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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
76099	MEMO	SIGUR TO CLARK RE. FOREIGN MILITARY	1	1/28/1983	B1	
76100	MEMO	CLARK TO SHULTZ AND REGAN RE. FOREIGN MILITARY [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76099]	1	ND	B1	
76101	BIO		1	2/28/1983	B1	B3
76102	BIO	[COPY OF DOC. 76101]	1	2/28/1983	B1	B3
76103	MEMO	SIGUR THRU TYSON TO CLARK RE. SCHEDULE PROPOSAL	1	2/28/1983	B1	
76104	LETTER	WEINBERGER TO CLARK RE. COURTESY CALL	1	2/15/1983	B1	
76105	MEMO	TYSON TO CLARK RE. BREAKFAST MTG.	1	2/23/1983	B1	
76106	LETTER	WEINBERGER TO CLARK RE. COURTESY CALL [COPY OF DOC. 76104]	1	2/15/1983	B1	
76107	MEMO	TYSON TO CLARK RE. BREAKFAST MTG. [COPY OF DOC. 76105]	1	2/23/1983	B1	

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76108	LETTER	WEINBERGER TO CLARK RE. COURTESY CALL [COPY OF DOC. 76104]	1	2/15/1983	B1

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1/15/83 1

Gaston,

Korea

Per your conversation with Dixie, attached is the letter from Amb. Hahm.

Dave Lambertson

Flo,
Plz - put in Korea file
G

Chong Wa Dae
Seoul, Korea

17 December 1982

Dear Dixie,

Thank you very much for your gracious note of yesterday. We who serve the President here at Chongwadae are greatly proud of his magnanimous decision.

Our admiration and respect for his statesmanship are vastly strengthened and deepened, more so by the fact that the decision to let Kim out of prison was absolutely his and his alone.

However, I want you to know, Dixie, that the discussion you and I had a few weeks ago on the subject did have an important bearing upon the recommendations presented to the President.

As a personal friend of yours and your country, I am personally gratified that an important contribution has been made to fortify and consolidate the existing friendship between our two countries.

With all the best wishes,

As Ever,

Pyong Choon

Pyong-choon Hahm
Secretary General
to the President

His Excellency
Richard L. Walker
Ambassador
Embassy of the United States of America

0437

Korea 87

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 17, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR

SUBJECT: Letter From Pyong-choon Hahm, Secretary-General to President Chun Doo Hwan of Korea

I attach a copy of a letter from Secretary-General Hahm of the President's office in Korea. Hahm's position is a powerful one and what he says or writes can be taken to come from President Chun himself.

Hahm was Ambassador to Washington a few years ago and he and I are good friends. He knows that Prime Minister Nakasone is also a good friend of mine.

Hahm is really a person who has even more trouble than most Koreans in dealing with the Japanese. His praise of Nakasone is quite remarkable.

I thought I would hold off in any response to Hahm until after we see how the Nakasone visit goes.

Attachment:
tab A Letter to G.Sigur from Pyong-choon Hahm

Chong Wa Dae
Seoul, Korea

13 January 1983

Dear Gaston,

It was indeed good to have had an opportunity of seeing you here. I was deeply gratified that the friendship between our two countries is being steadily strengthened under the leadership of President Reagan.

As you have heard already, Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan has just completed his official visit to Korea - the very first by an incumbent Prime Minister of Japan since the Liberation from the Japanese colonial rule. The Prime Minister has displayed uncommon courage and decisiveness for a Japanese politician to make this visit. Moreover, he made public declarations which have contributed greatly to soothing the negative sentiments of the Korean public toward Japan despite political costs and risks involved for him domestically.

We here in the Office of the President should like to express our sincere appreciation for all the assistance the White House and the United States government have rendered with a view to improving decisively the Korea-Japan relations. We think that without your support the historic event of the past few days would not have been possible. I want you, Gaston, to know how much we appreciate the warm and close friendship between our two countries.

With all the best wishes,

Sincerely,

Pyong-choon Hahm
Secretary General
to the President

Dr. Gaston J. Sigur
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506
U. S. A.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1/24/83

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Letter from Kim Dae Jung (S/S# 8300215)

Your draft reply (Tab A) has been approved by the National Security Council for forwarding to Mr. Kim Dae Jung.

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment:
Tab A Lambertson ltr to Kim Dae Jung
Tab B Kim Dae Jung ltr to President

6

DRAFT LETTER

Dear Mr. Kim:

President Reagan has asked me to respond to your letter of January 3, in which you expressed appreciation for his efforts in your behalf and asked for an appointment.

The President appreciated receiving your letter and is pleased that you and your family arrived safely in the United States. He hopes that the medical treatment you receive here will be effective. Unfortunately, his busy schedule will not permit time for the meeting you suggested, and the White House has asked that I be available if you wish to talk to someone in the executive branch of the government. I can be reached by telephone at 632-7717.

May I add that I too am pleased that you were able to come to the United States and that I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

David F. Lambertson
Director of Korean Affairs

Mr. Kim Dae Jung,
c/o Mr. Lee Sung Ho,
5531 Hempstead Court,
Springfield, Virginia 22151.

8300215

January 3, 1983

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Reagan:

During the Christmas season, I and forty-seven other political prisoners were released in south Korea, and I have come to the United States for a brief visit.

In September, 1980, I was sentenced to death by the military court, but my life was saved at the last moment when the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment on January 23, 1981. This was due to the work of God, the support of the Korean people, and the active involvement of world opinion. Above all, the Korean people and I know that your expeditious and effective efforts even before your inauguration played a crucial role in rescuing me from death.

We also know that your humanitarian spirit and political efforts in support of human rights figured prominently in my release on a suspended sentence with seventeen and a half years left on the twenty year sentence and my coming to the United States for medical care. I am grateful to you as one of the benefactors of my life and freedom. You will be remembered with gratitude by my family, myself, and our people.

Although my freedom has been restored, there are still several hundred political prisoners in south Korea, and the popular zeal for democratic restoration remains unfulfilled. It is well known that the overwhelming majority of the Korean people believe that democracy should be realized even if it causes a delay in economic growth.

Democracy is the only way to realize freedom, justice, and a genuinely human life for the Korean people. It is beyond question that only the absolute support of the government by the people and the active participation by the people within the democratic framework can strengthen national security, enable us to overcome the Communist threat, and pave the way for peaceful unification. Without democracy, I am concerned that continued political instability might result in another Korean war and inflict a great misfortune on both the Korean and the American people, who have together made enormous sacrifices.

I would thus like to ask for your continuing efforts for the immediate release of all political prisoners.

Further, if you could demonstrate openly as well as privately your special moral support for democratic restoration, so fervently desired by the Korean people, I believe that we can march with greater courage and confidence toward democratic reconstruction. Although democratic restoration and construction in Korea are ultimately the responsibility of the Korean people, your special support as the representative of the American people is indispensable for the accomplishment of these goals.

When an appropriate opportunity presents itself, I would like to meet you to exchange views on matters of mutual concern. I pray that you will have God's blessing and that the new year will be a year of hope and success in your private and public life.

Sincerely yours,

Kim Dae Jung

Kim Dae Jung

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76099	MEMO SIGUR TO CLARK RE. FOREIGN MILITARY	1	1/28/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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76100	MEMO CLARK TO SHULTZ AND REGAN RE. FOREIGN MILITARY [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76099]	1	ND	B1

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03 MAR 1 P12:47

LDX MESSAGE NO. 796 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 1

FROM: William Breer (Officer name) EA/K (Office symbol) 27717 (Extension) 5315 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Bio on Park Kun Woo for his calls on Dr. Sigur, Mr. Gregg and Mr. Armitage

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Dr. Sigur	395-6173	302 OEOB
NSC	Mr. Don Gregg	395-4213	298 OEOB
OSD/ISA	Mr. Richard Armitage	OX 7-2307	4E817
NSC	S/S		

REMARKS: FOR: CLEARANCE [ ] INFORMATION [ ] PER REQUEST [XX] COMMENT [ ]

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76101	BIO	1	2/28/1983	B1 B3

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76102	BIO [COPY OF DOC. 76101]	1	2/28/1983	B1 B3

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76103	MEMO SIGUR THRU TYSON TO CLARK RE. SCHEDULE PROPOSAL	1	2/28/1983	B1

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15

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL March 1, 1983

TO:	WILLIAM K. SADLEIR, DIRECTOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING
FROM:	WILLIAM P. CLARK
REQUEST:	Photo opportunity with YOON Sung Min, Korean Minister of National Defense
PURPOSE:	This is the 30th anniversary of the Korean Armistice and it is recommended that Minister Yoon make a short courtesy call on the President.
BACKGROUND:	Minister Yoon will be in Washington to attend the 15th US/Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting on 14 and 15 April. The SCM is an annual meeting between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense. This is the first large-scale Security Consultative Meeting ever held in Washington.
PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION:	None
DATE AND TIME:	Thursday, April 14, 1983. DURATION: Drop-by photo opportunity during administrative time.
LOCATION:	Oval Office
PARTICIPANTS:	Minister Yoon, The President, Secretary Caspar Weinberger, William P. Clark, Robert C. McFarlane, Gaston J. Sigur
OUTLINE OF EVENT:	Drop-by for photo opportunity
REMARKS REQUIRED:	Brief talking points by NSC
MEDIA COVERAGE:	White House photographer only
RECOMMENDED BY:	Secretary of Defense
OPPOSED BY:	None
PROJECT OFFICER:	Gaston J. Sigur

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76106	LETTER WEINBERGER TO CLARK RE. COURTESY CALL [COPY OF DOC. 76104]	1	2/15/1983	B1

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76107	MEMO TYSON TO CLARK RE. BREAKFAST MTG. [COPY OF DOC. 76105]	1	2/23/1983	B1

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KOREA SCOPE

Volume III, No. 1 March, 1983

Special Issue on: Kim Dae Jung in America

The editor invites the submission of articles bearing upon the internal and external problems that confront contemporary Korean society. Manuscripts should be no more than 7,000 words in length and should be doublespaced throughout. Statements of fact and opinion appearing in **KOREA SCOPE** are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editor or publisher.

Individual Subscription: $8.00.
Institutional Subscription: $15.00.
Foreign (except Canada): $12.00 for individual and $19.00 for institutional subscription.

Advertising: Advertising Department, **KOREA SCOPE**, P.O. Box 904, New York, NY 10027.

The **KOREA SCOPE** is published quarterly by The International Christian Network for Democracy in Korea, P.O. Box 904, New York, NY 10027. Third Class postage paid at Great Neck, NY. Send address change to **KOREA SCOPE**, P.O. Box 904, New York, NY 10027.

Democracy in Korean History

Speech at Harvard University, March 10, 1983

I. Korean Politics Before the 1970s

(A) The Fundamental Nature of Korean Democracy

Democracy is a political system that has its origin in the West, but its principles are not unique to the West. Historically and institutionally, democratic systems are different from one another. They are, however, all based upon the principles of freedom, justice, and human dignity.

The quest for these democratic ideals has been pervasive in Korean history. For example, the Dangun mythology emphasized the principle of benefitting all men. Confucianism equated human will with the will of heaven. Choi Soo-Woon, founder of the *Tonghak,* argued that man was one with heaven. During the *Yi* Dynasty, it was widely thought that to serve man was to serve heaven. All this indicates that the pursuit of these democratic ideals of freedom, justice, and human dignity has been an integral part of our long tradition.

Further, the *Tonghak* uprising of 1894 was a peasant revolutionary movement of a democratic character. For example, it demanded land reform, emancipation of slaves, a widow's right to re-marry, abolition of the rigid stratification system, and anti-imperialist struggles. Even though the uprising was defeated in the end by Japanese intervention, in response to the Chinese intervention invited by the frightened Korean king, it left an indelible impact upon our quest for human rights and democracy.

The March 1, 1919 movement was another example of our continuing search for national independence and democracy. In fact, the Shanghai Provisional Government was founded on, and reflected, the spirit and objectives of the March 1 movement.

Clearly, then, the Korean people have amply demonstrated their democratic aspirations, ideology and capacity. On the other hand, they have lacked experience in democratic politics. Naturally, we could not mature democratically under Japanese colonial rule. Also, when we were liberated in 1945, it was not by our power but by the power of allies. This meant that we did not attain democracy on our own; it was handed to us. This is a major reason democracy has not taken root in Korean society.

Another impediment to democratic development occurred because in search of bureaucratic stability and continuity, the American military government retained and recruited pro-Japanese elements that were experienced in colonial administration. These individuals quickly seized control of the government and obstructed democratic development.

(B) The Rhee Syngman Regime in the 1950s

In an attempt to protect his power from Kim Koo, who had returned from China, Rhee formed a coalition with pro-Japanese individuals. Thus, the Rhee regime was made up of mainly, not of patriots who had fought against Japanese imperialism, but of collaborators with the Japanese colonial authorities. As such, it not only damaged the integrity of our nation but also violated the moral expectation that those who fought for justice should be justly rewarded.

Moreover, Rhee used anti-Communism and national security as pretexts to suppress democracy and to justify the perpetuation of a one-man rule. It is Rhee, then, who passed onto subsequent dictators the basic political formulae for authoritarian politics.

The Rhee regime, however, was different from the dictatorships of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan. To the extent that it did not threaten his design for a long personal reign, Rhee allowed freedom. There were, for example, freedom of the press, legal provisions for fair elections, direct election of the President, autonomy of local administration, and systemic tolerance of opposition. On all these counts, there is no comparison with the Park and the Chun regimes.

Further, Rhee, recognizing the inevitable, stepped down during the April 19, 1960 student revolution to prevent further bloodshed. He thus provided the nation with his last act of mercy. The reasons for this partially democratic nature of the Rhee regime are two-fold. First, it was based not on the politics of fear controlled by intelligence agencies as the Park regime was. Rather, it was based upon the personal charisma of Rhee Syngman. Second, consistent United States support for democratic development played a vital role in maintaining the partially democratic character of the regime.

(C) The April 19, 1960 Student Revolution and the Chang Myon Administration

Unfortunately, the April 19 revolution was a student revolution and not a national revolution. Therefore, when the students returned to campus, the principal revolutionary force left the political scene, leaving a huge political vacuum. It is for this reason that the Chang Administration was hard-pressed to legitimize its rule and lacked power to implement a forceful and consistent policy.

Other factors also contributed to the brevity of the democraic restoration. Senseless splintering of the opposition parties made the matter worse. Moreover, some journalists admit that irresponsible journalism added fuel to the already chaotic situation.

(D) The Park Regime in the 1960s: The Constitutional Amendment for a Third Presidential Term for Park

In the Spring of 1961, the political situation began to stabilize. The Chang Government was able to consolidate its foundation, and cool heads began to prevail among the elements previously responsible for division and chaos. Suddenly, for no justifiable reason, Park Chung Hee staged a military coup d'etat.

Park insisted that the coup was necessary for anti-Communism and national security, both of which were allegedly being undermined by the chaotic internal politics. According to an official account published by the Park regime itself, however, the plot to overthrow Chang Myon started only 13 days after Chang formed his administration in August, 1960.

Initially, Park pledged to return to the military after a short revolutionary period; instead, he plunged into civilian politics. It should be noted, however, that his first two elections in 1963 and 1967 were by direct popular vote and were relatively fair. Park's military rule thereby gained a considerable measure of legitimacy.

The 1967 National Assembly election, however, was a quite different story. There were many irregularities which forced the National Assembly to shut down for six long months after the election. The scandal reached such crisis proportions that Park had to admit the widespread irregularities.

Why was the 1967 Presidential election relatively fair but the National Assembly election rigged? It was revealed later that Park was setting up the National Assembly for the 1969 Constitutional Amendment that would allow him to run for a third presidential term.

Although Park did win the 1967 election, his margin of victory did not give him a strong mandate. This prompted him to scheme to manipulate the Constitution prior to the next election. But, for this, he needed the courage and confidence to make public his foul design. A number of events played into his hands.

First, in return for sending Korean troops to Vietnam, Park secured the wholesale support of the Johnson Administration. Second, finally resolving the protracted difficulties in Korean-Japanese relations, Park was able to obtain large amounts of Japanese aid. Consequently, he had the blessings of both the United States and Japan for tightening his hold on power. This gave him the courage and confidence to push for a Constitutional Amendment.

It should be added that some hardliners among the opposition categorically objected to the 1965 Korean-Japanese talks. Such irrational and unreasonable behavior only rallied United States and world opinion to the support of Park.

Further, Park recorded at this time a modest success with his policy of economic growth, financed largely by American and Japanese capital. This made him believe that he had sufficient public support for a third Presidential term.

Last, but not least, Park was able to lay bare his lust for power because he had completed the formation of the totalitarian state by perfecting the politics of fear and the centralization of power.

So in 1969, Park Chung Hee violated all the laws and spared no tricks in railroading through the Constitutional Amendment. He thus exposed his raw desire for a permanent hold on power and breached the national aspirations for a democratic political system.

II. The Park Regime in the 1970s: The Yushin Dictatorship

(A) The Political Situation Before the Yushin System

When I ran as the opposition party's presidential candidate in 1971, several salient features emerged.

First, popular support for the opposition candidate had never been so high, and popular participation in his campaign never so extensive. Large numbers of clergymen, students, and intellectuals joined in my campaign. For instance, some 8,000 college students volunteered to serve as the opposition party's observers at ballot boxes in order to prevent irregularities. As the opposition party's candidate, I was, therefore, representing far more than a particular political party.

Second, I advocated abolition of the local reserve army system, the promotion of South-North talks, the creation of peace in the peninsula through cooperation of the Big Four, the implementation of a mass participatory economy to facilitate fair distribution under the free enterprise system, and the smashing of the conspiracy for permanent one-man rule. This platform became the focal point of the public's concern and generated tremendous popular support.

For the first time in Korean history, the 1971 presidential election appeared to boil down to confrontation on specific issues. The election was thus viewed very favorably at home and abroad. In spite of the government's flaunting power and money without limit, I managed to poll 46% of the vote even by the government's own count. I won in all major cities, including an overwhelming victory in Seoul. In every city, hundreds of thousands of voters turned out to hear our campaign speeches. When it was all over, it was clear to everyone both at home and abroad that this was one election that Park did not win.

It is important to note that in this election the Korean people discovered themselves, their potential, and raised their consciousness as democratic citizens.

Park Chung Hee was jarred by the people's intense desire for new leadership and by the maturation of their democratic capacity. Apparently realizing that another direct election would not win him another term in the Blue House, he began to plot a second constitutional amendment by coup d'etat-like methods.

Desperately searching for a rationale to extend his rule permanently, Park adopted the fundamental features of my proposal for peaceful unification, which had won resounding popular approval during the campaign. This was after he had accused me of pro-communism for advocating peaceful coexistence and peaceful dialogue with the North as necessary steps toward peaceful unification.

