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Collection Name SIGUR, GASTON: FILES

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File Folder KOREA 1983 (06/21/1983-08/10/1983)

FOIA

F07-057/1

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WAMPLER

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
76139	CABLE	211029Z JUN 83	3	6/21/1983	B1 B3
76140	MEMO	RE. SOUTH KOREA	10	8/8/1983	B1 B3
76141	LETTER	R. ARMITAGE TO SIGUR RE. KOREA	2	8/3/1983	B1
76142	PAPER	RE. KOREA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76141]	1	ND	B1
76143	CABLE	270330Z MAR 82	2	3/27/1982	B1
76144	PAPER	RE. KOREA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76143]	1	ND	B1
76145	PAPER	RE. KOREA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76143]	4	ND	B1
76146	LETTER	RING TO BARND'S RE. KOREA	5	4/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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A Prisoner's Report and Recommendations

General Meeting of Amnesty International-USA
Atlanta, Georgia
June 10, 1983

I. The History of My Persecution

My political career spans three decades, and I have always striven to stand on the side of freedom, justice and my people. Naturally, this has made me an adversary of dictatorship, whether that of Rhee Syngman's, Park Chung Hee's or Chun Doo Whan's. All of them have reacted with venom and vengeance. The fact that I am here today, after this succession of dictatorships and indescribable ordeals defies logic and probability.

My proposal for peaceful unification has made me the scourge of those minority elements of the military that profit from the absence of peace. My support for those who seek economic justice has alienated those who exploit the poor. Wealth and power I have never had or befriended. But I feel rich and I feel strong because I have the precious support of my people. In fact, I owe my life and my release after serving two and a half years of a twenty-year term to the support of my people and of world opinion.

Let me describe in detail the ordeals and crises of my life. First, I have had four brushes with death. During the Korean conflict, I escaped assassination by the north Korean Communists by breaking out of prison in the nick of time. In 1971, while I was campaigning for opposition candidates in the National Assembly election, the motorcade in which I was riding was hit broadside by a rampaging truck. This was an assassination attempt by Park Chung Hee's regime disguised as a traffic mishap. Three people in the car behind me were killed instantly, and I suffered an injury which led to hip joint arthritis. In 1973, the KCIA kidnapped me from a hotel room in Tokyo. Its agents first tried to kill me in the room, but were interrupted. Then they attempted to throw me overboard into the ocean only to be foiled by active United States' intervention. Finally, in 1980, General Chun Doo Whan sentenced me to death on trumped-up charges.

Among lesser ordeals and crises, I was imprisoned in 1961, 1962, and 1976, and served a total of three and a half years in prison during the Park Chung Hee dictatorship. Under the present Chun Doo Whan regime, I was arrested in May, 1980 and spent the next two and a half years in prison. During the last decade, then, I spent five and a half years in prison and four and a half years under house arrest and surveillance.

My house was normally surrounded by about 100 regular and plainclothes policemen who checked or barred visitors. Mail was inspected and phones were tapped. My family and relatives were also under surveillance and persecution. For example, my youngest brother and oldest son were arrested in 1980 and were subjected to harsh torture. They were freed after serving one year out of the two-year sentences which they received. My second son was a fugitive for three months during this period and was interrogated for three months by the KCIA while being detained at its headquarters. My wife was totally isolated for one whole year. The only one in our family who was left alone was my youngest son, then a high school student.

In addition, my relatives were either driven out of business or summarily fired from their jobs. My brother, an army major, was involuntarily discharged from the army. My second son could not even get married because of government harassment and interference and still remains a bachelor. He was even denied an opportunity to come to the United States for graduate study. Several of my secretaries and security people were also forced to serve time in prison.

I could endure the humiliation of interrogation and the loneliness of prison life. But it was not easy to accept the sufferings which the government inflicted on other people whose only crime was that they were close to me.

It appears that I am a hazard to other people, just by associating with them. It is often said in Korea, for example, that the surest way for a businessman to destroy a competitor is to spread a rumor that he is close to Kim Dae Jung. In an economy where the government is all-powerful, that is enough to ruin him.

In this context, let me thank you once again for taking the risk of inviting me to this meeting. I hope that you won't be contaminated by the contact. As a matter of fact, I think it would be impossible for me to contaminate Amnesty International. You have been infected already by contact with thousands, even millions of advocates of human rights. I think you are safe from being ruined by my presence.

II. Life in Prison

For three years from March, 1976 to December, 1978, I was in prison for signing the "Declaration for Democratic National Salvation." That declaration was signed by a former president, a national assembly member, five Catholic priests, eight protestant ministers and theologians, and two leading women activists. The Declaration was released peacefully during a prayer meeting in a cathedral. The Park Chung Hee regime first attempted to indict us on charges of treason, but had to settle for violation of the notorious Emergency Decree No. 9.

From May, 1980 to December, 1982, I was imprisoned by the current Chun Doo Whan regime. During the first 60 days, I was kept in a basement cell in the KCIA headquarters, where I was constantly threatened with torture. The place was full of groans and shrieks from torture, and I was kept awake for an extended period of days and nights while being investigated. It was one of the most trying periods of my life. Nevertheless, compared to others, I felt privileged because I was not tortured physically due to the fact that my case was internationally well-publicized and could create world-wide controversy in case of torture. This made me realize once again what the nameless prisoners of conscience were going through. For example, many of the two hundred people implicated in the so-called Kim Dae Jung case were tortured in all sorts of ways, including electric torture, water torture—in which water is poured into the nostrils while a person is held upside down, "airplane ride"—in which the victim is suspended upside down for a long time and beaten, and others. As a result of torture, some of these people have become permanently disabled, and many continue to suffer the after-effects of the torture. One of these persons is now in the United States. A representative from Amnesty International in London has met him and confirmed evidence of torture.

When I was arrested, I asked for legal counsel, which is guaranteed by law. The authorities acknowledged my right to legal counsel but refused to honor it. During the course of the trial, the defendants were separated from one another and were thus denied the legal right to hear others' testimonies.

