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6. memo	Lenczowski to Clark re Soviet Calls for Normalization 1p <i>R " " #83</i>	6/9/83	P1/B1
7. memo	Clark to RR re Soviet Calls for Normalization 2p <i>R 12/19/05 M04-017 #11</i>	n.d.	P1/B1

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MVH 3/18/08

Andropov's Political Position: The Importance of the June Plenum (U)

An Intelligence Assessment

Information available as of 31 May was used in this report.

This paper was prepared by [REDACTED] of the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the [REDACTED] SOVA, on 281-8561

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Andropov's Political Position: The Importance of the June Plenum ~~(U)~~
Key Judgments

After six months as CPSU General Secretary, Andropov has brought about a distinct change in the style and tone of Kremlin deliberations and a new sense of purposefulness to regime policies. Although he has yet to consolidate his political support in the Politburo or unveil a comprehensive policy program of his own, since late March there have been indications that he may have the momentum to do so:

- o The 24 March appointment of his ally, Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, as First Deputy Premier probably strengthened Andropov's position in the Council of Ministers and may have laid the groundwork for a move against one of Brezhnev's former cronies in the Politburo, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov.
- o Andropov's stature as a political leader has been bolstered by increasingly deferential treatment in the Soviet media, and particularly by the public acknowledgement that he is Chairman of the USSR Defense Council.
- o The appointment of a new Chief of the Central Committee's Organizational Party Work Department indicates that Andropov is making progress in gaining control over sensitive personnel appointments.

These political gains were facilitated by the sidelining of Andropov's putative rival, Konstantin Chernenko, by illness for two months this spring. ~~(U)~~

Andropov loyalists and other Soviet sources are now confidently predicting that high-level changes will be made at the next Central Committee plenum, reportedly set for mid-June. This meeting is important for Andropov. He is operating under a number of time constraints, and it is essential that he begin to reshape the top ruling bodies:

- o Not to make progress in this regard, in view of the expectations that have been raised, would be widely interpreted among the party elite as a sign of significant weakness.
- o Some personnel actions are urgent. The failure to name a new President has become a source of concern among Soviet officials, and that office can not be left unfilled without signaling serious political division and stalemate in the Politburo. The death of the Politburo's oldest member, Arvid Pelshe, creates another vacancy to be filled. ~~(C)~~

Time is of essence in other respects. Now almost 69 years old and in uncertain health, Andropov cannot count on a long tenure in which to leave his mark on the future course of Soviet policy. His discipline campaign--intended to end malingering, root out corruption, and increase accountability and efficiency throughout


the system--may have initially improved economic performance, but it is likely to lose its effect unless combined with other measures to provide incentives and reorganize the management structure. ~~(U)~~

Andropov reportedly believes more substantial changes in the economic system are necessary. A new department of the Central Committee has been set up to develop proposals for changing the economic mechanism, but Soviet sources contend that Andropov will move cautiously in this area. He probably does not yet have a comprehensive reform program in mind; and he realistically cannot hope to launch such a program until he has made some changes in the Politburo to bring it under his control. ~~(C)~~

The personnel actions taken at the June plenum should provide some indication of how fast Andropov will be able to move, and clearer signals on his policy preferences may emerge. Full implementation of his policies is likely to depend on those who come after him, and perhaps the most he can achieve is to bring to the top the kind of officials best suited to carry out his policies. The increased prominence accorded party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Andropov's evident intention to give new party secretary Nikolay Ryzhkov significant authority over economic policy suggests that he is already giving attention to this problem. ~~(U)~~

Andropov's Political Postion: The Importance of the June Plenum ~~(U)~~

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Andropov's Political Position: The Importance of the June Plenum. ~~(U)~~

Andropov Strengthens His Position

General Secretary Andropov has regained the political initiative in recent weeks, following a period in February and March when his efforts to consolidate his position seemed frustrated by ill health and political opposition. Since late March there have been a number of indications that he has significantly strengthened his position. The appointment of Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko as First Deputy Premier on 24 March placed this Andropov ally in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and possibly laid the groundwork for a future move against one of Brezhnev's former cronies in the Politburo, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov. Gromyko's seniority on the Politburo diminishes Tikhonov's authority and lends credence to rumors that he is on the way out. ~~(S)~~

This promotion had all the appearances of adroit backroom maneuvering by Andropov. Tikhonov was on an official visit to Yugoslavia when the announcement was made--a coincidence in timing that suggested a deliberate attempt by Andropov to steal a march on his Politburo opponents. The hasty return of another ally, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, from Hungary on the 23rd suggests that his presence was needed for the 24 March Politburo meeting that probably made the decision on Gromyko. Two days later, moreover, several high-level military promotions were announced that

suggested Andropov was consolidating his ties with the high command and perhaps preparing the ground for a shift in Ustinov's responsibilities within the leadership. Rumors have indicated he might be in line for the Presidency or the Premiership, and the US Embassy has now heard [REDACTED] that Ground Forces Commander, Vasilii Petrov, one of the generals promoted, will soon replace Ustinov as Defense Minister. (C)

The pace of personnel shifts has also picked up after a lull in February and March. The appointment of Yegor Ligachev as head of the Central Committee's Organizational Party Work Department--a post critical to control of personnel assignments--and evidence that the former head, Party Secretary Ivan Kapitonov, is now responsible for light industry and consumer goods, appears to be a particularly important step in Andropov's attempt to expand his influence in the area of personnel assignments.¹ Chernenko, however, may still have some oversight responsibilities for cadre matters. As recently as 24 May, Pravda commended his writings on this subject. (C)

¹Ligachev's closest political ties were probably with former party Secretary Andrey Kirilenko, with whom he first worked in the RSFSR party bureau in the early 1960s. This is the second major appointment of a presumed Kirilenko protege since Andropov took over--party Secretary Ryzhkov also had close connections with Kirilenko and with other members of the Kirilenko network. This suggests that Andropov was able to take advantage of Kirilenko's retirement last November for reasons of health to form an alliance with some of his followers. Their interests would seem to coincide: Andropov lacks a strong political following in the party apparatus, and they need a patron.

(U)

Equally significant, the Soviet media have dropped some of their former restraint in reporting personal praise of Andropov, and there appears to be a new effort to underscore his prestige and authority. He has been publicly identified as Chairman of the USSR Defense Council. Moreover, a Central Committee agricultural conference, held on 18 April, further buttressed Andropov's leadership image. The conference, which had the appearance of a miniplenum, was attended not only by his Politburo colleagues, but by all the republic and oblast party bosses--the group that some Andropov partisans acknowledged had been lukewarm in its support of him. Andropov's participation in the conference gave him a much-needed opportunity to demonstrate his authority and develop some rapport with this key group. The appointment of Ligachev, who has served for over 17 years as a regional leader, was probably reassuring to these regional officials as well. ~~(C)~~

Andropov's political efforts were undoubtedly helped by Konstantin Chernenko's illness and incapacitation during April and most of May. Chernenko's office told reporters that he had pneumonia, explaining his absence from several major leadership gatherings--the agricultural conference, Lenin's anniversary, and May Day. He also was unable to go to Berlin to give the address for the Marx anniversary celebration in mid-April. Several indications--the appearance of his portrait with those of other leaders at the May Day celebration, a review of his latest book,

and his signature on obituaries--suggest that he is not on his way out of the leadership. Moreover, there continue to be rumors that ideology will be the subject of the June plenum and that he will give the main report. Nevertheless, to be sidelined at such a critical period must have weakened his position. ~~(C)~~

Soviet Policy Under Andropov

Despite Andropov's initial strong showing on assuming the General Secretary post and recent signs that his political bandwagon is gaining momentum, he still does not control the Politburo. Until he has made some changes in that and other top ruling bodies, it is not likely that he will be able to set his stamp on the direction of regime policies. ~~(C)~~

