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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 8/31/2017

**File Folder** TERRORISM 10/9/84-10/26/84

**FOIA**

F2003-004

**Box Number** 113

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518

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
210313 LETTER	SECRETARY BALDRIDGE TO SECRETARY SHULTZ RE TERRORISM	2	10/9/1984	B1
210314 PAPER	RE FANATICISM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM <i>PAR 8/31/2017 NLR-753-113-1-2-3</i>	4	10/10/1984	B1
210315 CABLE	BRUSSELS 14176 <i>PAR 8/31/2017 NLR-753-113-1-4-1</i>	2	10/26/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM BALDRIGE, M

*AW 8/3/17*

DOCDATE 09 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: IRAN

EXPORT CONTROLS

TERRORISM

SUBJECT: CY OF BALDRIGE MEMO TO SHULTZ RE ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS ON EXPORTS TO  
IRAN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES . DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

*Withdrawer*

CAS 8/31/2017

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TERRORISM 10/9/84-10/26/84

*FOIA*

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**DATES:** This rule is effective September 28, 1984. Comments must be received by November 27, 1984.

**ADDRESS:** Written comments (six copies) should be sent to: Betty Ferrell, Exporter Services Division, Office of Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, P.O. Box 273, Washington, D.C. 20044.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Vincent Greenwald, Exporter Services Division, Office of Export Administration, Telephone: (202) 377-3856.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

Export controls on Iran have been maintained on aircraft valued at \$3 million each or more and on helicopters over 10,000 pounds empty weight. This rule modifies the controls to apply to all aircraft regardless of value and helicopters regardless of weight, including related parts and components.

Export controls have also been maintained on goods and technical data subject to national security controls and valued at over \$7 million, if the export were destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. The modified controls apply to all such goods and technical data, regardless of value.

In addition, this rule imposes controls on marine outboard motors of 45 horsepower or more.

The licensing policy on exports to Iran under these controls, as modified, is one of general denial. However, limited exceptions are possible since licensing decisions will take into account the existence of export obligations under contracts in effect prior to the imposition of controls. In addition, licensing decisions will take into account whether items had been exported from the United States prior to the imposition of controls, or whether the U.S. content of foreign-produced commodities is 20% or less by value.

Following consultation with the Department of State, it has been determined that this rule is necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States. Members of the Congress have been consulted, and the criteria described in section 6(b) of the Export Administration Act have been considered. The compelling need to impose controls on these sensitive exports renders industry consultation, prior to the imposition of these controls, inappropriate. Industry comments, however, on these controls are solicited and will be considered before regulations become final.

Failure to take action would be detrimental to the foreign policy of the United States, notwithstanding any foreign availability.

It has been determined that there are no feasible alternative means of achieving the purpose of this action and efforts are being made to obtain cooperation of countries that produce comparable items.

**Saving Clause**

Shipments of commodities and technical data removed from General License authorizations as a result of these changes that were on dock for lading, on lighter, laden aboard an exporting carrier, or en route aboard a carrier to a port of export pursuant to actual orders for export prior to (date of publication) may be exported under the previous general license provisions up to and including (two weeks after publication). Any such commodity not actually exported before midnight (two weeks after publication) requires a validated export license.

**Rulemaking Requirements and Invitation To Comment**

In connection with various rulemaking requirements, the Office of Export Administration has determined that:

1. Since this regulation involves a foreign affairs function, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, requiring a notice of proposed rulemaking, an opportunity for public participation and a delay in effective date are inapplicable.

However, because of the importance of the issues raised by these regulations, this rule is issued in interim form and comments will be considered in developing final regulations. These regulations may be revised before the end of the comment period. Accordingly, the Department encourages interested persons who desire to comment to do so at the earliest possible time to permit the fullest consideration of their views.

2. Applicants for the validated export license required by this rule will use Form ITA-622P. This Form has been approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 0625-0001.

3. This rule is not subject to the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 *et seq.*

4. Because this interim rule is being issued with respect to a foreign affairs function, it is not subject to Executive Order No. 12291 (46 FR 13193, February 19, 1981), "Federal Regulation."

