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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: Clark, William P.: Files
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Archivist: smf/smf
 FOIA ID: F2000-006 (Skinner)
 Date: 12/18/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Lenczowski to Clark re US Soviet Exchanges 4p R 6/12/06 F00-006 #22	3/17/83	P1/B1
2. letter	Clark to Wick 1p R " " #23	n.d.	P1/B1
3. memo	Wick to Clark re NSDD 75 4p D 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #24	2/14/83	P1/B1
4. memo	Wick to Clark re NSC Meeting 6p D 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #25	12/22/82	P1/B1
5. letter	Casey to Wick re Jan 21 letter 2p P 1/23/02 NLSF2000-006/1 #26	2/7/83	P1/B1, B3
6. summary	Extracts from Feb. 7 letter 1p R 1/23/02 NLSF2000-006/1 #27	n.d.	P1/B1
7. memo	Lenczowski to Clark re State's Latest Memorandum 1p R 6/12/06 F00-006 #28	3/22/83	P1/B1
8. handwritten notes	re Soviet Union 1p R " " #29	n.d.	P1/B1
9. memo	Lenczowski to Clark re Soviet SALT Compliance 8p R " " #30	3/25/83	P1/B1
10. memo	Lenczowski to RR re Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations 2p R " " #31	3/25/83	P1/B1
11. memo	Shultz to RR re Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations 3p R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #32	3/16/83	P1/B1
12. handwritten notes	re Meeting with President 1p R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #33	n.d.	P1/B1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
 B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
 B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
 B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
 B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
 B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3-23-83

Judge Clark

This requires a very basic value judgment. Who profits more from people exchanges? When we send Americans to Moscow (and Soviets come here) what losses do we suffer and what do we get for it.

This varies based upon the character of the exchange. Sven Kraemer, for example went to the USSR on a fellowship. Do we not benefit from that? That program is now cancelled. The Russians who came here in return are exposed to the US. Although we must be careful about their activities while here, this is not kind of source which is most serious.

On the other hand some visits by Russians are very harmful.

In short it is a matter of case-by-case judgment. John presupposes we will use bad judgment. That is not yet evident.

Bud



National Security Council
The White House

584

Package # 90169

'83 MAR 17 P6:21

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 17, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, Reciprocity, and
Controlling the Hostile Intelligence Presence

Charles Wick has sent you a memorandum recommending a way of achieving "full reciprocity" (including ideological reciprocity) in our exchanges with the U.S.S.R. (Tab II). It recommends that we invoke the "Baker Amendment" which enables us to exercise major control over visas to visitors from Communist countries.

This recommendation comes at a critical moment. NSDD 75 on U.S.-Soviet Relations, in calling for "full reciprocity" in exchanges with Moscow, states that "unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets will make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying reciprocal access to the Soviet Union." (My emphasis) The State Department interprets this to mean that the President has authorized it to negotiate a new exchange agreement with the Soviets. (Both Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman referred to this in the recent meeting with the President.) But, while "effective official framework" can mean a new exchange agreement, it does not necessarily mean this. It can mean other official arrangements to enforce reciprocity--including the invocation of the Baker Amendment. Before we rush headlong into a new agreement which the Soviets would love to have, we should explore this important alternative.

Legal Background

Sec. 212(a) (28) of the Immigration law declares that Communists are ineligible for visas. Sec 212(d) (3), however, permits the Attorney General to grant a waiver of that ineligibility should he choose to do so. The McGovern Amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization of 1977, in turn, mandates that, in the interests of complying with the Helsinki accords,

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Declassify on: OADR

NLS F00-006 #22

BY SMJ DATE 6/12/06

we must seek a waiver of that ineligibility. The Baker Amendment, finally, states that if a country is "not in substantial compliance" with Helsinki, then the Secretary of State "may refuse to recommend a waiver" of that ineligibility. If invoked it would render all Soviet Communists ineligible for visas. Thus, instead of having to take action to deny visas on an individual basis, action would have to be taken to grant visas on an individual basis.

Controlling the Hostile Intelligence Presence

Needless to say, invoking the Baker Amendment would be a key element in our effort to limit KGB infiltration of our country. Should the State view (i.e., do nothing) prevail on other reciprocity measures to limit the hostile presence which are currently before the SIG(I), invoking the Baker amendment restrictions might well become our most effective limitation on KGB pressure. Wick consulted the FBI and describes trends of such infiltration--especially through the vehicle of private exchanges--that the FBI considers "alarming." Wick also consulted Bill Casey who recommends that all proposals for exchange visits be funneled through a central government apparatus--perhaps the new Office of Foreign Missions--as a means of enforcing reciprocity and limiting KGB presence.

Criteria for Visa Approval

If the Baker Amendment were to be invoked, problems would arise as to how visa applications would be judged. Several criteria would have to be applied. Ideological judgement would have to be made to determine ideological reciprocity; and someone would have to judge the possibility of hostile intelligence presence. While the new Office of Foreign Missions was not especially designed for such responsibilities, it would be a logical place for developing such recommendations. However, this would require a specific and carefully developed expansion of its mandate. There have been several other proposals to add visa recommendation authority to the Office of Foreign Missions charter because it will have the requisite intelligence/national security perspective. Another possible office that could be involved in the ideological side of this might be the new Public Diplomacy shop located in Under Secretary Eagleburger's office. We could develop guidelines for their use to determine what constitutes ideological reciprocity.