So far the changes in policy that the Andropov leadership has brought about, while significant, are more a matter of style and tone than of substance. The emphasis has been on policy continuity in domestic and foreign affairs and improved implementation of existing policies. This strategy appears to have given new impetus to some old Brezhnev policies. Many of these--particularly agriculture and the Food Program--are closely identified with leaders other than Andropov and may not even enjoy his wholehearted support. Before becoming party leader, he did not give public support to the Food Program, and some [REDACTED] have implied that he has reservations about some aspects of it. Nonetheless, for now he has thrown his weight behind it. ~~(C)~~

Leadership Style and Discipline

Andropov has sought to convey an image of strong leadership that sharply contrasts with the more lax style of the later Brezhnev years. [REDACTED]

Soviet officials have made this explicit, blaming Brezhnev for indecisiveness, failure to follow through on the implementation of decisions, and unwillingness to hold errant officials to account. Andropov, they claim, is determined to change all this. ~~(S)~~

Andropov's influence has been most obvious in the discipline campaign, a broad-gauge effort to tighten up performance at the work place and eliminate corruption and mismanagement at all levels of the party and government. The introduction of militia spot-checks for truant workers is only one aspect--and the most transitory one--of a general effort to increase accountability and efficiency throughout the system. ~~(U)~~

Andropov's overall strategy would seem to represent the most practical course open to him, given his inexperience in domestic economic matters and his lack of strong institutional support in the economic apparatus and among regional party officials. In particular, the stress on economic discipline holds out the possibility of improving economic performance in the near term without new investments or risky policy departures. The higher growth rates in industrial production and labor productivity achieved for the first quarter of 1983 are probably partially

attributable to the discipline campaign. Moreover, if the Soviet leaders pushed implementation of measures already on the books, such as the 1979 management reform or the 1980 decree on agricultural incentives and planning, economic performance might be considerably helped. ~~(U)~~

Economic Reform

The discipline campaign is not likely to have any long-term economic impact, however, unless it is combined with other measures to improve incentives and revitalize the management mechanism. Well-placed Soviet officials, in fact, ██████████ contend that the discipline campaign is designed to lay the foundation for more fundamental changes in the economic system. ~~(C)~~

Available evidence indicates that Andropov believes that changes are necessary, but he does not appear to have yet fleshed out a blueprint. His remarks on the subject since assuming office have been limited primarily to passing reference in his November 1982 plenum speech to the need to study East European experience and the importance of giving enterprises and farm managers more authority. Andropov loyalists claim that he is familiar with the Hungarian economic reform and credit him with protecting this

experiment in quasi-market socialism from orthodox detractors in the Soviet leadership.² ~~(C)~~

Work on studying various reform models has speeded up, moreover, since Andropov took over. According to several Soviet officials the new party secretary Nikolay Ryzhkov was assigned specific responsibility for developing proposals for change in the economic mechanism. Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's remarks in his 22 April Lenin Day speech suggest as well that some work on a reform package may be in progress. He noted that "measures are currently being prepared to obtain a better blend of centralism and local initiative in economic planning and management." ~~(C)~~

Well-placed Soviet sources have recently told [REDACTED] that an associated reorganization of the central party apparatus is also being prepared. This reorganization, which would involve the Central Committee's economic departments, would be aimed at giving the party apparatus greater control over long-range economic planning and strategy and is seen by Soviet officials as a prelude to economic reform. Progress, however, is slow. No time has yet been set for the much-ballyhooed plenum on reforming the economic mechanism, mentioned first by Brezhnev, and ideology (not economics) is rumored to be the subject for the June plenum. ~~(C)~~

²Hungary's New Economic Mechanism (NEM) is the most extensive experiment in economic decentralization being carried out in the Soviet bloc. As in the other Communist countries, Hungarian central authorities formulate state plans and set macroeconomic goals. Under the NEM, however, the Hungarians rely heavily on indirect economic regulators and market forces rather than on binding plan targets and administrative controls to guide microlevel economic processes. ~~(U)~~

Soviet [REDACTED] moreover, have sought to play down the prospects that the plenum on reform of the economic mechanism--when it does occur--will launch sweeping changes. Reform-minded supporters of Andropov who initially predicted that it would make major changes now emphasize the formidable bureaucratic obstacles to any significant moves in the direction of economic decentralization. They warn that any serious effort at reform is at best years away and even then is likely to be modest in scope. (C)

Several Andropov consultants--most notably Fedor Burlatskiy--have stressed that even modest reform goals must be preceded by rejuvenation of the party and government ranks. They point out that no reform will work until government and party functionaries of the Brezhnev era are replaced by more efficiency-minded managers. For this reason, they say, the Andropov leadership is concentrating first on "cadre building." (C)

Leadership Infighting

Sources [REDACTED] have [REDACTED] claimed that he intended to use the discipline and anticorruption campaign to gain control of the party apparatus, clean out deadwood, and bring in new people who were more attuned to modern management methods and more supportive of his policy initiatives. His efforts initially appeared to go smoothly. He appears to have been instrumental in

the promotions of two young industrial managers from the Gosplan hierarchy--Nikolay Ryzhkov to the party secretariat and Nikolay Slyunkov as Belorussian party chief. Other high-level changes, particularly in the Council of Ministers and the propaganda apparatus, were made in December and January. A Brezhnev crony in the Ministry of the Interior was removed and replaced by one of Andropov's proteges, KGB Chairman Vitaliy Fedorchuk. ~~(C)~~

Nevertheless, Andropov's strategy appeared to run into some resistance, reportedly because of widespread fear among the elite and opposition to his program among his Politburo colleagues. Several press articles in early February attacking "factionalism" in the party suggested that Andropov's cadre renewal campaign was meeting high-level resistance. In early March, dissident Soviet historian Roy Medvedev claimed that infighting had intensified and that the influence of Chernenko and Tikhonov had increased, as officials fearful of losing their jobs tried to back them as a counterweight to Andropov. Chernenko is reportedly popular among regional officials and may have become a rallying point for threatened ministers and bureaucrats. They evidently see his presence on the Politburo as serving to protect their interests and providing someone to turn to if Andropov stumbles. ~~(C)~~

The pace of leadership replacements slowed markedly in February and March, with almost no changes above the deputy minister level and virtually no shifts among important regional

party officials that suggested the weeding out of incompetent officials. Some officials continued to hold their jobs who earlier had been rumored to be on their way out--Leonid Zamyatin, a Brezhnev-Chernenko loyalist and International Information Department Chief, was one. Even the exposes of corruption by high-level officials became less frequent. ~~(C)~~

Politburo Balance [REDACTED]

Andropov's political program probably ran into difficulty for several reasons, foremost among them the delicate political balance within the Politburo and his health problems. Although he probably commands a plurality on most major issues and has no strong political rivals within the Politburo, he does not have a solid majority committed to him. Until illness sidelined Chernenko, Andropov's opponents were evidently able to muster sufficient strength to block or slow down his efforts to expand his control over the party and government machinery. ~~(U)~~

We do not know the precise political alignments within the Poliburo. Consistent and generally credible reporting from a number of Soviet sources provides a good basis for speculation, however. Ustinov and Gromyko are generally described by Soviet sources as the core of Andropov's political support, and together they constitute a powerful leadership troika. Both allies now play a more prominent role than they did under Brezhnev and have been frequently rumored as candidates for the Premiership or


Presidency. While Andropov retains the role of the most authoritative regime spokesman on major policy issues, he has left responsibility for day-to-day conduct of policy to his colleagues. Gromyko's recent appointment as First Deputy Premier gives him broader responsibilities over the entire foreign policy field and would seem to enhance his authority as a regime spokesman. ~~(C)~~

More recently there have been signs of a budding alliance between Andropov and Gorbachev, who has been closely associated with the more innovative aspects of the Food Program and has gained prominence as a regime spokesman for agriculture. Part of Andropov's reason for supporting the Food Program was probably an desire to forge this alliance, and his appearance with Gorbachev at the Central Committee agricultural conference was a major boost for the youngest Politburo member. The choice of Gorbachev to make the Lenin anniversary address was another sign that he enjoys Andropov's favor, and at least one Soviet source is touting him as Andropov's heir apparent. ~~(C)~~