One of the charges against me was that I incited the Kwangju incident. The prosecutor produced a certain Mr. Chung Dong Yun, who had allegedly received about \$7,000 from me to organize the Kwangju rebellion. Even if Chung Dong Yun were in the audience right now, I would not be able to recognize him, because I never met such a man. Later from my family, I found out that Chung Dong Yun had succumbed to torture and signed a false confession. Then, deeply remorseful, Chung twice attempted suicide by cutting an artery with a sharpened plastic spoon. He, too, was sentenced to death, but was released at about the same time I was let out. Today, Chung goes around publicly asserting that the whole episode was fabricated.

The military regime did not stop at this. Our lawyers were bullied and threatened also. For example, we knew that the regime was anxious to carry out my execution. So we were determined to delay the legal process as much as possible. We had one week to file an appeal against the death sentence at the Supreme Court. We instructed our attorneys to file at the last minute on the seventh and last day allowed by the law. But, under coercion by the authorities, our lawyers filed an appeal on the first day instead.

There were a number of peculiarities about my trial. For one, although it was supposedly an open trial, I have still not received a copy of the court's opinion, which was given to me momentarily at the time of sentencing and then quickly snatched away. I believe that this was because the death sentence was based on my political

activity while I was in Japan, which violated a political settlement reached between the Japanese government and the Park Chung Hee regime in the case of my kidnapping in 1973. In that agreement, Korea agreed not to prosecute me for my activities while in Japan.

Also, while I was in the KCIA interrogation center basement, a ranking member of the Military Security Command, now a highly placed aide to Chun Doo Whan, visited me in prison and demanded my cooperation. Even though I had not even been indicted, he made it clear that cooperation was the only way my life could be spared. I refused his offer, and so the regime fabricated a case against me.

Let me now turn to life in prison in South Korea, especially as experienced by political prisoners, and let me talk of how they maintain themselves in prison.

I was placed in a special cellblock, which was specially designed for me. Three cells were walled off from the rest, and I was put in the middle cell. On one side stayed the prison guards assigned to me while on the other there was nothing but a small bucket which I could use for bathing. Five guards, always in teams of two, took turns watching my cell. Usually, there is one guard assigned to each cellblock of ten cells. Each of these cells holds about ten prisoners. Thus, the guard-prisoner ratio, which is usually 1 to 100, in my case was intensified five hundred times, to a ratio of 5 to 1! I am not sure whether this was some kind of measure of how fierce I was supposed to be, or whether it was a measure of the regime's fear.

My cell had a very thick door and a small window, through which I could peek at the sky. Because of the thick iron mesh over the window, however, I did not have a clear view of the sky or of the moon which I love to watch. Instead of being able to see the moon in one view, I saw many moons, through the many holes in the mesh. So I could enjoy several moons at one time.

Due to my arthritis, I could not sit on the floor nor could I cross my legs. Prison meals were indescribably bad, consisting of often decomposed, salty and peppery food. Even the poorest of workers ate better than I did. Because the food was so bad, I bought sweets to counter my hunger, and as a result, I gained weight. When I was released, my wife told me, "No one will believe you have suffered because you are so fat."

The prison cells did not have heating and prisoners had to spend the long winter months in frigid damp conditions. In Korea winter lasts for six months and temperatures reach 15 to 18 degrees below zero, centigrade. I was given a small electric heater in consideration of my arthritic condition, but it was not warm enough to keep water from freezing in my cell at times.

Turning to the brighter side of things, there were three joys. They were: family visits, family letters, and tending a flower bed during exercise hours.

At first, family visits were restricted to one 10-minute visit each month. This is twenty minutes less than allowed by law. After much sparring with the authorities, it was extended to two twenty-minute visits per month. Visitation was limited to the members of my immediate family. For two years, however, I was not able to see them clearly because we were separated by thick glass, and all visits were undoubtedly taped and transcribed.

Letters were also allowed only from my wife, sons and my brothers. My wife wrote me every day for two years. She wrote 640 letters in all and my sons wrote about 200 letters. I could not keep my letters in the cell. Nor could I keep the pictures of my family—of my granddaughters playing and making funny faces. After I had read the letters or looked at the pictures, they were taken away from me by the prison authorities.

I was allowed to write only one letter a month, on one aerogramme sheet. There was no legal basis for such a limit. My repeated requests for more sheets of paper were to no avail. Finally, I began to practice the art of dwarfing my writing, and the Japanese press described the size of my lettering as half the size of a rice grain. This was no exaggeration, as I learned to cram 14,000 characters onto one aerogramme. This used to take me about twelve to thirteen hours, over a two-day period.

When I was interviewed by *Matchbox*, I told Marcia Schwen that I had learned a skill in miniature writing that I would be happy to teach anyone in Amnesty International free of charge!

On my birthday, January 6, 1981, my sons visited me and, in keeping with Korean tradition, knelt down to the floor and bowed to me. Deeply touched, I composed a short poem as part of my next letter to the family. The letter passed the initial censor but was returned with the demand that I delete the poem from the letter. As an emotional expression, poems were judged to be too provocative by the Chun regime.

Another joy was tending my flower bed. Every day after lunch, I was allowed a one-hour exercise period, which I used to tend my flowers. It was a fairly sizeable plot, about four feet wide and 100 feet long. I had about ten different kinds of flowers to which I totally dedicated myself. I had petunias, chrysanthemums, yellows cosmos, dandelions, and others. I even talked to the flowers. One time, I had a flower that was not doing well. I told it, "I am disappointed in you. I have given you the best care, but you have not responded." After that it began to improve. When I clipped a branch, I talked to the plant, "Please do not mind; I am sorry but this is for the good of the whole plant." Gradually, even the prison guards, who had at first just stood by while I worked, began to help me water the plants. On the hottest days of summer, I used to work my flower bed, drenched in sweat. It was a transcendent experience, whereby I could part with my sorrow and anxiety altogether. My dedication paid off. My flowers outlived those in other flower beds by at least a month. I proved at least part of the truth of an old Korean proverb, that says the more you care for your wife and flowers, the more beautiful they get.

Inside the cell, I had one favorite pastime. I developed a knack of catching flies, which I would place on a spiderweb. Because spiders would not consume dead flies, I had to swat them just enough to stun them but not kill them. Also, I had to make sure not to rip the spiderweb while hanging unconscious flies on it. Afterwards, I would go to a corner and watch the spider consume its prey. Letter cramming and swatting flies into a stupor are two specialties which I mastered while in prison.

