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File Folder TERRORISM - LIBYA PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (06/12/1986-6/30/1986)

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
40693	MEMO	WALTER RAYMOND TO POINDEXTER RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON COUNTER TERRORISM R 10/4/2016 M404/1	2	6/12/1986	B1
40694	MEMO	FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON COUNTER TERRORISM (ATTACHMENT TO 40693) R 10/4/2016 M404/1	2	ND	B1
40695	PAPER	RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON COUNTER TERRORISM WITH ATTACHED CHART (ATTACHMENT TO 40693) R 9/26/2017 M404/1	5	ND	B1
40696	CABLE	130026Z JUNE 86 R 10/4/2016 M404/1	2	6/13/1986	B1
40697	CABLE	202039Z JUN 86 R 10/4/2016 M404/1	2	6/20/1986	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

June 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. *WR*
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy on Counter Terrorism

Attached at Tab A is Dave Miller's report on Public Diplomacy on Counter Terrorism. This report was developed by Dave after detailed conversations with key actors in the counter terrorism community, including senior officials in the NSC, State, CIA, and DOD. He has talked to a number of outside specialists and consultants. The bottom line of his analysis is that we cannot get from here to there with the current approach. The principal weakness is a failure to deploy dedicated personnel and resources full time for public diplomacy. The panacea, in his judgment, is the creation of an "Otto Reich" type of team for public diplomacy. He believes, as you suggested, that the team should be under the command and control of the Interagency Group on Terrorism (I/GT). The team need not be as large as that dedicated to that purpose for Central America and South Africa because, in Miller's mind, the team should draw more directly on resources committed to this purpose in the various participating agencies. Nevertheless, a team must be created.

He has some organizational recommendations which would call for a reorganization of the existing public diplomacy structure under the I/GT. I believe these recommendations require serious consideration, but I would recommend that the procedure that we follow include the following steps:

-- The agreement on the need for the immediate assignment of a coordinator for public diplomacy and a full-time dedicated team to support the coordinator.

-- The provision of this report to the newly-named coordinator for him to consider seriously and to adapt as he believes appropriate. In other words, I would like to give the coordinator the option of making changes on the basis of this report rather than mandating the changes in advance of his assignment.

Ollie North and I have discussed this report with Dave Miller and recommend that you forward it to George Shultz with a cover note. I have attached at Tab I a copy of the report and the recommended cover note. Dave has reviewed potential candidates to fill the

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position of public diplomacy coordinator. We tend to believe that a current or former ambassador would be appropriate because of his background and ability to work with the bureaucracy. We have met with Marshall Brement, whose qualifications are outstanding for this purpose. He is currently on the Naval War College faculty following the completion of his most recent tour as a Reagan Administration appointed Ambassador to Iceland. He was a professional Foreign Service Officer, who served in the past in the NSC with specific responsibilities for the Soviet Union. He is an effective manager and communicator. While we will need to be conscious of Jerry Bremer's concerns, we should not wait to put this public diplomacy team in place until late August when Bremer returns. George Shultz may also have possible candidates.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Secretary Shultz.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Ollie^W North concurs.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Sec Shultz
Tab A Amb Miller Study

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy on Counter Terrorism (U)

After discussion with the Interagency Group on Terrorism, we asked Ambassador David Miller to undertake a detailed study of our current public diplomacy efforts on counter terrorism and to make recommendations for how these efforts can be strengthened. His report is attached at Tab A. (S)

His principal recommendation is that we have a fundamental weakness in our approach to public diplomacy on this subject because we have not devoted full-time personnel to the issue. I share his recommendation that we must make a significant manpower commitment to this effort somewhat along the same lines as we did when we created the "Otto Reich" empire. I think we should put this interagency public diplomacy team directly under the command and control of the I/GT. After reading Dave's report, I would urge that we identify a top-flight coordinator, and have assigned to him, from the key participating agencies including State, USIA, and DOD, personnel on detail to staff this office on a full-time basis. (S)

I am less concerned about resolving Dave's proposals concerning the precise organization of the public diplomacy structure because I think that should follow the appointment of the key coordinator and his staff. Clearly, the Miller report will be a helpful document for the new coordinator to consider. The selection of the coordinator will be critical. (S)

One candidate who comes to mind is Ambassador Marshall Brement, who is now at the Navy War College, but you may have other suggestions in this regard. I think we should seek to identify and bring on board the coordinator and his team immediately. (S)

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I would appreciate your earliest attention to this subject and your reaction to the Miller report. (U)

Attachment

Tab A Amb Miller Report

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Public Diplomacy on Counter Terrorism

The "public diplomacy" efforts to win support for the President's counter-terrorism activities are mired in an inefficient and confusing series of inter-agency committees, with virtually no dedicated resources. Not surprisingly, little besides committee memoranda has been produced. While public support in the United States for the President's policies remains high, this is apparently not the case in Europe and the Middle East where the attack on Libya highlighted the different opinions on counter-terrorism held among countries whose friendship and cooperation we value.

The paper proceeds on the basis that (1) we are "at war" with a range of state-supported terrorists who share a common objective of destroying the influence of the United States; (2) we must develop a political philosophy and campaign to counter the terrorist message; (3) we cannot continue on the present course of inter-agency committees which is both inefficient, ineffective, and potentially embarrassing; and (4) we must dedicate a limited amount of human and financial resources, as has been done on other public diplomacy efforts, if we wish to see any real progress.

The War With Terrorism

While there are many terrorist organizations, if we focus on state-supported terrorism with radical Arab sponsorship or Soviet surrogate sponsorship, I believe that we are in a protracted struggle with enemies who share a broad philosophic objective and political strategy. Presumably this strategy is built around discrediting and eventually rendering impotent the United States/Western coalition -- at least in the Middle East, if not the world as a whole -- based on the well-recognized themes of decadence, imperialism, exploitation, Zionism, and so on.

The violent incident on which we tend to focus is simply a tool to advance their political objectives. If the violent incident "goes well" for the terrorist, the attendant media coverage will focus on the "justifiable political grievances" of the terrorists and not on the brutal, illegal behavior of psychopathic, anti-social individuals.

For us to win this struggle we must be actively advancing our ideology of the non-violent resolution of social conflict, typically within a democratic, market-oriented framework. While the ability to respond to the violent incident is imperative, we have probably focussed a disproportionate share of our resources on military response and not enough on "selling" our positions to Europe, the Islamic world, and our own public.

I am not sanguine that we are winning this struggle. While we have had covert success and responded forcefully to Libya, it is arguable that the terrorists are obtaining their overall objective of reducing American presence in the world. The "hardening" of our Embassies with attendant expense, the reduction of

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official personnel, increasing restrictions on personal movement of officials abroad all leave the image of a society on the defensive, threatened and insecure. Our private sector increasingly mirrors this image. Thus, even if we are coming closer to winning the incident struggle, the terrorists' objectives of reducing our presence, limiting our influence and distancing us from allies is arguably succeeding.

The "Public Diplomacy" Response

Public diplomacy in its broadest sense, as it must be pursued in this case, is the coordinated efforts of all agencies of our government to win public support at home and abroad for a particular policy. It includes assets in State, USIS, DOD, CIA, and the NSC. Some are obvious (speakers programs), some are not (videotapes of terrorist leaders).

It is ineffective, inefficient, and dangerous, to say nothing of exhausting, to try to win an effort of this importance and magnitude through four inter-agency committees with no dedicated personnel or resources. After more than a year of memos and meetings, four inter-agency committees (Public Affairs, Incident Management, Information, and PSYOPS) have been established whose primary output appears to be paper and meetings. A good deal of thoughtful time and effort has been put into this effort, frequently by people whose primary responsibilities have been exhausting, but the end result remains the same -- not much.

In addition, as we move towards implementation of some public diplomacy program, it is dangerous to leave responsibility in the hands of "inter-agency" committees. The subject matter is too delicate.

The current committee structure is confusing. Assets (PSYOPS) and sub-problems (Incident Management) appear as committees. Assuming that it is possible to obtain a few full-time people and financial resources, the committee structures should be recognized. I support the new organization.

In designing an organization it is useful to remember that form should follow function, and that with counter-terrorism we have very distinct "customer groups" for whom messages will have to be carefully crafted.

Thus at the outset let us focus on function. That is to say, to what customers are selling our product.

The American Public and Leadership

We need to maintain the broad public support for the President's recent initiatives, translate that into specific legislative objectives as required, and develop mechanisms to maintain the support for a sustained effort. Without domestic public support all else eventually comes to a halt. It cannot be taken for

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granted, particularly where the struggle will involve covert successes which cannot be publicized versus the occasional public setback which will certainly get media attention.

Western Europe

The recent exercise in Libya certainly highlighted the problem of public support, or lack thereof, for our counter-terrorist efforts. The costs to Mrs. Thatcher appear to have been, at least temporarily, high and the damage to American public perception of European allies is serious. We need to have a country-specific program -- developed in conjunction with each Embassy -- to ensure that President Reagan's counter-terrorism statement is understood not only by the broad public but by key leadership groups. How do we move the perception of the President from John Wayne to Socrates, thoughtfully defending Western values?

The Moderate Islamic Community

Many of our moderate Middle Eastern friends, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco -- to say nothing of Indonesia, Nigeria, and other non-Middle East Islamic states -- are caught in what they perceive as a virtually inescapable "political box." If the terrorists appear to be anti-Zionist, Moslem fundamentalists, refugee camp orphans supported by "fellow Islamic states," and our policy appears to generally be anti-Arab/Islamic, how do they support us -- publicly or privately? We must work hard to find ideological common ground, and get that message to the publics in these countries as well as the States.

The Hostile Islamic Countries

In hostile Islamic countries, "public diplomacy" is simply another tool in the struggle -- usefully viewed as the least violent notice to another sovereign entity that we find their conduct unacceptable. It is important for the long run defusing of the terrorist situation, that the body politics, or the elites of states that support terrorism, understand why we oppose terrorism and what the cost to them will be if their country continues to support terrorists. Libya, Syria, Zion, Palestinian camps (?), (to say nothing of Nicaragua) should be the targets of a concentrated effort to get this message out.

Soviet, Eastern Block, and China

As part of a long-run effort to get the facts to the general Soviet public, information on their government's training of terrorists should be included on RFE, VOA, and other channels. A special effort should be made to reach the Bloc countries, to explain to their populations and leadership groups how the Soviets are using them, thus damaging their image in the rest of the world, and limiting their acceptance among the community of actions.

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It is possible that this also is a subject in which the Chinese card could be usefully played.

The Organization

If we are going to pursue a public diplomacy strategy on counter-terrorism, we are going to have to devote people and resources. It cannot be won with a seamless web of inter-agency committees directed by a part-time, over-extended "Director of Public Diplomacy." This should come as no surprise as the two previous public diplomacy efforts -- Central America and South Africa -- have both required people and money.

What organizational structure fits our objectives? What structure will give us accountability for programs, plans, use of assets, and success or failure. I would recommend the following structure which would provide the guidance, strategy, hands-on management of the wide range of assets existing in the existing committee structure and throughout the government. (See attached chart.)

Comments on the chart may be helpful. The organization will take five to ten full-time professionals who know their region and public diplomacy, secretarial and administrative support, office space, and a budget of \$500,000. Many of the players can be loaned from State or USIS or DOD or CIA for a year on non-reimbursable details. The State Department, as the lead agency, must provide office space, administrative support, and salaries for the "non-detailees." The research requirements would be principally undertaken by the major participating agencies under tasking from the Public Diplomacy Staff.

The covert side must be completely separated from the overt public diplomacy efforts. For a wide range of reasons, including security, philosophic incompatibility, somewhat different objectives, and protection of credibility, covert support activity should be managed out of the CIA with close informal links to the overt side.

The incident management team would be composed of the three "lead individuals" enclosed in the "Red box" above, who would be responsible to senior operational officials for the public affairs/public diplomacy component of an incident as required to optimize the planning, execution, and aftermath. They could call on the resource pool reporting to them only when security requirements allowed, but by the very structure of the organization would be in the best position to reproduce rapid and efficient tasking.


As the "lead agency" it is up to the State Department to resolve the current "public diplomacy" situation. State has twice before proceeded vigorously to pursue a public diplomacy program -- presumably it can repeat the performance a third time.

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INTERAGENCY GROUP ON TERRORISM (I/GT/TIWG/OSG)



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MONTREAL FOR USREP ICAO, VIENNA FOR UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR
TAGS: UN, PTER, PREL
SUBJECT: USUN'S ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

ROME ALSO FOR FODAG, LONDON ALSO FOR SHIPPING ATTACHE

REFS: USUN 1094 (NOTAL)

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE RESPONDS TO ALL SUGGESTIONS FROM USUN RE MISSION'S ROLE IN FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM (REFTEL). RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO REFTEL PARAS. SPECIFIC ACTION REQUESTED IN PARAS. 9, 12, 13 & 14 BELOW. END SUMMARY.

3. US/UK EXTRADITION TREATY (PARA. 5): DEPARTMENT RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY TO WILLINGNESS OF AMB. WALTERS TO DISCUSS US/UK EXTRADITION TREATY WITH RELEVANT SENATORS (STATE 132548). ALTHOUGH WE HOPE THE SENATE COMMITTEE WILL HAVE ACTED ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL TREATY BY THE TIME AMB. WALTERS RETURNS FROM ASIA, IF IT HAS NOT YET DONE SO, DEPARTMENT MAY REQUEST THAT ADDITIONAL CONTACTS BE MADE.

4. WIDER RATIFICATION OF EXISTING TREATIES (PARA. 6): FOLLOWING ESTABLISHMENT IN JANUARY OF INFORMAL GROUP OF STATES PARTIES TO HOSTAGE-TAKING CONVENTION IN NEW YORK (USUN 134), DEPARTMENT REQUESTED DEMARCHES IN SELECT CAPITALS TO URGE NON-PARTY STATES TO BECOME PARTY TO

THE CONVENTION (STATE 92487). WE HAVE REQUESTED POSTS WHICH HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED TO DO SO BEFORE JUNE 12 FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF STATES PARTIES GROUP IN NEW YORK (STATE 176374). UNTIL WE HAVE EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON THE HOSTAGE-TAKING CONVENTION, WE WOULD PREFER HOLDING OFF ESTABLISHING SIMILAR GROUP OF PARTIES TO UN CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS.

5. SECURITY COUNCIL (PARA. 7): DEPARTMENT AGREES WITH SUGGESTION THAT USG LOOK FOR MORE OPPORTUNITIES TO URGE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION DEMONSTRATING TERRORIST ACTS, BUILDING ON OUR SUCCESSES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL LAST YEAR RE HOSTAGE-TAKING AND CONDEMNATIONS OF ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING AND ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORT ATTACKS. DEPARTMENT HOPES THAT LIKE-MINDED GROUP AT THE UN ON TERRORISM (PARA. 11 BELOW) COULD ALSO CONSIDER DEVELOPING CONCERTED COURSE OF ACTION FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION.

6. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION (PARA. 8): WHILE DEPARTMENT AGREES THAT A FURTHER CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING RESOLUTION IN THE GA WOULD BE DESIRABLE, TERRORISM IS A BIENNIAL ITEM AND WILL NOT BE ON THE AGENDA THIS YEAR. GIVEN THE WEEKS OF INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS NEEDED IN THE SIXTH COMMITTEE LAST YEAR TO PRODUCE THE GENERALLY FAVORABLE TERRORISM RESOLUTION, DEPARTMENT QUESTIONS WHETHER IT IS ADVISABLE TO SEEK TO CONVERT TERRORISM TO AN ANNUAL AGENDA ITEM AT THIS TIME. IF THERE IS CONSENSUS AMONG LIKE-MINDED ANTI-TERRORIST STATES IN THE UN INFORMAL GROUP AND/OR ANY TOKYO SUMMIT FOLLOW-UP MEETING (PARA 14 BELOW) ON A SPECIFIC RESOLUTION THAT WOULD FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM THIS YEAR, DEPARTMENT WOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT INSCRIPTION OF TERRORISM ITEM ON THE 41ST UNGA AGENDA. IN ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC PLAN OF ACTION THAT COULD GUARANTEE SUCCESS, IT WOULD NOT APPEAR ADVISABLE TO REQUEST THAT TERRORISM BE ADDED TO THE AGENDA THIS UP-COMING SESSION.

7. GA ACTION CONT.: DEPARTMENT NOTES THAT IN 1984, CUBA AND FRIENDS USED THE FIRST COMMITTEE TO ADVANCE A SO-CALLED "STATE TERRORISM" RESOLUTION ADOPTED IN PLenary BY A VOTE OF 117-0-30 (U.S.). WHILE CONDITIONS HOPEFULLY HAVE CHANGED ENOUGH TO PREVENT REPETITION OF

A SIMILAR EVENT, WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY.

8. LEGAL (SIXTH) COMMITTEE ACTION (PARA 9): DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES SENTIMENT THAT TIGHTER RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH TO PREVENT TERRORIST-RELATED ABUSES. ONE SUGGESTION IS TO RETURN TO PRE-VIENNA-CONVENTION STANDARD WHICH PERMITTED HOST GOVERNMENTS TO REQUEST THAT DIPLOMATIC POUCHES BE OPENED, AND ALLOWED DIPLOMATIC POST INVOLVED EITHER TO COMPLY OR TO REFUSE AND SHIP POUCH BACK OUT. ANOTHER PROPOSAL WOULD ALLOW THE USE OF METAL DETECTORS, X-RAYS, ETC. ON DIPLOMATIC POUCHES. ALTHOUGH DEPARTMENT SEES MERIT IN TIGHTENING CONTROLS ON DIPLOMATIC POUCHES TO PREVENT ABUSES, THERE IS NO USG INTER-AGENCY AGREEMENT ON WHICH, IF ANY, SUCH PROPOSALS THE USG COULD OR WOULD SUPPORT. DEPARTMENT THEREFORE BELIEVES THAT FOCUS OF ACTION THIS YEAR SHOULD BE ON GENERAL SUBJECT OF DIPLOMATS' NOT ABUSING THEIR STATUS TO SUPPORT OR CONTROL TERRORIST ACTS, WHICH WOULD COMPLY WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 32.

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9. LEGAL COMMITTEE CONT.: DEPARTMENT REQUESTS MISSION TO USE OCCASION OF SWEDISH AMB. VIDAR HELLNERS' VISIT TO NEW YORK, O/A JUNE 16 OR 17 (STOCKHOLM 4341), TO EXPLORE NORDIC WILLINGNESS TO USE SIXTH COMMITTEE AGENDA ITEM ON PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS TO ADVANCE EITHER A SEPARATE RESOLUTION OR SUPPLEMENTAL LANGUAGE IN NORDICS' TRADITIONAL TEXT TO URGE STATES TO ENSURE THAT THEIR DIPLOMATS DO NOT ABUSE THEIR PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES BY SUPPORTING, SPONSORING, OR CONDONING TERRORIST ACTS. THE POINT SHOULD BE UNDERLINED THAT THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ARE IMPORTANT MEANS OF COMBATTING TERRORISM, AND THAT THE STATES

PARTIES TO THEM MUST HONOR THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTIONS BOTH AS HOST COUNTRIES AND VIS-A-VIS THEIR OWN DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES. THE POINT CAN ALSO BE MADE THAT THE EC IS SUPPORTIVE OF TIGHTENING CONTROLS ON DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND PERSONNEL WHICH SUPPORT TERRORISM. (SEE ALSO PARA. 15 BELOW.) THE FALLBACK POSITION FROM A RESOLUTION WOULD BE FOR LIKE-MINDED STATES TO USE THE DEBATE ON THE AGENDA ITEM TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL COMPLIANCE WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS BY DIPLOMATS, AS WELL AS BY HOST GOVERNMENTS.

10. REPORTING ATTACKS ON DIPLOMATS (PARA. 10): DEPARTMENT AGREES WITH SUGGESTION THAT USG SHOULD REVITALIZE PRACTICE OF REPORTING TO AND CIRCULATING AT

THE UN FACTUAL INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON DIPLOMATS AND INNOCENT BYSTANDERS AS WELL. DEPARTMENT WILL PROVIDE MISSION TIMELY INFORMATION FOR THIS PURPOSE WHEN SUCH ATTACKS OCCUR. THIS WOULD SUPPLEMENT, BUT NOT REPLACE, USG EFFORTS TO HAVE SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMN SUCH TERRORIST ACTS AS THE NEED ARISES.

11. LIKE-MINDED GROUP (PARA. 11): DEPARTMENT HAS CONCURRED WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT USUN TAKE THE LEAD IN FORMING A LIKE-MINDED GROUP (STATE 138246). WE AWAIT MISSION'S REPORT ON PROGRESS ALONG THIS LINE AND ON POSSIBLE ACTIONS SUCH A GROUP WOULD RECOMMEND AND SUPPORT.

12. U.S. HOST-COUNTRY RESPONSIBILITIES (PARA. 12): DEPARTMENT SHARES CONCERN THAT USG MUST EFFECTIVELY AND FAITHFULLY PROTECT FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE SPECIFIC STEPS TO GUARANTEE, AND IF NECESSARY STRENGTHEN, USG COMPLIANCE WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS FOR FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC SECURITY IN THE U.S., AND IN PARTICULAR ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS HOST COUNTRY TO THE UN. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS MISSION TO REPORT ANY SUBSTANTIVE COMPLAINTS IN THIS AREA.