The period for submission of comments will close November 27, 1984. The Department will consider all comments received before the close of the comment period in developing final regulations. Comments received after the end of the comment period will be

**DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE**

International Trade Administration

15 CFR Parts 385, 390, and 399

[Docket No. 40919-4119]

**Foreign Policy Controls on Exports to Iran of Aircraft, Helicopters and Marine Outboard Engines**

**AGENCY:** Office of Export Administration, Commerce.

**ACTION:** Interim rule with request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** The Office of Export Administration maintains controls on exports to countries that have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, including Iran. This rule modifies anti-terrorism controls on certain exports to Iran. In light of the continuing policies of support for international terrorism maintained by the government of Iran, the U.S. government has determined that further restriction of U.S. exports to Iran is warranted.

84 OCT 9 P 7: 22

considered if possible, but their consideration cannot be assured. The Department will not accept public comments accompanied by a request that part or all of the material be treated confidentially because of its business proprietary nature or for any other reason. The Department will return such comments and materials to the person submitting the comments and will not consider them in the development of final regulations.

All public comments on these regulations will be a matter of public record and will be available for public inspection and copying. In the interest of accuracy and completeness, the Department requires comments in written form. Oral comments must be followed by written memoranda, which will also be a matter of public record and will be available for public review and copying. Communications from agencies of the United States Government or foreign governments will not be made available for public inspection.

The public record concerning these regulations will be maintained in the International Trade Administration Freedom of Information Records Inspection Facility, Room 4001, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20230. Records in this facility, including written public comments and memoranda summarizing the substance of oral communications, may be inspected and copied in accordance with regulations published in Part 4 of Title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Information about the inspection and copying of records at the facility may be obtained from Patricia L. Mann, International Trade Administration Freedom of Information Officer, at the above address or by calling (202) 377-3031.

#### List of Subjects in 15 CFR Parts 385, 390 and 399

Advisory committees, Communist countries, Exports.

Accordingly, the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Parts 368-399) are amended as follows:

#### PART 385—[AMENDED]

1. Section 385.4 is amended by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:

#### § 385.4 Country groups T & V.

(d) *People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria, and Iran.* (1) A validated license is required for foreign policy purposes for the export to the People's

Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria, or Iran (countries that have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism) of crime control and detection equipment (see § 378.14), military vehicles and items specially designed to produce military equipment as defined in CCL entries 2018A, 1118A, 2406A, and 2603A (see § 378.16), and certain other commodities as specified below.

(2) For the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Syria, a validated license is required for the export of aircraft valued at \$3 million each or more and helicopters over 10,000 pounds empty weight as defined in CCL entries 1460A(a), 1460A(b) and 5460F, except aircraft and helicopters for use by regularly scheduled airlines based in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Syria for which assurances have been submitted to OEA against military use, and of goods or technology subject to national security controls if the export is destined to military end-users or for military end-use and is valued at \$7 million or more. In the case of the use abroad of U.S.-origin parts, components or materials in foreign-origin products, the dollar limits set forth above apply to the U.S. content. Applications for validated licenses will be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether issuance of a license would be consistent with the provisions of section 6 and the applicable policies set forth in section 3 of the Act (exports subject to national security controls must also meet the national security provisions of the Act). When the request for authorization involves use of U.S.-origin parts, components, or materials in foreign-origin products destined for the People's Republic of Yemen or Syria, licensing decisions will take into account whether the U.S. content is 20% or less by value.

(3)(i) For Iran, a validated license is required for the export of all aircraft and helicopters, and related parts and components, and of marine outboard engines with a horsepower of 45 or more, as defined in CCL entries 1460A, 4460B, 5460F, 6460F, 1485A, 6494F, and 1501A (a), (b)(1) and (c)(1); and of all goods and technical data subject to national security controls if the export is destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. Applications for export to Iran of commodities and technology subject to these controls will generally be denied. However, applications may be considered on a case-by-case basis, if:

(A) The transaction involves the export or reexport of goods or technical data under a contract that was in effect before:

(7) January 23, 1984, in the case of helicopters over 10,000 lbs. empty-weight, aircraft valued at \$3 million or more each, or national security controlled items valued at \$7 million or more; or

(2) September 28, 1984, in the case of all other commodities or technical data.

