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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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FOIA ID: F95-001/4 (1544), Jespersen

File Folder: POW/MIA – Soviet Union

Date: 03/10/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	201139Z JUL 88, 2p <i>R 8/7/06 F95-001/4 #13</i>	7/20/88	B1
2. Cable	Re Meeting (first page of cable missing), 3p <i>R " " #14</i>	nd	B1
3. Cable	010838Z APR 87, 1p <i>PART 9/14/06 F95-001/4 #15</i>	4/1/87	B1
4. Memo	Childress to Jack Matlock re POW/MIA Issue, 1p <i>R 8/7/06 F95-001/4 #16</i>	10/31/85	B1
5. Cable	161855Z SEP 85, 4p <i>PART 8/7/06 F95-001/4 #17</i>	9/16/85	B1

RESTRICTIONS

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].

B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].

B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].

B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].

B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].

B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

<DIST>PRT: SIT
SIT: HUGHESJ KELLYJ PAAL LEDSKY MENATH VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUEHMO<DTG> 201139Z JUL 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
<TO> RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9460
IN RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8373

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: LETTER TO FM SHEVARDNADZE

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 17539

EXDIS

OPS CENTER PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: LETTER TO FM SHEVARDNADZE

REFS: A) SECTO 14136; B) SECTO 14092

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

SUMMARY

/-----

2. AMBASSADOR MET WITH FM SHEVARDNADZE ON JULY 19 TO DELIVER LETTER REF A. EXPRESSING SATISFACTION WITH RECENT SERIES OF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN SEVERAL REGIONAL CONFLICTS, SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION, WORKING TOGETHER, COULD GIVE IMPORTANT ENCOURAGEMENT TO THIS PROCESS. ON CAMBODIA, HE SAID:

--HE TOO WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT THINGS WERE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT;

--HE DECISION ON COMPLETE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL WAS ALREADY A FACT;

--THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION SHARED THE SAME VIEWS ON THE KHMER ROUGE PROBLEM;

--IT COULD PREJUDGE A KHMER DECISION FOR OTHERS TO STATE DEFINITELY AT THIS POINT THAT SIHANOUK SHOULD BE THE LEADER IN CAMBODIA.

FINALLY, SHEVARDNADZE INFORMED THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE WAS SENDING A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER REQUESTING FULL COOPERATION IN THE U.S. SEARCH FOR MISSING POWS FROM THE WAR, AND WOULD PASS THE RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY WHEN RECEIVED.

END SUMMARY

~END SUMMARY~

/-----

3. REQUESTING THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEND THE SECRETARY HIS GREETINGS, SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE WAS GOING TO WRITE THE SECRETARY SOON ON A NUMBER OF IDEAS. HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN SEVERAL REGIONAL CONFLICTS THAT HAD EMERGED SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS ON AFGHANISTAN; A WHOLE PROCESS SEEMED TO BE UNDERWAY. IRAN HAD JUST AGREED TO ACCEPT UN RESOLUTION 598, THE NEGOTIATIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA WERE GAINING MOMENTUM, AND NOW THERE WAS GOOD REASON TO HOPE THAT THINGS MIGHT BE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN

*Low/High
Soviet
(NOT Soviet Pows)*

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-001/4 #3
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 8/7/06

CAMBODIA. IN GENERAL, HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT TASK AND FELT THERE WAS MUCH WE COULD DO TOGETHER TO MOVE THINGS ALONG.

VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL

/-----
4. IN THE CASE OF CAMBODIA, SHEVARDNADZE CONTINUED, H'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW 50 PERCENT OF ITS TROOPS IMMEDIATELY HAD BEEN A SIGNIFICANT MOVE, UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTING TO SUBSEQUENT POSITIVE MOVEMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE DECISION ON COMPLETE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE, HE ASSERTED. IT WAS ALREADY A FACT IN THE EQUATION. HE FELT THE OPTIMISM HE DETECTED IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER WAS WELL FOUNDED.

