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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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FOIA ID: F95-001/4 (1544), Jespersen

File Folder: POW/MIA – Soviet Union POWs/MIAs

Date: 03/10/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	152054Z AUG 88, 1p <i>R 8/7/06 F95-001/4 #18</i>	8/15/88	B1
2. Cable	180922Z JUN 88, 2p <i>R " " #19</i>	6/18/88	B1
3. Memo	Tyrus Cobb to Paul Schott Stevens re Breakfast Item, 1p <i>R " " #20</i>	6/14/88	B1
4. Talking Points	POW/MIA (Soviet and U.S.), 2p <i>R " " #21</i>	nd	B1
5. Cable	101855Z JUN 88, 2p <i>PART " " #22</i>	6/10/88	B1

RESTRICTIONS

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].

B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].

B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].

B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].

B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].

B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

Soviet Pows

PAGE 01

NSC: CHLD KELL
<DIST>SIT: VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 152054Z AUG 88
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2430
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY PRIORITY 0322
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1891

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SOVIET POWS

~~SECRET~~ STATE 264841

E. O. 12355: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, AF

SUBJECT: SOVIET POWS

REFS: (A) STATE 260889 (B) STATE 197098

-- (C) ISLAMABAD 16933

1. REFTEL REPORTS MOST RECENT SOVIET DEMARCHE SEEKING U. S. ASSISTANCE IN PROPER HANDLING OF SOVIET POWS. PLEASE TAKE EARLY OCCASION TO BRIEF GOP ON SOVIET PRESENTATION, NOTING SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET CONCURRENCE WITH OUR VIEW THAT HANDLING OF POWS SHOULD BE BASED ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION, WITH CENTRAL ROLE FOR THE ICRC IN THIS PROCESS.

2. YOU ALSO SHOULD REITERATE TO GOP--AND FIND OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO AGAIN WITH RESISTANCE--IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO PROPER HANDLING OF POW MATTERS, DRAWING ON PARA 6 REF B. IN THAT CONNECTION, SAY THAT WE STRONGLY APPROVE OF THE WAY IN WHICH GOP AND THE RESISTANCE HANDLED MOST RECENT CASE OF TWO SOVIETS OF UZBEK ORIGIN (REF C) AND IN PARTICULAR RESPONSIVENESS TO ICRC INTERVIEW WHICH DETERMINED THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO BE REPATRIATED TO THE USSR.

3. TO THE GOP, YOU SHOULD ADD THAT IN REPLY TO MOST RECENT SOVIET DEMARCHE, WE WILL REITERATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, NOTE CENTRAL ROLE OF GENEVA CONVENTION AND ICRC. AND AGAIN URGE SOVIETS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR OWN HAND WITH THE MUJ BY FACILITATING ICRC ACCESS TO MUJ PRISONERS OF THE RA. WHITEHEAD

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 4841 <STOR> 880815185128 MSG000208983088
<TOR>880815185707

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-001/4#18
BY LOT NARA, DATE 8/7/06

~~SECRET~~

GEORGE C. WORTLEY
27TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEES:
BANKING, FINANCE AND
URBAN AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND
INSURANCE
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT

SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

August 12, 1988

Somit Pow!

6031
229 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-3701

DISTRICT OFFICES:
1269 FEDERAL BUILDING
SYRACUSE, NY 13260
(315) 423-5657
(800) 462-8080
601 LAKEPORT ROAD
CHITTENANGO, NY 13037
(315) 687-5027

AUG 15 1988

Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell
Asst. to the President
for National Security Affairs
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20506

Dear General Powell:

I am writing to express my grave concern about a potential problem associated with the repatriation of POWs under the recent Afghanistan accord.

As you know, several hundred Soviet soldiers either have been captured by the Mujahideen or have deserted to join their ranks. It has come to my attention that the Soviets have asked the State Department to intervene in this situation to ensure that all POWs are returned. While I appreciate the complexity of the situation, I believe that there are valid arguments against repatriation. Therefore, I strongly urge you to prevent any attempts by any U.S. officials whatsoever to forcibly repatriate the Soviet soldiers in question. It is important that all POWs and defectors be given complete freedom to choose whether or not they will return to the Soviet Union.

