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Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject
File: Records, 1981-1985
Folder Title: Middle East Trip (McFarlane)
CHRON Cables (08/14/1983-08/15/1983)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE:
Records

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Middle East Trip (McFarlane) Chron Cables [8/14/83-
8/15/83] Box 91407

Date: 12/2/99
Bowditch F98-008-1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	Cable #131008Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #138</i>	8/13/83	P1/F1
2. Cable	Cable #141122Z Aug 83, 3 p. <i>R 4/19/06 " #139</i>	8/14/83	P1/F1
3. Cable	No Cable #, re: Israel/Lebanon Agreement, 2 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #140</i>	8/14/83	P1/F1
4. Cable	Cable #141850Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R 4/19/06 " #141</i>	8/14/83	P1/F1
5. Cable	Cable #141855Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R 11 " #142</i>	8/14/83	P1/F1
6. Cable	Cable #110420Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #143</i>	8/11/83	P1/F1
7. Cable	Cable #150833Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R 4/19/06 " #144</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
8. Cable	Cable #151144Z Aug 83, 7 p. <i>PART " #145 PAR</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
9. Cable	Cable #151204Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R 11 " #146</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
10. Cable	Cable #151212Z Aug 83, 7 p. <i>PART " #147</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
11. Cable	Cable #151242Z Aug 83, 7 p. <i>PART " #148</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
12. Cable	Cable #151338Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #149</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
13. Cable	No Cable #, re: Perceptions of Egyptian Attitudes, 2p <i>R 11 " #150</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
14. Cable	Cable #151734Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R 11 " #151</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
15. Cable	Cable #152330Z Aug 83, 2 p.	8/15/83	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ *dlb 12/2/9c*

BEIRUT 8909

VZCZCBLI *

OO RUEHAM

DE RUEHBL #8909 226 **

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 141119Z AUG 83 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0659

BT

CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CHRG: PROG 8/13/83

APPRV: RCMCFARLANE

DRFTD: CWSROSS

CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS

DISTR: MCFARLANE-4; AMB.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BEIRUT 08909

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, JO, US. LE

SUBJECT: DRAFT MEMCON OF AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE'S
MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN

REF: AMMAN 7019

1. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REGRET DELAY IN RESPONSE. REPORT ON MEETING WITH
HUSSEIN IS FINE AND REQUIRES NO CHANGE. PLEASE TRANSMIT
TO SAME ADDRESSEES AS MAJOR REPORTING CABLES TO DATE
(E.G., CABLE ON MEETING WITH KHADDAM, ETC.) WITH SAME
SLUG LINES. THANKS. DILLON

BT

#8909

NNNN

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

BEIRUT 8909

~~SECRET~~

AMMAN 007019

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

XYMVZCZCBL0821

00 RUEHBL

DE RUEHAM #7019 2251009

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 131008Z AUG 83 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 6393

INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 7291

RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0238

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 07019

LOC: DISK 14 096

13 AUG 83 1010

CN: 07185

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

EXDIS

TEL AVIV/JERUSALEM FOR MCFARLANE

E.O.12356: DECL OADR

TAGS: PREL, JO, US, LE

SUBJECT: DRAFT MEMCON OF AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE'S
MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN

REF: AMMAN 7002

1. ~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE REALIZE THAT HEAVY SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS HAS
LEFT ALL OF YOU LITTLE FREE TIME, BUT WE WISH TO
CONFIRM THAT DRAFT MEMCON OF THE MEETING WITH
KING HUSSEIN HAS REACHED YOU. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO
DISTRIBUTE IT SOON, IN PARTICULAR, BECAUSE WE HAVE
NOT REPORTED ELSEWHERE THE KING'S REMARKS ABOUT
JORDANIAN MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO WHICH
WILL BE OF INTEREST TO WASHINGTON AND AREA POSTS.

3. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT
DJEREJIAN

BT

#7019

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

AMMAN 007019

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1#138

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 11/5/02

Answered -

VZCZCBLI *
OO RUEHC RUEADWW
DE RUEHBL #8910/01 226 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141122Z AUG 83 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2278
INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08910

CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: 8/14/83
APPRV: RMC FARLANE
DRFTD: RFAIRBANKS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MCFARLANE-1

NODIS/SIERRA

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY, EYES ONLY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O.:12356, DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPPS, IS, LE, US, SY
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED LETTER
TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

REFTEL: (A) JERUSALEM 2925; (B) JERUSALEM 2922

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN LIGHT OF MEETINGS REPORTED REFTEL (A) AND IN LIGHT OF THE URGENCY FROM BEIRUT PERSPECTIVE, I BELIEVE WE MUST CONSIDER RAISING THE ANTE WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT CONTINUED ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE ON PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WILL HAVE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES, BOTH IN OUR EFFORTS IN THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY AND IN THE LEBANESE CONTEXT SPECIFICALLY, UP TO AND INCLUDING FORMAL ABOGATION BY THE GOL OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN TAKE THE HIGH (AND HOPEFULLY EFFECTIVE) GROUND IN OUR NEXT STEPS WITH THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE PROPOSED A NOTIONAL FORMULA WHICH HAS PLENTY OF LATITUDE TO ACCOMMODATE THEIR LEGITIMATE CONCERNS. WE HAVE STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR A WAY TO REMOVE PUBLIC SUSPICION ABOUT PARTITION. THERE IS IN MY MIND NO REASONABLE EXPLANATION FOR BEGIN'S AND SHAMIR'S POSITION AND I CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT EITHER THEY FEAR THAT A STATEMENT OF THE TYPE WE HAVE PROPOSED WILL PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE LABOR OPPOSITION OR THAT THERE MAY BE ULTERIOR MOTIVES BEHIND THIS INTRANSIGENCE.

3. IT IS MY SENSE THAT WE ARE NOW IN A VERY DIFFICULT TRANSITION PERIOD IN WHICH THE ASSUMPTIONS EACH SIDE MAKES ABOUT THE OTHER ARE FLAWED AND NEED TO BE CORRECTED. THE GOL IS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAELI OBJECTIVES IN THIS REDEPLOYMENT. THEY BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL IS ALSO OMNIPOTENT IN ITS ABILITY TO CONTROL THE DRUZE AND THE PHALANGE. THE ISRAELIS FOR THEIR PART ARE DISDAINFUL OF THE LEBANESE FOR THEIR LACK OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY COURAGE. SOME SEEM ALMOST CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE LEBANESE BECAUSE THEY ARE IN

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 898-008/1 #139
27 CIS NARA, DATE 4/9/06

SUCH A PRECARIOUS SITUATION. THE SOLUTION ULTIMATELY MUST LIE IN CLOSE AND DIRECT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THESE SUSPICIOUS PARTIES. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO HELP IN RECONCILING THESE DIFFERENCES BUT THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IS TO QUIET LEBANESE FEAR OF PARTITION BY MEANS OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE GOI ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED IN REFTTEL (B).

4. WITH REDEPLOYMENT IMMINENT AS EARLY AS 1 SEPTEMBER WE HAVE PRECIOUS LITTLE TIME TO COMPLETE THE NECESSARY COORDINATION AT THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEVEL AND THEREFORE NEED TO TRY AGAIN TO GAIN BEGIN'S APPROVAL FOR A PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO A NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR A PHASED WITHDRAWAL. THERE IS A RANGE OF OPTIONS WE MIGHT CONSIDER. ONE POSSIBLE METHOD WOULD BE TO ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENTS CRITICAL OF ISRAELI REFUSAL TO PROVIDE A NOTIONAL SCHEDULE. A TOUGHER VARIANT MIGHT CALL INTO QUESTION ISRAELI ULTERIOR MOTIVES AND APPARENT DETERMINATION TO DISCREDIT AND FURTHER WEAKEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THIS COULD BE DONE THROUGH LEAKS AND/OR PRIVATE AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS. A MORE DIRECT AND SOMEWHAT SOFTER APPROACH WOULD BE TO PREPARE A LETTER WHICH I COULD DELIVER TO BEGIN IN YOUR NAME OR THE PRESIDENT'S. I FRANKLY PREFER THIS APPROACH BECAUSE BEGIN WILL HAVE TO RESPOND FORMALLY AND HOPEFULLY PROMPTLY. I DEFER TO YOUR DECISION WHETHER YOU SHOULD SIGN THIS LETTER OR WHETHER THE PRESIDENT SHOULD SIGN IT, FEARING IN MIND THAT WE MAY NEED THIS TYPE OF LEVERAGE IN THE FUTURE. IN ANY CASE, I AM PERSUADED THAT A FORMAL LETTER IS THE WAY TO MAKE CLEAR THE HIGH PRIORITY WE PLACE ON ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO A PUBLIC STATEMENT. PROPOSED TEXT FOLLOWS:

5. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I UNDERSTAND FROM AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DOES NOT AGREE IN THE NECESSITY OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A CLEAR SENSE OF PROCESS AND MOVEMENT -- OF PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS. IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, I BELIEVE THAT THE STATEMENT PROPOSED BY AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE IS IMPORTANT FOR

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

PAGE

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROG-DATE 8/14/83

FROM-ORIGINATOR
MCFARLANE

TO-RECIPIENT
AKRECZKO

FROM-ORIGINATOR
FAIRBANKS, DROBINSON

DISTRIBUTION
MCFARLANE-4, AMB

ORIGINATOR

ACTION ADDRESSEE, PRECEDENCE

SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR L - KOZAK, DELIVER BEGINNING OF BUSINESS
MONDAY, AUGUST 15

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O.: 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: IS, LE, PEPR

SUBJECT: ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 200164

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN PREPARATION FOR WED., AUG. 17, MEETINGS WITH SYRIAN
FORMIN KHADDAM, WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION BY OPENING OF BUSINESS (BEIRUT TIME) AUG. 16:

(A) TEXT OF PARA. 4 OF THE 9TH ARAB PEOPLES CONGRESS, HELD
IN BAGHDAD, WHICH, ACCORDING TO KHADDAM, PROHIBITS ANY
SEPARATE ARAB AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL (SEE PARA 13, REFTEL).

(B) BRIEF SUMMARY OF TERMS OF TREATIES WITH NAZI GERMANY
(E.G., MAINTENANCE OF ALLIED FORCES, ETC.), WHICH ASSAD
HAS CLAIMED ARE LESS THAN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT.

(C) PORTIONS OF COURT OPINION AND SEPARATE OPINIONS IN
THE ICJ FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE (1973) WHICH ADDRESS
ISSUE OF WHETHER ICELAND'S AGREEMENT WITH THE U.K. HAD
BEEN COERCED BY THE PRESENCE OF U.K. SHIPS IN FISHING
WATERS CLAIMED BY ICELAND.