A Similar Amendment in the Works

State's Bureau of Consular Affairs is preparing a similar amendment to be presented to Congress. It would permit the Secretary of State to refuse to recommend a waiver of ineligibility for "foreign policy reasons." This would give us the discretion to deny visas without having to declare a country in violation of Helsinki--and it would extend to non-signatory (i.e., non-European) countries. The problem here is that it may be months before such an amendment becomes law--if ever.

Options

- (1) We could fulfill State's dual desire for more exchanges and more negotiations and negotiate a new exchange agreement with the Soviets. Contrary to Ambassador Hartman's categorical assertions, however, this is not the only means of enforcing reciprocity--nor would it necessarily be an "effective" means as the NSDD requires. It is problematical whether such an agreement could legally prevent the Soviets from circumventing it through private channels as they do now. Something more is needed.
- (2) We could wait until the Consular Affairs Bureau's new amendment passes the Congress if it ever does.
- (3) We could invoke the Baker Amendment and get to work on this problem immediately. It would involve declaring the Soviets in violation of Helsinki: but we already do this constantly in a variety of international and public fora (only now it is all talk and no action). This need not preclude negotiating an exchange agreement with the Soviets. But I believe that such action should most definitely precede any new negotiations. (I have my doubts about a new exchange agreement in any event--especially at this time.) Finally, invoking Baker would send a strong signal to the Soviets that we are more in control of our security than they think we are.

Analysis of Options

For the variety of reasons already mentioned, invoking the Baker Amendment would seem to be the option most compatible with the President's views as I understand them. The State Department, having never even informed Dr. Pipes about this Amendment, has probably not told you or the President about it either. Thus, it would appear that the State-led interagency process would be unlikely to cough up this option--much less this recommendation. State will probably come up with several reasons not to follow this course. It may say that:

- this will disrupt our bilateral relations with the Soviets and harm the prospects of "dialogue;"
- the Soviets may retaliate perhaps by making life more difficult for our diplomats in Moscow;
- invoking Baker at this time will harm the prospects of passage of the Consular Bureau's new Amendment since it will have taken care of many of the national security arguments that the Consular Bureau would use;
- it will present us with the "intractable problem" of whether or not to invoke Baker vis-a-vis all Eastern European countries.

None of these possible arguments has enough validity to discourage the invocation of Baker. Since all we want is reciprocity, any argument citing Soviet adverse reaction is preposterous. The putative Consular Bureau argument is weak because its new Amendment incorporates the whole world and not just Europe--so its security justification can remain very well intact. Finally, the problem of invoking Baker vis-a-vis East Europe is simply a matter of the Secretary of State's discretion and should pose no problem at all.

Under the circumstances, I feel that this is a situation that calls for Presidential leadership and not simply for the President to follow State's lead.

JL for k del

JL for PD

Ken DeGraffenreid and Paula Dobriansky concur.

RECOMMENDATION

OK

NO

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| — | — | (1) That you convene an NSC meeting of yourself, the President, the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, and include CIA Director Casey, USIA Director Wick, and Attorney General Smith to decide whether to invoke the Baker Amendment. |
| — | — | (2) That you sign the attached letter to Director Wick at Tab I. |

Attachments:

- | | |
|--------|---|
| Tab I | Letter for your signature to Charles Wick |
| Tab II | Correspondence from Charles Wick |

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Charlie:

Thank you for alerting me to the existence of the "Baker Amendment." This could very well be the vehicle we should use to enforce reciprocity in our exchanges with the USSR and limit the hostile intelligence presence in our country.

At this stage, we are studying the best way of accomplishing these important goals and a final decision on how to proceed will be forthcoming from the highest levels. I may be calling you up soon on this.

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

The Honorable Charles Z. Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20547

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLS F00-006 423

BY anf, NARA, DATE 6/12/06

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 3-4 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

7 February 1983

Mr. Charles Z. Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Dear Charlie: -

I am responding to your 21 January letter soliciting my comments on the national security aspects of large numbers of Soviet personnel entering the United States on cultural and exchange visits, including students under the IREX programs. I have also just received your letter of 2 February in which you outline discussions between your agency and the FBI on the FBI's perception of the threat represented by the increased numbers of intelligence operatives traveling to the United States with visiting Soviet groups. I share your concerns and those of the FBI in these areas and will gladly work with you to develop and utilize appropriate mechanisms for more effective controls and greater reciprocity. (S)

Within the Intelligence Community, as I believe you know, we have a Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) that examines proposed visits to the United States by Soviets (as well as from other communist countries) under established exchange programs, including IREX students. USIA is represented on COMEX and regularly participates in the examinations, deliberations and formulation of recommended actions. COMEX actions include recommending denial of a visit, urging modification of a visit itinerary or scope, or interposing no objection to a proposed visit as scheduled. COMEX reviews normally consider national security matters such as exposure to high technology and the risk of the visitor acquiring sensitive or classified technologies. These concerns apply to students, exchange visitors and business visitors, many of which are arranged directly with the private sector as you correctly observe. Cultural visits of the type you describe are not normally reviewed because they are outside the purview of COMEX. (S)

