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**Collection:** Clark, William P.: Files  
**Folder Title:** US-Soviet Relations Papers Working  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Clark, William P.: Files  
**OA/Box:** Box 9 ~~1044~~  
**File Folder:** U.S.-Soviet Relations Papers Working File:  
 Contains Originals (14)

**Archivist:** smf/smf  
**FOIA ID:** F2000-006 (Skinner)  
**Date:** 12/18/00

| DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                   | DATE    | RESTRICTION |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|
| 1. memcon           | re US-Soviet Relations 5p<br><i>R 12/20/05 M04-024 #6</i>                       | 6/15/83 | P1/B1       |
| 2. memo             | Clark to Matlock re Summitry 1p<br><i>R 6/12/06 F00-006 #93</i>                 | 6/16/83 | P1/B1       |
| 3. memo             | Shultz to RR re Meeting w/ Dobrynin 5p<br><i>R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #94</i>  | 6/20/83 | P1/B1       |
| 4. memo             | duplicate of document 3 5p<br><i>R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #95</i>              | 6/20/83 | P1/B1       |
| 5. memo             | Lenzowski to Clark re Presidential Message 2p<br><i>R 6/12/06 F00-006 #96</i>   | 6/7/83  | P1/B1       |
| 6. memo             | Clark to RR re Message to the Russian People 4p<br><i>R 12/20/05 M04-024 #7</i> | n.d.    | P1/B1       |

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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 B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
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# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

**Withdrawer**

CAS 4/5/2007

**File Folder** US-SOVIET RELATIONS PAPERS WORKING FILE:  
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**FOIA**

M04-024

**Box Number** 9

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date |
|----|----------|----------------------|-------------|----------|
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|              |                   |                                                              |              |                      |
|--------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|
| <del>1</del> | <del>MEMCON</del> | <del>RE US-SOVIET RELATIONS (#6)</del>                       | <del>5</del> | <del>6/15/1983</del> |
|              |                   | <i>mvh 3/18/08</i>                                           |              |                      |
| <del>6</del> | <del>MEMO</del>   | <del>CLARK TO RR RE MESSAGE TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE (#7)</del> | <del>4</del> | <del>ND</del>        |
|              |                   | <i>mvh 3/18/08</i>                                           |              |                      |

**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



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June 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt  
Staff Director  
National Security Council

FROM: Robert L. Earle *RL E*  
Executive Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to the Soviet People  
in America Illustrated Magazine

The attached draft message from President Reagan to Soviet readers of USIA's America Illustrated magazine is submitted for NSC clearance. The State Department has already reviewed and approved the text, which is pegged to the Fiftieth Anniversary of US-Soviet diplomatic relations this November. Our November issue containing the message will also feature a text and photo story reviewing the course of US-Soviet official relations.

You may recall that last December you helped to expedite another draft Presidential Message for America Illustrated dealing with the President's arms control proposals. The issue carrying that message has just been distributed in the USSR -- an indication of the long "lead time" our magazine requires. To meet our printing schedule for this November's issue we need to receive NSC comments and approval by June 10.

I hope that you can help us once again gain timely clearance for a Presidential Message for America Illustrated -- a unique means for communicating the President's views directly to people of the Soviet Union.

Attachment

Draft Presidential Message

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

*smf 12/5/00*



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1983

Judge Clark --

*Jack # 3829*  
*Message to the Russian People*  
*9/83*

Very quickly -- I cannot imagine the President delivering such a message. It is clearly a call from the highest levels of the West for insurrection against a regime<sup>with</sup> which we and others -- rightly or wrongly -- conduct full diplomatic relations. I also feel it would receive little support from our allies, the Hill, the media, or the so-called attentive public.

It is so strong and beyond the pale of the Presidency that I question sending it to the President as a serious proposal. To issue such a one-shot blast at people brainwashed from birth and who would instantly and repeatedly hear it denounced throughout their society would gain us nothing but psychological satisfaction for ourselves.

It contains much which could be used by Radio Liberty and VOA, provided to columnists and others, perhaps. And the idea of a message by the President directly to the Soviet peoples is very worthwhile. Hasn't RR suggested such an exchange by the leaders? Even without an agreed-upon exchange, RR could still do a message -- via VOA or AI and I would urge that it be done, but it should focus -- as some of this does -- on US goals for peace, deal with the disinformation and misinformation about our policies, and seek to make common ground with the Soviet peoples on our mutual desire for peace and security, not calling into question the legitimacy of the regime and launching a verbal broadside against much of Soviet history and its beginnings. There is no question that our "public diplomacy" regarding the Soviets needs a great deal of improvement -- incidentally, the Voice is doing much more than it has in recent years -- but I don't think this is the message. I'd suggest you consult Jack Matlock before sending this forward. If he agrees -- or has already done so -- that it's worth RR's consideration, I'll pull back a bit!

*Mat*

*6/19/83*  
*Let's hold up for*  
*1 mth review*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

9: F1215  
6/15/83

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Relations

DATE & TIME: Wednesday, June 15, 1983; 4:50-5:50 PM

PLACE: The Treaty Room of the Residence  
The White House, Washington, D.C.

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Vice President Bush,  
Counsellor Meese, Chief of Staff to the  
President Baker, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs Clark,  
Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of  
Defense Weinberger, Deputy Director of  
Intelligence McMahon, Deputy Assistant to  
the President for National Security Affairs  
McFarlane

BACKGROUND: The purpose of the meeting was for the attendees to receive a status report on the state of US-Soviet relations as expressed in the dialogue undertaken at the President's instruction by the Secretary of State in February 1983. There have been approximately ten meetings between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin which have been focussed upon four generic areas: Human Rights; Regional Issues; Arms Control; and Bilateral Issues.

The Secretary of State opened with a summation of the President's thinking for why the initiative had been authorized originally. He referred to the President's success in establishing a solid beginning toward the restoration of our military strength. More recently, Williamsburg had presented solid evidence of greatly improved allied cohesion which would contribute significantly to Soviet perceptions of Western strength in any negotiation we might undertake.

The Secretary stated that the President's instructions had been to explore Soviet responsiveness to our interests in each of the four general areas. These discussions were to take place at the Ambassadorial level and based upon the results a decision could be taken as to whether or not the dialogue should be elevated to the Foreign Minister level with a view ultimately toward a meeting between the Heads of State.

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
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NLS 104-024 #6  
BY CU NARA, DATE 12/20/05



STATUS REPORT: The Secretary of State then went into the results thus far achieved in each of the four generic areas.

Human Rights. There appears to be some promise of progress in the human rights area as exemplified by the release of Lydia Vaschenko. The other members of her family have applied for their visas. The other family (Chymkhalov) has experienced difficulty in making their application. In short, while the process seems to be in motion all except Lydia remain in the Soviet Union.

The Secretary noted the possible promise of a channel established by Ambassador Kampelman with his KGB counterpart in the Soviet delegation at the CSCE-Madrid. While a solid agenda had been discussed no tangible results have thus far been achieved however. Time will tell.

Regional Issues. The Secretary of State said that with regard to discussions on Afghanistan, Poland and Central America, essentially nothing had been achieved. He noted that the Soviets had expressed an interest in discussing the Middle East. He had intentionally restricted references to the Middle East to only the most summary comments.

Arms Control. The Secretary noted that we have had mixed results in discussions on arms control. Today he had heard that the Soviets had made a somewhat encouraging statement in response to the President's recent START announcement. With regard to INF, we have thus far not been able to make progress. Concerning MBFR, we have had an apparent "nibble." Finally, concerning confidence building measures (CBMs) the Soviets appear to have some interest in two of the four proposals we had made.

Bilateral Issues. In this area the Secretary said the only initiative proposed by either side had been our offer for negotiation of a new long-term grain agreement (LTA). He noted that the Soviets viewed this proposal as serving our interests and not theirs. As a consequence it had a rather ambiguous standing.

The Secretary then went on to describe the format for the sessions with Dobrynin. These normally included two phases: the first in which staff specialists contributed to particular issues on the agenda, ( e.g., Ambassador Nitze on INF); followed by a private one-on-one session between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin.



Before going on to propose an agenda for the forthcoming meeting on Saturday, June 18, he asked if anyone had any comments.