I am enclosing a copy of a fact sheet from the Congress of Russian Americans which addresses this problem and proposes specific solutions. Please give it your careful attention.

I appreciate your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,


George C. Wortley
Member of Congress

GCW:dwg

Enclosures



July 21, 1988

THE RESCUE OF SOVIET POWs IN AFGHANISTAN.

The founding of "The International Committee for the Rescue of Russian Prisoners of War in Afghanistan" has been reported in the press in June of this year. The committee is co-chaired by the Russian artist Mihail Cherniakin and the American author Susanne Massie. According to the press releases by the committee organizers and members, this group is not connected with any political organization and is pursuing solely humanitarian goals to rescue prisoners.

From the available information, the committee is working closely with the Soviet government which is unable to establish any direct contact with the Afghan mujahideen who are holding 200-250 Soviet POWs and defectors. Thus, the purpose of the committee is to serve as mediator between the Soviet authorities and the Afghan partisans.

The committee's humanitarian aims, as we understand, cannot be limited only to locating the missing men, to negotiating with the mujahideen for their release and to giving the men medical care but must also include caring for them, i.e. planning for their future upon their return home. In this respect the committee undoubtedly relies completely on the Soviet government which offers assurances that no returnee would be subjected to persecution and would be able to resume normal life.

These assurances are precisely what greatly disturbs us. Because of the experience of the past seventy years, we have every reason to distrust such assurances by the Soviet government. Examples are readily available in the sad demise of ordinary Soviet people who were brought to Germany during WW II from the German-occupied regions of the Soviet Union and who were returned to their native land in festively draped trains, to the land that "was waiting for them and forgave them everything", then ended up in labor camps or exile to remote regions. As to the tragic fate of the Soviet POWs, there are many eye-witnesses from among the former concentration camp inmates to tell the sad story of all those unfortunates. For some unexplained reason these eye-witnesses are not represented in the membership of the Committee.

It is rumored that in these times of "democratization" and "glasnost", conditions have changed and we can trust the Soviet punitive arm to observe "socialist humanism" toward the amnestied defectors to the Afghan partisans. However, we have no reason to be confident that after some period of time, during which the amnestied young men will have been forgotten in the West, they will not be gradually dispatched to certain institutions for "treatment of their psychological traumas".

It is essential that the POWs and especially the defectors be given complete freedom to choose between returning to their homeland or settling in the West. With this in mind, it is necessary to enlist the cooperation of such organizations as the Tolstoy Foundation which has considerable contacts both in Europe and in the USA for settling people. But, above all, the entire procedure of freeing the POWs and giving them the freedom to choose where to settle must take place under the supervision of a commission which includes official representatives from the US and other democratic countries capable of exerting, if need be, diplomatic pressures on

the Soviet Union, something the above-mentioned committee of private individuals would not have the authority to exercise.

The problem of the missing Soviet servicemen in Afghanistan is very complex, requiring a well thought out approach. We should not forget that most of the Soviet soldiers, presently in the hands of the mujahideens, are actually deserters; therefore, it is very difficult to believe that the Soviet government, in spite of all their assurances of a general amnesty, would let them go without punishment. This is especially pertinent to those men who fought in the ranks of Afghan partisans against the Soviet troops. Of course, they will be tried, although they could be done away with without any trial, in which case the role of the rescue committee may be far from its humanitarian purpose if it fails to provide the men with the right to a political asylum in the West.

We trust the good intentions of the founders and members of the committee but it seems to us that they do not fully realize whom they are helping: the missing Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan or the Soviet government.