(B) The commodities or technical data had been exported from the United States before January 23, 1984 or September 28, 1984 as appropriate.

(C) The U.S. content of foreign-produced commodities is 20% or less by value.

(ii) Applicants who wish such factors to be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit adequate documentation demonstrating the value of the U.S. content, the existence of the pre-existing contract, or the date of export from the U.S.

(4) The appropriate Congressional Committee identified in subsection 6(i) of the Act will be notified 30 days before any application falling under this subsection valued at \$7 million or more is approved.

#### PART 390—[AMENDED]

2. A new § 390.6 is added reading as follows:

§ 390.6 General order preventing the use of special licensing procedures for aircraft controlled by Iran.

Effective September 28, 1984, special licensing procedures described in Part 373 may not be used to provide aircraft parts and accessories (Export Control Commodity Number 1460, 4460, 1485, 1501(a), (b)(1) and (c)(1) intended for aircraft (wherever located) owned, operated, or controlled by, or under charter or lease to Iran, or any of its nationals.

#### PART 399—[AMENDED]

3. In Supplement No. 1 to § 399.1 (the Commodity Control List), Commodity Group 4, Transportation Equipment, is amended by adding a new entry (in numerical order, disregarding the first digit) reading as follows:

**6494F Marine Outboard Engines With a Horsepower of 45 or More**

Controls for ECCN 6494F

*Unit:* Report in "number."

*Validated License Required:* Country Groups SZ and Iran.

*GLV \$ Value Limit:* General License GLV is not applicable; however, another general license may apply.

*Processing Code:* TE.

*Reason for Control:* Foreign policy.

*Special Licenses Available:* None.

Authority: Secs. 203, 206, Pub. L. 95-223,  
Title II, 91 Stat. 1626, 1628 (50 U.S.C. 1702,  
1704), Executive Order No. 12470 of March 30,  
1984 (49 FR 13099, April 3, 1984).

Dated: September 25, 1984.

**John K. Boidock,**

*Director, Office of Export Administration,  
International Trade Administration.*

[FR Doc. 84-25865 Filed 9-28-84; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DT-M

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

10 October 1984

Fanaticism and the Psychology of Terrorism

Thomas Freidman's article in the "New York Times" last Sunday aptly describes some of the major reasons for the success of fanatic terrorists in the Middle East: their willingness to use extreme measures that cow moderates, their ability to set the political agenda in terms that brook no compromise, their effective use of simplistic rhetoric and slogans which provide utopian answers and divert attention from the complexities of the real world. Freidman is also right when he notes the wide popular base of support for the goals of the terrorists and the general sense of frustration on which terrorism feeds.

But what is it that drives individuals to such extreme behavior? What makes individuals willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause? Is there a "fanatic terrorist personality" that explains such behavior? Attempts by behavioral scientists to delineate "the terrorist mind-set" have not succeeded. There are almost as many variants of personality found in individuals who become involved in terrorist pursuits as there are in the general population. Nevertheless, because the terrorist group satisfies certain personality needs, certain personality types are disproportionately attracted to the path of terrorism.

Within the wide range of terrorist groups, we can distinguish between two basic types: the anarchic/ideologues, such as West Germany's Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades of Italy, and the nationalist/secessionist groups, such as the Fatherland and Liberty Movement of the Basques and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. There would seem to be profound differences between terrorists bent on destroying their

This memorandum was prepared by Jerrold M. Post, M.D., Chief, Political Psychology Center, Office of Scientific and Weapons Research, at the request of Admiral Poindexter. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to Dr. Post on  25X1

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BY CP 8/31/17



own society, the "world of their fathers," and those whose terrorist activities carry on the mission of their fathers. To put it another way, for some, becoming terrorists is an act of retaliation for real and imagined hurts against the society of their parents; for others it is an act of retaliation against society for the hurt done to their parents.

This dichotomy implies that those committed to anarchy and the destruction of society suffer from more severe psychopathology, while those who join nationalist or secessionist movements to carry out their parents' mission are healthier in psychological terms. Moreover, the more repressive a society is, the more likely it is that the psychologically healthy will act in opposition to it. Yet, no matter how just the cause appears, no matter how repressive the society, there are some who join and some who don't. Not every son of a Basque joins ETA. Are those who join the true patriots, and those who don't cowards? Or are those who join more driven psychologically, while those who don't are psychologically healthier?