The Politburo's other members have been variously described as ranging from uncommitted to opposed, the latter category including Brezhnev's former cronies Tikhonov, Chernenko, and Kazakh party boss Dinmukhamed Kunayev. Four members--Viktor Grishin, Grigoriy Romanov, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, and Geydar Aliyev--remain the subject of considerable speculation. ~~(C)~~

Several sources have indicated recently that the three regional party bosses--Moscow First Secretary Grishin, Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy, and Leningrad party boss Romanov--are either in opposition to Andropov or on the fence. If true, this would be a significant switch in allegiance for Shcherbitskiy, who was credibly reported to have been an early backer of Andropov and thus slated for a high position in Moscow. Rumors of his imminent promotion soon ceased, however, and recent indirect criticism of his stewardship in the Ukraine by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet suggests that his political prospects may have dimmed. ~~(C)~~

First Deputy Premier Aliyev, too, remains a political enigma. His KGB ties led to early speculation that he was Andropov's man, but two considerations--his past political support for Brezhnev and Chernenko, and Medvedev's statement that Aliyev's promotion was arranged by Brezhnev before his death--suggest that the two men may not be close. Furthermore, Aliyev's chances to succeed Tikhonov as Premier, once rumored to be good, appear to have been dimmed by Gromyko's promotion. ~~(C)~~

Andropov's ability to gain the support of his Politburo colleagues will be affected by their perceptions of his health and by sheer political opportunism on their part. 

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Prospects

The June Central Committee plenum is likely to be a major watershed for Andropov. The time constraints under which he operates makes it essential that he begin reshaping the top ruling bodies. It is important that he make some progress, if only because expectations have been raised so high. Since last December, Andropov loyalists have been insisting that important personnel actions would be made by early summer. Not to meet this schedule would be widely interpreted among the party and government elite as a sign of significant weakness. ~~(C)~~

We believe that the plenum (and the Supreme Soviet session to follow on 16 June) will shuffle responsibilities within the leadership and bring in some new faces, rather than removing present members. Andropov and company already have a number of leadership vacancies to fill that are bound to be the subject of political infighting. The position of President (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), which Brezhnev held, has not been filled since his death. References at Soviet propaganda lectures to the lack of action on this question suggests that it has become a source of increasing concern in Soviet officialdom and is considered a source of political weakness for Andropov. Andropov may want to take this position himself; but such a move--while it would increase his stature as the USSR's authoritative leader--would not add significantly to his actual political power. Some

rumors have indicated that Andropov would like to put Tikhonov in the largely symbolic Presidency, and thus be able position an ally--perhaps Ustinov--as Premier. ~~(c)~~

The death on 30 May of the Politburo's oldest member, 84 year old Arvid Pelshe, creates yet another important vacancy to be filled. Pelshe had served since 1966 as Chairman of the Party Control Committee, the party's highest disciplinary review board.

The party Secretariat is also a key battleground for political infighting. Only three Central Committee secretaries--Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev--are full members of the Politburo. The position on the Politburo as the senior secretary for industry has not been filled since Kirilenko retired. Vladimir Dolgikh (a candidate Politburo member and party secretary) and Ryzhkov are obvious rivals for this important slot, with Ryzhkov probably being Andropov's choice. With the appointment of a new personnel chief in the Central Committee apparatus, a change in secretariat responsibility for cadres is also likely. Ivan Kapitonov, the longtime cadres secretary, appears to have been assigned to less sensitive duties in the Secretariat, possibly paving the way for the elevation to the party Secretariat of Ligachev, his replacement as cadre department head. ~~(c)~~

Andropov cannot begin to put a strong personal stamp on the direction of Soviet policy or launch a comprehensive program of his own until he has gained better control over party and government

machinery. But time is growing short. Although changes in the economic mechanism can conceivably be deferred, the leadership will have to address allocation issues before approving the 1984 economic plan in the fall, and signals must soon be given to the economic planners about national priorities for the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90). ~~(U)~~

The personnel actions taken at the June plenum will provide some idea of the direction and speed of Andropov's moves. If he can consolidate his position at the plenum, then more explicit signals as to his preferences on economic management and resource allocation may begin to emerge. Given his age and uncertain health, Andropov is undoubtedly aware that he may have little time to make his mark. He probably cannot hope to be around to see his programs fully implemented, and perhaps the most he will be able to do is bring into the top leadership the kind of officials who he thinks can follow the lead that he favors. Gorbachev and Ryzhkov apparently represent the type of officials he has in mind. ~~(U)~~

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June 9, 1983

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TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS

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PURPOSE: This memorandum reviews the current state of Soviet-American relations and suggests directions for a negotiating strategy for dealing with Moscow over the next two years. The paper concludes that this relationship is at a critical turning point and that the United States has a unique opportunity to seize the initiative and set the agenda for the superpower competition.

PROBLEMS WITH THE AMERICAN APPROACH

-- Over the past decade the American approach to dealing with the USSR has often been marked by:

- A nagging sense of Pessimism. Dominant feeling appears to have been that, as the Soviets claim, the correlation of forces was shifting to the advantage of the Socialist Camp and that we were negotiating from a position of weakness. The Post-Vietnam retraction, the rapid Soviet advances in strategic and conventional weaponry, the Iranian hostage crisis, and dissension in the Western Alliance System all contributed to a diminution of confidence.
- A frequent American preoccupation with minor issues and an abdication of the moral high ground to the Soviet Union. The USSR often galvanized world public opinion by pressing a series of intuitively attractive, albeit unrealistic, proposals that addressed growing global concerns over the danger of a nuclear conflict. American preoccupation with issues such as the Pentacostalists and the Shcharansky case, important as they are, has deflected considerable time and energy away from the critical issue -- the global competition between two opposing ideologies.
- An absence of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the USSR over time. Most administrations did not develop a broad policy line for engaging the USSR until the latter part of the term and even then the "plan" was conceptual in nature. Conspicuously absent (and this criticism applies to NSDP-75) has been a comprehensive strategy for implementation of the broad directives contained in the policy paper and a lack of a coordinating mechanism to supervise the tactical steps needed to implement the strategy.
- A lack of consistency in policy and a failure to follow initiatives through to their logical conclusion. The former is largely a result

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of the changes in American administrations (four in the last decade) and the tardy attention given to foreign affairs. The present administration itself has suggested a number of promising initiatives, but has frequently failed to maintain the initial momentum, to coordinate follow-up action throughout the government, or to press the propaganda advantages conferred by the initial proposals.

THE GLOBAL "CORRELATION OF FORCES": A SOVIET PERSPECTIVE REVISED

- Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the Kremlin stressed repeatedly that the shift in the "correlation of forces" had "forced the West to abandon its preference of dealing with the USSR from a position of strength and to pursue a policy of detente. As John Lenczowski correctly notes, they believed that their increased political and military strength had forced us into talks and negotiations. It was on the basis of these perceptions of U.S. weakness, he points out, that they made many of their geopolitical calculations.

- It would appear that a Soviet official would not be nearly so confident which direction the correlation is progressing today. In fact, an "objective analysis" would probably demonstrate that the shift is now in favor of the West. This is a result of a growing number of Soviet weaknesses that contrasts with a rejuvenated West. Consider the following:
 - POLITICAL: A continuing Soviet succession struggle as the ruling gerontocracy fails to adopt bold domestic initiatives required to revitalize a stagnant society and eradicate a growing sense of malaise. In the global arena the USSR remains isolated, regarded as enemy number one by the other major power centers. Her primary international strategy, of fracturing the Western Alliance, has suffered a severe setback.

 - ECONOMIC: Low rates of growth approaching stagnation have generated increasing frustration and consumer dissatisfaction. Traditional resource allocation priority to defense and heavy industry in question and regime will probably be forced to re-evaluate their choice between "guns or margarine".

 - MILITARY: The Soviet leadership can draw considerable satisfaction in the rapid modernization and expansion program that affords the USSR its one trump card in international politics. Still, Moscow must question the utility of the enormous resources devoted toward this buildup, given the unimpressive performance to date in Afghanistan.

