAS COME TWICE. THEY KNOW OUR POINT OF VIEW VERY WELL.

MCFARLANE: WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO MEET WITH SALEM AGAIN?

ASSAD: I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY TO HIM, AND HE HAS NOTHING TO GIVE ME. HE HIMSELF SAID SO. WHAT WOULD BE THE USE?

MCFARLANE: HE NEEDS YOUR ADVICE AND COUNSEL.

ASSAD: I HAVE PROVIDED THIS THREE TIMES. I WOULD BE REPEATING MYSELF. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT LINE IS NOT ONE WE WANT TO CREDIT. NO ARAB CAN LINK HIS RELATIONS WITH US AND HIS RELATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. WE HAVE SACRED PRINCIPLES. GEMAYEL IS NOTHING COMPARED TO SADAT, AND EGYPT HAS GREAT WEIGHT. RELATIONS BETWEEN SADAT AND ME WERE STRONG AND FIRM. WITH GEMAYEL, THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANCE TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS. WE ARE ONLY ACQUAINTANCES. WITH SADAT, WE HAD ONE POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMAND, AND THERE WERE DOZENS OF MEETINGS BETWEEN US. EVEN SO, AFTER HE MET WITH ISRAEL, WE COULD NO LONGER MEET. HE DIED WITHOUT MEETING ME AGAIN. GEMAYEL I KNOW AS AN ORDINARY CITIZEN IN THE PHALANGE. I DON'T KNOW HIM AS PRESIDENT. I ONLY MET HIM ONCE AT THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE. HE WAS TO COME TO SYRIA AND MEET AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. I RECEIVED HIM ONCE AS A MEMBER OF A DELEGATION.

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MCFARLANE: HOW CAN HE ACT TO ESTABLISH POLICIES THAT ANSWER YOUR CONCERNS AND PROTECT YOUR INTERESTS, IF THERE IS NO EXCHANGE?

ASSAD: IF HE IS COMING HERE TO LEARN HOW TO ACT, HE KNOWS HOW TO ACT. THE ISSUE IS VERY SIMPLE. IT CAN BE SUMMARIZED IN A FEW WORDS. I ASK YOU TO TRANSMIT THEM TO GEMAYEL: "WE WANT YOU TO CANCEL THE AGREEMENT." HE KNOWS THIS, BECAUSE HE PROMISED US THAT IT WOULD BE SOMETHING ELSE. BEFORE HE SIGNED WE INFORMED HIM OF OUR POSITION. GEMAYEL CANNOT BRING ISRAEL AND SYRIA TOGETHER. THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT DO SO. SO HOW CAN GEMAYEL DO IT?

WE ARE FOR LEBANON, BUT THE LEBANON WE KNOW -- ARAB

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LEBANON. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO WELCOME THEM AT ANYTIME, BUT WE KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN. THEY SIMPLY WANT TO GAIN TIME AND WASTE OURS. WE WANT TO DEAL WITH THEM HONESTLY AS BROTHERS. IF THEY WANT TO BE OUR BROTHERS, THIS IS NATURAL, AND THIS IS WHAT WE WANT. IF THEY WANT TO BE WITH ISRAEL, WE WILL GO OUR WAY AND THEY CAN GO THEIRS. WE ARE VERY CLEAR.

MCFARLANE: IS THERE ANY PROSPECT FOR ACCEPTING THAT ISRAEL HAS LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS?

ASSAD: NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF LEBANON OR SYRIA.

MCFARLANE: DOES ISRAEL, AS A SOVEREIGN ENTITY, HAVE THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY TO DISCUSS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS HOW, TOGETHER, THEY CAN LIVE IN PEACE?

ASSAD: THESE THINGS ARE DEALT WITH AND DEFINED BY U.N. RESOLUTIONS. WE HAVE AGREED TO THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

MCFARLANE: YOU HAVE BEEN VERY KIND IN PROVIDING TIME AND PROVIDING USEFUL PERSPECTIVES TO ME TO REPORT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. SO THAT I DO NOT MISREPRESENT YOUR VIEWS IN THE CAPITALS I VISIT OR TO MY GOVERNMENT, LET ME TRY TO SUMMARIZE THEM. (1) YOU AGREE WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT EACH COUNTRY SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEFINE AND DEFEND ITS INTERESTS, BUT YOU BELIEVE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS CHOSEN BADLY. YOU ACCEPT ITS LEGITIMACY, BUT BELIEVE IT HAS REACHED A BAD AGREEMENT. (2) ON THE INTERNAL RECONCILIATION, YOU BELIEVE SUCH A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IS NECESSARY, BUT YOU ARE NOT WILLING TO WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO ACHIEVE IT. (3) ON THE SECURITY SITUATION, YOU DO NOT SEE ANY VALUE IN ANY MOVEMENT OR WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES AT ALL. (4) NEITHER INTERNAL MATTERS NOR SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS JUSTIFY ANY FORMAL DIALOGUE.

ASSAD: ON YOUR FIRST POINT, THIS IS NOT THE PRINCIPLE. EACH COUNTRY DOES HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEFINE AND DEFEND ITS INTERESTS, BUT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ITS ARAB NATIONALIST AFFILIATION AND ITS ARAB COMMITMENTS.

MCFARLANE: IS THIS ITS OWN JUDGMENT OR SOMEONE ELSE'S?

ASSAD: THIS WAS DECIDED MANY YEARS AGO. AMONG THE COMMITMENTS MADE, IT IS FORBIDDEN FOR LEBANON OR ANY OTHER ARAB COUNTRY TO REACH A UNILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. THE CONFLICT IS NOT BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, BUT BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS. THERE IS AN ARAB DECISION TO BOYCOTT ANY ARAB STATE THAT SIGNS A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, ETC. ON THIS BASIS, ACTIONS WERE TAKEN AGAINST EGYPT. THE FIRST SUCH DECISION WAS TAKEN IN 1950 AND HAS BEEN REITERATED MANY TIMES, MOST RECENTLY IN 1970. THIS APPLIES TO LEBANON AS TO ALL ARAB STATES. EVERY COUNTRY IS FREE, BUT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ITS OBLIGATIONS.

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ON YOUR SECOND POINT, I SAY THAT RECONCILIATION IS NECESSARY, BUT I SAY THIS CONCERNS THE LEBANESE, NOT US.

ON YOUR THIRD POINT, THERE CAN BE NO MOVEMENT OR WITHDRAWAL UNLESS ISRAEL WITHDRAWS COMPLETELY FROM LEBANON.

THESE ARE MY CONCLUSIONS. NOT ONE OF THEM NEGATES THE FACT THAT LEBANON HAS REACHED A BAD AGREEMENT. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SAYING THAT LEBANON IS FREE TO MAKE DECISIONS AND NOT LINKING THEM TO ITS ARAB OBLIGATIONS. IT IS NOT MY CONCLUSION THAT THE AGREEMENT IS BAD. GEMAYEL AND WAZZAN HAVE BOTH SAID THIS. THEY HAVE BOTH SAID THAT IT WAS IMPOSED AND THAT THEY COULD DO NO BETTER. THE PERSON KHADDAM SAW REPEATED THAT GEMAYEL HAD SAID THIS

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MCFARLANE: GEMAYEL AND WAZZAN MAY SAY THIS, BUT GEMAYEL HAS MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE U.S. AND IN THIS REGION ACCEPTING THE AGREEMENT. HE HAS GOTTEN PARLIAMENT TO AGREE TO IT AND EXPRESSED HIS INTENTION TO FULFILL IT. THE REASON HE DOES THIS IS BECAUSE ISRAEL WILL LEAVE HIS TERRITORY ENTIRELY. ALSO, HIS BORDER IS RECOGNIZED AS INVIOABLE. THESE ARE ACCOMPLISHMENTS THAT FEW OTHER ARAB STATES CAN POINT TO. SADAT DID GET HIS LAND BACK. THIS IS NOT YET THE SITUATION IN THE GOLAN, BUT IT COULD HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE.