A review of the studies of the social background of terrorists suggests the outlines of a theory of the psychology of terrorist behavior. Both the West German and Italian scholars who have studied the life histories and careers of leftwing terrorists have found a pattern of incomplete family structure, especially during adolescence. There was a disproportionately high level of educational and work failure compared with society as a whole. The German scholars described the terrorists as "advancement oriented and failure prone"; the terrorist career was characterized as "the terminal point of a series of abortive adaptation attempts and unresolved political conflicts."

Although the terrorist who were psychologically examined were not described as mentally ill, two personality types were particularly attracted to terrorist groups. Many of the individuals were extremely self-centered with little regard for the feelings of others. Such individuals use others and prefer a parasitic lifestyle. These individuals seek and enjoy stimulation and tend to become bored easily. They seek both action and recognition and are attracted to what they believe to be the exciting life of the revolutionary.

Individuals of the second personality type are extremely hostile and share many features of the paranoid personality. These individuals are suspicious and aggressive, sensitive to slight, and always ready to defend themselves. Their motivation for joining the terrorist group is that it provides a setting that justifies and provides sanction for projecting the person's own hostility upon society.

These individuals reached young adulthood with a deficient sense of self-esteem. To compensate for their underlying self doubt, they developed exaggerated--in some cases, grandiose--concepts of their elevated role in an ideal world. Loners,

alienated individuals who did not fit, they projected onto society their own inadequacies when their own exaggerated expectations were inevitably disappointed.

We believe there is a link between these personality attributes and group behavior. The terrorists had made a complete break with their previous social surroundings, values, and norms. Although they developed strong positive feelings for their group, they maintained an overriding hatred for the enveloping larger group-society. For these alienated individuals who existed on the margins of society, joining a terrorist group represented the first real sense of belonging after a lifetime of rejection, and the terrorist group became the family they never had.

What of the "nationalist/secessionist" terrorists, such as the Palestinian and Basque terrorists? Analysis of the social background of Basque terrorists provides data that add to our understanding of terrorist psychology. The Basques are a fiercely proud, intensely nationalistic people, and there is very little intermarriage between the Basques and the Spanish. Indeed, in the Basque area of Spain, only 8 percent of the families are of mixed Basque-Spanish heritage. Children of such families are shunned and subjected to ridicule, scorn, and social isolation. But fully 40 percent of the membership of RETA is drawn from such mixed-parent families. It is the outcasts, those on the margins of society, who exaggerate their political identity to achieve a psychosocial identity.

The need to belong--to effect a stable identity, to bridge the conflict between oneself and society--helps explain the similarities in behavior of terrorists in widely divergent groups. For the individual who espouses the cause of the politicized ethnic or national minority--such as the Basque separatists--the split derives from the split within society and is a split in the sense of political identity. For the anarchic/ideologues, the split is within the personality of the individual. Individuals with such personality disorders tend to be absolutists who see themselves as all good and society--especially the establishment--as all bad. Having identified the government as the source of problems, it follows that the way to cure the problems is to destroy the government. Alone, alienated, and on the margins of society, such individuals are relieved to find other like-minded individuals, to be accepted at last.

If this formulation is an accurate description of the psychology of many terrorists, it has profound implications for the meaning of joining a group, for the impact of group dynamics on sustaining membership, and on group decisionmaking. It suggests that to belong to a terrorist group serves goals beyond those espoused by the group. Besides seeking to rectify the grievances of the Armenians, to recapture the Palestinian homeland, to bring down the German or Italian government, the

individual member seeks to belong. Sustaining the group and being accepted by it assumes major--indeed preeminent--importance. This explains the important role played by group dynamics in determining terrorist decisionmaking and fanatic behavior.

For those individuals with damaged self-esteem, there is a tendency to merge themselves in the group. In a figurative manner, we can consider the development of a group mind. Particularly among those psychologically scarred individuals who fail to develop individual consciences, the group becomes the determinant of ethical standards.