I was not allowed access to newspapers, television or radio. I was not allowed to attend church services, nor was I permitted to write. I requested that I at least be allowed to buy coffee, which I greatly craved. The lack of it made me nervous. Finally, it was approved by the prison warden. But even this was overruled by some higher authority, simply in order to add to my discomfort.

As total isolation continued month after month, I became afraid I would become totally ignorant. After much struggle, my family was given permission to write me about newspaper reports, since the newspapers in Korea were already tightly censored.

After I came to the United States I had a chance to see the film about Gandhi, whose character and nonviolent struggle I have long respected. To my surprise, I found that, compared to our Korean prison life, his prison experience was like a luxurious stay in a villa. I found it deplorable that the Chun Doo Whan regime, while proclaiming itself to be a democratic government, treats political prisoners much worse than a colonial administration did its opponents.

I knew only vaguely about the large-scale effort to save my life, which was organized abroad. My family had no way of telling me about it in detail either. I thought that, when my family mentioned it to me, they were just making it up to make me feel good. But after I came to the U.S., I found it was real, and learned just how much of an effort Amnesty made all over the world to save my life. The more I learned about this campaign, however, the guiltier I felt. When I considered all those nameless prisoners of conscience and those killed in the Kwangju massacre, it was as though I had stolen all the attention and care which should have gone to them.

One great concern was the lack of books allowed in my cell. I spent more than 10 hours a day reading, but the authorities would not allow me to keep more than 10 books at a time in the cell. This greatly hampered any serious study and was a nonsensical restriction, solely for the purpose of tormenting me. The restriction was modified after much complaint, so that I could keep thirty books in my cell at a time.

In the final analysis, however, joy in prison is not joy as such. Nothing could resolve the stress that made my heart pulsate, the feeling of neurosis growing from long solitary confinement or the sense of being done great injustice. The mental stress led to tinnitus in my left ear. Because of this and my arthritic condition, I felt much physical pain in prison.

Even though the law permits adequate medical care at one's own expense, I was denied any medical treatment for over two years. In the prison, there was a doctor who worked only part time, serving more than 2,000 inmates. Furthermore, he was an obstetrician and was not much help to me because, in more ways than one, conditions were not very conducive to my getting pregnant.

No matter how great my physical suffering was, I firmly believed that those who stand on the side of justice and the people cannot be unhappy. The body may grow weaker but the mind can only grow stronger. The oppressor can dole out physical pain but cannot make us sink into unhappiness because we are assured of victory in history. The beatitude expressed it well, "Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness sake, for they shall inherit the kingdom of God."

III. Recommendations to Amnesty International

It is not an exaggeration to say that the fate of Amnesty International in Korea epitomizes the fate of human rights in our country. Before May, 1980, it had a nationwide network and functioned effectively and courageously in spite of the government's attempts to persecute it, corrupt it and create internal discord. Since then, however, Amnesty International in Korea has lost much of its vigor and function. I feel deeply saddened by this development. I hope that Amnesty International in the U.S., either directly or through the international secretariat, can strengthen and support the independence of the Korean amnesty organization.

Second, I want to emphasize the importance of Amnesty's work on behalf of the nameless prisoners of conscience. The adoption of well-known prisoners such as myself is greatly appreciated, and necessary. But those who would remain totally unknown but for Amnesty's efforts must be at the heart of your concern.

Third, Amnesty International should monitor closely the impartiality of trials and the treatment of political prisoners, by vigorously sending inspection teams throughout the world. Whenever they are denied entry, Amnesty must react with such strength that international public opinion forces governments to open their doors to inspection or be seen as international outlaws.

Fourth, I believe that Amnesty International ought to concern itself with the plight of political exiles and those who seek political asylum. Most exiles suffer from loneliness, alienation and discomfort. In many cases, they face harassment by immigration authorities in the country where they seek refuge. Amnesty International-USA ought to include these people, and the families and friends they have left behind who continue to be harassed or persecuted in their home countries, in its concerns.

Finally, I want to say a word about the relation between Amnesty International's work in the U.S. and U.S. policy. AI is working marvelously on behalf of individual prisoners around the world. However, it should recognize that in many cases, the plight of prisoners has been caused at least in part by the attitudes and policies of the United States government in supporting dictatorships in the name of anti-communism or national security.

In a fundamental sense, the ultimate help to prisoners of conscience would be for the U.S. to remain at least neutral with regard to dictatorial regimes, and where possible, to actively give moral support to movements for human rights. In the case of South Korea, Mr. Kim Young Sam, former president of the now-banned New Democratic Party, has been fasting for some twenty days and is now in danger of losing his life. He is demanding that the Chun regime bring about democratic reform. The United States, however, has not expressed any meaningful concern about this problem. With such apathy in official circles in Washington, the seven hundred thousand Korean-Americans in this country feel a profound sense of disappointment and anger. This is in sharp contrast with the attitude of the U.S. toward Poland.

Amnesty International's policy of criticizing both left and right regimes for political repression has given it great international respect. I hope those of you who are members of Amnesty International in the U.S. may, as individual citizens, try to persuade your government that such a policy would increase its credibility on human

rights, and also help to restore a U.S. foreign policy that reflects the finest traditions and ideals of the U.S. This would be in consonance with the international covenants America has signed.

In concluding, I extend to you my respect, my love and gratitude. I pledge to cooperate with the objectives of Amnesty International for the rest of my life.

Kim Dae Jung
309 Yoakum Parkway #1608
Alexandria, VA 22304
(703) 370-7685

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Korea 4

Similar letters
went to
V.P.
Sec State
Judge Clark
Parsons
Ken Young
Wilson, etc.
Everybody on Hill, etc.

State Advises
not acknowledging

July 27, 1983

Dr. Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.
Senior Director of Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building - Room 302
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Dr. Sigur:

I thought you might be interested in these materials. I have written about the present Korean situation, prospects for achieving democracy and human rights in Korea, Korean-American relations, and what Koreans look to the U.S. for with respect to themselves and their American counterparts.

I know that my views may not always be considered correct, but I am most sincere in what I have to say. It is my hope that you might use these for reference.