INITIALS:

AUTH: *PM*

DRAFTER

1 CLEAR.

2

3

4

5

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

198-008/1-#140

BY

LOT

NARA, DATE

11/5/02

8914

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

(D) SYRIAN POSITION (PERHAPS IN UNSC OR UNGA) ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE 1968 SOVIET/CZECHOSLOVAKIA AGREEMENT
WHICH AUTHORIZED THE MAINTENANCE OF SOVIET FORCES IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

(E) TEXT OF THE STIMSON DOCTRINE ISSUED DURING
JAPANESE-CHINA CONFLICTS OVER MANCHURIA IN THE EARLY
1930S. (SEE 26 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
342). DILLON##

6
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3
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~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 8915

VZCZCBLI *

OO RUEHTV RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHJM

DE RUEHBL #8915 226 **

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

O 141850Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 0816

INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2281

RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0790

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08915

CLASS: SECRET

CHRG: PROG: 8/14/83

APPRV: RMCFARLANE

TD: RMCFARLANE

CLEAR: NONE

DISTR: RMCFARLANE (4)

AMB

DCM

POL-MIL

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS FROM MCFARLANE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, JNLY

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 198-008/1, 4/4

CN NARA, DATE 4/19/06

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, XF, US

SUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS: ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN A NINETY-MINUTE MEETING THIS MORNING WITH FM SALEM AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HADDAD (MCFARLANE-FAIRBANKS-DILLON ON US SIDE), A NUMBER OF ITEMS SURFACED WHICH ARE OF INTEREST TO THE GOI. ONE OF THESE, OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO ME, CONCERNS DANY CHAMOUN --DANY CHAMOUN'S MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO THE EFFECT THAT UNLESS THE GOL AGREED TO ACTIVE PUBLIC COORDINATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL WITH ISRAEL, THAT THE GOI WOULD SIMPLY WITHDRAW PREEMPTORILLY AND ESTABLISH A DRUZE CANTON/ISRAELI PROTECTORATE IN THE SHUF. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR DISCUSSING THIS REPORT (WITH SUITABLE SURPRISE) WITH AT LEAST DAVID KIMCHE AND/OR WHOMEVER YOU BELIEVE APPROPRIATE.

3. REFERRING TO THE PENDING ISRAELI REQUEST TO MOVE TO A NEW OFFICE OF THEIR OWN, HADDAD STATED THAT THERE WILL SIMPLY BE NO ACTION ON THIS REQUEST UNTIL THE MATTER OF THE ISRAELI PUBLIC STATEMENT IS RESOLVED. THIS IS BASICALLY FOR YOUR INFORMATION; NO ACTION REQUIRED.

4. AFTER MY DEBRIEF OF GOI WILLINGNESS TO TRY TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH JUMBLATT, BOTH SALEM AND HADDAD WERE VERY PLEASED AND GRATEFUL AND EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE URGENCY. IN ENSUING TALK OF THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MEETING THEY PROFESSED COMPLETE GOOD FAITH (E.G. NO PRECONDITIONS, BUT WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT REASONABLE TERMS). COMMENT: THE GOL IS EXTRAORDINARILY INTERESTED IN THIS MEETING TAKING PLACE. THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT SUCCESS ON THIS ITEM COULD LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS TO GOI IN OTHER AREAS. END COMMENT.

5. WE TALKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE TENDERING OF THE FORMAL REQUEST FOR THE SYRIANS TO LEAVE LEBANON. IT IS THE

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 8915

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 8915

JUDGMENT OF SALEM AND HADDAD THAT IF THEY CAN CUT A DEAL WITH JUMBLATT SO AS TO FACILITATE A REASONABLY STABLE TAKEOVER OF THE SHUF, THEY WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO SEND THE LETTER AND CALL FOR AN ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT. THEY DOUBT THAT THE ARABS COULD MUSTER THE COURAGE TO MAKE THE MEETING HAPPEN BUT ONCE THE CALL WAS MADE (AND THAT SQUARE FILLED), THEY WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO GO ON TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

6. HADDAD (PLEASE PROTECT) ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT ONE OF THE USEFUL OUTCOMES OF THE PAST THREE DAYS HAS BEEN THE OPENING OF ACTIVE EXCHANGES BETWEEN PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND SUCH LEADING OPPOSITION FIGURES AS NABIH BARRI, RASHID KARAMI AND FORMER PRESIDENT FRANJIIYA. THE LATTER (PLEASE PROTECT) WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT IF THE LAF IS ABLE TO HANDLE THE SHUF OPERATION SUCESSFULLY, THAT HE (FRANJIIYA) WOULD WELCOME THEM INTO THE AREA AROUND TRIPOLI AND ASK THE SYRIANS TO LEAVE.

7. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WOULD APPRECIATE EARLY WORD OF ANY SUCCESS IN ARRANGING MEETING WITH JUMBLATT.

8. LATE ENTRY. AFTER DICTATING THE ABOVE, I WANT TO REINFORCE THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EARLY MEETING WITH JUMBLATT, BOTH IN FOSTERING RECONCILIATION AND IMPROVING THE CLIMATE OF GOL-GOI RELATIONS. THE LEBANESE ARE KEENLY INTERESTED IN ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN ARRANGING THE MEETING AND INDEED IN ISRAELI PARTICIPATION. AS I HAVE SAID, A SUCCESS ON THIS EFFORT HOLDS GREAT POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVING GOL COOPERATION ON OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE GOI. DILLON

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 8915

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 8916

VZCZCBLI *

OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHTV RUEHJM RUEHJI
RUEHDM

DE RUEHBL #8916 226 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 141855Z AUG 83

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2282

INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0660

RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0817

RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0791

RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0639

RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0875

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08916

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, LE, JL
SUBJECT: APPROACH TO JUMBLATT

REF: STATE 226446

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS A RESULT OF OUR MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH
HADDAD AND SALEM, AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS
OF KING FAHD AND KING HUSSEIN WITH WALID JUMBLATT, WE
BELIEVE EMBASSY AMMAN SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE DEMARCHE
AUTHORIZED IN THE REFTTEL, ADJUSTING THE POINTS WHERE
NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PASSAGE OF SEVERAL
DAYS.

3. IF JUMBLATT OR HAMMADA DO NOT COME FORWARD THEMSELVES
EMBASSY AMMAN SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO SEEK THEM OUT
IN A LOW-KEY MANNER, MAKE THE POINTS OUTLINED REFTTEL
WITH SUITABLE ADJUSTMENTS, AND EMPHASIZE THAT WE
CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT AN INITIAL MEETING AT THE
EARLIEST MOMENT BETWEEN JUMBLATT AND NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER HADDAD (GEMAYEL'S CLOSEST PERSONAL ADVISER)
WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL AND TIMELY. IN MAKING THIS
POINT, EMBASSY AMMAN SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE
U.S. IS PREPARED TO FACILITATE THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS
FOR SUCH A MEETING. DILLON

BT

#8916

NNNN

CLASS: SECRET

CHRG: PROG 8/14/83

APPRV: RCMCFARLANE

DRFTD: CWSROSS

CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS

DISTR: MCFARLANE-4

AMB

DCM

POL

P/M

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 498-008/1, *142

CN NARA, DATE 4/19/06

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 8916

~~SECRET~~

STATE 226446

(29) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB PM CHRON

MG D VZCZCBLO429

OO RUEHBL

DE RUEHC #6446 2230718

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 110420Z AUG 83 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 5361

INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9310

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9431

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9069

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7668

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4628

RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8814

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 226446

LOC: DISK 12

11 AUG 83

CN:

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

*answered
8/14/83*

NODIS

PASS MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, LE, US

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
WALID JUMBLATT

REFS: (A) AMMAN 7012; (B) STATE 222228; (C) AMMAN 7012

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY OUTLINED IN REF B, AND AGREED TO BY AMB. MCFARLANE IN REF C, CHARGE SHOULD MEET WITH WALID JUMBLATT AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. WE BELIEVE THAT APPARENT DRUZE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS DAY OF HORRORS IN LEBANON MAKES SUCH A MEETING ABSOLUTELY IMPERATIVE. CHARGE SHOULD PRESS JUMBLATT IN STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS TO STOP THE MINDLESS BLOODSHED IN BEIRUT AND THE SHUF, TO HALT PROVOCATIVE DRUZE ACTIONS, AND TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE GOL-AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOLLOW:

-- YESTERDAY WAS ANOTHER TRAGIC DAY FOR THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AND A STEP BACKWARD FOR LEBANON. AT LEAST TWO INNOCENT LEBANESE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED AND 18 MORE PEOPLE WERE WOUNDED IN THE SHELLING ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT WHICH SOME SAY YOU ORDERED.

-- ONE OF THE WOUNDED WAS A U.S. MARINE WHO IS IN LEBANON IN ORDER TO HELP RESTORE PEACE AND STABILITY TO YOUR COUNTRY. THREE MORE OF OUR PEOPLE WERE WOUNDED IN A SIMILAR ATTACK LAST MONTH.

-- WE DO NOT KNOW THE EXTENT OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE ATTACKS, BUT FRANKLY WE DO NOT FIND ANY CONSOLATION IN THE FACT THAT OUR MARINES MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN THE TARGET.

-- SUCH IRRESPONSIBLE AND SENSELESS VIOLENCE IS TOTALLY

~~SECRET~~

STATE 226446

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 98-008/1#143

BY 101 NARA, DATE 11/5/02

UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. AND CAN ONLY LEAD LEBANON BACK TO CHAOS.

-- NEWS OF THE ATTACK ON THE AIRPORT WAS SHORTLY FOLLOWED BY WORD THAT DRUZE MILITIAS WERE ATTACKING LEBANESE ARMED FORCES POSITIONS IN THE SHUF.

-- THE LEBANESE ARMY, WHICH WE HAVE HELPED TO EQUIP AND TRAIN, IS AT THE VERY FOUNDATION OF LEBANON'S FUTURE UNITY, INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY. IT OFFERS LEBANON THE ONLY HOPE OF EVER ESCAPING AN ENDLESS CYCLE OF CONFESSIONAL VIOLENCE. THERE CAN BE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH AN ATTACK.

-- LAST NIGHT, WE LEARNED THAT PSP MILITIAMEN HAD APPARENTLY KIDNAPPED THREE CABINET MINISTERS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT -- MINISTERS WHO HAD BEEN SENT TO SEEK AN END TO THE VIOLENCE IN THE SHUF. WE ARE TOLD THAT THE MINISTERS ARE BEING HELD IN MUKHTARA AND THAT YOUR PEOPLE ARE DEMANDING, ON YOUR ORDERS, THAT THE MINISTERS RESIGN FROM THE GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO WIN THEIR RELEASE.

-- SUCH ARE THE DEMANDS OF THUGS AND ARE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES. WE URGE YOU IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS TO HELP GET THESE MEN RELEASED IMMEDIATELY.