At any rate, Park managed to hold a Red Cross Conference between South and North, soon followed by high-level political meetings between the two sides. On October 17, 1972, Park promulgated the *Yushin* Constitution, alleging that it was imperative to create a system suited for the talks of unification. He quashed all opposition, suspended parts of the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and passed the *Yushin*

Constitution under martial law. In violation of the Constitution, the Cabinet proposed and passed more than a hundred laws, and democracy appeared to have been dealt a lethal blow.

During the campaign, I had warned the Korean people of Park's conspiracy to install himself as Generalissimo with life-long power. Also, while supporting in principle the South-North Joint Communique, I had expressed concern in a news conference on July 13 that unification could very well be exploited as a pretext to rationalize the system of one-man rule.

Such statements were duly recorded in the Fulbright Report on the Korean political situation. Claiming the principle of non-interference, however, the United States steadfastly maintained silence over the declaration of *Yushin.* In reality, this was because the United States was so preoccupied with South Korean stability that it did not want to rock the boat.

(B) After the Yushin Declaration

Everything that I had predicted would happen did happen in the *Yushin* period. The direct presidential election system was replaced by an indirect electoral college. This new system effectively blocked the opposition parties from fielding candidates in the presidential race. Indeed, Park ran unopposed in the two elections during the *Yushin* period. The generalissimo system of permanent rule was thus made complete.

The President now appointed one third of the National Assembly, while the rest were elected in elections full of irregularities. Even Judges were unilaterally appointed by the President. Further, he could suspend the powers of the judicial and legislative branches and issue executive decrees with the force of law. As such, the President now superceded the judiciary and the legislature and made a mockery of the principle of checks and balances.

The *Yushin* system altered fundamentally the nature of opposition politics. Before *Yushin,* the opposition accepted the legitimacy of the Constitution of the Third Republic and concentrated its efforts on electing a new President. Thus, democratic struggle was in effect an electoral struggle.

Under *Yushin,* however, the struggle was over the legitimacy of the Constitution and the political system themselves. For the first time, anti-system movements began to materialize, and the democratic struggle came to enlist more and more clergymen and intellectuals who, until then, had remained politically neutral.

Countless people were fired from their jobs and imprisoned. But the struggle went on. Students continued to play a leading role and were joined by workers and peasants.

The anti-system movement was thrust forward with a new momentum when, in October, 1973, the students demanded the truth about my kidnapping from Japan. Even North Korea refused to receive Lee Hu Rak, Park's emissary for the South-North talks, because, as head of the KCIA, he was responsible for my abduction. This led to the collapse of the South-North political dialogue.

Student demonstrations continued into 1974, even though Park did all in his power to suppress them. In spite of Park's mobilizing the military to suppress student protest, it continued with heightened intensity. Nineteen-seventy-four was thus a critical period for the *Yushin* system, and Park's solution to the crisis was the abuse of presidential emergency powers. But, the anti-system, democratic struggle went on.

In March, 1976, a group of democratic leaders, including Catholic priests, ministers, professors, a former President, and myself, issued the "Declaration to Save the Nation and Democracy." The Declaration was a most dramatic expression of the national rejection of the *Yushin* dictatorship and the national aspiration for democracy. We and many others were imprisoned under the emergency measures.

In the late 1970s, female workers, employed primarily at the Dongil and the Y.H. Industries, began to wage persistent struggles against sub-human working conditions and exploitation by management. Their battle was supported by the Christian community and sometimes by the opposition politicians. In time, their struggle was transformed from labor activism to human rights and democratic movements. In the meantime, the Catholic Farmers' Association pushed aggressively for protection of farmers' rights.

In 1979, the New Democratic Party, the main opposition party, could no longer remain indifferent to the rapidly-expanding national democratic struggle. It had heretofore functioned as the cooperative opposition within the framework of the *Yushin* system but now recast its image as the aggressive opposition.

Following the "Declaration to Save the Nation and Democracy," the national passion for democracy continued to gain momentum. By 1979 there was formed a national front, the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification, composed of clergymen, students, workers, peasants, and a substantial number of politicians.

Beginning in the Fall of 1979, struggle erupted throughout the nation. And unlike the past, the struggle was not led just by students. It became a truly national struggle, drawing in people from all walks of life. The uprisings were uniform in their demand for Park's resignation and the abolition of the *Yushin* system. The initial uprising at Pusan and Masan were on the verge of engulfing the entire nation.

It was at this very critical juncture that Kim Jae Kyu killed Park Chung Hee, and the people's struggle unexpectedly ground to a halt. Park's assassination had unfortunate consequences. Instead of being overthrown by the people, the *Yushin* elements were given a reprieve by the massive confusion and chaos that followed Park's assassination. Further, it enabled a small group of power-hungry soldiers to put up as their front man Choi Kyu-Ha, who was incompetent and powerless but sadly ambitious. Using Choi, the small band of power-seeking generals were able to chart an anti-democratic course of action.

All in all, the democratic struggle reached its peak in 1979 but met an unexpected turning point with Park's assassination. The outcome was an unmitigated tragedy.

III. Korean Politics in the 1980s

Park's assassination was no doubt a traumatic event in the annals of Korean politics and appeared to promise fundamental political change. The national yearning for democracy so evident in the Pusan and Masan incidents finally seemed ready for realization. World opinion recognized this readiness, and the United States openly hoped for democratic restoration.

Contrary to what the Chun regime tells us today, a great number of generals, especially in the Navy and the Air Force, favored the abolition of Yushin and the restoration of democracy.

On December 12, 1979, however, Chun Doo Whan committed an act of insubordination, purged the Chief of Staff of the Army who favored democracy, and seized power by force. For the coup, Chun unilaterally withdrew troops from near the front, thus jeopardizing national security. The commanding officer of the United Nations Forces, who had authority over the Korean troops, conveniently chose to ignore this wanton violation. He thus encouraged the adventurous soldiers to run wild in their unconstitutional quest for power. It is not exaggerating to say, therefore, that the seed of the May 17, 1980 coup was sown on December 12, 1979.

At any rate, following Park's assassination, national democratic aspirations swelled, and the general expectation was that one of the three Kims would become the next President. For the first time in a long while, the supple wave of politics was gracing the nation's political landscape.

Meanwhile, the Korean people were scrupulously maintaining order and discipline, which drew praises even from the foreign ambassadors in Korea. And students, to avoid being taken advantage of by the scheming generals, exercised utmost restraint until a few days before May 10, 1980.

But a faction of the military was intent on instigating chaos and confusion. The Martial Law Command regulated the news media with strict censorship, using it skillfully to destabilize Korean society. It allowed banner headlines for student demonstrations and riots by the miners, but banned, or gave only a small space to my appeals to the citizens and students for order and restraint. The Martial Law Command also censored my proposal for a five-man conference to restore order comprised of the Martial Law Commander, the President, and the three Kims. When I drew up, upon request from a newspaper, an appeal to the students to return to

campus, the Martial Law Command forbade its publication.

Finally, Chun Doo Whan staged, without justification, a military coup on May 17, 1980 and crushed the national hope for democracy. At that time, Chun framed me for the Kwangju Incident. He also tortured a student, whom I had never met, to confess that I had given him money to organize the Kwangju uprising. Troubled by his conscience over the false confession, this student twice attempted suicide in prison and has avowed since his release last December that we have never met.

This clearly proves that the May 17 coup was not necessitated by social and political upheavals. Rather, high-powered weapons were used to suppress the citizens of Kwangju, who were clamoring for democratic restoration. In the midst of all this, the United States reneged on its promise to support democracy and acquiesced in the repressive action by Chun's paratroops. The U.S. Commander released Korean troops under his command to support the operation. A new phase of dictatorship thus came to the fore.

Even though there are many similarities between Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan, Chun will have to be much more brutal than his mentor in order to stay in power. This is because he illegitimately vaulted to the presidency by suppressing and slaughtering a great number of innocent citizens.

Today, the news media are under the strictest government control ever. The laws governing them are most stifling to date, and many media networks have been forcibly combined or shut down. Elections have become mere shams, and the labor movement is under restrictions more severe than during the Park Chung Hee regime. For example, labor is not allowed to organize by industrial sectors but only company by company. Regulation and surveillance of campuses have been intensified. Thirty percent of college students are forced out each year, while professors are being fired in droves.

As is well known, the Chun regime framed, and tried to execute me in order to rationalize its military dictatorship. It massacred the democratic citizens of Kwangju, thus creating a serious schism in the relationship between the people and the military. The ascendancy of politically-minded generals has produced a climate of political game-playing if one is to survive and be promoted. Further, some with the rank of colonel have wielded enormous power in the Chun regime, overruling and ignoring the generals. As a result, the military's image and credibility have been severely tarnished and its readiness for national defense greatly impaired. This greatly undermines the security of Korea.

A salient characteristic of the politics of the 1980s is that much Korean sentiment is not just against the dictator, it is also against America. American Cultural Centers in Pusan and Kwangju have been set on fire. The American flag has been burned at least twice, and in student protests one can hear the chant of "Yankee Go Home," a chant being echoed by some of the Christian community.

These anti-American emotions are reactions against United States' acquiescing in, and even encouraging, the dictatorship. The Korean people were especially dumbfounded by President Reagan's reception of Chun Doo Whan at the White House as his first state guest. It is no wonder they are asking themselves, "Is America really our ally?"

In the past year, the Chun regime seems to have recognized the limits of repression and of United States support for it. This is what seems to have led to the release of some 48 political prisoners and to lifting the ban on political activities for a number of former politicians. We should remember, however, that there still remain in prison more than 300 prisoners of conscience, that more are being imprisoned today, that torture goes on as before, and that still under the political ban are those individuals who are likely to continue their democratic struggle. These facts are reinforced by the recent Human Rights Report published by the United States Department of State.

IV. Conclusion

As we look back on our political history, Rhee Syngman ws the first to betray the national desire for democracy. In 1952, opposition parties were united to block Rhee's re-election but were beaten back by the

military, mobilized by Rhee under his wartime powers, with the favor of the United States.

In 1960, the students succeeded in overthrowing Rhee. But, upon their return to campus, Park forcibly moved in to fill the political vacuum. This was the second betrayal of the national democratic aspiration.

In 1971, I, as the Opposition candidate, was honored by an overwhelming support of the people and defeated Park in terms of popular support and, I believe, votes, but the outcome was otherwise. This was the third betrayal.

When Park realized that the direct presidential election system would surely spell an end to his reign of power, he introduced the *Yushin* system. It changed the nature and strategy of the democratic struggle from electoral competition within the system to an outright challenge to that system. Even this met a crushing blow when Chun Doo Whan pulled off the coup. This was the fourth betrayal.

Thus, the political history of Korea has been running in 10-year cycles. We have repeatedly tasted the bitter pill of shattered hopes. Our spirit, however, has not been broken. We have persisted in the struggle. Our stubborn hope and tenacious efforts are rarely duplicated in other parts of the world.

We have what it takes to bring about democratic restoration in the 1980s. I can point, first, to our unswerving commitment to human rights and democracy; second, to the high level of our cultural and educational sophistication; third, to the diffusion throughout Korean society of the Christian spirit; and finally, to the popular commitment to democracy as the only viable alternative to Communism.

As for me, no longer is it important what I will become. What concerns me is to what purpose I will put my life. I only hope for a quick return home so that I can share with my democratic compatriots the suffering and the eventual victory. ■

Christianity, Human Rights, and Democracy in Korea

Speech at Emory University, March 31, 1983

*(**Editor's Note:** Earlier on March 28, Mr. Kim spoke on "Human Rights in Korea" at Columbia University Center for the Study of Human Rights, in which he drew on some parts of the following text.)*

I. Current Human Rights Conditions in Korea

Human rights have never been so violated in Korea as they are today. In terms of human rights, there is no comparison between the Chun Doo Whan regime of today and the Rhee Syngman regime of 1948 to 1960. It is true that Rhee Syngman was so consumed by his lust for the perpetuation of one-man rule that, time and again, he perpetrated election irregularities. It is also true, however, that basic civil rights and liberties were honored during Rhee Syngman's reign as long as they did not threaten his presidency. As a result, the press was relatively free; election of the president was by direct, popular vote; political opposition was allowed a legitimate role in the political process; the autonomy of local government was implemented; and the judiciary maintained its independence and integrity.

The protection of human rights deteriorated precipitously during the Park Chung Hee era. Park unleashed a monster, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, and instituted the politics of fear and terror. Park also established a totalitarian state by imposing regimentation upon the Korean people. In spite of all this, the human rights situation was better than it is today.

To be specific, the number of politicians forced into inactivity did not run into the hundreds as it does today. News media were not coerced into mergers or simply abolished, and the legal regulation of the press was more relaxed than it is today.

Since General Chun Doo Whan seized power, as many as 700 journalists have been forced into retirement simply because they demanded freedom of the press. At least one hundred scholars have been expelled from academe for political reasons. It is estimated that each college campus has been infiltrated by 100 to 200 plainclothes policemen. A new regulation stipulates that each year 30 percent of the college students be dismised from school. The number of political prisoners has doubled and tripled, and punishment has become much harsher than before. The suppression of labor continues with unrelenting harshness.

That human rights conditions have grown worse is not my personal assessment alone. The human rights report, released in March by the Reagan Administration, a close ally of the Chun Doo Whan regime, offers an equally somber analysis. Let me read you some of the major points emphasized by the State Department report:

(1) a president who is supported by the military and not by the people;
(2) the continuation of torture (the Korean National Council of Churches has filed a protest with the President about the torture but has received no response);
(3) cruel and inhuman treatment of prisoners;
(4) denial of fair public trial in politically-sensitive cases;
(5) arbitrary arrest and punishment (the report states, for example, that "Kim Dae Jung had been imprisoned . . . on sedition charges which many believe were not substantiated.");
(6) invasion of the home (in my case, my belongings were confiscated in 1980 and have never been returned);
(7) surveillance, eavesdropping, and opening of mail;

(8) imprisonment in the event of criticism of government by foreigners;
(9) house detention of critics of the government;
(10) discouragement of advertising in the Christian Broadcasting Network, whose political programs are restricted because of their critical nature;
(11) organization of labor not by industries but only on a company-by-company basis;
(12) denial of the right to strike and to form collective agreements;
(13) provisions for dissolving political parties under the pretext of promoting democratic order; and
(14) increase in the number of political prisoners from 272 in late 1981 to 417 in November 1982.

In 1982, Amnesty International and the World Council of Churches both criticized the human rights conditions in Korea, pointing especially to the torture of prisoners of conscience. The Freedom House report has called Korea partially free.

There have recently been some signs of improvement: my democratic compatriots who went to prison with me were released when I left my country to come to the United States; death sentences for the two principals in the burning of the American Cultural Center have been reduced to life imprisonment; and some former politicians have been permitted to return to the political process. While welcome, these measures have only modified the injustice; they hardly represent a commitment to human rights and democracy.

II. The Relationship Between the Human Rights Movement and Democratic Restoration in Korea

In Korea as elsewhere, human rights cannot be protected and promoted without a genuinely democratic government. Human rights are predicated upon the principle that the government abides by the popular will, that people can claim their rights against the government, and that they can meaningfully participate in politics. Accordingly, Korean human rights movements have as their ultimate goal the establishment of a democratic government. There are five reasons, why, in spite of our long, persistent struggle, we have not succeeded thus far.

First, our independene from Japanese colonialism was not our own accomplishment. Nor was our first government established by our own will and efforts. Human rights and democracy, after all, must be won; they cannot simply be handed over.

Second, Rhee Syngman, as the nation's first president, had the historic mission of laying the foundation for democracy. But, blinded by his lust for power, he betrayed his mission and people and collaborated with pro-Japanese elements to consolidate his position. In addition, he appropriated the national interests of anti-Communism and national security in order to extend and rationalize his one-man rule. This set an unfortunate precedent, readily exploited by his successors to establish dictatorial rule.

Third, there are three institutions whose independence and integrity are essential to human rights and democracy: the legislature, the judiciary, and the news media. Sadly, however, during the dictatorships of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan, they have become impotent and, in some cases, even voluntarily became the lackeys of dictatorship.

Fourth, economic growth has produced an intractable problem: excessive concentration of wealth. The Korean people are, therefore, discontented, and Korean society, naturally, unstable. To suppress popular discontent and to rationalize their repression and dictatorship, the Park Chung Hee and the Chun Doo Whan regimes have relied upon anti-Communist and national security sentiments.

Finally, even though the majority of our soldiers are dedicated to national defense, a few are immersed in political game-playing. Especially those soldiers in and around our capital city of Seoul have established hegemony in the military command structure and have been subjecting military decisions to political manipulation. As a result, not only political integrity but national defense as well has been gravely undermined.

Undaunted by these obstructions to democratic development, the Korean people have tenaciously fought for human rights and democracy. Among the Asians, we are the people that have endured the most sacrifices. As there are five reasons why democracy has not yet been won, so there are five reasons why the struggle will go on.

First, Korea is the only nation in East Asia which, overcoming thousands of years of Chinese domination and influence, has retained its self-identity. While the Mongols and the Manchurians have been assimilated into China proper, Koreans have proudly preserved their national integrity. Democracy requires self-assurance and, in this regard, we have fully demonstrated our democratic potential.

Second, throughout five thousand years of Korean history, from the *Dangun* mythology to the *Tonghak* Uprising of 1894, and on to the democratic and human rights movement of today, there has been a remarkably consistent emphasis on the democratic principles of freedom, justice, and human dignity.

Third, the determined expression of national democratic aspirations has been particularly strong over the last one hundred years. I can point, among other things, to the *Tonghak* Uprising of 1894, the March First Movement of 1919, the April 19 Student Revolution of 1960, the 1971 presidential election which was essentially a popular electoral struggle to change power, and the 1979 popular revolt at Pusan and Masan. Even though General Chun Doo Whan has subverted by his military coup d'etat the national democratic passion, the Korean people who have shown so much resolve and resilience will never quit the march to democracy.

Fourth, the Korean people have the necessary education and cultural sophistication for democratic restoration. In this respect, they compare favorably with the French and the Americans during the founding of their respective democratic traditions.

Fifth, Christianity provides spiritual leadership in the nation's drive for modernization and democracy.

These democratic attributes will give us the will and the wisdom to surmount all obstacles and to establish democracy on our own in the 1980s. Since the founding of the Republic in 1948, the Korean people have mounted, at ten-year intervals, four historic, spirited battles for democracy: in 1952, to put an end to the Rhee Syngman dictatorship; in 1960, the successful April 19 Student Revolution, later nullified by Park Chung Hee's military coup d'etat; in 1971, the presidential election, in which, in spite of irregularities, I polled 46 percent of the popular vote; and, finally, in 1979, the surge of national democratic aspirations following Park's assassination. We, the Korean people, are like the grass. We may be pushed to the ground. We may be stepped on. We may be mowed off. But, in the end, we always rise again.