ON THE POINT YOU MADE ABOUT WITHDRAWAL -- CAN YOU IMAGINE THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROCESS THAT BEGINS SYRIAN. . WITHDRAWAL IF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAS ALREADY BEGUN BUT HAS NOT YET FINISHED?

ASSAD: I DON'T THINK SO. WE DON'T WANT TO LINK OUR PRESENCE OR WITHDRAWAL IN THEORY OR IN PRACTICE TO AN ISRAELI PRESENCE OR WITHDRAWAL. THIS IS A RIGHT WE CANNOT GIVE THE ISRAELIS. THE LEBANESE ARE OUR PEOPLE.

YOU WERE SAYING WE CAN HELP WITH RECONCILIATION? HOW? AT LEAST NINETY PERCENT OF THE LEBANESE BELIEVE THEY ARE SYRIANS. HOW CAN WE LINK OURSELVES WITH THE ISRAELIS?

MCFARLANE: I DIDN'T MAKE THIS LINKAGE. YOU DID.

ASSAD: YOU WERE TRYING TO FIND A WAY OUT. IN PRACTICE THERE IS A LINKAGE. WE WANT TO MAKE SOMETHING CLEAR TO

ISRAEL: THERE IS NO LINKAGE BETWEEN THEM AND US. WE WERE THERE EIGHT YEARS WITHOUT THE ISRAELIS. WHEN THE ISRAELIS INVADED, THEY DID NOT USE THE JUSTIFICATION OF SYRIAN SHELLING.

MCFARLANE: I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS NO EQUIVALENCE IN THEORY OR IN PRACTICE. THERE IS NO LINKAGE. WE AGREE WE ALL WANT ISRAEL TO LEAVE. IT WILL DO SO, INSHALLAH. SEPARATELY, ISRAEL HAS ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON. WITHOUT REGARD TO ISRAEL, SYRIA MAY AT SOME POINT DECIDE TO LEAVE LEBANON. HOW MIGHT THIS TAKE PLACE IN TIME? SOON, TO A SMALL DEGREE?

ASSAD: WE BELIEVE IT IS NEAR AT HAND AFTER ISRAEL WITH- DRAWS, WHEN THERE ARE NO ISRAELIS IN LEBANON, BJI IT IS FAR OFF TO THAT EXTENT THAT ISRAEL STAYS IN LEBANON. WE OURSELVES HAVE NO INTEREST IN STAYING IN LEBANON. I TOLD YOU THAT WE HAD DECIDED IN 1978-79 TO WITHDRAW AND THEY RESTRAINED US. WHY SHOULD WE LOSE MILITARILY, POLITICALLY AND FINANCIALLY IN LEBANON? WE HAVE LOST MANY SOLDIERS IN LEBANON. THE COST OF STATIONING TROOPS THERE IS GREAT. EVEN POLITICALLY, WE LOSE IN LEBANON, FOR THE PRESENCE OF ANY ARMY LEADS TO PROBLEMS AMONG THE POPULATION. WE CAN INFLUENCE LEBANON IN OTHER WAYS. THIS IS NOT LINKED TO THE PRESENCE OF AN ARMY. SYRIA'S INFLUENCE AND POSITION ARE GOOD.

MCFARLANE: ONE FINAL QUESTION: THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT NATIONAL RECONCILIA-

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TION BE ASSISTED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.
IT ASKED THIS OF AN ARAB LEAGUE COMMITTEE IN JULY 1981.
IT SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL TO THE FEZ SUMMIT IN AUGUST 1982.
GEMAYEL MADE A SPEECH BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE
LAST MANDATE OF THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE EXPIRED IN JULY
1982. I WOULD BENEFIT FROM YOUR EXPLANATION OF WHY
SYRIAN POLICY IS STILL TO REMAIN IN LEBANON GIVEN THESE
REQUESTS.

ASSAD: MCFARLANE HIMSELF CAN ANSWER THIS? BEFORE THE
ISRAELI INVASION I WAS UNAWARE OF ANYONE'S REQUEST FOR
THE DEPARTURE OF SYRIA'S FORCES. ON THE CONTRARY,
LEBANON ITSELF KEPT ASKING FOR RENEWAL. AFTER LAST
SUMMER WE LOOK AT ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE
SITUATION IN LEBANON, WHICH IS ONE OF OCCUPATION BY ISRAEL.

WE DO NOT WANT TO TAKE ALL OF GEMAYEL'S STATEMENTS SERIOUSLY. HE SAID A GREAT DEAL WHEN HE WAS IN THE U.S. HE SAID THAT DAMASCUS WOULD BE HIT WITH BOMBS. WE DID NOT TAKE THIS SERIOUSLY. LIFE WENT ON, AND PEOPLE DID NOT DESCEND INTO THE SHELTERS. WB WOULD TAKE HIS WORDS AS PRESIDENT SERIOUSLY IF THERE WERE NO ISRAELI OCCUPATION OUR PRINCIPLES ARE NOT FOR SALE OR TO BE BARGAINED AWAY. EIGHTY TO EIGHTY-FIVE PERCENT OF ALL LEBANESE ARE AGAINST THE AGGRESSION. THIS POSITION IS SIMILAR TO SYRIA'S. FOR THIS REASON, THERE IS NO REASON TO WORRY ABOUT GIVEN STATEMENTS. GEMAYEL IS WELL KNOWN AS A MEMBER OF THE PHALANGE POLITBURO. TO FILL HIS POSSITION AS PRESIDENT, HE SHOULD NOT BEHAVE AS A PHALANGIST. HE LOSES HIS POSITION TO THE EXTENT THAT HE IS LIKE THE PHALANGE. WE ARE NOT AFRAID OF HIS STATEMENTS AS PRESIDENT. WE ARE WITH THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON AND THEY ARE WITH US. GEMAYEL CANNOT CHANGE THIS REALITY. WHY IS HE UNABLE TO STOP THE RESISTENCE AGAINST ISRAEL OR PHALANGE KILLINGS? THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE CANNOT BE STIFLED. ISRAEL IS AN AGGRESSIVE, HOSTILE STATE. WE ARE ONE PEOPLE. GEMAYEL CANNOT EQUATE WITH US THE ISRAELIS. LEBANON WAS THE CREATION OF FRENCH COLONIALISM. SYRIA AGREED TO ITS ESTABLISHMENT ON CONDITION THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE A HARBOR OR PASSAGE WAY FOR SYRIA'S ENEMIES. LEBANON IN ITS PRESENT SITUATION CANNOT BE ANYTHING ELSE. WE ARE FOR LEBANON, BUT THE LEBANON WE KNOW, NOT THAT OF GEMAYEL OR PHILIP HABIB. PHILIP HABIB IS OF LEBANESE ORIGIN. I WISH HE WERE NOT, AND I TOLD HIM SO.

IN ANY CASE, I WANT YOU TO UNDERSTAND INTER-ARAB RELATIONS THE STATE WITH THE MOST SPECIAL IDENTITY THROUGHOUT HISTORY WAS EGYPT. THIS WAS TRUE SINCE THE PHAROAHS. IN SPITE OF THIS; NO ONE CAN SAY THAT THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE ARE PLEASED WITH AND RECONCILED TO RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HOW MUCH LESS NOW THIS IS IN LEBANON. WE ADMIT THAT LEBANON IS A SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT STATE, BUT THIS DOES NOT CONTRADICT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OUR HISTORY. THERE WAS A TIME WHEN LEBANON DID NOT EXIST AND SYRIA DID NOT EXIST. PEOPLE IN LEBANON, SYRIA AND JORDAN DO NOT HAVE THAT NARROW UPBRINGING THAT RESTRICTS THEM TO A GIVEN SET OF BORDERS. THERE IS NOT ONE ARAB PARTY THAT IS POPULAR AMONG THE MASSES THAT DOES NOT DECLARE ARAB UNITY AS ONE OF ITS FOREMOST SLOGANS.