-- FRANKLY, THESE AND SIMILAR ACTIONS OVER THE PAST MONTH CAUSE US TO QUESTION THE SINCERITY OF YOUR PROFESSED INTEREST IN ACHIEVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT IS ONE THING; VIOLENT ATTACKS ARE ANOTHER.

-- WE ARE NOT UNAWARE OF YOUR CONCERNS FOR THE DRUZE COMMUNITY. WE HAVE LONG CONSIDERED BOTH THE FEARS AND THE INTERESTS OF THE DRUZE IN ACHIEVING A UNIFIED

LEBANON. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THE ONLY HOPE FOR YOUR PEOPLE LIES IN SUPPORT FOR A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF EXERTING ITS AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

-- WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY URGED THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO SEEK A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH YOU. WE NOW URGE YOU ONCE MORE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 3308
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LOC: DISK 14 699
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CN: 07354
CHRG: PROG
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NLS 898-008/1 #144

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREP, MOPS, IS, LE, US, SY
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED LETTER
- TO PM BEGIN

REF: STATE 230016

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. ACCORDING TO MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS NOW PREPARED TO WORK OUT A STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL THAT WOULD TRY TO ALLAY THE FEARS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON ON PARTITION. WE THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT WE REOPEN DISCUSSIONS OF THE STATEMENT AS SOON AS AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE RETURNS TO ISRAEL, AND THAT AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE BE AUTHORIZED TO HOLD THE LETTER TO USE AT HIS DISCRETION DURING THESE TALKS.
END SUMMARY.

3. MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE TOLD DCM AT A SOCIAL EVENT LATE LAST NIGHT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS NOW PREPARED TO WORK OUT A STATEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON THAT WOULD SEEK TO ALLAY THE FEARS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON OVER THEIR PERCEPTION ON PARTITION. KIMCHE SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR EARLIER THAT EVENING AND SHAMIR HAD AGREED THAT A STATEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT. KIMCHE WAS CAREFUL TO NOTE THAT HE WAS NOT AGREEING TO THE DRAFT STATEMENT THAT MCFARLANE HAD PROPOSED, BUT TO A STATEMENT DESIGNED TO BE HELPFUL TO THE LEBANESE. DCM NOTED THAT IN THE FRIDAY MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE, SHAMIR HAD SEEMED ABSOLUTELY ADAMANT ON THE POINT. KIMCHE SAID THAT SHAMIR SIMPLY HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS STATEMENT TO THE LEBANESE AND THAT FOLLOWING THE SATURDAY NIGHT MEETING, HE, KIMCHE, HAD

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BEEN ABLE TO PERSUADE HIM THAT IT WAS A USEFUL GESTURE FROM THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE. SHAMIR IS NOW ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO ROMANIA FOR THE NEXT FOUR DAYS.

4. KIMCHE CALLED EARLY THIS MORNING TO ASK WHEN AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE WOULD BE RETURNING TO ISRAEL. KIMCHE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT MCFARLANE WAS COMING IN TODAY. DCM NOTED WE HAVE NO TRAVEL PLANS AS YET, AND TOOK THE OCCASION TO RECONFIRM WITH KIMCHE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN PROMPTLY ON DISCUSSIONS OF A STATEMENT. KIMCHE SAID THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS OF A STATEMENT AS EARLY AS THIS EVENING, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD BE PERSONALLY HAPPIER WITH DISCUSSIONS BEGINNING TOMORROW MORNING. KIMCHE BELIEVES IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH MCFARLANE BEFORE THE WEDNESDAY TRIPARTITE MEETING, AND WOULD LIKE THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO HAVE SOME TIME TO MAKE FURTHER PREPARATIONS FOR THE WEDNESDAY MEETING.

5. COMMENT: AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS THAT WE MOVE AHEAD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO REOPEN DISCUSSIONS OF THE STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL. HE BELIEVES THAT MCFARLANE SHOULD HAVE THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER IN HAND BUT SHOULD BE GIVEN DISCRETION TO DELIVER IT OR TO HOLD IT DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF FURTHER TALKS AND FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND THE DEPARTMENT. END COMMENT.

6. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. LEWIS
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CLASS: SECRET

CHRG: PROG 8/15/83

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DRFTD: HTEICHER/PDUR

CLEAR: RMC FARLANE

DISTR: RMC FARLANE (4)

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DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY AND PASS SECDEF
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, XF, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: STRATEGY FOR THE
IMMEDIATE FUTURE

REF: (A) STATE

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHERE WE ARE. WE ARE AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN OUR
EFFORT TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE OBJECTIVES THE PRESIDENT
HAS SET FOR LEBANON. WITHIN LEBANON, THE GOVERNMENT
WILL BE EITHER GREATLY STRENGTHENED OR SEVERELY
UNDERCUT DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE FORTHCOMING
SHUF REDEPLOYMENT BY THE IDF.

-- THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP HAS GROWN INCREASINGLY
EMBITTERED TOWARD AMIN GEMAYEL DUE TO ITS PERCEPTIONS
OF LEBANESE WEAKNESS AND BACKSLIDING WITH REGARD TO
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE ELIMINATION
OF A PUBLIC BILATERAL DIALOGUE. GIVEN THIS MISTRUST
OF GOL MOTIVES, THE APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE
REALITIES OF LEBANESE POLITICS, AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS
THAT SUCH A STATEMENT MIGHT CREATE WITH THE LABOR
OPPOSITION INSIDE ISRAEL, THE GOI CONTINUES TO RESIST
OUR REQUEST FOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT COMMITTING ISRAEL
TO A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL LINKED WITH A NOTIONAL
TIMETABLE. ADDITIONALLY, THE IDF CONTINUES TO PERMIT
THE STRENGTHENING AND MOVEMENT OF DRUZE AND PHALANGE
MILITIAS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LAF. THIS SEEMS TO
RESULT FROM INTERNAL POLITICAL CALCULATIONS AS WELL
AS A POLICY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
IN RESPONSE TO ITS REFUSAL TO COOPERATE PUBLICLY.

-- THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP IS UNDER GROWING DOMESTIC
PRESSURE ON TWO RELATED FRONTS: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS THAT
ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT WILL LEAD TO PARTITION AND THAT

RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE GOL AND NON-MARONITE
CONFESSIONAL GROUPS IS INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY DUE TO THE
PHALANGE DOMINANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT. THESE PROBLEMS
ARE EXACERBATED BY SYRIAN POLICIES DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE
GEMAYEL'S LEGITIMACY AND WIDEN THE CLEAVAGES AMONG

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CONFESSIOAL GROUPS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE CLOSURE OF THE AIRPORT BY THE DRUZE AND THE LAF'S HUMILIATION IN THE SHUF COMBINE TO FURTHER UNDERMINE SUPPORT FOR AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES.

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-- PRESIDENT ASSAD REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AND IS UNWILLING TO TAKE ACTIONS, SUCH AS A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IN THE UPPER METN, THAT WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE ASSERTION OF LEBANESE AUTHORITY IN A MANNER THAT WOULD FACILITATE THE LAF'S MOVE INTO THE SHUF. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SYRIANS ARE OBSTRUCTING OUR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, INSIST THEY WON'T CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL UNTIL ALL ISRAELIS LEAVE, AND -- SIGNIFICANTLY -- APPEAR UNCONCERNED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE IDF 22 KM FROM DAMASCUS. ON THE OTHER HAND, ASSAD IS TRYING TO WHET OUR APPETITE WITH HIS "GESTURE" OF ALLOWING RED CROSS IDENTIFICATION OF ISRAELI BODIES AND KHADDAM'S READINESS TO DISCUSS WITH US THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. MORE LIKELY, HE IS STRINGING US ALONG TO MAKE A RECORD OF "GOOD FAITH" WHILE BUYING TIME TO UNDERMINE GEMAYEL.

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-- THE SAUDIS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT OUR DIPLOMACY, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO STRENGTHENING THE GOL WHILE ENCOURAGING LEBANESE RECONCILIATION (I.E. PRESSURE ON WALID JUMBLATT) AND BY SUPPORTING OUR POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS THE SYRIANS.

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3. OUR OBJECTIVES. OUR BROAD GOALS ARE WELL-KNOWN; AND DO NOT NEED ELABORATION; FOR NOW WE NEED TO FOCUS DIRECTLY ON THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES WHICH MUST BE ATTAINED QUICKLY TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE DIFFICULT PERIOD WHICH LIES AHEAD. ON THE BASIS OF THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF MY MISSION, AND IN KEEPING WITH REFTTEL, THESE OBJECTIVES CAN BE SUMMARIZE

E.O. 12958
As Amended
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AS FOLLOWS: TO MAKE CLEAR PROGRESS IN PROMOTING RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE LEADERS OF THE SEVERAL FACTIONS, MOST IMPORTANTLY THE DRUZE; TO PACIFY ALAYH AND THE SHUF, FACILITATE THE ENTRY OF THE LAF AND AT LEAST INTERIM ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE GOL AND LOCAL LEADERS; TO DETER FURTHER SYRIAN INTERVENTION, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, TO DESTABLIZE AND OTHERWISE UNDERMINE THE PROCESS WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN; TO ENSURE THAT ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT IS SEEN AS THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS; AND TO ESTABLISH MOMENTUM FOR FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS.

4. POSSIBLE STRATEGIES. AS RECOUNTED IN EARLIER CABLES, WE HAVE TWO OPTIONS TO BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE. ONE IS AN INCREMENTAL STRATEGY WHICH WOULD RELY ON FREQUENT AND REPEATED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MAJOR ACTORS. WHILE IT MIGHT LEAD TO MEASURED PROGRESS IN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, FOR EXAMPLE, THE DESPERATION AND ANXIETY OF THE GOL LEADERSHIP AND THE IMMINENCE OF THE ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT FORCES ME TO RECOMMEND A BOLDER AND MORE DECISIVE APPROACH TOWARD THE ATTAINMENT OF OUR NEAR-TERM OBJECTIVES. AS DISCUSSED BELOW, WHAT WE PROPOSE IS A SERIES OF INITIATIVES TO BOLSTER THE CONFIDENCE OF THE GOL, FORCE THE GOI TO SOME PROMPT AND CONSTRUCTIVE DECISIONS, AND PUT DOWN MARKERS TO THE SARG THAT WE WILL NOT TOLERATE COERCIVE OR FORCEFUL INTERVENTION IN LEBANESE AFFAIRS.

5. CAPITALIZING ON THE FIRST PHASE OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. THE PROACTIVE STRATEGY OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 IS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SCHEDULED IDF REDEPLOYMENT FROM ALAYH AND THE SHUF OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE GOL TO BUILD ITS STRENGTH AND CONFIDENCE AND SET A PATTERN FOR SUBSEQUENT EXTENSIONS OF ITS AUTHORITY AND FOR FOSTERING A CLIMATE OF RECONCILIATION. LIKEWISE IT WILL BEGIN THE PROCESS OF CLOSE, DIRECT, AND FREQUENT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOL AND GOI ENVISAGED IN THE AGREEMENT AND HELP DISCOURAGE SYRIAN INTERVENTION.

6. ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY.

A. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. OUR FIRST PRIORITY IS TO PROMOTE ACTIONS WHICH REDUCE LEBANESE FEARS OF PARTITION WHILE ENCOURAGING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. IT IS THEREFORE CRUCIAL THAT THE GOI PUBLICLY AFFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL, IN ADDITION TO FACILITATING THE EXTENSION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES INTO THE SOUTH. SIMULTANEOUSLY WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO GEMAYEL AND JUMBLATT THE NEED FOR MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION. THE SUCCESS (OR FAILURE) OF GOL-DRUZE RECONCILIATION WILL SET AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT FOR OTHER CONFESSIONAL GROUPS AS FOREIGN FORCES WITHDRAW FROM OTHER PARTS OF LEBANON. WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER HOW TO HELP DEFUSE THE PERCEPTION OF DE FACTO PHALANGE DOMINATION. THIS WILL REQUIRE U.S. PRESSURE ON PIERRE GEMAYEL, AS IT IS INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT HIS "GODFATHER" STATURE, AND AMIN'S OWN RELATIVE POLITICAL WEAKNESS,

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ALLOW THE ELDER GEMAYEL TO DOMINATE AND BLOCK RECONCILIATION EFFORTS. WE MUST THEREFORE DEVISE A MECHANISM FOR NEUTRALIZING SHAYKH PIERRE WHILE BUILDING NATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN AMIN.

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B. PACIFICATION OF THE SHUF. BEYOND THE MEETINGS WITH WALID JUMBLATT, THE GOL, BY ITS OWN ADMISSION, MUST ALSO NEGOTIATE WITH A VARIETY OF DRUZE AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF TO FACILITATE THE ENTRY OF THE LAF AND OTHERWISE EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY AND THE PROVISION OF NECESSARY SERVICES TO THIS AREA. THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE THE EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOL; NEVERTHELESS WE WILL WANT TO IMPOSE A CERTAIN DISCIPLINE IN THE PROCESS BY KEEPING CLOSELY ABREAST OF ITS PROGRESS. ANOTHER POSSIBLE WAY WE CAN HELP IS TO OFFER "OBSERVERS" TO ACCOMPANY THE LAF AS IT RELIEVES THE IDF POSITIONS AND CHECKPOINTS THROUGHOUT ALAYH AND THE SHUF. WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND ARE SMALL DETACHMENTS SIMILAR TO UNTSO TO SERVE AS "WITNESSES" AND REASSURE LOCAL FORCES, ESPECIALLY THE DRUZE, THAT THE LAF WILL NOT SHOW PARTIALITY TOWARD ONE COMMUNITY OR THE OTHER. IN SHORT, THIS LATTER STEP MIGHT HELP TO PRECLUDE INCIDENTS

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C. DETERRING SYRIAN INTERVENTION. THIS IS PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT AND CERTAINLY THE RISKIEST OBJECTIVE. BARRING A CREDIBLE COMMITMENT FROM THE SARG TO NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE IDF REDEPLOYMENT FROM ALAYH AND THE SHUF, I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE SYRIANS WILL REFRAIN FROM USING THEIR DRUZE FACTIONS OR EVEN THEIR OWN FORCES TO OPPOSE THE LEBANESE FORCIBLY OR HARASS THEM, ESPECIALLY IN THE "FREE ZONE." GENERAL TANNOUS HAS DISCUSSED TWO "RED LINES" (SYRIAN AIR ATTACKS AND MASSED ACTIONS) AND TWO LESSER CONDITIONS (PSP ARTILLERY FIRE FROM THE SHUF AND SYRIAN/PSP ARTILLERY FROM THE METN) WHICH WILL EITHER PRECLUDE OR GREATLY COMPLICATE LAF DEPLOYMENT INTO ALAYH AND THE SHUF. GIVEN THE ENORMOUS RISKS WHICH ATTEND A FAILURE TO ESTABLISH LAF CONTROL IN THESE AREAS, I RECOMMEND THAT WE URGE THE GOL TO SEND A STRONGLY WORDED DEMARCHE TO THE SARG, WHICH WE WOULD REINFORCE, WARNING AGAINST THIS KIND OF INTERFERENCE. THE DEMARCHE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE GOL IS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE PROPOSING A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE METN AND A SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN THE TRUCE. TO UNDERLINE OUR DETERMINATION, I RECOMMEND WE GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO THE GOL REQUEST FOR REGULAR MNF PATROLS ON THE STRATEGIC ARTERIES IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF. MOREOVER, TO DETER SYRIAN ATTACKS ACROSS DEFENSIVE LINES MANNED BY THE LAF, I RECOMMEND THAT, AS AN ADDITIONAL MEASURE FOR EARLY CONSIDERATION, WE CONSIDER THE DEPLOYMENT OF MNF TRAINERS WITH LAF UNITS AT THE FORTIFIED POSITIONS TURNED OVER BY THE IDF. THE FACTS ARE THAT THE LAF IS POORLY LED. IT'S LINE UNITS HOLD PROMISE OF BEING ABLE TO HACK IT, BUT NOT WITHOUT FAR BETTER LEADERSHIP THAN NOW EXISTS. RECOGNIZING THAT THESE MEASURES WILL BE DIFFICULT POLITICALLY, WE MUST BALANCE THE RISK OF MNF CASUALTIES AGAINST THE RISK THAT SARG OPPOSITION TO THE LAF (MASKED AS PSP OPPOSITION) MIGHT LEAD TO WHAT WOULD BE PERCEIVED A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE LAF AND THE ATTENDANT CHAOS IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF. A FINAL JUSTIFICATION IS THAT WE NEED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SARG THAT WE ARE COMMITTED TO LEBANON'S SECURITY.

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D. MAINTAINING MOMENTUM OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. GIVEN THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ISRAEL, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO INSTIGATE A CONTINUING WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF AS A RESULT OF THE REDEPLOYMENT OUT OF THE SHUF. THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE AFFECTED BY LAF CAPABILITIES AND THE PLO PRESENCE IN LEBANON. MOREOVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT MOD ARENS, UNLIKE PM BEGIN AND FM SHAMIR, IS MUCH MORE WILLING TO CONSIDER WAYS TO CUT ISRAELI LOSSES AND EXPEDITE THE DEPARTURE OF THE IDF FROM LEBANON. THIS RESULTS FROM ARENS' LACK OF DIRECT ASSOCIATION WITH THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO ACHIEVE THE ORIGINAL GOALS BEGIN, SHAMIR, AND SHARON PROCLAIMED AT THE OUTSET OF THE OPERATION AND FROM THE MOD'S BUDGET CRISIS. ARENS IS UNDER PRESSURE TO SLASH THE DEFENSE BUDGET BY AS MUCH AS 20 BILLION SHEKELS (APPROXIMATELY 400 MILLION DOLLARS). OBVIOUSLY, ARENS' ABILITY TO BRING ABOUT IDF WITHDRAWAL WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY

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ENHANCE HIS OWN POPULARITY AT A TIME WHEN THE REST OF THE GOVERNMENT FACES A DRUMBEAT OF CRITICISM.

7. ACTION AGENDA/DECISION POINTS. THE FOLLOWING AGENDA IS KEYED TO THE OPERATIONAL STRATEGY OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6. WE WILL NEED YOUR THINKING ON THESE ITEMS AND APPROVAL TO SET THEM IN MOTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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A. PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE GOI. THE STATUS OF THIS INITIATIVE HAS BEEN REPORTED. I BELIEVE WE NEED A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THIS EFFECT, AS WELL AS SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS REAFFIRMING OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT THIS IS A REASONABLE AND NECESSARY MEASURE.

B. INTER-CONFESSIONAL MEETINGS. WE NEED TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOL AND LEADERS OF THE MAJOR CONFESSIONAL GROUPS. THE FIRST PRIORITY IS THE MEETING WITH WALID JUMBLATT, AND WE ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE THIS NOW. TO DEMONSTRATE OUR INTEREST, I BELIEVE THAT WE

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SHOULD OFFER TO HOST THIS FIRST MEETING UTILIZING A SIXTH FLEET UNIT AS A PLATFORM.

C. FORMAL LEBANESE REQUEST FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF THE ISRAELI STATEMENT AND THE FIRST GOL MEETING WITH WALID JUMBLATT, WE SHOULD PRESS GEMAYEL TO SEND THE FORMAL REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL TO THE SARG.

D. MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY. ONCE THE GOL LETTER HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED, I PROPOSE TO SEND DICK FAIRBANKS TO THE MAJOR ARAB CAPITALS TO REINFORCE GOL DIPLOMACY DESIGNED TO RALLY PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE GOL AND UNDERLINE ARAB DETERMINATION TO ISOLATE ASSAD IF HE FAILS TO COMPLY. I MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE A SEPARATE TRIP TO EUROPEAN CAPITALS LATE THIS WEEK (E.G. MNF PARTNERS, FRG, GREECE, VATICAN). MORE LIKELY, HOWEVER, THE TENSION OF GOI-GOL DIPLOMACY AND RECONCILIATION TROUBLES WILL KEEP ME HERE. AGAINST THAT PROBABILITY, I WOULD APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S DEVELOPMENT OF A MAJOR DEMARCHE TAILORED FOR EACH EC/NATO CAPITAL AND DESIGNED TO SUMMARIZE WHERE WE ARE (BASED ON THIS AND OTHER CABLES) AND SEEKING EC/NATO SUPPORT OF YOUR EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS SYRIA. IN ADDITION, I RECOMMEND WE PLAN TO SUPPORT A LEBANESE INITIATIVE IN THE UN STRONGLY AND THAT WE ENCOURAGE THE SAUDIS TO USE THE FORTHCOMING ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT TO SUPPORT LEBANON'S CASE.

E. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE MNF. IF THE SPECIFIC MEASURES OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 ARE APPROVED, I WOULD WORK WITH THE LEBANESE (PREFERABLY WITH THE HELP OF JCS LIAISON) TO DEVELOP A CONCEPT PLAN FOR MNF COOPERATION IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF. THIS PLAN WOULD THEN BE BRIEFED TO THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS HERE AND IN CAPITALS.

F. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RECONCILIATION. ALTHOUGH OUR THINKING ALONG THESE LINES IS IN THE FORMATIVE STAGES, I BELIEVE THAT A CONFERENCE OF ALL MAJOR CONFESSIONAL LEADERS, INCLUDING THE PATRIARCHS (E.G. CHAMOUN, FRANJIYYA, KARAMI, GEMAYEL), SHOULD BE CONVENED AND CHAIRED BY AMIN GEMAYEL. WHATEVER SUBSTANCE IS DISCUSSED, THE APPEARANCE OF ALL THE MAJOR FACTIONS MEETING AT THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST -- WITH HIGH U.S. SUPPORT AND INTEREST -- COULD LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A NEW CONSENSUS AND PERHAPS A STRENGTHENED AND MORE BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT.
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RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0795
RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0621
RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0880
RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0643
RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0573
RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0822
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CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: PROG 8/15/83
APPRV: RCMCFARLANE
DRFTD: RFAIRBANKS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MCFARLANE4 AMB POL
PM CHRON

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DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 898-008/1 #146
CIS NARA, DATE 4/19/94

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, JO, LE, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: RESPONDING TO
KING HUSSEIN

REF: AMMAN 7070

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. RECOMMEND THAT THE SECRETARY RESPOND TO KING
HUSSEIN'S LETTER (REFTEL) ON BEHALF OF BOTH HIMSELF
AND ME. FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT THE ANSWER BE DISPATCHED
TIMELY -- I.E., WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS.

3. FOLLOWING ARE MY THOUGHTS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
RESPONSE:

-- THANK THE KING FOR HIS MEETING WITH JUMBLATT AND
PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH GEMAYEL. HIS PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
AND COUNSEL TO MCFARLANE IN AMMAN WAS MUCH APPRECIATED
AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK TO HIM, KING FAHD, AND
PRESIDENT MUBARAK AS WE WORK ON THE GOALS WE SHARE TO
ACHIEVE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE POSITIVE MOMENTUM ON
RESOLVING THE LEBANESE SITUATION (WHICH WILL HOPEFULLY
PROVIDE A SPRINGBOARD FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON THE
PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 1 INITIATIVE).

-- AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS
ADVISERS, U.S. COMMITMENT IS FIRM AND STEADFAST, NOT
TO GEMAYEL AS AN INDIVIDUAL, BUT TO HIM AS THE
INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION FOR ALL THE
LEBANESE PEOPLE. JUMBLATT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT
IN THE NEAR TERM AS THE GOVERNMENT WORKS TO PREPARE

~~SECRET~~//EXDIS

BEIRUT 8931

FOR THE NEAR TERM REESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALEY AND THE SHUF, BUT THE GOL MUST INDEED, AS HUSSEIN HAS POINTED OUT, CONTINUE TO KEEP THOSE EFFORTS IN THE BROADER CONTACT OF WORKING WITH ALL THE CONFESSIONS.

-- I AM WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE GOL TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AFFIRMATIVE POLITICAL PLAN TO REINFORCE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE THE PERCEPTION AND SUBSTANCE OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WHICH IS CRUCIAL TO OUR TWO GOALS: STRENGTHENING THE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS BEHIND GEMAYEL (AND DISCREDITING ALTERNATE -- AND FOREIGN-INSPIRED -- LEADERSHIP GROUPINGS); AND USING THE CREDIBILITY AND REVITALIZATION OF THE INTERNAL CONSENSUS AS THE KEY ELEMENT TO DEMONSTRATE TO SYRIA THAT THEIR INTRANSIGENCE IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND THAT THEY MUST COME TO TERMS WITH THIS GOVERNMENT AND AGREE TO REMOVE THEIR FORCES (IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL) AS THEY PROMISED.

-- WE WILL WANT TO STAY IN CLOSE CONTEXT WITH HIS MAJESTY AND THE OTHER LIKE-MINDED ARAB CHIEFS OF STATE ON WAYS IN WHICH THE ARAB CONSENSUS BEHIND THESE GOALS CAN BEST BE MADE APPARENT AND EFFECTIVE THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. DILLON

BT

#8931

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VZCZCBLI *

OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHEG RUEHDM RUEHJM

RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHTV RUEHDT

DE RUEHBL #8932/01 227 **

ZNY SSSSS ZZR

O 151212Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2294

INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0664

RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0622

RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0881

RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0796

RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0644

RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0574

RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0823

RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0151

PT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08932

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

USUN FOR AMB. KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH
LEBANESE TEAM, AUGUST 141. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE, FAIRBANKS AND DILLON, JOINED BY ROSS, MET WITH THE LEBANESE TEAM AUGUST 14 TO EXAMINE NEXT STEPS IN THE SHORT TERM. SALEM, HADDAD AND AL-HASAN WERE PRESENT ON THE LEBANESE SIDE.

3. AIRPORT SITUATION.

SALEM OPENED WITH A TOPICAL DISCUSSION OF THE AIRPORT SITUATION. NOTING THAT SUNNI LEADER SA'IB SALIM, SHI'ITE LEADER NABIH BARRI, AND PSP VICE PRESIDENT MUHSIN DULLUL HAD BEEN CONSULTING ON THE SUBJECT, AND THAT THE PSP HAD SAID IT HAD NO INTENTION OF SEELLING THE AIRPORT FURTHER UNLESS IT WAS USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, AND THAT THE THREE LEADERS HAD ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT CALLING FOR REOPENING THE AIRPORT, SALEM ASKED WHAT WE THOUGHT. MCFARLANE,

[REDACTED] SUGGESTED THAT THE LEBANESE REOPEN THE AIRPORT WITH A STATEMENT STRESSING THAT THIS STEP SHOULD LEAD TO GOOD FAITH EFFORTS TO SOLVE OTHER PROBLEMS AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WELCOMED DIALOGUE

FOIA(b) (1)

CLASS: SECRET

CHRG: PROG 8/15/83


APPRV: ROMCRARLANE

DRETD: CWSROSS

CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS

DISTR: MCFARLANE4 AMB DCM

POL P/M



BY 411 NARA DATE 4/19/02
 NLS 98-0081 # 147
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 NLR 43008-098/12 # 51442
 BY any NARA DATE 11/24/08

WITH ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

4. BOUHABIB'S STATEMENTS.

McFARLANE RAISED THE REPORTED PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF AMB. BOUHABIB ON FAIRBANKS' PLANS TO VISIT SYRIA AND ON THE MNF. HE CHARACTERIZED THESE AS TOTALLY UNHELPFUL AND EVEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WITH SYRIA AND THE U.S. CONGRESS. THE LEBANESE UNDERTOOK TO CALL HIM, NOTING THAT THEY WERE ALSO UNHAPPY THAT HE HAD MENTIONED THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND PARTICULARLY WITH JUMELATT.

5. STEPS WITH ARABS.

THE LEBANESE RAISED THE NEED FOR FURTHER EFFORTS TO BUILD ARAB PRESSURE ON SYRIA AND ASKED WHETHER GEMAYEL SHOULD CONSIDER VISITING KEY ARAB CAPITALS. McFARLANE RESPONDED THAT, INDEED, LEBANON SHOULD BE ACTIVELY COMPETING WITH SYRIA FOR ARAB SUPPORT. IN ITS EFFORTS TO ISOLATE AND PUT PRESSURE ON SYRIA, IT WOULD BE BOLSTERED BY VISIBLE PROGRESS ON RECONCILIATION AND A SUCCESSFUL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. BECAUSE THESE SHOULD BE SEEN AS OCCURRING UNDER GEMAYEL'S DIRECTION, HE HIMSELF SHOULD REMAIN IN LEBANON. ARAB PRESSURE COULD BE BUILT BY INVITING THE LEADERS OF KEY ARAB STATES TO LEBANON AND -- WHERE THIS WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL -- HAVING SALEM OR OTHER KEY LEBANESE TRAVEL. SUCH VISITS COULD BE PRECEDED BY A MESSAGE FROM GEMAYEL TO ARAB HEADS OF STATE STRESSING THE PROGRESS TO DATE ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. RESPONDING TO A FURTHER SUGGESTION THAT HIGH VISIBILITY MEETINGS WITH ARAB AMBASSADORS OCCUR IN BEIRUT, SALEM CONFIDED THAT HE WAS THINKING OF HOLDING A MEETING OF LEBANESE ARAB WORLD AMBASSADORS IN RIYADH. McFARLANE URGED HIM TO TRY THIS IDEA OUT ON KING FAHD. STRESSING THAT HE WOULD BEGIN THE ARAB INITIATIVES OUTLINED ABOVE IMMEDIATELY, SALEM ASKED WHETHER SOME OF THESE MIGHT NOT BEST FOLLOW AN ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT OF FULL WITHDRAWAL. McFARLANE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT. A SATISFACTORY ISRAELI STATEMENT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE ARABS TO BE SUPPORTIVE.

6. THE ISRAELI FACTOR.

HADDAD ASKED WHEN AN ANSWER ON THE PROPOSED ANNOUNCEMENT MIGHT BE EXPECTED FROM ISRAEL. MCFARLANE, REFERRING TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. LETTER TO THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP ON THIS SUBJECT, SAID A DECISION WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE WENT TO THE CABINET. HADDAD, SPEAKING SARCASTICALLY, OBSERVED THAT REFERRAL TO THE CABINET WAS LIKELY SINCE A COMMITMENT TO FULL WITHDRAWAL WOULD REPRESENT A CHANGE OF POLICY.

SALEM NOTED THAT, IN ADDITION TO A SCHEDULE OF FULL WITHDRAWAL, LEBANON NEEDED DETAILED AND CREDIBLE INFORMATION ON THE SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHUF. THE RISKS WERE HIGH, AND LEBANON COULD NOT AFFORD TO MAKE ANY MISTAKES. IF THE DANGER OF FAILURE WAS HIGH, THE ARMY MIGHT NOT GO IN. GENUINE AND DAILY ISRAELI COOPERATION WAS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS. ANY POSSIBLE SYRIAN INTERFERENCE WAS EASY TO NEUTRALIZE BECAUSE IT WOULD BE MORE VISIBLE. ISRAELI ACTIONS WERE MORE SUBTLE, AND HADDAD, SALEM, AND ESPECIALLY TANNUS REMAINED SKEPTICAL.

MCFARLANE DESCRIBED THE LEBANESE TASK IN BRIEF AS ONE OF DEMONSTRATING FLEXIBILITY WHILE REQUIRING ISRAELI PERFORMANCE IN TWO KEY AREAS. ISRAEL HAD TWO PERCEPTIONS THAT NEEDED TO BE DISPELLED; NEITHER WAS TRUE AND BOTH HAD PRECONDITIONS: (A) THE ISRAELIS STILL BELIEVE THAT GEMAYEL HAD DECIDED TO SEND THE ARMY INTO THE SHUF WITHOUT A POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND COME TO TERMS ONLY AFTER ITS CONTROL HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS THEY VIEWED AS DANGEROUS. LEBANON COULD ACT TO DISPEL THIS PERCEPTION BY STRESSING ITS COMMITMENT TO RECONCILIATION. AT THE SAME TIME, IT COULD PUT THE BALL IN THE ISRAELI COURT BY REQUIRING ITS HELP ON JUMBLATT; AND (B) ISRAEL CONTINUED TO FEAR THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT COORDINATE ON WITHDRAWAL AT ALL. LEBANON COULD OFFER ISRAEL A PROCESS OF FULL COORDINATION FROM THE TOP DOWN. AT THE SAME TIME, IT COULD STRESS THAT IT WAS NOT PREPARED TO COORDINATE THE PARTITION OF LEBANON AND THAT, FOR FULL COORDINATION, ISRAEL HAD TO COMMIT ITSELF TO FULL WITHDRAWAL. DIRECT LEBANESE-ISRAELI COMMUNICATIONS ON THESE POINTS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROPOSED LETTER FROM THE U.S.; COULD KEEP THE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. SALEM RESPONDED TO BOTH POINTS.