III. Human Rights and Christianity

As I noted earlier, the democratic spirit and principles are inherent in our long history and tradition. It is Christianity, however, which provided them with concrete meanings. For instance, upon landing in Korea two hundred years ago, Catholicism introduced the ideas of equality between men and women, and of the monogomous marriage.

We should also note the contribution to human rights by one of the early Korean Christians, Suh Jae-pil, who unsuccessfully attempted in 1844 a coup for modernization. After years of exile in America, where he became a medical doctor, he returned home to dedicate himself to implanting in Korea the Jeffersonian creed of democracy. Although he was forced by the Yi dynastic government to leave the country again only two years after his return, his struggle for public enlightenment and the basic rights of the people is a treasured memory in our human rights and democratic movements.

The greatest influence on the Korean people's desire for human rights and democracy has been the Protestant Church, which arrived in Korea 100 years ago from the United States. Through its evangelical work and by engaging itself in public education, the Protestant Church systematically propagated the modern spirit. It also played a role in defending the principle of human dignity against the Communist threat from the north.

In recent years, the Christian church has served as the bulwark of the Korean human rights struggle. It actively opposed the 1973 declaration of the *Yushin* dictatorship by Park Chung Hee. It has since supported the advocates of human rights under persecution and, through prayer meetings, helped boost their morale. In addition, the Catholic Farmers Asociation and the Protestant Urban Industrial Mission have borne the brunt of the struggle to protect the rights of workers and peasants. Christian student groups have formed the nucleus of the student democratic movement. For their active involvement in the cause of social, economic, and political justice, more than 100 clergymen have been imprisoned.

It is, therefore, impossible to discuss human rights and democratic movements in Korea without fully appreciating the role of Christianity. The Christian doctrine as relates to the human rights movement in Korea can be summarized as follows:

Man is endowed with fundamental, natural rights which cannot be compromised under any circumstances. Christ lived, and died, for those whose natural rights were suppressed. Therefore, to be a Christian is to fight on behalf of the oppressed and to make necessary sacrifices. To be a Christian no longer means, as in the past, to seek only individual salvation; it means commitment to social salvation, to the salvation of all, not just of oneself.

Moreover, Christianity rejects subsuming the individual to the collective. Christianity holds that God is present in every individual, thus giving birth to the notion of universal equality and the indispensability of the individual. At the same time, the individual has to work for the happiness of the whole. Christianity thus aims at the salvation of both the individual and the collective. It is this aspect of Christianity that has helped the Korean people transcend the collective emphasis of Communism. It is also because of Christianity's dual emphasis that Korean Christians have chosen to fight on behalf of the oppressed and the underprivileged. This is known in Korean as the *Minjung* theology, the people's theology.

IV. The United States and Human Rights and Democracy in Korea

Korean-American relations are one hundred years old this year, and the Korean people have developed profound trust in the Americans, impressed by their democratic system and gratified by their assistance during the Korean War.

Since the middle 1960s, however, the United States has undertaken a series of actions that has shaken the Korean people's trust and gratitude. For example, as a *quid pro quo* for Park Chung Hee's sending Korean troops to Vietnam in the late 1960s, the United States did not oppose the 1968 constitutional amendment allowing a third presidenital term for Park. Under the pretext of stability and security, the United States chose to look the other way when the *Yushin* system was introduced in 1972. Even though the United States did openly support democratic restoration in the period immediately following Park Chung Hee's assassination, its actions during the tortuous and bloody rise to power of General Chun Doo Whan were totally inconsistnt with its earlier encouragement of democracy. And all of this was capped by President Reagan's invitation to Chun Doo Whan to be his first state guest in 1981.

The Korean people's disappointment and frustrations have exploded in the burning of the American Cultural Center in Pusan and Kwangju and of the American flag on at least two college campuses. Their feelings are not so much anti-American as they are critical of current United States support for the Chun Doo Whan dictatorship.

Even though the rationale for the United States support of dictatorships is that stability is necessary for national security, it is plain that security cannot be attained without the guarantee of human rights. I submit to you that human rights are a precondition of stability, itself a precondition of security.

Marshall Montgomery once stated that the courage of the British soldiers against the Germans could not be explained by their attachment to lofty democratic principles. Rather, they fought so bravely in order to protect

their concrete freedoms of choice, of residence, and of speech, freedoms which would be lost if Hitler were to win. Unlike the British who fought another nation, the Koreans in the south and the north confront the same blood. The south Koreans must have something to defend, something to secure, if they are to defend with all their might their country against their brothers and sisters across the border. This is why we need a government which honors human rights, freedom of the press, and basic political rights; a government that seeks to settle disputes by peaceful dialogue. Paradoxically, the Chun Doo Whan regime loudly pronounces its desire to confer with the north but flatly refuses to deal with responsible opposition at home. If the Chun regime insists upon confrontation, it will not long survive. Rhee Syngman was overthrown. Park Chung Hee and his wife met tragic deaths. What can be Chun Whan's fate, enjoying as he does, much less prestige than his predecessors and facing much more difficult problems?

We are not asking the United States to fight in our stead or directly to interfere with the Chun Doo Whan dictatorship. We only want the United States to provide us moral support as a democratic ally and to encourage the Korean military to devote itself to national defense rather than to political maneuvers. Above all, we want the United States to recognize human rights and democracy as the essential building blocks of Korean stability and security. We want our American brothers and sisters in this room to impress upon their government that security without human rights and democracy is a political alchemy that has never worked. This will be your contribution to our struggle for human rights and democracy in Korea. We can do the rest. ■

Prospects for Democracy in Korea

Speech at Princeton University, April 21, 1983

Since our liberation in 1945 and the founding of our Republic in 1948, we Korean people have made strenuous efforts to realize democracy. However, democracy still remains a distant goal. In its stead, we have faced a succession of dictatorships which have grown more brutal with the passage of time. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is a widespread belief in Korea as well as in the United States that democracy will remain just a dream for the Korean people. Even some leading intellectuals seem to share this pessimism. I plan to offer a critical assessment of the prevailing pessimism with regard to the prospects for democracy in Korea.

A. There are five reasons why democracy has not yet materialized in Korea.

First, what little democracy we have known in our brief modern history was not primarily our own achievement. It was handed to us as the by-product of American victory over Japan. Thomas Jefferson once said that the tree we call democracy grows on the blood of the people. In other words, democracy cannot be expected without the sweat and sacrifice of the people.

Let me tell you a story about which I still do not know whether to laugh or cry. Before the 1980 military coup d'etat, I made a public speech at the YWCA in downtown Seoul. In that speech I quoted Thomas Jefferson, stressing the historical necessity of building a democracy by our own will and efforts. Later, when I was sentenced to death on the charge of sedition by a military court, I was accused of using Thomas Jefferson to incite a riot. If Thomas Jefferson had been in Korea at that time, *he* might have been the one to receive the death sentence!

Although countless patriots gave their lives to attain independence from Japanese colonialism, our liberation, in the final analysis, was achieved apart from this struggle, by the U.S. victory over Japan. When compared with your War of Independence from the British, ours was much less clearly rooted in our own blood and sacrifice.

The founding of our Republic in 1948, similarly, was the product of the international political situation. That is, the Cold War was mainly responsible for the establishment of separate political entities in south and north Korea. As such, the Republic of Korea was designed much more to meet the needs of external powers than to fulfill the dreams of the Korean people. This was the first obstacle to democratic development.

Second, I have to point out the nation's first president, Rhee Syngman's betrayal of his mission. After a long exile in the United States, Rhee returned home to become our first president. He carried into this role the national expectation that he would exclude collaborators with Japan in putting together the Republic's first government. This would have enabled him to establish a government whose authenticity as the representative of the Korean tradition could not be questioned. His second mission was to pave the way for a democratic tradition. In both these missions, Rhee failed.

In order to keep at bay his political rivals and also to perpetuate his one-man rule, Rhee Syngman snubbed most of the patriots who fought against Japanese colonialism. In fact, he made life miserable for them or excluded them from government. Instead, Rhee recruited into high government pro-Japanese elements that should have been denied such a privilege following our liberation from Japan. The Rhee government, consisting mainly of pro-Japanese individuals, proved to be anti-democratic and insensitive to the proud tradition and will of the Korean people. Rhee Syngman thus set off the Republic on the wrong course.

In addition, Rhee Syngman abused the national interests of anti-Communism and security in order to perpetuate his hold on power. Rhee left behind an unfortunate legacy which his successors only too willingly

exploited, using anti-Communism and national security as rationale for repression and dictatorship.

The United States played a part in all this when it recruited into its military administration in 1945 to 1948 pro-Japanese elements in order to stave off Communist agitation. In spite of such deplorable aspects, however, Rhee Syngman's one-man rule was only child's play compared to subsequent dictatorships.

Under Rhee, some democratic freedoms were allowed, such as freedom of the press, direct election of the President, considerable autonomy of local administration; there was a functioning opposition, an independent legislature and the judiciary was respected by the people. In contrast, both Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan have thoroughly eradicated any semblance of democratic attributes and instead have instituted politics based on surveillance and fear.

Third, I must point to the loss of function of three institutions central to the preservation of people's rights—the news media, the judiciary and the legislature. The autonomy and integrity of these three agencies is essential for democratic development. Park Chung Hee, however, subverted these institutions by a clever combination of carrot and stick. On the one hand, he suppressed, terrorized and threatened them into impotence. On the other, he seduced them to serve as his handmaiden. Today, it is quite common for journalists, jurists and legislators to dance to the tune played by those in power. Such a tendency is particularly prevalent among journalists, many of whom function today as the voice of the president, or the government, or the ruling party, or as heads of government-controlled media. It is sad to note that such journalists occupy positions at all levels of government and are even in the national assembly in the ruling party, misleading and deceiving the public in order to rationalize the dictatorship.

Fourth, we must turn our attention to the anomalies of Korea's economic growth. Korea has run up a foreign debt of forty billion dollars, which is the world's fourth largest, after Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. In *per capita* terms however, Korea has a greater buren than Brazil, as our *per capita* debt is over $1,000 while Brazil's, with a larger *per capita* income, is only $650. Second, our economy is marred by a wide array of gaps—the gap between city and countryside, between big and small businesses, between heavy and light industry, between rich and poor, and between different regions. These discrepancies constitute one important element of instability in Korea today.

From the late 1960s to the 1970s, Korea recorded a seemingly remarkable economic growth and joined the group of so-called Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). Among East Asian countries in this category, i.e., Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, Korea is at the bottom of the pile in terms of the soundness of economic development. This is because Korea's economic growth has only accelerated the unequal distribution of wealth and the instability of the price structure. In a way, dictatorship has become inevitable for Korea, as the way to avert acute instability as a result of such an unsound economic development. For example, consider that 42 percent of the nation's GNP is produced by 10 corporations. People in the countryside cannot even dream of sending their children to college because they cannot afford tuition and fees. Rural decay has also forced rural youths into mass exodus into the city.

In the meantime, workers are denied the right of collective action and are allowed to organize only on an individual company basis. They are isolated from outside assistance by their national unions or by Christian organizations, which are prevented by law from involvement in factory union affairs. According to government reports submitted to the National Assembly last year, 59 percent of workers earn less than $120 a month, while the consumer price index is the seventh highest in the world.

In contrast, financial giants continue to expand their monopolies from heavy chemical industry to light manufacturing, banking, real estate and commerce. As a result, there are today a number of conglomerates worth somewhere between 500 million and one billion dollars. And these conglomerates, unlike those in the West, are for the most part privately held companies owned by one family.

Popular discontent is rather natural under such circumstances, to which the politics of terror and fear is the only response. This is the reality behind the "economic miracle," which has been used, along with "national

security," as the excuse for political repression by both the Park and Chun regimes.

Finally, the military intervention in politics has impeded democratic development in Korea. While the majority of Korean soldiers are devoted to national defense, a handful of them stationed around Seoul have been involved in politics, just as happened in 1961 when Park Chung Hee staged his coup. As a result, morale has declined and insubordination has become routine. The most dramatic instance of this was the December 12, 1979 intra-military coup by which General Chun Doo Whan and his followers seized Army headquarters and purged the Army Chief of Staff, the Martial Law Commander and many other military leaders. In this action, they not only destroyed the political neutrality of the military, they also jeopardized national security.

It is important to note here that, although he had strategic control over Korean troops, the commanding officer of the U.S. Forces in Korea took no effective action to prevent or stop this series of events in which all military rules were wantonly violated. Nor were the guilty persons disciplined in any way. On the contrary, they were rewarded with national political power.

Military rule is incompatible with the basic principles of democracy, because it equates power with justice, confuses pluralism with weakness, and attacks political rivals as enemies that must be destroyed. In such an environment where the military control politics, democratic institutions cannot grow or flourish.

These five factors, then, have stymied the growth of democracy in Korea: independence apart from our national struggle; betrayal by our first president; a captive media, legislature and judiciary; economic imbalance; and a politicized military.

B. *There are also five reasons for hope that democracy will be achieved in Korea.*

The Korean people have shown their perseverance under extreme conditions. We endured the thirty-six-year-long colonial rule by Japan, the division of the nation along the 38th parallel, the fratricidal Korean War, the autocratic rule of Rhee Syngman, Park Chung Hee's dictatorship, and now Chun Doo Whan's military rule. We have been dealt repeated setbacks. But we have never run away from the challenge, nor have we lost our faith in the ultimate victory of democracy. Why do the Korean people continue their faith and their struggle?

First, the Korean people possess tremendous reserve strength. Since the beginning of our history several thousand years ago, we have been surrounded by China to our west, Mongolia and Manchuria to our north and Japan to our south. We have seldom known a moment of peace from external threats. Internally, the Korean people, for over two thousand years, have usually had rulers who were concerned only with their personal comfort and glory. Thus, the Korean people have constantly been exposed to external threats and internal oppression.

Culturally speaking, Korea has been under the sphere of Confucian influence but proudly remains the only nation in East Asia that has successfully retained its own identity. Manchuria has been completely assimilated into China proper, while Mongolia, for the most part, has met the same fate. Korea, however, remains today an independent nation of 60 million people, the world's twelfth largest. Nor have overseas Chinese any financial supremacy in Korea as they have throughout much of East Asia. All in all, even if their leaders have often been subservient to foreign domination, the Korean people have steadfastly maintained their integrity and attained a high level of education and cultural sophistication. These are, of course, important ingredients of democracy.

Second, democratic ideals have been pervasive in Korean history. In the *Dangun* mythology, regarded as the beginning of Korean history some five thousand years ago, we can find the principle of benefitting all people. In the Korean versions of Confucianism, the will of the people was equated with the will of heaven. In the *Tonghak,* a secular religion which sprang up during the last years of the Yi Dynasty in protest against abuses in the Confucian system, man was considered at one with heaven and serving man was equated with serving heaven. Institutionally speaking, more than a millenium earlier, the *Shilla* and *Paekje* kingdoms had already practiced community decision-making in the sixth century. In recent history, during the Yi period (1392-1910)

there was widely adopted a system of consensus building in decision-making at the village level. Clearly, then, democratic principles and practices have been very much a part of our long history.

Third, popular struggle for democracy has been noteworthy in the last one hundred years. The *Tonghak* peasant revolution of 1894-1985 saw 200,000 peasants led by Chun Bongjun demand successfully the emancipation of slaves, land reform, the right of widows to remarry, and the purification of politics. Further they argued for popular participation in administration and government for the people. In the areas under Tonghak control, they practiced popular participation in cooperation with local government officials. Even though the *Tonghaks* were crushed by Japanese intervention, their revolutionary ideals represent an important chapter in the annals of the world peasant movement and are the precursors of the modern struggle in Korea for human rights and democracy.

In addition, Suh Jae-pil, a Jeffersonian democrat who attempted in 1884 to stage a coup against the corrupt Yi Dynasty, was banished to the United States until 1896 when he returned to begin a movement based on the Council for Independence, which he founded. Through his newspaper, *Independence Daily,* Suh Jae-pil propagated the ideals of freedom, people's rights, and independence. Even though he was forced again to leave the country in exile just two years after he started his democratic efforts, he made a significant contribution to the democratic movement.

In 1919, nine years after the annexation of Korea to Japan, the March First Independence Movement erupted, which, led by the masses, clamored for independence. Shortly after this, there was established in Shanghai a provisional government whose ideal was democratic. In 1929, the Kwangju student uprising took place, demanding independence from Japanese colonialism. It quickly became a nationwide movement.

In 1952, there was the Political Upheaval whose principal aim was to put an end to the authoritarian rule of Rhee Syngman. In 1960, students overthrew Rhee Syngman. In 1971, in the last popular election of the president, I polled 46 percent of the vote in spite of all sorts of irregularities. From 1973 to 1979, there was a tenacious struggle against Park Chung Hee's Yushin dictatorship. In 1980, hundreds of Kwangju citizens were massacred by military coup d'etat troops. Undaunted by such brutality, Cholla citizens mounted a heroic struggle for ten days. Their sorrow, their anger, and their determination to have a democratic Korea will be remembered not only by the Korean people but also by the democratic conscience of all the people of the world.

Fourth, the Korean people have attained a high level of educational and cultural sophistication. According to one national survey conducted in 1980, about 80 percent of the Korean people expressed the desire for democracy even if it meant sacrificing economic gains. This conclusively demonstrates the democratic consciousness of the Korean people. We need freedom, justice, and human dignity just as our American friends do.

Finally, I have to point out the role of Christianity in our pursuit of democracy. Although democratic ideals were pervasive in Korean history, concrete, modern democratic ideas came to Korea through Christianity. When Catholicism arrived in Korea two hundred years ago, it taught that all people are God's children. It thus disseminated the idea of equality between men and women and also among the people of different classes. It further preached the system of monogomous marriage and helped to modernize our consciousness by introducing western science.

As I mentioned earlier, Suh Jae-pil was instrumental in showing the close relationship between modernization and Christianity. In particular, the role of the protestant churches deserves closer examination. Protestantism came to Korea exactly one hundred years ago mainly from the United States. It spread the idea of human rights and democracy, stressed the rights of the oppressed, taught that God was on the side of the oppressed and that Christ lived for the persecuted. The protestant churches were also engaged in evangelism and public education.