Sincerely yours,

Kim Dae Jung
Kim Dae Jung

enclosure: Korea Scope; Volume III, No. 1; March, 1983 - with insert

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Korea 16

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 8, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *GS*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Senator Helms

In accordance with your instructions, I discussed with Jesse Helms' aide, Jim Lucier, the kind of letter the Senator wants to take with him to the conference he will be attending in Korea early next month. The conference is being held in Seoul under the auspices of the Asiatic Research Center (Seoul, Korea) and the Institute of American Relations of Washington, D.C. on the occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the signing of the United States-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. Several members of the Congress will be attending in addition to Helms.

In view of the fact that Senator Helms sponsored the unanimous Senate resolution commemorating the U.S./Korean Mutual Defense Treaty (Tab II) and has received warm letters from both President Chun and Foreign Minister Lee (Tabs III and IV) I think it is proper for the President to provide him with a letter to carry to the Seoul conference.

Speechwriters concur. *CMZ* Chris Lehman concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the draft letter to Senator Helms for the President's signature (Tab I).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Clark memo to President
 Tab A President's ltr to Helms
 Tab II US/Korean Mutual Defense Treaty
 Tab III Chun ltr to Helms
 Tab IV Lee ltr to Helms
 Tab V The Institute of American
 Relations memo

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Letter from you to Senator Jesse Helms

Issue:

Whether to sign a letter to Senator Helms for him to carry with him to a conference in Korea on the occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the signing of the U.S.-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty.

Facts:

Senator Helms will be attending a conference in Seoul, Korea, September 1-3. Participants will be Americans and Koreans who will gather together on the occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the U.S.-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. Several other members of Congress will also be in attendance.

Discussion:

The conference in Seoul is to be held under the auspices of the Asiatic Research Center (Seoul, Korea) and the Institute of American Relations of Washington, D.C. The purposes of the meetings are to review the achievements of the U.S. and our Korean ally in keeping the peace over the past thirty years, and to consider how to meet the challenge of the future. In your letter to Senator Helms, you will wish the participants in the conference well in their deliberations.

Recommendation:

O.K. No

_____ That you sign the letter to Jesse Helms at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A President's ltr to Helms

Prepared by:
Gaston J. Sigur

18

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Jesse:

I was very pleased to see that the Senate has approved unanimously your resolution commemorating the Thirtieth Anniversary of the signing of the United States-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. This action was indicative of the value which the people of the United States place on our relationship with the Republic of Korea.

It has come to my attention that Americans and Koreans will be participating together in an international conference in Seoul on September 1-3 to explore the past and future of this relationship.

I hope that you will be able to attend this conference. The Mutual Defense Treaty is an important element in our bilateral relations. The conference gives the occasion to review our achievements in keeping the peace, to pay tribute to the efforts of both our peoples, and to consider how best to meet the difficult challenges ahead. Please convey my best wishes to the distinguished participants for a successful meeting and to President Chun Doo Hwan.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 98th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 129

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 1983

No. 97

Senate

HELMS (AND OTHERS) AMENDMENT NO. 1481

Mr. HELMS (for himself, Mr. ABDNOR, Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. BOREN, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. DENTON, Mr. DOLE, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. EAST, Mr. FORD, Mr. GARN, Mr. GLENN, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. GORTON, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. HATCH, Mrs. HAWKINS, Mr. HECHT, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. INOUE, Mr. JEPSEN, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. MATTINGLY, Mr. MCCLURE, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. PELL, Mr. PERCY, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. QUAYLE, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. RUDMAN, Mr. STAFFORD, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. SYMMS, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. TRIBLE, Mr. WALLOP, Mr. WARNER, Mr. WILSON, and Mr. ZORINSKY) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 675; supra; as follows:

At the appropriate place in the bill insert the following:

COMMEMORATION OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

SEC. . (a)(1) The Congress finds that—

(A) this year is the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea;

(B) for a period of thirty years the Korean people have faithfully fulfilled their commitments to the defense of Korea as provided in the Mutual Defense Treaty; and

(C) the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Korea has significantly contributed to the maintenance of

peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia.

(2) The Congress recognizes that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea obligates both nations to participate in a system of collective security "pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific Area".

(b) It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea should be commemorated and observed with appropriate programs and activities which celebrate and reaffirm the long-standing commitments of the people of both nations to mutual security and the preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia; and

(2) It is in the best interest of both the United States and the Republic of Korea to take such action, in an appropriate forum and with private and official participation, as is necessary and appropriate to discuss, promote, and expand cooperation between both nations and to perpetuate the mutual security and the preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia.

* * * *

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the pending amendment is in the nature of a sense-of-the-Congress resolution commemorating the 30th anniversary of the United States-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. As the distinguished occupant of the chair knows, the treaty was signed in Washington on October 1, 1953, and has served as a bulwark of peace and stability in Asia ever since. This resolution has a broad,

bipartisan support with more than half the Senate already on record as cosponsors.

* * * *

Mr. HELMS. Historically, this broad support for our ally, the Republic of Korea, has always existed across the political spectrum, and across the political parties. The security of Asia is something that is not a partisan issue, and I am gratified that so many distinguished Members of this body have been willing to subscribe to this gesture of friendship and support for the Republic of Korea. Korea, unfortunately, is a divided country. It presents a situation that is at once volatile, yet reassuring. It is volatile because the atmosphere of tension which the Communists insist upon maintaining could be the springboard to a major international problem involving the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Yet it is reassuring because our presence and our commitments to the Republic of Korea have provided the stability to assure a long and continuous spurt of economic growth.

Under President Chun Doo Hwan, Korea has been able to upgrade the material well-being of its people, to strengthen its defenses, and to build up a balanced trade relationship with the United States and the free world. I salute President Chun, as well as his able Foreign Minister, Lee Bum Suk, who visited the United States only a few weeks ago. I also wish to compliment the expert representation of the Korean Ambassador, Lew Byong Hion, with whom, as chairman of the Agriculture Committee, I have worked closely on agricultural and security problems.

Let us turn, then, to consider the treaty whose 30th anniversary will be celebrated this year.

Mr. President, on October 1, 1983, the people of the United States and the people of Korea will celebrate the 30th anniversary of the signing of the mutual defense treaty between the

two nations. This is a significant anniversary for both peoples because it celebrates a remarkable partnership between two nations—a partnership which has been successful because it has been mutual both in participation and in benefits. But it is all the more remarkable because of the great disparity between the two nations when it began. Korea's record of development as a modern economy and an equal trading partner with the United States goes hand-in-hand with her unwavering friendship and loyalty. The stability provided by the 30-year-old mutual defense treaty has enabled Korea to become an economic power despite the hostile presence of Communist armies across the 38th parallel, only a few minutes from Seoul.