This concept is basic to understanding the degree of violence and cruelty to which terrorists can go. The group becomes idealized and the standards of the group take over and become the norm. What the group says is the standard; what the group asks for is desirable. Advancing the group's cause becomes the rationalization for the most extreme of actions, including "suicide attacks." The standards of the world outside of the group have become alien. It is onto this world that the hateful, aggressive impulses of the group's members have been projected, and it now is this world that they believe must be destroyed. In pursuing these absolutist goals, there is no compromise. The loss of an individual life is a small price to pay if it helps advance this cause.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02    LONDON 2423  
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E.O. 12356:    N/A  
TAGS:    ASEC, APTR  
SUBJECT:    TERRORIST BOMBING IN BRIGHTON

1. METROPOLITAN POLICE ADVISED RSO THAT THE IRA HAS NOW CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS MORNING'S BOMBING OF THE GRAND HOTEL IN BRIGHTON. THE POLICE HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE SUBSTANTIATION OF THE IRA RESPONSIBILITY CLAIM. RESIDENT IN THE HOTEL FOR THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONGRESS WAS PM MARGARET THATCHER AND SEVERAL OTHER NOTABLES OF HMG. AT THIS TIME, THE ONLY REPORTED NOTABLE INJURED WAS NORMAN TEBBIT, MP FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY.

2. THERE ARE TWO KNOWN DEAD WHO HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED, HOWEVER, THEIR NAMES HAVE NOT YET BEEN RELEASED. POLICE REPORTED THAT SOME TWENTY OTHERS ARE MISSING AND THEY ARE

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UNCLASSIFIED  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 LONDON 2423

DTG: 121438Z OCT 84 PSN: 077514

SEARCHING THE RUBBLE FOR THEM. THERE ARE NO KNOWN USCS  
AMONG THE 27 INJURED.

3. A CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION IS UNDERWAY AND IT IS TOO  
EARLY TO TELL OR EVEN TO PROVIDE AN EDUCATED GUESS AS TO  
THE SIZE AND TYPE OF EXPLOSIVE USED. THERE ARE  
CONFLICTING REPORTS THAT IT WAS THROWN OR PLACED IN THE  
HOTEL; HOWEVER, IT IS UNKNOWN WHERE OR AT EVEN WHAT FLOOR  
IT OCCURED SINCE THE COLLASPE OF UPPER FLOORS HAS MADE  
EVEN SPECULATION IMPOSSIBLE.

4. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED AS IT BECOMES  
KNOWN. PRICE

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FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 16 OCT 84

POINDEXTER

23 OCT 84

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KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

MEDIA

WEINBERGER, C

SUBJECT: TERRORISM STATEMENT / WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE

ACTION: POINDEXTER SGD MEMO

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Paul Thompson	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3	J	A
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	5		N
Situation Room	4	10/23 B	D

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)



10/23

Colin Powell,

The A'd comment  
in the attached piece  
jeopardizes the hostages  
and makes it less likely  
their captors will ever  
let them go.

Anything you can do to  
stop such irresponsible  
talks would be appreciated.

John

Attachment

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Authority NW-73-13132

BY CN NARA DATE 8/3/17

# Reagan Administration Avoids Retaliation For Embassy Bombing; Plans Better Security

By DAVID IGNATIUS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Reagan administration, for all its tough talk about retaliating against terrorists in Lebanon, faces the same delicate problem that hindered the Carter administration in Iran: fear of killing American hostages.

Pentagon officials say that concern for the safety of three missing Americans in

In other major international news, please see:

—Norway effectively lowers oil prices, page 2.

—The dollar had another record-breaking day, page 3.

Lebanon was a major reason why the U.S. Embassy decided against retaliating after last month's truck bomb attack on the annex in East Beirut. The three kidnapped Americans—diplomat William Buckley, clergyman Benjamin Weir and journalist Jeremy Levin—are thought to be held by the same pro-Iranian terrorist faction responsible for the latest embassy bombing.

"Everybody here goes around playing Hamlet," says a senior Pentagon official, describing the administration's soul-searching and delay in considering retaliation. Even this hard-line official fears that retaliation would only endanger the hostages and other Americans in Lebanon. "You can do it, but then what?" he asks.