YOU SPOKE OF THE FREEDOM OF ANY COUNTRY TO DETERMINE ITS INTERESTS AND SECURITY. THE ARAB WORLD REFUSED TO GIVE THIS TO EGYPT. SADAT USED TO SHOUT AND SCREAM ABOUT THE "ARAB MANDATE" OVER EGYPT, ABOUT THE INDEPENDENCE OF EGYPT ABOUT ITS POPULATION OF FORTY MILLION, ABOUT ITS LONG HISTORY. IN SPITE OF THIS, THE ARAB WORLD AND EGYPT DID NOT ACCEPT THIS, AND SADAT PAID WITH HIS LIFE. IF SUCH THINGS WERE REFUSED TO EGYPT AND SYRIA, HOW COULD THEY BE ACCEPTED FOR GEMAYEL AND FIFTY THOUSAND PHALANGISTS? WHEN THERE IS A FULL COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE AREA, THEY WILL BE TREATED LIKE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. THIS IS HOW WE SEE LEBANON.

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ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL PROCESS OF SHOOTING AT EACH COUNTRY WILL NOT LEAD TO PEACE. EVEN EGYPT IS RETURNING TO ARABISM AND ARAB RANKS. I WILL MEET WITH MUBARAK AS I DID WITH SADAT. WILL YOU HELP ME DO THIS, OR ARE YOU AGAINST IT? YOU ASKED ALL THE QUESTIONS; NOW I WILL ASK SOME.

MCFARLANE: I WOULD WELCOME SUCH A MOVE IF YOU WOULD THEN SIGN A PEACE TREATY.

ASSAD: AH HAI YOU ARE INDEED TIED TO ISRAEL! THE U.S. IS INDEED NOT FAIR! ISRAEL'S POLICY IS IN FACT EXECUTED BY THE U.S. WE SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES.

MCFARLANE: THIS IS NOT TRUE.

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ASSAD: EVERY U.S. AGREEMENT WITH US THAT DID NOT PLEASE ISRAEL WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED.

MCFARLANE: I WANT TO MENTION TWO THINGS. FIRST, I HOPE THAT IN OUR SESSIONS OVER MONTHS AND MAYBE YEARS I CAN CONVINCE YOU THAT WE WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL THE STATES OF THE AREA, NOT JUST ISRAEL. WE HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED THIS POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY. DURING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TERM OF OFFICE, ARMS SALES TO ARAB COUNTRIES HAS BEEN FAR GREATER THAN TO ISRAEL. THIS IS A LONG PROCESS, AND IT TAKES MORE THAN JUST COUNTING NUMBERS TO MEASURE OUR GOOD FAITH.

SECOND, YOU HAVE GIVEN ME A GREAT DEAL TO THINK ABOUT TODAY, AND I APPRECIATE IT. I'VE TAKEN MUCH OF YOUR TIME. THERE IS ONE OTHER ISSUE I WANTED TO CONVEY. ISRAEL HAS SYRIAN PRISONERS AND PALESTINIAN PRISONERS, AND VICE VERSA IN ONE CASE, ISRAEL MADE AN INQUIRY ABOUT FIVE SOLDIERS IN THE ARMORED BRANCH. SYRIA PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE IDENTITY OF THESE SOLDIERS AS HAVING DIED. SUBSEQUENTLY, FOUR OF THE NAMES IT PROVIDED TURNED OUT TO BE THE NAMES OF ISRAELI SOLDIERS ALIVE IN ISRAEL. THIS MAY BE A CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY, OR IDENTITY CARDS MAY HAVE BEEN SWITCHED. THE QUESTION IS, ASSUMING THAT THESE FOUR ARE DEAD, WHETHER THE ICRC COULD TRY TO IDENTIFY WHO THEY ARE BY EXAMINING THEIR BODIES.

ASSAD: YES, OF COURSE. I DON'T KNOW THE DETAILS. AT ONE TIME, I WAS TOLD UNOFFICIALLY THAT THERE WERE ISRAELI SOLDIERS BURIED IN THE JEWISH CEMETARY AND PRAYED OVER BY A RABBI AT BURIAL.

MCFARLANE: YES.

ASSAD: FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THIS. WHY WOULD WE GIVE FALSE NAMES? MAYBE, AS YOU SAID, IT IS A MISTAKE, A SWITCH OF IDENTITY CARDS. IT WAS NOT INTENDED, THAT'S FOR SURE. THE RED CROSS IS WELCOME TO IDENTIFY THE BODIES.

MCFARLANE: THAT IS A GENEROUS OFFER AND I THANK YOU.

ASSAD: I LOOK FORWARD TO WELCOMING YOU AGAIN FOR ANOTHER VISIT. DILLON

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CHRG: PROG
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NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, OVIP, JO, US
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL SUBJECT DISCUSSED DURING
- CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AND
- KING HUSSEIN AUGUST 9

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN ADDITION TO SUBJECTS DISCUSSED BY AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE IN PRIVATE MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN AUGUST 9 (SEPTEL), AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE ALSO DISCUSSED STATUS OF JLP. FOLLOWING IS REPORT:

3. ON JLP, MCFARLANE INFORMED THE KING THAT THE HOUSE/SENATE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON AUTHORIZATION APPROVED JLP FUNDING BY A VOTE OF 11 TO 2 AND SAID THAT WE NOW HAD TO GO THROUGH THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS. HUSSEIN WELCOMED THIS PROGRESS.

4. WE HAVE TREATED ABOVE SUBJECT IN SEPARATE CABLE BECAUSE MEMCON (SEPTEL) WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO POSTS AND IN WASHINGTON TO OFFICES WHICH ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH AND HAVE NO NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PROGRAM.

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT. DJEREJIAN
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NLS F98-008/1 #120

CA NARA, DATE 4/19/06

Rem File

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AME DCM PM CERON

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FOR AMEASSADOR MCFARLANE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M370/1 #57868

BY KML NARA DATE 4/5/13

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, JO, IS, SY, XF, OVIP
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: CONVERSATION
- WITH KING HUSSEIN, AUGUST 9.

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT MEMCON OF MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AND KING HUSSEIN ON AUGUST 9 FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE'S APPROVAL.
3. SUMMARY: DURING MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AUGUST 9 KING HUSSEIN REAFFIRMED JORDAN'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S. OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON AND CONCURRED WITH THE IMPORTANCE WE ARE ACCORDING THE STRENGTHENING OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S GOVERNMENT. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE'S ASSESSMENT OF HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD, THE KING SAID IT IS IMPORTANT "NOT TO RUN TO THE SYRIANS" AND AGREED IMPLICITLY WITH AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION THAT WAYS MUST BE FOUND TO CHANGE SYRIAN ATTITUDES THROUGH INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES. WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS, THE KING AGREED WITH MCFARLANE THAT A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UPPER METN WOULD ENHANCE THE GOL'S AUTHORITY. BUT, HE CAUTIONED THAT ANY GOL REQUEST REGARDING SYRIAN PULLBACK PUT BEFORE THE ARABS SHOULD CALL FOR TOTAL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THAT A PARTIAL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE USED AS A FALLBACK POSITION. THE KING WAS ALSO SKEPTICAL THAT AN ARAB SUMMIT WOULD PROVIDE THE KIND OF SUPPORT ONE WOULD WANT IN RESPONSE TO A CALL BY GEMAYEL FOR A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. BUT HE NOTED THE SAUDIS ARE INTERESTED IN A SUMMIT. HE ALSO STRESSED THAN AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT FOR THE FUTURE WILL BE GREATER COORDINATION AMONG THE ARABS AND SAID HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED IN THIS RESPECT BY HIS RECENT TALKS WITH KING FAHD. SPEAKING OF ISRAEL, THE KING SAID THE IDF PULLBACK FROM THE SEUF-ALAY AREA HAS JORDAN'S SUPPORT IF RPT IF IT IS PART OF THE CONTINUOUS AND TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. IN SUM, HUSSEIN MADE CLEAR HIS CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON AND PROVIDED

AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE WITH CANDID VIEWS ABOUT OPTIONS WE CURRENTLY HAVE UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR MAKING PROGRESS. ON THE PLO AND ARAFAT'S POSITION, HUSSEIN VOLUNTEERED THAT HE IS SENDING TWO OF HIS MINISTERS TO TUNIS TO DETERMINE WHAT ARAFAT'S THINKING IS ON HIS OPTIONS. SPECIFICALLY, THE KING WANTS TO FIND OUT WHETHER OR NOT ARAFAT WILL TRY TO EXTRICATE HIMSELF FROM SYRIAN CONTROL AND MOVE POLITICALLY WITHIN THE PLO BY MAJORITY SUPPORT AND NOT BY CONSENSUS. END SUMMARY.

4. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS MET WITH KING HUSSEIN FOR AN HOUR AND FORTY MINUTES AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 9. CHARGE DJEREJIAN, ROSS, TEICHER, DUR AND COLLINS ACCOMPANIED. PRIME MINISTER BADRAN, CINC LT. GEN. BIN SHAKER, MININFO ABU ODEH AND FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM WERE WITH THE KING.

5. WELCOMING AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE WARMLY, THE KING SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HEARING MCFARLANE'S IMPRESSIONS. MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT HE HAD COME TO INVITE HUSSEIN'S COUNSEL AND SEEK HIS WISDOM ABOUT LEBANON AND THE AREA. FIRST, HOWEVER, HE WISHED TO CONVEY TO THE KING THE WARMEST WISHES FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE ALSO WANTED TO EXPRESS THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION AND WILL TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS AND TO DEVOTE THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL.

6. MCFARLANE SAID THE PRIORITY THE PRESIDENT ACCORDS THE MIDDLE EAST STEMS FROM A RECENT MID-TERM REVIEW BY THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORS. NOTING THAT A PRESIDENT COMES TO OFFICE WANTING TO ACCOMPLISH MANY THINGS, MCFARLANE SAID AFTER A PERIOD OF COPING WITH WORLD REALITIES AND THE DIFFICULTIES IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS, HE COMES TO REALIZE THAT ONE OR TWO MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS ARE PROBABLY THE MAXIMUM HE CAN REASONABLY EXPECT TO ACHIEVE. A PRESIDENT THEN FACES A CHOICE ABOUT WHERE TO FOCUS HIS ATTENTION. THE RECENT POLICY REVIEW PRODUCED ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT ON A RANGE OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE FOCUS OF HIS EFFORTS DURING THE REMAINDER OF HIS TERM: CENTRAL AMERICA, PACIFIC BASIN, MIDDLE EAST, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ETC. IN THE REVIEW THERE WERE THOSE WHO ARGUED THAT THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD NOT BE A PRIORITY ISSUE,

GIVEN THE DIFFICULTY OF THE ISSUES AND THE HIGH CHANCE FOR FAILURE. NEVERTHELESS, AT THE END OF THE REVIEW THE PRESIDENT DECIDED HE WOULD DEVOTE HIMSELF TO TWO ISSUES: THE MIDDLE EAST AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE FURTHER DECIDED THESE AREAS WOULD HAVE CO-EQUAL POSITION ON HIS AGENDA. SAYING THE PRESIDENT REMARKED THAT HE HAD NOW NAILED HIS COLORS TO THE MAST, MCFARLANE CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SENT HIM TO THE AREA TO AFFIRM THE PRIORITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN U.S. POLICY AND TO MOVE QUICKLY ON LEBANON AND THEN MOVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST PROCESS.

7. WITH THIS INTRODUCTION MCFARLANE TURNED TO LEBANON. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES EVERYTHING POSSIBLE MUST BE DONE TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR WHAT U.S. OBJECTIVES ARE--WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, EXTENSION OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE ABILITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY. THE U.S. SEES LONG AND SHORT TERM OBJECTIVES ON LEBANON. IN THE NEAR TERM, AN IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS TO COPE EFFECTIVELY WITH ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHUF-ALAY REGION. THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL REPRESENTS BOTH A DANGER AND AN OPPORTUNITY. THE DANGER IS VIOLENCE; THE OPPORTUNITY, TO EXTEND GOL CONTROL TO A NEW REGION. AN IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT ANY OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THERE MUST BE AN ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE DRUZE. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT HE MUST FIND WAYS TO ACHIEVE ACCOMMODATION WITH OTHER LEBANESE GROUPS. WITHIN THE LEBANESE ARMY IT IS ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT THE LAF CANNOT BE A CHRISTIAN-LED OPERATION. THOSE UNITS TRAINED TO TAKE OVER IN THE SHUF WHEN ISRAEL WITHDRAWS, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE COMMANDED BY DRUZE AND SHIA OFFICERS.

8. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL MUST NOT BE SEEN AS AN END OR A STEP LEADING TO PARTITION. THE U.S. HAS URGED ISRAEL TO MAKE CLEAR THIS WITHDRAWAL IS A FIRST STEP TOWARD TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. WE HAVE ALSO STRESSED THE NEED TO HAVE A DEADLINE FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. THE ISRAELIS UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND NOW SEE AS WELL THE NEED TO DEFINE A TIME PERIOD FOR THEIR FULL WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, MCFARLANE SAID, HE HAS NOT YET AND DOUBTS THAT HE WILL GET ISRAEL TO ACCEPT FINAL WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT A SYRIAN PULL-OUT OF ITS FORCES. HOWEVER, ISRAEL IS ALSO READY TO TAKE OTHER STEPS TO STRENGTHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, TURNING OVER GREATER AUTHORITY TO LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOUTH. THE U.S. IS WELL-AWARE THAT FOR ANY SUCH STEPS TO BE EFFECTIVE IN ENHANCING GOL AUTHORITY SUCH OFFICIALS MUST BE UNDER REAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

CONTROL. WITH ISRAEL, IN SHORT, MCFARLANE CONCLUDED, MORE WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE--PARTICULARLY REGARDING A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL--AND THERE MAY BE A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL U.S. ASSURANCES.

9. TURNING TO SYRIA, MCFARLANE SAID HE MET SIX HOURS WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. HE HAD NO HIGH HOPES BEFORE THE MEETING, HE SAID, AND HIS EXPECTATIONS WERE FULFILLED. MCFARLANE TOLD THE KING HE EXPLAINED TO ASSAD THE U.S. VIEW THAT LEBANON NEEDS A "LEBANESE" GOVERNMENT, NOT JUST A CHRISTIAN ONE. HE THEN SPOKE TO ASSAD OF WHAT SYRIA COULD DO TO HELP PROMOTE THIS OBJECTIVE, IN PARTICULAR, LETTING THE GOL MOVE INTO THE UPPER METN--A STEP THAT WOULD REQUIRE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT AREA. MCFARLANE SAID HE ALSO GAVE ASSAD A FRANK ASSESSMENT ABOUT ISRAELI STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES, TELLING HIM ISRAEL WANTS TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON AND WILL DO SO, BUT NOT WITH SYRIA REMAINING IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. ASSAD WAS ALSO TOLD THAT IT IS THE U.S. JUDGEMENT THAT IF VIOLENCE ESCALATES, AND DESPITE THE HIGH ANTICIPATED ISRAELI LOSSES, ISRAEL WILL NOT HESITATE TO ATTACK THE SOVIET MISSILE SITES IN SYRIA, AND WOULD SUCCEED IN THIS OPERATION.