In order not to repeat the shameful return of Soviet prisoners after WW II, it is mandatory to form on the state level an international committee made up of persons responsible to their governments and the public and who are delegated with full authority to conduct negotiations with the Soviet government, the Afghan resistance forces as well as with Pakistan on whose territory some of the POWs may be held. It must be stipulated in negotiating with the Soviet Union that the Western countries have the right to verify the condition of the returnees from Afghanistan for a period of 10 years. Above all, there should be an investigation of the causes which compelled the Soviet soldiers to defect to the mujahideen, since the responsibility for their desertion, according to the available testimony, is on the Soviet government and the military command.

Congress of Russian-Americans, Inc.
P.O. Box 818, Nyack, N.Y. 10960

ST>PRT: SIT
T: VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUEHC #<DTG> 180922Z JUN 88
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC
<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0000
RUSBKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SOVIET MILITARY PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ STATE 197098

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, AF, PK, UR, ICRC

SUBJECT: SOVIET MILITARY PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN

REFS: (A) STATE 79389 (NOTAL) (C) GENEVA 6653

(B) STATE 173735 (D) MOSCOW 14539(NOTAL)

1. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AT MOSCOW UNIVERSITY, PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST IN GAINING THE RELEASE OF SOVIET PRISONERS. ISSUE WAS ALSO RAISED IN HUMAN RIGHTS WORKING GROUP BY FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF GLUKHOV OF MFA'S HUMANITARIAN AND CULTURAL TIES ADMINISTRATION (REF D, PARA 8). THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT PUBLICLY CONFIRMED WHAT WE HAVE SOUGHT TO BRING ABOUT IN RECENT MONTHS THROUGH THE ICRC AND IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOP AND RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED AND OFFERED TO ASSIST THE ICRC IN GAINING THE RELEASE OF ALL CAPTURED PERSONNEL, AS THE AFGHAN WAR WINDS DOWN. WE HAVE FURTHER URGED THE ICRC TO ASSURE THAT ALL SOVIET PRISONERS ARE GIVEN THE CHOICE OF WHETHER TO BE REPATRIATED OR RESETTLED; WE WOULD BE WILLING TO ASSIST THOSE OPTING FOR RESETTLEMENT.

2. WE HAVE MADE OUR POSITION KNOWN IN DETAIL TO THE GOP AND TO THE ICRC (REF A, BEING REPEATED TO MOSCOW). WE ALSO HAVE URGED THE LEADERSHIP OF THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE TO ABIDE BY THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON POWS.

3. GIVEN THE USSR'S PUBLICLY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN RECOVERING MISSING SOVIET SOLDIERS, AND THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AT MOSCOW UNIVERSITY, WE BELIEVE IT IS TIMELY TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A DIALOGUE ON THE MATTER. WE ALSO BELIEVE IT APPROPRIATE TO ASK SOVIETS TO ASSIST WITH OUR POW/MIA PROBLEM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITHOUT, HOWEVER, ESTABLISHING ANY CONDITIONALITY BETWEEN THE TWO. SPECIFICALLY, WE ASK THAT EMBASSY MOSCOW REVIEW WITH APPROPRIATE SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS, INCLUDING GLUKHOV, WHAT WE HAVE DONE THUS FAR, DRAWING ON PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE, AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- US MAINTAINS A STRONG CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON CAPTURED PERSONNEL. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED THE ICRC TO PLAY ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE IN THIS MATTER AND ALSO URGED THE GOP AND THE RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP TO ASSIST IN EVERY WAY THEY CAN. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. (AT ITS DISCRETION, EMBASSY CAN PROVIDE A COPY OF PAPER CONTAINED REF A SAYING THAT THIS IS A FORMAL STATEMENT OF OUR POSITION, WHICH IS KNOWN BOTH TO THE GOP AND ICRC.)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-001/4 #9

BY LOT NARA, DATE 8/7/06

-- FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION ON THE MEMBERS, IDENTITY OR WHEREABOUTS OF SOVIET PRISONERS. HOWEVER, RECENTLY WE LEARNED THROUGH A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT THREE PRISONERS DIED IN 1984. THEY WERE SERGEI MESHCHERYAKOV, FROM VORONEZH; ANDREI VANEYEV, FROM PEVROMAYSK; AND VALERYI KISELEV, FROM PENZA.