One of our largest problems is to learn about these proposed visits in sufficient time and detail to conduct a meaningful review and to initiate necessary limiting actions when undesirable features become known. This is a particular problem in the visits arranged directly in the private sector. (U)

I endorse your efforts to achieve strict or full reciprocity in the total range of visits, and I believe your suggested modifications to NSDD-75 were very beneficial. The remaining problem, of course, is how we achieve the objectives now stated as national policy. Visa control is certainly one way, but we have found this a difficult tool to apply without effecting major changes in current visa issuing policy. A better way to start, I believe,



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
NLS F2000-006/1#26

would be to compel at least the Soviets to funnel all proposals for exchange visits--private, cultural, business, students, etc.--through a central U.S. Government apparatus. This would provide us total advance knowledge of all visits, and we can devise the necessary review mechanisms to assess national security risks, balance the reciprocity concerns, and accomplish any other objectives called for in national policy. (S)

No central visit-clearing point exists in the Government, nor has there been any action to my knowledge to establish one. NSDD-75 provides the impetus to do so, however, and I am interested in pursuing this. One consideration I will look into is the appropriateness of tasking the new Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) within the State Department to take on this task. This Office is just now being established in compliance with the Foreign Missions Act signed into law in August 1982. Its primary purpose is to achieve reciprocity in the operation of foreign missions in the United States. We need to explore the applicability of this purpose to the full range of exchange visitors as extensions of the diplomatic missions to the United States. If we should find the OFM able to assume this role, the matter of visa control that you suggest could follow as a natural result. (S)

In sum, I applaud your efforts to gain recognition of the full reciprocity issue, I share your concern about the imbalance of Soviet exchange visitors to the United States, and I will pursue the matter of a central point through which all visits must be proposed and cleared. (S)

Sincerely,


William J. Casey

~~SECRET~~

Extracts of February 7 Letter to Mr. Wick from Mr. Casey
on Reciprocity in Exchanges with the Soviets

- "I endorse your efforts to achieve strict or full reciprocity in the total range of visits, and I believe your suggested modifications to NSDD-75 were very beneficial." (S)
- "I share your concerns and those of the FBI in these areas and will gladly work with you to develop and utilize appropriate mechanisms for more effective controls and greater reciprocity." (C)
- "The remaining problem, of course, is how we achieve the objectives now stated as national policy. Visa control is certainly one way, but we have found this a difficult tool to apply without effecting major changes in current visa issuing policy. A better way to start, I believe, would be to compel at least the Soviets to funnel all proposals for exchange visits -- private, cultural, business, students, etc. -- through a central U.S. Government apparatus. This would provide us total advance knowledge of all visits, and we can devise the necessary review mechanisms to assess national security risks, balance the reciprocity concerns, and accomplish any other objectives called for in national policy." (S)
- "No central visit-clearing point exists in the Government, nor has there been any action to my knowledge to establish one. NSDD-75 provides the impetus to do so, however, and I am interested in pursuing this. One consideration I will look into is the appropriateness of tasking the new Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) within the State Department to take on this task." (S)
- "If we should find the OFM able to assume this role, the matter of visa control that you suggest could follow as a natural result." (S)
- "In sum, I applaud your efforts to gain recognition of the full reciprocity issue, I share your concern about the imbalance of Soviet exchange visitors to the United States, and I will pursue the matter of a central point through which all visits must be proposed and cleared." (C)

~~SECRET~~

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NLS F 2000-006/1 # 2?

BY rmf, NARA, DATE 1/23/02

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

March 22, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: State's Latest Memorandum on U.S.-Soviet Relations

At Tab A is Secretary Shultz's latest memorandum to the President containing his proposals for U.S.-Soviet dialogue in accordance with his understanding of the President's instructions. This memo reflects the President's views more closely than State's earlier memoranda.

At Tab I is your cover memorandum to the President which makes the following points:

- That Shultz's memo is more cognizant about the dangers of detente-style dialogue;
- That you still have reservations about how this dialogue will be conducted;
- That to conduct such a dialogue is a very risky business and is a delicate balancing act;
- That you have real problems with two of State's specific proposals: a new cultural agreement and opening new consulates; and
- That you are willing to go along with the rest of State's proposals -- but very cautiously.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the cover memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President BY any, NARA, DATE 6/12/06
Tab A Secretary Shultz's memorandum, March 16, 1983

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1. I think we should seriously discuss with Sec. Shultz a strong demand - re the test of the P.L.S.
2. Of course we make a strong fight on these issues before long. Decision has been made on I.N.F.
3. We know the answer to these questions re - the Soviets and detente as done or attempted was not the answer. There is some truth however that the Soviets are mis-trusting of us because they are Russians. They've had a ~~secret~~ inferiority complex for centuries. We can be realistic about them & still try for peace. Not to do so is unthinkable.

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NLS F00 - 006 # 29

BY Jmf, NARA, DATE 6/12/06

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1983

INFORMATION

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLS F00-006 # 30

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JL*

BY *Amf*, NARA, DATE 4/12/06

SUBJECT: Soviet SALT Compliance and U.S.-Soviet Relations

The Immediate Issue

1. The immediate issue is how to handle the latest apparent Soviet arms control violation: the testing of the PL-5. The intelligence community unanimously believes that this test has raised enough questions about Soviet compliance that a major diplomatic demarche is necessary. The problem here is that this issue cannot be treated in isolation without causing severe problems for the President and his overall foreign policy.

