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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: Clark, William P.: Files
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Archivist: smf/smf
FOIA ID: F2000-006 (Skinner)
Date: 12/18/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Lenczowski to Clark re US-Soviet Relations 6p <i>Part 12/19/05 M04-017 #4</i>	5/4/83	P1/B1
2. memo	Hill to Clark 1p <i>R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #50</i>	4/7/83	P1/B1
3. paper	Issue: Consulates General in Kiev and New York City 3p <i>P 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #51</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
4. paper	Cultural Exchanges Agreement 2p <i>R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #52</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
5. memo	Stearman to Clark re US-Soviet Summitry 2p <i>A 4/12/06 F00-004 #53</i>	5/18/83	P1/B1
6. memo	Shultz to RR re Meeting with Dobrynin 3p <i>A 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #54</i>	5/20/83	P1/B1
7. memo	duplicate of document 6 with RR initial 3p <i>A 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #55</i>	5/20/83	P1/B1
8. paper	Planning for Upcoming Pressures 2p <i>R 12/19/05 M04-017 #5</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
9. handwritten notes	re Hartman visit 2p <i>A 4/12/06 F00-004 #57</i>	5/20/83	P1/B1
10. memo	McFarlane to Clark re Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations 2p <i>R 12/19/05 M04-017 #6</i>	5/21/83	P1/B1
11. memo	last page only 1p <i>R 4/12/06 F00-004 #59</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
12. memo	Dobriansky to Clark re US-Soviet Relations: Next Steps 1p <i>R " " #60</i>	5/21/83	P1/B1
13. memo	Shultz to RR re Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations 2p <i>R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #61</i>	5/21/83	P1/B1
14. paper	Cultural Exchange Agreement 2p <i>R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #62</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
15. paper	Issue: Consulates General in Kiev and New York City 3p <i>P 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #63</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
16. memo	Clark to RR re US-Soviet Relations: Next Steps 2p <i>R 12/19/05 M04-017 #7</i>	n.d.	P1/B1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
 B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
 B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
 B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: Clark, William P.: Files
OA/Box: Box 91644 §
File Folder: U.S.-Soviet Relations Papers Working File:
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Archivist: smf/smf
FOIA ID: F2000-006 (Skinner)
Date: 12/18/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. memo	duplicate of document 13-2p <i>R 11/28/01 NLSF 2000-006/1 #65</i>	5/21/83	P1/B1
18. memo	Poindexter to Hill re Paper for NSC Meeting 1p <i>R 6/12/06 F00-006 #66</i>	5/18/83	P1/B1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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File Folder US-SOVIET RELATIONS PAPERS WORKING FILE:
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FOIA

M04-017

Box Number 8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE US-SOVIET RELATIONS (#4)	6	5/4/1983
8	PAPER	RE PLANNING FOR UPCOMING PRESSURES (#5)	2	ND
10	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO CLARK RE NEXT STEPS (#6)	2	5/21/1983
16	MEMO	CLARK TO RR RE US-SOVIET RELATIONS NEXT STEPS (#7)	2	ND

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~EYES ONLY

May 4, 1983

HOLD
✓ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: New Consulates and Cultural Agreement

Attached (Tab I) is a State memorandum presenting various pros and cons of establishing new consulates in Kiev and New York and negotiating a new cultural exchange agreement. Although I have produced an official, on-the-record analysis on this memorandum to you, the following analysis is off-the-record and for your eyes only.

Consulates

With regard to the consulates, State presents four options, three of which recommend some form of approach to the Soviets on discussing new consulates, and the fourth recommending maintenance of the status quo. State's analysis, while an improvement over previous memoranda, is sparse and inadequate, as it fails to point out all the possible pros, cons and options. Its basic arguments in favor of this move are:

- A Soviet consulate in New York would increase Soviet capabilities only marginally.
- A U.S. consulate in Kiev would provide us with expanded contacts with important national and religious minority groups.
- It would provide consular services.
- It would give us a significant [REDACTED] 14(c)
- We would please the U.S.-Ukrainian and Jewish communities.
- Not doing this forces us to pay rent on three apartments in Kiev which we cannot use, and risks losing an office building that the Soviets have kept open for us.
- It would show the public that "confrontation is not the only arrow in our quiver."

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS 004-017 #4

By CLS, NARA, Date 12/19/05

Its arguments against this move are:

- It will lift an Afghanistan sanction.
- It may raise unrealistic expectations about better U.S.-Soviet relations.

State's Purpose: Detente or Public Diplomacy? Several points are missing from State's analysis. One is an argument it made more directly in previous memoranda: that expanded contacts of the kind that a new consulate would provide us would be a public diplomacy vehicle designed to help promote political change in the USSR. The question arises here as to what State's priorities are. Does it want expanded diplomatic ties for purposes of detente or for purposes of intelligence and helping political change?

In spite of the fact that one identifiable individual at State concerned with these matters, Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer, supports promotion of political change in the USSR, no one else there is known to share his position. This situation casts doubt not only about State's true intentions, but about its capability to engage in ideological competition in the first place.

If we were to open such a consulate in Kiev and recommend a vigorous policy of ideological penetration and public diplomacy, it is likely that State would resist on the grounds that such activity might risk provoking the Soviets to close down that consulate thus threatening the new, improved U.S.-Soviet relationship.

There is plenty of precedent for such behavior, and thus considerable grounds for suspicion of State's intentions. The entire Kissinger detente policy was based on the premise of interlocking agreements ("linkage") that would bind the Soviets to a course of good behavior lest they risk the breakdown of the entire edifice. In practice, however, while the Soviets were not bound at all, we were the ones bound. Kissinger and Co. did not want to do anything that displeased the Soviets lest we endanger the network of agreements: e.g., Solzhenitsyn could not be received at the White House. Thus, any new agreement of the type proposed is symbolic more so of diplomatic relations than of the needs of public diplomacy and hence becomes a hostage of the diplomatic process. Preserving the agreement and the consulates will become the highest priority and serve as yet another reason why we should never do anything to offend Moscow.

Not only will State adopt such an attitude, but so will Senators Percy, Pell and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. According to them, Project Democracy is fine, so long as there is no ideological content to it. VOA broadcasts are fine so long as they have no philosophical content. Time and again these Senators have worked to prevent us from doing even a minimum effort to promote democratic philosophy abroad.

A Risky Signal to the Soviets. Opening new consulates would also send a signal to the Soviets: it would tell them that we are ready once again for business as usual (i.e., detente), in spite of Afghanistan, Poland, military buildup, treaty violations and circumventions, etc. It would tell them that the correlation of forces (especially in the political-ideological sphere) is moving more in the Soviets' favor and as a result the United States is willing to do yet another act that serves to legitimize the Soviet regime and conduct business on its terms.

[illegible]

- Finally, the counterintelligence burdens could be formidable. When the SIG-I is recommending a reduction of the hostile presence, it is not logical to move to increase that presence.