Above all, Protestantism has helped the Korean people in their mental and spiritual fortitude in opposing first Japanese colonialism and then the dictatorships of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan. Especially, the Protestants, with the cooperation of the Catholic Church, served as the center of our human rights and

democratic movements during the Yushin period from 1972 to 1979. Before then, in 1969, many Christians actively participated in opposing the constitutional amendment allowing Park a third presidential term. In 1971, close to 10,000 Christian youths volunteered to serve as observers to oversee the voting and ballot counting. During the Yushin period, through prayer meetings, the church, including the Catholic Church, helped maintain the morale of those in the human rights and democratic movements. It provided legal counsel, aided the families of those in prison, and lodged protests to the government against torture and inhuman treatment of prisoners. For their distinguished and determined involvement in efforts to restore human rights and social justice, more than 100 ministers and priests have been imprisoned.

Christian participation in the salvation of the individual and the community has inspired student and peasant movements throughout the nation. Because of these efforts, it is inconceivable to speak of the human rights movement in Korea without discussing the role of Christianity. Here is one instance where religion is not the opium of the masses.

For these reasons, I feel certain about the prospects for democracy in Korea. The Korean people are like the grass. Regardless how they are trampled upon, they spring back upright. They remain silent when the feet of oppression are crushing them down, but they rise up the instant the feet are removed. Like the grass, they grow invisibly and grow stronger invisibly. Resilience and persistence are the salient characteristics of the Korean people.

As I discussed earlier, the tenacious democratic struggle by the Korean people has climaxed at about ten year intervals: first in 1952 to end Rhee Syngman's one man rule, then the successful student revolution of April 19, 1960, then the near victory in the 1971 presidential election, and then in the Pusan and Masan mutinies leading to Park Chung Hee's assassination in 1979.

When the current military regime came to power in 1980 and unleashed unprecedented repression, it appeared for a moment that the popular democratic movement had been choked to death. In less than a year, however, anti-government struggles began to erupt again. The Kwangju massacre has become the source of inspiration and renewed determination for the democratic movement. This movement today is stronger and more mature than ever before. The release of myself and my democratic compatriots testifies to the expanded democratic capacity of the Korean people. Both Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee miserably failed to suppress the democratic aspirations of the Korean people; how can Chun Doo Whan succeed, enjoying as he does much less prestige and popular support than his predecessors and facing much more difficult problems?

C. *The United States and Human Rights and Democracy in Korea.*

Korean-American relations were one hundred years old last year. During this century, the Korean people have developed profound trust in the Americans, impressed by your democratic system and gratified by your liberation of Korea from Japanese rule and your assistance during the Korean War, and by your support for the Student Revolution of April, 1960.

Since the middle 1960s, however, the United States has taken a series of actions that have shaken the Korean people's trust and gratitude. For example, in return for Park Chung Hee's agreeing to send Korean troops to Vietnam in the late 1960s, the United States was favorable to the 1969 constitutional amendment that allowed Park to run for a third term. Under the pretext of stability and security, the U.S. chose to look the other way when the Yushin system was introduced in 1972. Even though the United States did cautiously support democratic restoration in the period immediately following Park Chung Hee's death, its actions during the tortuous and bloody rise to power of Gen. Chun Doo Whan were totally inconsistent with its earlier encouragement of democracy. And all of this was capped by President Reagan's invitation to Chun Doo Whan to be one of his first state guests in 1981.

The Korean people's disappointment and frustration have exploded in the burning of the American

Cultural Centers in Pusan and Kwangju and of the American flag on at least two college campuses. Even though I can never support such destructive methods, I understand well the feeling which gave rise to these actions. Their feelings are not so much anti-American as they are critical of current U.S. support for the military dictatorship in Korea.

The rationale for the U.S.'s support of dictatorships is that stability is necessary for national security, but it is plain that security cannot be attained without the guarantee of human rights. I submit to you that human rights are a precondition for stability, which is a precondition for security. This is true for the United States. It is no less true for Korea.

Marshall Montgomery once stated that the courage of the British soldiers against the Germans could not be explained by their attachment to lofty abstract principles. Rather, they fought so bravely in order to protect certain concrete freedoms—freedom of choice, of residence, and of speech—freedoms which would have been lost if Hitler had won. Unlike the British who fought a foreign nation, the Korean people in both north and south confront the same blood. The south Koreans must have something to defend, something to secure, if they are to defend with all their might their country against their own brothers and sisters across the border. This is why we need a government which honors human rights, freedom of press and basic political rights; a government which seeks to settle disputes by peaceful dialogue.

Recently, the Chun Doo Whan regime has loudly proclaimed its desire to confer with the north. But it flatly refuses to deal with responsible opposition at home. It is an utmost irony that a dialogue with the north is being pursued when, within the south, there is neither an internal dialogue nor any appreciable effort for reunification. Any proposal for south-north talks must be preceded by internal unification. Otherwise, such a proposal will meet humiliating rejection. Even if the south-north dialogue materializes, the Chun regime will lack the strength to make forcibly its demands on the north unless it has internal support. The Chun Doo Whan regime should seek to establish a dialogue with the democratic forces and to unify the south first before it addresses the issue of unification with the north. No other procedure can have any chance of success.

At the same time, this is the only way to avoid a violent clash between the Korean people and the Chun Doo Whan regime and to resolve peacefully current political crises. The primary characteristic of the democratic movement since the rise of the Chun Doo Whan regime is its strongly critical attitude toward the United States. As I mentioned, I do not view this as simply anti-Americanism. But unless the present situation is rectified, I am concerned that Korean-American relations will develop into a grave crisis. It is for this reason that I call for a revision of U.S.-Korea policy.

What, then, is it that we Korean people want from the United States?

We are not asking the United States to fight in our stead or directly to interfere with the Chun Doo Whan dictatorship. We only want the United States to provide us moral support as a democratic ally and to encourage the Korean military to devote itself to national defense rather than to political maneuvers. Your moral support should encourage our efforts to realize immediately our fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and press, the release of *all* political prisoners, removing the ban from *all* politicians and restoration of the right to organize trade unions freely. Above all, we want the United States to recognize that these basic human rights and the democratic politics they support are the essential building blocks of Korean stability and security. We want our American brothers and sisters in this room to remind your government that security without human rights was a short-lived illusion that never lasted in Vietnam and that will not last in Korea. This will be your contribution to our struggle for human rights and democracy in Korea. We can do the rest. ■

Korea's Role in East Asia and America's Role in Korea

University of Washington, April 30, 1983

For centuries, Korea has been subject to the geopolitical rumbles and tumbles of regional as well as global relations. Geographically, the Korean peninsula links not only the China Sea with the East Sea but also the Asian continent with the Pacific Ocean. For this reason, Korea has long been considered the Balkan peninsula of Asia, and its history has had to do less with the wishes of the Korean people than with geopolitical battles between continental and maritime powers, each striving to gain control over it as a base to attack the other or as a buffer against attack.

Korean history, then, is the story of the Korean people's challenge to their geopolitical fate. In spite of thousands of years of hardship and adversity, the Korean people have grown sixty million strong today, with our own cultural and national identity. South and north Korea are a single nation divided into two hostile military camps. Behind either side cluster major powers, the United States and Japan on the one hand and China and the Soviet Union on the other, having large stakes in the peninsula and forming strategic alliances with south and north Korea respectively. As a result, the Korean peninsula today is one of the most volatile areas in the world.

A. Korea as the Location of Great Power Politics

(1) The Pre-1945 Period

For more than two thousand years, China exerted tremendous political, military and economic influence on the Korean peninsula. At times, China also used Korea as a military base against Japan and often wrestled with Japan over its control. For example, in the thirteenth century, the Yuan Dynasty attempted to conquer Japan, using Korea as a staging area for its military operations. Again in the sixteenth century, when Japan invaded the peninsula, Ming China, in spite of its own internal troubles, dispatched its troops to defend Korea. And, toward the end of the nineteenth century, China fought Japan again over the issue of who would dominate the Korean peninsula.

As for Japan, it was mainly through Korea that it came into contact with the continental Asian cultures. Korea was thus indispensable to the cultural and economic development of Japan as well as being a stepping stone on its path toward military conquest from time to time. It is no wonder that Japan has always considered Korea as its lifeline, and even went to war three times to secure its control, in the invasion of Korea in 1592, the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Victories over China and Russia enabled the Japanese to finally establish firm hegemony over Korea, which was confirmed by annexation in 1910.

For Russia, Korea was foremost in its constant search for an all-weather Pacific port from early in the 19th century onward. Russian desire to secure the straits near Cheju Island for its advance into the Pacific region was so strong that Russia did not even hesitate to fight Japan in 1904.

The United States and England did not attempt direct control over the peninsula. They supported Japan, however, in order to prevent the southward expansion of Russian influence. The United States in particular ignored the expectation and pleas of the Yi Dynasty and lent its weight to Japan in opposition to Russia.

(2) The Post-1945 Period

One immediate consequence of the Japanese defeat in World War II was the fateful division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel. As the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union heated up, the US-USSR Joint Committee failed to agree on a formula for unification, leading to the establishment of separate governments in south and north. This led directly to the Korean Conflict of 1950-53, which, after three years of bloody hostility, failed to bring about unification by force. The Armistice, signed in 1953 without much gain for either side, territorial or otherwise, has only extended to the present the hostile confrontation between south and north.

In essence, Korea has been a microcosm of the post-World War II cold war confrontation between east and west. One prominent feature has been the reemergence of China as a major power in the region by virtue of its participation in the Korean conflict. China's influence in East Asia has dissipated following its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. As a party to the Korean Conflict, however, it took part in the negotiation for cease-fire and re-surfaced as a major contender for regional influence along with the United States and the Soviet Union. As an ally of north Korea, China began to rival the Soviet Union.

Japan also lost its voice in the region following its crushing defeat in World War II. Rapid economic growth, stimulated by the Korean War, however, made it possible for the Japanese to re-assert economic leverage over Korea from the middle 1960s. Also, Japan became in the Korean War the logistical base for support of American troops in East Asia, which was formalized in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1952. Thus, Japan has come to think of itself as deeply involved in the security of Korea. A war on the Korean peninsula, therefore, would threaten Japan's interests both in strategic and economic areas.

For the United States, Korea has occupied since 1945 a key position as a forward defense line for its interests in defending Japan, except during a short period in 1949 to early 1950 when it was considered outside the U.S. defense perimeter. In recent years, however, this role has expanded and Korea is now considered as a critical link in the U.S. global strategic conflict with the Soviet Union, both as a front-line state and as a staging area for strategic warfare.

While the four great powers have converged on the peninsula, creating competition and tension there, south and north Korea have also done their share of fighting. We were engaged in a fratricidal war in the 1950s, refused to talk to each other in the 1960s, and, in spite of intermittent dialogue in the 1970s, remain mutually hostile today. The threat of invasion looms large in the thinking of people on both sides of the DMZ and war appears a continuing possibility.

Meanwhile, south Korea's importance today goes far beyond its obvious strategic military location. South Korea has the world's 18th largest population which is highly educated and skilled. Further, south Korea has become a newly industrialized state. A communized Korea would fundamentally alter both strategic and economic relations in East Asia.

Korea is in a unique situation, as a single nation divided into a non-communist and a communist form of government. Germany has similar features, but it was, after all, a defeated nation whose divisoin and subsequent ideological make-up were unilaterally determined by the victors. In contrast, Korea was a liberated nation whose unification has been openly advocated not only by the great powers—America, the Soviet Union, China and Japan—but also by south and north Koreans themselves. It is, therefore, ironic that there has been virtually no progress whatever toward unification in thirty years. The unification of Korea is delicately linked to the current interests and alignments of the four powers. However, in the final analysis, whether we remain a divided nation or become re-unified depends upon the Korean people's wisdom and determination.

B. Korea's Role in Establishing Peace in East Asia

Movement toward peaceful coexistence and the eventual re-unification of the two halves of Korea is a prerequisite to peace in East Asia. In this regard, the Republic of Korea must cooperate closely with its allies,

while at the same time striving to normalize diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union. The success of this complex mission hinges on an adroit balance between bold initiative and international cooperation.

Considering that the prevention of war is the primary task of our nation, both the south and the north must establish peace-oriented systems that are conducive to unification. Another Korean conflict would without doubt cause immeasurable expense and wipe out any progress made in the past thirty years, and might even destroy the possibility of future life in the Korean peninsula by entailing the use of nuclear weapons. Such a war could easily expand not only to an East Asian regional war, but could trigger World War III as well.

It is, of course, imperative for south Korea to maintain military preparedness for any provocation by the north. It should be remembered at the same time, however, that military buildup by both north and south has not achieved peace in the peninsula in the last thirty years. Clearly, peace requires dialogue as well as preparedness.

North Korea denies legitimacy to Chun Doo Whan's military rule and insists on a democratic government in the south as a condition for dialogue. While such a condition from north Korea may border on the ridiculous, it is certainly true that north Korea will not be inclined to attempt an overthrow of a south Korean government that has the spontaneous support of the people. Furthermore, it will be forced to accept negotiation as the only feasible way to achieve unification. In addition, the south outnumbers the north two to one in population and has a stronger economy as well. There is also a strong anti-communist sentiment among the south Korean people. If only the south Korean government can be made democratic and enjoy popular legitimacy, then the north will be deprived of its primary argument against dialogue and peaceful co-existence. Further, unless south Korea is democratic, it will enter any negotiations in a weakened position and will meet humiliating rejection.

I believe that a permanent solution to the Korean situation requires the following three steps: (a) peaceful coexistence; (b) peaceful exchange; and (c) peaceful unification. First, a credible solution has to be formulated to prevent another military conflict, which will have to be acceptable to both south and north. In this process, each will have to acknowledge the sovereign status of the other.

In the second stage, both should exchange official delegations and hold regular conferences. This stage will involve economic, cultural and athletic exchanges with a view toward restoring mutual confidence and a pan-national consensus. Finally, a provisional unification can begin to be thought about, which would be based on the coexistence of separate governments in the south and north. During this phase, both will have to explore thoroughly the means to peaceful unification. This is different from the federal system which north Korea has been proposing. In my estimation, their proposal does not recognize, as I believe necessary, the independence and sovereignty of both sides as the initial step toward unification. What is crucial at this stage is not so much the pace of progress as the sincerity of both governments, which will provide hope and trust among the people on both sides.

While these measures depend largely on the initiative of south and north Korea, efforts must simultaneously be undertaken to enlist the cooperation of the United States, Japan, China and the Soviet Union. In seeking their cooperation, both Korean governments must steadfastly maintain their own autonomy and should not behave like the Yi Dynasty in its last years, spinelessly servile to foreign powers.

Peaceful unification is possible only when there is a skillful mix of autonomous pursuits and international cooperation. This is because all the major powers involved want to prevent another war in the peninsula. First, the United States certainly does not have any reason to want to impose a military solution on north Korea. Second, Japan does not possess at this point sufficient military capability to engage in military operations on the Korean peninsula. Further, it is basically content with the economic advances it has made into the region. Third, China is too preoccupied with its own problems, particularly the problem of modernization, to be belligerent toward its neighboring country. This is especially true if, as likely, such a war would also bring vastly increased Soviet military presence into the region. Finally, the Soviet Union itself is disinclined toward a

military provocation in Korea. Most of its military industries and capabilities are concentrated in Europe and the cost of getting drawn into a conflict in Korea would be enormous and logistically difficult.

It is widely acknowledged that none of the four powers, either individually or in their respective alliance, can establish an exclusive control over the Korean peninsula. All of them are interested in the balance of power as it exists today and will resist any attempt to upset this balance. To this extent, peace in the peninsula is the shared concern of the four powers. Accepting this as a given fact, Korea should take the initiative to pursue peaceful solutions to the problem of division, while seeking international cooperation. The four powers should make this possible by agreeing not to support or initiate any aggression in the peninsula.

These were the proposals and the positions which I advocated during my presidential campaign in 1971. They attracted international attention, and, in 1975, then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advanced a position remarkably similar to mine. The Japanese government also has expressed support for a similar program, and ironically, Park Chung Hee also, after having sharply criticized my proposals, adopted them as his own policy in the last years of his rule. Chun Doo Whan has proposed much the same line.

In short, peace in East Asia requires the reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula, which in turn requires a genuine movement toward peaceful coexistence and dialogue. But dialogue is impossible without the restoration of democracy in the south, which will enjoy the full support of the people. Only such a popularly-supported government can force north Korea to participate in a meaningful dialogue.

C. Prospects for Democracy in South Korea

What are the prospects for such democratic development in the south?

I believe there are five reasons for the failure thus far of democracy in Korea. *First,* Korea's independence and its republican form of government were not directly the product of our struggle against colonialism, but were handed to us by the United States as the result of its victory over Japan. *Second,* our first president, Rhee Syngman, betrayed his mission of laying a democratic foundation by surrounding himself with anti-democratic former collaborators with Japan and abusing the ideology of anti-communism and the interest of national security in order to perpetuate his hold on power. *Third,* the unbalanced economic growth has accentuated the gap between rich and poor, rural and urban, between regions and sectors of industry and has caused heightened unrest. Increased repression to suppress this discontent has caused the destruction of democratic institutions. In political matters, Korea has experienced "negative growth" for many years, except in police and surveillance. *Fourth,* under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan, the citadels of democratic rights, that is, the National Assembly, the news media and the judiciary, have become powerless and severely compromised. And *finally,* the intervention by some elements of the military into political affairs, as in Park Chung Hee's military coup of 1961 and the similar coup of the group led by General Chun Doo Whan in 1980, have subverted both the nation's security and democratic politics.

All these obstacles notwithstanding, democratic prospects remain bright. There are also five reasons for this. *First,* even though the Korean nation has been adjacent to, and culturally influenced by, China for thousands of years, it has maintained its integrity and identity, unlike other peoples such as the Manchus or Mongolians who have been absorbed or overrun.

Second, democratic-oriented principles are embedded in Korean tradition, and have tempered the long succession of autocratic rulers to which the Korean people have been subject.

Third, in the last one hundred years, struggles for human rights and popular democracy have persisted, in spite of traditional authoritarianism, Japanese colonialism and military dictatorships. These struggles, dating from the *Tonghak* Uprising of 1894, and including the March 1, 1919 Independence Movement, the many student uprisings culminating in the April 19, 1960 student revolution that forced the resignation of Rhee Syngman, have continued into the present period with the rise of the human rights movement to protest the

Yushin dictatorship of Park Chung Hee and his successor.

Fourth, the Korean people are well-educated and culturally sophisticated. Their capacity for self-governance has greatly matured in this generation, even as the institutions for popular participation have been increasingly suppressed.

And *fifth,* Christianity, as an influential spiritual force for human rights and democracy, has taken root in Korea and provided both motivation and spiritual support for the struggle. Of particular importance are the Christian emphases on the rights of women and the dignity of all people regardless of their wealth or poverty or educational status.