Deputy Director McMahon noted that Chernenko's speech at the CPSU Central Committee Meeting in support of Andropov was an indicator of the latter's strength.

The next meeting. The Secretary then proposed that the forthcoming meeting follow the same format as before with the agenda this time to include a discussion of our recent initiative at MBFR (Ambassador Abramowitz to attend) and the President's recent proposal for START (Ambassador Rowny to attend for this item). The Secretary of State said he would also describe the Williamsburg Conference -- the point to be made, that of Allied solidarity. In addition to these subjects, the Secretary proposed going once more into each of the four generic areas. With regard to bilateral relations, the Secretary proposed that he be authorized to express US willingness to open talks toward the establishment of a Soviet Consulate in New York City and a US Consulate in Kiev. In addition, he proposed that he be authorized to express our willingness to open talks devoted to the negotiation of a new cultural agreement. The Secretary went on to explain that the net benefit from any such agreements would accrue to the United States. Specifically, with respect to the proposed consulates the Secretary noted that the improved intelligence accruing to the Soviets from a New York City consulate would not add that much to the capability they already enjoy through the United Nations presence. On the other hand, a window for the United States in Kiev would provide us a substantial improvement in our collection capability.

With regard to the cultural agreement, the Secretary noted at the moment the Soviets were free to send as many cultural representatives to this country as they wished since these are arranged through private sources and the government now has no real control over them. He noted that a treaty would give us an instrument for seeking greater reciprocity in this area and would also legitimize a higher flow of cultural visits from West to East.

The Secretary then noted that with regard to regional issues the situation had worsened in Central America and that this might be a outgrowth of a flaw in the marker we had earlier laid down to the Russians. Specifically, our statement that we would find the introduction of high-performance aircraft or Cuban combat units "unacceptable" may have implied that all actions other than these would be tolerated. The Secretary stated that we should clarify this.



Judge Clark noted that in the early 70's when the Soviets commenced submarine operations out of Cienfuegos, Cuba, the Administration had characterized this as "an unfriendly act." Ultimately this had led to the termination of these operations. He recommended that the Secretary treat current Soviet activities in Central America in the same fashion -- that is, that their activities which contribute to unrest generally (not just the introduction of modern weapons and combat units) will be unacceptable. The President approved this proposal.

The Secretary then raised the matter of how any mention of a summit ought to be treated. He reiterated existing Administration policy with regard to summits: that is, that we are not opposed in principle however they would need to be well prepared in advance and hold the promise of significant accomplishment.

Secretary Weinberger noted the inconsistency which would be represented by our conducting discussions of the possibility of a summit while the Soviets remained in Afghanistan, Poland and Central America.

This subject was not conclusively resolved.

At this point the meeting evolved into round-table remarks which were basically supportive of the Secretary proceeding according to the format he had proposed. The Vice President noted in particular the value of the private meeting after the larger set piece agenda had been disposed of. He believed that this private session held the most promise for getting results.

As the participants rose to leave, the Secretary of State asked whether he should bring Ambassador Rowny back to participate in Saturday's meeting. The President agreed that he should.

The Secretary also asked, "what about the other items?" The President answered go ahead.

Conclusions: After the meeting it was confirmed that the President approved:

- The convening of a meeting by the Secretary of State with Ambassador Dobrynin on Saturday, June 18.
- That this meeting should be conducted according to the same format as meetings of the past.

- That the Secretary should summarize important issues and proposals put forth by our side since the last meeting (e.g., START proposal and the results of Williamsburg).
- He should discuss human rights, arms control, regional issues and bilateral issues.
- That in discussing the situation in Central America, the Secretary should protest the recent Soviet escalation of military deliveries to Nicaragua and state that we consider these actions and other Soviet measures of support to Nicaragua for the export of revolution to neighboring countries to be unfriendly actions which must cease.
- That Ambassador Rowny and Ambassador Abramowitz should return to participate in the arms control portion.
- With regard to bilateral issues the Secretary was authorized to propose that the U. S. and the Soviet Union open talks devoted to the conclusion of agreements for the establishment of consulates in New York City and Kiev; and for the conduct of cultural exchanges between the two countries.

There were no conclusions reached with regard to:

- Any future possibilities of a summit meeting, or
- Travel by the Secretary of State to Moscow for meetings with Soviet officials.



~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1983

*Sam*

Jack Matlock

Subject: Summitry

For many reasons--some good and some not so good--we owe the President a thoughtful treatment of whether, and if so, why and how a Summit meeting should be held.

We have already given him two solid papers which treat the historical record, and emphasizing the damage which can be done to our long term interests by creating a false euphoria in the minds of Americans which makes it difficult to contend with continued misbehavior by the Soviets in the wake of a summit. In short, we have stressed that for a summit to be worthwhile, it must involve the resolution of problems, not atmospberics.

What we have not told the President is what should be our agenda (the issues we want to resolve) in the discussions to take place in the months ahead? Should we keep the emphasis on arms control or does that repose an artificial importance to these talks which can not be fulfilled by the results? What other candidate problems should we stress--Central America? Finally, once we have our priorities in mind, what should be our strategy for achieving our goals? How do we use our leverage to get the right concessions from the Russians?

This is a tall order. In addition it is needed rather promptly, next Monday at the latest. Could you tackle this and get back to me with any questions you may have.

Many thanks

*Bud*  
*Bud*

cc: Judge Clark

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F00-006 # 93

BY *smf*, NARA, DATE *6/12/06*

My Dear Friends. Today, at the close of the Easter season, I would like to convey my sincere best wishes and speak to you on the present place in the world of our two countries, America and Russia, and our common prospects for the future. In saying "Russia" rather than "the Soviet Union," I am not mistaken but rather am making a deliberate distinction between the people of a great nation and a regime which, by every possible means, has sought to cut you off from any genuine contact with and understanding of other nations, including my own. Such understanding is all too important today, and so I must be completely frank and honest with you. Much of what I have to say will not be pleasant for me to relate or for you to hear. How much simpler it would be for me to try to fool you with worn-out formulas and pious phrases about "peaceful coexistence" and "relaxation of tension," the only kind of talk which the Soviet regime would permit to reach your ears. But my words to you, which I hope will reach you by every possible means, are not likely to be welcomed by your rulers, for they are based on the contention that the truth, however unpleasant, must be faced squarely. The perilous state of today's world will not improve with anything less than both our countries' honestly shouldering our responsibilities and, I hope, achieving a genuine and lasting friendship. For it is no exaggeration to say that we, Russia and America, today control between us the destiny of the entire human race.

In observing this, one is struck first of all that this was foreseen, however imperfectly, long ago, in the early part of the last century. Many prescient thinkers of the time commented upon the "two young giants," each destined for greatness and the



leadership of half a planet. Indeed, America and Russia, alone of all nations which stem from the European cultural tradition, are each more than just countries but encompass within themselves an entire continent, a thousand races, creeds, and tongues -- an entire world apart. Other countries reached their natural limits long ago, but we, with great unmeasured expanses of land opening before us, are peoples whose history is marked by the Frontier -- drawing us every~~y~~ farther, we to the West, you to the East, onward to the Pacific, where our countries all but meet as neighbors in what is in effect our common border at the Bering Strait.

This sense of a vast openness which characterizes our lands -- what we here call "the wide open spaces" -- has left a common indelible imprint on the character of our peoples: a hearty vigor and vitality, a positive attitude of industry and ingenuity, a sense of basic fairness and down-to-earth practicality, a lively wit and warm hospitality, a deep reverence for the bounty and variety of nature and for the Creator who placed such riches in our care, and a fierce love of liberty and respect for human dignity.

It is only natural that these similarities should result in close friendship between our countries. For instance, during the American Civil War in the 1860s, Russia was the only one of the great European powers to open~~y~~ side with the cause of union and liberty. In the bleakest year of that war, 1863, visits by Russian naval squadrons to New York and San Francisco as a show of support greatly buoyed American spirits and bolstered the flagging war effort. Indeed, how much closer could the historical

parallel be when we consider that within the space of two years there occurred in Russia and America what are, without a doubt, the two broadest single acts of liberation in human history: the Edict of Emancipation of Alexander II, the Tsar-Liberator, an edict which lifted the yoke of serfdom from the necks of the Russian people; and the Emancipation Proclamation of President Abraham Lincoln, who has gone down in our history as the Great Emancipator, whose act sealed the end in our country of the shameful institution of human slavery. These two great leaders of revered memory were similarly rewarded for their magnanimity, in a manner which has become all too typical of our present bloody era: both died at the hand of an assassin.