Opening new consulates could be marginally helpful only if it were accompanied by other measures that ensured a much greater reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet relations such as a major reduction in the Soviet presence here and if the Kiev consulate were used for greater ties not with the Soviet government but with the Soviet people -- especially in the ideological and information spheres. If only State were a little more enthusiastic about strengthening our broadcasts to the people, or placing better, more politically oriented articles in America Illustrated (USIA's publication distributed in the USSR, which is noted for its apolitical character), one could be more confident about the way it might handle a new consulate.

Exchange Agreement

The arguments here in favor of a new cultural exchange agreement are the same as in previous memoranda from State. They include:

- A new agreement would ensure reciprocity and preclude Soviet use of private channels.
- It would give us a better means of ideological penetration of Soviet society.
- It would improve our access to influential Soviet circles.

The only arguments State proffers against a new agreement are that it would involve lifting another sanction and give the impression of a return to detente.

Of all the pros and cons, the most peculiar is State's desire to improve "access to influential Soviet circles." How a cultural agreement would accomplish this is left unexplained, as is why such an agreement should be a meaningful way of achieving this especially when it is supposed to be designed to expand contacts with the Soviet people. Also unexplained is what we could hope to gain from such access, which the Soviets use so well as a carrot and stick to induce us to do things their way. Ambassador Hartman is forever complaining about such lack of access, yet he never seems to produce any good reasons as to what are the ill consequences of this.

All this logic, combined with the above-mentioned questions about State's real motivation for its consulates proposal, casts considerable doubt about its true motivation here as well: does it truly want public diplomacy rather than another element of detente? And if it wants public diplomacy, will Senator Pell

allow us to conduct it in a politically effective way? Or for that matter, will USIA Director Wick stop permitting the program contents of his own agency and this Administration to be dictated by Senator Pell's staff assistant? I have my doubts on all counts.

For the first time, State mentions the possible invocation of the Baker Amendment to control visas as a means of ensuring reciprocity and therefore as a means of achieving greater leverage in negotiating a truly reciprocal agreement with the Soviets. This would require the Secretary to declare that the Soviets are "not in substantial compliance" with Helsinki and thus enable him to withhold visas from Soviet communist applicants. Unfortunately, State calls visa control a "crude tool" which is subject to easy retaliation. This argument, however, fails in several respects. First of all, a "crude" tool is better than no tool. Secondly, crudity is in the eye of the beholder; and in any case the real question is the efficacy of the tool. Thirdly, the claim of susceptibility to retaliation is a false argument, for it assumes that visa control is a provocative action that we would initiate in an offensive fashion. By imputing provocative motives to visa control, this argument distorts what surely would be the intent of such a policy -- i.e., to establish reciprocity, which is necessarily a retaliatory act in itself.

An interesting final note on the Baker Amendment: State includes as one of its arguments against invoking it the fact that it raises foreign policy questions that require "further study."

Conclusion

Neither of these proposals has been argued well enough by State. Whatever the merits of the consulates proposal, its liabilities appear far greater. The exchange agreement might serve the national interest if conducted in a proper way -- especially in conjunction with reciprocity-producing actions that would mitigate any suggestion that detente or accommodation to Soviet terms are possible underlying purposes or effects.

If State could muster up the courage to control visas by invoking the Baker Amendment and act upon an official assessment that human rights are actually being violated in the USSR, then a truly reciprocal exchange agreement might be possible, and State would have done a great deal to expand its credibility with regard to its capacity to conduct political competition with the Soviet Union.

Otherwise, without such modifications in its reasoning and its behavior, these proposals might do well to sit in the deep freeze for a while.

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PD
Paula Dobriansky concurs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the new consulates idea be put into a permanent deep freeze.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That the exchange agreement be made totally contingent upon invocation of the Baker Amendment.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab A Copy of State's memorandum, April 7, 1983

~~SECRET~~

I

National Security Council The White House

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further
Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

1. JP
2. WC

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE CLARK

Bob
FROM BOB SIMS

Subject: Dobrynin lunch with Time magazine

You will be interested to know that at a lunch today with Time's managing editor and other staff members of the magazine, Dobrynin was asked about his access to people in this Administration.

He said nothing had changed from previous Administrations, he has regular access to George, knows Clark but not well. You do it like the boss wants, he explained, and this President wants him to talk to the State Department. Are the communications more frequent? About the same. Are they acceptable at that level? Yes, he said, quite acceptable--but it is the character of the communications that is important, the kind of discussions you have. He seemed to be suggesting that he was seeing people here often enough, but that the discussions were more formal--more of a question and answer basis. He also said Shultz was busy with other things like the Middle East, so they didn't have much time to talk about arms control.

My contact at Time, who gave me this feedback in confidence, said Dobrynin was the "ultimate dissembler."



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II
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April 7, 1983

83 APR 7 P11:08

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Kiev/New York Consulates
and Cultural Agreement

We have been looking into the pros and cons of taking
action in two areas of our relationship with the Soviets:

- (1) Consulates General in Kiev and New York City;
- (2) Cultural Exchange Agreement.

We believe there are some clear benefits to be gained
by U.S. initiatives in these areas, but each also has some
public relations or foreign policy drawbacks. Attached are
our analyses of the options available to us on these issues
and the pros and cons of each.

Regarding cultural exchanges, you will recall that
NSDD 75 states, inter alia, that the exchanges framework
should not be further dismantled; and that those exchanges
that promote positive evolutionary change within the USSR
should be expanded at the same time that the U.S. will
insist on full reciprocity.


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Consulates General in Kiev and New York Options.
2. Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Options.

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DECL: OADR

NLS F2600-004/1 #50

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

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ISSUE: Consulates General in Kiev and New York City: Options

Option 1. Inform the Soviets that the U.S. is ready to establish Consulates General in Kiev and New York City and propose a public announcement and the resumption of technical discussions toward this end.

Pros and Cons

In terms of assets, we would gain substantially from the opening of a Consulate in Kiev; by comparison, the Soviet presence in New York City would increase only marginally. As matters stand, because of the UN presence, the Soviets have free run of New York and we have nothing comparable in the USSR.

expanded contacts with important minority nationality and religious groups, and consular access for our citizens would prove most advantageous to the U.S. Government. It would also respond to the wishes of the U.S. Ukrainian community and many in the U.S. Jewish community who have long stressed the need for a consulate in the area.

On the down side, the lifting of an Afghan sanction will evoke some criticism. While this move may effectively show the American public, the Allies and the Soviets that confrontation is not the only arrow in our quiver, it may at the same time raise unrealistic expectations both here and abroad about overall improvements in our relations.

Practical Steps

Even if we were to agree in principle to open Consulates General, the timing and cost of our actions would be determined by decisions on several subsidiary issues. The first decision involves the type of establishment we wish to open in Kiev. We have the choice of a simple, unclassified operation which would constitute an American presence and give some consular protection to American visitors, or a full-scale post,

in a key non-Russian area. Devolving from this decision will be the question of timing. An unclassified establishment in Kiev could be organized fairly easily and quickly in terms of personnel and money, whereas full-scale establishment would take years.