10. MCFARLANE SAID HE THEN DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR A STRONG LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND MADE THE POINT THAT ALL STATES SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE ABOUT THEIR SECURITY NEEDS. THE GOL HAS THAT RIGHT AND SHOULD HAVE IT RESPECTED. SECURITY, THEREFORE, WAS THE ISSUE TO BE TREATED FIRST ON LEBANON. AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE ACHIEVED, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE HOW IT WILL DEAL WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

11. ASSAD RESPONDED, MCFARLANE SAID, THAT THE PRINCIPLES MCFARLANE HAD SET FORTH ARE SOUND BUT LEBANON HAS APPLIED THEM IN A FLAWED MANNER. THE AGREEMENT WAS HARMFUL TO SYRIA'S INTERESTS. THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF THE LEBANON-ISRAELI AGREEMENT IN WHICH MCFARLANE STRESSED ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS, IN PARTICULAR ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO FULL WITHDRAWAL. ASSAD WAS TOLD THAT IF THERE ARE ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT THAT AFFECT SYRIA THESE CAN BE DISCUSSED WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. IT WAS ULTIMATELY AGREED THERE WOULD BE A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE U.S. AND SYRIAN OFFICIALS. ASSESSING THE TALK WITH ASSAD, MCFARLANE SAID IT IS HIS VIEW THAT THE SYRIAN APPROACH IS TO STALL. THE SYRIAN ARGUMENTS ARE PRETEXTS FOR ASSERTING SYRIA'S HEGEMONY IN THE AREA. THERE WAS NO HELP OR REAL ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ASSAD ON EITHER SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL OR ASSISTANCE FOR THE GOL AND ASSAD WAS FIRM THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW UNTIL THE LAST ISRAELI SOLDIER HAS LEFT LEBANON.

12. IN SAUDI ARABIA MCFARLANE SAID HE FOUND GREATER ENCOURAGEMENT AND SENSE OF OPTIMISM THAN HE EXPECTED. FAHD EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND TOLD MCFARLANE THE SAUDIS WILL SEND THEIR AMBASSADOR BACK TO BEIRUT SHORTLY. THE SAUDIS ALSO SAID THEY WILL WORK WITH THEIR ARAB COLLEAGUES TO PROMOTE SUPPORT FOR GEMAYEL. IN DISCUSSING WALID JUMBLATT, THE SAUDIS SAID HE WILL BE TALKED TO IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND WILL BE TOLD (1) HE SHOULD REACH ACCOMMODATION WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND (2) HE SHOULD GIVE THE GOL A CHANCE TO PROVE ITS FAIRNESS TO ALL LEBANESE. FAHD HAD STRESSED THAT THE SAUDIS BELIEVE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MUST BE A CONTINUOUS PROCESS. FINALLY, IN DISCUSSING THE PEACE PROCESS, FAHD AFFIRMED SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 1 INITIATIVE.

13. SUMMING UP, MCFARLANE SAID HE BELIEVES THAT IN THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST ROUND THERE IS GOOD AND BAD NEWS. HE THINKS THE ISRAELIS CAN BE BROUGHT TO AGREE TO A STATEMENT ON CONTINUAL WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FINITE TIME. IT WILL NOT STOP AT THE AWWALI RIVER REGARDLESS OF SYRIA BUT WILL, IN THE END, DEPEND ON ULTIMATE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HE THINKS THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CAN AND WILL ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION; JUMBLATT IS KEY TO A

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, ALTHOUGH HE REMAINS A WILD CARD IN THIS WHOLE EQUATION. THE NEGATIVE SIDE IS SYRIA WHERE NOTHING POSITIVE EMERGED. THE QUESTION, THUS, IS HOW TO PROCEED. MCFARLANE SAID HE SEES LITTLE MERIT IN BEATING AGAINST THE SYRIAN WALL IF SYRIA IS NOT GOING TO CHANGE. THEREFORE, PRIORITY MUST GO TO STRENGTHENING PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND ASSUME THAT SYRIAN INTERESTS DO NOT PROSPER IN BEIRUT. MCFARLANE, IN THIS CONNECTION, WARMLY PRAISED THE KING'S GESTURE IN PROVIDING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE LEBANESE ARMY. HE SAID STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO A MATTER THAT WILL REQUIRE FURTHER WORK IN ISRAEL.

14. MCFARLANE THEN ASKED THE KING FOR HIS ADVICE ON WHETHER THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CALL FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UPPER METN AS A SIGN OF GOOD WILL AND TO RESTORE GOL AUTHORITY BEYOND BEIRUT. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IF A CALL WERE MADE, MCFARLANE SAID, TO HAVE ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE GOL REQUEST AND TO HAVE IT SUCCEED. MCFARLANE SAID WE ALSO NEED TO THINK ABOUT OTHER ACTIONS-- POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INCENTIVES--TO CHANGE SYRIA

REQUEST FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, HOWEVER, WOULD BE GOL VULNERABILITY TO CRITICISM OF THE NORMALIZATION PROVISIONS OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAEL AGREEMENT. FOR JORDAN'S PART, HOWEVER, THE KING AFFIRMED THAT IT IS HIS POSITION THAT IF THE GOL ASKS SYRIA TO LEAVE, IT HAS THE RIGHT TO DO SO AND SYRIA SHOULD COMPLY. HUSSEIN COMMENTED HE HAD A GOOD MEETING WITH FAHD DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. THE KING SAID HE CANNOT, HOWEVER, FIND THE SOURCE FOR FAHD'S OPTIMISM ABOUT SYRIA. HUSSEIN SAID HE IS FAR MORE GLOOMY.

19. TURNING TO THE PLO, HUSSEIN TOLD MCFARLANE THAT JORDAN WILL BE SENDING TWO MINISTERS TO TUNIS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO DETERMINE WHAT ARAFAT AND THE PLO'S POSITION IS. THEY WILL MEET WITH ARAB LEAGUE OFFICIALS AND WITH PLO LEADERS. ARAFAT, THE KING SAID, HAS FEW OPTIONS: HE CAN BOW TO SYRIAN PRESSURE AND BECOME A FIGUREHEAD TO BE USED FOR A TIME AND ULTIMATELY DISCARDED; HE CAN ALLOW THE SYRIANS TO CONTINUE TO DESTROY PLO ASSETS; OR HE CAN IDENTIFY HIMSELF WITH "HIS CONSTITUENCY"--THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES--AND MOVE WITHOUT REGARD TO SYRIA. ALSO, ARAFAT MUST MOVE AWAY FROM THE IDEA THAT TO MOVE HE HAS TO HAVE A CONSENSUS. HUSSEIN EXPRESSED CONVICTION THAT ARAFAT STILL HAS A CHANCE. IN RESPONSE TO ARAFAT'S INSISTENCE THAT HE WANTS TO TALK WITH JORDAN, HE HAS BEEN TOLD HE MUST BE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. JORDAN HAS TO KNOW WHAT ARE HIS ENDS AND DIRECTION. ARAFAT HAS SAID HE WANTS A QUIET DIALOGUE AND JORDAN WILL KEEP IN TOUCH.