In spite of overwhelming odds against them and indescribable sufferings, students, workers, intellectuals, farmers, Christians and some politicians are mounting a spirited battle for human rights and democracy. We are a nation that has fought against tyrants at home and intruders from outside. We have the tradition and the resolve to realize democracy in the 1980s.

The Korean people are like the grass. We may be pushed to the ground. We may be trampled upon. We may be mowed off. But, in the end, we always rise again. Since the founding of the Republic in 1948, the Korean people have mounted four historic battles for democracy: (1) in 1952, to put an end to the Rhee Syngman dictatorship, (2) in 1960, the successful April 19 Student Revolution, (3) in 1971, the presidential election in which, in spite of irregularities, I polled 46 percent of the popular vote, and (4) finally, in 1979, the popular uprisings in Pusan and Masan that led to the assassination of Park Chung Hee. How can Chun Doo Whan succeed in suppressing our people, enjoying as he does much less prestige than his predecessors and facing much more difficult problems?

D. The Role of the United States in Democratic Restoration in Korea

Because the restoration of democracy is such an integral issue for Korea's role in bringing peace to East Asia, we have to examine the role of the United States in building a democratic Korea. America, of course, is more deeply involved in Korea than any other foreign power in both military and economic terms, and accordingly, wields the greatest amount of influence on Korean politics and society.

Korean-American relations are one hundred years old as of last year, and the Korean people have developed profound trust in the Americans, impressed by their democratic system and gratified by their assistance during the Korean War.

Since the middle 1960s, however, the United States has undertaken a series of actions that have shaken the Korean people's trust and gratitude. For example, as a *quid pro quo* for Park Chung Hee's sending Korean troops to Vietnam in the late 1960s, the United States did not oppose the 1968 constitutional amendment allowing a third presidential term for Park. Under the pretext of stability and security, the United States chose to look the other way when the *Yushin* system was introduced in 1972. Even though the U.S. did cautiously support democratic restoration in the period immediately following Park Chung Hee's assassination, its actions during the tortuous and bloody rise to power of General Chun Doo Whan were totally inconsistent with its earlier encouragement of democracy. And all of this was capped by President Reagan's invitation to Chun Doo Whan to be one of his first state guests in 1981.

The Korean people's disappointment and frustration have exploded in the burning of the American Cultural Centers in Pusan and Kwangju and the burning of the American flag on at least two college campuses. Even though I can never support such destructive methods, I understand well the feeling which gave rise to these actions. Their feelings are not so much anti-American as they are critical of current U.S. support for the military dictatorship in Korea.

The rationale for the U.S.'s support of dictatorships is that stability is necessary for national security, but it is plain that security cannot be attained without the guarantee of human rights. I submit to you that human rights

are a precondition for stability, which is a precondition for security. This is true for the United States. It is no less true for Korea.

What, then, is it that we Korean people want from the United States?

We are not asking the United States to fight in our stead or directly to interfere with the Chun Doo Whan dictatorship. We only want the United States to provide us moral support as a democratic ally and to encourage the Korean military to devote itself to national defense rather than to political maneuvers. Your financial aid should increase only if our human rights situation improves. Your moral support should encourage our efforts to realize immediately our fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and press, the release of all political prisoners, removing the ban from all politicians and restoration of the right of workers to organize trade unions freely. Our constitution, which now restricts and subverts the democratic process, should return to the pre-Yushin system that mandated direct elections and preserved the autonomy of the judiciary and the National Assembly. Finally and above all, we want the United States to recognize that these basic human rights and the democratic politics they support are the essential building blocks of Korean stability and security. They are the necessary conditions for negotiations that will lead to peace. We want our American brothers and sisters in this room to remind your government that security without human rights was a short-lived illusion that did not last in Vietnam and will not last in Korea. This will be your contribution to our struggle for human rights in Korea. We can do the rest. ■

The United States and the Prospects for Democracy in Korea

World Affairs Council, San Francisco, California, May 11, 1983

I. The Prospects for Democracy in Korea

Since our liberation in 1945, the Korean people have overcome fierce battles against the Communist north and have made incalculable sacrifices to attain democracy which is defined by the Constitution as our national framework. Democracy, however, remains a goal yet to be realized, which saddens and burdens our hearts.

In my opinion, there are five reasons, why, in spite of our long persistent struggle, we have not succeeded thus far.

First, our independence from Japanese colonialism was not, in the main, our own accomplishment. Nor was our first government established solely by our own will and efforts. They were the byproducts of the Allied Powers' victory over Japan. This goes to prove that democracy, after all, must be won and cannot be simply handed over.

Second, Rhee Syngman, as the nation's first president, had the historic mission of laying the foundation for democracy. But, blinded by lust for power, he betrayed his mission and his people and collaborated with pro-Japanese elements to consolidate his own position.

Third, there are three institutions whose independence and integrity are essential to democracy; the legislature, the judiciary, and the news media. Sadly, however, during the dictatorships of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan, they have become powerless and, in many instances, voluntarily have served as the lackeys of dictatorship.

Fourth, economic growth has produced a wide array of discrepancies and imbalances, i.e., a gap between town and country, between big enterprises and small and medium-sized businesses, between industries geared for export and for domestic goods, between heavy chemical and light industries, between rich and poor, and between regions. The Korean people are, therefore, discontented and Korean society instable. To suppress popular discontent and to rationalize their repression, the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan regimes have relied upon anti-Communist and national security sentiments.

Finally, even though the majority of our soldiers are dedicated to national defense, a few are immersed in political game-playing. Especially those soldiers in and around the capital city of Seoul have established hegemony in the military command structure and have been subjecting military decisions to political manipulation. As a result, both political integrity and national defense have been gravely undermined.

Undaunted by these obstructions to democratic development, the Korean people have tenaciously fought for democracy. Among Asians, we are people who have endured some of the most severe sacrifices. Just as there are five reasons why democracy has not yet been won, there are five reasons why the struggle will go on.

First, Korea is the only nation in East Asia which, despite thousands of years of Chinese domination and influence, has retained its self-identity. While most of the Mongols and all the Manchurians have been assimilated into China proper, Koreans have proudly preserved their national identity.

Further, Koreans have grown to be the twelfth largest population in the world of 160 nations, enjoying a high level of education and distinct culture. The ability of the Korean people to preserve their identity and independence is indeed remarkable. They do not seem to know the meaning of despair and have demonstrated throughout their history tremendous tenacity and resilience. The following aphorisms testify to such character attributes: even if the heaven were to cave in, there is a way to rise up; even if a tiger has you by its teeth, stay

alert to stay alive. Democracy requires self-assurance and perseverence, and, in this regard, we have fully demonstrated our democratic potential.

Second, throughout five thousand years of Korean history, from the *Dangun* mythology which stressed the need for universal distribution of benefit to all to the *Tonghak* folk religion of the 1860s, which equated man with heaven and the service to man with the service to heaven, and on to the democratic movement of today, there has been a remarkably consistent emphasis on the democratic principles of freedom, justice, and human dignity. It is important to note that these democratic principles are deeply ingrained in our long tradition.

Third, the determined expression of national democratic orientations has been particularly strong over the last one hundred years. I can point, among other things, to the *Tonghak* Uprising of 1894, a peasant revolution involving about 200,000 peasants, the March First Independence Movement, the April 19, 1960 Student Revolution, the 1971 presidential election which was essentially a popular electoral struggle to change power, and the 1979 popular revolts at Pusan and Masan, which created serious tension and friction within the ruling party, in turn, leading to the assassination of Park Chung Hee.

Fourth, as I indicated already, the Korean people have the necessary educational and cultural sophistication for the restoration of democracy. In this respect, they compare favorably with American society.

Fifth, Christianity provides spiritual leadership in the nation's drive for modernization and democracy. As I noted earlier, the democratic spirit and principles are inherent in our long history and tradition. It is Christianity, however, which provided them with concrete expression. For instance, upon arrival in Korea two hundred years ago, Catholicism introduced the ideas of equality between men and women, between the aristocratic *Yangban* class and commoners, and insisted upon monogamous marriage.

The greatest influence on the Korean people's desire for democracy has been the Protestant Church, which arrived in Korea one hundred years ago, mainly from the United States. Through its evangelical work and by engaging itself in public education, the Protestant Church systematically propagated the modern spirit. It also played a vital role in defending the principle of human dignity against Communist propaganda.

In recent years, the Christian Church has served as the bulwark of the Korean democratic struggle. It actively opposed the 1972 declaration of the *Yushin* dictatorship by Park Chung Hee. It has since supported the advocates of democracy under persecution and, through prayer meetings, helped boost their morale. In addition, the Catholic Farmers Association and the Protestant Urban Industrial Mission have borne the brunt of the struggle to protect the rights of workers and peasants. Christian student groups have formed the nucleus of the student democratic protest movement. Christian organizations have mobilized to help political prisoners and their families, to provide lawyers for defendants and to protest against the use of torture and inhuman treatment of prisoners. For their active involvement in the cause of social, economic and political justice, more than 100 clergymen and women have been imprisoned.

Since the founding of the Republic in 1949, the Korean people have mounted four historic battles for democracy: (1) in 1952, the so-called Political Turmoil of Pusan to put an end to the Rhee Syngman dictatorship; (2) in 1960, the successful April 19 Student Revolution, later nullified by Park Chung Hee's military coup d'etat; (3) in 1971, the presidential election, in which, in spite of irregularities, I polled 46 percent of the popular vote, and; (4) finally, in 1979, the popular uprisings in Pusan and Masan that eventually led to the shooting death of Park Chung Hee.

We, Korean people, are like the grass. We may be pushed to the ground. We may be stepped upon. We may be mowed off. But, in the end, we always rise again. Although we have not yet succeeded in restoring democracy in Korea, we have, nonetheless, overthrown two dictatorships. In this sense, our struggle has not been a failure but rather has accomplished the first important step toward democracy, i.e., removing the dictatorship. Both Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee failed in their attempts at a permanent one-man rule. How can Chun Doo Whan succeed, enjoying much less prestige, as he does, and facing much more difficult problems?

II. Several Views Concerning the Prospects for Democracy in Korea

In Korea as well as in America, there are a number of differing views on whether democracy is feasible in, and suitble to, Korea. In general, there are seven strands of arguments which are as follows: (1) security should take precedence over democracy; (2) Korea is not ready for democracy; (3) dictatorship is temporarily necessary for economic growth; (4) American troops should withdraw from Korea because their presence obstructs democratic development; (5) violence is the necessary means for the restoration of democracy; (6) military involvement in politics is necessary in Korea; and (7) the constitutional amendment, which is currently the subject of much speculation, will be harmful for democracy. I want to share with you my thoughts on these ongoing controversies.

First, it is fashionable to argue that national security is a precondition of democracy. But, if there is no democracy, what is there to be secured? If the south Korean people are going to defend their government against their brothers and sisters in the north, they should be made appreciative and proud of their political system and leaders.

Some argue that the dictatorship in the south, however unfortunate it is, is still more benevolent and thus more tolerable than its counterpart in the north. This is a rather simplistic view. In north Korea, dictatorship is justified in theory and practice. For instance, the Communist ideology prescribes the dictatorship of the proletariat, which advocates the one-party system and the state-run economy. In contrast, the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan regimes have claimed individual liberty as their organizing principle and objective. In theory, therefore, they espouse the competitive multi-party system and a periodic, peaceful change of power, while embracing the system of free enterprise. In reality, however, the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan regimes have been fraught with contradictions, corruption, and chaos and have been forced to rely on brutality and repression to maintain their power. As such, the dictatorship in the south cannot be as deeply entrenched institutionally and ideologically as the dictatorship in the north.

The United States has suffered a series of setbacks by Communists in China, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Nicaragua. This is primarily because of the United States' failure to defend democracy in those countries. Speaking of the painful debacle in Vietnam, I believe that the United States should have aggressively promoted democratic reforms in south Vietnam. If the United States still suffered a setback in spite of its strong stand for democracy, it would not have been viewed as a giant military power that met defeat in the swampy morass of Vietnam. Instead the world public would today look up to America as a champion of democracy, whose martyrdom was the result of unfavorable historical circumstances. The American people, then, would not feel pain but pride over the Vietnam saga. An excessive emphasis on security in Korea could drag south Korean and the United States down the Vietnam road. Nobody argues for the sacrifice of democracy in America because of security threats from the Soviet Union. How can it be different in Korea?

Second, some contend that Korea is neither ready nor suited for democracy. They point to the strong Confucian tradition, which, at first glance, seems incompatible with the ideals and principles of democracy. Also, they use the relatively small number of democratic nations in the world, i.e., about thirty out of 160 nations, to argue that democracy is not for every nation.

All the countries, however, including even the Communist ones, claim as their ultimate objective popular sovereignty and the fundamentally democratic system of politics. Democracy is the best political discovery that man has made, and I strongly believe that it is the historical necessity of every human being and nation in the world.

About the incompatibility between democracy and Confucianism, I can only refer to Japan, which is a successful democracy in spite of pervasive Confucian infuence. Moreover, Confucianism contains several democratic elements. For example, it equates human will with the will of heaven and also stresses universal education, both of which are important ingredients of democracy.

The Korean people are indeed highly educated and democratically oriented. They battled the Communists

during the Korean Conflict in 1950, toppled the dictatorships of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee, and continue today to mount determined campaigns for democracy. Ours is a history that has enjoyed no political stability without democracy.

Third, there is a peculiar argument that dictatorship is a temporary necessity in order to achieve economic growth. It is true that dictatorship can produce economic growth to a certain extent. The potential for economic growth under dictatorship, however, is limited because economic potential cannot be fully realized without individual creativity and initiative, which are thoroughly suppressed under dictatorship. Nor can a dictatorship attain economic development, which is predicated upon a well-rounded development of the various economic sectors and the fair distribution of wealth. A historical survey of dictatorial systems, including the Communist countries, bears this point out. For instance, America and France adopted from England both liberal democracy and capitalism. Prussia and Japan, on the other hand, chose to implement only the industrial revolution. The latter expanded their industrial powers but failed to accomplish economic development based on fairness and equity. Popular discontent ensued, which their respective leaders attempted to defuse by external aggression. We all know the final outcome, i.e., the total destruction of both countries as well as incalculable damages to other nations.

Interestingly enough, however, when Germany and Japan both became democratic in the post-World War II period, their economies recorded remarkable performances. This goes to prove that healthy development can occur only under the democratic system. As American shareholding companies have demonstrated, popular participation and support are a prerequisite to economic development and stability.

Fourth, the Communist north has consistently demanded the withdrawal of American troops from Korea. Recently, some in Korea have begun to echo this demand, contending that American troops hamper the restoration of democracy in Korea. This is simply not valid. The presence of American troops cannot be viewed as the most important determinant of democratic development. Consider, for example, that West Germany and Japan have tens of thousands of American troops stationed in their respective territories and yet are flourishing democracies. On the other hand, there are a number of countries which are not democratic, even though there are no American soldiers.

While in prison in 1977, I learned about President Carter's decision to pull out American forces from Korea. Immediately, I contacted the American Embassy in Korea through my legal counsel to deliver my disagreements with his decision. I stated that the proposed troop withdrawal would undermine the prospect for peace in the peninsula unless it was done with sufficient consultation among the four major powers, i.e., the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. Further, permanent peace in the peninsula, I argued, should be the precondition for the departure of American troops. The majority in the democratic movement, as a matter of fact, does not advocate the withdrawal of American troops. Furthermore, a premature pullout will supply the dictator with an additional pretext for more repression, as there surely will be a highpitched cry of an imminent security danger due to American military pullout.

Fifth, some advocate the violent overthrow of the Chun Doo Whan military dictatorship. I categorically object to the use of violence. Korean people set a proud tradition of non-violent resistance with the March 1, 1919, Independence Movement against Japanese colonialists. Personally, as a Christian, I subscribe to the non-violent, active resistance practiced by Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. Non-violence is morally right. Further, faced with a military dictatorship that enjoys an absolute advantage in weapons, the masses, whose only weapon is their fists, have no alternative to non-violence. In my March 1, 1979, democratic declaration, I unequivocally laid down non-violence as the principal *modus operandus* of the democratic movement. I have always feared that the government would goad the advocates of democracy into violence as it had done in May, 1980.

Sixth, military intervention in politics is held to be inevitable in the developing countries. Based on the experiences of the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan dictatorships, however, it is clear that the military should stay out of politics. When Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan staged their respective military coups,

only a handful of soldiers around the capital city of Seoul were involved. They manipulated the military establishment to further their political ends, which not only lowered the morale of the military but also distracted the military from its task of national defense.

In particular, when Chun Doo Whan pulled off a coup on December 12, 1979, he removed without the approval of the commanding officer of the United Nations Forces one army division located near the front. Chun Doo Whan used this divisional force to arrest the army chief of staff and kill his guards. Discipline and hierarchy are the foundations of the military. How can the Korean military be strong when these principles are so flagrantly violated?

Military politics provides few examples of success throughout the world. In economic matters, military dominance produces an excessive enlargement of military outlays and the unlawful use of resources for surveillance, thus leading to budgetary and financial wastes, corruption, and government contracts for construction, which produce unsound structures.

From the standpoint of democratic politics, the military has orientations inconsistent with the workings of democracy. For example, the military regards diversity and pluralism, the hallmark of democracy, as confusion and chaos, rivals and competitors as enemies to be subjugated or destroyed, and creativity as unruliness. Trying to build a democratic nation through military intervention is like trying to catch fish by climbing onto the top of a tree.

Finally, there is currently much speculation about a constitutional amendment that would allow Chun Doo Whan another presidential term. The real issue here is not whether Chun Doo Whan will remain in power or not. If the current constitution and the system of laws remain in force, which denies fair election, political freedom, and freedom of the press, "who will be our next president?" is a superfluous question. Even if Chun Doo Whan retires in 1988 after his term expires, there will be another Chun Doo Whan under the current dictatorial arrangement. The fundamental issue is the democratization of the constitution and the body of laws, and the reinstatement of the freedom of the press, and the right of the people to participate meaningfully in national politics. Should the current constitution and system receive a thoroughly democratic overhaul, and should Chun Doo Whan get elected for another term as president under the democratic constitution and politics, then he should be accepted as the nation's leader.

III. The Restoration of Democracy and the Tasks of the Democratic Government

I have reiterated my firm belief that democracy will be restored in the 1980s by our people's commitment, efforts and sacrifices. Then, the question becomes: how can we restore democracy?; what would be the tasks of the democratic government?

First, I sincerely hope that democracy can be restored through peaceful dialogue with Chun Doo Whan. Although I have been a victim of harsh persecution by the Chun Doo Whan regime, I am always willing and ready to talk with Chun Doo Whan if he accepts the principles of democracy and is genuinely interested in restoring democracy in Korea. It is an utter contradiction that Chun Doo Whan presses for dialogue, reconciliation and unification with the north when he refuses to talk with the democratic opposition and cannot build a national consensus within south Korea.