The treaty date itself is significant because it also marks the entrance into the second century of relations with Korea. On May 13, 1934, an American diplomat reported to the Secretary of State that opening of Japanese-American trade ties might lead to trade with Korea. In 1845, a resolution was introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives calling for an American mission to open Japan and Korea to trade; but at that time Korea was too far away from the imaginations of Americans, and the resolution failed to pass. But it was just a little more than 100 years ago, in 1882, that a Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation was signed by Commodore R. W. Shufeldt, USN, and Korean commissioners in Seoul, providing for diplomatic and consular representation, safe conduct for U.S. vessels and citizens in Korea, and rights and limitations of the conduct of each country's citizens in the other.

In the ensuing seven decades before the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty was signed, the United States twice came to the rescue of the Korean people on a grand scale. In World War II, the United States overthrew Japanese control of the Korean peninsula, ending 38 years of Japanese colonial domination, and leading to the formation of

20

21

the Republic of Korea in 1948. The second time, of course, was during the Korean war itself, when the United States provided the leadership and the largest contingents of the U.N. Command, a war which resulted in 33,626 killed in action, 20,617 noncombatant dead, and 103,284 wounded. It was this experience that led to the negotiation of the 1953 treaty, providing for the maintenance of separate and joint means "to deter armed attack" in the Pacific region against Korean territory, and providing for the stationing of U.S. military forces in Korea. The resolution of ratification was passed by the U.S. Senate on January 26, 1954, and the treaty entered into force on November 17, 1954.

In its report on the treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted that:

The primary purpose of this treaty is to deter further aggression in the Pacific area by a clear warning to potential aggressors that the United States and the Republic of Korea will regard an armed attack on the territory of either party as dangerous to their peace and security and that they will act to meet this danger in accordance with their constitutional processes.

This purpose has been fulfilled throughout its history. It has kept the peace, and it has kept the peace only because of its effect on would-be aggressors, but because of the wisdom of its provisions in maintaining a viable relationship with the United States.

The committee explained the rationale of the treaty as follows:

The treaty grew out of the Korean armistice negotiations and the legitimate concern on the part of the Republic of Korea for its security in the period following the armistice. In an exchange of letters last May and June with President Rhee, President Eisenhower stated that he was "prepared promptly, after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice, to negotiate" with the South Korean Government a mutual defense treaty similar to those with the other Pacific nations, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.

The strength of the treaty lies in its realistic acceptance of two key ele-

ments. As the committee said in 1954:

The first is one which has already been noted, namely its description of the territorial area to which the treaty applies. The provision gave rise to a searching discussion in the committee, where concern was expressed over the possibility that the United States might be called upon to give aid in the event the Korean Republic should seek to extend its dominion over North Korea either by an unprovoked attack on that area or by some other means not regarded as lawful by the United States. It seemed desirable to underline the fact that the United States must reserve for itself the right to determine whether territory not now under the administrative control of Korea has lawfully been brought under such control . . . The apprehensions voiced on this point led to a proposal by Senator George of an interpretative clause which would make clear just how far the obligations of the United States extended, to insure that the treaty could not be invoked to command the support of the United States for anything other than an armed external attack upon territory over which the United States recognized that the Government of Korea had lawfully acquired administrative control.

The apprehensions of the committee, occurring against the background of the sacrifices of American citizens in the Korean war, were understandable; but nothing which has taken place in the past 30 years has in the remotest degree raised those apprehensions again. The loyalty of Korea as an ally has been unimpeachable, and its exact understanding of our mutual relationship has given rise to a firm and friendly relationship with the American people which might not otherwise have occurred. The support of U.S. citizens for Korea has continued very high in poll after poll, despite the vicissitudes of world affairs in the past three decades.

The second element of strength in the treaty is the safeguarding of the constitutional processes of both nations. As the committee noted:

The second element . . . is its replacement of the specific commitment language used in the North Atlantic Treaty, by what Secretary Dulles has called the "Monroe Doctrine" principle. Thus each party, in article III, recognizes that the armed attack referred to therein would be dangerous to us

own peace and safety. The action to be taken would then be determined in accordance with its constitutional process. By contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty formula makes an attack upon one tantamount to an attack upon all, so that such an attack, which might not take place against the United States itself, is nevertheless so regarded. Because of the constitutional issues which the approach suggests, for example, whether an attack upon another member gives the President the same inherent right to act as an attack upon United States territory, the language of President Monroe was regarded by Secretary Dulles as preferable when he negotiated the Philippine and Australia-New Zealand Pacts, and is reproduced in the Korean Treaty.

In short, the phraseology of article III of the Korean Pact permits the United States to take any action we deem appropriate by our constitutional processes, and gives adequate assurance of support to the other country which may be the victim of an attack. It has the additional advantage of never having been challenged throughout our history, from the constitutional standpoint, as altering the balance of power between the President and Congress.

Indeed, it was this aspect of balance between the executive branch and the legislative branch which was later to be the very element which rallied American popular support behind Korea during a very tense period of danger. The fact that the treaty was so carefully drawn appealed to the American sense of fairness and rallied strong bipartisan support in Congress when the executive branch apparently miscalculated the will of the people. No doubt there had been some in 1953 who regretted the lack of NATO-style language of automatic commitment. But Korea—and the Western bloc of nations—is stronger today because of the farsighted construction of the treaty's provisions.

It did not take long for the effect of the treaty to be tested. On April 26, 1954, the Political Conference on Korea, provided for in the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, convened in Geneva. But the Communist side soon let it be known that it had no intention of agreeing to the two key issues; namely, the authority of the

U.N. command throughout all Korea, and the question of free elections. By June 15, the United States and 15 other nations unilaterally withdrew from the conference, declaring that, in the light of the Communist intransigence, continuation of the conference would serve no useful purpose. The North Koreans and their Chinese allies were not about to allow a democratic solution to take place. The Chinese "volunteer army" stayed in place on North Korean territory and a Communist arms buildup continued.