The Surrounding Immediate Issues

2. Coming up very soon are several critical issues, all related: the Adelman vote, the MX votes, the nuclear freeze votes, the defense budget vote, and a decision on how to proceed at the INF negotiations -- whether to present a new fall back proposal or not. Each one of these issues hinges on the answer to one question: how will the President conduct U.S.-Soviet relations? Each one of these issues represents a challenge to the President's views and policies. What the President must decide is whether or not he will try to win each battle by presenting the strongest case he can make or whether he is willing to risk losing these battles by compromising his views and thus making a weaker case in order to accommodate his critics.

The Real Issue

2 To view these various issues and upcoming battles in Congress in the context of the compliance issue presents a situation that cuts to the core of how we conduct our policy toward the USSR. This situation compels us to address several key questions:

- Who is responsible for U.S.-Soviet tensions?
- Who is responsible for progress or lack of progress in arms control negotiations?
- Is it possible to trust the Soviets?

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Declassify on: OADR

- Is it unreasonable, provocative or belligerent to conduct a policy based on a suspicion about true Soviet motivations and behavior, especially in the field of arms control?
- Is true peace and accommodation possible between the U.S. and the USSR, between democracy and communism?

Each of these questions depends upon a certain theory about the nature of the Soviet system and communism. Thus, the compliance issue in combination with its surrounding issues, at bottom, addresses the whole question of whose assessment of the USSR is correct -- that of the President and those who are realistic about the Soviets, or that of his critics -- the proponents of detente and those who are inclined toward wishful thinking and a mirror-image perception of the USSR. Put yet another way, the real question here is: are the Soviets actually communists or not, and if they are, will we conduct our foreign policy on the basis of this fact?

The Position of the President's Critics

The President's critics answer every one of the above questions on the basis of a wishful-thinking, mirror-image view of the USSR.

- They believe that the Administration is just as responsible as, if not more responsible than, the USSR for U.S.-Soviet tensions, the arms race and lack of progress in arms control. This is evident in their pressures on the President to back off his zero-zero proposal in order to "get the negotiations moving again." Apparently, the fact that they are not criticizing and pressuring the Soviets to do something means that in their view, the Soviet position is reasonable and the President's is unreasonable. Somehow it is the Soviets, and not the President who deserve the benefit of the doubt. Implicit in this view is the mirror-image perception that the Soviets must feel threatened by the prospective U.S. INF deployments and defense buildup and that their fears are legitimate ones.
- They either trust the Soviets (on account of the fact that they never raise questions about Soviet treaty compliance) or they argue that we need not trust them: instead we can rely on the fallacious, mirror-image assumption that the Soviets have just as much incentive to control arms as we do (e.g., the problems of their domestic economy). Their trust of the Soviets manifests itself in another, even more important way: they refuse to believe that the Soviets are using arms control negotiations as an integral part of their ideological struggle against democracy and that such negotiations are the key to the Soviet strategy of deception.

- They believe that the President (and Adelman as well) is not truly committed to arms control, and that as a result, the Administration position is not only unreasonable but even provocative toward the Soviets. Not one of the Senators opposing Adelman acknowledged that there is any legitimacy to the President's (and Adelman's) hesitation about rushing Cranston-style into new agreements with the Soviets -- a hesitation based exclusively on a realistic suspicion about Soviet motivations and behavior.

- They believe that some kind of real peace and accommodation can be reached with Soviets if only we try harder and give the Soviets the right incentives to cooperate with us to realize our alleged "mutual interests." Arms control negotiations are thus seen as the key to this process. Originally, it was detente that made arms control both possible and desirable. But, since the policy of detente was called into question by Soviet misbehavior, the only thing left to keep detente alive was arms control -- the only arena where there appeared to be a mutuality of interest, an interest in avoiding war. Thus the President's critics see arms control as a cooperative enterprise in confidence building and reduction of tension, a process of mutual concessions, mutual interests and mutual advantages. This is in direct contrast to the Soviet, ideological approach to diplomacy which considers negotiations as an arena of class struggle, a zero-sum game where one side must win and the other must lose.

The common denominator of each of these positions held by the President's critics is that the Soviets are not really communists and therefore do not pursue the unlimited international objectives of a revolutionary communist power, using any means necessary to achieve these goals. Instead they feel that the Soviets are just like any other normal great power, possessing limited international objectives, and desiring their fair share of the spoils. The assumption here is that once the Soviets get their fair share, which may include a "legitimate" security buffer, then they will behave like a good citizen in the existing international order and find an ever greater mutuality of interest with us in controlling arms and maintaining a peaceful international status quo.

This is not correct.

If this view of the Soviets is correct, then the policy of detente with its elements of appeasement and accommodation would be a legitimate foreign policy path to explore. If it is incorrect, then all elements of the policy of detente, including arms control, are put into question and we have to face up to the possibility that we are facing not just a "potential adversary" but a real, live, communist enemy, for whom the mere existence of a democratic United States is an ideological and therefore internal security threat.

As part of their wishful thinking, the President's critics refuse to listen to any portrayal of the East-West conflict that is couched in moral terms. They refuse to acknowledge that military forces are a reflection of political, ideological and moral differences and not the cause of them. To repeat, they refuse to believe that the Soviets are really communists.