Second, political vendetta should be unconditionally rejected in the process of democratization. We have had an unfortunate history of brutal political vendetta since the sixteenth century, which was repeated by Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan. I believe that the era and practice of political hatred and vengeance should end with my case. When I was sentenced to death by the military court in 1980, I made an appeal in my final statement to my democratic compatriots and their families that they should not seek vengeance against our political adversaries when democracy returned to Korea in the 1980s. What has been perpetrated by Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan should be recorded as an unfortunate chapter in our otherwise proud history,

as a reminder to our posterity not to make the same mistakes. We should never seek vengeance.

Third, the democratic government should solidify relations with the United States and Japan, and, based on the goodwill of their governments and peoples, strive to attain peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and the East Asian region. A democratic Korea would also make possible the formation of a cooperative structure among the four major powers.

Fourth, the democratic government will naturally have the support of the people and thus enjoy firm stability and security. The north, then, will be compelled to begin peaceful dialogue with the south, which, in turn, will facilitate the implementation of my proposal for the three-step approach to unification, consisting of peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchange, and peaceful unification. The process of unification should be based on the autonomous cooperation between south and north and yet has to draw on the international cooperation of the four principal powers.

Fifth, the democratic government can live with a constitution and a political system similar to the ones that existed in the pre-*Yushin* period because they guaranteed independence of the three branches of government, freedom of the press, popular sovereignty, etc. In economic matters, there should be a free enterprise system which promotes individual initiative and fair opportunity, a balanced development of the various sectors, and equitable distribution of wealth. It is only through the development of such an economic system that we can expect the spontaneous rise in the productive enthusiasm of the workers and the expansion of the domestic market. The democratic government should promote economic cooperation with the United States and Japan and other Western countries with the firm understanding that they would be guaranteed fair and equitable profit. Foreign capital should be invested in such a manner so as to ensure long-term, mutual benefit. Finally, the government should assist in structuring a cooperative relationship between labor and management.

Lastly, the democratic government should construct a foundation for long-lasting social stability by promoting social justice. This should not interfere with individual creativity and initiative. As Korea is rather poor in natural resources, human resources should be aggressively cultivated by improving education. The emphasis should be on the development of the whole person in terms of his intelligence, function, and personality.

III. The United States and Democracy in Korea

Korean-American relations were one hundred years old last year. The Protestant churches in Korea celebrate their centennial next year. During this century, the Korean people have developed profound trust in the Americans. We have been impressed by your democratic system, moved by your religious faith, and gratified by your liberation of Korea from Japanese rule and your sacrifice during the Korean Conflict.

Since the middle 1960s, however, the United States has taken a series of actions that have shaken the Korean people's trust and gratitude. For example, in return for Park Chung Hee's agreeing to send Korean troops to Vietnam in the late 1960s, the United States was favorable to the 1969 constitutional amendment that allowed Park to run for a third term. Under the pretext of stability and security, the United States chose to look the other way when the *Yushin* system was introduced in 1972. Even though the United States did cautiously support democratic restoration in the period immediately following Park Chung Hee's assassination, its actions during the tortuous and sanguinary rise to power of Chun Doo Whan were totally inconsistent with its earlier encouragement of democracy. And all of this was capped by President Reagan's invitation to Chun Doo Whan to be one of the first state guests in 1981.

The Korean people's disappointment and frustration have exploded in the burning of the American Cultural Centers in Pusan and Kwangju and of the American flag on at least two college campuses. Even though I can never condone such destructive methods, I understand well the feeling which gave rise to these actions. Their emotions are not so much anti-American as they are critical of current United States support for

the Chun Doo Whan dictatorship.

Marshall Montgomery once stated that the courage of the British soldiers against the Germans could not be explained by their attachment to lofty democratic principles. Rather, they fought so bravely in order to protect their concrete freedoms of choice, of residence, and of speech—freedoms which would be lost if Hitler were to win. Unlike the British who fought a foreign nation, the Korean people in both south and north confront the same blood. The south Koreans must have something to defend, something to secure, if they are to defend with all their might their country against their brothers and sisters across the border. This is why we need a democratic government which honors human rights, freedom of the press, and basic political rights; a government that seeks to settle disputes by peaceful dialogue.

We are not asking the United States to fight in our stead or directly to interfere with the Chun Doo Whan dictatorship. We only want the United States to provide us moral support as a democratic ally, and to encourage the Korean military to devote itself to national defense rather than to political maneuvers.

Developments in Poland receive banner treatments in the American media, but, much to our disappointment and frustration, daily struggles for democracy in Korea by students, workers, and Christians go largely unnoticed. Your moral support should encourage our efforts to realize immediately our fundamental rights—including freedom of speech and press, the release of all political prisoners, removing the ban from all politicians and restoring the right of trade unions, farmers' associations, and academic freedom. I noticed that, on March 5, Secretary Shultz addressed the Council on the United States and East Asia and expressed a sincere desire for the "growth of democratic institutional arrangements for economic and political conduct." We all share with Secretary Shultz the hope and desire for democratic development in Korea and elsewhere.

We want the United States to recognize that, for Korea as for the United States, the democratic politics which it supports is the essential building blocks of stability and security. We want all of you distinguished members of the Council in this room to impress upon your government that security without democracy is a political alchemy that has never worked. This will be your contribution not only to our struggle for democracy in Korea but also to the national interest of the United States. We can do the rest. ■

My Faith and My Political Participation

NCCCUSA Governing Board, San Francisco, Califoirnia, May 12, 1983

Today is a difficult time in the relationship between the United States and Korea because of the support the U.S. government has given to the current dictatorial government in Korea. But because of your strong expressions of solidarity with the human rights movement in our country, and your longstanding support for your sister churches in Korea, the Korean people continue to have great warmth and respect for the American people, even if we feel painfully the problems caused by your government's policies.

I would like to speak very personally this morning about my own experience of coming to know the connection between Christian faith and political action. I was baptized in 1956 as a Catholic believer and married my wife in 1962. At that time she was the General Secretary of the Korean YWCA and she had been my close friend since 1951. She was then, and still is, a member of the Korean Methodist Church. So our marriage can be called an ecumenical marriage, somewhat earlier than the ecumenical movement in our country.

Since our marriage her help has been invaluable. Without her I could not imagine what I might have become. Her help for me came from her own deep Christian belief, especially her Protestant beliefs influenced by the NCC movement in Korea. I know that the American National Council of Churches was of great influence in that movement. So my coming to be with you today is possible because of her, and I stand here as the husband of Lee Hee Ho. That makes me very proud.

In 1963, I returned to the National Assembly, after the turmoil following Park Chung Hee's coup d'etat of 1961. But I thought that the church and politics were unrelated, that the church was only concerned for spiritual matters and helping Christians get to heaven.

However, in 1969, when Park Chung Hee forced the amendment of the Constitution to allow himself a third term as president, many Christian leaders, led by Rev. Kim Chai Choon of Hankuk Theological Seminary, took part in the opposition. Rev. Kim, now in his 80s and semi-retired in Toronto, continues his strong advocacy of human rights as the honorary chairman of the North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea, which the NCC has helped to form and support.

In the 1971 presidential election in which I ran against Park Chung Hee, church leaders dispatched nearly ten thousand observers to watch the voting and ballot-counting, to try to ensure a fair election.

These two experiences made me reconsider the churches' social participation.

Then, in 1973, when I was in exile in the United States, I met with NCC leaders here in New York to discuss the Yushin dictatorship and to form plans to help restore human rights in Korea. It was then I realized that the NCC has a great concern for social justice and human rights. It was a kind of shocking experience for me, and caused me to reconsider Christianity, including my own faith.

Before August 8, 1973 when I was abducted in Tokyo, I continually prayed to my God to support our efforts for the restoration of human rights and democracy and wrote of this in my diary. But my most prominent experience of meeting with Christ happened in the course of that abduction.

Early in the morning of August 9, the morning after I had been taken by force from a Tokyo hotel and driven to a ship docked somewhere on the Inland Sea, some five of my abductors on the ship bound my arms and legs, and fastened a 30 or 40 kilogram weight to them. Then they forced a piece of wood into my mouth and held it fast with tape, put a blindfold over my eyes and strapped me to a long board behind my back, the kind we use in Korea to prepare bodies for burial. They were preparing to throw me into the sea.

At that very moment, Christ appeared by my right side. I grabbed the left sleeve of his robe and pleaded with him. "My Lord, there is much left for me to do for my people. This is not the time for me to be killed, so

please save my life."

Then I saw a bright flash, even through the blindfold, and heard a loud booming noise. The abductors ran away, shouting that there was an airplane. The ship suddenly began to go full speed. Later, I knew that it was at that moment that my life had been spared. It has been rumored that it was a Japanese or American plane, but it is not clear what identity the plane had. At any rate, my life was saved, and I have come to believe that Jesus accepted my plea, to make me participate in his work for justice.

So after this experience, my determination to realize God's justice for the oppressed has become much stronger.

Since 1974, after I was releaed from house arrest, I frequently participated in prayer meetings in both Catholic and Protestant churches, especially those meetings held at the Christian building in Seoul under the sponsorship of the Korean NCC. And I have participated in the human rights movement that is mainly led by church leaders, priests, pastors and theology professors. Because of the human rights movement, the Korean church has had to face serious reactions and criticism from the government, and even within the church, from the so-called conservative Christians.

Their accusations are two-fold. First, that the church should not be involved in politics, but must remain separate from state affairs. Second, that the Bible, especially Romans 13, teaches that Christians should obey authority.

I paid much attention to these arguments, especially after my arrest in March, 1976, for signing along with seventeen others, the "Declaration for Democratic National Salvation," which was read at Myongdong Cathedral in Seoul at a service commemorating the March 1, 1919 Independence Movement. All of the other signers were strong Christians, including a number of Catholic priests and Protestant pastors.

In prison, when we stood before the panel of judges, our testimony was like a confession of faith, for we spoke from our faith about why we had acted in such a way. We said, "Our activities cannot be understood as politics. We have only expressed our view before God. The Korean churches have no intention of gaining political power nor do we support any specific political power. We only seek the realization of human rights and social justice in accordance with God's will."

This is what Jesus did when he lived in this world. Jesus served the oppressed people as their friend, and at the same time, he sharply confronted the harsh rule that caused their opposition. He criticized the Pharisees' habit of "purifying" the external aspects of their life while leaving the matters of the heart corrupt. He challenged the law of the Sabbath, saying the Sabbath was for the people, not the people for the Sabbath. He drove the money-changers from the temple. Engaged in purifying society, Jesus involved himself in both personal and social salvation. In this way, Jesus walked both the path of the priest and the prophet.

So, if we are to be disciples of Christ, I found that it is necessary for us to follow the same path. Wherever thre is suppression or injustice, we can see Jesus Christ inviting us to participate in his work to save the oppressed and remove the injustice.

We came into this world to do God's work. This is very clear in the Bible. In the Gospel of Luke, Mary's song, the Magnificat, begins with the words, "Behold the handmaiden of God," and goes on to speak of the mighty deeds of God:

> *The arrogant of heart and mind he has put to rout, he has brought monarchs from their thrones, but the humble have been lifted high. The hungry he has satisfied with good things, the rich sent empty away.*

Again, in Luke 4: 18-19, Jesus in the synagogue announced his mission by the words from Isaiah:

> *The spirit of the Lord is upon me because he has annointed me; he has sent me to announce good news to the poor, to proclaim release for prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind; to let the broken victims go free, to proclaim the year of the Lord's favor.*

And in Matthew 25, the parable of the sheep and the goats makes it clearer that to serve the poor, the naked,

the hungry or the imprisoned is to serve God.

We can recognize many similar themes throughout the Bible; in the Old Testament, in the Books of the Law, in the prophets-Amos, Micah, Hosea, Isaiah, Elijah and others—and in the proverbs and psalms. In the New Testament, from the birth of Jesus to his works in this world, to his dying moments, in everything he asked us to participate in social justice as well as to save souls. These two activities are like two sides of the hand, inseparable from each other.

I re-examined the Lord's Prayer. Jesus asked us to pray "that Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." So I finally concluded that if I wanted really to follow Jesus Christ, there was no way to escape from his work to save the oppressed and make this world just.

So I came to believe that we were born for the purpose of participating in God's work, that our life gets its meaning by its participation in this work, and that we can die with the hope of being saved by God.

During our trial in 1976 we used to talk about this among the defendants, and even to joke about it at lunch sometimes. One day, one of my co-defendants, a priest, attacked me. He said, "We've all been arrested just because of you. If we had made the same statement on our own as religionists, there would have been no problem. But because of your involvement, the government attacks us for participating in politics."

I had no retort then. But I thought about it a while, and later I said to him, "Your accusation is not true. I thought about what you said. I'm a politician, and politicians can adapt to various conditions. If I weren't a Christian, I could, no doubt, be able to cooperate with Park Chung Hee and continue my political life. But you ministers and priests always say, 'Man does not live by bread alone. Follow Christ.' That seemed reasonable, so that's why I came to be put on trial now. So you're the one who is responsible. I don't hold a grudge against you for this. I'm happy to be here. But the responsibility is yours."

Then a minister spoke up. "No," he said, "you're both wrong. It is not we or you that is responsible, but Jesus Christ himself."

With this experience, I could gain a firm conviction. I felt a genuine re-birth and came to believe that God is always with me, even in prison. Even there, I felt great freedom and joy and thought how happy it is to be a Christian in the twentieth century, when our church has restored its real character and returned to its real duty.

When I thought about our church during earlier periods of history, I felt some disappointment or shame for it. But even today, I feel sad that there are some churches that are not churches that follow Christ. Rather they sell him like some kind of commodity.

In 1980, at the court-martial, when I was given a death penalty, in my final statement I made three points.

First, I expressed my strong belief in the restoration of democracy in the 1980s. Even if they are suppressed, the people will surely respond to bring democracy back during this decade.

Second, I said that of course they might be able to sentence me to death, but they could not kill me. If my God needs me, he will save my life. If not, he will let me die. So the one who kills me, I said, is not you, but God.

Third, I asked my 25 other defendants and their families to keep the faith, saying, "As I told you, you will restore democracy in the 1980s. But if you take power, never seek political revenge, even for me. You should pardon all with God's love. However, we must remember this time in our history well, so that we do not repeat it. But do not take revenge."

I still remember that after my speech, all the defendants and their families stood and sang the National Anthem, then they sang "We Shall Overcome." And then they shouted and cheered me with "Kim Dae Jung Shall Live!"

As my death seemed to draw nearer, I became somewhat uneasy. But I always remembered that God was with me and I believed that even if I were killed by Chun Do Whan, history would remember me as victorious because I had been on the side of my people and of justice. God would never abandon me. Those who are with God can meet many ordeals. But ordeals cannot make them unhappy.

Now I am convinced that even at midnight I can see the dawn of the next morning, that even in hell I can believe in the victory of justice because there is a God.

Someone recently advised me not to speak of Jesus Christ so frequently before common audiences. I strongly opposed that opinion, for without God, there would be no present Kim Dae Jung worthy of being listened to. In Korea, we could never have realized human rights without Christianity. Even though Christians are a minority, 10 million out of 40 million people, and even though among the ten million Christians, those concerned for human rights are also a minority, it is this minority that is leading the Korean people's spirit. Especially the Protestants, whose spiritual roots came mainly from the United States, have led the move for modernization and the consciousness of human rights in Korea.

My final comment is this: even though we have different nationalities, Korean Christian believers and American Christians who belong to the NCC are really one family, one body in Christ. In Korea, the Catholics and the Protestants became one body when we were thrown together in the same struggle for justice. The ecumenical movement was born under the pressure of a common fight for and with the oppressed people. Before then, we were very isolated from each other. The same is true of Korean and American Christians. In Korea, we feel a deep kinship for you, a close sense of our being one family, when we see attacks against the NCC in the U.S.

Now let me close by expressing the brotherly and sisterly love and solidarity of the Christians of Korea for you in this very important meeting. Our prayers are with you. Let us advance to victory together, following Christ who goes before us to set the prisoners free and declare this the acceptable year of our Lord. ■

Peace and Unification in Korea and America's Role in the Restoration of Democracy

University of California, Berkeley, May 13, 1983

I. The Balance of Power and the Korean Peninsula

The Korean peninsula remains one of the most volatile areas in the world. Even though the armistice has been in effect for the last thirty years, heightened tension continues to raise the spectre of war in the peninsula. The governments of south and north Korea have kept up arms races and perceive each other as the arch-villains. The prospect for peace indeed seems remote.

On the other hand, however, there is some justification for viewing the Korean peninsula as relatively stable, free from the danger of war. This is because the United States, Japan, China and the Soviet Union, the four principal powers with the deep interests in the peninsula, are checking one another. At the same time, they are tacitly cooperating with one another in order to maintain the *status quo*. In this sense, the Korean peninsula appears more stable than Southeast Asia or the Middle East.

The balance of power has proven historically to be an indispensable factor of peace in the peninsula. Whenever the balance was upset, its outcome was hostilities among the four powers not only because of their interests in Korea, but also because of Korea's geopolitical significance. Let me briefly outline the history of their involvements in the Korean peninsula.

First, the Han Dynasty of China established a colonial administration in the northern part of the Korean peninsula around 108 B.C. For the next two thousand years China exercised great influence and treated Korea as a component of its national interest. In the 13th century, China, controlled by the Mongols, conquered Korea and employed it as a base from which to launch an invasion of Japan. In fact, over the course of history, Korea's importance to China has become more and more strategic in nature as a stepping-stone to Japan or as a buffer against Japan. This is why the Ming Dynasty, in spite of its internal difficulties, dispatched its troops to repel a Japanese invasion of Korea. All this came to a head in the 19th century, when China went to war with Japan for the undisputed control of the Korean peninsula. As a result of its crushing defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, China was forced to yield its control over Korea to Japan.

Second, Korea has historically been the corridor which links Japan to the Asian continent. This is only natural considering that Japan had received through Korea much of its culture, written language and Buddhism. Thus, the Japanese consider the peninsula vital to their viability, which explains their willingness to fight the Chinese in 1894 and the Russians in 1904 over the control of Korea.

Third, Russia's interest in Korea has had to do with its perennial search for an all-weather port in order to gain access to the Pacific Ocean. Accordingly, Russia has had its eye on the East Sea and Cheju Island. It was set back, however, by the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.

Finally, the United States has never entertained a plan to conquer the peninsula as the other three powers have. Its main interest has been to use Korea to contain the southward movement of Russia. This accounts for the United States' support of Japan in the Russo-Japanese confrontation. Also, this is why, in spite of repeated pleas by the Yi Dynasty, the United States provided behind-the-scenes assistance to Japan when the latter annexed Korea in 1909.