IN THE WESTERN CAMP: RENEWED VITALITY AND STRENGTH:

- In contrast to the problems faced by the Soviet leadership, the Industrial Democracies have made significant strides in achieving economic growth, political cohesion and coordination of security policies. Kremlin analysts probably concede that the President has succeeded in significantly strengthening

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his position domestically and American influence in the Western Alliance system. In particular they would see:

- Renewed economic vitality: Inflation rate down, unemployment dropping. Growth projections show impressive rises. Consumer confidence returning.
 - Domestic political successes: President Reagan has secured important victories over issues important to the Soviets---the Adelman confirmation, the MX vote, the limited success of various nuclear freeze proposals. Defense modernization program less than originally requested, but reverses post-Vietnam trends and gives impetus to rearmament pledges.
 - President's success in rejuvenating the Western Alliance system. Has negated previous Soviet successes in splitting Allies away from the Americans. Kremlin appreciates that Williamsburg represents personal triumph for the President and a major step toward gaining Allied unity on national security issues. Moscow particularly vexed by Japanese endorsement of American politico-military positions, Tokyo's path toward upgrading its military, and France's movement toward reintegration into the NATO Alliance.
 - A conservative political trend now dominates European and Japanese politics---Kohl in West Germany and Thatcher's impressive mandate indicate greater ideological cohesion in Alliance. French Socialist government's harsh anti-Soviet stance irritates Moscow.
- The foregoing does not suggest that the USSR is in any danger of collapse or that we can significantly affect the debilitating socio-economic trends. Nor does it argue that the USSR will cease to be a dangerous competitor in global politics. Indeed, given its ability to concentrate resources and talent on selected high-priority issues the Kremlin will continue to act as a formidable adversary in the superpower competition.
- It does suggest, however, that:
 - The Kremlin probably recognizes that the forward momentum of the "Correlation of Forces" has been arrested and likely reversed.
 - Moscow concedes that the Reagan administration has secured the most favorable negotiating position vis-a-vis the Soviets in the last decade. The USSR's leadership has abandoned its initial mildly optimistic expectations of this Administration and become resigned to the fact that it must deal with this tenacious American regime, most likely for the next six years.

TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY:

- The United States now needs to proceed with confidence and speed to capitalize on the momentum that has been generated. The thrust of our efforts should not be on the development of major new initiatives but on the coordination and reiteration of proposals previously raised. Specific attention must be

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directed toward the development of a detailed plan of implementation.

The foreign policy bureaucracy must first review the initiatives already taken and ascertain their effectiveness and status. All past and future actions should be reviewed and new initiatives evaluated in the extent to which they:

--- SEIZE THE INITIATIVE FROM THE SOVIETS

--- OCCUPY THE MORAL "HIGH GROUND" IN THE GLOBAL COMPETITION

--- PROMOTE POSITIVE CHANGE WITHIN THE USSR

-- In the implementation of its negotiating strategy the United States should consider a demonstration of its willingness to test Andropov's sincerity, as expressed to Harriman, of his desire to move toward improved relations. Two initiatives are suggested because of the advantages accruing to the USA and the low profile nature of the proposals:

--- Propose the negotiation of a new Soviet-American Exchange Agreement. If properly fashioned it would allow us to present exhibits, publications and films in the USSR and lead to a greater access to Soviet media. At present the USSR enjoys the benefits of such an agreement with few of the drawbacks. The agreement should allow us to better control intelligence presence in this country, enforce reciprocity, and initiate a wider penetration of Soviet society.

--- Propose the opening up of a new Consulate in Kiev in return for a Soviet Consulate in New York. Although there are some causes for concern, the expansion of the Soviet presence in New York would not represent a significant increase in their intelligence-collecting capabilities. An American presence in Kiev could facilitate the extension of our ability to promote American policy in an important region.

-- As a second step the United States needs to consolidate proposals it has raised previously into a comprehensive and coherent program. We have suggested numerous initiatives designed to lessen tension between the superpowers, but the proposals have not been packaged coherently under a single, dominant theme. Further, they have not been coordinated so as to gain maximum impact and, in many cases, have not been followed through to completion.

--- THEME:

- We need to shift the focus from the preferred Soviet agenda, arms control issues, to another plane. The theme should

- (1) Be designed to place the Soviets on the Strategic Defensive
- (2) Consolidate previous proposals as much as possible and minimize the necessity for further initiatives

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- (3) Have as a long-range objective improvement of our access in areas of Soviet national security policy where we have little information; specifically, the politico-military decision-making process, force modernization projections, and military doctrine and strategy. Given the nature of our open society the USSR has ready access to most of this information on our side---we need to penetrate the Kremlin's national security policy process by opening up multiple and novel channels of access.
- (4) Mute public concerns that this Administration is overly bellicose in its foreign policy pronouncements and demonstrate its sincerity regarding the dangers of a nuclear conflict.

- This suggests that the theme of this program revolve around "Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear Conflict". The thought is hardly novel, but what is needed now is a reaffirmation of our commitment to take immediate steps to reduce the dangers of accidental nuclear war and eliminate tensions in the superpower relationship.

---VEHICLE:

- A major Presidential address could serve as the vehicle for launching this program. However, it should not be undertaken until a fully-staffed, well-coordinated and comprehensive plan of implementation is in place.

REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT: A POLICY APPROACH

- The President must stress that he applauds the concern demonstrated in this country regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the dangers inherent in an atomic exchange. He should firmly state that nuclear war would be horribly destructive and could mean the end of civilization as we know it; that there are far more nuclear weapons that can be reasonably employed; that the superpowers must move with haste toward the reduction of nuclear arsenals.
- In the speech the Chief Executive should support the yearnings expressed in the West European and American peace demonstrations and add that, indeed, it is vitaly necessary to "Wage Peace".
- However, he should stress, what is absent is the same type of concern and protest from inside the USSR. While the peace movements are in full swing in the West the leaders of genuine anti-nuclear movements in the USSR are being incarcerated.
- Leaders of the movement must carry their message person-to-person to the people of the Soviet Union and engage the "man in the street" in discussions.
- Information on the extent of nuclear stockpiles and money spent on armaments must be distributed widely, including in the USSR. Western speakers must be encouraged to tour the USSR and East Europe

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and the Soviet Bloc governments called on to permit this expanded dialogue, much as we permit their publicists to tour this country.

- The President should reiterate his suggestion that the leaders of both countries appear on television and discuss their opposing views of national security issues. Further, he should suggest that American and Soviet officials and academicians appear frequently on television programs in debates and discussions on security issues (Face the Nation/Studio 9).

NOTE: The effectiveness of television as a medium of communications was aptly demonstrated in Charge Jack Matlock's July 4, 1981, address over Soviet TV. Delivered in fluent Russian and containing subtle references to the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan and the volatile situation in Poland, Mr. Matlock's speech was observed throughout the Soviet Union and drew numerous favorable comments from Soviet citizens.

- Finally, the President should place the Soviets squarely on the defensive by calling for the USSR to firmly support its contention that there is a great need to establish greater "Doveriye" (trust) between the two nations. This can only be accomplished, we should stress, if we can have confidence in the intentions of one another. This can be realized only if we lift the lid of secrecy on our respective armaments programs. We must now be prepared to delineate our respective long-term defense programs and share information relating to the strategic concepts that guide the deployment of these systems. Of course, the United States already makes most of this information available. Therefore, the USSR would either have to provide highly useful information or bear the onus of rejecting an initiative designed to get at the root of the strategic competition.
- He should reiterate and give fresh impetus to a series of proposals previously raised in the realm of "Confidence-Building Measures," particularly in his Berlin speech (June, 1982), should stress that conflict is often a result of inadequate confidence and that increased confidence could reduce the intensity and incidence of conflicts.
- Measures previously raised requiring reaffirmation:

- (1) Modernizing the direct communication links between Washington and Moscow; Improving the "Hot Line".
- (2) Creation of a direct military channel of communications in crisis situations
- (3) International agreement on consultations if a nuclear accident occurs
- (4) Advanced notification of test launchings of missiles.
- (5) Advanced notice of major military exercises

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- (6) Broad exchange of data on nuclear forces designed to reduce surprise, miscalculation and uncertainty. We must insist that this is the foundation on which "confidence-building measures" must be undertaken. Without greater access to respective defense modernization programs, budget allocations & decision-making processes, uncertainty and "worst-case" analyses will prevail.