The President's critics are so unwilling to face this possibility (just as Chamberlain and Co. were unwilling to take Naziism's unlimited revolutionary objectives seriously), that they remain committed to doing everything they can to try to teach the Soviets to be something they cannot be.

To find an arms control violation thus represents not only a failure of these efforts and a failure of the policy of detente, but it represents a repudiation of their wishful-thinking, mirror-image view of the USSR, a view which is the only thing that seems to sustain their hope that peace on earth is possible. Thus, any violations of agreements must be made to go away: either they did not occur, they were passing aberrations, or they have no significant military or political consequences.

It is for this reason that the Carter Administration defined a SALT violation not as an act contrary to the terms of the agreement, but as a deliberate act, contrary to the precise terms of SALT, which results in a significant increase in Soviet strategic power.

The Soviet Role

The Soviets have one overall objective in this context: to change the correlation of forces (both political and military) in their favor. Their immediate objective is to stop our INF deployments and force us to reduce our defense budget and our strategic programs. Their principal means for achieving these goals are the use of deception and intimidation.

Deception: Their primary deception -- their number one disinformation theme -- is to convince the West that they are really not communists and that therefore a true accommodation is possible between us and them. They try to cultivate the notion that they do not really believe in their ideology any more, that they have lost their revolutionary elan, and that there is a new non-orthodox "pragmatic" group in power. The more they can promote this fallacious mirror-image perception in the minds of Western leaders, the more those leaders can be convinced that the Soviets are as interested in arms control as they are.

A related disinformation theme is the idea that the Soviets have as much to fear from Western military forces as we do from theirs. This theme promotes the idea that the U.S. is as responsible as, if not more responsible than the USSR for the arms race and lack of progress in arms control.

If the Soviets can compel Western publics to accept these premises and assumptions, then they can much more easily force us to play the peace game on their terms rather than ours. Thus, they can come to the arms control table and make countless false statements, engage in all sorts of circumventions and violations, and still compel us to sit at the table with them. In spite of a decade's worth of unilateral U.S. restraint, in spite of all our peaceful international intentions and behavior, much of the West accepts these false notions to be true.

We must do better than we have in negotiating this.

Intimidation: As part of their effort in psychological conditioning, the Soviets have used various forms of intimidation to compel Western publics and leaders to accept their terms of the "peace" game. Principal among these is to encourage us that there will be dire consequences if the arms control process does not continue. Others forms of intimidation include the recent threats that INF deployments would compel the Soviets to target European cities and station similar weapons close to American borders, and the threat of nuclear attack against the Japanese.

The Soviet Assessment of Western Behavior

The one factor that rarely is considered in situations like this is the true Soviet view. Almost always, the fallacious, mirror-image perception of the Soviet view is the basis upon which Western decisions are made. This mirror-image perception invariably explains that the Soviets will see how their own alleged interests in reducing their own military expenditures and reducing tensions with the West are advanced by the arms control process. This mirror-image perception also explains that the Soviets regard all U.S. negotiating proposals as signs of U.S. strength and self-confidence: after all, isn't the reverse true? -- didn't we tell ourselves that the Soviets would never negotiate until they felt strong enough to bargain from a position of relative parity and therefore strength?

The facts are the complete opposite. The Soviets view the very fact that we are sitting at the table with them as something they forced us to do. Every time we impatiently come up with another negotiating proposal (usually a fall-back position), they regard it the same way. Most significant of all is their perception of our utter lack of response in the face of their continuing circumventions and violations of existing agreements. They can only see this as proof that the correlation of forces has shifted so much in their favor that Western leaders have no choice but to accommodate themselves to the Soviet position that no violations have occurred.

A point to note G. Ch. they have always insisted coming G. Ch. Table.

I agree we must insist on enforcing G. Ch. better every agreement we have.

What Is To Be Done

As things currently stand, we are in the intolerable position of being forced by our allies to reject the zero-zero proposal as if we were the ones responsible for no progress in the INF talks, as if we have been negotiating in bad faith. In other

I don't believe this is accurate. We know from the 1st we might have to settle for less but whatever gains we made might make it easier to ultimately get zero zero.

words, we are being forced to act as if we are the principal cause of East-West tensions and the arms race. Since this is unequivocally not so, the Soviets can only view their disinformation efforts as successful and remain convinced that even under Ronald Reagan, the U.S. is too weak to compete politically with them.

If the President loses the nuclear freeze vote (a Soviet proposal, after all), the defense budget vote, the Adelman vote, the MX vote, the Soviets will be even further convinced of the Administration's and America's political weakness. And they will make further plans for more geopolitical offensives around the world based on this view.

The only recourse available to us to reverse this situation is to expose Soviet bad faith in arms control. No explanations of arcane weapons comparisons or military force balances (which can be easily manipulated by sophisters) will either be as convincing or comprehensible to Western publics as a clearcut accusation that the Soviets have been cheating.

If, however, the President accuses them of a violation only on the PL-5 issue, and only on the grounds of impermissible changes in the RV to throw-weight ratio (which would be utterly incomprehensible to the public), then he will be put in a very politically precarious position. His critics will easily be able to portray him as having gotten overly exercised about a miniscule violation that is strategically insignificant. They will try to make the President look petty and foolish.