(1) NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WAS FIRST AND FOREMOST A LEBANESE, NOT AN ISRAELI, PREREQUISITE. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT SEND THE ARMY TO PACIFY ANY REGION IN WHICH SECTARIAN CONFLICT MIGHT RESULT. THIS WAS NOT IN LEBANON'S POLITICAL MORES, AND OCCASIONAL TOUGH LANGUAGE INDICATING OTHERWISE WAS MEANT MERELY TO MOBILIZE THE POPULATION AND THE ARMY. IF JUMBLATT WAS THE KEY WITH THE SHUF, THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO "GO TO

THE END OF THE EARTH" TO MEET HIM. ALTHOUGH HADDAD HAD MET WITH OTHER DRUZE LEADERS, JUMBLATT WAS THE DRUZE RALLYING POINT IN TIMES OF CRISIS. AS PRESIDENT, GEMAYEL WAS PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING NECESSARY TO OBTAIN NATIONAL OBJECTIVES, EVEN IF AS A PERSON HE "GOT MAD" WITH

JUMBLATT. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WAS BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY NECESSARY, AND EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS WERE IN THIS DIRECTION. THEREFORE, ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE ANXIOUS. (2) ON COORDINATION, LEBANON COULD DISCUSS VARIOUS KINDS AND LEVELS. ON TIMING OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SRUF, ISRAEL SHOULD SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE. IDEALLY, ISRAEL SHOULD BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW WITHIN AN AGREED THREE-DAY WINDOW WITHIN ITS SEPTEMBER 1-OCTOBER 15 TIMEFRAME.

MCFARLANE OBSERVED THAT, ON TIMING, THERE WAS GOOD NEWS

AND BAD NEWS. THE GOOD NEWS WAS THAT, ONCE ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE, THE ISRAELIS COULD MOVE TO THE ANWALI IN NO MORE THAN THREE DAYS, ALTHOUGH MILITARILY ONE WEEK WAS MORE SENSIBLE. THE BAD NEWS WAS THAT THIS COULD NOT BE DONE WITHOUT ONE WEEK OF COORDINATION OUTSIDE THE AREA AND ONE WEEK OF COORDINATION INSIDE. THE TRIGGERING EVENT SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON FULL WITHDRAWAL. HADDAD COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD CERTAINLY TAKE MORE THAN ONE WEEK FOR JUMBLATT TO PACIFY THE AREA. HIS ASSOCIATES ON THE GROUND, FIGURES LIKE NASIR AD-DIN, BARAKAT, FOTAYRI, AND MAHAMID, MIGHT RESPOND RAPIDLY TO HIS CALLS FOR ESCALATION, BUT THEY WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO BRING INTO LINE ON POSITIVE STEPS.

McFARLANE RAISED THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM OF HOW TO PROTECT JUMBLATT IF HE WERE TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. HADDAD AND SALEM SAID THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COULD DO THIS IF HE TOOK UP RESIDENCE IN MUKETARA.

7. THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION.

SALEM NOTED LEBANON'S DIFFERENCES WITH THE EC-10, PARTICULARLY OVER TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS. THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER, WHILE INITIALLY HOSTILE TO LEBANON, HAD REVIEWED HIS POSITION DURING SALEM'S RECENT VISIT TO GREECE AND WAS NOW WILLING TO WORK WITH THE EC-10 ON LEBANON'S BEHALF. OTHER EUROPEANS CONTINUED TO ENTERTAIN EXTENSIVE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. (HADDAD ADDED THAT THE FRENCH WERE BECOMING A REAL PROBLEM.) SALEM ASKED WHETHER WE THOUGHT IT WAS TIME FOR THEM TO TALK TO THE EUROPEANS, SO AS TO MAKE THEM FEEL THEY HAD NOT BEEN FORGOTTEN.

McFARLANE OUTLINED VISITS TO EUROPE AND THE MAGRIB THAT HE AND FAIRBANKS WERE PLANNING. FAIRBANKS WOULD SET OUT SHORTLY FOR THE MAGRIB AFTER THE PROPOSED ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL AND, WHEN HE RETURNED, McFARLANE WOULD PROCEED TO EUROPE TO ENCOURAGE SPECIFIC INITIATIVES ON SYRIA. SINCE HIS EUROPEAN TRIP MIGHT NOT OCCUR UNTIL AUGUST 29 OR SO, WE MIGHT PROPOSE THAT THE SECRETARY SEND EACH EUROPEAN CAPITAL AN INTERIM MESSAGE ON GOALS, PROGRESS TO DATE, AND POSSIBLE HELP.

8. THE U.N. DIMENSION.

SALEM, NOTING THAT U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUÉLLA WAS UPSET AT THE LACK OF COORDINATION WITH THE U.S., SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY MIGHT WANT TO SEND HIM A COMMUNICATION AS WELL. HE ASKED WHETHER A VISIT TO LEBANON BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE USEFUL AT THIS TIME, NOTING THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED HIMSELF WILLING TO COME IF THE U.S. AGREED IT WOULD BE HELPFUL.

McFARLANE SAID HE WOULD WANT TO CHECK WITH AMB.

KIRKPATRICK. SALEM EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT VISITS BY U.N. AND EUROPEAN FIGURES COULD HELP OUR EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS SYRIA BY PROVIDING THE APPEARANCE OF A MULTILATERAL EFFORT. BEYOND THIS, HIGH U.S. VISIBILITY

HAD LED TO A HARDENED SOVIET POSITION. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, IN REPEATED DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBANESE LEADERS, HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTED LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, IT WANTED TO DEFEAT THE U.S. INITIATIVE. HADDAD, WHILE HE SAW VALUE IN VISITS BY EUROPEANS, DISMISSED THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE U.N. AS UNLIKELY TO HELP.

9. THE SOVIET DIMENSION.

SALEM COMPLAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH LEBANON HAD "TRIED

EVERYTHING," IT HAD FAILED TO ALTER THE SOVIETS' POSITION. THIS BEING THE CASE, WOULD A VISIT BY WAZZAN OR SALEM HIMSELF BE OF ANY HELP? MCFARLANE REPLIED THAT A PUBLIC STEP OF THIS KIND WOULD HAVE TWO CONTRADICTORY EFFECTS. IT WOULD BE VERY BADLY RECEIVED BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD CONSTITUTE A VERY WORRISOME ELEMENT FOR ASSAD. ONE WAY TO RECONCILE THIS CONTRADICTION MIGHT BE TO THINK IN TERMS OF A PRIVATE (I.E., UNPUBLICIZED) VISIT. THIS MIGHT INCREASE SYRIAN WARINESS WITHOUT CAUSING A NEGATIVE REACTION IN WASHINGTON. SALEM RESPONDED THAT LEBANON WISHED THE U.S. TO MAKE THIS DECISION FOR IT. WHEN THE U.S. THOUGHT SUCH A STEP MIGHT BE USEFUL, LEBANON WAS READY. FOR THE MOMENT, IT SHOULD SIMPLY BE KEPT IN MIND.

10. THE NON-ALIGNED DIMENSION.

SALEM ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY VALUE IN APPROACHING MRS. GANDEI, GIVEN HER LEADERSHIP OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND HER CLOSE RELATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS. MCFARLANE REPLIED THAT HE SAW NO HARM IN THIS.

NOTE: AS OF 11:00 A.M. LOCAL, AUGUST 15, AIRPORT IS STILL CLOSED. DILLON

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ZNY SSSSS ZZE

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2298

INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEEDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0885

RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0800

RUERTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0827

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08933

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARA, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, IS, LE, US, PLO, ISY

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: THIRD TRIPARTITE
- - - MEETING, AUGUST 13, 1983

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: THE THIRD LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. POLITICAL MEETING TOOK PLACE AUGUST 13. ITS AGENDA WAS HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY RECENT EVENTS IN THE SHUF, WHICH DEMONSTRATED THE NEED FOR CLOSE COORDINATION (THE POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF WHICH THE LEBANESE ARE STILL LINKING TO A SATISFACTORY ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT ON FULL WITHDRAWAL), AS WELL AS A POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE DRUZE, PARTICULARLY WITH WALID JUMBLATT. THE ISSUE OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WAS ALSO DISCUSSED, AND WAYS OF BRINGING MAXIMUM PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SYRIA WERE EXAMINED. PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE WERE ALSO RAISED AT LENGTH. ALTHOUGH THE DISCUSSION WAS INCONCLUSIVE ON ALL THE ABOVE POINTS, THE MEETING DID PERMIT A FURTHER AIRING OF POSITIONS AND CONCERNS AND CONSTITUTED YET ANOTHER STEP IN THE PROCESS OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. A FOURTH TRIPARTITE POLITICAL MEETING WAS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 17. END SUMMARY.

3. THE THIRD LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. POLITICAL MEETING TOOK PLACE AUGUST 13 IN BEIRUT AT THE HOME OF LEBANESE ARMY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF COL. QASSIS. IN ATTENDANCE FOR ISRAEL WERE KIMCHE, MERHAV, AND LEOR. AME. MCFARLANE AND BOSS REPRESENTED THE U.S. QASSIS HAD A LEBANESE ARMY NOTETAKER WITH HIM. THE DISCUSSIONS LASTED ABOUT THREE HOURS.

4. OPENING.

QASSIS OPENED WITH A REFERENCE TO THE CONTINUED CLOSURE

CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: PROG 8/14/83
APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE
DRFTD: CWSROSS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4 AMB DC
POL P/M CHERON



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 198-0081 #148
By CAC, NARA, Date 4/19/06

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLR 142008-098/12 #54043
By any NARA DATE 11/24/08

OF THE AIRPORT. HIS GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, COULD NOT OPEN AND CLOSE IT REPEATEDLY. A STABLE SITUATION WAS NEEDED, AND THIS WAS TIED TO A RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ISSUE IN THE SHUF. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REQUEST ISRAEL'S ASSISTANCE IN REOPENING THE AIRPORT, HE IMPLIED HEAVILY THAT ISRAEL, BY ITS LACK OF CONTROL OF EVENTS ON THE GROUND, WAS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBLEM IN SPITE OF ITS DECLARATIONS OF GOOD INTENTIONS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

5. ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE.