The ensuing years saw the intensity of Russian/American friendship ebb and flow with the changes of the international season -- a normal occurrence between any two countries. But always a basic respect and fund of goodwill remained. The second decade of the present turbulent century saw the two giants firmly linked, as allies in the tragic fratricidal conflict which shook Western Civilization to its roots and which sounded the strident theme of war, revolution, and destruction which has plagued the international community ever since.

For Russia the war proved to be a catastrophe. Taking advantage of the exhaustion and confusion of wartime, and treasonously receiving enemy gold and assistance, a small group of fanatical conspirators seized the opportunity to grasp the reins of governmental power in Russia. For them, Russia as a country or as a people meant nothing. Rather, what they sought was a base of operations from which to spread their absolute



power over the entire globe. The world was astounded. In the words written in 1919 by the future Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, we looked upon Russia and beheld an

"...apparition with countenance different from any yet seen on earth [standing] in the place of the old Ally. We saw a state without a nation, an army without a country, a religion without a God. The Government which claimed to be the new Russia sprang from Revolution and was fed by Terror. It has denounced the faith of treaties; it has made a separate peace ... It had declared that between itself and non-communist society no good faith, public or private, could exist and no engagements need be respected. It had repudiated alike all that Russia owed and all that was owing to her. Just when the worst was over, when victory was in sight, when the fruits of measureless sacrifice were at hand, the old Russia had been dragged down... Thus, the Russian people were deprived of Victory, Honor, Freedom, Peace, and Bread. Thus there was to be no Russia in the Council of the Allies -- only an abyss which still continues in human affairs."

Cloaking their true intentions in all manner of lies, the Bolsheviks promised the people of Russia every conceivable benefit. But none of these promises were kept.

They promised you peace.<sup>1</sup> But what they gave you was war, civil war, mass murder, slave labor, and a shameless capitulation to German imperialism.<sup>2</sup> In the early years of their rule, the Bolshevik leaders eagerly planned for an imminent

war of world revolution, and to further that goal Tukhachevsky's army struck through Poland<sup>3</sup> in a vain attempt to reach a Germany similarly convulsed with revolution. In 1941, Stalin and his henchmen were criminally unprepared for the treacherous onslaught of their Nazi allies, a dereliction that cost uncounted millions of Russian lives. And even today, under the transparent guise of "socialist internationalism" the blood of your sons and brothers is squandered in the mountains and ravines of Afghanistan, not for the defense of your own homeland and people but solely in the interests of a dozen-odd gray, faceless old men -- responsible to no one, elected by no one, who do not even recognize the power of the Almighty above them in restraint of their limitless ambitions.

They promised you land. But what they gave you was confiscation, expropriation, and collectivized poverty. After six decades of liberty the rural population of Russia was once again shackled to the land by the chains of a new serfdom much harsher than the old one.

They promised you bread. But what they gave you was famine, disease, starvation on a mass scale. Russia, which for centuries had fed not only herself but also half of Europe, has become a hungry country, the world's largest importer of grain. Since your country was mobilized for war in August 1914 her economy has yet to be given the chance to return to a normal peacetime operation and to provide for the needs of her people. Instead, her resources are lavished upon the various Castros and Ho Chi Minhs of the world on behalf of so-called "wars of national liberation" and the violent worldwide advance of



socialism. Last of all in your rulers' calculations have been the needs of the Russian people. The Bible commands us: "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn." Now, if even an animal is owed a just recompense for its labor, how much worse it is for an entire nation, for the better part of a century, to be denied the right to provide decently for its own well-being. Russia alone of industrialized countries actually demonstrates a declining life expectancy. The rate of infant mortality is growing so as to embarrass even the Soviet regime, which several years ago stopped publishing these data. Why are your rulers afraid to tell you how many of your infants are dying?

In only one respect have the Soviet rulers been consistently truthful: they are, they say, firmly and resolutely following Lenin's course. But what are the consequences of this course for you -- and not only for you but for us as well, for the rest of humanity? A fellow Bolshevik once asked Lenin about the harshness of the party's rule, about what their methods -- the Cheka,<sup>4</sup> forced grain requisitions, red terror -- were doing to Russia. Lenin responded: "I spit on Russia ... This is merely one phase through which we must pass on the way to world revolution." Under the Marxist-Leninist scheme of thought there is no morality apart from the expeditious waging of the class struggle. There is no crime, no enormity, to which the communists will not stoop in advancing the cause of socialism, even up to the deliberate causing of a famine at the beginning of the thirties to break the back of the Russian peasantry -- at a cost of up to seventeen million lives. I do not need to recount the

hideous record of the communists' rule in Russia through all of the various purges, terrors, and campaigns against non-existent "enemies of the people," of the damage to your culture, your religion, your national integrity. I merely note this: before World War I Russia, it was calculated by demographers, would have by the year 1985 a population of 400 million souls. Today, your number is somewhat over 265 million. What happened to all those other people? Certainly many millions died in Hitler's and Stalin's war, the great war, as one observer has put it, to decide whether the concentration camps of the future would be Brown or Red. But still, the war aside, many statisticians and demographers, both Russian and foreign, who undertake an honest survey of the numbers, consistently come up with a figure on the same scale: that civil strife and communist repression have cost the peoples of Russia upwards of 60 million souls. My friends, none of us, of whatever nationality, can look upon such a record with detachment.

Not content with the ruination of your country and those of your neighbors, your masters have made it plain that they intend to advance their rule to the ends of the earth. Not for nothing do they, even today, as in Pravda of March 25, 1983, speak of the present epoch as "the age of the formation of a communist future for all mankind." These words are not idle. In Africa, in Asia, even on our doorstep in the Western Hemisphere, your rulers, either directly by their own devices or with the help of their ideological brethren in all countries, project their influence everywhere in pursuit of total power. Of course you are further impoverished, your blood and treasure wasted by



corrupt, irresponsible men who think nothing of treating the vast resources of your country as their own personal property. Using the ruthless methods of terror and control perfected against you, on Russian soil, they commit outrages which, whatever the national origin of their perpetrators, are attributed to Russia, to you, and blacken your reputation in the eyes of other people.

However much we might wish otherwise, my friends, the nations of the world which still have their freedom, including the United States, must take steps to defend themselves from the desire of the Soviet leaders to everywhere force life into a collectivized, regimented pattern under their illegitimate yoke. And that means we are forced to build weapons. Now, the Soviets distort this, saying that the USA is preparing for war with all sorts of horrible-sounding weapons: Pershings, cruise missiles, the MX, the so-called neutron bomb, binary chemical weapons, and so on. Having no shame, they even trot the Patriarch of Moscow out to bear witness to their lies. They do this because facts are quite a bit different from what you are led to believe, as a brief recitation of the particulars will illustrate. For instance, when we talk about chemical weapons you must know that in the early 1970s our leaders, believing the promises of the Soviets about "detente" and "relaxation of tension" destroyed chemical stockpiles and all but halted research in this area. But your rulers not only continued to build such weapons but today use them -- in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, where many thousands of defenseless villagers are killed by them. In light of this we, however, reluctantly, once again have to consider

the production of chemical weapons. As for the word "binary," this simply means that the gas is in two parts that become deadly only when they mix on impact but by themselves are harmless. This is so that if there is an accident, such as during transportation, our population will not be exposed to the dangers of the kind which have been inflicted on Russia, where hundreds of people have been killed by accidents with poison or biological weapons. But not a word about this is said to the people of your country.

Or consider the so-called neutron bomb. This weapon, which actually is not a bomb but rather a shell, is made to be used only on small battlefields against tanks; for in Europe we and our allies are vastly outnumbered by the forces of the Warsaw Pact. The distinctive quality of this weapon is its low destructive potential, so if necessary it could be used, if we were attacked, without destroying nearby towns and villages. In fact, the military plans of both the Soviet Union and NATO envisage that war would begin with a Soviet move into Western Europe. All Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces are clearly deployed for the offensive, not defense.