-- IN OUR VIEW, THE ICRC IS THE LOGICAL AND MOST CAPABLE ORGANIZATION FOR THIS JOB AND WE URGE THE USSR TO BE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEM. HOWEVER, FOR THE ICRC TO ACT EFFECTIVELY IT MUST BE IN A POSITION TO WORK ON BEHALF OF ALL CAPTURED PERSONNEL, BOTH THOSE HELD BY THE MUJAHADIN AND THOSE HELD BY THE RA AND THE USSR. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE USSR, THROUGH ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE RA, CAN PROVIDE THE ICRC WITH ACCESS TO RA - HELD COMBATANTS, IT WILL ALSO IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF THE ICRC TO GAIN ACCESS TO SOVIET PRISONERS OF THE MUJAHADIN.

-- FOR OUR PART, WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION AND WILL BE WILLING TO WORK WITH THE USSR TO THAT END.

-- WE CONSIDER THIS A HUMANITARIAN EFFORT AND A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. IN THAT SAME SPIRIT, WE ASK THAT THE SOVIETS PROVIDE COMPARABLE ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING ON OUR POW/MIA'S FROM THE VIETNAMESE. AS SOVIETS ARE AWARE, THIS IS A MATTER OF GREAT PERSONAL CONCERN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

5. FOR GENEVA: PLEASE BRIEF THE ICRC ON OUR APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS, AND ASSURE THEM OF OUR CONTINUING WILLINGNESS TO HELP. ON THREE MATTERS RAISED, PARA FIVE REF B, MISSION SHOULD RESPOND AS FOLLOWS:

WE HAVE AND WILL USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE.

- WE HAVE VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ON NUMBERS, WHEREABOUTS, OR IDENTITIES OF VARIOUS PRISONERS. SEPARATELY, WE WILL TRY TO MAKE AVAILABLE WHAT INFORMATION WE HAVE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SPECIFIC INFO ICRC MIGHT HAVE.

-- WE WILL TRY OUR BEST TO PROTECT THE ICRC; WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN COMPROMISING OUR RELATIONS WITH THAT ORGANIZATION.

6. FOR ISLAMABAD: PLEASE BRIEF GOP ON APPROACH WE HAVE TAKEN WITH USSR AND ICRC AND INQUIRE WHETHER THEY HAVE HELD ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE SUBJECT. AS GOP IS AWARE, FROM COMPREHENSIVE PAPER WE PRESENTED TO THEM (REF A), WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE ICRC AND THE APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION. EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO FIND EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE TO THE RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP OUR VIEWS ON THIS SCORE AND EMPHASIZE TO THEM THAT BY CONFORMING TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION AND COOPERATING WITH THE ICRC THEY WILL ADD TO THEIR STATURE INTERNATIONALLY. SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 7098<STOR> 880618112535 MSG000203945135
<TOR>880618113449

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NON-LOG

Soviet POWs

INFORMATION

June 14, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *W*
SUBJECT: Breakfast Item -- POWs/Defectors

There are two related aspects of this issue that need to be raised: shifting the Soviet defector/POW program to a more overt operation, and enlisting Soviet pressure on Viet-Nam to be more forthcoming in our efforts to find American MIAs in IndoChina.

- AFGHANISTAN: The current program, which should not be discussed in any detail given the compartmented nature of its operation, has successfully brought several Soviet POWs/Defectors to the West. However, the program has been very expensive and placed an enormous burden on DOD. Now that the May 15 agreement is in place, State is working to develop an overt program under the auspices of responsible international agencies to assume responsibility for the release, repatriation or resettlement of all persons held captive in the Afghan conflict.
- U.S./SOVIET COOPERATION: In his Moscow address to MGU, in response to a question from the audience, President Reagan indicated he would be willing to help in the effort to find and repatriate Soviet prisoners. State should prepare a cable, cleared with us and DoD, on how this might be done.
- SOVIET ASSISTANCE FOR U.S. POW/MIA ISSUE: Cooperation with the Soviets over Afghanistan would demonstrate in a concrete way that the return of POWs or remains is a humanitarian matter separate from political differences, our public stance with Hanoi. Thus, we maximize possible leverage on the Soviets to influence Vietnamese cooperation with us. Although we cannot make our help a formal precondition, due to our public humanitarian stance, reminding the Soviets of our previous requests for help with Hanoi would be implicit linkage to our offer to help with Pakistan.