13. VIEW OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL (NEW ITEM): DEPARTMENT NOTES THAT THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERING REPORTS ON THE VIEWS OF THE SYG RE FOLLOW-UP UN ACTION ON LAST YEAR'S UNGA AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. IN LONDON, SYG REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE UN SECRETARIAT STAFF WAS CONSIDERING WHAT THE UN COULD DO TO FOLLOW UP ON LAST YEAR'S MOMENTUM (LONDON 11010). IN SPAIN, BY CONTRAST, HE REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE UN HAD DONE ABOUT AS MUCH AS IT COULD ON TERRORISM AT THIS TIME (MADRID 6322). DEPARTMENT REQUESTS MISSION TO DETERMINE CURRENT THINKING OF SYG ON FUTURE UN STEPS AGAINST TERRORISM.

14. TOKYO SUMMIT TERRORISM STATEMENT: THE STATEMENT URGED ALL LIKE-MINDED NATIONS TO COLLABORATE WITH THE SUMMIT SEVEN, PARTICULARLY IN THE UN, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, TO IMPROVE AND EXTEND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST TERRORISM AND THOSE WHO SPONSOR OR SUPPORT IT. THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC STEPS TO IMPLEMENT SUCH INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS. USG IS CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS WITH SUMMIT GOVERNMENTS BILATERALLY, AND HOPES THAT AN EXPERTS MEETING CAN BE SET UP TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THE

DECLARATION, INCLUDING POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL-ORGANIZATION INITIATIVES. DEPARTMENT ENDORSES MISSION'S ACTION TO CONSULT WITH JAPANESE UN MISSION IN A SIMILAR VEIN (USUN 1535).

15. TOKYO SUMMIT TERRORISM STATEMENT CONT.: ONE POINT IN TOKYO STATEMENT COULD BE FOLLOWED UP IN THE CONTEXT OF SIXTH COMMITTEE ACTION DISCUSSED IN PARA. 9 ABOVE. POINT 4 IN STATEMENT LISTS TWO STEPS THE SUMMIT SEVEN DECIDED TO APPLY WITH RESPECT TO ANY STATE SPONSORING OR SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY LIBYA: -- STRICT LIMITS ON THE SIZE OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS AND OTHER OFFICIAL BODIES ABROAD OF SUCH STATES, CONTROL OF TRAVEL OF MEMBERS OF SUCH MISSIONS AND BODIES, AND POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN OR CLOSURE OF SUCH MISSIONS AND BODIES; -- DENIAL OF ENTRY TO ALL PERSONS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, WHO HAVE BEEN EXPELLED OR EXCLUDED FROM ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ON SUSPICION OF INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OR WHO HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF SUCH A TERRORIST OFFENCE. SHULTZ
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 10135

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, PTER
SUBJECT: A SOVIET LECTURE ON TERRORISM

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

SUMMARY

2. MEMBERS OF THE AUDIENCE AT A RECENT ZNANIYE LECTURE ON TERRORISM ASKED QUESTIONS WHICH APPEARED TO BECOME LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM. IN RESPONSE TO OTHER QUESTIONS, THE LECTURER SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT SUBSCRIBE TO A "PUNISH OR EXTRADITE" APPROACH TO TERRORISTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE LECTURER CLAIMED THAT TERRORISM WAS PROVOKED BY FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE "PALESTINIAN QUESTION." END SUMMARY

3. MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DOCTOR OF LAW, YURY ALEKSANDROVICH RESHETOV GAVE A SOMEWHAT DRY AND DETACHED LECTURE TITLED "INTERNATIONAL AND STATE TERRORISM IN THE SERVICE OF REACTION" TO A ZNANIYE SOCIETY AUDIENCE ON JUNE 10. SOME 40 PEOPLE COMPRISED THE AUDIENCE, INCLUDING ELDERLY WOMEN, YOUNG AND MIDDLE-AGED MEN, PLUS THREE BOYS NO OLDER THAN 12 YEARS. THE FIRST PART OF HIS SPEECH WAS DEVOTED TO DEFINING TERRORISM, CITING STATISTICS REFLECTING THE GROWTH OF TERRORISM IN RECENT YEARS AND THE REASONS BEHIND THE SURGE.

4. ACCORDING TO RESHETOV, INDIVIDUALS ACTING INDEPENDENTLY CARRY OUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM TO PROVOKE A GOVERNMENT INTO TAKING ACTIONS THAT WILL ULTIMATELY WORK TO THE BENEFIT OF TERRORISTS. FOR EXAMPLE, INCREASED REPRESSION BY ONE GOVERNMENT TO COMBAT TERRORISM MIGHT LEAD TO THE ALIENATION OF GROWING SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION. HOWEVER, RESHETOV STATED THAT TERRORIST ACTS BY INDIVIDUALS EVEN OF LEFTIST TENDENCIES HAVE NOT SERVED THE INTEREST OF THE WORKING CLASSES. THE SOVIET UNION CONDEMNED THEM, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE TERRORISTS THEMSELVES, WHILE SYMPATHIZING WITH SOME OF THE THOUGHTS BEHIND THE SOVIET REVOLUTION, WERE OF BOURGEOIS BACKGROUND AND LITTLE INTERESTED IN THE WORKING MAN.

5. THE DISCUSSION OF STATE TERRORISM CONSISTED LARGELY OF ATTACKS ON RECENT U.S. ACTIVITY (GRENADA, LIBYA). RESHETOV SAID THE U.S. WAS EXPLOITING "ALLEGED" SUPPORT OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS TO ATTACK THESE COUNTRIES WHOSE POLICIES WERE NOT SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. GOALS. THE AUDIENCE, IN VARIOUS STAGES OF ATTENTIVENESS DURING THE LECTURE, DID NOT PERK UP DURING THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD. FOLLOWING ARE THE HIGHLIGHTS:

6. Q. WAS THE MURDER OF OLOF PALME AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL OR STATE TERRORISM? (QUESTION ASKED BY A PREADOLESCENT BOY)

A. PALME WAS AN INTERNATIONALIST PAR EXCELLENCE:

HE HAS A RELATIVE WHO WAS A FINNISH GOVERNMENT MINISTER AND ANOTHER WAS AN ORGANIZER IN THE BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY. HE STUDIED IN THE UNITED STATES AND UPON COMPLETING HIS STUDIES, TRAVELLED AROUND THE COUNTRY BY BUS. IT WAS AFTER HAVING SEEN THE MASSIVE INJUSTICE IN THAT COUNTRY DURING HIS TRIP THAT PALME BECAME A SOCIALIST. HE WAS A STRONG CRITIC OF U.S. VIETNAM AND ABORTIONS POLICY AND SEVERAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS WERE QUITE COGNIZANT OF HIS VIEWS. SOMEONE WHO DISAPPROVED OF THE FACT THAT PALME STROVE TO BETTER THE LOT OF TRADE UNIONISM AND LESSEN INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS KILLED HIM. IT'S A DELICATE QUESTION: BT

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CL NARA, Date 8/21/07

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 10135

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I DO NOT KNOW WHO KILLED HIM BUT I CAN IMAGINE...

Q. THAT THE U.S. REQUESTED AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST LIBYA IS OBVIOUS. IF, HOWEVER, ONE WERE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT QADHAFI'S ACTIONS OVER TIME THEY WOULD SEEM TO JUSTIFY THAT ATTACK, NO?

A. THE AMERICANS HAVE NO PROOF THAT QADHAFI WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM SUCH AS THE BERLIN DISCO BOMBING. THEY ACTED OUT OF SPITE, OUT OF A SENSE OF ACTS GOING UNPUNISHED, AND THEN PAPERED OVER THEIR AGGRESSION WITH A MASSIVE DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN.

Q. WHAT KEEPS US FROM HAVING A COMMON POSITION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN AGAINST TERRORISM? I AM PESSIMISTIC THAT UNLESS GOVERNMENTS GET TOGETHER NOTHING WILL EVER BE RESOLVED.

A. IN JANUARY MRS. THATCHER TOLD AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST THAT TERROR WAS BAD, BUT IT WOULD BE WORSE IF COMBAT OF TERROR WOULD LEAD TO CHAOS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. A FEW MONTHS LATER SHE ALLOWED THE AMERICANS TO USE HER COUNTRY'S AIRFIELDS TO ATTACK LIBYA. THE ITALIAN PRESIDENT SAID IN "LA STAMPA" THAT THE MAIN CAUSE FOR TERRORISM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION WAS THE UNRESOLVED PALESTINIAN QUESTION, YET HE JOINED THE OTHER WESTERN LEADERS IN

THE TOKYO SUMMIT'S RESOLUTION ON COMBATTING TERRORISM.

STILL, I AM NOT SUCH A PESSIMIST. FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET, AMERICAN AND FRENCH CITIZENS WERE KIDNAPPED IN LEBANON. WE COULD HAVE WORKED TOGETHER THERE. THE WESTERN EUROPEANS HAVE AN ANTI-TERRORIST NETWORK AMONG THEMSELVES, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN TOO SUCCESSFUL TO DATE. WORK IN SUCH MATTERS BETWEEN COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERING SOCIALIST SYSTEMS IS MORE COMPLICATED. STILL THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ROMAN CASE OF LAW "PUNISH OR EXTRADITE" IS ONE TO WHICH WE COULD ADHERE.

Q. WAS THE ATTEMPT BY AMERICAN WARSHIPS TO VIOLATE OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS RECENTLY AN ACT OF STATE TERRORISM (QUESTION ASKED BY A PREADOLESCENT)?

A. NO, THEY WERE TRYING TO TEST OUR ARMED FORCES' READINESS. IT WAS AN ACT OF PROVOCATION.

Q. FROM A LEGAL VIEWPOINT: WHY IS THE FIRST AMERICAN ATTACK ON LIBYA AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WHEN LIBYA FIRED THE FIRST SHOTS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS?

A. THE U.S. HAS A DISPUTE WITH LIBYA OVER INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES. THE PROPER WAY TO SETTLE IT IS THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, NOT THROUGH EXERCISE OF MIGHT. THREAT OF VIOLENCE IS CRIMINAL. THE U.S. CHOSE TO IGNORE ARTICLES OF THE U.N. CHARTER. THE LIBYANS FELT THREATENED AND

WERE ENTITLED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES.

THE AMERICANS ARE ALWAYS QUICK TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE. WHEN U.S. DIPLOMATS WERE TAKEN HOSTAGE BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS, THE WRONG WAS NOT RIGHTED BY THE U.S. SENDING IN THEIR ARMED FORCES TO RESCUE THEM. THEY SHOULD HAVE SOLVED THE MATTER IN THE
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SUBJECT: A SOVIET LECTURE ON TERRORISM

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. HARTMAN
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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

R
JM

June 17, 1986

Mr. Walter Raymond, Jr.
National Security Council
Old Executive Bldg., #351
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Mr. Raymond:

Last August after the TWA 847 hijacking, I wrote about the psychology and tactics of the criminals involved in my "National Security Outlook" letter and in the opinion pages of the Christian Science Monitor. I received a number of letters asking for details about my recommendation for firm action against terrorists.

Since most terrorists are unrestrained by policies of appeasement, one part of my answer about what America can do against them has to do with the use of force. Traditional international law has always permitted a state the right to redress for armed aggression against its citizens. Where no redress is possible, as is the usual case when states sponsor or give haven to terrorists, reprisals are legal. Reprisals or retaliatory acts must be proportionate (punishing, but not unreasonably so) and discriminate (as unharmed as possible to the innocent). Not only are such reprisals legal, they are militarily possible. The enclosed article, written early this year before the Libyan affair and printed in the current issue of the journal Policy Review, indicates some past successful uses of force against terrorists, and suggests a few American options for deterring more murders of our fellow citizens.

Of course, the use of force is only one of the tools for countering terrorism. We have at our disposal the usual kinds of diplomatic and economic sanctions. American assistance to troubled areas can also be helpful: Our aid to Egypt and Israel after the Camp David accords helped reduce tension between those two countries, and the recent congressional votes to aid Ireland may help diminish social strife and terrorism in that country. A great deal of money is being spent on making our embassies abroad more secure. There is also considerable interest in a new bill before the House, H.R. 4125, which has passed the Senate by a 92 - 0 vote. It would extend the jurisdiction of the U.S. Attorney General so that under certain defined conditions we may seize someone who has killed an American for terrorist purposes and bring him to trial under American law in federal court.

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None of this is pleasant business. But more than 150 Americans were killed or wounded by terrorists abroad last year, and the elected representatives of the American citizenry have a duty to do something about it. The problem is not whether we become barbaric by taking measured and forceful action against terrorist murderers. The problem is that to do nothing is to be impotent in the face of barbarians. Taking a more active role in counterterrorism is the only way to prevent more atrocities.

Sincerely,



JIM COURTER
Member of Congress

JAC/ch
Enclosure

PROTECTING OUR CITIZENS

When to Use Force Against Terrorists

REPRESENTATIVE JIM COURTER

Twenty-three Americans died in terrorist attacks abroad last year, and another 160 were wounded. From the murderous and elaborate theater that Nabih Berri and his associates staged around the TWA jetliner in Beirut, to the bombings which killed servicemen in Greece and West Germany, to the use of an automatic weapon on invalid Leon Klinghoffer traveling on the *Achille Lauro*, terrorists have treated American lives and honor with contempt. And yet, apart from the use of fighter aircraft to capture the *Achille Lauro* pirates, the United States has done remarkably little to secure justice for the wrongs done to its citizens. Americans have been hearing for a long time about "the war against terrorism," but thus far the war has been one-sided, and it is not the terrorists who are losing.

There have been no known attempts to rescue the six Americans still held hostage in Lebanon. Nor have there been any known measures taken against Iran, which last had possession of the Shiites who murdered William Stanford and Charles Hegna in December 1984 on a Kuwaiti airliner at Teheran. The killers of Navy petty officer Robert Stethem have been identified by the State Department, but have since been reported to be at large in Beirut. Very recently, one of them was allowed to pass through France untouched.

Neither Abu Nidal nor his Libyan and Syrian patrons have paid any price for their submachine gun and grenade attacks on defenseless travelers in the Rome and Vienna airports in December. Instead, the new year began with the Sixth Fleet maneuvering uselessly off the coast of Libya, as Colonel Qaddafi poured scorn on the White House. The naval exercises may not have intimidated Qaddafi, but they can be presumed to have reinforced his megalomania.

Thomas Jefferson dealt differently with the Mediterranean pirates of his day. "An insult unpunished is the parent of others," he said. Jefferson overturned the George Washington/John Adams policy of paying protection money to the Barbary pirates who preyed upon commerce from bases in Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. In lieu of further payment, he sent our six-ship Navy under Stephen Decatur's command to the Mediterranean. The fleet bombarded the pirates' bases and the military installations of their governmental sponsors and blockaded their coasts,

eventually forcing their submission. Decatur came home with guarantees of something which tradition and all codes of international law promised but could not by themselves preserve: the freedom of trading ships to move on the high seas.

"History is full of such episodes," wrote Yale's Sterling Professor of Law Eugene Rostow in 1980 after critics questioned the legality of our attempt to rescue diplomats imprisoned in our Teheran embassy. The cases demonstrate both the responsibility of a state to prevent its territory from being used as a base for international crimes, and the right of a victimized state to redress such crimes by force if other means fail. A simple reprisal is acceptable where it is "discriminate"—no more dangerous than necessary to innocent parties—and "proportionate," which means punitive but no more so than necessary. Natural moral law, traditional international law, and even the more delicate rules of the United Nations Charter all guarantee the right to self-defense, particularly against the transnational movements of armed bands.

As one terrorist atrocity follows another, it has not been law which has prevented measured and forcible American reaction. Our hand has been stayed by political reservations and by moral and psychological inhibitions. The Reagan Administration's policy—that force is both justifiable and necessary—has been argued clearly and repeatedly since 1981. But time after time, we have vented our anger and sheathed our sword.

We have made ourselves experts at explaining why not acting is almost always the more satisfactory course. We think of the danger a rescue mission poses to the hostages and of the dangers military reprisal presents to innocent bystanders. We echo each other's remarks about not furthering "the spiral of violence." We persuade each other that retaliation would mean Libyan or Iranian terrorism in American streets. We read of the concern any action would be certain to raise in the capitals of friendly coun-

REPRESENTATIVE JIM COURTER, *Republican of New Jersey*, is a fourth-term member of the House Armed Services Committee. He was aided in preparing this article by legislative assistant Christopher Harmon.

tries or even in capitals of unfriendly countries like Syria, which already has a place on our list of identified governmental sponsors of terrorism. And if all these reasons do not stop us from punishing terrorists and their patrons, then we come to discover that, after all, visiting justice on a religious or political zealot is counterproductive because it would only gratify his longing for martyrdom.

Meanwhile, we have been overlooking the remarkable number of counterterrorism success stories in the past two decades. Time and time again, hostages have been rescued unharmed by the swift and skillful use of force. Time and time again, decisive action has destroyed terrorists' headquarters or camps and thus impaired their military capabilities or deterred them from using terrorist tactics. The option of the use of force, while not always necessary, must always be available. Contingency planning for a rescue mission or military retaliation or both should begin from the very hour in which Americans are taken hostage or killed abroad. There is no need for us to be paralyzed: history gives ample evidence that international terrorism can be impeded by countermeasures that are skillful and swift.

Rescue Missions

Delta Force, the U.S. Army's team of counterterrorism specialists, is regrettably best known for failing to take enough helicopters to the desert staging ground outside Teheran in 1980. When three of the eight helicopters developed mechanical problems, the mission to rescue the 52 Americans had to be aborted. But Delta should also be remembered for other, more successful missions.

In March 1981, for example, the unit was asked for assistance when Islamic fundamentalists of the "Kommando Jihad," or Holy War Command, seized an Indonesian DC-10 airliner with about 50 passengers. As the plane rested on an airstrip in Bangkok, Thailand, Delta Force sent an anti-terrorist team with specialized equipment to advise and assist the Indonesian commandos. The Indonesians then stormed and liberated the airplane, killing three terrorists and mortally wounding a fourth.

Delta's advice was sought again in July 1984 when a Venezuelan DC-9 with 79 aboard was skyjacked by a Dominican national and a former Haitian army captain. The Venezuelan government defied the terrorists' demands, and the airplane made a series of short hops around the Caribbean, settling in Curacao. A clever airport technician crept to the plane and let the air out of its front tires and removed several electrical fuses. Eventually, 12 American-coached Venezuelan commandos armed with Uzi submachine guns approached the plane from two directions. As a hijacker panicked and threw gasoline into the aisles, they stormed the aircraft and killed both gunmen. There was no injury to any of the hostages.

Israel has successfully prevented the hijacking of its passenger liners. One El Al jet was commandeered in 1968 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P). Never again. Israel put undercover sky marshals on selected flights, reinforced cargo holds to nullify the effect of baggage bombs, and reportedly installed devices under jet wings which can alter and misdirect the flight of incoming missiles. When two Arabs tried to seize an El Al jet in 1970

on its flight from Amsterdam to New York, one of them was shot dead by a marshal while the other was handed over to authorities when the plane landed in London. Palestinian terrorists lost their interest in flying with El Al. The Israelis also have a fine record of recapturing other nations' airliners for them. Disguised as ground attendants, one team liberated a Belgian plane at Ben Gurion Airport in 1972, killing two members of Wadi Haddad's P.F.L.P. team and saving 97 passengers. Another squad retook a Sabena Airlines plane held by Black Septemberists that same year.

Egypt was one of the countries to study the Israeli lessons. In 1976, gunmen in the pay of Libya made the mistake of skyjacking an Egyptian Boeing 737 en route from Cairo to Luxor. As the government's negotiators stalled the gunmen with false news of a technical problem that would delay lift-off from Luxor, the army was working with information provided by several released hostages to develop a plan. Crack Egyptian paratroopers dressed as technicians were put aboard to perform the "necessary repairs." Working slowly, they talked themselves into the terrorists' confidence and their eventual request for spare parts and tools was granted. When these arrived, the "technicians" suddenly opened battle with the iron tools, battering several hijackers in prolonged hand-to-hand combat. A second team rushed in with effective automatic weapons fire. Every terrorist ended up in the hospital while every one of the 101 passengers and crew—Arab, French, West German, and Japanese—escaped harm.

In 1977, Palestinian gunmen hijacked a Lufthansa flight to Mogadishu, Somalia, where they threatened to kill the 90 hostages unless Baader-Meinhof terrorists were released from a West German prison, and a \$9 million ransom was paid. As Somali government negotiators bought time, a team from West Germany's GSG-9 team, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Wegener, flew in from Crete and made an unobserved night landing. With blackened faces, dark clothes, and special soft shoes that allowed them to creep unnoticed along the wings of the plane, they placed their explosives. A ruse was employed to get all the terrorists to go forward to the cabin momentarily, and the starboard doors and several rear windows were then blown off. The GSG-9 team rushed in and gunned down all four terrorists. No one else was hurt. Leaders of the Baader-Meinhof gang committed suicide in their German prison cells when they heard of the counterassault. The raid at Mogadishu proved to be the psychological and political end of their movement.