KHMER ROUGE

/-----
5. THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION SHARED THE SAME APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF THE KHMER ROUGE, SHEVARDNADZE SAID. MOSCOW DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE REIGN OF TERROR REPEATED IN CAMBODIA AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE KHMER ROUGE WAS NEVER AGAIN IN A POSITION TO TAKE CONTROL.

SIHANOUK

/-----
6. SHEVARDNADZE THOUGHT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO BE ABLE TO STATE DEFINITELY THAT SIHANOUK MUST BE THE LEADER IN CAMBODIA. THIS WAS REALLY A DECISION TO BE
~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 17539

EXDIS

OPS CENTER PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TASS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: LETTER TO FM SHEVARDNADZE

MADE BY THE KHMER THEMSELVES. THE LEADER WOULD HAVE TO BE A MAN ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE GROUPS. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE SIHANOUK, BUT IT WAS NOT OUR PLACE TO PREJUDGE THE PROCESS, HE ARGUED.

HELPING SEARCH FOR US POWS FROM VIETNAM

/-----
7. REFERRING TO THE SECRETARY'S PREVIOUS LETTER FROM BANGKOK (REF B), SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE WAS SENDING A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER REQUESTING FULL COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. SEARCH FOR MISSING POWS FROM THE VIETNAM WAR. HE WOULD PASS THE RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BECAUSE HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT A CRITICAL ISSUE THIS WAS FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

MATLOCK

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 7539<STOR> 880720182753 MSG000206735273

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 7539<STOR> 880720182802 MSG000206735282

<TOR>880720183825

SUMMARY

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2. ON JULY 14, DCM MET WITH DEPUTY FM CHAPLIN TO DELIVER LETTER FROM SECRETARY (REFTEL) TO FM SHEVARDNADZE. CHAPLIN SAID HE WOULD PASS IT TO SHEVARDNADZE, WHO WAS STILL IN WARSAW ACCOMPANYING GORBACHEV. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, CHAPLIN GAVE AN UPBEAT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION LEADING INTO THE JAKARTA INFORMAL MEETING, SAYING MOSCOW WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH THE CHINESE STATEMENT OF JULY 1. HE SEEMED FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT SIHANOUK WOULD REJOIN THE PROCESS SOON. WITHOUT QUESTIONING THE U.S. PROPOSITION THAT VIETNAM SHOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE, CHAPLIN EXPRESSED STRONG DOUBT THAT ANY AMERICAN MILITARY WERE LIVING IN VIETNAM. WE FIND IT CURIOUS THAT CHAPLIN RESISTED MENTIONING THAT THE MYSTERIOUS HENG SAMRIN WAS MEETING WITH SAME DAY WITH GROMYKO IN MOSCOW.

END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

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3. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHATEVER REPLY THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD WISH TO MAKE, CHAPLIN OFFERED HIS OWN VIEW THAT THE ATMOSPHERE AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA SEEMED BETTER NOW THAN THEY HAD EVER BEEN. NOTING THAT HE HAD TRAVELLED PERSONALLY THROUGH VIETNAM, LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND THAILAND IN JUNE TO DEBRIEF ON THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, CHAPLIN SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE KEY PLAYERS IN THE POTENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS HAD ALL MOVED IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION. THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION ALREADY SHARED A COMMON POSITION ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT POINTS, INCLUDING THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE KHMER ROUGE. THE ASEAN COUNTRIES, WHO HAD EACH HELD A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT POSITION PREVIOUSLY, SEEMED TO HAVE MOVED TOGETHER, PARTICULARLY WITH THE RECENT MOVE BY THAILAND TOWARD COMPROMISE. THE THAI-VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING HAD BEEN HELPFUL. THE VIETNAMESE, OF COURSE, HAD NOW EFFECTIVELY SET A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL BY 1990 OR EVEN EARLIER. BUT MOST ENCOURAGING WAS THE JULY ONE STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE. MOSCOW WAS NOW STUDYING THIS STATEMENT CAREFULLY, BECAUSE IT APPEARED TO REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIALLY NEW POSITION ON THE PART OF BEIJING. FOR EXAMPLE, BEIJING WAS SAYING FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE POSSIBLE IN PARALLEL WITH VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL AND THAT ALL PARTIES MUST SHARE IN THE SETTLEMENT.