By 1957, the U.N. Command in Korea announced that in view of flagrant violations of the armistice agreement relating to limitations on increases in military strength it no longer considered itself bound by the armistice in this regard. It was clear that the United States, under terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, was prepared to maintain the military balance even if the Communists continued the buildup. In February of 1958, the Chinese announced that all Chinese forces would be withdrawn from Korea by the end of 1958. In July, the United States stated that the governments of the U.N. Command were "prepared to withdraw their forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly were fulfilled." The statement went to say that to withdraw their forces otherwise would remove a necessary guaranty against further Communist aggression.

The Chinese countered that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea—a proposal that put the aggressors on the same level as the defenders of freedom. On October 27, the U.N. Command rejected these proposals, stating that even if all Chinese forces were to be withdrawn from Korea, it would still represent only a long-awaited partial compliance with the February 1, 1951 General Assembly resolution declaring that the Chinese were aggressors in Korea, and calling upon them to cease their aggression. On November 10, the Chinese declared that

they had withdrawn all their troops from Korea, a fact that was soon confirmed by our intelligence. The Mutual Defense Treaty had met its first test: The aggressors were deterred.

The Communist side was forced to regroup. On July 6, 1961, North Korea and the U.S.S.R. signed a mutual defense treaty providing that each party would assist the other in event of attack by a "state or coalition of states." Five days later, an almost identical treaty was signed with the People's Republic of China. Yet free Korea was not intimidated.

As the Vietnam war heated up, the Republic of Korea began sending its military personnel to help the effort of its ally, the United States. In 1964 an ROK mobile army surgical hospital was deployed to Vietnam at the request of the South Vietnamese Government. By February 1965, 2,000 other military personnel had been sent. By mid-1965, an agreement had been worked out between the United States and Korea that there would be no U.S. or ROK force reductions in Korea without prior consultation between the two parties, and that the United States would provide support for the modernization of the ROK forces in Vietnam. By the end of the year, ROK combat troops were fighting in Vietnam. All in all, a total of more than 40,000 ROK military personnel went to Vietnam to fight along side United States and South Vietnamese troops there. Korea had demonstrated that the spirit of the Mutual Defense Treaty was indeed mutual.

In October 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Korea, and reiterated American support for the ROK; but on the last day of his visit the first of a series of several hundred incidents took place which resulted in U.S. casualties. Over the next 3 years, U.S. forces lost 38 killed, 123 wounded and 3 missing in such actions. At the same time, 1,472 incidents took place in which 566 North Korean agents and infiltrators were killed and 52 were

captured by U.S. and ROK forces. The threat from the north was still real.

On January 23, 1968, the U.S.S. *Pueblo* was seized by the North Korean Navy and its crew imprisoned. By March, the United States announced that it had sent more than 200 combat jet aircraft, 12,000 airmen, and 10,000 tons of supplies to Korea to reverse the balance of air power. This brought U.S. personnel in Korea to a level of 62,000 men. The *Pueblo* crew was released in December. By 1971, however, the situation had stabilized enough so that the United States was able to withdraw 20,000 men, while at the same time announcing with Korea a force modernization program for the ROK forces that would total \$1.5 billion.

On July 18, 1973, Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated on a trip to Seoul that U.S. troops would remain in Korea until it was clear that their removal would not destabilize the balance of military power between the two Koreas. In September, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., stated that there were no plans for withdrawal or reduction of U.S. troops in Korea from current force levels, pointing out that an increased North Korean military capability had actually increased the threat to South Korean security. In November, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, on a trip to Seoul, reiterated the continued U.S. commitment to Korea. When, 2 weeks later, North Korea claimed possession of the waters surrounding five islands in the Yellow Sea held by South Korea under terms of the armistice, the U.N. Command was quick to deny the claim. The Republic of Korea placed its armed forces on full alert, but proposed a nonaggression pact with North Korea. On January 22, Secretary Kissinger affirmed American support for the South Korean claim to the five disputed islands in the Yellow Sea. The North Koreans quietly let the issue die; it was clear that the treaty meant what it said.

Meanwhile, however, the United States was undergoing the agony of Vietnam. There was a widespread belief, particularly in media commentary, that the United States was turning inward upon itself, and was no longer interested in Asian Commitments. The 40,000 U.S. troops in Korea began to be looked upon by some as an anachronism. Korean troop withdrawal became an issue in the 1976 Presidential campaign. In May 1977, President Carter announced that U.S. ground troops in Korea would be phased out over a period of 4 or 5 years. The President said that his decision was based upon the Republic of Korea's improvement in economic strength and self-confidence, and upon the United States' improving relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The unspoken implication was that North Korea's allies would restrain their client in the interests of improved relations with the United States.

Contrary to the expectations of the administration, the withdrawal plan created consternation not only in the Republic of Korea and in Japan, but in the Congress as well. Some of the most distinguished Members of both the House and the Senate felt that the plan was too hasty and based upon faulty assumptions. Moreover, they felt that valuable opportunities had been lost in the manner in which the plan was implemented. The late Senator Hubert Humphrey and our distinguished colleague JOHN GLENN jointly wrote a report for the Committee on Foreign Relations which was sharply critical of the plan. For example, they said:

During consideration of the withdrawal alternatives, the Administration apparently rejected the idea of using possible troop withdrawals as a bargaining chip in bilateral or multilateral negotiations to reduce tensions on the peninsula. In rejecting these possibilities, the Administration may have lost an important opportunity. Similarly, apparently no high-level efforts were made to gain even tacit non-belligerence pledges from China and the Soviet Union until Sec-

retary of State Vance's August visit to Peking. There the subject was reportedly discussed for half an hour [deleted]. The deterministic way the Administration approached the withdrawal decision in large measure precluded using the withdrawals leverage to gain concessions.

Moreover, the plan was based upon erroneous strategic assumptions. It was assumed that there was a fundamental balance between North and South Korea, and that North Korea's allies would see to it that this balance would not be destroyed. Yet, Writing in January 1978, Senators HUMPHREY and GLENN stated:

The military balance between the North and South Korean forces, has shifted from rough parity in 1970 to a definite advantage for the North in 1977. The principal advantages for the North today lie in ground weapons—tanks, artillery, mortars—quantity of fighter aircraft and quantity of naval combat vessels. The resulting firepower advantage, however, is at least partially offset by South Korea's favorable terrain for defense and the presence of U.S. forces. The military balance can be restored over time through U.S. military sales to South Korea and increased South Korean domestic defense production, but when this may be achieved is unpredictable.