The team at Mogadishu was assisted by specialists from Europe's most celebrated counterinsurgency professionals, the British Special Air Service (S.A.S.). The S.A.S. carries on a small exchange program with Delta Force, and has helped the Dutch Royal Marines, who put an end to South Moluccan terrorism in their country in the 1970s by successfully storming a train, an embassy, a school building, and other enclosures where hostages had been seized. Initiated to carry out commando raids against Rommel's forces in North Africa in World War II, the S.A.S. then focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism work in Indonesia, Malaya, and South Yemen. Today, rescuing hostages is one of its specialties. So formidable is its reputation that



WANTED: Yasir Arafat for ordering the killing of Cleo Noel; Abu Nidal, for the hijacking of an Egypt Air plane last November; Abu Abbas, for the murder of Leon Klinghoffer.

the reported presence of plainclothes marksmen from the regiment was said to have persuaded four Irish Republican Army terrorists to surrender after holding a building on Balcombe Street in London in 1975.

An S.A.S. contingent attached to the Special Branch of London's Metropolitan Police went on alert on the afternoon of April 30, 1980, when dissident Iranians stormed their own embassy in London and seized 26 hostages. Armed with a submachine gun, a machine pistol, Browning automatic pistols, and hand grenades, the Khomeini opponents from the Arab province of Khuzestan separated the hostages by sex and held them in two rooms on the third floor of the elegant five-story building. Such dispersal of hostages makes rescue considerably more difficult, which is why the tactic has become commonplace in more recent years.

London's police specialists had outlasted and out-talked and outwitted many hostage-takers before, and remained confident during the six-day siege. They kept the terrorists on one telephone and passed everything they learned by another to the S.A.S. The regiment was busy with blueprints of the building, their contingency planning, and certain limited movements on the embassy site itself. The gunmen began to sense their presence, and the government was still resisting their demand for an airplane to Baghdad. Terrorist leader Sami Mohammed Ali lost his patience. "The time for talking is past," he announced into the telephone as he gunned down a hostage. He pushed the body out the door and warned that another would die every half hour. "Knowing someone had been killed,

things had to change," said John Dellow, deputy assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.

"What followed took just 11 minutes," *The Times* of London later reported. S.A.S. teams descended from the roof of the embassy using a high speed drop along ropes which they had anchored earlier to the jump-off point. They carried "frame charges" four feet long and two feet wide, specially packed with plastique, which they placed around the perimeters of the heavily reinforced windows. Through the blown apertures came stun grenades, an S.A.S. invention which produces a flash and a roar that momentarily immobilizes terrorists and hostages alike. Then the S.A.S., wearing helmet gear and built-in radios, came through and rushed upstairs, killing one gunman in the hallway and the others in the rooms with the hostages. Then some searched the rest of the embassy while others formed a human chain and virtually hurled the hostages one by one down the staircases and out of the burning building. With faces still hooded—now against the eager electronic eyes of the press—the S.A.S. troops boarded their waiting helicopters and disappeared.

The motto of the Special Air Service is "Who Dares, Wins."

Retaliation

The United States helped impose a Palestine Liberation Organization contingent on Tunisia as part of the deal it brokered in 1982 to evacuate Palestinians loyal to Yasir Arafat from Beirut and scatter them throughout the Mediterranean. The elderly President Bourguiba did his best to

alleviate his new problem by not permitting P.L.O. members to wander far from their camp and not permitting them to take their weapons with them when they did. But while he would later make reference to their "combatant" status, Bourguiba did not try to inhibit their foreign operations. He must have known very well what they were.

Tel Aviv knew as well. Force 17, Arafat's elite personal guard, was increasingly assuming an external role. Several crimes inside Israel were credited to them, and boatloads of Force 17 guerrillas were apprehended twice approaching the Israeli coast in August 1985. Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin charged that they were launched from Algeria on the orders of the Tunis headquarters, and told simply "to kill as many Jews as they can." Rabin made his statement in early September; a few days later, Force 17 seems to have sent three terrorists to murder Israeli tourists moored off Cyprus in a yacht. Many of these events were boasted of by captured Force 17 members and confirmed by American and British intelligence. The P.L.O. denied everything.

On October 1, 1985, two weeks after the Cyprus killings, Israeli jets left home for Arafat's headquarters just outside the Tunisian capital. Carrying the radar-jamming and deflecting equipment that proved so successful against Syria in 1982 and refueled in the air by Boeing 707 tankers, they approached the compound in two waves. First came F-15s, carrying laser designators to mark the P.L.O. headquarters building. Then came F-16s, which dropped American-built, laser-guided bombs that honed in on laser beams reflected off the designators. The phrase "surgical strike" has seldom been more appropriate. According to the *Washington Post*, the raid "damaged or destroyed buildings used by Force 17 . . . while leaving others in the complex untouched." Of the 70 or so killed, all were P.L.O. except for a dozen Tunisian policemen.

In an age of highly accurate weapons, including precision-guided munitions, Americans have clung stubbornly to the view that bombing is almost by definition indiscriminate. In part, this is due to our endless war in Vietnam, where we dropped staggering amounts of ordnance with remarkably little effect. But the Vietnam War was also a proving ground for new radio- and laser-guided munitions that can be used with pinpoint accuracy and minimum risk to civilians. The U.S. Air Force flew about 800 sorties against the Thanh Hoa bridge near Hanoi between 1965 and 1967 and lost 30 to 40 aircraft. But in May 1972, the first four Phantoms to be sent in with laser bombs hit the bridge. In June 1972, using 15 laser-guided 2,000-pound bombs, the U.S. Air Force destroyed the generating capacity of the Lang Chi dam, northwest of Hanoi, without destroying the dam itself—thereby preventing a flooding of the Red River valley that would have endangered civilians.

These and other more sophisticated weapons can be employed, as they were at Tunis, to ensure that reprisals against terrorist encampments or military and economic targets are exact and undamaging to civilians.

Not all Israeli raids have been as "clean" as that at Tunis. But the Israeli Defense Force history includes many such strikes in which the damage is devastatingly effective but limited to military targets. Late this January, after the at-

tacks in Vienna and Rome by Abu Nidal's Libyan- and Syrian-supported Palestinians, and after a Syrian-supported Fatah faction led by Abu Musa claimed credit for the Sunday bombing of a Jerusalem pizzeria, Israel decided upon action against an Abu Musa outpost at the Ain el Hilweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon, long a shelter for Palestinian gunmen. As first light broke on the morning of January 29, a flight of Israeli war planes swept over the

It took the British Special Air Service just 11 minutes to rescue hostages from the Iranian embassy in London in 1980.

Lebanese border and struck at a selected cluster of three houses outside the camp. Though surrounded by sandbags and twin-barrelled anti-aircraft gun emplacements, all three buildings were destroyed by strafing and 50-pound fragmentation bombs.

Israel's pilots returned safely to their bases and reported accurate hits on the one-story center of Abu Musa's group, a smaller building occupied by Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, and a two-story possession of another guerrilla group. The operation was over so swiftly that the Palestinians were unable even to remove the covers from their anti-aircraft guns. The refugees nearby were untouched.

The psychological effects of such an accurate raid are extraordinary. It must have been particularly hard on Abu Musa: 18 months before, in August 1984, Israeli jets had hit his bases with precision attacks in East Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, home to 5,000 anti-Arafat Palestinian guerrillas, and the departure point for frequent raids into Israel. One pair of Israeli bombers destroyed several buildings at Mejd el Anjar, a guerrilla base just south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. Abu Musa would admit to losing only four of his fighters, but about 100 people were buried in the rubble of a three-story building which Israel said served as his security and intelligence office. If the pursuit of Abu Musa has not yet resulted in his death, it has seriously disrupted his military operations. Many terrorist commanders remember the Israeli air attacks as "the worst part of their careers," wrote veteran Middle East reporter John Laffin, "because the Israeli planes 'always seemed to know where to find us.'"

American cases of retaliation are rare. One involved a combined rescue/retaliation action directed by President Gerald Ford in 1975 when Cambodian Communists seized the American cargo ship *Mayaguez* off the Cambodian coast. The U.S. Navy counterassault was swift, somewhat clumsy, and successful: all 40 captives were rescued. The President was much criticized by those who would guard us against any trace of "adventurism" and by others who judge a rescue mission not by its punitive and deterrent

effect or by the retrieval of hostages but by body counts of the American soldiers who try to bring them back. Interviewed by Hugh Sidey five years after giving the orders for action, Mr. Ford had a short answer for his critics: "There was never a repeat while I was President."

The case of the *Mayaguez* illustrated how necessary our military alliances and overseas bases are to rescue missions. Reconnaissance aircraft were dispatched from Utapao Airfield in Thailand. The U.S.S. *Coral Sea* carrier group was redirected toward the area, as were other U.S. ships of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff needed a landing party and ordered an Okinawa-based Marine battalion to Utapao. Two other Marine platoons would be brought in from Cubi Point in the Philippines.

The captured *Mayaguez* had been anchored near Kaoh Tang Island, and the movement of small boats to and from the ship suggested to intelligence that the 40-member crew had been transferred to land. (Intelligence, as it happens, was wrong.) Late in the fourth day, following a meeting of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered that Kaoh Tang Island be attacked and the empty *Mayaguez* reboarded and towed to sea. Airstrikes hit the Cambodian airfield at Ream, heavily damaging the installations and the airstrip. The 180 Marines in the helicopter-borne landing parties nonetheless took barrages of automatic weapons from the ground. Of the eight helicopters in the first wave, three crashed and two were disabled. Claymore mines on the beach also took their toll. Other landings placed hundreds of other troops ashore, some on nearby Tang Island where they engaged 150 Cambodians. If the fighting was bloody, it was also brief: three hours after the assault commenced, a fishing boat with mostly Caucasians on board was reported to be approaching Kaoh Tang Island flying a white flag.

The incident has a number of parallels with the Grenada operation of 1983. Both combined rescue and assault missions. Both successfully used overwhelming force on a small enemy-held island, but proved costly in men and machines. In both, there were lethal accidents. In Grenada, a skiff full of equipment-laden Navy SEALs overturned in unexpectedly heavy surf as a helicopter towed it towards the shore of the eastern side of the island. In Thailand, as helicopters landed at a U.S. base with Cambodia-bound Marines, one chopper crashed, costing 23 lives. The Cambodian operation used three arms of the military services: Navy, Marines, and Air Force. The Grenada mission used the Navy, Marines, Army personnel, and special forces.

President Ford had been told to expect to lose between 10 to 40 men in the *Mayaguez* mission. Fifteen died in action, and the 23 others in the shattered helicopter in Thailand must also be counted as losses. Another 51 servicemen and officers were wounded, and a three-man machine gun crew disappeared in action. Two cryptic entries in the records of the debriefing of the *Mayaguez* crew would have satisfied Commander-in-Chief Ford, however. According to one of these, the *Mayaguez* captain "convinced Cambodians that he could get U.S. forces to stop bombing/strafing if ship and crew released." The other is the last: "Ship's captain states that Cambodian fear of airstrike and prompt U.S. force response were the primary causes for release of the ship and its crew."

What Works, and What Doesn't

Certainly there are cases in which force has been used badly. Last November, 59 hostages of an Egypt Air plane hijacked to Malta by followers of Abu Nidal were killed during a rescue attempt by the Egyptian counterterrorist squad Sa'iq'a. A rescue attempt was necessary, because the terrorists had begun executing passengers. But action is not of itself enough. Neither planning nor skill were in evidence. French counterterrorism expert Paul Barril, who helped the Saudis recapture the Great Mosque of Mecca from heavily armed Sunnis in 1979, has criticized Sa'iq'a for using no sophisticated equipment, such as spike microphones, which can locate each of the terrorists with some precision inside the plane, or incapacitating gas, or the stun grenades which had rooted out the terrorists in the catacombs beneath the Great Mosque. No deception was attempted to provide the element of surprise.

Maltese authorities were also to blame. Available American experts were kept confined to their quarters by the Maltese; they were not even allowed to communicate with Sa'iq'a's commanding officer. Barril notes further that the Maltese authorities' refusal to allow refueling of the plane cost Sa'iq'a its best chance to approach and gather intelligence. The rule in hostage situations is not to refuse to negotiate but to buy time by appearing to negotiate.

Sa'iq'a commenced its operation with an attempt to blow an aperture in the plane, but used too much explosive and set the aircraft on fire. Then, unforgivably, it killed innocents after passengers and terrorists began rushing from the burning plane. Counterterrorist forces are trained at instantaneous distinction between those with guns and those without. Firing without certainty is the worst mistake. Sa'iq'a had no reason to fire into knots of escaping passengers and terrorists when the police presumably had the airport cordoned off.

Disaster in Colombia followed the one in Malta, and the reasons for it were similar. After three dozen M-19 Communist guerrillas seized the Palace of Justice and a number of judges on November 6, the Colombian army stormed and recaptured the building. The result was some 100 deaths and only three dozen of the dead were guerrillas. So bad was the carnage that the 12 rescued justices boycotted the memorial service that President Betancur held for their 11 colleagues and the other innocents.

The operation discredited the use of force, an option to which a democratic society like Colombia must have recourse when faced with drug traffickers and Communist terrorists. Given the strategy by which terrorists and their sympathizers operate, lethal overreaction by the victimized government is of more propaganda value to them than a successful act of terror. Terrorists wish above all to discredit the power and the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of their audience, the people.

Time was on the side of the Colombian officials at Bogota and they threw it away. Until the terrorists began killing (and they apparently had not) waiting was appropriate, just as it was at the Iranian embassy in London in 1980. Instead, President Betancur waited two days—more than enough for the terrorists to organize their defenses but not enough for them to be worn down by the siege—and then the army was sent in with much bravado and no apparent



LIP/Reimann Newspictures

This attack by Arab commandos at Rome Airport in December 1985 cost 13 lives. Fifty others were wounded.

plan. Soldiers simply rammed an armored personnel carrier through the front door. The ensuing firefight raged for two days inside the block-long, three-story building. Some of that time seems to have been used by the guerrillas to execute at least six of the 11 justices who died.

The M-19 guerrillas who took the Palace of Justice were reportedly led by five Cuban-trained members of Nicaragua's Directorate of Special Operations. At a safehouse outside the capital, they had built a scale model of the targeted building and trained with it for three weeks. They maintained regular coded communication with Cuba and Nicaragua, which supplied half the arms they took to the Palace. Such opponents cannot be surprised—or prevented from shooting their captives—by the appearance of an armored personnel carrier at the front door. But even two army fire teams, introduced into the building by stealth, or given satchel charges and placed on the roof by helicopter at the moment the ground assault began, would have diverted the besieged, compromising their freedom to concentrate their fire on army personnel on the ground.

When to Use Force

Malta and Bogota are cases in which force was used ineptly. Sometimes force ought not be used at all. This is most likely when hostages are taken on a country's own soil and the government possesses complete control over the environment. Police and political officials can permit or limit the terrorists' movement, allow or prevent visitors, withhold or grant food and communication.

The New York City police department has a splendid record of outlasting and out-talking nonpolitical hostage-takers. "We bore them to death," one officer has said. Although ideological zealots differ from emotional cases, sometimes they, too, can be exhausted or tricked into submission. There may also be times in which terrible danger can be averted or scores of hostages rescued by giving into the demands or granting terrorists their escape. In such cases, it is important to make sure that punishment or reprisal take place afterward.

Everything that was done wrong at Malta and Bogota was done right at Entebbe. Even after a decade, that operation by the General Intelligence and Reconnaissance Unit 269 of the Israeli Defense Force remains the model of the three elements of success in rescue missions: surprise, speed, and skill.

On June 28, 1976, Air France flight 139 en route to Tel Aviv was skyjacked by Palestinian and German terrorists and flown to Entebbe, Uganda. By the morning of July 1, a fullscale mock-up of Entebbe's Old Terminal had been built from blueprints (obtained from the building's Israeli architect) and from tourists' vague photographs. The commando force was assembled and commenced rehearsals under the stopwatch. One hour before midnight on July 3, the first of four C-130s touched down after a 2,200 mile flight, exactly 30 seconds behind schedule. The planes disgorged armored personnel carriers, jeeps, other vehicles, and several hundred men. They killed the terrorists, recaptured the hostages and put them on a plane for home,

machine-gunned the Ugandan MIG fighters at the airstrip, refueled, reloaded, and disappeared into the skies, all in an hour and a half. The Israelis called it "Operation Thunderbolt," and Ugandans in the ministries and army barracks at Kampala understood what they meant.

Without surprise, the lives of hostages and counter-attackers alike are in the gravest danger. The terrorists may fire on their captives; this happened at Entebbe and London, though in most cases terrorists naturally turn upon their attackers. Operating at night has often proven a good way to gain surprise. Guards are least alert then, and although the commandos are on unfamiliar ground, they enjoy the advantages of moving out of darkness and toward lit interiors. Where they attack in dark interiors, infrared-sensitive night vision goggles can provide an advantage in a firefight. The rescues at Entebbe and Mogadishu occurred at night and a dozen others were planned for or took place in darkness. By contrast, some of the most celebrated disasters—the attempt to stop Black September's escape with Israeli hostages at Furstenfeldbruck Airport outside Munich in 1972, Lamacav on Cyprus in 1978 where Sa'iq'a botched a rescue attempt, and the Malta disaster of last year—took place in the full light of day. The best opportunity for Delta Force to rescue the TWA 847 passengers last June may have been stymied by Algerian authorities, who kept on the brilliant lights at Algiers airport while the plane was held there overnight between trips to Beirut.

Arriving at Entebbe at night was not of itself enough to gain surprise. Elaborate plans were necessary to fool the Ugandan radar systems and the Entebbe air traffic controllers. In addition, putting a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft down on an airstrip unseen may be possible, but putting it down quietly is a challenge. William Stevenson has described how the first of the four transports cut its speed to a mere 100 miles per hour and then cut it again to 75. To the soldiers strapped inside, the landing airplane "seemed to fall out of the air with a shriek of twisted metal and protesting turbines," but outside "an observer would have seen the craft slide almost soundlessly onto the runway, the underinflated tires uttering a soft squeal."

Enemy troops on the ground presented another problem. An Israeli paratroop major assigned to get his men from the first plane to the distant Old Terminal building (where the hostages were) solved the problem of surprising the expected sentries only in the last hours before boarding. He realized that the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin always traveled in a black Mercedes, and had been visiting the airport regularly to see his P.F.L.P. friends and "console" the hostages. The major requisitioned a Mercedes, but the only one available was white; it went into the Hercules with a new wet coat of black paint. The deception worked perfectly. Outside the Old Terminal, Ugandans who would have fired upon an unidentified column of jeeps snapped to attention when it was led by a black Mercedes, and the commandos inside cut them down with silenced-equipped pistols. The addition of surprise to the customary swiftness and skill of Israeli military operations made the Entebbe rescue a masterstroke. It broke a most dangerous circle of political criminals from Palestine and West Germany and saved the hundred persons they had victimized.

What Can Be Done

The President and Secretary of State Shultz have propounded a reasonable, moral, and convincing doctrine of the use of force against terrorism. Calling for the use of preemption, punitive retaliation, and other acts which go to the sources of terrorism, this doctrine is said to have been codified by National Security Directive 138 in April 1984. The doctrine has often been invoked but rarely applied. Given the fact that Americans continue to be the leading targets of international terrorism and that such acts of terrorism continue to rise, it is necessary for the United States to undertake a more aggressive counterterrorist role. While it must be to others to choose the methods and tools of action, the following suggestions indicate the breadth of the American options.

The United States should make immediate and effective use of international arrest warrants for known terrorists, both those shielded from extradition by foreign governments and those beyond the control of their own poorly governed states. The Terrorist Protection Act, recently passed unanimously by the Senate, would lower domestic legal barriers that inhibit American agents from seizing those who kill Americans for political reasons abroad and allow them to be brought to trial under American law.

Bounties may be useful supplements to American efforts to arrest and prosecute known killers. The Department of Justice has offered a bounty of \$250,000 for the killers of Charles Hegna and William Stanford on a hijacked Kuwaiti airliner on December 4, 1984 at Teheran airport. It has offered \$500,000 for Hasan Izz-Al-din and Mohammad Hamadei, the Hezbollah members who murdered Robert Stethem on the TWA plane last summer. While there is no good moral or political reason to turn over to bounty hunters the counterterrorism work we should do ourselves, bounties may nonetheless be of use in cases in which American agents are simply unable to locate the killer.

There will, of course, be objections. Israel's clever kidnapping-for-trial of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina 25 years ago produced a roar of international protest in spite of the distinct unpopularity of Nazi mass murderers. We must expect the objections, as surely as President Reagan expected Mubarak's unhappiness about the *Achille Lauro* force-down. We should turn them against the government from which they come: if requests for extradition go unheeded, the snatch that follows should be accompanied by wide dissemination of details of the government's refusal to help seize an international terrorist, and by full listings of the charges against the accused.

Ambassador Charles Lichenstein, formerly with our United Nations mission, is among those examining ways of bringing formal charges against Yasir Arafat, who is alleged to have given orders over a shortwave radio to kill Cleo Noel, American ambassador to the Sudan in 1973. Carlo Mastelloni, a magistrate at Venice, has already issued a warrant for Arafat's arrest (in September 1984) on charges of weapons smuggling to the Italian Red Brigade via the Mediterranean. And a justice in a court in Genoa, from whence the *Achille Lauro* sailed, has issued a warrant for Abu Abbas on charges of piracy and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer.