20. CONCLUDING HIS REMARKS, HUSSEIN COMMENTED ON THE ROLE OF JUMBLATT AND IDEAS FOR PUTTING PRESSURE ON SYRIA TO BECOME MORE FORTHCOMING. JUMBLATT, THE KING SAID, IS WALKING A TIGETROPE AND KNOWS IT. HUSSEIN BELIEVES JUMBLATT SEES THE DANGER THE SYRIANS REPRESENT, BUT HE ALSO FEARS THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT UNDER GEMAYEL. HUSSEIN HAS TRIED, HE SAID, TO DISSUADE JUMBLATT FROM HIS PRESENT COURSE AND TO GET HIM TO COME TO TERMS WITH AMIN GEMAYEL. AND HE DISCUSSED JUMBLATT WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WHO SAID THE GOL IS READY TO TALK SERIOUSLY WITH JUMBLATT. THE KING SAID JUMBLATT ALSO WANTS TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE U.S. AND THAT JUMBLATT TOLD HIM HE HAS BEEN INVITED TO WASHINGTON TO SEE THE SECRETARY. HOWEVER, THE KING SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE THIS ALL STOOD NOW.

21. WITH REGARD TO COPING WITH THE SYRIANS, HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD TWO PIECES OF ADVICE: (1) DO NOT RUN TO THE SYRIANS, AND (2) MAKE SOME PROGRESS ON ENDING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. FURTHER, THE SOVIET EQUATION SHOULD NOT BE NEGLECTED. THERE MUST ALSO BE GREATER EFFORT TO COORDINATE ARAB POSITIONS AND ACTIONS,

AND TO CONSTRAIN ASSAD'S FREEDOM OF ACTION. ONE SUCH STEP MIGHT BE TO TRY TO HAVE THE PLO LEAVE LEBANON AND TO REMOVE ASSAD'S POINT OF LEVERAGE HERE, THOUGH THIS IS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO HAVE AN ARAB SUMMIT AT WHICH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WOULD REQUEST WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES AND ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND SEEK ARAB SUPPORT FOR HIS REQUEST. THE PROBLEM WITH THIS APPROACH IS THAT TO BE EFFECTIVE, GEMAYEL WOULD HAVE TO KNOW ARAB SUPPORT WOULD BE THERE.

15. RESPONDING, THE KING EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR MCFARLANE'S PRESENTATION AND VIEWS. HE ASKED MCFARLANE TO CONVEY HIS WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND RESPECTS TO THE PRESIDENT. HE WAS HEARTENED, HE SAID, TO HEAR THE PRESIDENT IS RESOLVED TO CONTINUE GIVING PRIORITY TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL AS TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE DECISION IS COURAGEOUS; IT IS ALSO THE RIGHT ONE. WITHOUT A DYNAMIC U.S. ROLE THERE WOULD BE A VACUUM IN THE REGION. THE AREA WOULD BE IN GREAT DANGER AND VITAL U.S. INTERESTS WOULD BE AT RISK. THE SOVIETS ARE IN THE AREA AND ARE INVOLVED. THEY ARE GOING TO DEFEND THEIR INTERESTS. HOWEVER, SOVIET ATTITUDES ARE NOT CLEAR. THEY SUPPORT SYRIA, BUT ARE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT TO DO SHOULD THINGS GO WRONG. THEY ARE AWARE THAT THE SITUATION CAN BACKFIRE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN DEFICIENT. THIS HAS BEEN A FACTOR IN THE OVERALL SITUATION.

16. TURNING TO LEBANON, THE KING SAID IT IS GOOD TO HEAR THAT THE U.S. WILL SUPPORT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. THE OBJECTIVES OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ARE GOALS DEAR TO JORDAN. IN THIS REGARD THE CONCEPT OF ASSURING THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHUF/ALAY AREA IS A STEP BEGINNING TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAS JORDAN'S FULL SUPPORT.

17. WITH REGARD TO SYRIA, THE KING SAID, THE SYRIAN ATTITUDE IS NOT SURPRISING AND THE SYRIAN LEADERSHIP IS NEGATIVE ON EVERYTHING, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. THEY TAKE THE VIEW THAT FUTURE GENERATIONS SHOULD DECIDE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA; THERE IS NO NEED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY NOW. THIS APPROACH, HUSSEIN SAID, IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT IGNORES THE COSTS TO HUMAN BEINGS OF FAILING TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE AREA'S PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, SYRIA IS ENCOURAGED IN ITS NEGATIVE APPROACH BECAUSE IT BRINGS THEM ATTENTION AND THE LIMELIGHT. ALSO, THEY HAVE BEEN REWARDED FOR THEIR OBSTINANCE THROUGH THEIR USE OF POLITICAL BLACKMAIL. THUS, THE KING AGREED SYRIA'S OBJECTIVE IS TO PROCRASTINATE

AND TO WEAKEN THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT AND GOL AUTHORITY. THE SYRIANS KNOW TIME IS NOT ON THE SIDE OF LEBANON AND THE GOL; THE PASSAGE OF TIME WITHOUT PROGRESS LEADS TO THE LOSS OF HOPE AND FAITH. AGAINST THIS TREND ANYTHING DONE TO SUPPORT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS A GOOD STEP.

18. COMMENTING ON POSSIBLE STEPS OUTLINED BY AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE, THE KING SAID HE DOUBTS THAT A LEBANESE APPEAL FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD DRAW ARAB SUPPORT. NEVERTHELESS, HE BELIEVES THE GOL SHOULD TAKE THE STEP OF ASKING SYRIANS OUT IN ORDER TO PUT AN END TO SYRIAN USE OF THE ABSENCE OF A FORMAL GOL REQUEST TO SYRIAN ADVANTAGE. THE KING ALSO AGREED SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UPPER METN WOULD HELP THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT, BUT SAID WE SHOULD EXAMINE CLOSELY MAKING SUCH AN APPEAL. (THE KING LATER STATED THAT ANY GOL REQUEST FOR A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL SHOULD SEEK COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.) IN REGARD TO AN ARAB SUMMIT, THE KING SAID THE SUDANESE PROPOSAL HAD FOCUSED ON A SUMMIT TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS OF THE PLO. THE SAUDIS, WHO ARE INTERESTED IN THE IDEA OF A SUMMIT, HAVE SAID A MEETING SHOULD DEAL WITH "ALL SUBJECTS." ONE PROBLEM WITH SEEKING SUMMIT SUPPORT FOR A GOL

PARTICULARLY TO GENERATE SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. THE SAUDIS MUST BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND LEBANON. THE KING SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED IN HIS TALKS WITH THE SAUDIS THAT FAHD HAD SUGGESTED THAT IF A CONSENSUS CANNOT BE ACHIEVED, JORDAN AND THE SAUDIS SHOULD "TRY TO COORDINATE POSITIONS" AND WORK FOR AN ARAB MAJORITY TO MOVE FORWARD ON BASIC ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE KING SAID, THE FACT IS SYRIA IS GETTING HUGE AMOUNTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. FURTHERMORE, THE PROBLEM WE ALL CONFRONT IS NOT JUST SYRIA, BUT RADICALISM WITH SOVIET BACKING. HUSSEIN CONCLUDED THAT JORDAN WILL BE HELPFUL TO OUR EFFORTS IN ANY WAY IT CAN.

22. THANKING THE KING FOR HIS VIEWS, MCFARLANE SAID HE PROPOSES IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE TO FOCUS ON THE ISSUE OF GOL-DRUZE RECONCILIATION. ASSURANCES MUST BE OBTAINED THAT THE PHALANGE WILL NOT DISRUPT OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A GOVERNMENT MOVE IN THE SHUF. HE WILL ALSO BE SEEKING A STATEMENT FROM THE ISRAELIS TO CONVINCING THE LEBANESE THAT THE RE-DEPLOYMENT FROM THE SHUF IS A PARTIAL STEP IN A PROCESS OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. MCFARLANE SAID HE WILL ALSO BE LOOKING AT WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT

SYRIA AND WAYS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON EXPANDING THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

23. AFTER THIS LARGE MEETING, KING HUSSEIN INVITED AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE FOR A SHORT PRIVATE DISCUSSION.