Establishing a full-scale post would entail a great deal of

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NLS F2000-006/1 M-51

By smf, NARA, Date 11/28/01

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-2-

effort to secure the necessary personnel and funding, and to resolve numerous technical and logistical difficulties. However, depending upon how rapidly we would wish to implement this, several approaches are available. If quick results are crucial, we could immediately start the process of securing preliminary funding, TDY personnel for an advance team, and logistical support in order to have the consulates operational (through with a skeleton staff) within approximately a year. At the other end of the spectrum, we could do a limited amount of initial planning until Congressional support was assured and all funding requirements approved. A third approach would involve sending a temporary advance team as soon as possible and then developing an overall strategy for the selection of long-term personnel, the briefing of Congressional committees, the acquisition of funding, and the fulfillment of all the technical requirements of the facility. The implementation of this strategy would follow as soon afterwards as considered desirable or feasible.

Option 2: Propose to the Soviets that we resume discussions on the possibility of establishing Consulates in Kiev and New York, but not move quickly actually to open the Consulates and make no announcement at this time.

Pros and Cons

This approach would enable us to do the preliminary work both with the Soviets and within the U.S. Government necessary for the opening of the Consulates General at some future date. At the same time, it does not obligate us to take the more visible steps of actually putting an Advance Team in place now or allowing the Soviets to resume construction work on the building that will eventually house our Consulate General. The decision on whether or when to undertake these steps could depend on progress in the technical discussions and the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Since the discussions would be technical, no formal announcement would be required at this time. Similarly, no final decision would have to be made regarding the lifting of an Afghanistan sanction. On the other hand, the Soviets would regard this as a positive decision and it would allow us to begin allocating personnel and resources and setting up a logistical support system.

However, if Congress or the public becomes aware that we are identifying positions and earmarking funds for Kiev, we would probably be asked what this meant for our sanctions policy. Other disadvantages of this option are limited.

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-3-

Option 3. Tell the Soviets that we are actively considering the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of Consulates General.

Pros and Cons

The main advantage of this option is that it simply allows us to await a more favorable moment. It also enables us to avoid any criticism, except from the Ukrainian-American community which is pushing us to open in Kiev. Its primary drawback is that it accomplishes little. In terms of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is devoid of benefits, since the Soviets would see it as a do-nothing statement. After the suspension of our agreement to establish these Consulates General in 1980, a weak consensus emerged on the policy level that on balance the suspension was an ill-advised move.

Option 4. Say nothing to the Soviets and adhere to the status quo.

Pros and Cons

The one advantage inherent in this position is that we are spared from justifying the lifting of an Afghan sanction. The costs of our current practices are high. Financially, we bear the burden of three apartments in Kiev for which we pay rent but have no use. (We have kept the apartments because we previously spent substantial money on reconfiguring them for U.S. use, and because if we gave them up, we would have a lot of trouble obtaining other adequate apartments later.) We also risk the loss of the office building which the Soviets have, to date, kept open for us. The cost of reconstructing an alternate building will be considerably higher in the future. Finally, we face criticism from U.S. visitors to Kiev, especially Jewish groups, whom we are unable to assist.

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Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Options

As matters now stand, the Soviets have almost unlimited access to American media and other forums. And we have only limited means to penetrate the Soviet Union with our ideology. Our open society and the legal restraints on our ability to refuse visas to Soviet citizens except on national security grounds make this possible. We are fortunate that the Soviets since 1979 have chosen not to send performing artists here; otherwise, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moscow Circus and similar major groups could be touring the US annually without any reciprocity for American groups in the USSR. There are indications that the Soviets are rethinking this policy. and may start sending performers again. We currently have no means of ensuring reciprocity in this area, nor do we have leverage to gain Soviet agreement for us to conduct thematic exhibits in the USSR. Such exhibits, with American guides speaking Russian or other local language, have proven to be one of the most effective means of reaching thousands of Soviet citizens with the American message. For example, Vladimir Bukovsky has stated that he became a dissident when he visited the US Exposition in Moscow in 1959.

To increase our penetration of Soviet society through cultural exchanges, we need to consider the most effective means. We see three basic options:

1. Negotiate a new exchanges agreement, replacing the one that expired in 1979, that ensures reciprocity.

PROS: The exact form of an agreement would have to be worked out in interagency discussions to ensure that all USG interests would be considered. At a minimum, it would define the areas in which reciprocity must be provided, including the performing arts. We should be able to improve our access to influential Soviet circles by putting continued access to US audiences on a reciprocal basis. Exhibits would be an important part of an agreement, as would all other legitimate means of penetrating Soviet society. We would also require access to Soviet television.

CONS: This would involve negotiating a highly visible agreement and raise questions about how it conforms to our sanctions policy. It would cause speculation whether we are returning to a policy of detente.

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DECL: OADR

NLS F2000-006/1 #52

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

2. Combine negotiation of an exchanges agreement with a stricter visa regime, through legislation restoring our ability to refuse visas for foreign policy reasons or by invoking the "Baker Amendment." Such draft legislation is now at OMB for review and decision. The Baker Amendment involves an official determination, which can be made by the Secretary of State, that the USSR is not in substantial compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

PROS: This would permit us to generate greater leverage to get the kind of truly reciprocal exchanges agreement we want. It has the additional virtue of allowing us to refuse visas for policy reasons and not have to justify refusals on national security grounds. We could choose which Soviets we would admit or exclude.

CONS: This has the same problems as Option 1, somewhat mitigated by combining it with instituting tougher visa controls. In addition, visa refusals are a crude tool, subject to easy retaliation not necessarily confined to the visa field. American sponsors of Soviet visits would criticize arbitrary refusals, and those who invested money in long-term planning to bring Soviet performers here might have a legal claim. Invoking the Baker Amendment raises issues of foreign policy and long-term US-USSR relations that require careful study.

3. Continue current practice.

PROS: This involves no change and is easy to administer, with few decisions having to be referred to senior levels for political decision.

CONS: This does nothing to ensure reciprocity and leaves the Soviets with easy access to US society.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 18, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Summitry

We can expect continuing pressure for a Reagan-Andropov Summit from State, our allies and others. So far, the President has wisely resisted a summit until the Soviets demonstrate better intentions through concrete, positive actions. He should continue to hold the line for reasons explained below.

The President is, in a way, emulating Eisenhower's wise example. After Stalin's death in 1953, Eisenhower stated he would go to a summit if the Soviets agreed to: A German Peace Treaty, an Austrian State Treaty or significant arms control measures. The Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty in 1955 and a summit took place in Geneva a few months later. The resulting "Spirit of Geneva" reinforced a Soviet detente campaign which was beginning to weaken NATO until detente ended with the Hungarian Revolution. At least Eisenhower made the Soviets pay a price for the summit.

The record of U.S.-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. With one exception, Camp David in 1959, these summits have ranged from being merely unnecessary to being nearly disastrous. For example, I have long believed that the 1961 Vienna summit (in which I was involved) convinced Khrushchev that Kennedy could be pushed around, and the result was the Berlin Wall and later the Cuban missile crisis. Camp David, on the other hand, bought us valuable time needed to toughen our position on Berlin.

The 1961 Vienna summit illustrates a principal danger in summitry. There is bound to be an unbridgeable gulf between the mind-set of a Soviet leader and that of any American President. This compounds the danger of misunderstandings and miscalculations. This danger is further compounded by the fact that summits are perforce short and rendered even shorter by the necessity of translation; therefore, the serious and complex subjects, which are usually on the agenda, can be only superficially discussed.