What he must do, therefore, is to explain to the public that this is the last straw -- the straw that broke the camel's back. He would then explain what all the others straws are.

Presenting the Catalog of Soviet Deceptions, Circumventions and Violations

The President can then point out that:

- The Soviets have consistently violated the 1972 Agreement on the Basic Principles of Relations between the U.S. and the USSR. Since the SALT II Treaty states in its preamble that it "proceeds" from the Basic Principles Agreement, the only foundation of SALT II is being violated.
- The Soviets have violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements of 1962 on the placement of offensive weapons in Cuba. (The President and three top national security officials are already on record with this charge.) Specific violations include the TU-95 Bear, the nuclear capable MIG 23/27's and others.
- The Soviets have committed more than 30 violations of both SALT I and II and other arms control agreements.

Explaining Why Soviet Deceptions, Circumventions and Violations are an Intrinsic Element of Soviet-Communist Strategy

The most convincing way the President can present the catalog of Soviet violations is by putting them in the context of communist (particularly Leninist) strategy. For the first time in decades, the President can explain the real basis of the East-West conflict and thus why both sides have the kinds of arsenals they do.

What this really means is that he must show the American people that the Soviets really are communists. He must explain that whether they believe in the ideology or not, the system requires that they must behave as if they believe in it entirely. He must show how the Soviet Party leaders use their ideology as the standard against which deviationism is measured -- and how this is the way they identify threats to their rule and thus stay in power.

From this analysis necessarily follows a foreign policy which cannot accept a "social status quo" and thus which considers negotiations as part of the class war.

What Then?

If the President comes forward with these charges and explanations, many will instantly conclude that arms control is dead and that he is leading us to war. To curtail the effect and spread of such accusations, he can immediately declare that the U.S. will continue to negotiate with the Soviets and do everything possible to reach a verifiable agreement -- only now it will be on our terms and no longer on Soviet terms.

A Challenge Brewing in the Senate

If the President fails to raise the entire compliance issue he will face a major challenge from conservative Senators. As far as I can tell two measures are being prepared: a SALT II withdrawal resolution and an amendment prohibiting U.S. unilateral compliance with SALT II (on Constitutional grounds).

- If the resolution or amendment wins, SALT II is dead.
- If either fails, it will be followed by passage of a Senate advice and consent resolution on SALT II ratification.
- If this wins, the conservatives will have at least prompted U.S. compliance with SALT II to be in accordance with their Constitutional powers on treaty making.
- If consent for SALT II ratification is given then the President will be in a very difficult spot. He will have to ratify a treaty which he declared to be "fatally flawed" and he will have to do so in the context of the recent evidence of Soviet violations, and face charges of appeasement and cover-up.

- If the President refuses to ratify SALT II after Senate consent, he may face a major conflict with the Senate that may have Constitutional implications.

If the President fails to charge Soviet violations in his March 31 speech, it is very likely that he will be faced with this predicament.

Conclusion

If the President follows the recommendations in this memo:

- He will not only avoid the potential challenge in the Senate;
- He will seize the moral high ground;
- He will take the steam out of the freeze movement;
- He will demonstrate to the Soviets his and America's political strength, thus strengthening our military deterrent in a non-military way;
- He will re-enter the peace game on American terms while rejecting Soviet terms;
- He will gain as good a chance as any of winning the votes on Adelman, the MX, the freeze, and the defense budget;
- He will have told the unadulterated truth, thus confounding the Soviets' number one foreign policy priority -- namely to silence Ronald Reagan, and aborting the efforts of their principal disinformation campaign -- to convince the West that they are not really communists and that a true accommodation, especially in the form of a good faith arms accord can be reached with them.
- He will have made the strongest case he could possibly make in each of the upcoming political battles he faces.
- He will have avoided appealing to the weakness of the American people -- their naive good will and willingness to give others (including the Soviets) the benefit of the doubt; but rather,
- He will have appealed to the strengths of the American people -- their pride and greatness, their commonsense view of right and wrong, their devotion to truth, justice and fair play.

SK
kd
Sven Kraemer and Ken DeGraffenreid concur.

National Security Council The White House

Package # 2040

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>		
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

Bud, let's discuss. John
CR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 25, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*

SUBJECT: Procedures of the National Security
Planning Division

I have drafted for your signature a memo outlining procedures of the National Security Planning Division (Tab I).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to members of the National Security Planning Division (Tab I).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memo for Signature

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR DENNIS BLAIR
PAULA DOBRIANSKY
DOUGLAS FEITH
ROGER FONTAINE
DON GREGG
MICHAEL GUHIN
GEOFFREY KEMP
CARNES LORD
ED MCGAFFIGAN
HENRY NAU
RICHARD PIPES
JAMES RENTSCHLER
WILLIAM STEARMAN
RAYMOND TANTER
GUS WEISS
FRED WETTERING

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Procedures of the National Security Planning
Division

A small planning group will report directly to National Security Planning Senior Director Bailey. At present, this will consist of Gus Weiss and Carnes Lord but may be expanded in the future. All members of the planning nucleus will retain their present substantive areas of responsibility.