--- Additional measures that might be raised under this rubric:

- (1) Direct military-to-military contacts between high command on both sides. Suggestion has been endorsed in the U.S. Senate, Moscow has hinted receptivity. We should take the initiative on this score. It is unlikely that Soviets could learn a lot more from us than they already know, but it does open the possibility of establishing new channels of access for us.
- (2) Direct "working-level" contacts between key policy planners in the Soviet and American national security decision-making bureaucracies. Again, the Soviet officials have enjoyed unusual access to individuals in the USA, not just government officials, with considerable expertise and knowledge on politico-military matters. We must develop a greater range of contacts ourselves. The Soviets have shown interest in initiating State Department-Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussions at the working level, but we should insist on Central Committee staff access.

NOTE: We should also give greater significance to our channel of communication through our Ambassador in Moscow. We have relied much too heavily on the Dobrynin conduit and need to upgrade the role of our Moscow representative. A first step might be to bring Ambassador Hartman back for consultations, replete with a media-intensive coverage meeting with the President.

A REAGAN-ANDROPOV MEETING: IS IT IN OUR INTEREST?

- Speculation continues to grow regarding the probability of a "summit" meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Andropov. The USSR maintains a low profile on this issue, feigning indifference, but, as Bill Stearman has stressed, they would probably jump at the chance for a Summit Conclave if offered. The pros and cons have been spelled out in other documents, but in brief:

--- DISADVANTAGES:

- Could be perceived as signifying improvements in Soviet-American relations, a "business-as-usual approach" while acceptable changes in Soviet behavior have not been undertaken.
- A Summit could generate unrealistic expectations
- American track record at summits is not impressive; fear is that the Soviets could turn it to great propaganda advantage

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- Confirms USSR's co-equal status as one of the world's two great superpowers

--- ADVANTAGES:

- A High-Level meeting would assist in maintaining Allied support for our security programs and the U.S. approach to East-West relations
 - President would be perceived as genuinely interested in decreasing tension between US and USSR; willing to engage in broad-based, multiple channel dialogue in order to improve relations
 - Every American President since Roosevelt has met with his Soviet counterpart; President would not be seen as opponent of relaxation of tensions.
- The momentum toward a summit or high-level meeting may be impossible to resist without unacceptable political costs. While the arguments against a summit are persuasive to the sophisticated, the more simplistic statements ("What's wrong with talking?") may be more convincing to both American and European public opinion.
- While American performance at past summits has been less than satisfactory, we should not assume that these mistakes would be repeated by President Reagan.
- The record of Williamsburg gathering testifies to the President's powers of persuasion. While he will not convince Andropov to change the course of Soviet national security policies, there is little reason to think that this President will fall prey to previous summit pitfalls.
- Should we perceive the inevitability of a summit or other form of meeting between Reagan and Andropov, we should immediately take steps to:
- (1) Take the high political ground by setting the terms of the summit agenda and let the USSR bear the onus of rejection
 - (2) Unrealistic preconditions for a summit should not be set, lest we be perceived as recalcitrant and guilty of establishing impossible standards. However, we should make it clear at the outset that we expect progress in important areas. As such, the program suggested here for greater cooperation in the area of "strategic philosophy" and "nuclear risk reduction" may offer a useful approach.
 - (3) The preparations for a Reagan-Andropov meeting/summit should be as thorough and complete as were those of the Williamsburg conclave. The results are likely to be equally favorable.

Prepared By:
TYRUS W. COBB

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National Security Council
The White House

Package # _____

EYES ONLY

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u><i>J</i></u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u><i>for copy</i></u>	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	<u><i>✓</i></u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u><i>✓</i></u>	<u><i>I</i></u>
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	_____	<u><i>R</i></u>
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

*These are the first drafts of
U.S. - Soviet paper from Cobb.*

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

June 9, 1983

TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK
FROM: TYRUS W. COBB
SUBJECT: A TURNING POINT IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS?

This memorandum summarizes the thrust of the accompanying paper reviewing the state of Soviet-American relations and suggests directions for a negotiating strategy. The paper concludes that this relationship has reached a critical crossroads and that the United States has a unique opportunity for seizing the initiative and setting the agenda for the superpower competition.

-- SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS

- The dynamics of the ties have clearly shifted to the advantage of the Western Allies in general and the United States in particular. The Kremlin recognizes that the forward momentum of the "Correlation of Forces" has been arrested and likely reversed. A combination of factors have contributed:
- Deteriorating economic conditions in the USSR; a stale leadership enmeshed in a continuing succession struggle; a gerontocracy unable to initiate bold new initiatives.
 - In contrast, economic upturn in the USA; unemployment and inflation down, growth rates surging. Consumer confidence returns. President's popularity on upswing; dynamism at core of national leadership.
 - Continuing dissension in the Eastern Bloc countries, worsening economic conditions. CEMA so divided it is unable to convene meeting.
 - Williamsburg summit demonstrates new-found unity in Western Alliance on security issues. French cooperation with NATO improves, Japanese support for our politico-military stance solid. President Reagan's policies given strong vote of confidence. Conservative political trend prominent across Allied countries.
 - Soviet hope of "psychological and political disarmament in Europe" clearly rejected. Moscow's two-track strategy for managing East-West relations in shambles (First, to maneuver USA back to a congenial bilateral relationship in which we give clear priority to arms control issues and broadly engage Moscow in a dialogue on regional security issues, and, secondly, to exploit differences between U.S. and NATO allies.)

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BY anj DATE 6/12/00

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--- This suggests that the time is ripe to revise many of the characteristics of our approach to the Soviet relationship over the last decade:

- A nagging sense of pessimism; a feeling that we were dealing from a position of weakness as the correlation of forces shifted to the Soviet advantage.
- A frequent American preoccupation with minor issues and the abdication of the political high ground to the Soviets.
- An absence of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the USSR over time; a lack of a coordination mechanism to supervise the implementation of our strategies.
- A lack of consistency in policy and a failure to follow initiatives through to their logical conclusion.

-- IS THE TIME PROPITIOUS FOR A NEW DYNAMISM?

--- Moscow likely calculates that the Reagan administration has secured an enviable negotiating position vis-a-vis the USSR. The Kremlin is probably resigned to the fact that it must deal with this tenacious American regime for another six years.

--- President Reagan's vote of confidence at Williamsburg and recent domestic political (MX, Adelman) and economic successes place him in excellent position to carry the initiative to the Soviets in US-USSR relations.

--- Therefore, the United States needs to proceed with confidence and speed to capitalize on the momentum that has been generated. The thrust of our efforts, however, should not be on the development of major new initiatives but on the coordination and reiteration of proposals previously raised. SPECIFIC ATTENTION MUST BE DIRECTED TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DETAILED PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION.

-- SHOULD WE MOVE FORWARD WITH ANY NEW INITIATIVES AT THE PRESENT TIME?

--- Moscow would be ecstatic if we were to offer to open up a series of negotiations on regional and arms control issues. There is no rationale for this at the present time. However, two minor initiatives should be favorably considered:

- Drafting of a new Exchange Agreement. It could provide important benefits for us, but attention needs to be directed at the crucial question: How will the agreement be administered and how will reciprocity be insured?
- Opening of a new Consulate in Kiev in exchange for New York. However, at this time we should only tell the Soviets that we are

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actively considering the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of Consulates General.

--- These measures could be raised in the context of an American willingness to test the sincerity of Andropov's "quest" for better relations. While we do not want to be seen as "taking the first step", neither do we wish to appear intransigent before world public opinion.

-- IS A SUMMIT DESIRABLE? NECESSARY? AVOIDABLE?