North Korean ground forces are in an offensive posture along the DMZ, either to take advantage of a military opportunity or to use these dispositions as a bargaining chip in any force reduction negotiations. With a firepower advantage and forward positioning, North Korea has the option of a surprise attack. If surprise were attained, South Korean defenses would be in serious jeopardy and the possibilities of a breakthrough to Seoul would be increased.

U.S. commanders do not have great confidence in the extraordinary security precautions taken by North Korea. The ability of Peking and Moscow to restrain Pyongyang is reduced because North Korea has sufficient military supplies to fight a short war. The offensive posture, self-sufficiency and firepower advantage of North Korean ground forces are the most destabilizing factors on the Korean Peninsula.

The opposition to the withdrawal policy was bipartisan and widespread; it was a classic confrontation between the legislative and the executive branches. One result of the Humphrey-Glenn report was language in

the fiscal year 1978 Foreign Relations Authorization Act stating that U.S. policy in regard to Korean troop withdrawal should be decided both by the President and Congress, and that implementation of troop withdrawal should be "carried out in regular consultation with Congress."

In January 1979 new intelligence estimates showed that the imbalance between North and South Korea was even greater than Senators HUMPHREY and GLENN had feared. Unclassified reports of these estimates indicated that North Korean ground forces numbered between 600,000 and 700,000 men, instead of the 440,000 which had been previously accepted by the administration. In short, North Korea had over 40 combat divisions, rather than the prior estimate of 29. North Korea's offensive weaponry was estimated at 2,600 tanks, including 300 T-62 tanks, 1,000 armored personnel carriers, 1,500 to 2,000 multiple rocket launchers, 9,000 mortars, and 3,500 to 4,000 field artillery weapons. The lead in tanks was 3 to 1, in mortars 2 to 1, and nearly 2 to 1 in field artillery pieces.

When these facts circulated in Congress, the result was that the International Security Assistance Act for fiscal year 1979 contained even more specific language, requiring the President to send Congress a detailed report on the effects of the withdrawal on the situation inside Korea and in the northeast Asian region 120 days before each phase of the troop withdrawal.

This attitude of Congress was backed up by the attitude of popular opinion in the United States. In July 1977, a CBS-New York Times poll showed that 52 percent of those surveyed favored keeping U.S. troops in Korea, while only 32 percent favored withdrawal. A year later, a Potomac Associates poll showed 55 percent in favor of retention of the troops.

In July 1979 Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's National Security adviser, read a statement to the press an-

nouncing that the plans to withdraw the troops had been suspended.

Today, very little has improved with regard to the threat from North Korea. The ROK has 600,000 men under arms, with the assistance of 40,000 U.S. troops. ROK spends about 6 percent of its gross national product on defense and defense-related items—one-third of its national budget. Yet North Korea spends about 20 percent of its GNP on military resources, and its mobilization is near total. The United States gives Korea no military aid or developmental aid, although this year the administration has asked for \$230 million in foreign military sales credits—that is, loans for the purchase of American-made defense material. In return, Korea is purchasing \$900 million in military products from the United States every year. But the total trade between Korea and the United States was \$12 billion in 1982—50 times what it was only 20 years ago. And in 1986, that total trade is expected to reach \$20 billion.

iv

The policy of the United States toward Korea was summed up by Secretary of State George Shultz when he visited Seoul last February. He said that the central theme of his visit was "the reaffirmation of our mutual commitment to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula and of the Northeast Asian region." He spoke of the tremendous burden borne by the Korean peoples:

The hostile confrontation between two parts of a divided nation which has characterized Korean life for decades is undeniably a tragedy. It requires an enormous diversion of resources away from peaceful purposes—resources that could be used to provide better lives for all the Korean people.

Even so, we should acknowledge that in the Republic of Korea the per capita income has increased from \$89 in 1962 to \$1,700 per capita in 1982. This must be one of the most astonishing rates of sustained growth in

modern economic history. But this growth could not have been possible, despite the hard work of the Korean people, without the mutual partnership of the Koreans and the Americans, without the mutual sharing, and the mutual giving. What is truly astonishing is not just the rate of success, but the degree of mutuality in the relationship. This mutuality is symbolized by the 30th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty—the treaty that made it all possible.

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today to join the distinguished senior Senator from North Carolina as a co-sponsor of a Senate resolution which commemorates the 30th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and Korea. The United States-Korean relationship, shaped in the post-World War II period and by the Korean war, has continued its growth and development over these past 30 years and today endures as one of deep mutual respect and cooperation.

The Republic of Korea has been faced by enormous burdens imposed by the heavy defense requirements necessitated by the active hostile environment on its border. Nevertheless, Korea has made remarkable progress. In the economic arena, Korea has gone from one of the world's poorest countries at its founding in 1948 to the fourth largest U.S. trade partner in agricultural products, and ninth largest in overall trade with the United States. In that period, Korea's per capita gross national product rose from less than \$100 to nearly \$1,700, and it is now the second richest nation in Asia. Last year alone, United States-Korean trade amounted to more than \$11 billion, and, since 1980, has not required any U.S. financial aid. This dramatic economic growth and development is especially remarkable in that Korea lacks natural resources and must rely on imported sources of energy and industrial raw materials.

The Republic of Korea has also made progress in the field of human

rights. The country has slowly but steadily moved toward a more truly democratic political system, with the release of substantial numbers of political prisoners and the liberalization of laws limiting political activity. These actions have contributed significantly to the greater stabilization and national maturity of the country.

The Republic of Korea has shown itself to be a true friend of the United States, as well as a partner in mutual defense and trade relationships. It is particularly appropriate that we recognize the 30th anniversary of the formal relationship for mutual defense with Korea, and that we work with that country to promote continued cooperation in all areas of mutual concern and benefit. I urge my colleagues to join in support of this resolution.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, having served in Korea and modestly contributed in the struggle that assured the freedom of the Republic of Korea, I wholeheartedly support this resolution commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and Korea.

Nearly 6 million Americans joined in fighting for this freedom and establishing the relationship that now exists between our country and Korea; 100,000 Americans were wounded and 54,000 gave their lives.