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BY *SNF* *ALL 6/13/86*

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The Soviets presently feign disinterest in a summit; however, they would probably leap at one were it offered. Summits help them promote detente and "peace" campaigns, provide a convenient propaganda platform, and are regarded by the Soviets as necessary reaffirmations of their co-equal status as a "super power." U.S. participation in a summit may temporarily buy the Administration some domestic and foreign political advantages, but can also backfire when unrealistic expectations are dashed by the usual absence of concrete results -- for which the U.S. may be blamed as much as the Soviets (or even more). Of course, this would not be the case if a summit only ratified agreements already concluded -- which is the only circumstance under which I feel a summit is warranted at all.

cc: John Lenczowski

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE

ID 8390445

RECEIVED 08 APR 83 09

TO CLARK

FROM HILL

DOCDATE 07 APR 83

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

inf 12/5/00

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: US - SOVIET RELATIONS - KIEV / NEW YORK CONSULATES & CULTURAL
AGEEMENTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

LENCZOWSKI

FOR CONCURRENCE

Dobriansky

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# 8310490

LOG 8390316

NSCIFID

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ATION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

SPATCH

To please hold
these & other S.C.
memos in special
file -

WPC

WILLIAM P. CLARK, JR.

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # _____

MAY 21 1963

9:30 am

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>separate copy</u>	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

*Orig to Pres at Secondary 1830 hrs
For staffing ? ✓*

*Recommended send to President
with other memo on Consulate
and Exchange Agreement. J*

~~SECRET~~

cc BJD
JP

PLANNING FOR UPCOMING PRESSURES

Over the next 18 months there will be increasing political pressures for an arms control agreement and a summit to sign an agreement. The main pressures will be to have the President either make concessions, that are not in US interests, to achieve an agreement or, more likely, agree to a largely cosmetic agreement designed to demonstrate "goodwill and progress." Either approach would be against the Administration's arms control principles.

We need to begin planning now on how to deal with these growing pressures. An effective major arms control agreement that served the national interest, and that could be announced at a summit, would obviously satisfy most pressures. But if such a "best case" scenario does not unfold, what then?

Possible Approaches

- o If neither INF nor START reach an agreement, we must be in a position to document clearly that such failure was the Soviets' fault. By 1984 we should be ready to issue a "white paper" detailing how hard the US tried to achieve an agreement.
- o To augment this approach, we could be ready to increase the visibility of verification/compliance problems. Ideally, we could work to a position where the basic differences in START focused on verification since that tends to be something the public and Congress readily understand and deem important -- and on which skepticism is very high (polls indicate that upwards of 80% of the American people believe the Soviets cannot be trusted to abide by an arms control agreement).
- o More public, documented denunciations of Soviet violations might then be considered (e.g., bringing the "yellow rain" issue before the UN Security Council, criticizing Soviet encryption, or others). However, this tack may not be wise as it would run counter to portrayal of the President as the "peace candidate."
- o We could also consider breathing "new life" into the Geneva negotiations in 1984 by such steps as (a) sending the Vice President or Secretary Shultz to Geneva for a brief period, and/or (b) seeking to combine INF and START negotiations.
- o In tandem with the above, we could give greater attention to second level arms control measures -- TTBT and PNE; some type of US-Soviet understanding on non-proliferation; the radiological weapons agreement; and/or CBMs (hot line, data exchange, exercise or launch notifications).

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M04-01745

BY CS

NARA, DATE

12/19/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Pressures for an arms control agreement will be related to those for a summit. Trudeau has publicly stated that he "enjoined" the President and "pleaded with him...to work toward a summit." This theme will be picked up and amplified in the US.

Those pressures will be great. Every President since FDR has held a summit, some with anticipated political gain. Rises of 10% public approval from summits have historically been lost in about a month, after the public "euphoria" passed. A backlash could be severe a few months after a summit, especially if the Democrats blame the President for having "nothing new" from it.

A summit in 1983 would raise a number of serious problems and should be ruled out. In the arms control area, it could easily undercut the INF deployment schedule, since voices in Europe might argue effectively for a moratorium on deployment pending the summit results. The Soviets would play it that way as well.

If a summit is deemed desirable or necessary in 1984, we should ensure that arms control does not become the centerpiece unless we have an acceptable START or INF agreement. The Soviets seek to put arms control front-and-center of summits and our bilateral relations generally since this posture (a) tends to downplay their military buildup and behavior around the world, (b) emanates equal status and importance with the US, and (c) legitimizes their regime internally as it dignifies the regime internationally.

The problems with any type of summit are how to hold one without (a) being pressured into an unwise arms control agreement to cap it, (b) building euphoria rather than reasonable hope, and (c) underplaying the Soviet military buildup and their objectionable behavior around the world (Poland, Afghanistan, Middle East, etc).

Possible results of a summit, besides an arms control agreement, could include (a) regularized communications between the Heads of Government on a range of issues (yearly summits ala Nixon or letters), and (b) regularized communications between military leaders, economic chiefs, disarmament chiefs or others. These would aim at more open channels of communication during President Reagan's second term. These process oriented steps could help considerably in political terms.

There are no doubt possible results of a summit in other areas (e.g., strengthening non-proliferation policies, fisheries or whatever).

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 20, 1983

To: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *GP*
Subject: My Meeting with Dobrynin -- May 19, 1983

I wanted to give you a more complete account than was possible last night of my first meeting with Dobrynin since my return from the Middle East. The meeting lasted about eighty minutes. During the first part of it we were joined by our senior staffs for a discussion of a wide range of issues -- the Sakharov case, the grains LTA, the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, the MBFR negotiations, and a number of pending bilateral problems. We also met alone for a discussion focusing on the Soviet-Syrian relationship, the dangers of the current situation in Lebanon, and the overall substance and tenor of our bilateral relations.

I led off with our serious concern over the health of Andrey Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner and urged that the Soviets permit them to return to Moscow for medical treatment. I referred to Congressional interest and your Sakharov Day proclamation, and noted to Dobrynin that we had treated this matter with considerable discretion.

On MBFR, I told Dobrynin that we would be back to him soon with some ideas for introducing new momentum into the negotiations. On the grains LTA, I told Dobrynin that although I was not yet in a position to give him an official response, his suggestion that the grains consultations previously scheduled for June 1-2 be devoted to preparations for the negotiations seemed a generally good idea, and I saw no reason why we should not treat the parameters of a new agreement at the meeting.

Turning to the Middle East, I gave Dobrynin a fairly full briefing on the negotiations leading to the Israeli-Lebanese agreement. I recalled that all parties to the negotiations had bargained hard and in good faith. For the Lebanese, the bottom line had been to retain the exclusive right to guarantee the security of their borders, and we were satisfied that this had been achieved. I concluded that Lebanon now deserves a chance to address its internal problems, and can do this best if all

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F2000-006/1 #54

BY *Am* , NARA. DATE 11/28/01

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

foreign forces would withdraw. Israel had now committed itself to withdraw, and it was up to others to follow suit.