We do not expect the discussion to be conclusive, but should generate a few ideas for a "game plan" for handling these interrelated problems.

Bob Oakley, Barry Kelly and *Asu concur* Dick Childress concur.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-001/4 #20

BY LOT NARA, DATE 8/7/06

6/15/88

RC - -

Copy provided to
Ly Cobb.

Q.

-4-

FROM LEAGUE NEWSLETTER, GOING TO PRINTER 6/15/88

U.S. ASKED TO HELP WITH ACCOUNTING FOR SOVIET MIAs: According to press reports emanating from Moscow at the conclusion of the summit, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is seeking U.S. help to find more than 300 soldiers listed as Missing in Action during the war in Afghanistan. Quoting a June 1st United Press International (UPI) release from Moscow, General Secretary Gorbachev stated, "I too have received letters from some of the mothers of those who are missing in Afghanistan," adding that although this was not discussed directly with President Reagan, "at the level of experts, we have begun discussing these questions." He concluded with a commitment for the Soviet Government that, "We shall do all in our power to return our people to their homes." President Reagan was asked by students at Moscow State University if he was willing to help and reportedly stated, "Very much so. We would like nothing better than that."

Comment: Had the priority and visibility of the issue not been established, such questions would not have been raised in the context of the summit. It is also important that the President responded positively, demonstrating that accounting for missing individuals is humanitarian, not political, and an issue which should be of concern to all nations. This incident served as an opportunity to emphasize the fact that the U.S. Government's policy on separating humanitarian issues from policy differences is international in scope and something with which all nations should try to assist.

Unfortunately, a few family members, calling themselves "The American League of Families of Prisoners of War in Laos," attempted to distort the President's humanitarian pledge by calling his commitment "an absolute outrage." It is difficult to understand how anyone could view such an interpretation as helpful to returning our men, particularly implying that the Soviets have never been asked to help with the American POW/MIA issue - a completely false assertion. We, as family members, should hope that General Secretary Gorbachev will respond to the appeals in the same spirit as President Reagan.

AMERICAN TO BE RELEASED FROM CAMBODIA: According to a June 11th Associated Press (AP) release from Bangkok, the government in Phnom Penh plans to release American citizen Sterling Brian Bono who was seized on May 2, 1987 after he crossed the Thai border into western Cambodia. "Some reports have said that Bono, a Vietnam War Army veteran, crossed into Cambodia to look for some 80 Americans still listed as missing in action from the Indochina conflict. Others said Bono hoped to locate and help Vietnamese he had known during the war who he thought might have fled to the Thai-Cambodian border area." Phnom Penh's Prime Minister Hun Sen had publicly admitted detaining Bono last year; however, no date was given for his release. There is as yet no response to repeated requests to release the remains of Americans Hun Sen claims are in his possession, despite U.S. offers to dispatch an American aircraft to repatriate them when a date is set. Efforts are continuing.

19TH ANNUAL MEETING: Plans for the League's 19th Annual Meeting, the last of the Reagan Administration, have previously been distributed; however, some reminders are provided due to fast approaching deadlines:

Start File
Soviet MIAS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 14, 1988

TO: SITUATION ROOM
FROM: RICHARD CHILDRESS

Please LDX the attached on an urgent basis to the following person:

TO: JEFF MILLINGTON
STATE/EA/VLC
Room 5210 State
647-3132
FROM: RICHARD CHILDRESS
NSC
392 OEOB
395-3576

Attachment
2-page ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Document

MIA
3/1/04

Thanks.