Another candidate for arrest or reprisal may be Hussein Mussawi, a Lebanese militant and an organizer of Hezbollah, the sponsors of the TWA hijacking. Mussawi operates primarily from West Beirut, Baalbek, and southern Lebanon. He has been identified as the probable draftsman, with Iran's Minister of Islamic Guidance, Seyed Muhammed Khatami, of a 200-page plan drawn up in May 1984 for the formation of terrorist strike forces. Mussawi reportedly sits as part of the secret council of Islamic Jihad, or "Holy War," which meets in the Iranian Embassy in Damascus. Apart from holding our six American hostages, Islamic Jihad claims credit for the bombing of the Marine barracks, as well as that of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983. The Departments of Justice and State might also take a hard look at the chief of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, Colonel Ghazi Kanaan, to whom terrorism expert Arnaud de Borchgrave ascribes "the key supervisory role for Shiite extremists in Lebanon. [He] functions as President Assad's pro-consul in a country Syria regards as its own. Colonel Kanaan has worked closely with the K.G.B. in Syria and in Lebanon."

Kamaran Island, South Yemen's northernmost possession in the Red Sea, may be an example of the kind of hard target available to American planners, should they be directed by the President to retaliate for the killings of Americans by the P.L.O. In early 1985, Kamaran Island was reported to be a new site for pro-Arafat P.L.O. activities. The 70-square-mile island was leased to him and military construction and the lengthening of an airstrip were underway. P.L.O. pilots were expected from other Middle Eastern bases. If U.S. intelligence had confidence in such a report, Kamaran Island could have been deemed a reasonable target for a bombing raid following pro-Arafat P.L.O. atrocities. The danger to South Yemeni citizens would have been minimal.

Any number of Iranian, Syrian, or Libyan terrorist training camps suggest themselves as potential targets when retaliation is appropriate. The State Department says it knows of some 15 camps in Libya. Instructors are Syrian, East German, Palestinian, and Cuban. Some 7,000 young men and women from all over the world train there. Many of the camps are on or near the Mediterranean coast and

are vulnerable to airstrikes and covert or overt operations from the sea. These include Res al Hilal west of Tobruk, the "April 17th" camp near Benghazi, and a cluster of others around Tripoli.

If action against a country like Iran is necessary, according to the Naval War College's chairman of strategy, Alvin Bernstein, the best targets would be those outside the country which would not endanger Americans carrying out the reprisal. Arms-carrying ships essential to the Ayatollah's war effort against Iraq are one such target; naval patrol boats are another.

We should also start thinking about using political alliances, political leverage, and financial and covert operations against state sponsors of terrorists who kill Americans. Every dictator has vulnerabilities. Arafat faces enemies within the P.L.O. Syria's Assad is a member of an Alawite minority in a largely Sunni country. Egypt might give quiet support to U.S. operations against Libya, which has repeatedly engaged in cross-border terrorism and assassination attempts against Egyptian officials. Terrorist atrocities sponsored by Iran could be answered by overt, publicized increments of military aid to Iraq.

A Closing Word

If the first five years of the present decade have demonstrated anything, it is that closer international cooperation by victimized states, better intelligence gathering, and diplomatic and economic sanctions can all help control terrorism, but that each fails in decisive respects. Most terrorists, particularly the most well known, are not caught by such means. And most of those who are caught do not stay in jail long.

Five years ago, 52 Americans finally came home from Iran. Khomeini had done nothing for 444 days. Then a "breakthrough"—for which more than one negotiator claimed credit—came in the very first hours of the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, who had made well known his opinions of the handling of the hostage crisis and of Khomeini. The new President welcomed back the 52 Americans with words we would do well to live by: "We hear it said that we live in an era of limits to our powers. Well, let it also be understood, there are limits to our patience." ■

Foreign Opinion Note

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of Research



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June 19, 1986

ISRAELIS BACK U.S. RAID ON LIBYA BUT DOUBT ITS IMPACT

Following are highlights from several recent public opinion polls among representative samples of Jewish Israelis.

SS
JM
WR

Most Justify U.S. Raid on Libya, But Few Say It Will Slow Terror

A large majority (79%) of Jewish Israelis, according to a mid-April PORI poll, "justified" the American "attack on Libya's missile sites and ships." Yet only about one-fifth (22%) thought this attack would decrease Arab terrorism; more (32%) said terror would actually increase, while one-third expected no change.

At the same time, most Israelis (71%) continued to oppose reentering Lebanon "to remove terrorists"; and more than ever before (54%) called Israel's 1982 campaign there "a failure." On a current controversy over terrorism, most Israelis (61%) polled by the reputable Dahaf firm opposed investigating an alleged cover-up of how two captured suspects died in 1984. Three-quarters (74%) said security took precedence over law.

One-Third See War with Syria; Say Peace Requires Palestinian State

Even before the early May war scare, one-third of Israelis said war with Syria "could" erupt "this year." In early March, only one-fifth said a war was actually "likely" within two years. If, on the other hand, peace talks did resume, nearly one-third said a Palestinian state would be "vital" (11%) or "important" (20%) in reaching a "final peace"; twice as many disagreed. This finding is consistent with a late 1985 PORI poll, when Israelis rejected a Palestinian state by the same two-to-one margin.

Most Favor Coalition; Labor Up Slightly, Likud and Kach Down

As of mid-April, a solid majority of Israelis continued to rate their government's political and economic policies in the fair-to-good range. In line with this, about two-thirds wanted to keep the National Unity Government "under any circumstances."

But if a new election were held, a PORI poll published May 19 suggests more support for Labor, and less for Likud. Labor got 40 percent (up 3% since the 1984 election); Likud, only 26 percent (down 6%). Kahane's "Kach" party got under 2 percent -- much less than in late 1985 surveys. About 20 percent chose religious or other small parties; 15 percent gave no choice.

USIA Office of Research:
David Pollock, Analyst (P/RNA)
N-6/19/86

Approved by: Nils H. Wessell
Director of Research (485-2965)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01781

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, UNSC, UN
SUBJECT: TERRORISM - UN ACTIVITIES

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN THE LAST WEEK WE HAVE HELD A MEETING AT FRG MISSION IN CONNECTION WITH EFFORT TO INCREASE PARTIES TO HOSTAGES CONVENTION, MET WITH COMMITTEE SIX WEOG TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE FUTURE ACTION, INCLUDING EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL FOR CONFERENCE WHICH ALL CONCERNED THOUGHT A POOR IDEA. WE HAVE ALSO MET WITH SWEDISH FONOFF TERRORISM COORDINATOR HELLNERS, WHO ALSO THOUGHT EGYPTIAN/GREEK IDEA OF CONFERENCE WAS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IDEA. END SUMMARY.

3. HOSTAGES CONVENTION

- A. WE HELD SECOND MEETING OF INFORMAL GROUP AT FRG MISSION TO DISCUSS ONGOING EFFORT TO INCREASE RATIFICATIONS OF HOSTAGES CONVENTION.

- B. THOSE WHO HAD MADE CONTACTS REPORTED ON THE RESULTS THEREOF. MOST REPORTS REFLECTED GOVERNMENTS HAD SIMPLY NOT FOCUSED ON THE MATTER AND AGREED TO DO SO IN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHES. EXCEPTIONS TO THIS WERE FRANCE, WHICH NOW CLAIMS TO BE TROUBLED BY PROBLEMS IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE CONVENTION, PAKISTAN, WHICH SAID IT FAVORED REGIONAL SOLUTIONS OVER GLOBAL, KUWAIT, WHICH EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA SAID ARTICLE NINE CREATED PROBLEMS FOR THEM, BUT PROBABLY NOT INSURMOUNTABLE ONES.

- C. GROUP REVIEWED STATES FROM WHICH THERE HAD BEEN NO REPLY AND PARCELLED OUT FURTHER LIST OF DEMARCHES. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE AGREED RECOMMEND THAT WE MAKE DEMARCHES IN BURKINA FASO, CHAD AND GUINEA.

- D. GROUP AGREED THAT THOSE WHO HAD RECEIVED PROMISES TO STUDY MATTER IN RESPONSE DEMARCHES WOULD MAKE FOLLOW-UP DEMARCHES IN FALL TO KEEP PRESSURE ON.

- E. GROUP AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH INFORMALLY AND MEET AGAIN AS REQUIRED, BUT IN ANY EVENT TO GET TOGETHER DECEMBER 1986 OR JANUARY 1987.

- F. COMMENT: MALAWI, ITALY AND JORDAN HAVE BECOME PARTIES SINCE WE COMMENCED EXERCISE AND LARGE NUMBER OF REPLIES THAT WERE THOROUGHLY POSITIVE IN TONE SUGGEST EXERCISE LIKELY BE EFFECTIVE IN SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASING NUMBER OF PARTIES TO CONVENTION IN COURSE NEXT YEAR OR TWO. ALLEGED FRENCH PROBLEMS WITH ARTICLE 12 ARE SOMEWHAT SURPRISING, SINCE FRENCH ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN ITS ELABORATION AND NOT ONLY GAVE NO INDICATION OF PROBLEMS AT THE TIME OF ITS ADOPTION, BUT EXPRESSLY ENDORSED THE PACKAGE. SOVIET PROBLEMS WITH ARTICLE 9 ARE MORE UNOERSTANDABLE IN LIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS WHICH PERMEATE IT. END COMMENT.

4. WESTERN GROUP MEETING

- A. UK, AS CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE SIX WEOG, CONVENED MEETING FOR TOUR D'HORIZON OF PENDING LEGAL ISSUES WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON TERRORISM.

- B. EDWARDS (UK) OPENED DISCUSSION BY EXPRESSING VIEW THAT IT IMPORTANT SEEK WAYS TO BUILD ON SUCCESS OF RES. 40/61 AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD ERODE SUCCESS ACHIEVED TO DATE. HE SUGGESTED GROUP CONSIDER (I) WHETHER TO PRESS FOR A TERRORISM ITEM ON AGENDA 41ST UNGA, (II) VIEWS ON EGYPTIAN AND GREEK PROPOSALS FOR CONFERENCE FOCUSED ON DEFINITION, (III) CONSIDERATION OF GROUP RESPONSE TO SECRETARY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT COMMENTS ON TERRORISM.

- C. ALL WHO SPOKE RECOMMENDED FOCUS AT 41ST UNGA SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS ITEM AND RECOMMENDED AGAINST SEEKING TO INSCRIBE TERRORISM ITEM ON 41ST UNGA AGENDA.

- D. EGYPTIAN/GREEK IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TERRORISM OPPOSED BY ALL WHO SPOKE, SAVE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE WHO AT END OF DISCUSSION SAID HE HAD GOTTEN THE MESSAGE AND WOULD DULY REPORT BT

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PAGE 01 USMISSION USUN NEW 1781 DTG: 202039Z JUN 86 PSM: 037601
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- B. IN SUBSEQUENT MEETING, HELLNERS TOLD US HE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, UNSC, UN

SUBJECT: TERRORISM - UN ACTIVITIES

IT. MAIN THRUST OF OPPOSITION TO CONFERENCE WAS THAT
FOCUS ON DEFINITION WOULD FORCE BITTER CONFRONTATION
OVER ROLE OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND QUESTION OF
SO-CALLED STATE TERRORISM, THAT PROGRESS ACHIEVED TO
DATE WAS FUNCTION OF FOCUSING ON PARTICULAR HEINOUS
ACTS AND AVOIDING DEFINITION. COMMENT: UK
REPRESENTATIVE WAS AMONG THE MOST OUTSPOKEN OPPONENTS
OF EGYPTIAN/GREEK IDEA AND WE DOUBT ANY UK OFFICIALS
SEE ANY MERIT IN GREEK SCHEME, EVEN AS WAY OF FORCING
GREEKS TO FACE UP TO ISSUE. END COMMENT.

- E. ON QUESTION OF ATTEMPTING GROUP RESPONSE TO
SECRETARY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR COMMENTS, VIEWS WERE
DIVIDED. SWEDEN AND FRANCE EXPRESSED HESITATION
ABOUT FORMAL UNIFIED GROUP RESPONSE. OTHERS,
INCLUDING FRG AND UK, THOUGHT UNUSUAL ACT OF
RESPONDING AS A GROUP WOULD ATTRACT ATTENTION AND
SEND USEFUL MESSAGE. IT AGREED TO LET UK TRY A DRAFT
AND REVERT TO QUESTION WHEN WE HAD A SPECIFIC DRAFT
TO CONSIDER (PROBABLY IN SEPTEMBER).

5. MEETING WITH HELLNERS - (SWEDEN)

- A. AT REQUEST SWEDISH MISSION, AMBASSADOR OKUN
AND MISOFF MET WITH AMBASSADORS HELLNERS AND
STROMHOLM (SWEDISH DEPUTY PERMREP). HELLNERS
EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR VERY USEFUL VISIT IN
WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE ANY
USEFUL INITIATIVE SWEDEN COULD TAKE IN UN AT THIS
TIME BEYOND PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS ITEM AND
COOPERATION IN THE WORKING GROUP ON THE HOSTAGES
ITEM. HE SAID HE WOULD BE TALKING WITH UN LEGAL
COUNSEL FLEISCHHAUER, EGYPTIANS AND VARIOUS OTHERS.
HE VOLUNTEERED TO REPORT BACK TO US BEFORE HIS
DEPARTURE.

REMAINED OF VIEW THERE NO PARTICULAR INITIATIVE
SWEDEN OR NORDICS GENERALLY COULD USEFULLY TAKE AT
THIS TIME. HE REPORTED HE TOLD EGYPTIANS HE THOUGHT
IDEA OF GLOBAL CONFERENCE VARIOUSLY UNAPPEALING AND
ONE FOCUSED ON DEFINITIONS A DREADFUL IDEA. HE SAID
EGYPTIANS ASKED WHETHER A CONFERENCE
FOCUSED ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM
MIGHT BE BETTER, TO WHICH HELLNERS SAID MAYBE LESS
DISASTROUS BUT SURELY POINTLESS UNLESS THERE SOME SPECIF
FORM OF COOPERATION ENVISAGED AND A FAIR PROSPECT OF VER
WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT, BOTH OF WHICH HE DOUBTED EXISTED.
HELLNERS SAID HE FORMED IMPRESSION EGYPTIAN PERMREP
BADAWI FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM AND WOULD TRY TO
AVOID INSCRIBING AN ITEM OR ANY OTHER COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
ACTION AT 41ST UNGA IF CAIRO WOULD LET HIM, WHICH
HELLNERS THOUGHT WAS AN OPEN QUESTION.

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LIBYA

REACTIONS TO U.S BOMBING RAID REPORTED

JEUNE AFRIQUE Comment

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 p 25

[JEUNE AFRIQUE Introduction]

[Text] The one as controversial as the other, these two men have had people killed, including the innocent. By assassins called terrorists, and by bombing called imperialist. Libyan Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi proclaims the revolution of the peoples of the Third World against imperialism, particularly American. The American Ronald Reagan presents himself as the herald and hero of the so-called "free" world against Libya. Both have allies, sometimes accomplices. By picking a fight, they risk involving entire nations in their quarrels.

We wished to know more about their intentions and their reasons. How, and with whom, has Ronald Reagan sought to engineer the dismantling of the Libyan regime? What danger, and to whom, can this Libyan regime present? And this question: should the Africans, the Arabs, and all those in the Third World, while condemning the American aggression on Libya, yet feel themselves obliged to support Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi in all his deeds, always and everywhere?

In the following pages, JEUNE AFRIQUE provides some elements of answer and explanation. We also open a debate.

Reagan's Deputy Poindexter

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 pp 26, 28

[Article by Amir Taheri: "The Man Who Is To Bring Down Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi"]

[Text] He looks like the father of a quiet family, he is the very model of the unpretentious small official always ready to help children in the crosswalk. Yet, Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter is obviously the man who President Ronald Reagan has chosen to bring down the "guide" of Libya, Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi.

Indeed, since December Poindexter has been chairman of the U.S. National

Security Council, a key post formerly occupied by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. However, contrary to his flamboyant predecessors, he avoids the footlights. His friends regard him as the "eminence grise" of the American President. His detractors call him the "invisible man."

Hardly 2 weeks after the American raids against Libya, everyone in Washington has been talking about the "Poindexter doctrine." What "doctrine" can this be? Quite simply, Poindexter believes that terrorism must not be regarded as a simple political-diplomatic problem, but as a new form of war. The logical implication of this analysis is not difficult to imagine.

According to the same analysis, the American military power, nuclear as well as conventional, rules out the unleashing of an open war of the traditional type by the "enemies of democracy," that is, those who oppose Washington's current policy in the world. That is why the latter have invented the "terrorist war," for which the United States is not yet ready.

Poindexter believes, like the Prussian military theorist Clausewitz, that the best defense is to attack first. It is on the basis of this reasoning that he has persuaded Reagan of the necessity to bring down the "countries sponsoring terrorism," one after another. Libya, regarded as the weak link in this "terrorist chain," was chosen as the test case of the "Poindexter doctrine." Other "terrorist countries" (Syria, South Yemen, Iran, Nicaragua, and North Korea) have already been subjected to pressure in various degrees, prior to a more direct confrontation in the future.

Effective the Day of Egyptian Plane Interception

Poindexter demonstrated the effectiveness of his theories in October when he was still only number 2 in the National Security Council by arranging the interception of the Egyptian plane carrying the "hijackers" of the Achille Lauro. The Americans' success in this unprecedented operation at the time added 10 points to Reagan's popularity rating in the polls.

One Reagan adviser revealed: "Poindexter was the architect of this operation, which restored American morale. I watched him work: he controlled everything by phone, while eating his hamburger. Nonchalant, he knew better than anyone else how to stay cool."

With a very military frankness, Poindexter prefers to express himself in short and direct phrases. He caused a lot of surprise in January, only a month after his appointment, when he spoke up during a meeting with Ronald Reagan to say: "Mr President, this is not what you should say about this matter." A White House adviser said: "Reagan immediately realized that Poindexter does not mince his words. And that is the very type of man he respects."

With his round glasses and his almost bald head, Poindexter has no resemblance to Rambo, the 100-percent American hero who has declared war on evil men. Forty-nine years old, he is neither a Gary Cooper nor a Sylvester Stallone. He more resembles Edward G. Robinson, the anti-hero par excellence of the Hollywood movies of the 1940's.

A Poindexter admirer said: "You should not be misled by his glasses. Don't forget that even Superman wore glasses in his daily activity."

Type Not Accustomed To Mincing Words

John M. Poindexter was born on 12 August 1936 in a small town in Indiana, a state in the Midwest. In 1958 he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy. He was first in his class. The same year, he married a childhood friend, Linda. From this union, five sons were born.

Poindexter also studied at the California Institute of Technology, where he received a doctorate in nuclear physics in 1964.

Having always been fascinated by the military aspects of politics, he preferred to work in Washington rather than in distant oceans where the U.S. Navy symbolizes American power. In 1971, he became administrative assistant to the secretary of the Navy, before being appointed commander-in-chief of U.S. naval forces based in the United Kingdom in 1974. He later served in two naval command posts until 1981, the period when he became personal assistant to President Reagan for military affairs and member of the National Security Council. He is thus the only important member of the council to still be there after 6 years.

And since 1981, Poindexter has been witness to a constant struggle for power within Reagan's administration itself. He has witnessed the fall of three of his predecessors, all victims of their unbridled ambitions and personal conflicts with other staff of the President. Poindexter seems determined not to make the same mistakes. He has established very good working relations with Secretary of State George Shultz, chief of the Pentagon, Caspar Weinberger, and, above all, with the all-powerful Donald Regan, Ronald Reagan's right arm in the White House.

Poindexter is not a man for personal conflicts. According to those close to him, he almost never gets angry. "The only thing that shows he is not really happy is when he starts chewing on his pipe," one of his colleagues said.

His critics say that Poindexter does not have the caliber necessary to resist Shultz or Weinberger, to give the President "a third opinion, a third option" on the major problems of the hour. However, thus far everything indicates that the "invisible man" has obtained almost everything he asked for. His was the major influence in persuading Reagan to opt for a military intervention against Libya, despite Weinberger's hesitations.

Al-Qadhdhafi Must Be Eliminated Before End of Year

The latter was not at all convinced that the American war machine could do much in an antiterrorist strategy. The fact that Shultz had maintained from the beginning the idea that it was necessary to hit Al-Qadhdhafi is today cited by Poindexter's critics to support the thesis that the latter is only a creature of the secretary of state. These critics seem to ignore that it was Shultz who converted to Poindexter's views, and not the other way around.

Poindexter knows that he only has a few months to bring down Al-Qadhdhafi. The approach of the senatorial and gubernatorial elections of 1987 and the presidential election of 1988 will have a limiting effect on application of his doctrine. If Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi succeeds in quieting the game for a few months, his chances of saving himself from the American plot to overthrow his regime will be stronger and stronger.

How should we evaluate the performance of the Poindexter team thus far? It certainly wanted to kill Al-Qadhdhafi, in direct violation of the American legislation prohibiting physical elimination of a foreign leader. With the initial euphoria past, it is now completely clear that Al-Qadhdhafi, although shaken, is not in danger of being overthrown. The "guide" of the Jamahiriya even seems determined to continue his almost obsessive campaign against the United States.