4. NOTING THAT HE HAD MET WITH THE THREE INDOCHINESE AMBASSADORS ON JULY 13 TO RECEIVE A READOUT ON THE INDOCHINESE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN PHNOM PENH JULY 11, CHAPLIN SAID THEY HAD CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO GO TO JARKARTA THIS MONTH ON THE TERMS THAT HAD BEEN AGREED EARLIER WITH INDONESIA.

*Dr/min
USSR
(not Sov. Pres)*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-001/4#14

BY ADJ, NARA, DATE 8/7/06

MOSCOW EXPECTED THE JAKARTA MEETING TO BE A REAL BREAKTHROUGH, HE DECLARED, BECAUSE IT WOULD REPRESENT THE BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE, EVEN IF IT DID NOT PRODUCE TANGIBLE RESULTS. RIGHT NOW DIALOGUE WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT INGREDIENT. CHAPLIN ADDED THAT SIHANOUK, WHILE DECLINING TO GO TO JARKARTA OFFICIALLY, HAD NOT RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WOULD TRAVEL TO INDONESIA BEFORE THE END OF THE MONTH. THIS, CHAPLIN CONCLUDED, WAS TANTAMOUNT TO KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN ON HIS RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD IT BE EXPEDIENT. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY'S JUDGMENT THAT SIHANOUK WAS A CLEVER TACTICIAN.

5. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN POWS IN VIETNAM, CHAPLIN ASKED WHETHER WE REALLY EXPECTED THAT ANY AMERICAN MILITARY WERE STILL ALIVE IN VIETNAM. RECALLING HIS YEARS AS AMBASSADOR IN HANOI, HE SAID THERE WERE HUNDEREDS OF SOVIETS IN VIETNAM STRETCHED FROM NORTH TO SOUTH AND IT WAS QUITE CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE PICKED UP ANY RUMORS OR EVIDENCE OF AMERICANS OR EUROPEANS LIVING AMONG VIETNAMESE. THEY HAD NEVER FOUND ANY SUCH EVIDENCE. THE DCM REPLIED THAT OUR MAJOR CONCERN WAS GAINING VIETNAMESE COOPERATION IN COLLECTING WHATEVER EVIDENCE MIGHT EXIST ABOUT POWS AND MIAS -- DEAD OR

BT
#7282

BT
SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 17282

DEPT PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: LETTER TO FM SHEVARDNADZE ON CAMBODIA ALIVE -- SO THAT PUBLIC DOUBTS IN THE U.S. COULD BE SATISFIED. UNTIL THIS ISSUE WAS PUT TO REST, U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM WOULD REMAIN STRAINED.

COMMENT

/-----

6. IT IS SURPRISING THAT CHAPLIN FAILED TO MENTION THAT HENG SAMRIN WAS MEETING WITH GROMYKO THE SAME DAY, ON HIS WAY THROUGH MOSCOW TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA. FOR THOSE WHO MAY WONDER WHETHER THERE REALLY IS A HENG SAMRIN, HE APPEARED IN LIVING COLOR ON THE SOVIET TV NEWS PROGRAM VREMYA JULY 14, ENGAGED IN SEMI-ANIMATED CONVERSATION WITH HIS HOST GROMYKO ABOUT THE PROMISING PROSPECTS FOR THE JAKARTA MEETING. HENG SAMRIN'S FORAY INTO THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO INJECT MORE SUBSTANCE INTO THE IMAGE OF THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME IN THE LEAD-UP TO THE UNGA DEBATE.