Finally, consider the question of our Pershings and cruise missiles, which the NATO alliance plans to begin putting into Europe later this year. Before the end of the 1970s, although the Soviet Union has always possessed a great advantage in conventional weapons -- tanks, artillery, personnel carriers -- there had been a rough equivalence in nuclear weaponry. That balance was disrupted by your rulers when, at the rate of one per week, they began to deploy a new type of extremely destructive



missile which could hit the capitals of our allies in a matter of minutes. So we made plans to respond with similar rockets of our own: Pershings and cruise missiles. However, we offered to remove the threat to both sides: if your rulers would get rid of their missiles, we would not deploy any missiles of our own. But this the Soviets rejected, calling it "unilateral disarmament" for the USSR. So in March we tried again, saying, alright, we will deploy only some of our missiles, and the Soviets will get rid of some of theirs, so that the resulting numbers would be equal. Again, they rejected our proposal. Clearly the only solution that the Soviets desire that they have their rockets and we have none, giving them nuclear superiority to match their superiority in conventional weapons. In effect, they want us to concede that we will not defend our allies in Europe.

Now I understand that you may not be inclined to believe that what I have told you is true or believe that the picture is similar in other areas as well. But, please, consider this: you know the reality of things as they are in your own country, things which you can verify with your own eyes; and you know just how truthful your rulers are when they talk about this same reality. So I ask you: why should they be more truthful in describing the outside world and the international situation, which they will not permit you to see and and verify with your own eyes, than they are when they lie about what goes on in your own country, the truth of which you can see?

Here, in our country, all of these questions of weapons and military affairs are open, not secret as in the USSR. The natural inclination of a free country is to spend money on food,

clothing, travel, amusement, just about anything but weapons of war. This is so because our free enterprise economy is the result of millions of economic decisionmakers demanding and supplying products in the market place and is not run by a central plan controlled by a few powerful men who can use this centralized mechanism to place the highest priority on military production. Because our system is decentralized, we disagree on how much to spend on defense. Since we barely built anything of military significance during the last decade, I believe that we need to build more, but many other people -- among them many elected representatives in Congress, which unlike the Supreme Soviet is not a sham parliament but a real one -- think we should spend less. And I can't just order people around in these matters; I have to go on television and talk to the people and try to convince them. But in your country, this is all secret. All of the things I have said, your leaders already know very well, yet they deliberately keep you in the dark about where your country's resources go. Of course everybody has some idea: part of it to revolutionaries around the world who care nothing about the well-being of Russia; and a large part goes to maintaining the communists in the kind of luxury that would put any nobleman of times past or any Western millionaire to shame. But a tremendous amount -- up to 40 percent of your country's production, according to some sources in Russia, goes to military uses<sup>5</sup> and weapons of war. Meanwhile, over the past 20 years, our defense expenditures have fallen as a portion both of the U.S. Government's spending and of our country's total economic production. To give one example, in 1955 the U.S. Government



spent only one-fifth of its money on payments to individual citizens and more than half of its money on defense. Today, out of a much larger budget, we spend about half on individuals and about one-quarter on defense. By 1980, our defense expenditure was only four-fifths of what it was in 1970.

But, again your rulers know all this, and they even get into the domestic debate here. It seems that every other news show on our media features a spokesman for the Soviet regime explaining why the U.S. should reduce its defenses. Not in America, nor anywhere else in the world is anyone deprived of the Soviet viewpoint; we get it directly from Soviet publications and from the mouths of Soviet officials. But you, how do you hear about us? Why, from the very same Soviet officials. When was the last time you heard an American official discuss our policies on the radio or saw one of our spokesmen on television? No, instead, the Soviets tell you what they say our policy is, that we are openly calling for war and so forth, even though neither I nor any other American official has ever called for war of any sort. They note that they have called for a mutual pledge never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, but we have refused. Why? Because we say that no weapons or force of any sort, nuclear or non-nuclear, should be used. And we have seen just how much the Soviet regime's pious pledges about weapons are worth, such as with chemical weapons.

No, my friends, there can only be one explanation for all of this: they are lying to you. They never stop lying.

The slogans of your rulers -- "peace" and "peaceful co-existence" -- hide the fact that they are giving us here a

simple choice. We can have so-called peace as long as we are willing to surrender, year by year, country by country. For as they always admit, even under conditions of "peaceful coexistence" the "international class struggle" and "the ideological struggle" against us continue. Their so-called peace policy amounts to that expressed in a famous saying attributed to Bismarck: "I don't want war: I want victory." And for reasons too complex for me to go into at this moment, their slogans even produce some results among free peoples. There are some here, not a majority but not just a few either, who believe that peace, even at the cost of surrender into slavery, must be maintained no matter what. There is even a slogan here, which in English rhymes: "Better Red than Dead." But this slogan, inspired by the lies of your rulers, is itself a lie: for as your recent history shows, Red power here would inevitably mean death for many of us.

We are determined to defend our lives and our liberty, but we are a fundamentally decent people, a God-fearing nation. It pains us that our defense must be guaranteed by terrible weapons which if used would rain death down upon not just your rulers but upon many of you, upon many innocent people. It is in large part for this reason that on March 23 of this year I proposed to the American people a new system of defense, one that actually defends our people from the rockets of your rulers, striking them down from the sky, without the current cruel necessity of threatening you, who have no voice in influencing their actions. They, of course, distort our intentions in this too, saying that we are planning a "first-strike" against the USSR. But for two



decades after the Second World War, we possessed first a nuclear monopoly and then a clear superiority in nuclear forces. We had that "first-strike" capability that your masters profess to fear: we did not use it. There was no war although we could have destroyed the USSR with little damage to ourselves. But who would be so foolish as to wager that the Soviet regime, with similar power, would not use it, would refrain from world domination?

My friends, I am not claiming that we are perfect, that our government never makes mistakes, that our society has no warts or blemishes. As I observed in a recent speech to a group of clergymen: "There is sin and evil in the world. And we are enjoined by the scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose it with all our might. Our nation, too has a legacy of evil with which it must deal. The glory of this land has been its capacity for transcending the moral evils of our past. For example, the long struggle of minority citizens for equal rights, once a source of disunity and civil war, is now a point of pride for all Americans. We must never go back. There is no room for racism, anti-semitism, or other forms of ethnic and racial hatred in this country." And, my friends, what I said then is true, we have made great strides. But of course we still have such problems as every country has, as Russia surely had before the communists and still has today, problems which will exist as long as people do and have not attained perfection. In some ways we are better than some countries, in others we may be worse. But our problems are in the open, aboveboard; they are discussed, debated; solutions are proposed. Unlike your illegitimate rulers, who

hide their evil deeds and the corpses of millions of victims under a blanket of lies and ideology, our policy is and always has been to face the truth and deal honestly with our ills, however unpleasant this may be. And our society's goal is clear, as we, each one of us, become better people: to live up to the principle embodied in the Biblical commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

In assessing our mistakes and vices there is one misdeed of ours which is of special significance for you. Contrary to the normal rules of our society it was kept almost secret for many years by those who engineered the policy or later rationalized it, although even their silence betrayed their inner recognition of shame and degradation. Of all the acts committed by those out here in freedom in support of the communist system -- acts committed by those who had the opportunity to know better -- none compares to the terrible Operation Keelhaul carried out by American and Allied forces at the end of World War II. Using deception, false assurances, and even brute force, we turned over several hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens, mostly Russians and Ukrainians and including women and children, who had taken the opportunity offered by the war to flee abroad. We turned them over to the waiting arms of Stalin and the NKVD, to be ground up in the great gears of that engine of destruction. So here, now, before you today, I express on behalf of the American government and people our sincere repentance for this evil act and ask your forgiveness. And more, I pledge to you that to the best of my power, never again will the forces of the



United States be used as slavecatchers in betrayal of people fleeing their communist masters.

My friends, we are determined to stand up for what is right. Your rulers must understand that we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. A number of years ago, I heard a young father, a very prominent young man in the entertainment world, addressing a tremendous gathering in my home state of California. It was during the time of the cold war, and communism and our own way of life were very much on people's minds. And he was speaking to that subject. And suddenly, though, I heard him saying, "I love my little girls more than anything..." And I said to myself, "Oh, no, don't. You can't -- don't say that." But I had underestimated him. He went on: "I would rather see my little girls die now, still believing in God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in God." There were thousands of young people in that audience. They came to their feet with shouts of joy. They had instantly recognized the profound truth in what he had said, with regard to the physical and the soul and what was truly important.