If nothing happens between now and the end of this year, Al-Qadhdhafi will have a good chance of staying in power for a long time after the departure of Ronald Reagan from the White House (and Poindexter with him).

Libya is only one example. The outcome of the present crisis will have major importance for the development of U.S. foreign policy during the two very critical years to come. The thesis that a muscular application of U.S. military power can correct the shortcomings of Washington's foreign policy, if actually adopted, could change a lot of things on the international chessboard.

Poindexter is right when he says that the United States, in certain specific cases and in certain regions of vital importance, has no chance of defending its interests by purely diplomatic and political means. However, in the view of many observers, it is in the remedy that he recommends, resort to military force, that he goes wrong.

These observers affirm that a redefinition of U.S. interests would be much more effective as a long-term policy than a fixation on completely untenable situations.

The escalation of enthusiasm in the American policy of combating the "terrorists" had begun with the Achille Lauro affair in October. However, that was a matter of a particular case involving a group of individuals openly linked to a very specific act of terrorism. To go from an operation to prevent a few terrorists from escaping justice to a virtual war intended to bring down a regime is a giant step taken by Reagan on the course laid out by his advisers. And it is already known that other plans are being prepared to destabilize other "hated" regimes. And from there, to imagine that the United States can change the political map of the world...

The logic of the Poindexter doctrine involves war, a "little war" to start with, in order to get rid of a small dictator who is megalomaniac and bothersome. And afterward? The prowess of Superman and Rambo knows no limit...

Role of Shultz

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 p 27

[Article by Hugo Sada: "The Dove Shultz Becomes a Hawk"]

[Text] When George Shultz succeeded Alexander Haig at the State Department, everyone thought that Ronald Reagan wanted at the head of American diplomacy a man who was less hasty, less imperious, and capable of defending American interests with more flexibility.

Haig was distinguished by his aggressiveness in his determination to impose, using all means, a new American supremacy in face of the Soviet Union, which had profited greatly from detente to increase, in strength, its military influence in the world. By comparison, George Shultz then appeared a calm man. His age, his experience and his frankness, his physique and his calm really did not convey a hawk image. At his side within the American government, the hawk was rather Caspar W. Weinberger, the secretary for defense and promoter of the most spectacular "peace-time" military effort by the United States in its history.

Certainly, the functions of each contributed to supporting this impression. It is among the military that one naturally looks for the "go to war" people, while one generally regards the diplomats as more disposed toward compromise.

It was quickly realized that appearances were deceiving. The convictions of George Shultz were far from burdening him with moderation or caution: "The hard reality is that a diplomacy not supported by military force is ineffective," he said at the beginning of 1984. And he added: "Strength and diplomacy are not alternatives. They must go together, or we will not accomplish much in the world." His doctrine was thus formulated without ambiguity. It surprised Americans, still not fully recovered from the Vietnam trauma. It is true that in the meanwhile the brutal invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet troops had helped to bring the United States out of its complexes.

The Shultz doctrine on use of military force in foreign policy was made specific and gained popularity and credibility with the development of terrorism and the proliferation of attacks on American targets. In October 1984, in a speech that received attention, the secretary of state launched a determined call for use against terrorism of a preventive strategy of reprisals and surprise. And in connection with the War Powers Resolution voted by Congress in 1973 relating to Vietnam, and limiting the executive's ability to use force, he explained: "We are going to need to act at the opportune moment. We will not have the time to get back into a national debate after each terrorist attack."

As we can see, the operations by the American forces against Al-Qadhdhafi confirm Shultz' victory. Today no one in the United States disputes his doctrine. It is true that in applying it, the secretary of state chose his

target carefully. He benefits from the incontestable international right to combat terrorism. Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi contributed to the game, thus enabling the Americans to leave aside many other instigators of terrorist operations just as involved as the Libyan leader, but which were less convenient targets.

Paradoxically, Caspar Weinberger Was a "Dove" Instead...

When George Shultz began to urge a more systematic use of military force, paradoxically it was Caspar Weinberger, the secretary of defense and frenziedly trying to increase the military budget, who issued a caution to him. In a speech, Weinberger listed six basic conditions for an armed intervention by the United States outside its borders:

1. The vital interests of the United States must be involved;
2. If the United States decides to commit itself, it must mobilize all the means and resources necessary to win;
3. It is necessary to have precisely defined political and military objectives; we must know why and where we must fight;
4. The scope and goals of the intervention must be constantly reevaluated to confirm their validity; as soon as they are no longer valid, we must stop; if they are still valid, it is necessary to constantly readjust the means to reach the set objectives;
5. It is necessary to have the support of the American people and the Congress; the American forces cannot fight against the people and the Congress while trying to win the war abroad;
6. Commitment of the forces should be carried out as a last resort, after the diplomatic, political and economic solutions have proved ineffective.

These golden rules of intervention defined by Weinberger are the direct result of the lessons of the Vietnam War. They constitute the basic precautions that the American military must take to avoid ever again being trapped in the gears of a foreign adventure that it does not control. The rules are not basically incompatible with the Shultz doctrine.

The Libyan affair has produced a change in the definition of vital interest: Al-Qadhdhafi is certainly not one for the United States, however, terrorism is henceforth a threat to U.S. vital interests. The American intervention also scrupulously respected, at least in form, all of Weinberger's other conditions. And for the future, on the military level, the main lesson to be retained from this post-Vietnam era, one broadly demonstrated by the American deployments in the Gulf of Sidra, is the determination of the United States to provide itself with the means to avoid any further defeat, whatever the adversary.

Details of Raid

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 pp 28-31

[Article by Hamza Kaidi: "The Truth About the Raid"]

[Text] Though the American raid on Tripoli and Benghazi lasted only a few minutes and the operation itself several hours, the disinformation campaign conducted by Washington in regard to this operation has not stopped during 2 weeks. Everything (or almost everything) the American authorities made public about the operation has proved to be inaccurate. Beginning with the map shown on the day of the operation by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger giving the itinerary of the American planes, the number and type of planes used, etc.

According to this document, the USAF planes took off from the British RAF bases of Lakenheath, Mildenhall and Fairford, and that is true. They are alleged to have flown off the coasts of France, Portugal, Spain, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia before reaching their target, Tripoli.

Many observers doubt whether that was the real itinerary. In their view, passage via the Strait of Gibraltar and the length of the Moroccan and Algerian coasts, crammed with civilian and military radar, of an armada of more than 50 planes could not pass undetected. Rabat and Algiers, being linked to Libya, the one by the Oujda Treaty and the other by the Hassi Messaoud Treaty, could have alerted Tripoli and spoiled the surprise, so vital to the success of the operation. In the opinion of these same observers, the American planes must have passed over the French-Spanish border, skirting the length of the Pyrenees, benefiting from the terrain to escape attention of the radars. This solution would have provided two advantages: significantly shortening the route of the planes, and keeping them out of range of Maghrebian radars.

Mr Weinberger's map included other errors deriving from pure and simple disinformation. According to this document, 18 F-111F fighter bombers, three EF-111 electronic jamming planes, and 30 KC-10 and KC-135 tanker planes participated in this operation, which was given the code name "Eldorado Canyon." Later, the Americans themselves admitted that the number of combat planes was wrong. They admitted the participation of 24 F-111F's and five EF-111's.

The British papers revealed that even this latter figure was false. According to the SUNDAY TIMES, 16 other F-111's joined the formation to serve as a reserve force. A high official of the Italian Defense Ministry proposed an almost identical figure: according to him, 44 F-111's were counted in the Libyan area.

However, let us return to the beginning of the operation. Having been planned for several weeks, the decision to launch an attack from the United Kingdom was made on 9 April by President Reagan in person. The American chief executive had difficulty persuading Mrs Thatcher, who in turn had difficulty convincing her ministers, who were very skeptical about the results of the operation. Finally, Americans and British agreed that the USAF planes should only attack specific targets assigned in advance. The F-111's had been

assigned for the task due to their ultrasophisticated equipment enabling very precise bombing by day or night. Civilian losses were to be avoided at all costs. Any plane that did not succeed in correctly acquiring its target was not to drop its lethal cargo but to jettison its bombs over open sea and return to base.

On Monday 14 April, at 1816 hours (London time 1516 GMT), the first KC-10 and KC-135 tanker planes took off from Lakenheath air base for one of the specified locations for in-flight refueling of the squadron. A little before 2000, the first F-111 took to the air from the same field, to be followed by other planes in the following minutes, while 20 other F-111's took off from Upper Hayford. As a security measure, the assigned base identification initials on the planes (UH for Upper Hayford and LH for Lakenheath) were carefully camouflaged, however too many precautions are harmful, because it was this camouflage that enabled British journalists to determine accurately how many planes were used, after their return, of course.

After an initial in-flight refueling to replace the fuel consumed during takeoff (there were to be four altogether), the planes one by one joined the formation assembling at 12,000 meters, the cruising altitude of the squadron, which was to fly at subsonic speed. Radio silence was imposed on the entire formation to avoid prying monitoring. At one point during the refueling operations, communication was carried out by the position signal lights. Over the Mediterranean, and not far from Tripoli, the planes left the civilian corridor, Upper Blue 21, used up to that point, and dived to an altitude of barely 200 meters to avoid the Libyan radar beams.

Shortly before 0200 hours (local time)(midnight GMT), they were in sight of Tripoli. Two EF-111's separated from the group toward Benghazi, where the Navy planes were waiting. Their task was to jam the radars in that area to enable the 26 A-6 and A-7 fighter bombers from the aircraft carriers Coral Sea and America to attack their targets without fear of Libyan antiair missiles.

All this movement was followed attentively by the Italian detection stations. The operators identified not less than 60 echoes on their screens. And since the American planes fly in close formation and it can thus happen that two planes produce only a single echo, they estimated at more than 70 the number of aircraft participating in the operation.

Let us return to the F-111's that we left near Tripoli. A few kilometers from the Libyan capital, five fighter bombers left the group because of mechanical problems. The others gained altitude and approached their targets. A first wave flew over the residence of the British ambassador at precisely 0200. The city was asleep, but it was normally lit, proving that the attack was unexpected and that no precautions had been taken. Four minutes before the attack of the bombers, the EF-111's began to transmit their electronic jamming signals. The guiding radars of the Libyan missiles were neutralized.

The experienced pilots--some 30 of them had been trained for operations deep into the Soviet Union--illuminated their targets with their infrared searchlights and laser beams. Seated beside them, the officers responsible for release watched on a screen the landscape unrolling under the plane. With

a kind of electronic "flea" they marked the target. The laser then fixed on it and did not leave it regardless of the movement of the plane. One-ton bombs were then released, which followed the laser beam, theoretically guiding them as if on a rail. However, things do not always happen that way. In some planes the aimers did not have time to fix on the target. Others released their lethal cargo too early or too late. We know the results today. Theoretically five targets were to have been destroyed (three in Tripoli and two in Benghazi). In fact seven locations were hit, among them civilian targets. The Ben Achour residential quarter, which seemingly was not among the targets assigned on departure, received about 10 bombs. It was seriously damaged. Houses were pulverized, and chancelleries, including the French, suffered considerable damage. A two-story building housing the Libyan intelligence services survived without other damage than a few windows blown out.

The Bab Azizia barracks, the residence of Colonel Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi, received direct hits. The small building containing the family was blown apart. On the other hand, the tent where the Jamahiriya leader likes to meditate was touched only by the falling of a lamp post. It appears that the colonel was not there at the time of the attack. According to reports received by certain diplomats, he was in his crisis command post at Jufrah, 200 km south of Tripoli. The Sidi-Bilal naval base, used for training frogmen, was also hit. Apparently, the same was true for the military part of Tripoli airport, where some 10 Ilyushin transport planes were reportedly destroyed, according to certain reports. Thirteen minutes later the American planes started on their return path.

In Benghazi, the A-6's and A-7's of the Navy attacked the Jamahiriya barracks and the Benina civilian and military airport. The equipment there is mainly antiradar missiles and air-to-ground Maverick missiles, which are fired from several kilometers' range. According to information from diplomatic sources of Eastern countries and from Western commercial circles, 25 Mig's stationed at Benina were destroyed, as well as a Sam 5 missile site.

The final toll of the attack has not yet been established. It appears, however, that this raid, which the White House and State Department portray as one of the most remarkable in history, did not achieve the expected results. Yet it is true that the foulups were less numerous than in the previous American raids in Lebanon. Mr Reagan, who has seen his requests for colossal funds to modernize weapons increasingly opposed, will now be able to argue the "appropriateness" of his decisions. Seen from this viewpoint, operation "Eldorado Canyon" was a great success for the White House, which can also claim that the raid was carried out with minimal losses: a single plane carried as missing, while the rest of the squadron was back in its bases on 15 April at 0800 hours.

Psychological Warfare Tactics

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 p 32

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "When 'Intox' [brain washing] Bombards a City in the United States..."]

[Text] Reagan-Rambo against Al-Qadhdhafi-Dracula: a bad psychological warfare film that nevertheless produces real deaths.

'Intox,' to use a term from psychological warfare, sometimes has side-effects that are as dangerous to the user as to his target. And when one creates personages who border on the unreal or fantastic, one can also become the victim.

Thus, years of propaganda have elevated Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi to the level of a superhero of evil capable of striking everywhere, wherever he wishes, when he wishes, capable of sowing dissension throughout the world. Proof of this is the panic that seized the small American town of Bremerton, where a violent storm was thought by the population to be a Libyan air raid! According to AFP, this happened the day after the American bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi.

This Libyan psychosis in the United States has everywhere taken a both ridiculous and dangerous turn. The town of Bremerton is located some 30 kilometers from a base of nuclear submarines equipped with Trident strategic missiles. The Russians and Chinese now look like choir boys compared to the dangers of Al-Qadhdhafi.

Even before the U.S. bombing, the psychological war had been breaking records. Reports, true or false, emerged from everywhere: Al-Qadhdhafi was trying to buy a nuclear bomb, specifically in China, he wanted to drive the United States out of the United Nations (though its headquarters is located in New York), Libyan threats against all the NATO countries, threats to the military targets in Southern Europe, the moving of foreigners in Libya to military bases so they would become targets of any American bombing, and Libyan efforts to deal over the European hostages detained in Libya, etc.

All the necessary conditions were thus created to justify the Reagan-Rambo bombing against Al-Qadhdhafi- Dracula.

A surprise attack on a moonless night. The accuracy of the bombing, thanks to infrared, killed hundreds of people, including children, women and old people. And thus the Americans continue to help make Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi "the miraculously saved of the legendary barracks." Everything around him was destroyed, pulverized under the bombs, without Al-Qadhdhafi having received a single scratch, as several visitors have witnessed.

And the psychological war resumed even stronger during the day of 16 April with rumors that circulated almost everywhere and particularly in Washington, information given credence by the White House, the Congress, the State Department or the secretary of defense. There was talk that day about a coup in Libya, a revolt by the military against Al-Qadhdhafi rule, a confrontation between the regular army and revolutionary committees. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi had been caught between two fires, and the population had deserted Tripoli to seek refuge elsewhere. Al-Qadhdhafi, wounded, had gone for treatment in Damascus, Algiers or Aden... There was also talk of riots, of a country that had fallen into chaos, etc.

Al-Qadhdhafi, a past master in the art of cultivating his image, let the talk continue, then appeared, as if by miracle, on television on the night of 16 to 17 April. The capital, Tripoli, also victim to these wild rumors, was immediately transformed into a city dancing with joy in honor of the "guide saved by a miracle."

In the course of this unhealthy joy, the deaths and tragedies of the preceding days and nights were forgotten... Since Reagan and Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi both like to make films, it would be interesting to get them together in a film that could be called: "Stronger than me, you die."

[Boxed item by Abdelaziz Dahmani "Diplomatic Contradictions": Though international opinion, and not only in the Third World, moved slowly but favorably for Libya, Libyan diplomacy did not really rise to the challenge of the circumstance in the days following the attack. It was, in fact, a diplomacy with several voices, not agreeing. Each Libyan leader gave his own analysis and interpretation.

This diplomatic confusion can be explained by the respite for a few days by Al-Qadhdhafi himself after the bombing. This gave rise to a number of contradictory statements. Ahmed Chahati, Libyan deputy foreign affairs minister, made two stops in Athens. The first, in the evening of Thursday 17 April enabled him to state that the Libyan leaders desired a peaceful settlement. This being the case, he hoped for mediation by the EEC. When he left on Friday, his plane, after several hours, again requested to land at Athens, following an "outside interference." Had an attempt been made to divert it? The Libyan leader was seeking to protest to a group of newsmen when his press session was stopped for security reasons. He nevertheless affirmed that he had not asked for any mediation. While the new foreign liaison minister, Mansour, gave a very tough speech to the nonaligned conference in New Delhi that seemed to favor extreme solutions, his predecessor, Libya's new ambassador to the United Nations, used very different language. He hoped in particular for a dialogue between his country and the United States, without precondition. He even added that Libya is ready to cooperate with the United States in the United Nations to combat terrorism, after, it is true, agreement on the definition of terrorism.]

Other World Reaction

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 pp 33,34,36

[Article by Jean-Paul Guetny: "From ex-President Giscard d'Estaing, who approves, to Thomas Sankara, who is indignant at the weakness of the revolutionaries, the following are those who condemn, those who are keeping quiet..."]

[Text] As a whole, one cannot say that the American raid on Libya (14-15 April) raised intense emotion around the world. Nothing comparable to that produced by the massacre in the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila (16-18 September 1982), or the machine-gunning by a Soviet fighter of a South Korean Boeing (31 August-1 September 1983).

In the category of those who supported Reagan, only Israel chose to sound its bugle. Its prime minister, Shimon Peres, gave his full support to Washington, concluding that the United States was in a position of "legitimate defense."

In the opposing camp, much more crowded, there were not many pattern responses--strong condemnation of the United States, quick support for Libya. In Moscow, the official TASS agency, which--a very rare occurrence--had announced the raid with a special flash, compared the operation to the American actions in Vietnam, Nicaragua and Grenada. Mikhail Gorbachev expressed to Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi "the sentiments of solidarity of the Soviet leadership and people," and the "firm intention" of the USSR to "fulfill its commitments to strengthen Libya's defense means." It would have been hard to do less. Other allies of Moscow issued condemnations without nuance or reservation: Cuba; Nicaragua, where the report of the raid caused fears of an upcoming American intervention; and Syria, the first Arab country to react.


In the same camp, one still finds Iran, whose side Libya has taken in the Gulf war; the PLO and the Palestinian organizations, which have called for breaking off diplomatic and economic relations with Washington, and several African countries: Ethiopia, Benin, Madagascar, Ghana and Burkina, whose delegate to the United Nations, Antonin Ouedraogo, has supported a Libyan request for a Security Council meeting and recommended "preventive actions" to forestall a new raid.

In a lower tone, but still clear in condemnation, were Algeria, which called for an urgent special Arab summit meeting to study the consequences of the American "aggression"; the Congo, as well as a number of countries regarded broadly as "moderates": Nigeria, Sudan, Djibouti, Qatar and Kuwait. The Moroccan position is more interesting because that country, a friend of the United States, has been linked to Libya since 1984 by a treaty of union. King Hassan II expressed his "full solidarity" with Colonel Al-Qadhafi. He sent a ministerial delegation to Tripoli, and reaffirmed, to the council of Arab justice ministers meeting in Casablanca, his support for the Libyan leader, victim of "illegality."

In an even lower tone were the countries giving rather mild condemnation, though even here one must note degrees. Among these were the majority of the West European states and some Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan). To which should be added Peru in South America, India and China in Asia, and in Africa, Senegal and Mali, which issued a joint communique on the raid.

While the OAU "energetically" condemned the American raid and saw in it proof of "(Washington's) arrogance and contempt for international law," OPEC did not raise even its little finger. With a Libyan proposal before it (supported by Teheran) for an embargo on deliveries of crude oil to the United States, it did not follow up. The Ecuadoran delegate noted that Libya's oil installations had not been hit. The Kuwaiti delegate said the decision was the responsibility of the foreign ministers (Nigeria took the same position), and Qatar called for arbitration by the Arab League. Eight days after the bombing of Benghazi and Tripoli, the decision to call a special Arab summit had not yet been taken.

[Cartoon] Let the Qadhdhafi guy attack us. Our defenses are formidable.



OPEC Didn't Raise Its Little Finger for Libya

In New Delhi, while condemning international terrorism, the ministerial conference of the nonaligned countries on 20 April deplored "the development of the situation in the Mediterranean, due to the repeated aggressions by the United States and the provocations against Libya that seriously threaten peace and stability in the region and the entire world."

At the proposal of the Socialist group, though with great difficulty (148

votes in favor, 144 against and 3 abstentions), the European Parliament condemned the American operation. In the United States, the Congress as a whole approved the raid decided on by the Reagan administration, even though Robert Byrd, the Democratic minority leader in the Senate, expressed some doubt about stopping the terrorism that could ensue. In Egypt, the three parliamentary committees condemned the operation, recalling that the Egyptian people "reject resort to force" to settle the differences among states.

Often, the oppositions were more incisive than the governments. This was true for Egypt. In France, the situation was almost the opposite: the Socialists, particularly through the voice of Roland Dumas, the former minister of foreign affairs, expressed their "satisfaction" at the government's action, while the majority leaders such as Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Jean Lecanuet (see boxed item) proclaimed their support for the American raid.