These great sacrifices were not in vain. The citizens of the Republic of Korea have enjoyed and lived under freedom for 30 years. At the same time, they have remained a staunch ally in the region. Our mutual defense treaty has been a crucial factor in maintaining the peace, freedom, and stability in East Asia.

By commemorating the 30th anniversary of this treaty, we further underscore its value and importance to that area of the world. The success of this agreement serves as an outstanding example of the benefits accruing to free peoples when they join for the common good.

I urge my distinguished colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. QUAYLE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.

Mr. QUAYLE. I congratulate the Senator from North Carolina for this amendment. I am allowed, on behalf of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the senior Senator from Texas, to enthusiastically support what the Senator is doing in this resolution. I believe that everyone is aware of the Senator's fine interests in foreign affairs and the work that he has done on the Foreign Relations Committee and also his commitment to national security. I think it is certainly appropriate that we at this particular time take a little of the Senate's time to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the signing of the United States-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. I think it is a very good thought, it is one that is obviously supported by this body, and I certainly as one Senator thank the Senator from North Carolina for his contribution on this and other matters.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator for his generous comments.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I have looked at the resolution. I commend the distinguished senior Senator from North Carolina.

The only question I would raise is that it might be better and more effective if it were passed as a separate resolution by the Senate. This way it goes into the regular authorization bill.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator for his comments.

Mr. JACKSON. I am ready to yield back my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there any further debate on the amendment? If not, the question now occurs on the amendment of the Senator from North Carolina.

The amendment (No. 1481) was agreed to.



29

President of the Republic of Korea

(Translation)

16 May 1983

Dear Senator Helms,

I wish to thank you for your thoughtful letter of May 2, 1983. I also would like to thank you for the helpful assistance and advice that you kindly gave to Foreign Minister Bum Suk Lee during his recent visit to Washington.

I am well aware and appreciative of the fact that in the Senate you strongly advocate the importance of close security cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea and endeavour to promote understanding and cooperation between our two countries.

I was greatly encouraged by your support for the proposed meeting of the leaders of the Pacific Basin and to learn of your intention to introduce a resolution in the Senate to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the U.S.-Korea Defense Treaty. I also endorse your proposal for a major international conference in Seoul. I whole-heartedly concur with your evaluation of the vital roles of the U.S.-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty and the presence of American troops in Korea.

It is my hope that, sometime soon, you will find the time to travel in this part of the world, and that it will be possible for us to meet again. It most certainly will be my privilege, and a great pleasure, to greet you in person and discuss matters of mutual concern.

I send you my warmest regards and wish you continued good health and success, and happiness and well-being in the family.

Sincerely,

/s/ Chun Doo Hwan

The Honorable
Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SEOUL, KOREA

July 26, 1983

Dear Senator Helms,

The government and people of the Republic of Korea are very much grateful to you as they have learned of the initiative you took to have the United States Senate unanimously adopt the resolution commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty.

All the newspapers, radio and television in my country have covered this news, and most vernacular papers as well as two English ones have carried editorials welcoming this historic bipartisan move.

Through the painstaking action of rallying more than half of your colleagues into the co-sponsorship of the resolution and leading to a unanimous consent, you have created an unprecedented awareness in Congress of the importance of a closer cooperation between our two nations in their joint security efforts.

The eloquent statements you made in presenting the resolution have undoubtedly gained far-reaching sympathy not only from those on Capitol Hill but from other American citizens in all walks of life as well. We are assured that they understand more than ever before that the people of Korea have so faithfully fulfilled their commitments to mutual security and the preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula and East Asia.


The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

30

I am also thankful to you for the leading role you are playing in recruiting U.S. participants in the international conference to be held here in Seoul in the beginning of September. It is my earnest desire that you could encourage as many members of Congress as possible to take part in the conference.

Once again I remain in all good wishes for your personal well-being and happiness in the family until I have a renewed honor to see you in Seoul.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Bum Suk Lee', written in dark ink.

Bum Suk Lee
Minister.

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THE INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS
325 CONSTITUTION AVE. N.E., WASHINGTON, D.C., 20002
(202) 543-5121

THE UNITED STATES - REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLIANCE: THE NEXT 30 YEARS

An International Conference Jointly Sponsored by the Asiatic Research
Center (Seoul, Korea) and the Institute of American Relations

Shilla Hotel - Seoul, Korea
September 1-3, 1983

October 1, 1983 marks the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the U.S.-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. The importance of this landmark in international relations was recently recognized by a resolution passed by the U.S. Senate with over 50 co-sponsors commemorating the event and looking forward towards the future. The resolution noted that the anniversary "should be commemorated and observed with appropriate programs and activities which celebrate and reaffirm the long-standing commitments of the people of both nations to mutual security and the preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia."

Accordingly, the Asiatic Research Center of Korea University and the Institute of American Relations have joined together to organize a major international conference of public and private leaders of both countries to examine the past thirty years and to look forward towards a like period of mutually beneficial relations.

From the American side, a number of key Administration officials from the State Department, the White House, and the Department of Defense, as well as representation from the Senate and House and leaders of the academic world have indicated their intention to participate.

Both President Chun Doo Hwan and Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk have strongly endorsed this conference. The conference will be opened by the Foreign Minister and will be attended by leading public and private Korean citizens.

All necessary travel and lodging in connection with the conference will be furnished by the Asiatic Research Center of Korea University. U. S. arrangements are being made by the Institute of American Relations, a 501(c)(3) foundation created in 1975. For further information and assistance with travel and lodging arrangements, please contact Mrs. Deborah Orsini or Ms. Elizabeth Feday, Project Coordinators, at the Institute of American Relations at (202) 543-5120.

MZ

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8/8/83

TO: DICK CHILDRESS

FROM: GASTON SIGUR

Please let me have your
comments. Thanks.

↑
Cover fully
w/defense. This was certain
when I had the desk in
the Pentagon and is now
absolute requirement in case
of an attack on the ROK.
Dick

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76141	LETTER R. ARMITAGE TO SIGUR RE. KOREA	2	8/3/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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76142	PAPER RE. KOREA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76141]	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
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76143	CABLE 270330Z MAR 82	2	3/27/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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76144	PAPER RE. KOREA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76143]	1	ND	B1

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76145	PAPER RE. KOREA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76143]	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
76146	LETTER	5	4/25/1983	B1
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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