Clearly, the four powers have conflicting interests in the Korean peninsula and have never shown a willingness to accept the dominance of any one particular power in the peninsula. They have long held an interest in the balance of power in the region. Naturally, the Korean government and people have to blamed,

in part, for all the colonial wars that were fought in the peninsula. If Korea were internally strong, it might have been able to solidify its position *vis-a-vis* external powers, thus keeping them out of the peninsula and averting conflicts among colonial powers. In the final analysis, however, the four powers have simply bullied their way into the peninsula and turned it into a playground for power politics.

As we all know, the post-World War II period has seen major changes in the configuration of power among the four contestants for influence in the peninsula. During the Korean Conflict, China successfully intervened on behalf of north Korea when the United Nations forces approached the Yalu River. This enabled China to regain some of the influence it lost as a result of its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. As for Japan, it has returned to the peninsula as an economic power and exerts today a great amount of economic influence on Korea. In addition, it continues to serve as a logistical base for American troops stationed in Korea as it had during the Korean Conflict. As in the past, Japan views Korea as a buffer against continental powers. As such, Korea remains economically and militarily important to Japan.

The Soviet Union firmly established its position in the peninsula by occupying the northern half in 1945 and has been actively competing with China for a major share of influence over north Korea. In recent months, the Andropov regime has shown interest in improving relations with north Korea.

The United States liberated Korea in 1945 and helped us estabish a democratic government in 1948. Unfortunately, however, it committed a major policy error when it publicly declared south Korea to be out of its defense perimeter in East Asia, thus inviting north Korea's aggression in 1950.

The United States played a major role in the defense of south Korea during the Korean Conflict and continues even today its vital contribution to the security of south Korea. As I indicated earlier, the United States originally considered Korea as a strategic post in its attempt to contain Communism and safeguard Japan. Today, however, Korea's significance exceeds such a strategic consideration. This is because south Korea has forty million people who are well educated, highly cultured, and well trained in productive skills and technology. Losing such invaluable human resources and the already advanced economy to north Korea would no doubt tip the balance inrreparably in favor of the Communist bloc in the region.

For these reasons, the four powers are keenly interested in the *status quo* and the balance of power in the Korean peninsula. Any disruption of the present situation will not be passively tolerated by the countries involved and is likely to lead to a regional, and even a world-scale, conflict.

What, then, are the specific lessons of the Korean Conflict? First, the United States cannot withdraw its troops from Korea without carefully weighing the consequences and implications of such a move. The Korean Conflict was the direct result of a unilateral action by the United States to declare Korea out of its defense perimieter without consulting other major powers and without any substitute plans to ensure the security of south Korea. The military vacuum created by the hasty action of the United States, then, was the immediate cause of the Korean Conflict.

Second, a dictatorial Korea is an open invitation to the Communist north to attempt a military solution to unify the peninsula. For example, the Rhee Syngman regime in the 1950s consisted largely of pro-Japanese elements, contrary to the popular expectation that patriots who fought against Japanese colonialism would form the nucleus of the First Republic. Rhee Syngman thus betrayed the nation and severely compromised national integrity. As a result, in the 1950 National Assembly election his party received less than one third of the seats. North Korea had little reason to respect the Rhee Syngman regime and must have thought that it could easily overtake the south. The fundamental error by the north here is that popular distrust of the Rhee Syngman regime did not mean that the Korean people would abandon their desire for a democratic Korea and embrace the Communist north.

Another contributing factor to the Korean Conflict was the tendency of the Rhee Syngman regime to make loud, empty statements which only discredited it. For example, Rhee's defense minister was fond of saying, "Pyongyang in three days; a bucket of water from the Yalu River in a week." Such loose talk produced the illusion of military preparedness when, in reality, south Korea was militarily almost naked. These gratuitous

remarks also made both the general public and policy-makers feel relaxed about national security, thus contributing to humiliating setbacks during the initial phase of the Korean Conflict.

There is no doubt that the presence of American troops and the anti-Communist consciousness of the Korean people are two essential components of our national security. We have both factors presently in south Korea. Unfortunately, however, they are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions of national security.

The current Chun Doo Whan regime sadly lacks popular legitimacy, and its anti-democratic nature has disappointed and angered the Korean people. Further, the concentration of wealth, the widening gap between rich and poor, rampant corruption in the highest level government, and internal discord within the Chun Doo Whan regime have resulted in the growing instability of Korean society and the weakening of national security.

Another factor which gravely undermines national security today is the political manipulation of the military. The political neutrality of the Korean military has been thoroughly destroyed by a small group of soldiers stationed around the capital city of Seoul. They have established hegemony over the rest of the military by the methodical use of its intelligence apparatus. These soldiers arbitarily promote, transfer, and discharge military personnel, which has lowered the morale of our soldiers. Our national security is undergoing a serious test today.

In addition, national security has been misused by Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan as an instrument of maintaining their power. In order to rationalize their dictatorships and repression, Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan have deliberately thrown a Communist scare into the public. For example, in 1972, Park Chung Hee warned the Korean people that Kim Il Sung of north Korea was keen on celebrating his 60th birthday in south Korea. In 1975, Park unnerved them again by warning that the north Korean Communist Party planned to commemorate its 30th anniversary in Seoul. In the spring, the people were warned that north Korean guerrillas were surely to infiltrate into the south in the coming summer by crawling through the tall grass. In the fall, the people were told that the north Koreans would invade in the coming winter by walking over the frozen rivers along the border. These repeated false alarms have undermined the credibility of the Park Chung Hee and the Chun Doo Whan dictatorships and also national security because the Korean people are uncertain when and what to believe when their leaders cry wolf.

A government which lacks popular support and credibility, as the Chun Doo Whan regime does, cannot be expected to have much success in dealing with its adversaries. Indeed, the north Korean regime has been playing deaf to repeated requests by the Chun Doo Whan regime for a dialogue. It is an utmost irony that the Communists in the north should refuse to sit down on the same table with officials of the Chun regime, claiming that the Chun regime is not a democratic government. Nevertheless, this only goes to show that rejection and humiliation are the familiar fate of dictatorial governments. Further, this is a clear demonstration that an unpopular, dictatorial government is incapable of preserving peace and the balance of power.

II. A Democratic Government as a Prerequisite to Peace and Unification

Only a democratic government can enjoy the spontaneous support and the dedication of the entire nation to its defense. This means that a peaceful dialogue with the north will be possible only when the government guarantees freedom, justice and human dignity. North Korea, then, cannot but choose to enter into a meaningful dialogue with south Korea. Further, the four major powers and world opinion will favor a south-north dialogue. The Korean people will, then, be able to apply autonomous and prudent solutions to the problems of peace and unification in the peninsula.

A peaceful solution is possible when there is a skillful mix of autonomous pursuits and international cooperation by democratic governments. This is because all the major powers involved want to prevent another war in the peninsula. First, the United States certainly does not have any reason to want to impose a

military solution on north Korea. Second, Japan does not possess at this point sufficient military capability to engage in military operations on the Korean peninsula. Further, it is basically content with the economic advances it has made into the region. Third, China is too preoccupied with its own problems, particularly the problem of modernization, to be belligerent toward its neighboring country. This is especially true if, as likely, such a war would also bring vastly increased Soviet military presence into the region. Finally, the Soviet Union itself is disciplined toward a military provocation in Korea. Most of its military industries and capabilities are concentrated in Europe and the cost of getting drawn into a conflict in Korea would be enormous and logistically difficult.

It is widely acknowledged that none of the four powers, either individually or in their respective alliance, can establish an exclusive control over the Korean peninsula. All of them are interested in the balance of power as it exists today and will resist any attempt to upset this balance. To this extent, peace in the peninsula is the shared concern of the four powers. Accepting this is as a given fact, Korea should take the initiative to pursue peaceful solutions to the problem of division, while seeking international cooperation. The four powers should make this possible by agreeing not to support or initiate any aggression in the peninsula.

These were the proposals and the positions which I advocated during my presidential campaign in 1971. They attracted international attention and, in 1975, then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advanced a position remarkably similar to mine. The Japanese government also has expressed support for a similar program, and ironically, Park Chung Hee also, after having sharply criticized my proposals, adopted them as his own policy in the last years of his rule. The Chun Doo Whan regime has proposed much the same line.

In short, peace in East Asia requires the reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula, which in turn requires a genuine movement toward peaceful coexistence and dialogue. But dialogue is impossible without the restoration of democracy in the south, which will enjoy the full support of the people. Only such a popularly-supported government can force north Korea to participate in a meaningful dialogue.

With regard to the concrete steps toward re-unification, I have always advocated a three-stage approach. When I introduced it during the 1971 presidential campaign to the enthusiastic Korean voters, Park Chung Hee realized the national aspiration for re-unification. At the same time, Park recognized that direct election of the president would not ensure him another term. Putting two and two together, Park Chung Hee grasped the potential usefulness of the re-unification issue as a means of perpetuating his one-man rule. That is, Park proclaimed the *Yushin* dictatorial system, which he argued was necessary to make adequate preparations for re-unification. By equating the *Yushin* system with the need for re-unification, Park Chung Hee asserted that repudiating *Yushin* was tantamount to opposing re-unification. It should be noted, however, that the *Yushin* Constitution and system were used for the sole purpose of strenghtening and perpetuating Park Chung Hee's power and not for the promotion of re-unification. I do not enjoy reminding people that I told you so, but, when a joint south-north communique was issued on July 4, 1972, I warned the Korean people that re-unification could be exploited to further Park Chung Hee's dictatorship. Within three months of this caveat, *Yushin* became a dark reality. In the United States, my warnings were duly recorded in the Fulbright Report on the Korean political situation.

It appears to me that Chun Doo Whan is adopting a tact very similar to his predecessor's with regard to re-unification. Although I do not necessarily question Chun Doo Whan's desire for unification, I have strong doubts whether he could succeed in making substantive progress toward re-unification. Chun Doo Whan has been running in the opposite direction from national unity and harmony. He has been refusing any communications with the democratic movement, imprisoning advocates of democracy, restricting political freedom and activity for hundreds of politicians, and suppressing academic freedom and workers' rights. When Chun Doo Whan cannot unify south Korea, how does he expect to unify south and north? How can he succeed when the north is flatly refusing to recognize his regime as the legitimate representative of the south Koeran people? Only when the Chun Doo Whan regime becomes democratic and attains internal unity and solidarity can it induce the north to cooperate toward unification.

At the present time, the four major powers seem to prefer peace and stability in the Korean peninsula to unification. This is because any movement toward unification may very well disrupt the balance of power among them. It is clear, however, that they do not have any reason to object to unification as the ultimate solution to the problem of peace in the region. Again, only a democratic south Korea can bring about unification without upsetting the balance of power in the Korean peninsula.

What, then, are the three stages in my proposal for unification? They are: (a) peaceful coexistence; (b) peaceful exchange; and (c) peaceful unification. First, a credible solution has to be formulated to prevent another military conflict, which will have to be acceptable to both south and north. In this process, each will have to acknowledge the sovereign status of the other.

In the second stage, both should exchange official delegations and hold regular conferences. This stage will involve economic, cultural and athletic exchanges with a view toward restoring mutual confidence and a pan-national consensus. Finally, a provisional unification can begin to be thought about, which would be based on the coexistence of separate governments in the south and north. During this phase, both will have to explore thoroughly the means to peaceful unification. This is different from the federal system which north Korea has been proposing. In my estimation, their proposal does not recognize, as I believe necessary, the independence and sovereignty of both sides as the initial step toward unification. What is crucial at this stage is not so much the pace of progress as the sincerity of both governments, which will provide hope and trust among the people on both sides.

While these measures depend largely on the initiative of south and north Korea, effort must simultaneously be undertaken to enlist the cooperation of the United Statse, Japan, China and the Soviet Union. In seeking their cooperation, both Korean governments must steadfastly maintain their own autonomy and should not behave like the Yi Dynasty in its last years, spinelessly servile to foreign powers.

The United States can make significant contributions to the peace and unification of the Korean peninsula. In cooperation with Japan, China and the Soviet Union, the United States can lay the foundation for unification and a permament peace in the peninsula by helping expand peaceful exchange between south and north. As I have stressed repeatedly, however, a democratic Korea is the most fundamental step toward peace and unification in the peninsula. Therefore, I believe that the most important objective of the United States should be to assist in the restoration of democracy.

III. America's Role in the Restoration of Democracy

Let us examine the role of the United States in building a democratic Korea. America, of course, is more deeply involved in Korea than any other foreign power in both military and economic terms, and accordingly, wields the greatest amount of influence on Korean politics and society.

Korean-American relations are one hundred years old as of last year, and the Korean people have developed profound trust in the Americans, impressed by their democratic system and gratified by their assurance during the Korean Conflict.

Since the middle 1960s, however, the United States has undertaken a series of actions that have shaken the Korean people's trust and gratitude. For example, as a *quid pro quo* for Park Chung Hee's sending Korean trops to Vietnam in the late 1960s, the United States did not oppose the 1968 constitutional amendment allowing a third presidential term for Park. Under the pretext of stability and security, the United States chose to look the other way when the *Yushin* system was introduced in 1972. Even though the U.S. did cautiously support democratic restoration in the period immediately following Park Chung Hee's assassination, its actions during the tortuous and bloody rise to power of Chun Doo Whan were totally inconsistent with its earlier encouragement of democracy. And all of this was capped by President Reagan's invitation to Chun Doo Whan to be one of his first state guests in 1981.

The Korean people's disappointment and frustration have exploded in the burning of the American Cultural Centers in Pusan and Kwangju and the burning of the American flag on at least two college campuses. Even though I can never support such destructive methods, I understand well the feeling which gave rise to these actions. Their feelings are not so much anti-American as they are critical of current U.S. support for the military dictatorship in Korea.

The rationale for the U.S.'s support of dictatorships is that stability is necessary for national security, but it is plain that security cannot be attained without the guarantee of democratic rights. I submit to you that democratic rights are a precondition for stability, which is a precondition for security. This is true for the United States. It is no less true for Korea.

What, then, is it that we Korean people want from the United States?

We are not asking the United States to fight in our stead or directly to interfere with the Chun Doo Whan dictatorship. We only want the United States to provide us moral support as a democratic ally and to encourage the Korean military to devote itself to national defense rather than to political maneuvers. Your financial aid should increase only if our human rights situation improves. Your moral support should encourage our efforts to realize immediately our fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and press, the release of all political prisoners, removing the ban from all politicians and restoration of the right of workers to organize trade unions freely. Our constitution, which now restricts and subverts the democratic process, should return to the pre-*Yushin* system that mandated direct elections and preserved the autonomy of the judiciary and the National Assembly. Finally, we want the United States to recognize that the restoration of democracy is essential for peace and unification in the Korean peninsula. We want you to urge your government to modify its Korean policy which has been misguided by preoccupation with security defined in narrow military terms. Your efforts to enlighten American policy-makers about the inseparable relation of democracy to peace and unification in the peninsula will benefit not only our struggle for democracy but American national interests as well. If you, as concerned and responsible citizens, can bring about the reformulation of the United States Korea policy to stress both democracy and security in Korea, we can do the rest. ■

Kim Dae Jung—Held for Ransom

by Scott E. Kalb
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It is early 1970. Kim Dae Jung is a prominent, extremely popular politician. He is highly visible—delivering speeches and issuing papers on a broad range of topics including economic policy, reunification and social welfare. Kim survives a power struggle with Kim Young-sam and Lee Chul-seung to become the surprise opposition party nominee for the next presidential election. He proves to be an adept and attractive candidate. Usually reserved and highly critical, the press and media are outspoken in their support of Kim. He is touted by many as the man with enough charisma and insight to lead Korea on a path toward democracy.

Now it is 1971. Kim is running for the presidency of South Korea. His campaign gathers momentum and the government is getting alarmed. The climax of Kim's campaign is a rally in Seoul which draws almost half a million people.[1] The election is held, and Kim loses narrowly to Park Chung Hee. A cry goes up and charges are made about unfair electioneering practices including open intimidation of rural voters.[2] There is reason to believe that in an open, fair election Kim might have won.[3] Even under these conditions Kim garners 46 percent of the vote and loses by a margin of less than 6 percent.

* * *

This was the highpoint of Kim's political career. He soon became much more famous as a human rights case than he ever was as a politician. Kim was catapulted to international prominence when he was kidnapped from his Tokyo hotel room in 1973 by K.C.I.A. agents for speaking out against the newly promulgated Yushin Constitution and Park Chung Hee. He has remained in the spotlight for the past ten years as he has continued to advocate human rights and democratic reform despite the fact that he has been harassed, both physically and psychologically, and incarcerated on politically-based charges for the better part of the decade.

What has received far less attention over the years is the way that Kim has been used as a pawn in a brutal game of international power politics. The participants in this game, the governments of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, have all bargained and received bonuses at Kim's expense, but the biggest winners have undoubtedly been the Park and Chun governments of South Korea. U.S. negotiations and gains have been fairly obvious; far less easy to discern is the part Japan has played. What kind of concessions have been made and what "wins" have been taken home by Japan?

U.S. Involvement

That the U.S. has been heavily involved in behind-the-scenes diplomatic negotiations with South Korea regarding the fate of Kim Dae Jung seems clear. The sequence and timing of certain key decisions and actions point unmistakeably to this conclusion. It has in fact been admitted, though unofficially, on both sides.

The clearest example occurred on January 23, 1981 when it was announced that Chun Doo Hwan and President Reagan would meet in Washington on February 2; Chun was the first foreign Head of State to be received by Reagan as President of the U.S. He was also the first Korean leader to confer with an American President in the United States since Park's meeting with Nixon in August, 1969.

Only twenty-four hours after the visit was announced, Chun issued a stay of execution for Kim Dae Jung. His sentence was commuted first to life imprisonment and then, later, to twenty years. On January 25, just two days

after the announcement of Chun's pilgrimage to Washington, Chun decreed an end to martial law and simultaneously designated February 25 as the day for presidential elections. It was also announced that Kim's stay of execution would enhance U.S.-R.O.K. relations.[4] The timing could hardly have been coincidental. In November 1981 Richard V. Allen, then Reagan foreign policy adviser and later Presidential National Security Advisor, met with General Lew Byoung Hion, Chairman of the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff and now Korean Ambassador to the U.S., and discussed the possibility of a Washington visit by Chun. Allen later discussed the idea at great length with South Korean Ambassador Kim Yong-shik and then publicly stated that Kim's execution would have serious consequences for Korea's bilateral relations with the U.S.[5] The commutation of the death sentence was clearly based on a two-way deal and many felt that, although it was a step in the right direction, Chun was getting the big prize.[6]

What did Reagan gain by negotiating for a lighter sentence for Kim? Reagan had attacked Carter's human rights diplomacy as weak, ineffective and damaging to relations with foreign countries.[7] He had been quietly indicating his displeasure with Chun's hardline stance on Kim Dae Jung[8] but now, recently inaugurated, Reagan was coming under fire for being too hardline. He had to demonstrate his concern for human rights and getting Kim's sentence commuted was certainly a feather in his cap. In addition, meeting Chun would reinforce Reagan's message that he intended to support U.S. allies and fight against communism in the wake of the Shah of Iran-Khomeini debacle.