Senior Director Bailey will determine, in consultation with me and Bud McFarlane, which substantive issues will be coordinated through his office. All other matters may be communicated directly to me, Bud, John Poindexter or Mike Wheeler.

Bailey should be copied on all Weekly Reports.

cc: Tom Reed
Michael Wheeler

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

March 25, 1983

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

NLS F00-006 #31

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

BY smf, NARA, DATE 6/12/06

SUBJECT: Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations

The attached memorandum (Tab A) outlines Secretary Shultz's proposals for relations with the Soviets according to his understanding of your guidance at last week's meeting. His basic thrust is that both he and Ambassador Hartman should continue talks with the Soviets to press them on issues of special concern to us including human rights issues, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations.

This memo represents a continuation of State's insistence on intensified U.S.-Soviet dialogue. However it appears to recognize a bit more explicitly than previous communications on this subject the dangers of being perceived as returning to "business as usual" with the Soviets. State thus reassures you that our public statements should continue to emphasize our concerns about Soviet misbehavior.

With a couple of exceptions, State's proposals, if carried out discreetly and judiciously, may serve our interests in small but concrete ways. They may yield some very limited positive results. But we must be under no illusions: the Soviets will neither change their communist system to please us nor pull out of places like Afghanistan until they are forced to by exceedingly high costs. They may let the Pentacostalists or Shcharansky go, but their only real motivation for doing so would be to encourage the illusion in Western minds that bigger and better things can be accomplished (when the fact is that the kinds of things we really want cannot be accomplished without major political change in the Soviet system). Thus, certain concessions they might make to us are part of the general Soviet strategy of deception.

It is for this reason that the way we go about a dialogue with the Soviets, the way we handle it publicly, is the most critical question here. It is a very delicate balancing act. On the one hand, we want to appear reasonable, peaceful, and ready to deal with the Soviets in ways that minimize the possibility of war. On the other hand, this entails the enormous risk of raising false public expectations -- i.e., deceiving our own people about the possibility of achieving a true accommodation with communism.

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

Since the number one theme of Soviet disinformation strategy is to make the West believe that true peace is possible with the USSR, we must be extremely wary about serving as accomplices to this Soviet deception. That is why it is encouraging to see State's acknowledgement that our public statements will continue to be tough. Nevertheless, I have my reservations about how State will handle all this. Its heart is in dialogue and detente and not in the kinds of public statements that are necessary to sustain public vigilance and support for our defense buildup. Unfortunately, whenever you tell the blunt truth about the nature of communism, too many people at State cringe in embarrassment. The issue here is that the truth is the only real weapon we have in our political competition with the Soviets, whose principal weapons are falsehood and deception.

The other great danger in the way we handle any limited dialogue is the kind of signal we may be sending to the Soviets. If we appear too eager to make concessions, or to pursue a greatly expanded agenda for talks, they will get the immediate impression that their manipulation of Western public opinion forced us into talks with them, and that we are weakening and they are getting stronger. We may not see things this way. But this is the way the Soviets look at it. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, they believed that their greater political and military strength had actually forced us into talks and negotiations with them. It was on the basis of these kinds of perceptions of U.S. weakness that they made many of their calculations to advance geopolitically worldwide.

I have strong reservations about State's two proposals for bilateral relations. The first, a new cultural agreement, seems innocuous enough. But the issue is part of a whole complex of questions that relate to reciprocity and controlling the KGB presence in our country. I will be sending you a more detailed explanation on this. But for now, we should not yet authorize any negotiations until the issue has been thoroughly aired at an NSC meeting. The second proposal is equally problematical: opening a U.S. consulate in Kiev and a Soviet consulate in New York. This also needs much further study.

Otherwise, so long as State's proposed talks are held very discreetly, with no public fanfare, no bragging about great accomplishments, I believe we can achieve the two political results we want: projecting our peaceful intentions and maintaining realism and vigilance with regard to the Soviet threat.

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, March 16, 1983

SYSTEM II
90316THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 16, 1983

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F 2000-000/1 #32BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

In accordance with your instructions, here is how I propose to proceed in our bilateral relations with the Soviets in the coming months. I will continue to report to you and seek your further guidance at each stage of the process.

Human Rights: We will continue to keep this issue at the top of our agenda with the Soviets, focusing on:

--The Pentecostals: I will meet with Dobrynin this week to begin implementing the approach you have approved. Emphasizing that the recent Soviet response does not go far enough, I will press Dobrynin to permit the immediate emigration of the one member of the family (Lydia) who was evacuated from the Embassy in connection with her hunger strike last year. I will also give him our understanding of the Soviet statement concerning the Pentecostals still in the Embassy, i.e. that they will be given permission to emigrate if they return to their home and submit applications. At this initial meeting, I will inform Dobrynin that I have discussed areas for possible progress in our bilateral relations with you, but will reserve further discussion of these for a later meeting.

--Shcharanskiy: I will continue in subsequent meetings to reiterate our strong interest in an early release of Shcharanskiy and indicate that we remain interested in the possibility of an exchange for him (as you know, there has recently been some movement on this score).

--Madrid: Underscoring our interest in a balanced outcome at Madrid, I will continue to reinforce Max Kampleman's suggestion that Soviet release of a number of prisoners of conscience would remove a major obstacle to a successful conclusion of the conference.