13526

E. O. 12958

~~As Amended~~

Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

24. MCFARLANE THEN EXPLAINED TO THE KING ISRAEL'S STATED PREFERENCE FOR PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND HOW THIS COULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN OBTAINING OVERALL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES FROM LEBANON.

25. FINALLY, AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE REFERRED TO THE KING'S COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET ROLE AND THE LIMITED U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE FLOATED THE IDEA OF POSSIBLY USING THE PRESENCE OF THE MNF TROOPS IN LEBANON AS A BARGAINING CHIP WITH THE SOVIETS IN TERMS OF THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN SYRIA. KING HUSSEIN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THIS IDEA.

26. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT. DJEREJIAN

BT

#7002

NNNN

VZCZCBLI *
OO RUEHC RUEHDM RUEHTV RUFHGV RUEHJM
DE RUEHBL #8753 222 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101645Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2181
RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0825
RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0774
INFO RUFHGV / USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0041
RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0749

CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
CHRG: PROG 8/10/83
APPRV: RFAIRBANKS
DRFTD: CROSS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4 AMB
CHRON

BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08753

EXDIS

TEL AVIV ALSO FOR MCFARLANE

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, ICRC, SY, IS, PLO, LE
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROGRESS ON SYRIA/MIA ISSUE

REF: DAMASCUS 6088

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE PROGRESS REPORTED BY ICRC DAMASCUS DELEGATE GAUTIER IS LIKELY TO HAVE RESULTED FROM AMB. MCFARLANE'S APPROACH TO PRESIDENT ASSAD IN THE COURSE OF THEIR MEETING AUGUST 7 (SEPTELS). AT THAT MEETING, MCFARLANE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED ASSAD'S AUTHORIZATION FOR THE ICRC TO IDENTIFY THE FOUR BODIES IN THE JEWISH CEMETERY IN DAMASCUS. ASSAD, WHO WAS GENERALLY FAMILIAR WITH THE ISSUE BUT PROFESSED TO BE UNAWARE OF THE DETAILS, SAID HE HAD "NO OBJECTION" TO HAVING THE ICRC PROCEED.

3. EMBASSY DAMASCUS SHOULD ENCOURAGE GAUTIER TO KEEP THE EMBASSY INFORMED OF PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE. IF SIGNIFICANT DELAYS ARE ENCOUNTERED IN EXHUMING THE BODIES FOR IDENTIFICATION, AMB. PAGANELLI MAY WISH TO PURSUE THE ISSUE WITH KHADDAM ON THE BASIS OF ASSAD'S GO-AHEAD.

4. FOR AMB. MCFARLANE: WE RECOMMEND THAT, WHEN YOU INFOR THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, YOU STRESS THA ANY REPEAT ANY LEAR TO THE MEDIA OR TO INTERESTED PRIVATE PARTIES COULD SERIOUSLY ENDANGER THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF YOUR APPROACH. ANY PREMATURE PUBLIC DISCUSSION MIGHT WELL CAUSE THE SYRIANS TO RETRACT THEIR AGREEMENT OR, AT A MINIMUM, TO STALL IDENTIFICATION. DILLON

BT
#8753

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1#122

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

NAYMVZCZCBL0334

OO RUEHBL

DE RUEHC #5462/01 2221853

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 101750Z AUG 83

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9280

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4525

BT

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 225462

EXDIS, FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

LOC: DISK 12 056

10 AUG 83 1955

CN: 06707

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EG

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT
MUBARAK

REF: STATE 165422

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS SIGNED A LETTER TO PRESIDENT
MUBARAK (TEXT PARA 3), WHICH SHOULD BE DELIVERED BY
AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE DURING HIS VISIT TO CAIRO.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

AUGUST 9, 1983

DEAR HOSNI:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 12 WHICH WAS CONVEYED
BY YOUR ADVISOR OSAMA EL-BAZ. I HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF
AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE'S VISIT TO CAIRO TO HAVE HIM CONVEY
MY RESPONSE AND MY PERSONAL BEST WISHES.

I UNDERSTAND AND SHARE THE CONCERN YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR
LETTER ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. INDEED,
IT WAS BECAUSE OF THIS CONCERN THAT I FOLLOWED THE ADVICE
IN YOUR JUNE 12 LETTER AND ASKED SECRETARY SHULTZ TO
VISIT THE REGION AGAIN FOLLOWING HIS TRIP TO ASIA. AS HE
REPORTED TO YOU IN CAIRO, HIS VISIT WAS USEFUL IN
MAINTAINING OUR DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA AND DEMONSTRATING THE
STRENGTH OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE REGION. I WANT TO
REASSURE YOU THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE WHATSOEVER IN
MY COMMITMENT TO PURSUE VIGOROUSLY BOTH A RESOLUTION TO
THE LEBANON CRISIS AND THE BROADER ISSUE OF A JUST AND
LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT.

AS MY APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AND HIS CURRENT
DISCUSSIONS IN THE REGION DEMONSTRATE, MY COMMITMENT TO
PRESSING FOR A PROMPT RESOLUTION OF THE LEBANON CRISIS
REMAINS FIRM. OUR TASK IN LEBANON HAS BEEN COMPLICATED
BY SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE AND THEIR EFFORTS TO DOMINATE THE
PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT. AS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED, WE ARE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-099/3 #57871

BY RW NARA DATE 5-24-10

PRESERVATION COPY

CONTINUING OUR DIALOGUE WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD IN THE HOPE THAT THIS WILL LEAD EVENTUALLY TO PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON.

YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT IS A VITAL ELEMENT IN OUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF LEBANON. IN YOUR CONTACTS WITH SYRIA, YOU MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE PRESIDENT ASSAD AND HIS COLLEAGUES UNDERSTAND THE DANGERS FOR LEBANON AND THE REGION INHERENT IN THE PRESENT IMPASSE ON WITHDRAWAL. IN ADDITION, THE SYRIANS NEED TO BE REMINDED THAT THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT ACCURATELY REPRESENTS THE LEBANESE PEOPLE'S DETERMINATION THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON. I FRANKLY FIND IT IRONIC THAT ONE ARAB STATE WOULD BY ITS ACTIONS PROLONG THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ANOTHER ARAB STATE.

IT APPEARS THAT SYRIA'S ACTIONS CONCERNING LEBANON ARE RELATED TO ITS DESIRE TO DICTATE THE COURSE OF ANY FUTURE PROGRESS TOWARDS A BROADER PEACE SETTLEMENT. SYRIA HAS LEGITIMATE CONCERNS WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED IN THE PROCESS OF REACHING A BROAD AND JUST PEACE IN THE REGION. NEVERTHELESS, WE CANNOT ALLOW THE SYRIANS -- AND THROUGH THEM THE SOVIETS -- TO FRUSTRATE OUR COMMON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY.

CONTINUING THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD WILL SEND A STRONG SIGNAL TO DAMASCUS IN THIS REGARD. I AM HEARTENED BY THE RECENT VISIT TO CAIRO OF THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE GENERALLY POSITIVE COMMENT IT PRODUCED IN OTHER KEY ARAB

STATES. I HAVE SEEN REPORTS THAT YOU MIGHT VISIT BAGHDAD. SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR OUR SHARED INTERESTS IN THE REGION AND IT WOULD ENHANCE EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE. WE WANT TO SUPPORT YOUR EFFORTS AND HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE SAUDIS AND THE JORDANIANS THAT THEY MIGHT SEE IT IN THEIR INTERESTS TO SUPPORT THIS TREND.