BIO NOTE

/-----

7. CHAPLIN'S PORTFOLIO AS DEPUTY MINISTER IS

STRICTLY ADMINISTRATIVE. WE WERE SURPRISED TO FIND THAT HE HAD BEEN PUT IN CHARGE OF DEPUTY MINISTER ROGACHEV'S ASIAN RESPONSIBILITIES WHILE ROGACHEV WAS ON VACATION. HE SEEMED PLEASED TO BE DEALING WITH US ON THIS ISSUE AND APPROACHED IT EXPANSIVELY. IN ADDITION TO AN INTERPRETER AND JOSIP PODRAZHANETS OF THE USA/CANADA DEPT., CHAPLIN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HEAD OF THE INDOCHINA DEPT AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE DIRECTORATE OF ASIAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES MYAKOTNYKH, WHO SERVED EARLIER AS HIS DCM IN HANOI.

MATLOCK

BT

#7282

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 02

<SSN>

7282

<TOR>

880715155732 MSG000206294252

<SECT>

SECTION: 02 OF 02

<SSN>

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DIA SPECIAL
HANDLING REQUIRED

SECRET

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FOIA(b)(1)

SUBJ: U.S. POW'S IN VIETNAM AND LAOS (b)

(S//NF//NF//NF)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AND A DISCUSSION ENSUED ABOUT HOW
EASILY THE MEN AND MACHINES OF A MILITARY FORCE COULD BE
SWALLOWED UP BY SUCH TERRAIN. SUDDENLY, KHAVINOV THEN
ASKED NO IF "HIS SIDE" BELIEVED THAT U.S. POW'S FROM THE
VIETNAM WAR WERE STILL BEING HELD IN INDOCHINA. NO
REPLIED WHILE WE OCCASIONALLY RECEIVED EVIDENCE WHICH
INDICATED U.S. POW'S INDEED STILL MIGHT BE PRESENT IN
VIETNAM OR LAOS, WE WERE ALWAYS SEEKING HARD INFORMATION
WHICH MIGHT SHED MORE LIGHT ON THIS QUESTION.

THEM TOLD NO THAT HE WAS GOING TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMA-
TION FOR TWO REASONS: HIS PERSONAL HUMANITARIAN
MOTIVATIONS AND HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR [REDACTED] THEN
STATED THAT "THERE ARE NO U.S. POW'S STILL ALIVE IN
VIETNAM OR LAOS, YOU CAN COUNT ON IT." TO LEND
AUTHORITY TO HIS STATEMENT, KHAVINOV THEN SAID THAT
HE HAD TWICE TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY IN VIETNAM ON EACH
OCCASION HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THERE WHO WER? IN A POSITION TO KNOW. HE
FURTHER STATED THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH
MANY OF THE [REDACTED] WHO HAD SERVED IN VIETNAM
AND HAD ACCESS TO THEIR REPORTS. SEVERAL TIMES DURING
THIS PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION HE REPEATED: "THERE
ARE NO U.S. POW'S STILL ALIVE IN VIETNAM OR LAOS;
YOU CAN COUNT ON IT, I KNOW."

(S//NF//NF//NF) NO THEN CHALLENGED [REDACTED] BY
ASKING IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR U.S. POW'S TO BE HELD
IN VIETNAM OR LAOS WITHOUT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
[REDACTED] THERE KNOWING ABOUT IT. [REDACTED] RE-
PLIED: "AS I'VE TOLD YOU BEFORE, THE VIETNAMESE
ARE VERY TOUGH AND INDEPENDENT GUYS; OUR INFLUENCE
ON THEM IS LIMITED. HOWEVER, WE HAVE VERY GOOD
INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN VIETNAM AND
LAOS. I HAVE ACCESS TO THAT INFORMATION AND I AM
AS SURE AS ANYONE CAN BE THAT THERE ARE NO U.S. POW'S
STILL ALIVE IN VIETNAM OR LAOS."