At this point, I invited Dobrynin to take the floor, and he began with the familiar line that the Sakharov case was an internal Soviet matter. To my comments about the LTA, Dobrynin responded positively, and assured me we could work with the Soviet in charge of the June 1-2 talks, but added that a new agreement should contain assurances against future embargoes. Responding to my comment on MBFR, Dobrynin said that he would wait to see what we had to say. He noted that the Soviets were themselves waiting for our response to their proposal for confidential consultations between U.S. and Soviet scientists on the implications of your ballistic missile defense initiative.

Turning to bilateral relations, Dobrynin noted that in our meetings earlier this year, we had reviewed a number of issues which were of particular concern to the Soviet side. Among these he listed the bilateral agreements on cooperation in Transportation and Atomic Energy up for renewal this year, the Soviet proposal for more activity under other bilateral agreements still in force, and the Soviet request that we take another look at seven bilateral arms control negotiations which are now suspended. He also noted that, at one point, I had mentioned the possibility of taking another look at negotiations for a new cultural agreement and consulates in Kiev and New York, but had had nothing more to say to him on these issues, so that he wondered what we propose to do. Finally, he said that the Soviet side looked forward to my meeting with Gromyko at the UNGA this fall and hoped that other meetings preliminary to it would take place.

At this point, Dobrynin and I adjourned for a private meeting. I told him of our concern that the tensions in Lebanon were becoming more dangerous. There are Soviets in the Bekaa, I noted, and the Soviets are associated with the Syrians in Lebanon, with the PLO, with other groups. Who controls such groups is an open question; one had bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, and we had one report that there was Soviet involvement in this. I had told the official who said it that we had no evidence of that. But the fact is that the Soviets are involved with various irresponsible groups in Lebanon, I said, and that they are playing with fire. And their increased military deployments in Syria meant that they would inevitably be involved in any new war from the outset. The situation is extremely dangerous.

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- 3 -

Dobrynin replied that he had understood my message and did not think the Syrians were seeking a conflict nor doing anything to bring one about. In this connection, he said the Soviets had counselled Damascus to be careful. (I said we had done the same with the Israelis.) On the question of the broader Middle East peace process, Dobrynin said it was not up to the U.S. to determine whether the Soviets have a role. He asserted that the Soviet Union needed no U.S. "ticket" to play in the Middle East game, perhaps signalling Soviet sensitivity over their current position on the diplomatic sidelines.

Dobrynin and I then privately reviewed our personal dialogue over the past few months, agreeing that it would rate a grade of C-plus at best. Noting the possibility of a trip by me to Moscow this summer for meetings with the Soviet leadership, I told Dobrynin frankly that not enough progress had been made to justify the trip at this point.

Dobrynin replied that, from Moscow's perspective, the results of our dialogue had not been impressive. The only real accomplishment had been our LTA offer, and this had been accompanied by our statements that this step had no broader political significance. Dobrynin continued that, when asked by Moscow for a list of steps the U.S. had taken in the interest of improved relations, he had little or nothing to report. In these circumstances, Moscow is of the opinion that the U.S. Administration has a hostile attitude toward the USSR.

The meeting concluded on this note. Dobrynin and I agreed, however, that it is important for us to stay in touch, and that we should meet after the Williamsburg Summit and before the NATO Ministerial, in the first week of June. While there was a certain amount of characteristic posturing in Dobrynin's remarks, his attitude was businesslike, and I believe the overall thrust of his presentation should be taken seriously. I look forward to our discussion together with Bill Clark Monday morning on next steps in our relations with the Soviets.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

PR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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DECL: OADR

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NLS F2000-006/1 #53

BY *smf*, NARA, DATE *11/28/01*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

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— Forster visit 5/20/83 —

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

① No sessions —

② Summary — Jan
Lee Majors Kang
see story which what?
see source paper —
objectives →
circulation of statement —

Arbator — visas
Marshall Goldman!
Howard, Coleman spend

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

no consultations with
Holmes on Arbator —

Needle → ? Arbator =

L & A — on gesture —
safety of K.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

Pentecostals —

NLS Foo-oo #57

BY ~~NY~~, NARA, DATE 8/12/06

Max 2

Cultural agreements — ?
Exhibits

— Carter made a mistake
— Kido —

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/2 of Ambassadors
not on classified floors
Telephone operating - more
Lafferty
no security reasons -
Dave Glavin report satisfactory?

BY CU, NARA, DATE 12/19/05~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1983

Judge Clark

Subject: Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

I have not sent this paper to Cap or Bill for reasons of security and negotiating strategy.

What do I mean? As you know, I have a fundamental problem with the way we are conducting our dialogue with the Russians. These deal with both style and substance. Here are the parameters as I see them:

-We are now strong enough and have enough leverage to get real concessions from the Russians--in short we are bargaining from strength.

STYLE {
-We must not fritter that leverage by making public what it is (consulates etc) because if it leaks, we are steamrollered into making some deal to suit the special interest group involved in the congress or the country at large. We must play our cards close to the vest.

STRATEGY
-In playing our cards, however, we must know what we want to achieve. Surely some of our leverage is more valuable than others. We should use it wisely and get substantial quids for it. ~~These~~ means we must have priorities. What do we want to get for consulates, for a cultural agreement, for the grain deal etc. Surely these agreements must not be signed for nothing more than "improved dialogue." In short, what are our priorities?

-Once we have our priorities set, we must have a negotiating strategy which tells us which cards we play first, second, etc; what our fallbacks are; when we stonewall etc.

Assuming we can put this together--and let me stress I do not believe it can be done within the European Bureau and perhaps not even within the Department at all--it must be handled very discretely. Otherwise it will leak and we will come under enormous pressure to forfeit our advantages for the sake of agreement. This means we cannot staff US-Soviet Relations through the bureaucracy.

How should we proceed? I think the only way to deal with this issue is to handle it from the White House. The options are that you deal with it personally; that I handle it privately with Dobrynin; or that the Vice President handle it. There are advantages to each of these. I guess I come down on the Vice President option for reasons of low visibility.

But we cannot go on as we are with State continuing to fritter away leverage, not being taken seriously by the Soviets and, at the end of the day, ending up with no strategic gain to show for our several incremental concessions.

Could we discuss this?

Bud

Judge,
I agree with this. As long as we know we have a strategy that the President agrees with the various aspects of such issues as consulates and exchange agreements can be analysed outside the interagency process.

John

Finally, I have already requested that State produce an inter-agency approved paper on the pros and cons of a new U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange agreement and the establishment of new consulates for discussion at an NSC meeting scheduled for June 10.

On Monday, May 23, at our 9:45 a.m. meeting, George Shultz may bring up this matter. For the above reasons, I recommend that you disapprove his raising these topics with Ambassador Dobrynin next week.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Secretary Shultz not meet with Ambassador Dobrynin next week to discuss the negotiation of a new cultural agreement and the establishment of new consulates.