These beliefs permeate our history and our government. Our Declaration of Independence from Great Britain, the basic document that marks our emergence as a distinct people, mentions the Supreme Being no less than four times. The phrase "In God We Trust" is engraved on our coinage. Our Supreme Court opens its proceedings with a religious invocation. and our Congress opens its sessions with a prayer. Our commitment to freedom and

personal liberty is itself grounded in the much deeper realization that freedom prospers only where the blessings of God are avidly sought and humbly accepted. The entire American experiment in democracy rests on this insight. Its discovery was the great triumph of our Founding Fathers, voiced by our William Penn when he said: "If we will not be governed by God, we must be governed by tyrants." And it was our first President, George Washington, who said that "of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports."

Indeed, my friends, perhaps the whole American concept of government can be summed up in a few sentences by Thomas Jefferson, our third President and author of the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, in which appear these words:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed..."

This concept is just as valid, as vital, as meaningful for us today -- and for all peoples -- as it was when Jefferson first penned those lines over two hundred years ago. Human beings have rights not because of their class or their race, not at the whim of any party or state, not conditioned on some crude materialist explanation of history -- but because it is the Creator who has given us those rights and endowed each of us



with an intrinsic dignity and value as a human being. For that reason, even the least among us has an absolute value and the right to be respected by our fellow men. The rights of all people, of Americans and Russians and of all nations, cannot be taken away by any force. No government can eternally rule without a thought to the rights and wishes of its people.

In trying for more than six decades to impose their total control over you, to strip you of the dignity which is your devine patrimony, it is not accidental that so much of the usurpers' efforts has been directed against God and the Church, to erase from your minds the ultimate source of human liberty, to uproot your memory of yourselves as a God-fearing nation. But they will never succeed, no matter how much they have destroyed, no matter how empty life has become so that so many now find solace only in drink. Who now can count the riches that were stolen, the righteous people murdered, the churches desecrated and demolished -- including that gem of Russian architecture, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, blown up in 1931? Such crimes against man and God had become commonplace, the criminals confident that they would not be called to account for a long time, maybe never. In many cases justice has been delayed a long time -- along time, but not forever. For the day will come, indeed is near at hand, when an accounting will be demanded, when tens of murdered millions will rise up and live again, in your hearts and in those of decent people the world over -- demanding at long last: enough of lies, violence, and godlessness. The time has come to reclaim

that part of us which belongs to God from the illicit claims of an atheist Caesar.

As I have told the American people on several occasions, I believe that communism is another sad, bizzare chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written. I believe this because the source of our strength in the quest for human freedom is not material but spiritual. And because it knows no limitation, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man. For in the words of the prophet Isaiah: "He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no might he increased strength ... But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run and not be weary ..." Yes, today, here and there in the vast empire of evil, the mortal cracks are plainly seen, in Poland, in Central America, in Africa -- growing ever wider. And in Russia, too, the purifying waters of revival have begun to flow like the first streamlets of Spring under the dense, gray, hard-packed snow.

Again, it was our Jefferson who said: "The God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time." As long as life remains, whether their wicked reign lasts six decades or six centuries or six thousand years, as long as any of us lives they will never succeed in stamping out that spark which lives in us all, the seed of the divine intention. As long as you and we survive, God's creative purpose is not dead, and the nations of the world will not be left to die in totalitarian darkness. Perhaps the mysterious words of I Corinthians 15:21 are nowhere more applicable than in the life and death of nations: "For



since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead."

No, my friends, the day is fast approaching when Russia -- along with all other peoples now languishing in communist slavery -- will rise up again and retake her rightful place among the nations of the world in honor, in dignity, and in peace.

The road you travel is a hard and painful one. May Our Lord be with you and give you the power and wisdom to resist the lies and violence that surround you at every turn: rejecting the lies wherever they find us, eschewing fraud and deception, refusing to betray our neighbors. To each of you, may the words of the psalmist be your shield:

Only with thine eyes shalt thou behold and see the reward of the wicked. Because thou hast made the Lord, which is my refuge, even the most High, thy habitation; there shall no evil befall thee, neither shall any plague come nigh thy dwelling. For he shall give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways."<sup>6</sup>

May anticipation of the approaching thousand-year commemoration of Russia's acceptance of the Christian faith give you greater strength with each passing day. May the 80th anniversary of the canonization of Saint Serafim of Sarov<sup>7</sup> be for you as a landmark on the path to national recovery and spiritual rebirth. May the warmth and brightness of the Easter season inspire in you a joyous sense of renewing life and shining resurrection. And finally, as I leave you, I ask you to be

confident in the knowledge that all people of goodwill throughout the globe, especially those here in America, are always with you in our thoughts, in our hopes, and in our prayers.

Thank you for your attention.



### Explanatory Notes

1. The Bolsheviks employed the slogan "Peace, Land, Bread" in their campaign to seize power during the disorders of 1917.
2. Shameless capitulation to German imperialism. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
3. Tukhachevsky's army struck through Poland. In August 1920.
4. Cheka. Original name of the Soviet secret police.
5. Forty percent of Soviet GNP goes to the military, according to Sakharov.
6. The passage is from the 91st Psalm (90th in the Russian Bible), a special favorite of the Russian people, commonly invoked before a journey and by soldiers going into battle.
7. Saint Serafim of Sarov. A 19th Century Russian saint, a particularly popular figure among Russian Orthodox Christians.

TO THE READERS OF AMERICA ILLUSTRATED:

FIFTY YEARS AGO, IN NOVEMBER 1933, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ESTABLISHED FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OUR RESPECTIVE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW, AND THE APPOINTMENTS OF WILLIAM C. BULLIT AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR AND ALEKSANDR TROYANOVSKY AS THE USSR'S AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, MARKED AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL AND OTHER RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. AS PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT SAID AT THE TIME, THE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS WERE "SERIOUS" BUT NOT "INSOLUBLE," AND COULD ONLY BE SOLVED BY FRANK, FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS. OUR GOAL THEN, AS NOW, WAS BETTER UNDERSTANDING, MUTUAL BENEFIT AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE IN THE WORLD.

IN LESS THAN A DECADE, HOWEVER, WE FOUND OURSELVES FIGHTING TOGETHER AS ALLIES IN WORLD WAR II IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST NAZISM. THE ENORMOUS SACRIFICES THAT WE ALL SUFFERED IN THAT WAR CONVINCED BOTH OUR COUNTRIES THAT WE WOULD NEED TO COOPERATE TO PRESERVE THE PEACE, YET THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US REMAINED SERIOUS. WE BOTH REALIZE THAT, WITH THE ADVENT OF ENORMOUSLY DESTRUCTIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE WORLD OF 1983 IS MUCH DIFFERENT FROM THE WORLD OF 1933. WE NEED TO MOVE BEYOND THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR, AT WHICH WE HAVE FORTUNATELY BEEN

SUCCESSFUL, TO RENEWED EFFORTS TO FIND NEW WAYS TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN US.

LET US HOPE THAT THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS WILL WITNESS UNPARALLELED PEACE AND PROSPERITY FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND LET US WORK TOGETHER ONCE AGAIN TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL FOR ALL PEOPLES. I PLEDGE MYSELF, AS DO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES, TO THAT END.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 704-024#7  
BY CIS, NARA, DATE 12/21/05ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Message to the Russian People

Issue

The address attached at Tab A is an important contribution to our effort to promote positive change in the communist world through public diplomacy. Its specific purpose is to move the ideological struggle onto the Soviets' home ground by going over the communists' head directly to the Russian people. (We could address subsequent messages to the non-Russian people as well.)

Facts

This message was drafted by a State Department official and a member of the NSC staff, but has not received interagency clearance. It is the kind of document that is unlikely to be either produced or approved by a committee. Nevertheless, it is a serious document which I believe you should seriously consider -- if for no other reason than the fact that it dramatizes how little we have been saying to the people of the USSR over the years and therefore how meager have been our public diplomacy efforts toward the peoples of the communist world.