1 (S//NF//NF//NF) THE CONTENTS OF THIS MSG WILL BE
SHOWN TO SINO (S//NF).
DCL: OADR

ACTION DIA/SPEC(8)

(M)

MCN-87091/02783

TDR-87091/0905Z

TAD-87091/0911Z

CDSN-MIA937

PAGE 1 OF 1

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F95-001/4 #15
By LOT, NARA, Date 9/14/06



DEC 20 1985

90 12/20

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

POW/MIA
Soviets

Dear Mr. Applegate:

Mr. Oglesby at the White House has passed to me the November 15 letter you and your colleagues wrote to the President urging him to raise with the Soviets during the Geneva Summit meeting the issue of American prisoners and missing in action in Indochina. I can assure you that this Department shares your perception of the importance of this issue and your desire that it be resolved.

The Secretary, on behalf of the President, did bring up the POW/MIA issue with the Soviet Foreign Minister during the course of their discussions at Geneva. In doing so he underlined the importance the United States attaches to its resolution. Mr. Shevardnadze replied that the Vietnamese Government had told the Soviets that it planned to be responsive to American concerns on this issue.

While this exchange was useful and it is wise to remind Vietnam's principal ally of the importance of this issue, it is our general view that real progress in the resolution of the cases of our missing men must come through contacts with the governments directly involved. We are pursuing such a course with Vietnam and Laos, and though we are still far short of obtaining their full cooperation, we have made gratifying progress during the last three years. This has been particularly true this year during which Vietnam has agreed to an accelerated rate of cooperation, including the return of more remains than in any year since 1973, more frequent technical meetings and our first joint excavation of a crash site, and Laos has similarly cooperated in a crash site excavation. I have enclosed a paper which outlines what has happened on this issue and where we now stand.

The Honorable
Douglas Applegate,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

- 2 -

We will continue, under the President's direction, to pursue resolution of this important issue. We owe it to our missing men who served, and may still be serving, this nation so well and we owe it to their families.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosures:

Correspondence Returned.

Outline on American Servicemen
Missing in Indochina.

Drafted: EAP/VLC:STJohnson)
12/05/85:x23132:W-4542

Cleared: EAP:JCMonjo
EAP:Staff Assts.
EAP/VLC:MLBreckon)
EUR/SOV:EEdelman)
NSC:RChildress)
S:JBenton (subs)
H:RBock

~~SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

POW/MIA
S. U.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 31, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK F. MATLOCK

FROM: RICHARD CHILDRESS *RC*
SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issue and the Soviets

One of the few topics that elicited a grudging recognition from the Soviets during Wolfowitz's regional discussions was the POW/MIA issue. The Soviets indicated they would pass on our concerns after years of saying it is strictly bilateral and none of their business.

The Vietnamese agreed in August of this year (when I led a delegation to Hanoi) to a two-year work plan to resolve the issue. I followed this meeting up in New York and we have a document now that lays out the work. We received word this week from Hanoi of the agreed date for the first joint crash site excavation in Vietnam and we expect another large turnover of remains.

As a follow-up to the Wolfowitz meeting, we agreed to have the President mention the topic at the Summit as he has done with the Chinese.

Below is a brief talking point which will continue the momentum:

Our recent understandings with the Vietnamese on the humanitarian issue of accounting for our missing in action are encouraging. We believe this activity is in Vietnam's national interest and hope that you will encourage them to continue on this constructive path.

Bud is aware of the initiative.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-004/1 #16
BY WJS NARA, DATE 8/7/06

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

*Pow/MIA
Soviet Union*

PAGE 01 OF 02 TOKYO 9178
EOB790 AN005389

DTG: 161855Z SEP 85 PSN: 004499
TOR: 260/1510Z CSN: HCE133

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 08 TOKYO 19178

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UR, XB
SUBJECT: US-SOVIET ASIAN EXPERT TALKS

COMPROMISE" IN THE UPCOMING TALKS WITH IOC OFFICIALS IN SWITZERLAND. A/S WOLFOWITZ WELCOMED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR AN ROK-DPRK DIALOGUE BUT NOTED IOC RULES SEEMED TO PRECLUDE THE PROSPECT OF PYONGYANG CO-HOSTING THE GAMES. HE TERMED THE NORTH KOREAN IMPLICATION THAT IT MIGHT DISRUPT THE GAMES IF IT DID NOT GET ITS WAY BOTH "OUTRAGEOUS AND DANGEROUS."