Chun, however, was undoubtedly the big winner. Returning home on February 6 he splashed pictures of himself with Reagan and quotes of Reagan's support all over the country in a barrage of propaganda that lasted all year but was particularly intense until just before the election three weeks later. Chun won by a landslide. Although there is no doubt that Reagan was involved in political bargaining with Chun, it seems that he was guilty of a far more serious offense—striking a bad bargain. A symbolic political gesture and a life sentence for an innocent man are not much of an exchange for seven years of dictatorial rule.

Kim Dae Jung's sudden release to Seoul National University Hospital for medical treatment on December 16, 1982 and his subsequent departure for the U.S. on December 23, came as a surprise to the international community. Quiet diplomacy had been handled much more discreetly this time but U.S. involvement was obvious. Though the State Department and the Reagan Administration denied taking direct action they soon began to acknowledge unofficially some role in Kim's release. It was "another human rights victory" for Reagan. Kim himself, upon arrival at Washington National Airport, acknowledged his debt to Reagan for bringing pressure to bear on Chun for his release.[9]

Clearly both Kim and the Reagan Administration have gained something from Chun's act of clemency but what has Chun come away with? On December 23, the same day that Kim departed for the U.S., it was officially announced that Secretary of State Shultz would visit Seoul on February 6, after a swing through Japan and China.[10] Although such a visit was a logical step for a new Secretary of State, the timing of the announcement indicates a link to negotiations for Kim Dae Jung's release. More importantly, it was hinted by the Associated Press that "the suspension of execution of Kim's sentence, besides helping to reduce criticism when Shultz arrives, might possibly pave the way for a visit [to Korea] by U.S. President Reagan."[11] Such a possibility had neither been confirmed nor denied by the State Department at the time of writing but unofficial sources speculated tht it was quite likely sometime within the next year. The political benefits that Chun could gain from a Reagan visit would be enormous.

Despite such visible benefits for both Reagan and Chun from the release of Kim Dae Jung, Japanese-R.O.K. relations and negotiations have been more critical in the matter and it was there that the biggest gains were made. The winnings, in fact, amounted to four billion dollars for Chun, approximately three times as much as Japan's entire investment in South Korea since relations were normalized in 1965.

Japanese Involvement

As in the case of the U.S., negotiations between Japan and the R.O.K. in recent months have produced a suggestive array of facts and dates. On December 16, 1982 Kim was released to S.N.U. Hospital for treatment. Three days later, December 19, the Japan-South Korea Parliamentarians League held its tenth annual meeting in Tokyo and called for further cooperation in security, economic and cultural fields. The aid negotiations were the primary topic and new Prime Minister Nakasone, as guest speaker, promised to settle the controversy quickly. At the conclusion of this meeting Lee Chai-hyung, Chairman of the Democratic Justice Party (D.J.P.) and leader of the Korean delegation, announced Nakasone's intention to meet Chun.[12] Four days later, on December 23, Kim was released and sent to the U.S. The conservative *Japan Times* wrote "his departure is expected to remove one of the few remaining impediments to the successful negotiation of a $4 billion loan from Japan."[13] Five days after that, on December 28, Japanese Ambassador to South Korea, Maeda, asserted "a Japan-R.O.K. summit is desired as soon as possible although I am not at liberty to indicate specific dates."[14] About a week later, on January 5, an official announcement was made about the Nakasone-Chun summit to be held in Seoul on January 11. By the next day, January 6, it had been announced that the aid package issue had been settled in preparation for the summit. In addition, the *Chungang Ilbo,* a major Seoul daily newspaper, reported "now that Kim Dae Jung has left Korea . . . Nakasone's upcoming visit here should provide momentum to lay the groundwork for stability in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1980's," directly connecting Kim and relations with Japan.[15]

What was going on here? Had Nakasone bought Kim's freedom for the enormous price of $4 billion in aid? Or, on the other hand, had the Korean government used Kim's release as an extra incentive for obtaining the aid money? In order to get a clearer picture, it is helpful to first examine some of the Japanese and Korean governments past dealings over Kim.

Ever since August 1973, when Kim was kidnapped from Tokyo by K.C.I.A. agents, the Japanese public has taken a keen interest in his condition and the protection of his human rights. Popular pressure has at times been intense enough to force the conservative Japanese government to take a hard line with South Korea over the status of Kim Dae Jung. From August through October 1973 there was a tremendous uproar in Japan over the Kim Dae Jung affair. Besides being concerned about Kim's well-being, the Japanese public was outraged over the flagrant violation of Japan's sovereignty. Indeed it was probably this uproar, together with the pressure brought to bear by Philip Habib, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, that saved Kim's life.[16]

President Park at first denied any official connection whatsoever, but, as time went on and the evidence mounted (Korean Diplomat Kim Dong-woon's fingerprints were found in the room that Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped from), some kind of political action became necessary.

Japanese Prime Minister Kakue Tanaka and the majority Liberal Democratic Party (L.D.P.) were coming under pressure to demand Kim's return, hold a thorough investigation of the affair and stop all aid to Korea. Although the opposition parties were quick to criticize the L.D.P. for their own gain, there also was obviously a lot of popular support for sanctions against Korea. Why was the government loathe to take such steps? The answer, not surprisingly, was money.

In a 1972 ministerial session, Japan had pledged $170 million in aid to Korea and had already financed massive industrial and agricultural projects including a steel mill in Pohang. In 1972, export and imports between Japan and Korea had totaled $1.6 billion and in the first seven months of 1973 they had reached a high of $1.4 billion. Ninety-five percent of all foreign capital investment in South Korea for the period January through August 1973 was Japanese. This accounted for 190 out of 203 foreign investment projects.[17] Obviously the Japanese government and business community had extremely close political and economic relations with Korea and had vested interests in the maintenance of good relations.

In addition, powerful, pro-South Korean lobbying groups, including the Japan-South Korea Parliamentarians League with a membership of 293 L.D.P. and Democratic Socialist Party (D.S.P.) members, were

urging Tanaka to settle quietly with Park and get on with business. The League had already been tainted by graft[18] and this was publicly indicated by Harvard Professor Jerome Cohen on September 12, 1974, when he reported that Japanese businessmen had made huge profits from rebates on Japanese aid to Korea.[19] In all fairness, it should be pointed out that equal, if not larger, kickbacks were changing hands within the Park regime as well.[20] In any case, it was obvious that Park could not long survive without Japanese aid for this third five-year economic plan.

After a few months, on November 2, a political settlement was finally reached. Kim Dae Jung was granted a measure of freedom, Kim Dong-woon was dismissed after a face saving Korean government determination that he had acted on his own initiative.

Kim Chong Pil was dispatched to Tokyo to apologize to Tanaka and an agreement was reached whereby the Korean government promised to grant Kim Dae Jung the right to travel to Japan and Japan promised not to proceed with charges of violation of sovereignty on the condition that Kim Dae Jung not be charged for any activities in Japan prior to his abduction.[21] It was a politically expedient solution at best, and was dubbed "seiji ketchaku" (political settlement) in Japan.

After the apology was accepted and the agreement settlement, it was announced on the same day that the Japan-Korea annual Ministerial Conference (begun in 1967) had been rescheduled; the main subject of the meeting was to be "Japanese economic assistance which is now moving ahead with a long range development program."[22] Obviously the precedent of money politics was set long ago.

In 1976 the arrest and incarceration of Kim Dae Jung in connection with the Myong Dong Cathedral Incident caused renewed tension in Japan-R.O.K. relations. In 1979 the Japan-South Korea Ministerial Conference was cancelled because of the assassination of President Park and the ensuing political turmoil. Economic assistance was frozen at $80 million in 1980. In the spring of 1980, the arrest of Kim Dae Jung for an alleged connection with the Kwangju rebellion caused serious concern in Japan. When Kim was charged with sedition and violation of the National Security Law this concern turned to alarm and when he was sentenced to death under the National Security Law by a court martial, specifically for involvement with the Hanmint'ong, an anti-Park, Korean group in Japan, the alarm turned to outrage. Kim's trial and sentencing were in direct violation of the 1973 settlement, which guaranteed that Kim would not be charged for activities in Japan prior to August 1973.

Sensitive to Japanese criticism and censure, Korean officials told Japanese representatives that the prosecution of Kim Dae Jung touched on his activity in Japan simply as part of a background explanation.[23] On September 17 Kim was sentenced to death but the case was made to Japan that the charge of violation of the National Security Law was dropped "in consideration of friendly relations with an unspecified ally,"[24] and that Kim had been given the death penalty solely on the basis of being convicted of sedition and conspiracy to foment revolution. In fact, this was not true. The provision applied to Kim in connection with the alleged conspiracy to commit sedition was Article 90 of the Korea Criminal Code under which the maximum penalty was life imprisonment. The only provision applied to Kim which carried a maximum penalty of death was Article 1 of the National Security Law—forming an anti-state organization and being its ringleader.[25] This analysis was later supported by the Korean government's refusal to hand over the trial transcript and judicial decision to Japanese authorities.[26]

Japan did not officially protest this violation of the political agreement to South Korea, but aid was suspended.[27] Chun responded by drumming up anti-Japanese sentiment for trying to interfere in Korea's internal affairs. There the matter came to rest until the new year when Kim's sentence was commuted and relations began to thaw a bit. On August 21, 1981, bolstered by reports from the Ottawa Conference of World Power leaders in May, where Suzuki had promised Reagan to support South Korea,[28] Chun demanded $10 billion in aid from Japan for a five year period. $6 billion of the aid was requested in Official Development Assistance (O.D.A.0 soft loans and $4 billion in commercial loans. If approved the sum would have represented a staggering 70% of Japan's O.D.A. for all of Asia.

Chun had been courting old friends of the Park regime in Japan and soliciting new connections. Six different groups of Japanese Dietmen had visited Korea in the previous three months. Listed among old influential L.D.P. friends were former Prime Minister Fukuda and, interestingly, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Director General of the Administrative Management Agency.[30] Attempts to form new connections were primarily focused on the Tanaka faction because Chun had apparently become aware that new ties with Japan could not be established without the participation of Tanaka.[31] Tanaka remains the most powerful individual in Japanese politics despite his on-going bribery trial which grew out of the Lockheed scandal.

Despite these efforts, when the eleventh Ministerial Conference was convened in Seoul on September 10, 1981 after a three year hiatus, no agreement was reached. The session broke up without issuing a joint communique for the first time in the short history of the Conference. The impasse seemed final. The next day Secretary of State Haig announced a meeting with Foreign Minister Sonoda in which Japan-R.O.K. relations would be a major topic. The U.S. was obviously interested in encouraging closer Japanese-Korean ties but the relations between aid and international security was now clearly becoming an issue.

In November Korea seemed willing to reduce its aid request by almost half, cutting the $6 billion O.D.A. request to $3 billion and the $4 billion commercial loan request to $2 billion. Japan still found the figure exorbitant and negotiations broke down over the terms of the package. By spring, it had become obvious that Chun could not survive politically unless he could prove his administration to be economically sound; he needed Japanese aid to support his five year economic plan. Negotiations resumed but were interrupted by the textbook revision scandal in July 1982. Chun used the opportunity to apply more pressure to Japan but by the end of the summer Chun had cut his total request to $4 billion. The main dispute now seemed to be over the breakdown of the request: Korean wanted $2.3 billion in O.D.A. soft loans and $1.7 billion in commodity aid. Japan had agreed to $1.5 billion in O.D.A. and $2.5 billion in Japan Export Import (JEXIM) Bank loans.[32]

The talks remained stalled until Nakasone took office in November. Quiet negotiations to improve relations with South Korea began almost immediately. Less than three weeks later Kim was released and the aid issue was soon settled. The final terms of the loan were not much different than what Japan had proposed in the fall: $1.85 billion in O.D.A. and $2.15 billion in JEXIM Bank loans.

In the final analysis, what did the Chun government come away with? First and foremost it received a desperately needed infusion of capital, a fast guarantee of $4 billion over five years. South Korea is now listed as the fourth largest debtor in the world, ranking behind only Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. Although not on the verge of bankruptcy or in as serious trouble as many other nations,[33] Chun had recognized that if he could not prove his regime economically successful in short order, he would not finish a full seven-year term as President. During Park's regime economic development had gradually surpassed national security as the most crucial domestic political issue.

In addition, Chun could claim Kim's release was a humanitarian act or in the end a regrettable, but necessary, concession to the U.S. In this way he could avoid showing that he may have responded in any way to Japanese pressure (an extremely sensitive political issue in Korea), while also enjoying the benefits of Reagan's support.

What about Nakasone and the Japanese contingent? What could they possibly have stood to gain by giving away $4 billion? The answer was "plenty." Nakasone was credited with moving quickly and decisively to restore good relations with the R.O.K. by settling some thorny issues: the Kim Dae Jung case and the eighteen month old aid package dispute.[34] Moreover, it must be remembered too that Nakasone was on his way to meet Reagan on January 17. Coming under the Reagan Administration's fire for not increasing national defense spending fast or far enough, he could now point to the aid package to take some of the heat off. Simply giving a large increase to the military budget was not politically feasible for Nakasone, it was too hot a domestic issue in Japan. However, contributing to the defense of East Asia through support of South Korea was a useful bargaining chip for Nakasone in Washington.[35]

Finally and most important, the terms of the aid package upon closer examination are quite favorable to both sides. The $1.85 billion in O.D.A. soft loans is 55% tied to Japanese products and is to be repaid at an

annual interest rate of only 4% over a period of twenty-five years. This was really a gift. But the $2.15 billion in JEXIM Bank loans is tied 100% to Japanese commodities and is to be repaid at 9.25% interest over five to fifteen years. In other words, Japan will loan $4 billion, approximately $3 billion of which must be spent on Japanese products. Japanese businessmen can look forward to increased exports to Korea while the government collects at least some interest on a little more than half of its principle investment. On the seamier side, considering past examples of kickbacks or "commissions," there is no reason to suppose that this kind of thing was not also involved. Nakasone has taken care of his constituencies.

Obviously all this has some positive aspects. Aid to South Korea and the resumption of healthy relations between Korea and Japan are not bad developments. The freeing of Kim Dae Jung is a positive step in both specific and general human rights terms. But was it really concern for his well being and loss of rights which motivated all this activity on his behalf? Kim himself has indicated uneasiness about the negotiations and terms for securing clemency in 1981 and release in 1982. Upon closer examination, it is clear that consideration for Kim's rights has played only a very small role in the political machinations which have surrounded him since 1973. Looked at in the worst light, events indicate that Kim has been held ransom for political and financial gain over the decade. At best, concern for Kim or the violation of his rights has been subsumed by the greater political and economic goals of the government.

Whatever the conclusion, Kim has been a political pawn in a game of international power politics. Considering that he hopes to return to Korea to continue his fight for democratic reforms and that legally he has only been granted a "suspension of execution of sentence," it seems likely that the story is far from over. ■

Footnotes

1. *Korea Annual,* 1972, pg. 26.

2. Joung-wong Kim, *Divided Korea: The Politics of Development 1945-1972,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1975; pg. 281-283.

3. In Seoul Kim carried 58 percent of the vote to Park's 39. In overall urban population Kim carried 51.5 percent. In 1963 Park had won 50.8 percent of the rural vote and 52.2 percent in 1957. Yet in 1971 he was reported to have carried 58 percent of therural vote, a suspiciously large increase. It seems especially odd at a time when the rural areas were facing an economic slump and there was justifiable discontent. See *Korea Annual,* 1972; *Donga Ilbo* (May 5, 1967 and April 24, 1971).

4. *Chungang Ilbo,* January 25, 1981, p. 1.

5. Don Oberdorfer; *Washington Post,* January 27, 1981.

6. John Chapman, special to the *Washington Post,* January 25, 1981, p. 10.

7. Don Oberdorfer; *Washington Post,* November 20, 1980.

8. Bernard Gwertzman, *New York Times,* November 18, 1980.

9. A.P. News; *Japan Times,* December 25, 1982, p. 1.

10. *Korea Times,* December 23, 1982, p. 1.

11. A.P. News; *Japan Times,* December 25, 1982, p. 1.

12. *Korea Times,* December 21, 1982, p. 1.

13. *Japan Times,* December 24, 1982, p. 1.

14. *Korea Times,* December 29, 1982, p. 1.

15. *Chungang Ilbo,* January 6, 1983.

16. "Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations; House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session; Part I, June 22, 1977.

17. Kentaro Koshiba; "Japan-R.O.K. History Lesson: Money Talks, *Japan Times,* November 5, 1973, p. 1.

18. Minoru Shimizu; "The Korean Connection," *Japan Times,* September 13, 1973, p. 14.

19. T.K., *Letters from South Korea,* Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo, 1976, p. 422.

20. Bob Boettcher, *Gifts of Deceit,* Holt, Rinehart and Winston, N.Y., 1980, p. 189-290.

21. *Japan Times,* November 2, 1973, p. 5.

22. *Japan Times,* November 3, 1973, p. 5.

23. *Japan Times,* August 15, 1980, p. 1.

24. *Japan Times,* September 17, 1981, p. 1.

25. "Unjust, Illegal and Cruel Treatment of Kim Dae Jung and His Co-Defendants," in "Monthly Review of Korean Affairs, Friends of the Korean People," publishers, Arlington, VA, Vol. 2, no. 10, Nov./Dec. 1980, p. 5.

26. *Kyodo News,* Tokyo, October 6, 1980.

27. *Far East Asian Economic Review,* December 5, 1980, p. 15.

28. *Japan Times,* September 13, 1981, p. 1.

29. *Far East Asian Economic Review - Asian 1982 Yearbook,* p. 184.

30. Minoru Shimuzu, "New Channel of Japan-R.O.K. Relations," in *Japan Times,* September 3, 1981, p. 14.

31. Ibid.

32. *Japan Times,* January 6, 1983, p. 1.

33. "The Debt Bomb," in *Time Magazine,* Vol. 121, No. 2, January 10, 1983.

34. *Time Magazine,* Vol. 121, No. 4, January 24, 1983, p. 53.

35. Charles William Maynes, "Helping Japan on Defense," *The New York Times,* April 20, 1983, p. A27.

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