--- The disadvantages of a summit/high-level conclave between President Reagan and General-Secretary Andropov outweigh the advantages. However, the sophisticated nature of these rationales may fall on deaf ears, more simplistic questions ("What's wrong with talking?") may be more persuasive to public opinion.

--- Momentum toward a summit meeting may be impossible to stem without unacceptable political costs. Therefore, United States should take the initiative and set the terms of such a meeting.

- Conditions should not appear to be unrealistic or we will be accused of being intransigent and insincere.

- If summit meeting/conclave appears inevitable, we should attempt to turn the thrust away from complex issues with which the Soviet propaganda machine has become comfortable. Focus on measures to provide greater strategic openness, need to open the books on military doctrine, defense spending, long-range plans.

- Summit should be prepared with same thoroughness and care that went into Williamsburg. We should feel that past poor American performances at summits are not precedents, but serve as cautionary notes. This President could turn such a conclave into another personal triumph.

-- A LONG-RANGE STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS: SHIFTING THE FOCUS

--- We must shift the focus from the preferred Soviet agenda, arms control issues, to another plane. The theme should:

- Be Designed to Place the Soviets on the Strategic Defensive

- Consolidate previous proposals and minimize major new initiatives

- Have as a primary objective the improvement of our access in areas of Soviet national security policy where we have little information, specifically the politico-military decision-making process and national security strategy and doctrine.

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--- The attached paper spells out such a program, designed to proceed from President Reagan's proposals in the realm of confidence-building measures and steps to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. A program centered on this theme would respond directly to the criteria outlined above.

Prepared By:

TYRUS W. COBB

IV

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Advised by

MEMORANDUM

BY omf NARA, DATE 6/12/84

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 9, 1983

*018-1114*ACTION*Save*

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JL*SUBJECT: Soviet Calls for Normalization and Peaceful
Coexistence

Andropov's recent meeting with Averell Harriman produced yet another salvo in the ongoing Soviet "peace offensive". Specifically, Andropov used the occasion to call again for "normalization of relations" with the U.S., and to reiterate that the Soviet Union fully supports a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West.

Although the State Department publicly welcomed Andropov's comments in its customary way, it strikes me that this would be an appropriate time for the President to make a creative response that can not only make him appear as a man of peace, but educate the public and put the Soviets on the defensive.

Specifically, in a press briefing or some other public statement, the President could welcome the idea of peaceful relations with the USSR, but then would raise a question as to what the Soviets mean when they call for "normalization," "peaceful coexistence" and the like. He could then clarify to the public the Soviet definitions of these expressions, and expose them as being deceptive examples of "doublethink," thereby casting doubts on the Soviets' real intentions.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President suggesting that he raise this issue in the context of a briefing with the press. The memo also contains the Soviet definitions of several of their key terms including an attachment (Tab A) which is an entry in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia defining the concept of "peaceful coexistence." The entry is written by Alexander Bovin, one of Moscow's foremost polemicists and a close advisor to Andropov. I have underlined several key passages.

ry Paula Dobriansky, Walt Raymond and Bob Sims concur. *JL for RS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum attached at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Excerpt from Great Soviet Encyclopedia

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MO4-017 #11BY CK, NARA, DATE 12/19/05

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Soviet Calls for Normalization and Peaceful
Coexistence

Issue: Renewed Soviet calls for "normalization of relations" and "peaceful coexistence" raise once again the question of Soviet intentions and present you with an opportunity to explain to the public what the Soviets really mean when they make such expressions.

Facts: At his recent meeting with Averell Harriman, Andropov called for "normalization" of relations with the U.S., and reiterated that the USSR fully supports a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West. He called for "good neighborly relations, and declared that people "will benefit" from "normalization" and from "constructive" interaction between the U.S. and the USSR. These declarations are but the most recent salvos in the ongoing Soviet "peace" campaign and are intended as always to deceive the Free World about the true nature of Soviet intentions.

Discussion: Although the State Department has welcomed Andropov's remarks in a customary way, this might be a good opportunity for you to make a new kind of creative response to the Soviet initiative.

Specifically, at a press briefing, interview or other similar occasion, after having welcomed the idea of peaceful relations with the USSR, you could raise, in an almost off-the-cuff manner, the question of what the Soviets really mean when they use such expressions as "normalization," "peaceful coexistence" and the like. The objective here would be not only to educate the public and undercut the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, but to emphasize your own peaceful intentions while casting doubt on the Soviets'.

For example, you could ask, rhetorically: "What do the Soviets mean when they call for 'peaceful coexistence' with the U.S.?" Then you could answer your own question, explaining the Soviet definition and comparing it with ours. Here, the real Soviet meaning of "peaceful coexistence" is a "form of struggle between capitalism and socialism" where all means of struggle are permissible except overt military attack. The Soviets repeat this definition to themselves constantly. In comparison, our

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common sense understanding of "peaceful coexistence" is: "We may dislike each other, but we are ready to live and let live." This is a far cry from the Soviet definition. (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia's authoritative definition by Alexander Bovin, a prominent Andropov advisor, is attached at Tab A. Although its important passages are underlined, the entire text is worth reading as a definitive theoretical explanation of Soviet foreign policy.)

The disparity between these definitions is explained simply by the fact that so much of Soviet terminology is "doublethink," whose purpose is to serve the goals of propaganda and deception.

Similarly, the term "normalization of relations" has an analogous double meaning. It refers to bringing relations to a "normal" state. And what is "normal" for communists is not normal for us. Their norm is class struggle on an international scale. Ours, again, is "live and let live." In fact, any Soviet word with a positive connotation is defined in a way that associates benefit or goodness with progressive movement toward communism. This is how the Soviets can twist the real meanings of words to their advantage.

No President in recent memory has pointed out these disparities. And as a result, with our public growing progressively less educated about communism, more and more people grow susceptible to communist propaganda, "peace" offensives and deception. A well-reported analysis by you of this issue would do much to educate the public, expose Andropov's true intentions, and emphasize the sincere quality of your desire for peace.

It would be yet another way that we could use the truth and public diplomacy to serve our national security in a non-military way.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

— — That you raise the issue of the true meaning of Soviet words at the next appropriate press briefing or interview (to be determined).

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

Attachment:

Tab A Excerpt from Great Soviet Encyclopedia

acc. not a deal between the imperialist powers concerning the vision of the booty by the capitalists and their governments, it a really lasting and democratic peace, which cannot be lived without a proletarian revolution in a number of countries" (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 31, p. 55).

The change in world politics from an imperialist peace, with wars that grow out of it, to a durable democratic peace, which lays the foundation for the complete elimination of wars, began with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. In the first enactment of the Soviet government, the Decree on Peace, the program of democratic peace was organically linked to the new principle of international relations engendered by the socialist revolution—the principle of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist systems. The creation of the crucial guarantees for a stable peace has been approached gradually. During the period between the two world wars, the Soviet state and the international working class, led by the parties of the Third International, struggled for the new principles of world politics proposed by socialism. The development and strengthening of the might of the first socialist power and later, of the world socialist system also contributed to the establishment of guaranteed peace.

The contemporary statement of the issue of peace, as set forth by the Communist and workers' parties at the international conferences of 1957, 1960, and 1969, rests on a new evaluation of the changed relationship between the power of socialism and capitalism. It proceeds from the fundamental fact that another world war is no longer inevitable, owing to the consistently peaceful policies of the USSR and other socialist states, the growing influence of the concerted policies of these countries on world events, the redoubling of the struggle of the working class and the toiling masses in the capitalist countries, the growth of the national liberation movement, and the activity of democratic forces throughout the world in defense of peace.

As a result of the unprecedented growth in the destructive power of military weapons, peace has become a problem for all of humanity. Essential to its resolution is joint action in defense of peace by all who have an interest in saving the fruits of mankind's labor and creativity, regardless of their convictions and political views. On the one hand, the struggle for peace is inseparable from the development of the anti-imperialist movement; it merges with the struggle for the freedom of nations, for progress, and for democracy. On the other hand, the consolidation of peace creates favorable conditions for the liberation struggle of the toilers.