6/14/88

RC - -

F41.

TUBED TO SIT RM

✓.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Points - POW/MIA (Soviet and U.S.)

- President Reagan personally made the POW/MIA issue in Southeast Asia a matter of highest national priority.
- In implementation, we have publicly made clear that the issue is humanitarian and separate from political questions and that nations should return POWs/remains and provide information on deserters/defectors as a matter of humanitarian obligation under international norms. (Geneva)
- We have previously raised the issue of the U.S. POW/MIA problem in Southeast Asia with the Soviets. They have replied that this is a bilateral matter between Hanoi and the U.S.
- The only Soviet reply beyond this was in 1985 regional discussions when we were negotiating with Vietnam on their declared intention to resolve the issue in two years beginning January 1986. At that time, they said the Vietnamese told them they would increase cooperation.
- The President's offer to aid the Soviets in resolution of their MIA problem in Afghanistan provides us an opportunity.
- We can publicly demonstrate that our humanitarian stance on POW/MIAs is valid for all, and by pursuing it in that way, we demonstrate to Hanoi that we are speaking of principle not politics.
- Secondly, we, without making it a precondition, position ourselves to bring added pressure on Hanoi to cooperate. The relationship between Moscow/Vietnam and Washington/Pakistan is not identical, but in principle on this issue, parallels can be drawn.
- We should request from the Soviets their list of MIAs and case narratives and offer to help where we can with Pakistan and perhaps elements of the Afghan resistance.
- We should proceed with fulfillment of the President's pledge rapidly and after demonstrating our sincerity, speak to the Soviets again about our problem without conditioning or assistance on the Vietnam situation.
- Such a course will not be lost in Hanoi.
- Our public posture must be closely handled. Fringe elements of the POW/MIA issue in the United States are not sophisticated enough to understand this dynamic, but the League of Families does.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-001/4 #21

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 8/7/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Our public posture should focus on the humanitarian need for all nations to attempt to bring answers to families of those missing regardless of politics as we are doing.
- In answer to question, we could cite our previous discussions with the Soviets and express our hope that this standard will be maintained by them as well.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<DIST>SIT: VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUEHGV<DTG> 101855Z JUN 88
<ORIG>FM USMISSION GENEVA
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3892
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4754
RUSBKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1309
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0081
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3795

*Same
Soviet POW's*

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: ADDENDA ON SOVIET MILITARY DETAINEES

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 06653

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, AF, PK, UR ICRC

SUBJECT: ADDENDA ON SOVIET MILITARY DETAINEES

REF: (A) GENEVA 6430

- (B) STATE 173735

- (C) GENEVA 4625

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THERE FOLLOWS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM ICRC ON
SOVIET MILITARY DETAINEES. ICRC [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] WAS THE SOURCE, IN
MEETING JUNE 9 REQUESTED BY DCM.

3. ICRC - SOVIET DISCUSSIONS

[REDACTED] SAID THAT ICRC TALKS WITH SOVIET MISSION
GENEVA REPRESENTATIVE JUNE 6 HAD CENTERED ON RECENT
ALLEGATIONS THAT APPEARED IN THE "NATION" OF LAHORE.
IN A RECENT ARTICLE THAT NEWSPAPER HAD MAINTAINED
THAT THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WOULD REMAND SOME 1300
REPEAT 1300 SOVIET PRISONERS PRIOR TO THE AUGUST 15
SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAWAL MILESTONE. THE SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVES HAD PRESSED HARD FOR ICRC
CONFIRMATION OF THE ALLEGED OFFER. WHEN POINTING OUT
TO THE SOVIETS THAT NO REPEAT NO
EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THE ICRC SUBSTANTIATED THE
REPORT, [REDACTED] WAS STRUCK BY THE ABSENCE OF ANY
DISAVOWAL OR DEFLATION BY THEM OF THE 1300 FIGURE,
EVEN THOUGH DURING THE DISCUSSION [REDACTED] HAD
MENTIONED THE OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED TOTAL OF 311
SOVIET POW'S.