Arms Control: In my meetings with Dobrynin and in our other diplomatic contacts, we will stress our intention to continue serious negotiations at Geneva. Our arms control approach will continue to be based on the criteria you have established -- real reductions, equality, verifiability, and enhanced stability of the East-West military balance.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL. OADR

Regional Issues: In accordance with our overall policy of probing Andropov for new flexibility on regional issues, we will continue to raise these issues with the Soviets. Because we do not wish to fall into the old pattern of conducting most of our exchanges through Dobrynin, our principal interlocutor with the Soviets on these issues will continue to be Art Hartman. I believe that in coming months Art should test the Soviets on the following regional issues:

--Middle East: Art should meet with senior MFA Officials for a discussion of the Middle East, as he has done on two recent occasions. These exchanges represent a low-cost means of keeping the Soviets at bay on this issue and, of course, would not touch upon more sensitive aspects of our diplomacy. They also give us a means of reiterating our concerns about unhelpful Soviet behavior, such as the export of SA-5s to Syria.

--Afghanistan: Art should also be instructed to keep the pressure on Moscow by reiterating our basic position on Afghanistan -- something we have not done in detail since Andropov became General Secretary. Following the visit of UN SYG Perez de Cuellar to Moscow this month and the next round of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva next month, we will again assess whether there is more we can do, together with the Pakistanis and Chinese, to press Moscow on Afghanistan.

--Southern Africa: We are carefully considering whether further US-Soviet dialogue would advance our Namibia/Angola initiative and our broader objectives in the region. If this review suggests that more exchanges would be in our interest, I would anticipate that Art would be our principal channel of communication on this issue as well.

Bilateral Relations: In this area, we will move deliberately and cautiously, looking at each step in terms of our interests and the requirements of our overall policy approach. In accordance with your guidance, I will in subsequent meetings with Dobrynin indicate our willingness to take two steps that are in our interest:

--Negotiation of a new cultural agreement to enforce reciprocity and enhance U.S. ideological penetration of the Soviet Union itself;

--Opening of a U.S. consulate in Kiev to establish a new U.S. presence in the Ukraine.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

As for the existing bilateral agreements which come up for review/renewal over the next year, we will examine carefully each agreement on its merits to ensure that any action we take is clearly in the U.S. interest. The first of these is the Fisheries Agreement where we are already under pressure from Congress and U.S. fishing interests to negotiate a new agreement with expanded joint venture fishing activities -- steps which would rescind elements of our Afghanistan and Poland sanctions regime. I will be sending you a recommendation on this issue shortly.

As I suggested in our recent discussions, the long-term grains agreement is a special case requiring careful handling. I will shortly be sending you a recommendation on this matter.

High-level Dialogue: As noted above, I will be implementing your instructions in meetings with Dobrynin, focusing first on the Pentecostals, and then addressing other issues in subsequent meetings. I will instruct Art Hartman to pursue his contacts with the Soviet MFA on regional issues. If these discussions indicate that a meeting before the next UNGA between Gromyko and me would be in our interest, I will have further recommendations on timing and venue.

Public Handling: As we proceed, it will be essential that our public statements on US-Soviet relations continue to emphasize our concerns about Soviet behavior -- their military buildup, geopolitical expansionism, and human rights violations. Against this background of Soviet behavior, we must continue to stress the necessity for a renewal of American economic and military strength. It must be equally clear that we have no intention of returning to "business-as-usual" in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union -- there must be significant concrete changes in Soviet behavior.

Our public statements should also emphasize that we intend to continue the dialogue with the Soviet Union which we began at the outset of this Administration on the full agenda we have established. We should continue to emphasize our intention to negotiate in good faith in the START and INF talks. But we should also underscore that we have engaged the Soviet Union in discussion of human rights, regional issues, and our bilateral relations. While continuing to stress the continuity of our policy of realism, strength, and dialogue, we can proceed with confidence to take limited steps in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union where it is in our interest to do so.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

26 March 83

Mr. President

Following your meeting with George Shultz, he dropped by my office to leave the attached notes used during your meeting. His opening comment to me was "I don't understand what game is being played over here in your not attending my meeting with the President." Mr. President, if our plans for the Soviets (or any other issue in my area of responsibility) are

WILLIAM P. CLARK, JR.

not coordinated with Cap and Bill and
Jeane, we will fail.

Bill



PR

I. Introductory

- Pres visit = dinner conditions + Doby
- = Pentacost + bilateral + probing
- ↳ a major signal-direct

II. General ~~plan~~ process

- basic decision
- steps that are interruptible but become longer as taken
- steps | Human Rights | Arms
- | Bilateral | Regional
- G - NYC - And

III. Immediate

- Pent. *costs of movement*
- MBR - verification - big battle
- Bilateral - Cultural Corollaries | LTA - April

key as sig re Afgan

Desuninski bilateral Soviet

- Poland (local vs S. Pol in trade missions)
- start on INF - serious *have* (change shifts)

Charles Phipps
Historical
manuscripts

IV. Medium term

- Doby on Arms + Regional leading to agenda for
- Coranyno
- full agenda

Poland
Afgan
Kamibach
Horn of At

So. Af
Central
Afr.

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NLS F2000-000/1 #33

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

V. Process

- with Pres (basic issues) - Pres Conf.
- Allies (Nato, J, G)
- Turkey only