30. ON INDOCHINA, MR. WOLFOWITZ SPOKE OF OUR CONCERN FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AND FOR OUR ALLY THAILAND AS A RESULT OF VIETNAM'S CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA. POINTING OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTENTION OF "PUNISHING" VIETNAM FOR THE OUTCOME OF OUR INVOLVEMENT THERE TEN YEARS AGO, WOLFOWITZ STATED THAT -- TO THE CONTRARY--"WE WOULD FRANKLY WELCOME A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM, AND VIETNAM COULD BENEFIT FROM THIS" IN RETURN, PROVIDED THE CAMBODIAN OCCUPATION IS TERMINATED. HE ALSO STRESSED US DESIRE TO RESOLVE HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THE POW/MIA ISSUE. A/S WOLFOWITZ, REJECTING EARLIER SOVIET ASSERTIONS, EMPHATICALLY STATED THAT INDOCHINA'S ONGOING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS COULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA, WHICH HAD ALREADY ENDED 13 YEARS AGO. WASHINGTON DID NOT SUPPORT, AND HAD NEVER SUPPORTED, POL POT OR THE KHMER ROUGE. WE ARE FORCED TO REGARD WITH THE GREATEST SKEPTICISM HANOI'S PROFESSIONS OF PRIORITY COMMITMENT TO ELIMINATION OF THE KHMER ROUGE IN VIEW OF SRV ACTIONS IN THE PAST DRY SEASON OFFENSIVE, WHEN IT CONDUCTED ITS EARLIEST AND MOST VIGOROUS OFFENSIVES AGAINST KPNLF CAMPS ALONG THE THAI BORDER. WOLFOWITZ REAFFIRMED THE US INTEREST IN SEEING A TRULY NON-ALIGNED REGIME INSTALLED IN PHNOM PENH. HE EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT HANOI RECENTLY HAS VOLUNTEERED TO COOPERATE MORE EXTENSIVELY IN AN ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING US SERVICEMEN, AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT MOSCOW CAN ADD ITS ENCOURAGEMENT ON THIS.

31. IN ADDITION, WOLFOWITZ URGED MOSCOW TO SUPPORT THE RELEASE OF RE-EDUCATION CAMP PRISONERS IN VIETNAM

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95 001/4#17
By 101, NARA, Date 8/7/06

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

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DTG: 161855Z SEP 85 PSN: 004499

FORMERLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE US. THEIR RELEASE WOULD POSE NO THREAT TO VIETNAM AND WOULD BE A VALUABLE HUMANITARIAN GESTURE. WOLFOWITZ ALSO CONDEMNED RECENT INSTANCES OF SOVIET SHIPS FORCIBLY REPATRIATING VIETNAMESE REFUGEES AND CALLED UPON THE SOVIETS INSTEAD TO ABIDE BY INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE IN TRANSPORTING REFUGEES TO THIRD COUNTRY PORTS.

32. IN HIS REMARKS [REDACTED]
-- SPOKE OF THE REBIRTH OF KAMPUCHEA FROM THE RUINS OF 1978 AS AN "IRREVERSIBLE SITUATION."

FOIA(b) (1)

-- CALLED FOR A DIALOGUE BASED ON INDOCHINESE PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY THE AUGUST COMMUNIQUE OF THE INDOCHINA FOREIGN MINISTERS IN VIENTIANE.

-- INDICATED SOME SOVIET INTEREST IN THE MALAYSIAN VARIANT OF ASEAN TALKS WITH INDOCHINA BUT CALLED THE THAILAND PROPOSAL UNACCEPTABLE.