Among religious figures, while Desmond Tutu, the Anglican bishop of Cape Town, termed the bombing "dreadful news, a horrifying and shameful event," Pope John-Paul II showed great caution, confining himself to expressing his "anguish," and his "active concern about the situation created in the Mediterranean." Even "moderation" on the part of Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN secretary general, who "deplored" at the same time the American action and the Libyan reprisal operation against military installations on the Italian island of Lampedusa.

Oppositions Were More Active than Governments

Various demonstrations, from Hamburg to Cotonou, from London to Sargodha in Pakistan, showed that the Tripoli and Benghazi bombings had far from created a unanimity in public opinion. In the United States, a poll on behalf of THE NEW YORK TIMES carried out on 15 April showed that 77 percent of Americans approved of the raid, with 14 percent giving a negative opinion. However, the French approved by a majority (55 percent) the government decision to refuse permission to the American planes to fly over the national territory.

For having "aided" Reagan, Margaret Thatcher received a clear rejection by British public opinion. According to a 16 April poll by the Louis Harris Institute, she received a favorable opinion of only 28 percent; 68 percent of British people disapproved of her "cooperation" with the Americans.

EEC Countries' Reaction

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 p 34

[Article by Jean-Paul Guetny: "European Cacaphony in Luxembourg"]

[Text] In face of the American raid on Libya, the Europe of the Twelve emitted a real cacaphony. The United Kingdom had authorized the Americans to use 18 of their F-111's based on its soil to bomb Tripoli and Benghazi. The FRG approved of the operation. The other countries demonstrated their disagreement, some in a more nuanced way (Belgium), others more clearly (Greece). What could be done to "reattach the fragments" and demonstrate in the eyes of the world that European unity is not an empty word? By taking

measures against "Libyan terrorism." And that is what the foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg did, after four-and-a-half hours of discussion.

The issue was heated and the consensus took long to emerge between a United Kingdom favoring a firm attitude; Belgium, Germany (without counting the southern countries of Europe) reluctant to brandish the economic weapon; France not very happy hearing talk about coordination among secret services; and Greece concerned to preserve its good relations with Tripoli.

In the end, four diplomatic sanctions were kept, with application left to the discretion of the national governments:

--Significant reduction in the number of Libyan representatives in the EEC countries, and reciprocally;

--Prohibition on Jamahiriya diplomats living in the Community to leave the capitals or consular towns without authorization;

--Review of the number of Libyan citizens who are not diplomats in the trade offices, airline companies, and press organs;

--Expulsion of Libyans suspected of terrorism, and prohibition of stay in the Community countries.

Portrait of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 pp 34-35

[Text] The former Austrian chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, is regarded as a friend of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi. Our French colleague, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, asked him to give an assessment of the "guide" of the Libyan revolution and of terrorism, which Al-Qadhdhafi is accused of instigating. This is his portrait of the Libyan leader.

Our relations are ambivalent, answered Bruno Kreisky. He is an Arab revolutionnaire. I, myself, am a reformist European. There are more things separating us than bringing us together. However, I try to understand and to maintain a kind of dialogue. That is the only useful approach in the current circumstances. Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi does not want to distance himself from the terrorists, because he is a revolutionary. Imagine a Robespierre rejecting the Terror? Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi is the Robespierre of the Arab revolution. This has not yet been understood in the West. He only rules over 2 million Libyans, however he has for himself the tens of millions of Muslims in the Near East and Africa. The Gulf leaders hate him. However, they do not do anything against him, because they know that they would have their own people against them.

When Kreisky was asked how the Western countries should protect themselves from terrorism, he answered:

Certainly not by the Reagan method, which consists in bringing war everywhere. The military actions in the Gulf of Sidra were excessive. I have seen

Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi. I know that he wanted to talk. And Reagan refused.

We cannot stop the course of the revolution inspired by Al-Qadhdhafi and impose our own patterns on the Arab countries. The response to terrorism is first of all political. For there is no miracle solution. Killing 44 people in a plane, as Mubarak did, to show the terrorists that one refuses to yield, is absurd. For the terrorists had committed their lives anyway, and the 40 others wanted to live.

It is true that resort to terrorism against the European countries, even in the name of the Arab revolution, is unacceptable. And I said that to Al-Qadhdhafi very clearly. Nor can one recognize it as a war in the sense of the international agreements, as the terrorists claim. We must protect ourselves using the means of the police, by being vigilant, but also by basing our response on reason, while accepting discussion, and yet more discussion. If Europe had had the courage to play a positive role in the process of peace in the Near East, instead of always submitting to the bidding of the Israelis and the Americans, things would have developed differently.

French Point of View

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 p 35

["Excerpt" from L'EXPANSION]

[Text] We know that terrorism has become war in another form. The American bombing of Tripoli confirmed this in a spectacular and dramatic way.

We will know later--or perhaps never--whether Reagan has used a good method against a state terrorism that is not limited to Al-Qadhdhafi in the world. Our public opinion and governments would have preferred a more discreet action: Ah! If only suicide commandoes, masked, had been sent into Al-Qadhdhafi's tent, dying with him in the strictest anonymity, what a relief! Yet here are the democracies striking with face uncovered under the suspicious, uneasy, relieved eye of their public opinion.

Westerners, who hardly practice morality at the individual level any longer, still need it at the collective level. Perhaps they even demand more of their states than they require of themselves. Take the case of France: we pretend to want to reconcile with the Iranians (in order to get back our hostages in Lebanon) while at the same time supplying arms in abundance to Iraq. Our bombs have killed more Iranians than Reagan has killed Libyans. However, to save appearances, we have them dropped by other people. Perhaps we are right to operate this way. There is no doubt that the Teheran regime is a real threat to peace, located as it is near the largest oil reserve.

We thereby attest to our own hypocrisy. In wars where we are committed without saying so and almost without wanting to be, the greatest danger is to identify the leaders with the regimes, the regimes with the peoples, the peoples with the religions. It is not because Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi is a megalomaniac that the Arabs are all dangerous. It is not because Iran and Libya claim to act in the name of the Prophet (how many times in our history

have we perverted Christianity in politics...) that Islam incarnates Satan.

Since morality is pervading us, let us not divest it of a degree of discipline of intelligence. Since our will is sick, let us not add to it dimness of spirit.

Viewpoint of Giscard d'Estaing

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 p 35

[Text] Valery Giscard d'Estaing has been the only major political leader in France to unreservedly approve "the American action in Libya, justified by repeated acts of aggression against the people of the Western democratic countries." In such circumstances, "the West must above all give proof of solidarity," the former president of the Republic emphasized on 16 April in a communique that served as a second free warning to the new French government. The first had been delivered on the rostrum of the Assembly, when he warned Jacques Chirac that he would be the guarantee for carrying out the joint platform of the right.

He reminded that in the operation against Tripoli and Benghazi, France could have demonstrated at least the solidarity shown by the United States in 1978 by providing the transport for French paratroops dropped over Kolwezi in Zaire, "in analagous circumstances."

To avoid spreading distress among the majority, Valery Giscard d'Estaing deliberately abstained from condemning the government's refusal to grant permission to the American planes taking off from the United Kingdom to fly over French territory (which would have shortened their route by half). However, the warning is no less clear. His motivation is on several levels.

First, though he denies it, Valery Giscard d'Estaing wanted by this communique to register the fact that the UDF [French Democratic Union] did not intend to "do the dirty work" for Jacques Chirac, ready to couch all his initiatives in the framework of a "cohabitation" with Francois Mitterrand that would threaten to turn into "comanagement," as Jean Lecanuet, its president, put it. The UDF feels it was given a bad deal by the RPR [Rally for the Republic] in respect to the composition of the government, whose outstanding personalities are Chirac people; and feels threatened by the return to majority vote, which will cause it to lose some 30 seats in the coming elections, within 2 years at the latest. It feels the need to affirm its identity by distinguishing itself from its partner on the level of implementing a genuinely liberal policy, suspecting that the RPR is lukewarm toward this--as has been well demonstrated by the criticisms of its leaders in the controversy with the Presidency over the decrees.

To this tactical political motivation are added some more personal reasons. On the one hand, the former president of the Republic has not accepted at all willingly his exclusion from the new government. He would have liked a major ministry, Finance and National Recovery, which Jacques Chirac did not want to give him; or External Relations--which Francois Mitterrand categorically vetoed. He was offered Justice, which he refused as not worthy of him. The

National Assembly "perch," which appeared attractive to him, had been promised to Jacques Chaban-Delmas. While, contrary to his attitude toward Parliament, where he is again seated after 10 years, he may not have been too clever in this matter, it should be said that the new head of the government has also lacked refinement in dealing with him. Little inclined to forget wounds, particularly those to his self-esteem, Valery Giscard d'Estaing has developed a degree of bitterness toward him. Along with Raymond Barre, he is waiting for Jacques Chirac in the next round, when the real difficulties in the present "dual command" emerge.

Finally, another reason, Valery Giscard d'Estaing's continuing resentment against Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi since the Libyan intervention in Chad in 1980 and the fall of N'Djamena, which affected the credibility of his African policy and was resented by the French military as a virtual insult. The ebullient colonel had paid no attention to the warnings that had been addressed to him (without naming him specifically). "Leave me my Muslims, I will leave you your blacks," he reportedly said at the time for the benefit of the French president, who was then proposing a division of Chad.

In the view of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Al-Qadhdhafi is a disturber of international order, and Libya a hotbed for terrorist agitation. The Western democracies should have reacted vigorously to the threat that it poses by coordinating more fully. There is no doubt that by taking such a clear position in favor of the strong American approach, Valery Giscard d'Estaing sought to erase the memory of weakness and lack of solidarity with his allies of which he was accused, in France and abroad, when in March 1980 he went to meet Leonid Brezhnev in Warsaw.

Contrasting Arab Attitudes —

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 p 36

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Cautious Support from the Arab Side"]

[Text] In protest against the American raids on Tripoli and Benghazi, anti-American and anti-British demonstrations were quite widespread around the world, specifically in Peking, East Berlin, Madrid, Vienna, Athens, New Delhi, Pakistan, and even in London or New York. There were demonstrations also in two of the 20 Arab capitals: Khartoum and Tunis.

Elsewhere, in the other Arab countries, demonstrations were discouraged, often by force. There were prohibitions on going into the streets or approaching the American or British embassies.

On the other hand, free rein was given to the torrents of words and slogans denouncing "imperialism and the state terrorism of the Americans."

In the Gulf, Choice of a Low Profile

A majority of the Arab governments retreated into a strange silence, caught among various feelings and contradictions. On the one hand, the reactions of disapproving of these bombings are real, legitimate. However, they do not

necessarily mesh with the interests of these Arab states, of which a good number are pro-American.

It was thus that all the Gulf countries opted for a "low profile," leaving it to the Arab League to protest on behalf of the whole membership of 21 member states. Indeed, one could no less than the nonaligned states, which denounced the American state terrorism during a ministerial meeting in New Delhi of their coordination bureau.

However, a few initiatives were taken, such as, for example, the call--by Algerian proposal--for a special Arab summit conference. However, while some countries agreed, Iraq vetoed it. Bombs? It is bombed every day but neither has it enjoyed a total solidarity of the entire Arab world, too divided by its problems, contradictions and alliances. Iraq even accuses Libya of being one the arms suppliers to its Iranian enemy.

And what did the Arab World do when Tunis was the target of the Israeli bombs, a few months ago? People were angry, they condemned, but then nothing more. Does that give the Tunisian Government the right to remain silent and leave the field open to all the opposition parties?

Instead, in Algiers there was regret that the region has not achieved "the Maghreb of the peoples," which implies the fall of Hassan II and emergence of a Saharan state recognized by all the region's countries.

Yet Moroccans Were First To Arrive in Tripoli

Thus, each paid attention to his objectives, and the special OPEC conference meeting in Geneva failed again because of the conflicts of positions of its members, mainly Arabs. The price of oil remains low, it has even dropped slightly due to the differences and dissensions among Gulf countries and other "progressives."

Nevertheless, an Arab delegation visited Tripoli the day after the American raid. This first was the privilege of a Moroccan delegation led by Ahmed Osman, the president of the Parliament, and Ezzedine Laraki, deputy prime minister. The delegation brought a message from King Hassan II, Al-Qadhdhafi's ally in the framework of the Arab-African Union.

But you should realize something: Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi appeared on television, in the evening of 17 April, with behind him a map of the Arab World and Africa showing a Saharan state within the outline of the former Western Sahara.

Unity of the Arab World will not happen tomorrow.

Reaction in Chad

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 p 37

[Article by Marc Yared: "Explosion of Joy in N'Djamena"]

[Text] "The United States gave a good lesson to Al-Qadhdhafi, that expansionist dictator who constantly treads on the sovereignty of his neighbors." Gouara Lassou, chief of Chadian diplomacy, does not mince his words. His country is the only one on the black continent to have loudly approved, with enthusiasm, the 15 April American raid on Libya. The fact is that of all the African capitals N'Djamena is the one with the most reasons to be happy over Reagan's "success" in his arm wrestling with Al-Qadhdhafi. One can talk at length about the hostility of President Habre toward the Jamahiriya, which in 1973 "annexed" the Aouzou Strip and which has been "occupying" since 1983 one-third of Chad, north of the 16th parallel. It is also useful to recall that throughout his "sojourn in the desert," from March 1980 to June 1982, the United States discreetly but effectively supported Hissein Habre--particularly through Sudan--while France turned a deaf ear. Habre is thus now only "giving tit for tat."

However, the explosion of joy that today greeted the American raid on Libya was not only a heartfelt cry and showing of gratitude. For President Habre, the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi has immediate and considerable positive repercussions, in Chad itself. The 3,000 Libyan soldiers encamped without enthusiasm in northern Chad, preventing Habre's "liberation" of his native town of Faya-Largeau, have had bad morale since 15 April. A relative of Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, Col Abd el Hafid Messaoud, who coordinates from the Libyan Sebha oasis the activities of the expeditionary force in Chad, reportedly left precipitously by plane for Tripoli on hearing of the American attack. From now on, one thing is sure: having to face on its Mediterranean side a formidable American air-naval armada, and incapable of maintaining combat on two fronts more than 1,000 kilometers apart, the Jamahiriya is on the defensive in Chad. It is no longer a matter of supporting, as in February, audacious incursions south of the 16th parallel. Moreover, the Saharan "legionaries" recruited by Tripoli to replace the serious losses by its Chadian allies will not be operational for some time.

Most Activists Want To Cross 16th Parallel

Suddenly, Al-Qadhdhafi's man in Chad, former president Goukouni Oueddei, who depends entirely on Libyan support, finds himself an orphan again. Having suffered in February and March a series of defeats in the field, at Kouba Olanga, Ziguey, Kalait, Oum Chalouba and Chicha, Goukouni must bitterly regret not having gone to Loubomo in the Congo at the end of March to negotiate his reconciliation with Habre. Now prompted by the Libyans to be cautious, Goukouni appears caught in a triple impasse, diplomatic, political and military. Abdou Diouf, head of the Senegalese state and president of the OAU, but also an increasing number of African leaders including the very "progressive" Congolese number one, Sassou Nguesso, were not at all happy about the failure of the Loubomo rendez-vous. Since then, all have clearly increased their distance from the leader of the Chadian opposition. "Discouraged," Goukouni's representative in Brazzaville has disassociated himself from his leader. He may join President Habre, as have done before him the Chad Democratic Front, the Revolutionary Democratic Council (CAC-CDR), and the red Codos of Colonel Kotiga. In N'Djamena, a wild hope still persists among the most activist members of the head of state's staff: the "providential" American raid on Libya may perhaps provide a unique opportunity

to "liberate" all of northern Chad once and for all. Has not the moment come for the FANT (Chadian National Armed Forces) to launch a general offensive beyond the 16th parallel, in the direction of Fay-Largeau and Fada?

However, Chirac Hesitates To Launch His Own Planes Against Libyans

Habre's troops would not have a lot of trouble finishing off the Goukouni forces. Under the best of hypotheses, the Libyan soldiers themselves, demoralized, would draw back. The only unknown factor: the reaction of the Westerners. Would the United States and France permit the Libyan air force to halt and then decimate the FANT? Some in Hissein Habre's entourage believe that the Reagan administration would be delighted to see Libya "caught in a sandwich." There is no doubt that the United States, in case of intervention by Al-Qadhdhafi's air force in Chad, would hasten to provide advanced weapons, or even experts, to N'Djamena. Especially since Washington is concerned about the proliferation of anti-Western attacks in two neighboring countries of Chad: Sudan and Central Africa.

However, it is the attitude of France that will be decisive. Paris, which has maintained 1,000 soldiers in Chad since February as part of operation "Epervier," had already been embarrassed on 17 March by the attack launched by the Chadian army on Chicha. Since the Chirac government came into power, it has expressed assurance that "France will continue operation 'Epervier' and will not leave Chad except at request of the legitimate government." However, Paris hesitates to go into action directly against the Libyan army. In the eyes of Africa and the Arab World, France appears to be participating in Ronald Reagan's crusade.

Aftermath in Tripoli

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 pp 38-41

[Article by Mohamed Selhami: "In Tripoli after the Fire From Heaven"]

[Text] Tuesday 22 April: Tripoli has resumed its usual routine. On the major arteries the traffic is heavy, the stores have reopened their doors, and the din is heard again from the alleys. The administration has resumed, at a rather slow pace it is true, but for a long time the Libyan and work have been one. The children are back on the road to school. Certainly, faces are still having difficulty smiling. The thing is that it is difficult to erase in the space of a week a wound that afflicted the population to the very depth. The raids of 15 April inflicted enough victims and damage so that the scars, both material and moral, will remain painful for a long time.

The precise number of deaths will never be known: according to the officials, 37, around a hundred according to witnesses.

People are coming from all areas to gather before these sacred graves. In silence, prayers are said, and out loud people curse Ronald Reagan, whom the people's committees have nicknamed since the attack, "executioner of children." In this connection, it is not known where Al-Qadhdhafi's adopted daughter Hanna, killed by American bombs, is buried. She was 15 months old.

Tripoli is still mourning its dead, but the leader is certainly alive. This helps many to struggle against fatalism. Certainly, people wonder what will happen to the Jamahiriya, this country that has long been considered inviolable and invincible. However, people prefer not to think too much about this, even though deep inside, Libyans are convinced that things will change quite quickly. In what direction and how? Only God knows. For the moment, Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi has the situation in hand. And the revolutionary committees are keeping watch. The American "surprise raid" was not really a surprise. It was not known when and where the United States would strike at Libya, but it was expected. In order to better understand the stimulation that has prevailed in Tripoli, let us trace the thread of the events 4 days before the aggression.

Friday 11 April: Information of an imminent attack by the American reached Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, who through his news agency JANA threatened to bomb towns in Southern Europe if his country was the target of a new aggression. The events in the Gulf of Sidra had occurred hardly a month before. In the morning, the colonel received Cherif Messaadia, sent by President Chadli Bendjedid to reaffirm Algeria's support for Libya. Perhaps the Algerian emissary had been alerted to the imminence of an American attack. In the afternoon, Al-Qadhdhafi convened the army staff in its headquarters at Bab Azizia barracks. An important decision was taken: to clear the air bases of their planes and tanker trucks and put them in a safe place, far away in the Fezzan, specifically at Sebha, where the commander of the military area, Col Abdelhafid Messaoud, is a cousin of Al-Qadhdhafi. The latter obviously did not want to directly oppose the United States, in the interest of preserving his air force.

Saturday, 12 April: The Arab ambassadors accredited to Tripoli were called to the Secretariat (ministry) of Foreign Liaison. They were received by Ahmed Chehati, fulfilling the functions of minister. The portfolio holder, Assad al Mansour, then in Teheran, was to fly on to New Delhi to participate in the meeting of foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries. Ahmed Chehati briefed the Arab ambassadors on Ronald Reagan's intentions. He did not go into detail, but nevertheless requested the support of his "brothers." He asked them to support Malta, which had requested a UN Security Council meeting.

Shaykh Ali Msallam, bearer of a message from Saudi Arabian King Fahd arrived in the Libyan capital. He met with Maj Lakhouldi Lahmidi, who, after reading the message, called Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah Ibn Abdelaziz on the telephone. Riyadh wanted to reassure the Libyan leaders: U.S. Vice President George Bush, who had just passed through Saudi Arabia and had been received by the king, was instead advocating negotiation. Indeed...

At any rate, it was another bell tone that Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi received from Moscow: watch out! The Kremlin solemnly announced its military support to Libya.

Sunday, 13 April: A new threat made by Al-Qadhdhafi, this time against the European NATO bases. He again called on the Arabs to help him stand up to the American giant. They did not react. In desperation, the Jamahiriya leader

announced that foreigners would henceforth sleep at their place of work; this was above all to apply to the oil technicians. In effect, this was flight in advance. However, the Libyan media continued to boast of the defensive capability of the Jamahiriya and retold at length the epic of the Sidra events, interspersed with excerpts from the leader's speeches.

Monday, 14 April: Life in Tripoli was absolutely normal. In the morning, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi received Georges Haoui and Georges Batal, both Lebanese Communist Party leaders, as well as a delegation of the Palestinian Popular Front composed of Teyssir Kobaa and Abu Maher Yamani, the principal colleagues of Georges Habash. He also received the Libyan delegation led by Omar Handi, an Arab Congress official, returning from Khartoum where he had witnessed the announcement of the Sudanese legislative election results.