Discussion

The address is calculated to appeal to the Russian people's underlying non-Soviet, patriotic and religious consciousness and to identify that consciousness with the principles of the United States. Parts of the message come directly from your speech in Orlando. It is also designed to add a new psychological dimension to our national security strategy vis-a-vis the USSR: it seeks to convey to the Russian people that we are on their side, that we pose no threat to them, and that we share their aspirations for peace and human rights. Such a message, if published in America Illustrated, broadcast over VOA and Radio Liberty and distributed by our diplomatic representatives and through samizdat channels in the USSR, would be a first step in beginning to counter Soviet attempts to brainwash their people into believing that America is a threat to them -- a ploy the Kremlin uses to justify the economic privations it visits upon the people to finance its military buildup.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



The language of the address is straightforward and truthful: there is no self-censorship designed to please the Soviet regime. As such it is calculated to enhance your credibility with Russian listeners, who rarely are able to hear the truth openly expressed. Because delivery would be in Russian there is no need for you to actually deliver it aloud.

A Two-Track Policy. This message would be the beginning of a new "two-track" policy toward the USSR and the beginning of a real policy of reciprocity in the battle of ideas. One track would be the normal diplomatic relations we have with the Soviets: dialogue, arms control negotiations, exchanges, grain agreements, etc. The other track would be our direct, unfiltered, un-self-censored relations with the peoples of the Soviet empire -- the essence of true public diplomacy. The question we must ask ourselves is: Do we need to ask the permission of the Soviet regime to speak the truth to its subject peoples? I would hope that we can still say "no" to that question.

The Beginning of Ideological Reciprocity. Insofar as this would be the beginning of a policy of true reciprocity in this aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations, we must not forget how the Soviets treat us. They are masters in the conduct of a "two-track" policy. They toast us with champagne at diplomatic receptions, while simultaneously blasting America at high decibels over Radio Moscow and other media. The Soviet effort to influence our public directly is an enormous one and makes our public diplomacy programs blanch in comparison.

Until we learn to conduct a two-track policy as skillfully as the Soviets do, or for that matter the British or French, our foreign policy will remain more inflexible and handicapped than it need be.

The Soviet Perception. The release of this message would most certainly cause an outburst from the Kremlin. Their propaganda will scream that Washington is raising U.S.-Soviet tensions to the most provocative and belligerent levels ever. Dark predictions of World War may issue forth. It will all be done as though the Soviets themselves are pristine innocents, as though their propaganda never does any such thing.

Such an outburst would be nothing more than an extension of the Soviet efforts to intimidate the West and psychologically condition us to conduct relations on their terms (i.e., self-censorship by the West) and never on reciprocal terms.

In spite of such a reaction, the Soviets' respect for our country and this Administration as a serious contender in international politics will considerably increase. They will be forced to reassess the way they deal with us and recognize that, perhaps now, having taken two steps forward, it may be time for them to take a step or two backward. In short, such a move in



public diplomacy particularly such an exhibition of our capacity to tell the truth, would be seen by the Soviets as a major indication of American moral-spiritual strength underlying an even more credible military deterrent.

Contents of Message. The message contains the following:

- 1) A historical survey (up to World War I) of the similarities and world responsibilities of Russia and America, and the natural reasons for friendship between the two countries.
- 2) How this friendship was derailed by the communist coup d'etat and the tremendous losses Soviet rule has meant for the Russian people: a history of lies and broken promises.
- 3) An exposure of the duplicitous communist "peace" campaign, which in fact is intended to spread communist tyranny to all countries.
- 4) An explanation of the non-threatening nature of our defense efforts, focusing on the open nature of our society and highlighting our intention of developing a missile defense so as to avoid a nuclear retaliation against the Russian people.
- 5) Renunciation of U.S. support for the communist system especially as it was manifested in the infamous Operation Keelhaul where we forcibly repatriated hundreds of thousands of fleeing Russians at the end of the war. This is designed to dispel the widespread sentiment in Russia that under pressure the West sides with the communist regime against the people.
- 6) An exposition of the philosophical bases of American government --including its religious underpinnings. The address ends on a note of hope, expressing the inevitability of Russia's rejoining the free family of nations. Its religious allusions are chosen for their special significance in the Russian religious tradition. Its tone, while not exactly in your style, is specifically designed to be comprehensible and credible to the target audience, as all public diplomacy statements should be.
- 7) A page of explanatory notes referring to historical allusions, etc.

RECOMMENDATION

OK    No

—       —       If you like the message as it is, the general idea, and/or specific parts of it, that you authorize me to work with State and USIA to produce a revised version per your instructions, which nevertheless accommodates interagency concerns. We could then publish it in America Illustrated, broadcast it over our international radios and disseminate it in other ways.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

Prepared by:  
John Lenczowski

Attachment:

Tab A      Proposed message to the Russian people

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Georgetown University • Washington DC

June 16, 1983

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "S. Joffe", is located in the upper right corner of the page.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Judge Clark  
FROM: David Abshire  
RE: Soviet Briefing

Let me begin by congratulating you on the appointment of Jack Matlock as your senior Soviet specialist. He is a superb choice (as a matter of fact, Joe Jordan has thoroughly gone over the backgrounds of the senior foreign service officers with Soviet expertise in an effort to locate a diplomat-in-residence for CSIS and had just come to the conclusion that Matlock was the best man!) His appointment calls to mind again, the matter I have discussed with you before, namely, having our work in the Soviet field briefed to you and two or three of your more senior staff.

We have tightened and improved the briefing a great deal and have added somewhat to its policy implications dimension since I briefed some of your junior staff. At this point I really think it would be worth your taking perhaps an hour and a quarter of your own, Bud McFarlane's, Chuck Tyson's and Matlock's time. It would be convenient for the Center to do this on the 13th, 14th, or 15th of July or anytime the first half of August. We could manage it earlier than 13 July, but we would want to bring some of our best experts for the session, and of course they are sometimes hard to corral over the summer.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1983

MEMO TO: JUDGE CLARK  
FROM: PETE ROUSSEL

FYI

FRIDAY, June 17, 1983

Questions arising at the 9:15 A.M. briefing:

VOLCKER

- Can we assume that since the President is leaving for Camp David before the market's close that there will be no announcement regarding the Fed today?
- Will it be announced in the radio speech tomorrow?

BUDGET

- Does the President support Weinberger in his refusal to talk about or consider any budget cuts?

EL SALVADOR

- Does the President agree with Faith Whittlesey that he'll be judged in history by what happens in Central America?
- Is Faith Whittlesey's involvement part of an all out campaign to rally support for El Salvador? Is this a new drive - putting her in charge on this particular subject?
- Will the President ask Magana if it's all right for Stone to meet with the rebels?

1980 CAMPAIGN BRIEFING PAPERS

- Do Baker, Gergen and Stockman plan to respond to the subcommittee? Have they responded? Are they responsive to questions on this?
- Was the President aware of this? Did he know the papers were stolen?

WFO HAS SEEN

June 17, 1983

Judge Clark


Subject: additional point from shultz  
on Travel to Moscow

At the end of the conversation with Sec Shultz while you were gone this a.m. he said he had reviewed the Memcon of the session with the President on US-Sov relations and agreed with it. (He also said he would send it back).

With regard to the point of their being no conclusion on his travel to Moscow, he said he agreed but that he thought he needed to have the latitude to deal with the possibility of their being forthcoming in the meeting tomorrow. Consequently he proposed that he be given the latitude to "play the travel issue by ear." Specifically, that if (ti) came up he would respond affirmatively or negatively depending upon how the meeting had gone. He might express willingness to go; flatly turn it down or say that we could discuss it further.

I suggested that he discuss it with you and the President at the conclusion of the Magana prebrief when there will probably be 5-10 minutes left over.

Bud





Package # \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | ACTION |
|-----------------|-------------|----------|--------|
| John Poindexter | 1           |          |        |
| Bud McFarlane   |             |          |        |
| Jacque Hill     | 2           |          | R      |
| Judge Clark     |             |          |        |
| John Poindexter |             |          |        |
| Staff Secretary |             |          |        |
| Sit Room        |             |          |        |

## DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other\_\_\_\_\_

## COMMENTS

Judge and the President have  
seen this. Please put in Soviet  
file. J

RECEIVED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

83 JUN 20 A10:18  
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *gpn*  
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin, June 18, 1983

I met with Dobrynin for two-and-a-half hours Saturday, June 18, beginning and ending with private sessions, with a larger meeting in between.