-- IMPLIED US INTERFERENCE WITH ASEAN EFFORTS TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE ON KAMPUCHEA.

-- ASSERTED VIETNAM'S RIGHT TO "DEFEND ITSELF" BY CONDUCTING INCURSIONS INTO THAILAND FROM KAMPUCHEA WHILE PARADOXICALLY CLAIMING THAT VIETNAM POSED "NO THREAT" TO BANGKOK.

-- ENCOURAGED DIRECT US-VIETNAM CONTACTS ON IMPROVED RELATIONS, BUT PROMISED TO PASS ON OUR CONCERNS TO HANOI.

33. [REDACTED] DECLARED
THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT SEEK ANY SPECIAL BENEFIT

FROM THE "REBIRTH" PROCESS IN VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA, AND THAT THE PROCESS IS NOT ORIENTED AGAINST ANY THIRD COUNTRY. THE VIETNAMESE ARMY DOES NOT MAINTAIN AN AGGRESSIVE POSTURE; ITS "VOLUNTEERS" IN CAMBODIA ARE THERE AT THE INVITATION OF PHNOM PENH SOLELY TO PROVIDE A "SHIELD" AND TO "SWEEP THE COUNTRY OF BANDITS." VIETNAMESE INCURSIONS IN THAILAND ARE LEGITIMATE ACTS OF SELF-DEFENSE IF WE TAKE AS A PREMISE THAT KAMPUCHEA IS A REALITY. THAILAND IS WHERE THE REAL THREAT ORIGINATES. IT IS ONLY LOGICAL TO EXPECT THAT BANGKOK SHOULD AGREE TO PROPOSALS FOR A BORDER ZONE OF NEUTRALITY. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IS A CARRYOVER FROM THE US WAR IN VIETNAM, HE
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ASSERTED, BUT ADDED THAT MOSCOW KNOWS THAT VIETNAM WOULD
LIKE TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM "LEGALLY RATHER THAN
ILLEGALLY."

FOIA(b) (1)

34. RETURNING TO THE CONVERSATION, [REDACTED] ASSERTED
THAT THE ASEAN STATES ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE QUESTION OF
VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA IS A VERY DIFFICULT
ONE; AND HE CLAIMED THAT SINGAPORE PRIME MINISTER LEE
KUAN YEW HAS TOLD THE SOVIETS HE KNOWS THAT "IF VIETNAM
WITHDRAWS TODAY, POL POT WILL BE BACK TOMORROW." AN
EXACT DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL HAS NOW BEEN GIVEN (1990), A
POINT THAT BOSTORIN STRESSED AS VERY SIGNIFICANT.

35. MR. WOLFOWITZ CITED THE "GREAT GAP BETWEEN
VIETNAM'S WORDS AND ITS ACTIONS" ON THIS ISSUE, POINTING
PARTICULARLY TO THE RECENT MASSIVE VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE
AGAINST NON-COMMUNIST KHMER RESISTANCE FORCES. IT SEEMS
THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE NOW BECOMING AS HATED BY THE
CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AS THE KHMER ROUGE ONCE WERE. HE
REMINDS THE SOVIETS THAT THE DEATHS OF TENS OF THOUSANDS
OF VIETNAMESE REFUGEES WAS A MASSIVE ATROCITY, SMALL ONLY
IN COMPARISON TO POL POT'S BUTCHERIES, AND AGAIN CALLED
ON THE SOVIETS TO HONOR THE FUNDAMENTAL OBLIGATION TO
CARRY REFUGEES TO THE NEAREST NEUTRAL PORT.