The retaliation issue is the clearest example of the Reagan administration's difficulty in making good on its rhetoric about terrorism. Despite the tough-sounding new policy outlined last April in National Security Decision Directive 138, which called for preemptive and "pro-active" measures against terrorism, the administration's own supporters concede the policy hasn't accomplished much yet.

"I don't think the administration has followed through with a counter-terrorism policy to match its words," says Samuel T. Francis, a terrorism expert who works for conservative Republican Sen. John East of North Carolina.

Following the Sept. 20 Beirut bombing, Democratic presidential nominee Walter Mondale criticized President Reagan for paying too little attention to security in Beirut. Administration officials contend that the situation isn't as bad as it looked. They argue that security measures at the embassy annex, though inadequate, prevented the truck bomber from reaching the basement of the building and causing much higher casualties than the two American and 10 Lebanese killed. Last month's bomb—a gas-enhanced device with explosives equivalent to about 500 pounds of TNT—was bigger than those that hit the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 and the Marine headquarters at the Beirut airport in October.

"We're not sitting on our hands," says Noel Koch, a deputy assistant secretary of defense who deals with terrorism problems. But he stresses, "The idea that you can wave a magic wand and everything falls into place isn't right."

Administration officials claim they are making progress in the three basic areas of the new anti-terrorism policy: security, intelligence collection, and "pro-active" deterrence. But the rate of improvement remains slow, leading even Secretary of State George Shultz to complain last weekend about delays by his subordinates in boosting security at U.S. embassies around the world.

The security situation should finally begin to improve soon, at least in the areas where money can buy better protection. Following the latest bombings, Congress approved \$110 million for emergency security improvements at American embassies and an additional \$366 million for security measures during the fiscal year that began this month. Congress also approved laws designating hostage-taking and airplane-sabotage as U.S. crimes and allowing the secretary of state to offer rewards for information about international terrorism.

Administration officials claim that intelligence collection also has improved since last year. The Central Intelligence Agency

**"Everybody here goes around playing Hamlet," says a senior Pentagon official.**

warned last month, before the embassy annex was hit, of a new terrorist threat in Lebanon.

After the bombing, the CIA was able to identify the culprit as a small pro-Iranian faction called Hezbollah, or The Party of God, whose members operate around Baalbek, in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, and in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

Middle East Trail

"The intelligence was good enough (to retaliate). We knew it would be possible," says a Pentagon official. Other officials say the U.S. has evidence that Hezbollah received explosives for the attack from Iran, shipped via Syria, and that U.S. analysts have identified some of the organizational structure and funding sources of Hezbollah.

The group's spiritual leader is said to be Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, a pro-Iranian Shiite mullah. Despite such tidbits of information, U.S. intelligence officials concede it is difficult to penetrate the Lebanese terrorist organizations.

The biggest gap between the administration's rhetoric and its performance has been in areas of deterrence and retaliation. Despite its boasts of a new "pro-active" policy (in contrast to the allegedly "reactive" policies of the past) the Reagan administration has gradually discovered the same prudent limits on use of American power that other administrations recognized.

The strongest arguments against retaliation have tended to come from career officials at the two agencies that would be most closely involved in such operations, the Pentagon and the CIA. Both have long

been suspicious of paramilitary operations, especially those that might trigger an escalating war of reprisal and counter-reprisal that the U.S. isn't well equipped to fight.

There doesn't seem to be any political will in the Reagan administration to challenge the professionals. For example, White House campaign strategists are said to have counseled against retaliating for last month's bombing, in part because it could jeopardize President Reagan's reelection bid. As Mr. Francis notes, the Reaganites "keep talking, making cryptic references to retaliation, but none of this is ever done."

Quiet Successes? Some administration officials say the U.S. has succeeded in blocking certain terrorist operations. But they say they can't talk about these successes for fear of compromising intelligence sources and methods. U.S. officials claim, for example, that advance intelligence about threats to American diplomats in Lebanon and elsewhere has allowed the U.S. to take precautions that probably saved their lives. "A lot of things have been preempted," claims one senior official.