My main point in the opening private session was that you continue to be willing to engage the Soviets in serious dialogue aimed at solving problems, and that the individual items we wished to discuss should be seen in that context. I would therefore be making various proposals designed to determine whether the Soviets are also prepared for such dialogue, but I wanted Dobrynin to understand that, from the point of view of U.S. policy, the whole is larger than the sum of these parts.

I also laid down two markers on regional issues:

-- As you had instructed, I emphasized that Soviet/Cuban activities in Central America, and in particular their support for Nicaragua and Nicaraguan activities and their arms shipments to the area were in our view "unfriendly acts." Dobrynin replied that Nicaragua is a small country that does not pose a threat to the U.S. I informed him that we thought otherwise, that I was not going to argue the point, but that the Soviet Union should understand our view.

-- On Lebanon, I reiterated that we wanted to see all foreign forces out of that country, and that the sooner they left, the sooner our MNF forces could also leave. I pointed out that there is a relationship between the role the MNF would have to play and the role of UNIFIL, thus making the point that if they are worried about the MNF they can help by extending the UNIFIL mandate. Dobrynin did not respond directly to this point, but did relate it in the third phase of our meeting to the Soviet view that we should have a genuine dialogue on developments in the Middle East.

In the larger meeting where Ken Dam, Larry Eagleburger, Rick Burt and Dobrynin's aides joined us, we discussed a number of specific points:

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

NLS F2000-006/1 #94

BY *smk* NARA DATE 11/28/01



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- 2 -

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-- I said we were following the progress of the Pentecostalist families with their emigration applications very closely, and asked whether Dobrynin had any specific information; he replied that he had nothing official to say;

-- I said the Madrid conference is at a critical point, and we want a satisfactory conclusion. I noted that Max Kampelman's earlier discussions with the Soviets seemed to make progress, but more recently the Soviets had become intransigent, and improvements on human rights in the draft concluding document were needed.

-- I then raised the issues of Sakharov, Shcharanskiy, and Jewish emigration, noting I had seen a number of Jewish leaders this past week. Dobrynin responded merely that these were "internal matters."

I next went over the series of meetings the Western Allies have just completed -- the OECD Ministerial, the Williamsburg Summit, the NATO Defense and Foreign Ministerials. Here I stressed that these meetings demonstrated not only Western economic recovery and renewed growth that would be advantageous to other economies too, but also Western determination to maintain cohesion and unity on issues of security and East-West economic relations. Specifically on INF, they showed that behind our resolve to deploy, there is also a genuine desire to negotiate. The main point is that the West is strong and cohesive, on the one hand, and ready to negotiate, on the other.

Dobrynin said the Soviets had followed these meetings and read my Senate testimony last week, and the situation looks different to them. Economically, they see us as doing everything possible to cut off East-West trade (I said our objective relates to the security aspects of trade and in no sense implies a trade war with the Soviets). On the security side, the U.S. seems to want military power not for defense but for foreign policy, to impose its views on others. In reply, I repeated the main point that the West is determined to maintain its defenses, but also to lessen tensions and reduce armaments. That provided the context for further discussion of specific issues:

-- Ambassador Abramowitz joined us on MBFR, and I said we wished to respond to Andropov's answer to you in March. We agree that we should seek reductions through a process leading to parity as the ultimate outcome. This will mean asymmetrical reductions. We think the principal task is verifying reductions to equal levels, putting in place a verification system that

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- 3 -

will result in the capacity to ensure correct data. In other words, I said, we are prepared to defer the problem of prior agreement on data if we can agree on adequate verification procedures. If the Soviets agree to this approach, our Vienna negotiators can explore it privately.

Dobrynin said he would report back, but urged the small symbolic step of small U.S.-Soviet reductions first.

-- Ambassador Rowny joined us on START. Here I said we had made new decisions and would be putting our new proposal on the table, but the basic point is your desire for real give-and-take in Geneva. We now need a sharper focus and a more dynamic process, and we would like the Soviets to be more explicit and precise than they have been. On confidence-building measures, I noted that both sides had proposals on the table, and urged agreement to set up a working group in START to discuss them.

Dobrynin said that he did not have detailed instructions, but could make several general points. If the U.S. approach continued to single out Soviet land-based missiles, or sought direct throw-weight limits or highly restrictive sublimits like the 110 ceiling on heavy missiles, there would not be much progress. The Soviets are prepared to look at warhead limitations, but not to make substantial cuts in the major leg of their strategic forces. I replied that if the talks are to get anywhere there must be cuts in heavy missiles. The largest cuts would come through warhead limitations, but it is important for the Soviets to understand that reductions in destructive potential, where there is a huge disparity in their favor, are important.

On bilateral issues, I informed Dobrynin that you are prepared to renew discussions leading toward openings of consulates in Kiev and New York, and to negotiate a new cultural agreement. If the Soviets respond positively, I said, we can work out the modalities for discussion. Dobrynin responded that he would report this back to Moscow.

In our concluding private meeting, I reiterated that while each individual issue has its own importance, we have a broad agenda, and the overall signal we wish to make is that we are prepared to discuss that whole agenda seriously. Dobrynin finished with three broad points:

-- Gromyko's speech at the Supreme Soviet June 16 dealt with U.S.-Soviet relations to an "unprecedented" extent. (I took this to indicate intense preoccupation with the current state of relations.)

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- 4 -

-- Chernenko's speech at the Central Committee Plenum June 14 laid heavy emphasis on the need to combat the American democracy initiative, as well as our statements about yellow rain and other objectionable Soviet activities: the Soviets view all this as an attempt to discredit the USSR. (I took this to mean that our public diplomacy program has grabbed their attention.)

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-- He gave them a short statement that the first launch of the Peacekeeper, a new type of "light" intercontinental ballistic missile (under SALT II criteria) took place June 17, and pointed out that this notification parallels their notification of a new-type test last October.

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-- Burt informed the Soviets that the U.S. has approved extension of the Transportation Agreement for a six-month period, and would be proposing an exchange of notes that would register extension before the expiration date next week.

In conclusion, I told Dobrynin I would be back and available for discussions and for Soviet responses to our proposals in early July.

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- 5 -

As I see it, by your decision we have now taken the initiative to move our dialogue forward on the basis of our agenda, and the ball is truly in the Soviet court. We cannot at this point predict how they will respond, but we are at least in a position to say we have undertaken a major effort.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *gps*  
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin, June 18, 1983

I met with Dobrynin for two-and-a-half hours Saturday, June 18, beginning and ending with private sessions, with a larger meeting in between.

My main point in the opening private session was that you continue to be willing to engage the Soviets in serious dialogue aimed at solving problems, and that the individual items we wished to discuss should be seen in that context. I would therefore be making various proposals designed to determine whether the Soviets are also prepared for such dialogue, but I wanted Dobrynin to understand that, from the point of view of U.S. policy, the whole is larger than the sum of these parts.

I also laid down two markers on regional issues:

-- As you had instructed, I emphasized that Soviet/Cuban activities in Central America, and in particular their support for Nicaragua and Nicaraguan activities and their arms shipments to the area were in our view "unfriendly acts." Dobrynin replied that Nicaragua is a small country that does not pose a threat to the U.S. I informed him that we thought otherwise, that I was not going to argue the point, but that the Soviet Union should understand our view.

-- On Lebanon, I reiterated that we wanted to see all foreign forces out of that country, and that the sooner they left, the sooner our MNP forces could also leave. I pointed out that there is a relationship between the role the MNP would have to play and the role of UNIFIL, thus making the point that if they are worried about the MNP they can help by extending the UNIFIL mandate. Dobrynin did not respond directly to this point, but did relate it in the third phase of our meeting to the Soviet view that we should have a genuine dialogue on developments in the Middle East.

In the larger meeting where Ken Dam, Larry Eagleburger, Rick Burt and Dobrynin's aides joined us, we discussed a number of specific points:

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DECL: OADR

NLS F2000-006/1-95

RV And NARA DATE 11/28/01



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- 2 -

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Jacque,

6/21

The Judge was  
going to send  
Tab II to the  
President. I don't  
think he did. Please  
match it up with  
this.