Communists reject both the pseudorevolutionary extremist idea that socialism and peace are consolidated as a result of war and the right-wing opportunist conception that peace is a repudiation of the class struggle and of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and politics. Because the offensive against imperialism—the source of the threat of war—has intensified, it is possible to gain a decisive victory over imperialism and to defeat its aggressive policies, to impose peaceful coexistence on the imperialists, and to realize the striving of peoples for peace. The chief preconditions for peace are the cessation of the arms race, disarmament, the abolition of military blocs and hotbeds of war, the repudiation of acts of aggression and international tyranny, and the development of international cooperation. In the first half of the 1970's the struggle of the Soviet state and other peace-loving forces to bring about fundamental change in the direction of détente led to a new situation, in which guaranteeing the irreversibility of progress toward peace and peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems became a practical task.

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E. G. PANFILOV [16-906-3]

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, a type of relation between states with different social systems. The underlying principles of peaceful coexistence include the renunciation of war and the adoption of negotiations as a means of resolving disputes between states; equal rights, mutual understanding, and trust between states, as well as consideration of each other's interests; noninterference in the internal affairs of another state; and recognition of each people's right to choose freely its own socioeconomic and political system. In addition, peaceful coexistence presupposes a rigorous respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the development of economic and cultural cooperation based on full equality and mutual benefit. A policy aimed at establishing and developing this type of relations between states is called a policy of peaceful coexistence. Its intent is to eliminate from the international arena relations of dominance and subjugation and to affirm the general democratic norms that have been crudely violated by imperialism.

Peaceful coexistence is a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena. The struggle is waged between two ruling classes, each of which possesses full state power. The basically antagonistic conflict between the two opposing socioeconomic systems is transferred from the level of military clashes to that of economic competition, comparison of political systems and ways of life, and ideological struggle. The organic relationship and unity of struggle and cooperation are characteristic of peaceful coexistence and are both the source of its internal contradictoriness and a continual stimulus for seeking mutually acceptable solutions that preclude military conflict.

The feasibility of peaceful coexistence as a system of relations, as a practical policy, and as a theoretical concept stems from a fundamental peculiarity of the historical process—the uneven development of the world socialist revolution. With the appearance of the first socialist state in 1917, the coexistence of the two socioeconomic systems became a fact. The question was, what kind of coexistence it should be and what kind it would be. The imperialists supported the formula proposed by the French premier G. Clemenceau: "Intervention and blockade." The communists expressed their point of view in Lenin's Decree on Peace. "What we prize most is peace and an opportunity to devote all our efforts to restoring our economy," declared Lenin (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 42, p. 313).

The elaboration of the concept of peaceful coexistence was one of the greatest achievements of the political theory of Leninism. While upholding on the battlefield the right of a socialist state to exist, Soviet Russia clearly formulated its view of the coming postwar period. "Our slogan has been and remains the same," proclaimed the report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs delivered at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on June 17, 1920. "Peaceful coexistence with other governments, no matter what kind they are. Reality has made it necessary for us to establish long-term relations between the workers' and peasants' government and the capitalist governments" (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, vol. 2, 1958, p. 639). This conclusion, which was derived from an analysis of the international situation, particularly the condition of world economic ties and the conflicts among the imperialist powers, expressed the conviction that the preservation of the gains of the October Revolution and the building of socialism were the main internationalist duties of Russia's working class.

The principles of peaceful coexistence were affirmed in a sharp struggle with various left-extremist elements, including L. Trotsky and N. Bukharin, who rejected the possibility of "peaceful cohabitation" between the socialist republic and the imperialist powers and defended the right of "red intervention." Lenin proved that the irreconcilability of the class interests of the world bourgeoisie and the triumphant proletariat is not an insurmountable obstacle to peaceful relations between socialist and

capitalist countries. The struggle to establish such relations became one of the most important tasks of the socialist state's foreign policy.

The defeat of the foreign and internal counterrevolution and the stabilization of the situation in the country and on its borders confirmed that Lenin's position on peaceful relations between capitalist and socialist countries was correct. As early as 1921 he had ascertained the development of "a certain equilibrium, though a highly unstable one" (*ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 291) in the relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist world. Because of the extremely unstable character of this equilibrium and the sober realization that it was highly probable that the balance of forces of that time would encourage new attempts by imperialism to destroy the emerging socialist world by force, the limited goal of achieving a "peaceful breathing space" was given priority in the foreign policy of the Republic of Soviets. The Soviet state achieved this goal, and war was avoided for two decades.

The decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the defeat of fascism, the formation of the world socialist system, the collapse of colonial empires, and the general upsurge in mass democratic movements led to radical changes in the international arena. The new balance of forces was characterized by the growing superiority of international socialism over imperialism. The forces of peace gained a real opportunity to narrow substantially the field of activity of the forces of war and aggression. Particularly after the USSR developed nuclear missiles, imperialism's reliance on a world thermonuclear war as a means of achieving political objectives became untenable. All of these changes created the preconditions for a substantial broadening of the framework and content of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The world communist movement endorsed the fundamental conclusion reached by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, that the prevention of a new world war is possible. As stated in the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries (1957), the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between the two systems "is a stable basis for the foreign policy of the socialist countries and a reliable basis for peace and friendship of peoples" (*Programnye dokumenty bor'by za mir, demokratiu i sotsializm*, 1964, p. 9). The Statement of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties (1960) emphasized that "through the united efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national liberation movement, all countries that oppose war, and all peace-loving forces, a world war can be prevented" (*ibid.*, p. 57). This profound conviction became the basis of the international foreign policy of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and all peace-loving forces. Favorable conditions for détente and peace in Europe were created by the signing of treaties between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and between Poland and the FRG (1970), the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin (1971), the treaty on the principles of relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the FRG (1972), and the treaty on the normalization of relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the FRG (1973).

Major advances have been made in Soviet-American relations. Both countries are committed to do everything possible to avoid military confrontations and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Summarizing the results of the implementation of the Peace Program proposed by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU, the April 1973 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU confirmed the change from the cold war to détente and noted that the principles of peaceful coexistence have received wide recognition as a norm of relations among states with different social systems. The Plenum set the goal of ensuring that the changes achieved in the international situation become irreversible.

The theoretical and political problems associated with the interpretation and embodiment of the principles of peaceful coexistence are focal points of the contemporary ideological struggle. Three groups of ideas are contrary to a correct understanding of peaceful coexistence: right-wing bourgeois ideology, certain liberal bourgeois points of view, and various leftist views.

Right-wing bourgeois ideologists stubbornly adhere to the idea that the policy of peaceful coexistence is a Communist "trap," "ruse," or "tactical maneuver" designed to cover up "the export of revolution." In practice, however, contemporary international relations and all of the actions of the socialist states in foreign policy serve as evidence that the policy of peaceful coexistence is not a tactical device but one of the fundamental elements of the foreign policy strategy of socialism. This strategy, which is oriented toward the attainment of a durable, stable peace, as well as security for the peoples of the world, makes a principled rejection of the export of revolution—that is, the forcible artificial imposition of revolutionary transformations on any people. F. Engels wrote: "The victorious proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Soch.*, 2nd ed., vol. 35, p. 298). V. I. Lenin, who held the same views, wrote that people who believed revolution could break out in a foreign country to order or by agreement were either mad or provocateurs (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 36, p. 457). "We exercise our main influence on the international revolution," wrote Lenin, "through our economic policy . . . The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale" (*ibid.*, vol. 43, p. 341). The policy of peaceful coexistence is the logical culmination of this way of posing the question of world revolution.

Lenin wrote that no forces would have been able to undermine capitalism if it had not been undermined by history. Communists proceed from the premise that the capitalist social structure is doomed by its own internal laws of development. The fate of capitalism will be decided not by the export of revolution but by the class struggle in the capitalist countries.