Without clear successes to point to, the administration these days is stressing the complexity of the terrorism problem and its world-wide nature. An administration official notes, for example, that in the 30-day period ended Oct. 10, there were 37 terrorist attacks around the world, by 13 different terrorist groups against the property and citizens of 20 nations.

The Reagan administration is learning there aren't any quick fixes to the terrorism problem. For all the talk about cracking down on terrorists, notes a congressional intelligence aide, "The U.S. government is acting today pretty much the same way it always has," using its intelligence resources the best way it can.

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

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Date 23 Oct 84 <sup>18</sup>  
*as 8/3/17*

Subject: Terrorism Statement

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 16, 1984

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Terrorism Statement

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NR-753-113-132  
BY C/N NARA DATE 8/31/17

Please find attached at Tab I a revised and now unclassified statement on terrorism. This reflects a total of four additional events: one in Israel, one in Lebanon, one in Chile, and the Brighton bombing against Prime Minister Thatcher.

CIA has authorized this to be an unclassified presentation, now that it is in the public domain (see Tab II). The article at Tab II is particularly damaging in that it portrays this Administration to be restrained by the same problems as beset Carter. The sources are obvious. Amb Oakley did not talk to the reporter, nor did I. Oakley is very concerned that the article further jeopardizes Levin, Regier, and Dr. Weir. It makes the recovery of the three even less likely since "Administration sources" indicate that a reprisal for the Beirut bombing would jeopardize their safety.

Mrs. Levin called Oakley as soon as she saw the article. She now believes that the Administration is not doing all it could and that her best recourse for recovering her husband may be to go to 60 Minutes. The producers have been anxious to portray her dilemma for over a month. Oakley and Jim Baker's wife have been effective thus far in preventing such action.

Secretary Weinberger should be apprised of this second "revelation" from DOD. For our part, you will recall my attempting to discourage any discussion with this reporter. It may be useful to address the issue with the staff.

RECOMMENDATION

That you urge Bud to call Secretary Weinberger on this matter and raise the matter with appropriate staffers.

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - Revised/Unclassified Statement on Terrorism
- Tab II - Wall Street Journal Article, Tuesday, Oct 16, 1984  
"Reagan Administration Avoids Retaliation for Embassy Bombing; Plans Better Security"

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

21  
October 16, 1984

STATEMENT OF TERRORISM

International terrorism is a growing problem for all of us in the Western world--not just the United States. While we in the Western democracies are most often the targets, terrorist attacks are becoming increasingly violent and indiscriminate. Since the first of September, there have been 41 separate terrorist attacks by no less than 14 terrorist groups against the citizens and property of 21 nations. Sixteen of these were attacks against individual citizens and 18 of these were bombings or attempted bombings in which innocent third parties were victimized.

While the Middle East remains high on the list for potential terrorist activity, the 41 events last month occurred in places as diverse as Western Europe, South America, Africa, and even Australia. Thus, our response to terrorism can not be confined to a specific geographic area.

The Administration has, in fact, addressed the matter as one of serious import for all the Western powers. We have made good on a longstanding commitment to protect our citizens both in the United States and overseas. Actions taken to date reflect this concern:

- On July 23, 1983, I issued a public statement urging international cooperation against terrorism.
- In a message to the European Heads of State and Government on September 17, 1983, I made a similar direct appeal for their help in deterring terrorist attacks.
- In April 1984, the Administration submitted four bills to the Congress designed to strengthen our legal instruments for dealing with terrorists and show good faith with our Allies. Three of these bills, hostage taking, aircraft hi-jacking, and authority to pay rewards for information on terrorists have been passed by the Congress.
- In an effort to improve international cooperation in combatting terrorism, Western leaders at the London Economic Summit in June 1984 issued a seven point declaration on cooperative steps to be taken against terrorists.
- On September 27, 1984, I asked the Congress to approve \$110 million for immediate security enhancements to our overseas missions. The Secretary of State has asked the Congress to authorize a total of \$366.3 million for this purpose in FY-85. These funds will better our security protection and allow us thwart terrorist actions before they occur.

Bud *29*

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
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4. WE HAVE ADDITIONAL INFO WHICH WILL BE SENT ASAP.  
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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