36. WOLFOWITZ OBSERVED THAT IN THE US VIEW VIETNAM SEEMS
TO WANT TO DICTATE POLICY IN THE REGION WITHOUT REGARD
FOR OTHERS AND CALLED UPON HANOI TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY
AFFORDED BY ASEAN'S PROPOSAL FOR PROXIMITY TALKS IF IT
WAS SERIOUS IN SEEKING A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT. HE
CORRECTED THE SOVIET MISPERCEPTION THAT RECENT
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS WERE MEANT FOR THE KHMER
ROUGE. MR. WOLFOWITZ REMINDS [REDACTED] THAT IT WAS NOT
THE US WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE CREATION OF THE KHMER
ROUGE OR OUR DOCTRINES WHICH THEY USED WHEN THEY CAME TO
POWER. WHY, HE INSISTED, IS HANOI FIGHTING SO HARD TO
ELIMINATE THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IF ITS MAIN WORRY
IS, AS CLAIMED, THE RETURN OF POL POT? HE REHEARSED THE
BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE ICK PROPOSAL AND THE ASEAN APPEAL

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AND EXPLAINED HOW THEY COULD ASSURE AN INDEPENDENT, NON-ALIGNED CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT CHOSEN BY FREE ELECTIONS THAT THE KHMER ROUGE COULD NOT POSSIBLY WIN.

37. [REDACTED] RETURNED FRIDAY AFTERNOON FOR A BRIEF WRAP-UP SESSION WHICH LASTED FORTY MINUTES. HE BEGAN BY REQUESTING US VIEWS ON THREE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS.

FOIA(b)(1)

38. ON ASIAN CBM PROPOSALS, A/S WOLFOWITZ INDICATED A PREFERENCE FOR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS SUCH AS THOSE MADE BY US IN KOREA, RATHER THAN VAGUE DECLARATIONS OF PRINCIPLE. [REDACTED] ASKED IF WE WOULD REJECT POL POT'S PARTICIPATION IN A CAMBODIAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WOLFOWITZ REPEATED OUR DISTASTE FOR THE KHMER ROUGE AND URGED PRIMARY FOCUS ON THE ELABORATION OF MECHANISMS FOR FREE ELECTIONS IN CAMBODIA, ELECTIONS WE WERE CERTAIN WOULD REPUDIATE POL POT AND HIS FOLLOWERS.

39. [REDACTED] ASKED IF THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO STAND AS GUARANTORS, ALONG WITH THE SOVIETS AND PERHAPS OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNSC, OF A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT REACHED BETWEEN INDOCHINA, ASEAN, AND PERHAPS OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES. A/S WOLFOWITZ RESPONDED THAT WHILE WE WOULD TAKE SUCH A REQUEST VERY SERIOUSLY WE CANNOT COMMIT IN ABSTRACT TO SUCH A ROLE. IT WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT WE WERE ASKED TO GUARANTEE AND WHO ASKED US TO DO SO. UNFORTUNATELY, WE SEEM TO BE A LONG WAY FROM ANY CONCRETE AGREEMENT.

40. A/S WOLFOWITZ THEN WENT BACK TO THE QUESTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN YONG BYONG WHICH HAD

BEEN RAISED THE FIRST AFTERNOON WITH [REDACTED] CAREFULLY RESTATED THE SOVIET UNION'S ABIDING COMMITMENT TO NON-PROLIFERATION PRINCIPLES, SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THESE APPLIED TO THE DPRK, BUT THEN SAID HE HAD "NO INFORMATION" ON THIS QUESTION. HE OFFERED TO INFORM US AS INFORMATION BECAME AVAILABLE AND A/S WOLFOWITZ THANKED HIM FOR THIS COMMITMENT.

41. TURNING TO HIS BROAD SUMMARY, [REDACTED] STATED THAT THE USSR TOOK THE NOVEMBER GENEVA MEETING VERY SERIOUSLY. ACCUSING THE US OF A "CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH" TO ASIA, WHICH HE CONTRASTED TO HIS OWN GOVERNMENT'S "MORE POSITIVE" POLICIES, [REDACTED] SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE REGIONAL EXCHANGES LIKE THE EAST ASIAN SESSION AND OTHERS THAT HAVE ALREADY TAKEN
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