Al-Qadhdhafi Sent Telegram to Malta and Went To Sleep

Before returning to his quarters at Bab Azizia, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi addressed a telegram of thanks to the government of Malta for its request for a Security Council meeting.

The leader was under careful guard. About 100 soldiers, or even more, were posted around and inside the barracks. It was a little after midnight when the television ended its programs with a news brief devoted mainly to the leader's activities.

Tuesday, 15 April, 2 a.m. A fateful moment. A roar of jet engines split the air, followed by explosions at several locations in the city. Buildings collapsed, cries rang out, voices raised: "Allah Akhbar" (God is the greatest) enunciated by the adults. "Mother, father," the terrorized children screamed. About 15 minutes of carnage. Tripoli was plunged into total darkness. People came out into the streets. Some stretched prostrate right on the sidewalk, others jumped into their cars and set off, headlights on, at full speed toward the exits of the city. From time to time one heard the clash of metal: inevitable accidents in this darkness, and almost as lethal as the projectiles that had fallen from the sky.

A precarious calm was established, which was to last 3 hours. The dead were quickly collected: sometimes an arm, a leg, a head detached from the body. Women wept and tore their cheeks with their nails in accordance with the Maghreb custom. There were wounded by the scores. How to count them? Some were buried in the rubble. Ben Achour quarter in the center of Tripoli was the most damaged.

A little further east of the city, the planes had aimed at a major target: Bab Azizia barracks, the headquarters and residence of the leader. The two-story building containing Al-Qadhdhafi's offices was completely leveled. The apartments of his family were half-collapsed. It was there that little Hanna was killed and two of her brothers, Seif el Islam, 4, and Kalife, 3, were wounded. Five hundred meters further is the tent where Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi sometimes spends the night. Particularly when he finishes working late. A tent and net with a bed, desk, bookcase, and a television set connected to a videotape recorder. A videotape in Arabic was still in place; it was titled

"The Latest Events in South Yemen." Nearby, on a small table, could be seen books also published in Arabic, of which one was devoted to the Vietnamese revolution.

Not content with their first raid, the American planes made a second approach. It was about 0500 hours. Bab Azizia barracks was again a target, and further away, the military airport and the Naval School. The latter two targets suffered serious damage. In the Naval School alone, 10 dead were counted, all adolescents.

Beginning at 0600 hours, ambulances began carrying the wounded to the major hospitals in the capital.

Sun Rose on the Apocalypse; It Was Carnage

At 0700 hours, the sun was already up. Tripoli gave the impression of having experienced the apocalypse. The streets were deserted, the doors of houses shut; here and there were burned cars; charred trees. Many Libyans had gone to seek refuge in their country houses, far from the carnage. The diplomats and their families had taken refuge in their embassies. Some tried, not without difficulty, to telephone or telex to their government to inform it about the situation. One question was repeated in all the messages they received: Is Al-Qadhdhafi alive or dead?

The leader was certainly alive. The proof? He had been in contact with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad. However, the Libyans were not to see Al-Qadhdhafi on this Tuesday, 15 April, they did not hear his voice. Tripoli was prey to a terror that was to grow toward 2100 hours, when the firing of anti-aircraft missiles at an American plane was heard--a spy plane, it was said. The radio, which was broadcasting patriotic songs, announced the destruction of three enemy fighter planes.

Wednesday, 16 April: The Libyans did not close their eyes that night. At about 0100 hours, the air defense thundered. But no American planes in the sky. Was it a desire to keep the population on the alert, or simply an excess of zeal by the air defense specialists? This time, the revolutionary committees armed with automatic weapons spread out in groups of four on all the major thoroughfares of the city. A few official vehicles were traveling at high speed with their lights painted blue to reduce the light. This day was particularly busy because of the coup rumor that originated from a British newsman. Like all his colleagues in Tripoli, he had heard the sound of light arms fire from the Bab Azizia quarter. The news was taken even more seriously because Al-Qadhdhafi, who was to have held a press conference, had still not showed any sign of life. Speculation about his fate quickly spread around the world. The denial broadcast by JANA was not fully convincing. However, the leader of the Jamahariya was well and truly alive. At the end of the afternoon, he received a Moroccan delegation sent by Hassan II. It included Ahmed Osman, the president of Parliament, Deputy Prime Minister Azzeddine Laraki, and Minister of Health Tayeb Bencheikh. Accompanied by their charge d'affaires in Tripoli, Abdelaziz Bennis, and by the Libyan representative of the AAU (Arab-African Union) in Rabat, Belgassem Zoui, the three Moroccan emissaries were received in the bunker of Bab Azizia barracks.

Mu'ammarr al-Qadhhdhafi was relaxed, and he showed no injury, either on head or arms. The reports by Abdelaziz Bennis reassured the Libyans and disconcerted those who had taken him for dead or seriously injured.

"Guide" Spoke on TV, But Not Railing Against Reagan

Then, Colonel Al-Qadhhdhafi appeared in flesh and blood on the little television screen. He was wearing an immaculate white uniform decorated with medals, and his face was strained. However, his statements during the half hour were moderate. First, he called on the people to pull themselves together and--why not?--to sing and dance; on the radio, to stop broadcasting patriotic songs; and on the revolutionary committees to lift the security measures. Then he reassured the southern Europeans: their towns would not be bombed. Finally, he announced that he had never given an order to kill innocent human beings. One caution, however: Ronald Reagan should not amuse himself any more by attacking Libya. With the speech over, the fear subsided in Tripoli. The public streetlights came on, cars reappeared, and people began to return to their homes. They thought about this phrase of Mu'ammarr al-Qadhhdhafi in his speech: "I accept the fate God has in store for me. He is more powerful than America."

Thursday, 17 April: The first sign of relaxation, the radio broadcast at 0900 hours a program devoted to the family; advice to mothers on education of their children; and from time to time, love songs. One would think one was listening to Radio Cairo. In the streets, there were pedestrians, and also children playing under the eye of their parents. The patrols of the revolutionary committees were less frequent. For the first time, soldiers appeared. Some were directing traffic. At the various entrances to the city, barricades were set up. The airport remained closed to traffic and was strongly guarded, as was the telecommunications center, as well as the intelligence services headquarters and Baba Azizia barracks. However, the latter was visited by diplomats and newsmen.

At 1800 hours, the television resumed its usual programs, interspersed with reports on the damage caused by the American raids. The latter continued to obsess the Libyans. As on the previous evening, at 2100 hours the air defense began to thunder. Later, however, the night became quiet. The diplomats were already telling their governments of the progressive return to normal. One question worried them, however: "What credence should be given to the accusation, launched by Libya against Tunisia, of having permitted the American bombers to fly through its airspace?" It is true that the Libyans do not hide their dislike of the Tunisian Government, which, according to them, has declined to address its condolences to Mu'ammarr al-Qadhhdhafi. However, it is known that popular demonstrations took place in Tunis. That was some consolation...

Friday, 18 April: Holy day in the Muslim world. The Libyans buried their dead while reciting Koran verses. The Sidi Mender and El Hani cemeteries were crowded with people. Maj Lakhouldi Lahmidi, in uniform, gave a speech that was as moderate as that of his leader. Certainly, he condemned Ronald Reagan, but without "exaggeration," one could say. His appearance in public, along with that of Maj Abdessalam Jallud, who gave a press conference in the

evening, had a significance: the "free officers" were behind Al-Qadhdhafi. Major Jallud told newsmen specifically: "Our leader is and will remain Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi." The number two Libyan sought thereby to end all the speculations that may have been made here and there regarding his ambitions. A third and no less important "free officer" appeared on television. This was Army Chief of Staff Gen Abu Bakr Yunis.

One after the other, the military commanders of the various regions of the country came to reaffirm their fidelity to the leader.

During the night, the arrival of some 100 Western journalists was announced, including American, adding to the 80 foreign reporters and press correspondents who had been in Tripoli since the Gulf of Sidra events.

Saturday, 19 April: The Libyans were more and more convinced that the raid on their country would remain unpunished, since the Arabs had not succeeded in agreeing and the United Nations could not condemn the United States. Thus, people huddled together and meditated about the immediate future. Was this the end to the support to the various liberation movements, as well to the oppositions, real or supposed, in certain countries? One thing is sure: Libya does not want to continue to be the milk cow for the "oppressed of the earth." From now on there is a stop to the shouting of the revolutionary slogans. It is the sign of a calling into question that could profoundly change the image of the Arab socialist and revolutionary Jamahiriya. The distinguished visitors doubtless realized this in their meeting with Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. These were Maj Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lingani, the Burkina minister of defense, who arrived in a dark civilian suit, and Sudanese Gen Salah Othman, also minister of defense, who was belted in his uniform spangled with medals.

Sunday, 20 April: The schools reopened their doors. Neighbors exchanged mutual reassurances about their health, traded provisions, and if unhappily appropriate, presented their condolences. Many of the stores remained closed. Anyway, merchandise is rare. The port was asleep, and the airport was used only by foreign citizens returning to their countries. The Swissair company made two flights to bring back 300 Swiss citizens. Other Western and Arab companies transported a small number of Europeans. If all the foreigners joined forces to leave the Jamahiriya, it would mean a total halt to the highly mechanized production. The Third World supports Al-Qadhdhafi. But would Ronald Reagan give up the desire to economically stifle Libya, after trying in vain to kill its leader?

Monday, 21 April: The sun rose over a taciturn Tripoli. People went about their daily occupations. French Ambassador Michel Leveque decided to temporarily house his colleagues in his residence. Diplomats exchanged the rare information. Their teleprinters chattered nonstop: people analyzing, speculating. Libyan officials remained silent about the internal situation. One might have thought that Al-Qadhdhafi was preparing to clean house. In the meanwhile, the people's committees were meeting. And when the people's committees are busy, the revolutionary committees comply.

Nature of the Jamahiriya

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 pp 42-43

[Article by Mohamed Selhami: "This Jamahiriya Whose Death Reagan Seeks"]

[Text] The term "Office for Export of the Revolution" characterizes the regime of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, who wants to be the midwife of Arab unity.

With his "afro" hairdo, leather jacket, and faded jeans, Moncef makes one think of those tough guys of Treichville in Abidjan or Mers Soltane in Casablanca.

"I do not consider myself as belonging to this generation of dropouts. Mister, I am a revolutionary, the real thing!" Moncef told us in a peremptory tone.

How can one judge this status? Not because of the Kalashnikov that he caresses nervously with his hands, but because he was born in September 1969. A historic date for the 3 million Libyans: it marks the transformation of the monarchy into a revolutionary regime (1 September 1969).

In Tripoli they will tell you that this date marked the transition from misery and ignorance to dignity and wealth. Moncef is thus a pure product of the "Qadhdhafian" revolution.

Like many youth of his generation, he affirms an "unshakable" admiration and loyalty to Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. Is there any need to point out that Moncef has only one idea in his mind: to avenge his leader, after the humiliation that he and all Libyans received from Ronald Reagan.

Moncef declared: "Humiliation is not the word, that old operetta cowboy tried to assassinate Mu'ammar!" Indeed, by sending his air force against the Bab Azizia barracks in the night of 14-15 April, the American President could only have had one purpose: to eliminate Al-Qadhdhafi, and with him the entire regime of the Jamahiriya. At the time of the raid, 0200 hours, the Libyan leader could well have been, as is his habit, working with his close colleagues.

However, Moncef did not explain Ronald Reagan's frenzy against his country. What is it so irritating about Al-Qadhdhafi that the whole world, or almost, conspires against him? The Libyan leader knows that his regime irritates many heads of state around the wide world. "Because his revolution draws its inspiration from terror," it is said in some Western capitals.

After he came to power, the Libyan leader certainly did not hide the principles that inspired him: to unite the Arab World and return Africa to the Africans!

Financer of All Revolts

He was to fight with frenzy to carry out this vision of things, even by force, both inside and outside his country. Even more, he adopted as his own all the

causes of the disinherited peoples, from the Palestinians to the Irish in the north, and including the Armenians, Saharans and the Sudanese.

Tripoli had become a center of gravity for all the real or supposed oppositions. They had in Al-Qadhdhafi a huge financier, even a supplier of the treasured weapons.

Among his "beneficiaries" some were famous for their terrorist actions, such as the Palestinian Abu Nidal, who, after having commuted between Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad, ended up finding refuge in Tripoli. This alliance with "the most dangerous man in the world" could only irritate the Western countries to the extreme.

Abu Nidal in Libya, that is fully consistent with the logic of Al-Qadhdhafi, whose watchword is fighting reaction and imperialism wherever they are found. These two "phenomena" are in his eyes the "principal henchmen of Zionism." To this end, Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi has established, in his country and elsewhere, "suitable structures." The oil manna has helped him in this. And in order to better devote himself to the realization of his vision, he divested himself of his administrative functions (in 1977), leaving to the people's committees the running of the state.

At any rate, he did not need to fear that someone else would take his place. The "state of the masses" that he established did not permit the army--or any other paramilitary force--to impose its law. On the one hand, a large portion of the population is armed, which reflects the idea of the "people in arms." On the other, Al-Qadhdhafi has created the revolutionary committees, a virtual state within the state.

A Member of His Family Commands

Faithful to the philosophy of the leader (contained in the Green Book), these committees are powerfully armed, and serve the function of political police possessing great power. To command them, Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi has always chosen a member of his family. Example: his first cousin Ahmed al-Qadhdhafi ed Dem, who was succeeded by his brother Sayed, Hassan Hishkal (disappeared in 1985), Khalifa Hamich...

The current man responsible for the revolutionary committees is Abdallah Senussi, brother in law of the leader, and regarded by the Libyans since the events of 15 April as the second strongest man in the regime. He is also the "boss" of the intelligence services, whose headquarters was bombed by the American planes. The belief in Washington is that most of the terrorist operations have been prepared in his offices, operations that were planned with the Bureau for Export of the Revolution, whose direction has always been entrusted to Col Lakhouildi Lahmidi, one of the five survivors of the group of free officers who overthrew King Idris Senussi.

The Bureau for Export of the Revolution recruits its members virtually everywhere round the world, and undertakes their military training. It was Lakhouildi Lahmidi, for example, who formed the Islamic Legion, of which some members, Africans mainly, are fighting in Chad.

The Arab World has its own administration through the Arab Liaison Bureau, whose headquarters is in Tripoli. It owes its creation to Sayed Kaddaf ed Dem, who was seriously wounded in an attack in 1984.

For some time, and until his disappearance, his successor was Hassan Hishkal. It is temporarily under Abdallah Senussi.

The Arab Liaison Bureau, as its name indicates, is concerned with the Arab countries. Recruiting of "revolutionaries" is assisted by the Arab General Congress directed by an Al-Qadhdhafi loyalist, Omar Lahmidi. The stated mission of this congress is to help achieve Arab unity. It has official representation in numerous Arab capitals, and even in some Western capitals where there is a large Arab community. Examples: Paris, Brussels, Madrid.

Parallel to all these structures, there are as in all countries the security and intelligence services, whose duties sometimes go beyond the Libyan frontiers, for example to execute or kidnap an opposition Libyan considered dangerous to the regime.

And the army, what is its role in the Jamahiriya? It is rarely involved in export of the revolution or carrying out attacks abroad. However, certain of its higher officers work in close cooperation with Al-Qadhdhafi. Among them are Chief of Staff Gen Abu Bakr Yunis, Col Mohamed Kharrouhi, head of the army intelligence services, and Col Abdelhafid Messaoud, commander in chief of the Fezzan (fief: Sebha).

Al-Qadhdhafi and His Army Do Not Get On Well

Since the disappearance of his cousin Hassan Hishkal, Colonel Messaoud has handled the Chad file. Until that time, he had been chief of operations in Chad, with Col Mohamed Riffi as his assistant.

The relations have rarely been good between Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi and his army. The latter reproaches him for having removed its leader and involved it in a war that is not its own: Chad's war.

However, the biggest grievance is the power given to the revolutionary committees, thus putting the army on the second level. Especially since it was this same army that got rid of the Senussi monarchy.

What is the political regime that Ronald Reagan has sought to eliminate? That of the people's committees, the army, or the revolutionary committees? Because he did not know by which end to grab the Jamahiriya, the American President opted for physical elimination of the author of the Green Book. Too late: perhaps Al-Qadhdhafi from now on has his disciples: Moncef and his like.

Soviet Attitude

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 pp 44-45

[Article by Amir Taheri: "Why Did Moscow Let Al-Qadhdhafi Be 'Punished'"]

[Text] In vain, Al-Qadhdhafi asked the Soviet leaders for a "friendship and cooperation treaty" like the ones with Syria or Iraq.

In the Manichaeen imaginary world that the Americans have created since the cold war of the 1950's, Al-Qadhdhafi, today regarded as public enemy number one in the United States, is situated on the side of the Soviet Union, that is of the "empire of evil," condemned by Ronald Reagan.

Yet, the Soviets have not considered it useful to lift even a little finger to help their supposed ally at the most critical moment in its political existence. It was partly out of certainty that Moscow would not move that Reagan opted for the strong method to counter the "Guide" of the Jamahiriya.

The Soviets, informed by Washington that a military action against Libya was indeed on the way, fully understood, and passed the information on to their "ally" a few days before the raids on Tripoli and Benghazi. However, they foolishly "forgot" to inform Al-Qadhdhafi of the exact time of the raids. Yet they had been informed by Washington 2 hours before the F-111's took off from British soil. Thus, Moscow had at least 6 hours to act before the arrival of the American bombers over Tripoli.

Why did the Soviets decide to let the Americans "punish" Al-Qadhdhafi? Were they in a position to prevent the American aggression? Are the Kremlin leaders going to remain mere spectators while American Vice Adm John Poindexter, the White House adviser, implements his plan for overthrow of the Al-Qadhdhafi regime?

The Soviets were, at least theoretically, perfectly capable of preventing the American raids against Libya. They could simply have sent part of their fleet that is cruising in Mediterranean waters to pay a "courtesy visit" to Tripoli and Benghazi. The presence of the Soviet warships, which Al-Qadhdhafi requested in vain, could have faced Reagan with the possibility of an East-West confrontation. This is exactly the same tactic that Moscow has used on several occasions over the last 30 years. The most recent example of this "advanced presence" to dissuade Washington from trying to benefit from a troubled situation was given to us during the recent crisis in South Yemen. Moscow has rendered the same service to its Syrian allies on several occasions. In 1974, the presence of the Soviet Navy in Iraqi ports on the Gulf prevented the Shah of Iran from unleashing a "punitive" attack against the Baghdad regime.

"Al-Qadhdhafi Is Unpredictable," Say Russians in Private

However, this time the Soviets did not consider it wise to take the risk of a confrontation with the United States to save a man whom they do not regard as a sure ally. "Al-Qadhdhafi is unpredictable, the Soviets say in private. For

a primarily conservative system such as that in power in Moscow, there could be no more serious shortcoming.

However, Moscow did not even need to risk a face to face with the American superpower to help Al-Qadhdhafi, at least on the symbolic level. Soviet diplomacy has a whole panoply of initiatives to pass a single message to the Americans: "Don't touch my buddy."

The most classic: the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation, of the type that links the USSR to Syria and, in an even stronger way, to Iraq. On several occasions, Al-Qadhdhafi has asked for the conclusion of such a treaty with Moscow. His most recent request in this respect was forwarded to the Kremlin in January. However, the Soviets have each time succeeded in resisting the colonel's advances by resorting to diversive maneuvers.

At the beginning of April, or only a few days before the raids on Tripoli and Benghazi, Al-Qadhdhafi even asked the Soviets to tell him the necessary procedures for becoming an associate member of the Warsaw Pact. According to Western sources, Moscow has preferred to remain silent about a "subject that borders on the ridiculous."

No Soviet Delegation in Tripoli After American Attack

The Soviets even refused to issue a solemn warning to the Americans in regard to Al-Qadhdhafi. It is known that solemn warnings are one of Moscow's specialties. Why did it refuse to Al-Qadhdhafi what it had done for Ethiopia, South Yemen and Angola, not to mention the very special case of Cuba in the past?

Another typical move of Soviet diplomacy is to send to the site a strong political-military delegation whenever an ally finds itself in a difficult position. Geydar Aliyev, deputy chairman and member of the Soviet Political Bureau, to cite one example, shuttled back and forth between Moscow and Damascus in 1982-1983 to emphasize the Kremlin's determination to side with the Syrians in case of Israeli attack.

In the case of Libya, however, Moscow did not consider it useful to send even the smallest delegation, before or after the American raids. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet number one, was the only head of state whom Al-Qadhdhafi approached to request help, but he only answered 6 days after the raids, with platitudes.

Moscow's canceling of the preparatory meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to underline the Kremlin's unhappiness cannot be interpreted as a mark of solidarity with Al-Qadhdhafi. The Soviets are not really enthusiastic about a new Reagan-Gorbachev summit this year; they would prefer a meeting next year. Thus, if they succeed in postponing their summit with Washington by using the Libyan crisis as pretext, it is Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi that they will have to thank.

The fact remains, however, that Moscow is not going to stand with arms folded till conclusion of the American plan to destroy the Al-Qadhdhafi regime.

According to the Soviet analysis, the raids against Tripoli and Benghazi may have a beneficial effect by making the "Guide" wiser and more cautious.