_____ Approve _____ Disapprove

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F00-006 #59

BY onf DATE 4/12/06

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

System II
90660~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SENSITIVEACTION

May 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{ry}

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Next Steps

At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Shultz to the President outlining State's recommendations as to how to proceed with US-Soviet relations. Specifically, the Secretary recommends that he be permitted to meet with Ambassador Dobrynin next week to discuss the negotiation of a cultural agreement and the establishment of new consulates in New York and Kiev.. Your memorandum to the President (Tab I) recommends against this idea for the following reasons:

-- The current international environment (Soviet obstinacy in Geneva, sabotage of US peace efforts in the Middle East, new round of pressures on Polish regime to intensify repression of workers, etc.) makes the raising of these symbolic issues untimely.

-- Second, the impending June 10 Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party might change or clarify the Soviet internal power balance, thus enabling us to judge Soviet moves better.

-- Third, before these issues can be addressed, there is a need to develop an overall operational strategy as to how to implement the goals set forth in NSDD-75 (US Policy Toward the Soviet Union).

-- Fourth, a June 10 NSC meeting is scheduled already to discuss the pros and cons of a cultural agreement and new consulates.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for The President
Tab A Incoming memorandum from State

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLS Foo-006 #60

BY Amf, NAHA, DATE 4/12/06

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room	<u>3</u>		DAVON to Camp David (Dave Fischer)
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch
			N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Bud,

The Judge wanted to send
this to President at Camp David.

Judge,

We held this up until you looked
at bigger picture.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

May 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Decisions on New
Consulates, Cultural Exchange Agreement
and Reciprocity

In several memos in the past month, the State Department has recommended the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural exchange agreement. At the last meeting you had with Secretary Shultz on these and other bilateral issues, you agreed that these two issues be presented again with more elaboration of the pros and cons. State then sent such a memo to me. Unfortunately, it did not include the views of other agencies.

Specifically, Defense and the Intelligence Community are concerned with the hostile intelligence presence. As I understand it, however, views of both sides do not appear to be irreconcilable -- especially on the cultural exchange agreement -- as certain steps are taken, such as visa control, to help ensure strict reciprocity.

I have, therefore, requested State to produce an interagency approved paper taking all views into account, in preparation for an NSC meeting scheduled for June 10 to present these issues to you in the presence of your National Security Council.

8315318

SYSTEM II

90660

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 21, 1983 MAY 21 9:12

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

At your direction, I have embarked on a process of intensive dialogue with Dobrynin on the full range of US-Soviet issues; Max Kampelman has been engaged on sensitive Madrid issues; and Art Hartman has also had a role in Moscow. We have identified four necessary topic areas for discussion:

A. Human Rights: In this area there has been some movement. It began with your initiative to break the impasse in the Pentecostalist case, but in recent weeks the Soviets, in the context of reaching a CSCE agreement in Madrid, appear to have been moving toward us on other human rights issues of special concern.

B. Bilateral Relations: Dobrynin and I have reviewed outstanding issues in our bilateral relations to see where we might move to mutual advantage. In this area, our principal move was your proposal to begin negotiations for a new Long Term Agreement on grains. They knew we wanted an agreement, and they have now accepted the proposal.

C. Arms Control: Here the results of our discussions have been mixed. We have covered virtually every topic in your arms control negotiating program, and the Soviet responses have ranged from some modest movement on START, MBFR, and your recent CBMs proposals; through a serious but still unsatisfactory reply to our démarches on their tests of the PL-5 ICBM; to a blank wall on INF. At the same time, there is some momentum in our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on nuclear non-proliferation (Ambassador Richard Kennedy will hold a second round of these consultations in Moscow in mid-June). As you know we are now reviewing our positions on some of the central arms control issues and, depending on what we decide, we may have more to say to the Soviets on these subjects.

D. Regional Issues: We have had a fair amount of dialogue with the Soviets on issues such as Afghanistan, but positive results have been meager. Our task remains to drive home to the Soviets the importance of progress on these issues if there is to be a meaningful and lasting improvement in our relations.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F2000-006/1 #61

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

Against this background, we are now in a position where we need to take further steps if we want to see whether a visit this summer to Moscow for meetings with Andropov and Gromyko, an invitation to Gromyko to Washington for a meeting with you at the time of the UNGA this fall, and ultimately a meeting between you and Andropov would be in our interest. I believe the next step on our part should be to propose the negotiation of a new US-Soviet cultural agreement and the opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York, as I suggested some months ago. Both of these proposals will sound good to the Soviets, but are unambiguously in our interest when examined from a hardheaded American viewpoint. I am enclosing copies of the options papers on these issues the Department earlier sent to Bill Clark.

In NSSD 75 on US-Soviet relations, you endorsed the idea that getting an adequate formal framework for exchanges is the only way to ensure reciprocity in cultural, academic and media contacts with the Soviets, and to penetrate the Soviet Union with our own ideology. To get it we need to negotiate a new US-Soviet cultural agreement with the Soviets, and that is what Charlie Wick and I have proposed for your decision.

The opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York would have the advantage of getting us onto new Soviet terrain while increasing the Soviet presence here only marginally. The Soviets already have a big UN Mission in New York, while our consulate in Kiev would be the first Western mission in the capital of the Ukraine. There is growing interest in a Kiev consulate in Congress and among American Jewish and Ukrainian groups. A U.S. presence in Kiev would also help us broaden our access to and ideological penetration of Soviet society.

In order to continue the dialogue process you have authorized me to pursue, I would like to propose to Dobrynin next week that we move forward with the cultural agreement and the consulates. So far it is the Soviets who have made most of the moves in the process, particularly on the LTA and human rights. It is now time for us to take some modest steps of our own. These steps are necessary (but obviously far from sufficient) ingredients to development of the possibility of a substantive meeting with real results between you and Andropov during your first term. || ?

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Options

As matters now stand, the Soviets have almost unlimited access to American media and other forums. And we have only limited means to penetrate the Soviet Union with our ideology. Our open society and the legal restraints on our ability to refuse visas to Soviet citizens except on national security grounds make this possible. We are fortunate that the Soviets since 1979 have chosen not to send performing artists here; otherwise, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moscow Circus and similar major groups could be touring the US annually without any reciprocity for American groups in the USSR. There are indications that the Soviets are rethinking this policy and may start sending performers again. We currently have no means of ensuring reciprocity in this area, nor do we have leverage to gain Soviet agreement for us to conduct thematic exhibits in the USSR. Such exhibits, with American guides speaking Russian or other local language, have proven to be one of the most effective means of reaching thousands of Soviet citizens with the American message. For example, Vladimir Bukovsky has stated that he became a dissident when he visited the US Exposition in Moscow in 1959.

To increase our penetration of Soviet society through cultural exchanges, we need to consider the most effective means. We see three basic options:

1. Negotiate a new exchanges agreement, replacing the one that expired in 1979, that ensures reciprocity.

PROS: The exact form of an agreement would have to be worked out in interagency discussions to ensure that all USG interests would be considered. At a minimum, it would define the areas in which reciprocity must be provided, including the performing arts. We should be able to improve our access to influential Soviet circles by putting continued access to US audiences on a reciprocal basis. Exhibits would be an important part of an agreement, as would all other legitimate means of penetrating Soviet society. We would also require access to Soviet television.

CONS: This would involve negotiating a highly visible agreement and raise questions about how it conforms to our sanctions policy. It would cause speculation whether we are returning to a policy of detente.