4. PROBLEMS IN OBTAINING ACCESS TO DETAINEES

[REDACTED] LISTED SOME CONTINUING PROBLEMS THE ICRC
HAS ENCOUNTERED IN EFFORTS TO VISIT POW'S:

--PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES, IN THAT THE PRISONERS WERE
WIDELY DISPERSED AND THE ICRC HAD ONLY INCOMPLETE,
SPASMODIC, AND UNVERIFIABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION
ABOUT LOCATIONS AND NUMBERS, LET ALONE IDENTITIES;
--WITH BOTH THE KABUL REGIME AND THE RESISTANCE
GROUPS CALLING FOR RECIPROCITY IN ICRC ACCESS TO
PRISONERS, NEITHER CONTENDING SIDE SEEMED WILLING TO
TAKE A UNILATERAL, HUMANE STANCE TO PERMIT VISITS AND
SURVEYS OF PRISONER HOLDINGS;
--MATTERS WERE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY INTERMITTENT AD
HOC PRISONER EXCHANGES BETWEEN KABUL REGIME AND
RESISTANCE COMMANDERS, ON THE MARGIN OF LOCAL
HOSTILITIES--THESE HAD STOPPED OF LATE, HOWEVER, DUE

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By LOI, NARA, Date 8/7/06

TO INTENSIFICATION OF THE COMBAT;

--THE KABUL REGIME WAS DIVIDED WITHIN ITSELF ON THE SUBJECT OF ACCESS, E.G. THE PRESIDENCY AND FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD SHOWN THEMSELVES RATHER CONCILIATORY, WITH THE POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY HEADQUARTERS HAVING TAKEN A VERY HARD-LINE POSITION AGAINST GRANTING VISITATION PRIVILEGES;

--THE RESISTANCE, MEANWHILE, HAD PROVIDED THE ICRC WITH ENCOURAGING SIGNS OF INCREASING APPRECIATION FOR THE ICRC ROLE, IN CONTRAST WITH AN OVERALL ATTITUDE OF THE KABUL REGIME THAT WAS MARKEDLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE ICRC AND ITS MOTIVES.

5. ICRC WELCOMES U.S. HELP

ASKED BY THE DCM HOW THE U.S. MIGHT POSSIBLY BE HELPFUL, [REDACTED] LISTED THREE MATTERS THE ICRC WOULD APPRECIATE IN PARTICULAR :

--THE U.S. COULD USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE RESISTANCE TO URGE THAT IT WAS IN THE LATTER'S "POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN INTEREST" TO RESPECT THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, WHICH, MOREOVER, CONFORM WITH THE TRADITION AND SUBSTANCE OF ISLAMIC LAW;

--ASSIST IN PROVIDING THE ICRC WITH SOLID INFORMATION ABOUT WHERE AND HOW MANY POW'S WERE HELD BY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 06653

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, AF, PK, UR ICRC

SUBJECT: ADDENDA ON SOVIET MILITARY DETAINEES RESPECTIVE RESISTANCE ELEMENTS--AND WHETHER, AS CONTINUING ALLEGATIONS INDICATED, THERE WERE PRISONERS HELD AT PESHAWAR;

--TO ENSURE THAT THE ICRC WAS NOT COMPROMISED WITH THE KABUL AUTHORITIES, IN THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN MISSIONS HAD PASSED TO THEM INFORMATION DERIVED FROM U.S. SOURCES. (PRESSED FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THIS POINT, [REDACTED] SAID THAT HE HAD NO SPECIFICS BUT THAT SOME MISSIONS HAD APPARENTLY ABUSED CONFIDENCES GIVEN THEM IN GOOD FAITH BY US, HENCE WE SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY CIRCUMSPECT ABOUT PRISONER QUESTIONS AND "BEWARE OF LEAKS.")

6. ICRC EXPECTS TO MEET AGAIN WITH THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA IN ABOUT A WEEK. WE WILL SEEK A READOUT AND REPORT PROMPTLY.

PETRONE

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