QASSIS THEN TURNED THE DISCUSSION SOMEWHAT UNEXPECTEDLY TO THE ISSUE OF THE RELOCATION OF THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE, ANNOUNCING THAT HE HAD TWO BUILDINGS THAT HE WISHED THE ISRAELIS TO LOOK AT. (SINCE HE PROFESSED HIMSELF TO BE PRESENTING A PROPOSAL HE BELIEVED MET ISRAELI CONCERNS, HE MAY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO ESTABLISH A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE EARLY IN THE MEETING.) KIMCHE EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT QASSIS HAD TAKEN ANY ACTION, NOTING THAT THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES HAD BEEN LOOKING AND HAD FOUND A SUITABLE VILLA NEAR THE COAST IN THE ANTILYAS/DBAYYA AREA. WHEN KIMCHE ASKED WHETHER QASSIS WAS PLANNING FOR ALL THREE DELEGATIONS TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE TO SHARE A BUILDING, QASSIS SAID THAT WAS WHAT HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS HAD WANTED. IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS, KIMCHE DENIED THIS, SAYING ISRAEL WANTED A SEPARATE BUILDING AND SAYING THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD DEALT WITH THIS ISSUE. ROSS, COUNTERING KIMCHE'S STRONG IMPLICATION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD PRODUCED AGREEMENT ON PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE LIAISON OFFICE, NOTED THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN AMBIGUOUSLY CRAFTED IN ORDER TO PAPER OVER A CONTINUING DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI POSITION (A SEPARATE ISRAELI BUILDING) AND THE LEBANESE POSITION (A TRIPARTITE BUILDING -- I.E., AMB. KHARMA'S CELEBRATED "FLOORAL ARRANGEMENT").

QASSIS AMPLIFIED HIS POSITION, CITING THE PRACTICAL NEED FOR EFFECTIVE AND RAPID LIAISON AS THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR HIS PROPOSAL. KIMCHE CLAIMED THAT THE "VISA" AND THE "MUTUAL RELATIONS" FUNCTIONS -- AND

THE LIAISON FUNCTION FOR THAT MATTER -- DID NOT REQUIRE A JOINT LOCATION. WHAT WAS FOREMOST ON ISRAEL'S MIND, HE SAID, WAS SECURITY. SINCE SOME THIRTY ISRAELI PERSONNEL, UNLIKE LEBANESE OR U.S. PERSONNEL, WOULD BE BOTH WORKING AND LIVING ON THE PREMISES, ISRAEL PREFERRED A BUILDING ALL ITS OWN, SURROUNDED BY A SOLID WALL.

McFARLANE, ATTEMPTING TO CUT THIS STERILE DISCUSSION SHORT, POINTED OUT THAT THE DIFFERENT POSITIONS OF THE TWO PARTIES ON PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS REFLECTED THE DIFFERENT PURPOSES THEY INTENDED THE LIAISON OFFICE TO SERVE. ISRAEL WAS SEEKING AS MANY OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF AN EMBASSY AS IT COULD GET, WHILE LEBANON WANTED TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF NORMALIZATION. THE DAY MIGHT COME WHEN AN ISRAELI EMBASSY WAS POSSIBLE, BUT THIS DAY HAD NOT YET COME. THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAD DEMONSTRATED THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE LIAISON. BEYOND THAT, SECURITY WOULD BE BETTER IF THE BUILDING WERE A JOINT ONE. TO TRY TO BRIDGE THE TWO POSITIONS, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL OVER THE NEXT WEEK FOR THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO THINK OF WAYS TO CREATE A PROCESS THAT WOULD START WITH A MIXED LIAISON OFFICE AND LEAD OVER TIME TO SOMETHING ELSE.

KIMCHE, STRESSING THE NEED TO AVOID A NEGATIVE PROCESS, POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL ALREADY HAD ITS OWN BUILDING. TO SOFTEN THE IMPACT OF HIS POSITION, HOWEVER, HE PROPOSED THAT THE SIGN ON THE ISRAELI OFFICE READ SIMPLY "JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE," THAT THE FLAG BE LEBANESE, AND THAT A LEBANESE SECURITY OFFICE AND PERHAPS A U.S. ROOM BE INCORPORATED INTO THE ARRANGEMENTS. THE PRACTICAL NEED FOR EFFECTIVE LIAISON COULD BE MET BY INSTALLATION OF "SUPERMODERN" COMMUNICATIONS. (McFARLANE AND ROSS RAISED THEIR EYEBROWS AT THIS POINT. "EFFICIENT COMMUNICATIONS" IS AN OXYMORON IN LEBANON TODAY.)

6. EVENTS IN THE SHUF.

QASSIS THEN SHIFTED TO THE MAIN TOPIC OF THE EVENING'S AGENDA -- THE EVENTS IN THE SHUF AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS. HE AGREED WITH KIMCHE THAT THE VARIOUS INCIDENTS HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF MISTAKES (ON BOTH SIDES), NOT OF BAD INTENTIONS, BUT HE WENT ON TO COMPLAIN THAT THE WAY THE IDF WAS BEHAVING IN THE ALAYH AND SHUF DISTRICTS WAS NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THE COMMON OBJECTIVES OF A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, THE RESTORATION OF PEACE, AND THE PREVENTION OF PLO INFILTRATION. EVENTS ON THE GROUND WERE TAKING A CONTRADICTORY DIRECTION, WITH A SERIES OF INCIDENTS -- ESPECIALLY THE ATTACK ON THE LEBANESE ARMY IN ALAYH AND THE ABAYH/FAR MATTA CLASHES -- COMBINING TO UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY, WHICH WAS THE ONLY FORCE CAPABLE OF RESTORING PEACE AND PREVENTING PLO INFILTRATION. THE ISRAELIS COULD HAVE PREVENTED THESE EVENTS, AND THE IDF'S DELAY IN RESPONDING TO LEBANESE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE WAS CAUSE FOR ANXIETY.

MERHAV RESPONDED THAT THE IDF HAD NOT KNOWN ANYTHING ABOUT THE INITIAL INCIDENT AT ABAYH/KFAR MATTA. THE HIGHEST LEVELS, WHEN THEY LEARNED OF IT, WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH WHAT THEY SAW AS THEIR MAIN PRIORITY -- OBTAINING RELEASE OF THE KIDNAPPED MINISTERS. SINCE THEN, ISRAEL HAD MADE A STRENUOUS TACTICAL AND POLITICAL EFFORT. AMONG OTHER THINGS, IT HAD REOCCUPIED A MAJOR LEBANESE ARMY POSITION ON "HILL 924" AND WOULD BE RETURNING IT TO THE LEBANESE ARMY AS PART OF THE RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE. THE IDF REFUSAL TO PERMIT REINFORCEMENT HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO KEEP THE INCIDENT LOCALIZED: REINFORCEMENT WOULD HAVE LED TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR THROUGHOUT THE SECF.

7. POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SHUF.

KIMCHEE ASKED OBLIQUELY IF THE LEBANESE ARMY HAD THE STRENGTH TO ENTER THE SHUF BY FORCE IF THE IDF

RESISTED. QASSIS RESPONDED THAT, IF THERE WAS A DANGER OF FULL SCALE DRUZE-ARMY CONFLICT, THE LATTER WOULD NOT ENTER. THIS WAS NOT FOR MILITARY REASONS. THE LEBANESE ARMY DID NOT WISE TO ENGAGE THE ENTIRE DRUZE COMMUNITY IN BATTLE.

KIMCHE, EXPRESSING REAL SATISFACTION WITH QASSIS' ANSWER, STRESSED THAT INDEED THERE HAD TO BE A POLITICAL AGREEMENT. QASSIS AFFIRMED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS WORKING ON THIS VERY HARD, BUT WALID JUMBLATT WAS NOT PRESENT IN LEBANON. FURTHERMORE, THE ISRAELIS WERE ALLOWING HIS FORCES TO RESUPPLY. IN SHORT, ISRAEL HAD A KEY ROLE TO PLAY. [REDACTED]

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MC FARLANE, EXPRESSING REGRET AT THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS, URGED THAT ALL PRESENT WORK TO PREVENT ANY RECURRENCE. CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS HAD TO CHANGE. THE LEBANESE HAD TO ABANDON THE NOTION THAT ISRAEL CONTROLLED EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED. MILITARY-TO-MILITARY AND POLITICAL COORDINATION HAD TO OCCUR. A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH WALID JUMBLATT WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, AND BOTH THE U.S. AND ISRAEL COULD HELP. ONCE A STABLE POLITICAL FOUNDATION HAD BEEN CREATED, THEN MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COORDINATION BASED ON A REALISTIC DIVISION OF LABOR MUST OCCUR. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE "LEBANESE FORCES." MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COORDINATION, BEGINNING AT THE TANNUS-LEVY LEVEL BUT EXTENDING TO FIELD COMMANDERS, WOULD HAVE TO ARRANGE CONTACT RELIEF OF AT LEAST ONE WEEK. THIS WAS POLITICALLY DIFFICULT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, BUT WAS NEVERTHELESS A POLITICAL NECESSITY. THE UPCOMING LEVY-TANNUS MEETING SHOULD LEAD TO DAILY COORDINATION BETWEEN SUBORDINATES.

IN SHORT, MC FARLANE SAID, ISRAEL HAD TO BE ASSURED THAT LEBANON WAS SERIOUS ABOUT A RECONCILIATION WITH THE DRUZE. LIKEWISE, ISRAEL HAD TO BE ASSURED THAT THE EXISTING MILITARY LIAISON CHANNELS WOULD BECOME TRULY EFFECTIVE, MAKING COMMITMENTS IN THE NAME OF THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY COMMANDS. LEBANON, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD TO BE ASSURED THAT ISRAEL WAS COMMITTED TO FULL WITHDRAWAL.

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CASSIS, CALLING MCFARLANE'S PROPOSALS "GOOD ONES," REPEATED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS SEARCHING FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE ARMY'S ENTRY INTO THE SHUE. THE DEADLOCK WAS THE RESULT OF JUMBLATT'S ABSENCE. THE U.S. AND ISRAEL SHOULD GET JUMBLATT BACK TO LEBANON TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE PROPER IMAGE, AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE JUMBLATT WITH THE NECESSARY SECURITY. KIMCHE AND MCFARLANE CONFIRMED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HELP.