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-2-

2. Combine negotiation of an exchanges agreement with a stricter visa regime, through legislation restoring our ability to refuse visas for foreign policy reasons or by invoking the "Baker Amendment." Such draft legislation is now at OMB for review and decision. Invoking the existing Baker Amendment involves an official determination, which can be made by the Secretary of State, that the USSR is not in substantial compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

PROS: Either of these routes would permit us to generate greater leverage to get the kind of truly reciprocal exchanges agreement we want. Each has the additional virtue of allowing us to refuse visas for policy reasons and not have to justify refusals on national security grounds. We could choose which Soviets we would admit or exclude.

CONS: This has the same problems as Option 1, somewhat mitigated by combining it with instituting tougher visa controls. In addition, visa refusals are a crude tool, subject to easy retaliation not necessarily confined to the visa field. American sponsors of Soviet visits would criticize arbitrary refusals, and those who invested money in long-term planning to bring Soviet performers here might have a legal claim. Invoking the Baker Amendment raises issues of foreign policy and long-term US-USSR relations that require careful study; it would also tend to make every visa for a prominent Soviet a contentious political issue within the USG.

3. Continue current practice.

PROS: This involves no change and is easy to administer, with few decisions having to be referred to senior levels for political decision.

CONS: This does nothing to ensure reciprocity and leaves the Soviets with easy access to US society.

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ISSUE: Consulates General in Kiev and New York City: Options

Option 1. Inform the Soviets that the U.S. is ready to establish Consulates General in Kiev and New York City and propose a public announcement and the resumption of technical discussions toward this end.

Pros and Cons

Since the Soviets specifically asked for this when we raised the possibility in February, this option would represent a visible and real sign of movement in our relations. In terms of assets, we would gain substantially from the opening of a Consulate in Kiev; by comparison, the Soviet presence in New York City would increase only marginally. As matters stand, because of the UN presence, the Soviets have free run of New York and we have nothing comparable in the USSR. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] expanded contacts with important minority nationality and religious groups, and consular access for our citizens would prove most advantageous to the U.S. Government. It would also respond to the wishes of the U.S. Ukrainian community and many in the U.S. Jewish community who have long stressed the need for a consulate in the area.

On the down side, this option will be the most difficult to explain to the American public. The lifting of an Afghan sanction may evoke some Congressional opposition, and strong arguments will be required to convince Congress of the need to fund this project. While this move may effectively show the Soviets and others that confrontation is not the only arrow in our quiver, it may at the same time raise unrealistic expectations both here and abroad about overall improvements in our relations.

Practical Steps

Even if we were to agree in principle to open Consulates General, the timing and cost of our actions would be determined by decisions on several subsidiary issues. The first decision involves the type of establishment we wish to open in Kiev. We have the choice of a simple, unclassified operation which would constitute an American presence and give some consular protection to American visitors, or a full-scale post, [REDACTED] in a key non-Russian area. Devolving from this decision will be the question of timing. An unclassified establishment in Kiev could be organized fairly easily and quickly in terms of personnel and money, whereas full-scale establishment would take years. In either case, however, we would have to start with an unclassified advance party, which could be in place within six months.

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By Smf, NARA, Date 11/28/01

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Establishing a full-scale post would entail a great deal of effort to secure the necessary personnel and funding, and to resolve numerous technical and logistical difficulties. However, depending upon how rapidly we would wish to implement this, several approaches are available. If quick results are crucial, we could immediately start the process of securing preliminary funding, TDY personnel for an advance team, and logistical support in order to have the consulates operational (though with a skeleton staff) within approximately a year. At the other end of the spectrum, we could do a limited amount of initial planning until Congressional support was assured and all funding requirements approved. A third approach would involve sending a temporary advance team as soon as possible and then developing an overall strategy for the selection of long-term personnel, the briefing of Congressional committees, the acquisition of funding, and the fulfillment of all the technical requirements of the facility. The implementation of this strategy would follow as soon afterwards as considered desirable or feasible.

Option 2: Propose to the Soviets that we resume discussions on the possibility of establishing Consulates in Kiev and New York, and have in mind sending an Advance Party to Kiev this year.

Pros and Cons

This approach would enable us to do the preliminary work with the Soviets and within the U.S. Government necessary for the opening of the Consulates General. At the same time, it does not obligate us to take the more visible steps of actually putting an Advance Team in place or allowing the Soviets to resume construction work on the building that will eventually house our Consulate General. The decision on whether or when to undertake these steps could depend on progress in the technical discussions and the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Since the discussions would be technical, no formal announcement would be required at this time. Similarly, no final decision would have to be made regarding the lifting of an Afghanistan sanction. On the other hand, the Soviets would regard this as a position decision and it would allow us to begin allocating personnel and resources and setting up a logistical support system.

However, if Congress or the public becomes aware that we are identifying positions and earmarking funds for Kiev, we would probably be asked what this meant for our sanctions policy. Other disadvantages of this option are limited. It might raise unwarranted Soviet expectations and open us to pressure for the full establishment of Consulates in Kiev and New York.

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- 3 -

Option 3. Tell the Soviets that we are actively considering the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of Consulates General.

Pros and Cons

The main advantage of this option is that it simply allows us to await a more favorable moment. It also enables us to avoid explanations or possible confrontations with Congress and the public. Its primary drawback is that it accomplishes little. In terms of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is devoid of benefits, since the Soviets would see it as a do-nothing statement. Domestically, it would simply create disagreements within the bureaucracy. After the suspension of our agreement to establish these Consulates General in 1980, a weak consensus emerged on the policy level that on balance the suspension was an ill-advised move. Reviving the discussions on this issue is more likely to fan dissensions than to lead to agreement.

Option 4. Say nothing to the Soviets and adhere to the status quo.

Pros and Cons

The one advantage inherent in this position is that we are spared from justifying the lifting of an Afghan sanction. The costs of our current practices are high. Financially, we bear the burden of three apartments in Kiev for which we pay rent but have no use. (We have kept the apartments because we previously spent substantial money on reconfiguring them for U.S. use, and because if we gave them up, we would have a lot of trouble obtaining other adequate apartments later.) We also risk the loss of the office building which the Soviets have, to date, kept open for us. The cost of reconstructing an alternate building will be considerably higher in the future. Finally, we face criticism from U.S. visitors to Kiev, especially Jewish groups, whom we are unable to assist.

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MEMORANDUM

System II
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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SENSITIVE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Next Steps

Issue: Should George Shultz meet with Ambassador Dobrynin next week to discuss the negotiation of a cultural agreement and the establishment of new consulates in New York and Kiev?

Facts: In several memos in the past month and in previous discussions with you, George Shultz has recommended the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural exchange agreement. At the last meeting you had with Secretary Shultz on these and other bilateral issues, you agreed that these two issues be presented again with more elaboration of the pros and cons. At Tab A is such a memorandum from George Shultz to you.