6/25

JP:

Jacque —

The match up has been made -- Tab II  
(3829) ( I believe this is the one).

I have also left attached at Tab II  
Mort Allin's comments. I presume we  
would not want Allin's comments to  
leave this office. CORRECT

Should any of this or copy of be placed  
in the Sov-US file? YES

Put original

jh

646

**National Security Council  
The White House**

Package # 3829

RECEIVED  
19 JUN 67 10:07

|                 | SEQUENCE TO     | HAS SEEN                                                             | ACTION                         |
|-----------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| John Poindexter | <u>1</u>        | <u>[initials]</u>                                                    |                                |
| Bud McFarlane   |                 | <u>[initials]</u>                                                    |                                |
| Jacque Hill     | <u>2</u>        | <u>[initials]</u>                                                    |                                |
| Judge Clark     | <u>3</u>        | <u>[initials]</u>                                                    | <u>A</u>                       |
| John Poindexter |                 |                                                                      |                                |
| Staff Secretary | <u>5</u>        | <u>Handed Tab I to [initials] Ret. rest of package to [initials]</u> |                                |
| Sit Room        |                 |                                                                      |                                |
| <u>Judge</u>    | <u>4</u>        | <u>[initials]</u>                                                    |                                |
| I-Information   | <u>A-Action</u> | R-Retain                                                             | D-Dispatch N-No further Action |

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other [initials]

**COMMENTS**

*[Large handwritten signature across the bottom, possibly "John"]*

*[Large handwritten signature, possibly "Deaver"]*

*[Large handwritten signature, possibly "Meese"]*

*[Large handwritten signature, possibly "Baker"]*

*[Large handwritten signature, possibly "VP"]*

*[Large handwritten signature, possibly "Done"]*



6.9.83

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

John Poindexter:

John Lenczowski rewrote this package after our discussion yesterday. I recommend we proceed quickly on dispatching Tab I, and I leave to Bud and the Judge the decision on Tab II.

Bob Kimmitt

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 7, 1983

WPC HAS SEEN

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLS F00-006 #96FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *YL* BY inf, NARA, DATE 6/12/86SUBJECT: Presidential Message to the Soviet People in  
America Illustrated Magazine

The attached draft Presidential statement (Tab III) to the Soviet people prepared by USIA is a typical example of what is so often wrong with our public diplomacy. Although entitled a message to the "Soviet people" (which is in truth a misnomer and a repetition of a Soviet propaganda expression), it is actually a message to the rulers of the Soviet people containing several of the hoariest cliches and most unctuous expressions of the "detente" period. It is a typical example of self-censorship designed to please the Soviet regime.

The subject peoples and nations of the Soviet empire are not interested in seeing the American President commemorate 50 years of diplomatic relations with the government of their oppressors -- the 50th anniversary of the day when we helped to do more to confer legitimacy on an illegitimate regime than at almost any other time.

If diplomatic exigencies require that we send such messages to the Soviet regime, it can be done through other channels. But if America Illustrated, which is a public diplomacy vehicle, is to be filled with such statements and the kind of apolitical, "National Geographic"-type contents which are usually carried therein, there is no point in publishing it.

Ideally, I would recommend that the entire statement be scrapped. But in the interest of bureaucratic peace, I believe that it would be best to use the amended draft appears at Tab I. I have cleared this draft with Speechwriters, State and USIA.

If, however, we were to conduct public diplomacy in a way that begins to reciprocate Soviet efforts in this field, I recommend in the memorandum to the President at Tab II that he sign the message at Tab A. I am under no illusions that the interagency process would approve this message (which needless to say has not been cleared), given the ongoing investment the State Department is making in certain elements of our bilateral relations. This message tells the truth and gets to the heart of the moral conflict facing the West and the spiritual agony

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



facing those enslaved by totalitarianism. It was drafted (with some of my own amendments) by a colleague at State, Jim Jatras, who shares my conviction that a key element in our national security strategy must be to convey to the subject peoples of the Soviet empire that we are on their side, that we pose no threat to them and that we are interested that they enjoy the same natural rights that we do. The fact that it is almost inconceivable that the interagency process could come up with such a message is testimony as to how far our government has strayed from representing the kind of civic courage that is required to avoid conducting relations with the USSR in unreciprocal ways and on Soviet terms.

For the immediate purposes at hand, I recommend that you authorize Bob Kimmitt to transmit the amended Presidential message at Tab I. But in addition, I recommend that you read the much longer message at Tab A and forward it to the President for his consideration. (Perhaps this might be most appropriate for his weekend reading -- although since it is timed for the end of the Russian Easter season which ends in mid-June, it might be handled more expeditiously.) If he likes either the statement itself or the general idea, we could get his permission to work with the State Department to produce a version which accommodates everyone's concerns.

WN  
Walt Raymond concurs.

#### RECOMMENDATION

1. That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to sign the memorandum to USIA at Tab I, forwarding an amended message.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab II forwarding for his consideration the message to the Russian people.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

3. That, if you think the attached memorandum to the President is inappropriate for any reason, you forward the message at Tab A informally to the President for his consideration.

Approve ✓ Disapprove for Cong David Consideration -  
WJR

#### Attachments:

|         |                                                                 |
|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tab I   | Memorandum from Kimmitt to USIA (with revised message)          |
| Tab II  | Memorandum to the President                                     |
| Tab A   | Proposed message to the Russian people                          |
| Tab III | Incoming memorandum from USIA, June 1, 1983, with draft message |

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT L. EARLE  
Executive Assistant to the Director  
United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to the Soviet People in  
America Illustrated Magazine

Attached is a slightly revised version of the message from the President to the peoples of the USSR for inclusion in America Illustrated. It includes the special message that the President would like to convey -- namely that we have no aggressive intentions toward them.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

cc: Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 12/5/00



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

### TO THE READERS OF AMERICA ILLUSTRATED

Fifty years ago, in November 1933, the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics established formal diplomatic relations. The establishment of our respective diplomatic missions in Washington and Moscow, and the appointments of William C. Bullit as U.S. Ambassador to the USSR and Aleksandr Troyanovsky as the USSR's Ambassador to the United States, marked an important change in the relations between our two countries. As President Franklin Delano Roosevelt said at the time, the difficulties between our two nations were "serious" but not "insoluble" and could be ameliorated by frank discussions and negotiations. Our goal then, as now, was the preservation of peace in the world.

In less than a decade, however, we found ourselves fighting together as Allies in World War II in the struggle against National Socialism. The enormous sacrifices that we all made in that war convinced both our countries that we would need to cooperate to preserve the peace, yet the differences between our governments remained serious. We both realize that, in this age of enormously destructive nuclear weapons, the world of 1983 poses new kinds of dangers compared to those of the world of 1933.

To cope with these dangers, I have suggested to our government and scientific community that we work toward developing a new form of defensive system to protect ourselves against the dangers of deliberate or accidental nuclear attack. It is because the American people have no quarrel with the peoples of the Soviet Union, and do not want to threaten you in any way, that we seek to abandon a defense strategy that relies exclusively on a retaliatory attack against you, your families and your homes. We in America hope that your government will find that mutual defense is a better way of maintaining peace and strategic stability than the existing strategy of retaliatory destruction or any strategy of an offensive first-strike nature.

Of course, defensive systems of this type are a hope for the future. But in the meantime, I want to stress my continuing commitment to achieving deep, balanced, and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons by both the Soviet government and mine.

The American people, like you, want peace, and our government is directly and immediately responsible to the people, by whom we were elected. Any attribution of hostile intentions to the U.S. is a misrepresentation of our policy. There is no possible electoral constituency in the U.S. in favor of a war of aggression, and the Soviet government knows this. Even when the U.S. had an absolute monopoly in nuclear weapons, this was the case. Then, as now, we did our best to convey our peaceful intentions.

Let us hope that our efforts to maintain nuclear peace can be matched by greater efforts to ensure that this peace be accompanied by freedom, justice, democracy and unconditional individual human rights for all people, so that the absence of war can mean not only international peace but peace at home as well. The U.S. was founded upon the concept of liberty as the divine birthright of all men. We stand today, as we did during World War II in the defense of liberty. Our hand is extended in friendship to the peoples of the USSR, for whom we wish only the blessings of peace, prosperity and freedom.