The liberal group of bourgeois ideologists, and the Social Democrats and revisionists, lean toward a very expansive interpretation of the potential of peaceful coexistence, which is viewed as a way to extinguish the political and ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism and bring about the gradual convergence of the two systems. At best, this point of view is utopian. The struggle of the two systems is rooted in deep-seated social processes and in the opposition of the fundamental principles of the organization of society. Thus, ideological coexistence and the gradual interpenetration of the two social structures are ruled out. The policy of peaceful coexistence does not and cannot solve the cardinal social problems of our time and cannot prevent political and ideological clashes, which may occasionally be very sharp. Indeed, it is not required to solve these problems. It has a very different purpose—to preserve world peace, to prevent a global thermonuclear conflict, and to find mutually acceptable principles for cooperation between socialist and capitalist states.

The third group of false interpretations of the policy of peaceful coexistence is associated with various leftist views. Their spokesmen attempt to prove that in pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, the socialist countries bar their own way from actively supporting revolutionary processes. Thus, from their point of view, peaceful coexistence contradicts the pursuit of proletarian socialist internationalism and impedes the development of mass anti-imperialist movements. As an alternative to peaceful coexistence they essentially propose increasing international tension, intensifying the confrontation of the two systems, and exporting revolution. Historical experience teaches that peaceful coexistence does not hinder but stimulates the world revolutionary process. In rejecting the export of revolution, victorious socialism is by no means isolating itself from liberation movements. Lenin said that the world socialist revolution "must be helped." However, he immediately added that "we have to know how to help it" (*ibid.*, vol. 35, p. 396).

By pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence and imposing it on imperialism, the socialist countries create favorable preconditions for the rapid development of their economies and for the all-around progress of socialist social relations. The stronger the world socialist system and the more fully its ideals are implemented, the greater its revolutionizing influence on the masses of the working people will be, and the broader the possibilities for supporting revolutionary movements, which is by no means the same as artificially spurring them on. Under the conditions

of peaceful coexistence, imperialism's opportunities for aggressive actions in the international arena and for exporting counter-revolution are sharply curtailed. The policy of peaceful coexistence also influences the domestic situation in capitalist countries. In connection with a conference in Genoa, Lenin declared that it was a task of socialism "to split the pacifist camp of the international bourgeoisie away from the gross-bourgeois, aggressive-bourgeois, reactionary-bourgeois camp" (*ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 408). In carrying out this task, the policy of peaceful coexistence promotes the growth of all democratic, anti-imperialist forces. It blocks the imperialists' attempts to overcome internal conflicts, impeding their efforts to aggravate international tension, and it promotes the development of the class struggle against imperialism on a national and worldwide scale. The policy of peaceful coexistence "meets the overall interests of the revolutionary struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation" (*Mezhdunarodnoe Soveshchanie kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii: Dokumenty i materialy*. Moscow, 1969, p. 318).

The policy of peaceful coexistence is a compromise in the sense that it is based on a quest for a reasonable balance of interests and for mutually acceptable agreements. Of course, within the framework of these agreements each side seeks to uphold its own principled, fundamental interests.

Lenin clearly defined the principles on which possible accords between a socialist state and capitalist states should rest. "Of course, an advocate of proletarian revolution may conclude compromises or agreements with capitalists. It all depends on what kind of agreement is concluded and under what circumstances. Here and here alone can and must one look for the difference between an agreement that is legitimate from the angle of the proletarian revolution and one that is treasonable, treacherous (from the same angle)" (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 40, pp. 289-90). Concretizing his ideas about the "price" of a compromise, Lenin wrote: "We must make it a rule not to make political concessions to the international bourgeoisie . . . unless we receive in return more or less equivalent concessions from the international bourgeoisie to Soviet Russia, or to other contingents of the international proletariat which is fighting capitalism" (*ibid.*, vol. 45, p. 142). Lenin's methodology forms the basis of the practical activities of the USSR and other socialist countries in establishing mutually beneficial cooperation with the capitalist world.

As the main principle of conducting international affairs, the principle of peaceful coexistence is applicable in theory only to relations between the two world systems—capitalism and socialism. In practice, however, there is a tendency to use and to regard peaceful coexistence as a regulatory principle of the entire system of international relations—that is, of relations between states, regardless of their socioeconomic systems. Without disputing the historical validity and political reality of this tendency, it is necessary to emphasize that the highest principle of relations between socialist countries is socialist internationalism. Nonetheless, peaceful coexistence still has meaning in this context. In a sense, it is taken for granted as a natural, minimal basis for relations between states. The center of gravity shifts to mutual assistance among fraternal socialist states on the basis of class solidarity.

With the growth in power and size of the world socialist system, with the deepening of progressive transformations in the Third World countries, with the further strengthening of ties between the socialist and the developing states, the principle of internationalism will play an increasingly important role in the evolution of international relations. Its consistent implementation leads to the creation of additional opportunities for solidifying peace and peaceful coexistence. The converse relationship between the implementation of a policy of peaceful coexistence and the growth of internationalism is not as clear-cut. In some instances, the relaxation of international tension dulls the sense of class solidarity and stimulates a weakening of internationalist bonds. Therefore, a well thought-out, realistic policy of peaceful coexistence that soberly takes into account all the positive and negative aspects of the situation presupposes a purposeful struggle for the further cohesion of the socialist countries and all states actively opposing imperialism.

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PELEE, MOUNT (Montagne Pelée), an active volcano on Martinique, in the West Indies. Elevation, 1,397 m. Mount Pelée is known for its catastrophic eruption in 1902, when a heavy hot cloud of ash and volcanic bombs and blocks destroyed the city of St. Pierre and its 26,000 inhabitants. The eruption led to the classification of such volcanoes as Pelean. Mount Pelée was less strongly active in 1929-32. [16-162-2]

PENNATULARIA (sea pens), an order of marine invertebrates of the class Actinozoa. A colony consists of a large main polyp, which forms the trunk of the colony, and usually numerous small secondary polyps, located on the upper end or on special lateral processes of the main polyp. In the latter case, the colony has the form of a feather. The base of the main polyp is embedded in the sea bottom. There are approximately 300 species of sea pens, distributed predominantly in tropical and subtropical waters from the littoral zone to a depth of 6 km. In the USSR, six species are found in the seas of the Far East, and four in the northern seas (including *Umbellula encrinus*—which is up to 2.6 m tall). Many sea pens are luminescent. [16-1762-1]

PERENNIAL FORAGE GRASSES, herbaceous plants cultivated for livestock feed that have a life span of more than one year. The yearly life cycle of these grasses consists of the following phases: spring sprouting, tillering, heading, flowering, fruiting with repeated tillering, autumn vegetation, and winter dormancy. Plants of the families Gramineae (timothy, foxtail, wheatgrass) and Leguminosae (clover alfalfa, sainfoin) are among those cultivated most often for forage. Grasses and legumes are generally sown together; this combination favorably affects the quality of the forage and the fertility of the soil. Because of the repeated tillering, it is highly advisable to fertilize perennial forage grasses in the second half of the vegetative stage. [16-1097-2]

PERENNIALS (also perennial plants), herbs and subshrubs that persist through more than two winters. Some perennials live several years, and others 20 to 30 years. Some species have a life-span of 100 years (for example, tau-saghyz). Upon reaching a certain age, perennials may flower and bear fruit every year (polycarpic plants); this contrasts with annuals and biennials (monocarpic plants), which flower and bear fruit only one time. Some perennials retain their leaves year round (evergreens). In unfavorable periods (winter, drought), the leaves and other aboveground organs of most perennials die, and only the underground organs remain alive (rhizomes, tubers, bulbs, and roots). In some perennials the aboveground shoots are partially preserved as well (rosettes, creeping shoots, and the lower parts of erect stems).

Sometimes the division of plants into annuals, biennials, and perennials is conditional. For example, the tropical perennial castor oil plant (*Ricinus communis*) grows as an annual in moderate climates, and annual bluegrass (*Poa annua*), which generally grows on plains, develops as a perennial in the mountains. Trees and shrubs are sometimes referred to as perennials.