CASSIS, STRESSING THAT LEBANON WANTED AND NEEDED MILITARY COORDINATION, POINTED OUT THAT -- WHILE CLOSE COORDINATION WAS VERY IMPORTANT -- IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL TO PROVIDE A TIMETABLE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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8. SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

THE DISCUSSION TURNED TO AN EXAMINATION OF WAYS TO KEEP PRESSURE ON SYRIA. MCFARLANE, OUTLINING THE VARIOUS SPECIFIC STEPS THAT KING FAHD HAD PROMISED TO UNDERTAKE, NOTED THAT THEIR IMPORTANCE WAS PRINCIPALLY AS A DEMONSTRATION TO SYRIA THAT THE ARAB COMMUNITY INDEED SUPPORTS LEBANON. BEYOND THESE STEPS, IT WAS PERHAPS TIME FOR LEBANON TO MAKE A FORMAL DEMAND FOR SYRIA'S WITHDRAWAL. LEBANON HAD ALREADY PAID THE POLITICAL PRICE AND MIGHT JUST AS WELL GO AHEAD AND DO IT. IN DOING SO, IT WOULD GET THE SUPPORT OF THE U.S. AND OF MANY ARABS.

[REDACTED] AMONG OTHER THINGS, ISRAEL COULD TAKE MANY PRACTICAL STEPS TO HELP. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE PROVISION OF A TIMETABLE FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL WAS IMPORTANT.

MCFARLANE AGREED THAT AN INVENTORY OF POSSIBLE INITIATIVE WAS NECESSARY.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WHEN ASKED IF MCFARLANE SHOULD CONTINUE TO GO TO DAMASCUS, BOTH QASSIS AND KIMCHE AGREED THAT HE SHOULD, BUT ONLY IF ASSAD UNDERSTOOD THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA.

9. NEXT MEETING.

IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT TRIPARTITE POLITICAL MEETINGS SHOULD CONTINUE ON A FREQUENT BASIS. KIMCHE SUGGESTED WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 17, AS A CONVENIENT DATE. HE RENEWED HIS PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING IN ISRAEL BUT QASSIS SAID THIS SHOULD BE LEFT FOR LATER. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FOR HIM WAS THE NEED FOR HIS PRESENCE IN BEIRUT.

KIMCHE ALSO RENEWED HIS REQUEST THAT THE MEETINGS BE PUBLICIZED. QASSIS AGREED THIS COULD BE DONE IF REPEAT IF THERE WAS A TIMETABLE FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL.

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INFO RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0808
INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
CHRG: PROG 8/15/83
APPRV: RCMCFARLANE
TD: CWSROSS
CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4; AMB.

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08936

NODIS

TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND RSO
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY AND A/SY/CC
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: OVIP (MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS) ASEC, PREL, MOPS,
MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: VISIT TO ISRAEL

REF: TEL AVIV 1101

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN VIEW OF THE ENCOURAGING NEWS FROM ISRAEL (REFTEL), AMBS. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS, ACCOMPANIED BY MRS. MCFARLANE, HOWARD TEICHER, WILMA HALL, MICHAEL CROWE, AND DAVID HAAS, PLAN TO TRAVEL TO ISRAEL VIA SPAR AIRCRAFT TUESDAY, AUGUST 16, ETA 0845 LT (0645 Z). WE UNDERSTAND THAT SPAR CREW HAS BEEN ALERTED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS.
3. MCFARLANE'S PARTY PLANS TO RETURN TO BEIRUT THE SAME AFTERNOON, BUT WILL BE PREPARED TO REMAIN OVERNIGHT IF NECESSARY TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS.
4. WE AGREE WITH AMB. LEWIS' RECOMMENDATION THAT WE BE GIVEN DISCRETION TO DELIVER OR HOLD THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER IN THE LIGHT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS. DILLON

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NLS F98-008/1#149

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 11/5/02

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

PAGE

~~SECRET~~ SECRETION

PROG-DATE 8/15/83

APPROVED BY RMC FARLANE

DRAFTED BY CWSROSS

CLEARANCES RFAIRBANKS

DISTRIBUTION

MCFARLANE-4 AMB DCM POL P/M

ORIGINATOR

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO, IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN, PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM, PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA, PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH, PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, PRIORITY

EXDIS

FROM MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, US, EG

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PERCEPTIONS OF
- EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES

REF: A) BEIRUT 8891; B) CAIRO 2379

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. EMBASSY CAIRO'S POINT ON THE REPORTED BUTRUS GHALI STATEMENT DOWNPLAYING THE PRIORITY OF LEBANON IN FAVOR OF A WIDER MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT IS WELL TAKEN. WE GOT THIS REPORT FROM FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, WHO WAS EVIDENTLY PARAPHRASING. WE HAVE CHECKED BACK WITH HIM, AND HIS RECOLLECTION IS THAT ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO BUTROS GHALI WAS QUOTED IN THE BEIRUT PRESS AS EXPRESSING THE FEAR THAT THE U.S. "OBSESSION" WITH LEBANON WAS PERMITTING THE ISRAELIS TO ESTABLISH NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND AS CALLING FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE WEST BANK BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. IN THE PRESS OF MEETINGS, WE DID NOT CHECK SALEM'S REPORT OUT.

3. BUTROS GHALI'S STATEMENT ON SYRIAN OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT WAS REPORTED IN "AN-NAHAR" AUGUST 10, CITING AN AP DISPATCH FROM KUWAIT, WHICH IN TURN QUOTED KUWAIT'S "AS-SIYASA." THE TEXT AS IT APPEARS IN

INITIALS:
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BY 10T NARA DATE 11/5/02

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PAGE

"AN-NAHAR" IS A MIXTURE OF GOOD AND BAD. BUTROS GHALI IS REPORTED AS SAYING THE FOLLOWING (MOST OF THE REPORT IS NOT A DIRECT QUOTE, BUT MERELY PARAPHRASING):
"...SYRIAN OPPOSITION IS JUSTIFIED 'BECAUSE IT IS NATURAL FOR SYRIA TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS WHILE THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ARE OCCUPIED.' HE ADDED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE CONCERNED AS WELL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK, AND THEY ARE SEEKING GUARANTEES ON THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS AND ON THE RETURN OF THE GOLAN. HE ALSO ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE-*** ISRAELI AGREEMENT***
GUARANTEES ON THEIR SECURITY***
RETURN OF THE GOLAN. HE DESCRIBED THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AS SIMILAR TO THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS THAT SYRIA AND EGYPT HAD SIGNED WITH ISRAEL AND NOT A PEACE TREATY."

4. WE WILL CHECK REPORTS OF STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO BUTROS GHALI AND OTHER EGYPTIAN LEADERS WITH EMBASSY CAIRO IN THE FUTURE. DILLON##

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INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5544

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1173

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~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 11068

EXDIS

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS) ASEC, PREL, MOPS

- MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE MISSION: VISIT TO ISRAEL SCHEDULE

REF: BEIRUT 8936

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE HAVE SCHEDULED 10:30 MEETING WITH KIMCHE, LUBRANI AND OTHERS AT MFA TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS ON PROPOSED STATEMENT. SHAMIR IS IN ROMANIA. ARENS WILL BE IN LEBANON FOR MUCH OF THE DAY BUT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE FOR AN EVENING MEETING. IN LIGHT OF OUR PAST EXPERIENCE ON NEGOTIATING TEXTS WITH ISRAELIS, INEVITABLE REQUIREMENT FOR BEGIN TO GO OVER THE PRODUCT, AND FACT THAT BEGIN WILL WANT TO CONSULT PERSONALLY WITH ARENS AND PERHAPS OTHER CABINET MEMBERS, I AM SURE MCFARLANE WILL NOT HAVE FINAL ANSWER BEFORE WEDNESDAY. THEREFORE, WE ARE ASSUMING PARTY WILL OVERNIGHT IN JERUSALEM TUESDAY.

3. ISRAELIS WILL ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS PRACTICALITIES OF THE PROPOSED MEETINGS BETWEEN WALID JUMBLATT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND ADDITIONAL PRACTICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING COORDINATION OF THE WITEDRAWAL. BOTH OF THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE SEEN BY KIMCHE AS PREPARATION FOR THE WEDNESDAY EVENING TRIPARTITE MEETING. LEWIS

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NLS F98-0081 #151

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/5/02

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RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9529
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9113
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NODIS
BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

NLRR M2008-098/12 #

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BY smf NARA DATE 11/24/08

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED LETTER
TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

REF: A. TEL AVIV 11001, B. BEIRUT 8936

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN VIEW OF KIMCHE'S WILLINGNESS TO REOPEN DISCUSSIONS ON A STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL (REFTEL A), AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE IS AUTHORIZED TO HOLD THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER FOR USE AT HIS DISCRETION. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW FINAL TEXT OF LETTER DATED AUGUST 15, ORIGINAL OF WHICH IS BEING POUCHED TO EMBASSY TEL AVIV.

3. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MENACHEM:

I UNDERSTAND FROM AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DOES NOT AGREE IN THE NECESSITY OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A CLEAR SENSE OF PROCESS AND MOVEMENT -- OF PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS. -IN

LIGHT OF THE VERY DELICATE SITUATION IN BEIRUT, I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT A STATEMENT BY YOUR GOVERNMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE PROPOSAL MADE BY AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE IS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT BUT INDEED TRULY URGENT IF WE ARE TO STAY ON COURSE TOWARD OUR COMMON GOALS OF OBTAINING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT YOU HAVE CONCLUDED WITH LEBANON. WHILE SOME ALTERNATE LANGUAGE CAN PERHAPS BE FOUND, THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IS TO REINFORCE MORE CONCRETELY AND SPECIFICALLY THE DECLARATIONS YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY MADE IN MORE GENERAL TERMS. UNFORTUNATELY, THOSE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN PERSUASIVE IN CHANGING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS IN LEBANON THAT THE IMPENDING REDEPLOYMENT OF THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES WILL CULMINATE IN PARTITION.

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YOU AND I BOTH UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNMENT OF AMIN GEMAYEL. I URGE STRONGLY THAT YOU RECONSIDER THE MATTER OF A STATEMENT. WE ARE AT A CRUCIAL WATERSHED, AND HISTORY WILL NOT JUDGE US KINDLY IF WE FAIL TO ACT DECISIVELY TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO RESTORE STABILITY IN LEBANON.

IN MY VIEW, WHAT IS AT STAKE IS BOTH ACHIEVING POSITIVE PROGRESS IN LEBANON AND SHOWING THE WORLD THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS IS THE ROAD TO PEACE AND SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES. I HOPE THAT WE MAY CONTINUE TO WORK IN CLOSE COOPERATION TOWARD THESE AFFIRMATIVE RESULTS.

WITH WARM REGARDS, SINCERELY, RON END TEXT.

4. FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE: SALUTATION CHANGED FROM "DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER" TO "DEAR MENACHEM" AND CLOSE FROM "RONALD REAGAN" TO "RON" TO CONFORM WITH PAST PRACTICE AND PER CONFIRMATION FROM EMBASSY TEL AVIV.

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM

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