YOU RAISED THE QUESTION OF U.S. ACTIONS TO REASSURE THE PALESTINIANS ABOUT THEIR FUTURE. I UNDERSTAND YOUR POINT AND BELIEVE WE HAVE ALREADY TAKEN SOME STEPS TO DO SO. MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE, OF COURSE, IS MY ONGOING PEACE INITIATIVE WHICH FORESEES A SETTLEMENT THAT RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AS WELL AS ISRAELI SECURITY. MY ADMINISTRATION HAS SOUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM MUST BE RESOLVED IF THE MIDDLE EAST IS TO ENJOY PEACE AND STABILITY. IN ADDITION TO THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, I AM ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE QUALITY OF LIFE EXPERIENCED BY THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE REGION. SECRETARY SHULTZ NOTED THIS CONCERN IN HIS JUNE 22 PRESS CONFERENCE AND HE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH ISRAELI MINISTERS SHAMIR

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AND ARENS DURING THEIR VISIT TO WASHINGTON. IN THESE MEETINGS, HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO ACT SO AS TO ENCOURAGE LEGITIMATE LEADERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO START VIEWING THE PEACE PROCESS IN CONSTRUCTIVE, RATHER THAN CRITICAL AND NON-PRODUCTIVE WAYS. WE WILL CONTINUE THESE EFFORTS AND ARE STUDYING WAYS IN WHICH IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THE DAY-TO-DAY LIVES OF PALESTINIANS, IN THE WEST BANK AND ELSEWHERE. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT WHILE THE SYRIANS ARE ENCOURAGING STRIFE AMONG PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON AND SEEKING TO MAKE PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND LEADERS SERVE SYRIAN INTERESTS, WE NOT BE BLIND TO THE VERY PERSONAL TRAGEDY OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE OR THE NECESSITY OF FINDING WAYS TO ADDRESS THEIR JUST CONCERNS.

YOU CLOSED YOUR LETTER TO ME WITH AN EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE U.S. WILL MAKE ANOTHER CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ALLOW ME, MR. PRESIDENT, TO AMEND YOUR THOUGHTS A BIT. I AM CONFIDENT THAT EGYPT AND THE U.S., WORKING TOGETHER, WILL MAKE STILL MORE CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY. DOING SO WILL REQUIRE EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS AND COOPERATION, BUT I AM CERTAIN WE WILL PREVAIL.

WITH WARMEST BEST WISHES,

SINCERELY,

/S/ RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT.

4. FOR CAIRO: SIGNED ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED.

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

BT
#5462

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INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3233
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6649
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9596
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JFRUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1126
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7908
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4281
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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
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APPRV: AMB:SLEWIS.
DRFTD: POL:DKURTZER
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: AIL LEB 11

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TEL AVIV 10829

-EXDIS

FROM MCFARLANE

F.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PINS, LE, IS
SUBJ: KIDNAPPING OF THREE LEBANESE MINISTERS

REF: BEIRUT 8755

1. ~~C~~ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE'S AUG 10 MEETING WITH MINDEF ARENS, DMI BARAK WAS INFORMED THAT THE DRUZE HAD KIDNAPPED THE LEBANESE MINISTERS OF DEFENSE, ECONOMY, AND HEALTH. BARAK SAID THAT HIS INFORMATION, REPORTEDLY DERIVED FROM LEBANESE POLICE SOURCES AND BROADCAST PUBLICLY IN LEBANON, NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE MINISTERS WERE ON THEIR WAY BACK TO BEIRUT FROM A MEETING WITH A DRUZE LEADER WHEN THEY WERE WAYLAID. CHIEF OF STAFF MOSHE LEVY ASSURED MCFARLANE THAT THE IDF WILL ACT FAIRLY THURSDAY, AUG 11, TO TRY TO LOCATE THE MINISTERS, CALM THE SITUATION, AND MEDIATE THEIR RELEASE.

3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

BT
#0829

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ EXDIS

TEL AVIV 10829

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NLS _____
NARA, DATE _____

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NLS F98-008/1 #124
Cll NARA, DATE 9/19/06

(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS POL PM CHRON

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5457

INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3234

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6650

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9597

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1127

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7909

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4282

RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3289 3291 EXPECTED MCN

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3052

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~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 10830

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

(PARA 3 SUB PARA 9)

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, IS, ICRC, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: HIGHLIGHTS OF
MCFARLANE-ASSAD MEETING, AUGUST 7

REF: BEIRUT 6742

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN A SIX-HOUR ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR
MCFARLANE, AUGUST 7, PRESIDENT ASSAD MADE THE FOLLOWING
MAJOR POINTS IN RESPONSE TO MCFARLANE'S PRESENTATION OF
US OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON AND TO MCFARLANE'S REQUESTS FOR
SPECIFIC SYRIAN ACTIONS.

3. -- ASSAD ASSERTED THAT U.S. ANALYSIS OF AND PRINCIPLES
FOR LEBANON ARE INCORRECT AND UNREALISTIC DUE TO
AMERICAN LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONFESSIONAL
REALITIES IN LEBANON.

-- IN THIS CONTEXT THE SYRIANS ARGUED THAT THE
PHALANGE PARTY STANDS IN ISOLATION AGAINST ALL REPEAT
ALL NATIONALIST FORCES, PARTIES AND PERSONALITIES.

--- THEREFORE THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT, CONTAINING
MARONITES, SUNNIS AND DRUZE, REFLECTS THE FULL RANGE
OF CONFESSIONAL GROUPS IN LEBANON.

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ALL NARA DATE 4/19/04

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0000 -- BASED ON THESE "FACTS" ASSAD SAID THAT MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION THAT THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY INTO THE SHUF DOES NOT REPRESENT A TEST OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE TO BRING ABOUT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. ON THE CONTRARY WHAT IS PROPOSED FOR THE SHUF WILL ONLY YIELD THE VIOLENT IMPOSITION OF THE PHALANGE ON THE DRUZE.

-- BY EXTENSION ASSAD SAID THAT THIS IS WHAT GEMAYEL INTENDS TO DO IN ALL OF LEBANON BUT THAT THE PHALANGE ATTEMPT WILL NOT SUCCEED.

0000 -- THEREFORE THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT REALLY LEGITIMATE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. IT CANNOT THEREFORE REACH ANY AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER PARTIES.

-- ASSAD REJECTED MCFARLANE'S CONTENTION THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALEY/SHUF COULD BE USED TO BENEFIT LEBANON.

0000 -- IN RESPONSE TO MCFARLANE'S PROPOSAL THAT SYRIA WITHDRAW FROM THE UPPER METN, IN ORDER TO FURTHER THE EXTENSION OF GOL AUTHORITY, ASSAD REJECTED THE REQUEST.

-- ASSAD NONETHELESS, THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION, EMPHASIZED SYRIAN SUPPORT TO LEBANESE UNITY AND INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF LEBANON'S ARAB TIES. THIS CONTINUES TO FORM THE BASIS OF SYRIAN REJECTION OF ISRAELI-LEBANON AGREEMENT.

-- WITH RESPECT TO SYRIAN LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE US, ASSAD EXPLAINED ITS LACK OF CONFIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF AMERICA'S INABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY PRESSURE ISRAEL.

0000 -- WITH REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EVERY STATE TO DETERMINE HOW TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS AND SECURITY, ASSAD SAID THAT LEBANON HAS THESE RIGHTS ONLY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ITS ARAB AFFILIATION.

-- ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, ASSAD STATED THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW ON THE BASIS OF UNSCR 508/509.

-- SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW IF LEBANON ASKS AFTER ISRAEL LEAVES.

0000 -- REGARDING THE AGREEMENT, ASSAD SAID THAT THE LEBANESE TOLD HIM IT WAS IMPOSED ON LEBANON BY ISRAEL