Based on George's meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin, the memorandum identifies four broad topics for continued discussions with the Soviets: human rights, arms control, bilateral relations and regional issues. It asserts that some signs of flexibility by the Soviets in the human rights and bilateral areas have been detected. The memo also notes that we have to explore the prospect of moving forward in overall U.S.-Soviet relations and consider a potential trip to Moscow by the Secretary and/or inviting Foreign Minister Gromyko to Washington. With these aims in mind, State proposes that George Shultz meet with Dobrynin next week to discuss a new cultural agreement and the establishment of consulates in Kiev and New York. State's memorandum does not reflect other agency views.

Discussion: I have serious reservations about the wisdom of State's specific recommendations to commence discussions on a cultural agreement and consulates with the Soviets at this time. The costs of undertaking these steps in the current international setting (Soviet intransigence on arms control talks, sabotage of U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East, new round of pressures on the Polish regime to repress the workers, etc.) are prohibitively high. In its present form and with its timing, these steps would especially manifest the Administration's engagement in a "creeping return to detente." If this impression was to set in, new pressures by the Soviets to modify our policies would follow.

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BY CIS NARA, DATE 12/19/05

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An additional reason for not raising these issues next week, is the prospect that the Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party to be held in June might shed some light on Andropov's power within the Politburo. In fact, if Andropov's authority is reinforced by his appointment as a titular head of state, in addition to being General Secretary, we might expect some additional movement shortly thereafter on arms control. This environment would be clearly more propitious for discussions on a cultural agreement and consulates.

Before these issues can be addressed, there is also a clear need to develop an overall operational strategy with your national security advisors as to how to implement the goals set forth in NSDD-75 (U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union). That is, a clear and comprehensive, short-term/long-term approach must be developed to achieve NSDD-75 objectives. Specifically, with regard to a new cultural agreement, terms of reference must be drafted to address what kind of cultural agreement is being sought, how can we best ensure equal access to Soviet audiences, etc. Answers to such critical questions should be obtained before we approach the Soviets.

National Security Council The White House

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u><i>[initials]</i></u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u><i>M</i></u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u><i>✓</i></u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u><i>✓</i></u>	<u>ADVANCE</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Judge,
 I have tasked the staff to prepare a
 Cover memo for this to go to President
 on Sunday. George just will not follow the
 interagency process. After my conversation
 with you yesterday, I told State 10 June NSC
 meeting on U.S. Soviet Relations was still
 scheduled and we still needed an interagency
 (over)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

paper on Consulates and Cultural
agreement. My Tasking memo
is attached. I had passed verbal
instructions to them earlier.

I'm sure George will want
to talk about this at 0945
on Monday.

J

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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May 21, 1983 83 MAY 21 A 9: 12

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz ⁵⁵⁵
SUBJECT: Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

At your direction, I have embarked on a process of intensive dialogue with Dobrynin on the full range of US-Soviet issues; Max Kampelman has been engaged on sensitive Madrid issues; and Art Hartman has also had a role in Moscow. We have identified four necessary topic areas for discussion:

A. Human Rights: In this area there has been some movement. It began with your initiative to break the impasse in the Pentecostalist case, but in recent weeks the Soviets, in the context of reaching a CSCE agreement in Madrid, appear to have been moving toward us on other human rights issues of special concern.

B. Bilateral Relations: Dobrynin and I have reviewed outstanding issues in our bilateral relations to see where we might move to mutual advantage. In this area, our principal move was your proposal to begin negotiations for a new Long Term Agreement on grains. They knew we wanted an agreement, and they have now accepted the proposal.

C. Arms Control: Here the results of our discussions have been mixed. We have covered virtually every topic in your arms control negotiating program, and the Soviet responses have ranged from some modest movement on START, MBFR, and your recent CBMs proposals; through a serious but still unsatisfactory reply to our démarches on their tests of the PL-5 ICBM; to a blank wall on INF. At the same time, there is some momentum in our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on nuclear non-proliferation (Ambassador Richard Kennedy will hold a second round of these consultations in Moscow in mid-June). As you know we are now reviewing our positions on some of the central arms control issues and, depending on what we decide, we may have more to say to the Soviets on these subjects.

D. Regional Issues: We have had a fair amount of dialogue with the Soviets on issues such as Afghanistan, but positive results have been meager. Our task remains to drive home to the Soviets the importance of progress on these issues if there is to be a meaningful and lasting improvement in our relations.

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NLS F2000-006/1 #65

BY sml NARA DATE 11/28/01

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- 2 -

Against this background, we are now in a position where we need to take further steps if we want to see whether a visit this summer to Moscow for meetings with Andropov and Gromyko, an invitation to Gromyko to Washington for a meeting with you at the time of the UNGA this fall, and ultimately a meeting between you and Andropov would be in our interest. I believe the next step on our part should be to propose the negotiation of a new US-Soviet cultural agreement and the opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York, as I suggested some months ago. Both of these proposals will sound good to the Soviets, but are unambiguously in our interest when examined from a hardheaded American viewpoint. I am enclosing copies of the options papers on these issues the Department earlier sent to Bill Clark.

In NSSD 75 on US-Soviet relations, you endorsed the idea that getting an adequate formal framework for exchanges is the only way to ensure reciprocity in cultural, academic and media contacts with the Soviets, and to penetrate the Soviet Union with our own ideology. To get it we need to negotiate a new US-Soviet cultural agreement with the Soviets, and that is what Charlie Wick and I have proposed for your decision.

The opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York would have the advantage of getting us onto new Soviet terrain while increasing the Soviet presence here only marginally. The Soviets already have a big UN Mission in New York, while our consulate in Kiev would be the first Western mission in the capital of the Ukraine. There is growing interest in a Kiev consulate in Congress and among American Jewish and Ukrainian groups. A U.S. presence in Kiev would also help us broaden our access to and ideological penetration of Soviet society.

In order to continue the dialogue process you have authorized me to pursue, I would like to propose to Dobrynin next week that we move forward with the cultural agreement and the consulates. So far it is the Soviets who have made most of the moves in the process, particularly on the LTA and human rights. It is now time for us to take some modest steps of our own. These steps are necessary (but obviously far from sufficient) ingredients to development of the possibility of a substantive meeting with real results between you and Andropov during your first term.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


May 18, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Paper for NSC Meeting -- June 10, 1983

An NSC meeting on U.S.-Soviet relations has been scheduled for Friday, June 10 to discuss several pending bilateral issues. In preparation for this meeting, please provide an interagency-approved paper of options, pros and cons on: 1) a possible cultural exchange agreement with the USSR and reciprocity; and 2) a possible agreement to open consulates in New York and Kiev. The views of the Department of Defense and the intelligence community should be incorporated into this document. The paper should be reach the NSC no later than COB, Wednesday, June 7, 1983.



John M. Poindexter
Military Assistant to the Assistant
to the President for National
Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F00-006 #66

BY SPF DATE 6/12/06

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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May 17, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *OL*

SUBJECT: Request for Paper on U.S.-Soviet Bilateral
Issues

As we discussed, attached at Tab I is a self-explanatory memorandum for your signature to Charles Hill, requesting an interagency-approved paper of options and pros and cons be provided to NSC by COB June 7, 1983 as preparation for an NSC meeting scheduled for June 10.

Attachment:

Tab I Tasking Memorandum, Poindexter to Hill

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 22, 1997
By *Amf* NARA, Date *12/5/00*

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