The Soviet have always approved of and supported armed struggle as a means of liberation. Their KGB is also certainly involved in "terrorist" activities of the classic type, in the West or elsewhere. However, they do not want to support "blind" terrorism, of the type that Abu Nidal has practiced for several years. Indeed, Moscow is aware that the weapon of terrorism can also be used against the USSR. The abduction of four Soviet diplomats in Beirut last year was a good illustration of this danger.

For the moment, Moscow seems to have decided to keep all options open. The Kremlin experts are not at all certain that Al-Qadhdhafi will be able to resist the American pressure. His fall would not necessarily bother them. Their men are already well established in all sectors of Libyan life; they would be perfectly capable of ultimately taking over power. A pro-Soviet leader and one less unpredictable than Al-Qadhdhafi could better serve Moscow's interest in the region, and Moscow will thus wait a while yet before deciding whether the "Guide" is finally doomed or not.

If Al-Qadhdhafi Gets His Treaty, He Will Have To Renounce Terrorism

If Al-Qadhdhafi succeeds in preservng his position at the head of the Jamahiriya, even if for only a few weeks, in that case Moscow will no doubt propose to him an alliance, in effect, which could later also assume the necessary form.

This proposal will involve three conditions, the same that Moscow specifies in all its alliances with Third World countries:

1. No major decision must be taken without consulting Moscow;
2. The anti-imperialist struggle must be continued in the general context of East-West relations, and under the control of the USSR;
3. The "noncapitalist road to development" must be adopted as the economic model.

If Al-Qadhdhafi agrees to play the game, he will be able to benefit from the Soviet protection. In exchange, he will be obliged to give up his role of godfather to the "terrorist" groups and accept the Soviet policy on the issue of the Middle East conflict. At the same time, he will be required to give up his plans for territorial expansion in Africa.

Then he will be only a "wise and predictable" leader benefiting from the support of the Soviet Union. Moscow will then be in a position to assure Washington that the "Guide" of the Jamahiriya has become a pawn, controllable and controlled, on the world chessboard. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi could then live a long time, and continue to hold power for a long time yet.

However, is the "Guide" ready to give up his historic ambitions? Would he who is regarded as the "lion of the Arabs" agree to play the role of a sweet and

gentle kitten? Can Al-Qadhdhafi change his nature? Those who know him best and have done so for a long time know that the answer to all these questions is negative. The "Guide" is convinced that he is a great personality in contemporary history. In reality, Aal-Qadhdhafi is a tragic character and does not have a choice: he must continue on the road that fate has set out for him.

Other Western Interventions

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 p 46

[Article by Hamza Kaidi: "The Madman Is Not the One We Think"]

[Text] At the report of the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi by Mr Reagan's planes, my first reaction was to cry "Look out for the madman!" This action fitted in well with the logic of this dangerous oil man close to senility who presides over the destinies of America, and thereby also of humanity.

Was not the admirer of Rambo finally living out in reality the crazy or bold dreams of the mediocre actor that he was formerly? Was he not finally coming to identify himself with the good sheriff or with the fearless and irreproachable pioneer, fighting off the fearful Sitting Bull, whom he clearly recognized in the characteristics of Al-Qadhdhafi, his early-morning enemy?

The reasoning holds up, however the lessons of history suggest another alternative, and how much more real. Mr Reagan's action is part of the fine logic of Western imperialism, pure and simple. That imperialism which wants to ruthlessly destroy everything that does not serve its purposes.

How can one not see a certain resemblance between what is happening today in Tripoli and what Algeria experienced in 1830? The expedition of French Marshal de Bourmont had been decided on to put an end to the hideous acts of the Barbary pirates, executioners of good Christians, and to avenge the honor of a Western power that had been flouted, we are taught, in the person of its consul by a Barbary dey.

Contemporary historians now inform us that this good king Charles X merely wanted to replenish his rather too empty treasury by laying hand on the treasure of that "old pirate" Hussein Dey.

Let us not go so far as to say that the White House wants to grab the Barbary ape Al-Qadhdhafi. But how can we not cite the pretext used by the French to lay their hand on Tunisia at the end of the last century: the mountain people of Kroumirie were attacking their factories in the Calle.

But why go so far? In 1953, Mossadegh was overthrown by the good old CIA for having dared to nationalize the Iranian oil. In 1956, Egypt paid the price of a tripartite aggression. Who can still believe today that the French and British, in connivance with the Israelis, landed at Port Said to "restore freedom of navigation" through the Suez Canal!

But someone will say to me that all that is outdated, that colonialism and the

gunboat policy are gone forever. Indeed no! The victims of imperialism still falling in our time are there to remind us that we are still being served the same salads to make us swallow the same grass snakes. The pretexts invoked today for punishing Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi (freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Sidra, really? terrorism?) are no more acceptable than those invoked in the past to punish Nasir. Was not that leader accused of all the problems of his time? Didn't they see his hand and the eye of Moscow behind every uprising, every agitation, and any coup d'etat that opposed the big guys of this world? Today, the scapegoat is named Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi.

Without going so far as to whitewash the leader of the Jamahiriya of all the charges against him, how can we accept the idea that one can send 34 bombers over two cities in the middle of the night to avenge the victims of the West Berlin discotheque? Those who were even yesterday calling the law of retaliation barbarous come to avenge the death of an American soldier with the assassination of some hundred civilians, women, children and old people. Whom do they think they are fooling by saying that they aim to eliminate terrorism by these methods?

This finds its roots not in the acts attributed to Al-Qadhafi, but in the unjust order that Mr Reagan seeks to maintain at any cost in the Middle East and elsewhere! And one can ponder that still current fable to the effect that the reason of the strongest is always the best. Between Al-Qadhafi and Rambo-Reagan, which of the two is the terrorist? Is it the one who, sometimes by rather questionable methods, seeks to serve as a model for the millions of oppressed, or the one who leaves them no other course but despair?

Let us also ponder the attitude of these "humanists" who were yesterday deploring the killing of the old man on the Achille Lauro, and who today celebrate over bodies of children in Tripoli!

As for ourselves, we Third World people, let us remember the following: one cannot register as being opposed to the invasion of Afghanistan and approve what happened in Libya. Whatever our grievances in regard to Al-Qadhafi, we can only condemn the aggression of which his country has been victim.

Let us not laugh at the misfortunes afflicting the Jamahiriya. Our own peoples could also pay the price of the plans of the current powerful. Yesterday, the blows of the country of apartheid struck Angola and Mozambique, and those of Israel struck Tunisia.

Today, America is raining its blows on Libya. Tomorrow, whose turn will it be?

Role of Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 p 47

[Article by Amir Taheri: "Unpredictable, Inconsistent Al-Qadhafi"]

[Text] Should Al-Qadhafi burn? The question is of a nature to arouse passionate and inflaming debate. One can like or not like Al-Qadhafi, but no

one will deny his ability to provoke even among the calmest an unleashing of violent feelings.

Al-Qadhdhafi has always wanted to be, and sees himself as, a heroic personage who must not be satisfied to live a drab existence and to live like average mortals.

I met him for the first time in Cairo, at Nasir's funeral in September 1970. As soon as he was aware that television cameras had been set up in the great hall of Al Qubbah palace, he began to sob. His cries ("Ya Abu Khaled, ya Batal al-Uruba!" that is: O Father of Khaled, O hero of Arabism) pierced our ears, but earned him the heart of Egyptians. Khaled is the first name of Nasir's eldest son. When the television coverage was over, he got up to shake our hands. He had not shed the least tear, and wore an enigmatic smile. All that was only window dressing.

Our second meeting was in Lahore, Pakistan, 4 years later. He was anxious, and asked his group whether "the oppressed masses" were really present in sufficient number to receive him in the stadium that he had had constructed to honor his name.

The speech he gave in the stadium on this occasion was received with indescribable enthusiasm by an unrestrained crowd. "Today we have changed the course of the history of mankind," he shouted. His eyes sparkled with happiness. But his happiness was of short duration. On his return to the villa provided for him, the Pakistanis presented him with a long list of requests for aid. He was very annoyed. The next day, in the Islamic Conference hall, flanked by Idi Amin Dada and Gaafar Nimeiri, he spoke a phrase full of bitterness, intended for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistani prime minister: "I am not a check stub hero."

The reality, alas, is that Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, the "Guide" of the Jamahiriya, is indeed in the eyes of many a creation of the petrodollars.

Think for an instant if Libya had no oil. In that case it would be a country a little larger than Chad, but with only half that country's population. And the "Guide" in all that? He would be just a Hissein Habre or a Goukouni Oueddei, involved in an unending war recalling the atmosphere in the book "Desert of the Tartars," by Dino Buzzati.

It is almost 17 years since Al-Qadhdhafi came to power, a period during which he has had at his disposal more than \$150 billion in oil earnings: the equivalent of 3 centuries of income for Chad.

To whom does he owe this huge treasure? First of all to his enemies of today; that is, to the Americans, and, more specifically, to a certain Armand Hammer, a big capitalist in his state and also a man in whom the Kremlin has confidence.

It was the big American oil companies that marketed Libyan crude on the international market in order to reduce the respective importance of the Gulf and Venezuela.

war, and that the only means they have to continue their battle against that country is what the West calls "terrorism."

There are two other Arab strategies with respect to Israel. The first is that of Sadat: to make peace with the Jewish state and thus try to create a new context. This strategy implies a rapprochement with the United States in order to reduce Tel Aviv's influence in Washington. At least theoretically, it can yield positive results for the Arabs, but only in the very long term: between 30 and 50 years to see some results. However, Al-Qadhdhafi cannot wait. And those, like Sadat, who are ready to wait, often do not have the capability to do so.

The second possible strategy, followed in part by Nasir, was to bring down all the "reactionary" Arab regimes in order to replace them with radical regimes, which could then ally with Moscow and succeed in destroying Israel, or in imposing on it a "just" peace with the help of the USSR. However, that also requires time, patience and a great deal of optimism.

The supporters of each solution do their best to prevent the others from trying their luck. However, the reality is that the three strategies have already suffered irreversible setbacks.

The latest to suffer a setback has been the strategy of Al-Qadhdhafi and his friends. They have not advanced an inch in achieving their dream. Moreover, they have strengthened the U.S. support for Israel while creating a confusion of international opinion between the Palestinian cause and "terrorism."

Al-Qadhdhafi, Abu Nidal and their allies have already done the most that they could do. What else can they do? At the most, they can hijack several more planes and kill a few score more Americans and Israelis. However, Israel will certainly not be destroyed and replaced by a Palestinian state in this fashion.

Then, should Al-Qadhdhafi burn? Our answer is no. The "Guide" of the Jamahiriya long ago began his own self-immolation. He has squandered the fortune of his country. On the internal front, people ridicule his insipid slogans. The economic crisis is beginning to affect even the most well-off elements of the population. And the "check stub heroes" can no longer buy miracle solutions.

On the international scene, Al-Qadhdhafi has realized the dearest dream of the Israelis: to portray the Arabs as terrorists and the Palestinian cause as a slogan for takers of hostages and air hijackers.

The American intervention, if it remains without followups, can only set up the "Guide." It will make him a "blood and fire hero" with tragic aspects, a thing he always admired in Nasir.

However, President Reagan should pay attention. He will not end the problem of terrorism by making a martyr out of Al-Qadhdhafi. His activism may complement that of Al-Qadhdhafi, while at the same time justifying it. As everyone knows, it always takes two to tango.

By the end of 1970, Al-Qadhdhafi had begun to regard himself as the political successor of Jamal Abd an-Nasir. This dream did not bother the Americans or their Israeli friends at all; they had quickly understood that the ambitious colonel could make life impossible for Anwar as-Sadat, at that time the man to bring down, in the view of the Tel Aviv leaders.

Unpredictable and divisive by nature as well as by vocation, Al-Qadhdhafi also prevented any effort to develop a rational strategy to deal with the main problems facing the Arab countries. King Faysal of Saudi Arabia thus made no mystery, in private of course, of his suspicions regarding the "real motivations of this guy."

The three main problems facing the Arabs were as follows: fear of modernization, elimination of the legacies of colonialism, and the existence of Israel.

However, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi has never known what the word patience means. He is a convinced believer in miracle solutions and instant responses. A revolutionary in form, but at heart a conservative. Giving himself a revolutionary aura is easy to do. Nasir had done it for years. All you need is to have a powerful radio transmitter, a few vitriolic slogans, and the ability to say "no" to anything relating to negotiation with the "enemy."

It was to the last of the three problems facing the Arabs that Al-Qadhdhafi chose to devote his energies. In his view, without the least doubt, Israel must be destroyed as a state and replaced by an Arab Palestine in which the Jews will of course be able to continue to live. A huge task, as things stand.

Early on, Al-Qadhdhafi decided to devote himself to the cause of the destruction of the Jewish state. The Israelis knew this from the beginning, but, convinced since 1947 that only Egypt and Syria could really threaten the existence of their country, they thought it useful to let him alone, and at times they even encouraged him.

A fan of miracle solutions, the colonel was quickly fascinated by terrorism. From all evidence, he was an admirer of the past exploits of Yasir 'Arafat and also of Carlos. The end justified the means. One could tolerate everything in order to achieve the sacred goal of liberation of Palestine. Later, Al-Qadhdhafi also used terror against his own Libyan opposition, but his principle concern remained the destruction of Israel.

Basically, he is not anti-American. One can even say that he is fascinated by the United States. However, he could not dream of the destruction of Israel without sooner or later running up against the reality of American support to the Jewish state. His anti-Americanism is thus only derivative: he opposes the United States because it supports Israel.

Palestinian leaders like Abu Nidal, Georges Habash or Ahmed Djibril, who share his dream of destroying Israel, are all in the same situation. They know that the Arabs cannot, within the foreseeable future, defeat Israel in a classical

Attitudes of Africans

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 pp 48-49

[Article by S. Andriamirado: "Leave This Wind Seller Alone!"]

[Text] "The only hegemonism that I condemn (on the part of an African country), and I hope that it will no longer be more than a bad memory, is that of Libya." The Senegalese Abdou Diouf was not yet president of the OAU when he thus confided his fears to me. However, already, when I asked him if he thought one could reason with Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, he answered: "I do not believe so. Thus far, no one has succeeded. I do not think he can fundamentally change. I would like him to change, but he will not do so." That was at the end of 1981.

At the time, Al-Qadhdhafi was agitating in all directions, and in many places in Africa. In Chad, certainly, where his troops had just left N'Djamena, but where they had occupied (and still occupy) the Aouzou Strip since 1973. Two years before, he had exposed his army to ridicule by sending it to get bogged down in the Uganda forest in an effort to save a certain Idi Amin Dada. And he had promised a certain Jean-Bedel Bokassa to help him hold onto his throne in Central Africa. Two (former) dictators who, of course, shared the "progressive and revolutionary" ideas of the "Libyan Guide." Bokassa recounted to me the details, with emphasis and bursts of laughter, of how Al-Qadhdhafi, to convince him to become a Muslim and to transform his empire into the Islamic Republic of Central Africa, had "washed the feet" of him, his son, and the entire government.

Alas, Mu'ammr al-Qadhdhafi was not content with washing the feet of dictators. He armed and financed all who promised him to establish somewhere any Islamic republic whatever. From Chad President Hissein Habre he asked for only two conditions in return for no longer bothering him: cession to Libya of the Aouzou Strip and proclamation of an Arab Islamic Republic of Chad. Two conditions that are unacceptable to any Chadian leader. Just as unacceptable as this phrase he issued one day to Guy Georgy, the then French ambassador to Tripoli: "Leave me the Arabs in northern Chad. You, France, can keep your negroes."

In reality, he had never wanted to leave the negroes in peace. While he occupies northern Chad, he is known to demand also the Mangueni plateau in Niger to control the caravan trails and the wells scattered along them from Madana to Bilma. The Niamey leaders do not want to talk about it; to avoid further exciting a man who explodes without any further stimulant than his own self-fermentation--like alcohol. They wait, knowing that Al-Qadhdhafi is no more immortal than any mortal. And, while waiting, they have to endure the periodic incursions by columns coming from Libya to attack an administrative post lost in the Kaouar or even in the Tenere.

It is easy for Al-Qadhdhafi to take on his neighbors, against whom he can unleash mercenaries recruited among poor youngsters, Chadians, Tunisians, Malians, Nigeriens, etc., rejects from everywhere, to whom he promises \$800 a month, 280,000 CFA francs: a fortune that the youth will never touch, however.

Because they are condemned to die, abandoned in the pebbles of the Air.

However, Al-Qadhdhafi only dares to attack from a distance, and by rhetoric, those who are more determined than he. Does he want to hurl invective at the regime of Mobutu Sese Soko? Without invitation, he lands in Burkina and in Rwanda to call the Zairians to revolt. He does not know that all he has to do is speak to cause the young Zairians, even among those most critical of Mobutu, to declare themselves ready to follow the master of Kinshasa in any battle or war against Qadhdhafian Libya.

Yet one cannot blame the Jamahiriya leader for not understanding. He is too full of himself to leave room for other reasoning than his own. Hence his failure with heads of African states presented as his friends, even his disciples: as a result of promising anything to anybody, Al-Qadhdhafi has run into people who have called on him to settle up.

January 1985, Ouagadougou. The Burkina capital was hosting the preparatory meeting for a summit of four heads of state regarded as ideological allies: Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, Thomas Sankara of Burkina, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, and Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi of Libya. First of all, Al-Qadhdhafi announced that he would not come, and that his second in command, Major Jallud, would represent him. Secondly, the Burkinabe and the Ghanaians had the insolence to list the unfulfilled Libyan promises, though made in the name of the "progressive international": millions of tons of cement that had never arrived; farms that had never been constructed; banks that had never opened a single counter, lines of credit that had never been honored. And they said in criticism: the promises are only fulfilled in respect to regimes that brother Al-Qadhdhafi is still seeking to seduce; Togo or Niger, for example, those to whom he can no longer sell his ideology can continue to wait. The Ghanaians slammed the door. The summit meeting was not to take place.

The Burkinabe swallowed their bitterness for a year. At the end of March 1986, several members of the very secret CNR (National Council of the Revolution) said to me: "The war with Mali enabled us to count our friends. Libya did not send us a single cartridge or single liter of fuel. We have finally understood that we have to depend on ourselves."

How does Al-Qadhdhafi choose his friends? Like a seller of wind. An African head of state told me: "The Libyans always come proposing their cooperation with three teams: the ideologues, who are trying primarily to peddle their line; if you agree with them, then the technicians come to ask you what you need; then all that is left is for the accountants to pay."

The credulity of the "Guide" of the Jamahiriya is such that he swallows all the grass snakes when someone pretends to swallow his bait. Thus, neither the Malagasy Didier Ratsiraka nor the Togolese Gnassingbe Eyadema, whose countries have benefited from his subsidies, have ever intended to impose the colonel's Green Book on their peoples.

Others, on the other hand, have talked but have done nothing. This is the case with the Burkinabe and the Ghanaians, who, believing that they were dealing with genuine theoreticians and practitioners of the revolution, have

found it wise to contradict the "Libyan ideologues," or worse, to tell them: "Your revolution interests us, but leave us to make our own. We don't need spiritual fathers."

That is why Burkina and Ghana have finally given up expecting anything from an elder who is so fickle, clumsy, and little respecting of his word and of others, and so imperialist--why not say it? The Al-Qadhdhafi myth was in the process of disappearing even in the camp of those he presented as his friends.

And then there came on the scene a cowboy, blundering but arrogant, Ronald Reagan. While no one in Africa has ever had the bad taste and irresponsibility to approve of the terrorism directed by Al-Qadhdhafi or encouraged by his calls for murder, now the America of Ronald Reagan upsets everything. One cannot approve of random assassination of men, women and children whose sole crime is to be American. But nor can one approve of a Reagan who sends 36 bombers to wipe out a single man (and fails). In Tripoli and Benghazi, Reagan also killed innocent people whose only crime was to be Libyans.

The imperialism of the one does not excuse the imperialism of the other, however, the stupid American bombing provides motives for new acts that are just as terroristic and irresponsible. By his arrogance, Ronald Reagan has taken the risk of regilding the escutcheon of an Al-Qadhdhafi who did not deserve it.

I accuse Reagan of having tried to transform into a martyr an individual who has no justification for becoming one. And who, with reason and without reason, will more than ever take himself seriously.

Bechir Ben Yahmed Conclusion

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 86 pp 50-51

["What I Believe" comment by Bechir Ben Yahmed: "Should We Support Al-Qadhdhafi"]

[Text] Let us try to understand before we judge: whether it is national or international, whether it emanates from the rank and file or is directed at the top by a state power, terrorism is the weapon of the weak and oppressed. Not, as one may have an impression, a triumphant offensive of devilish beings indifferent to the death of others was well as their own.

It is the spasm of revolt of men and women who are basically desperate. They go into terrorism because they feel more strongly than the average person the injustice done to themselves or to their community, the indifference of others to their fate (or, sometimes, hate). They have observed the futility of the traditional forms of struggle, and are experiencing the "betrayal" of those who are in charge of conducting the legal struggle. One day, "they take the plunge." The terrorist is thus a desperate person, but one who refuses to admit defeat; an unloved who revolts, puts himself outside the law, and who kills and is killed in an effort to gain recognition.

In this journal, we have been among the first to affirm that terrorism outside of militarily occupied territories is neither defensible nor effective. As for the so-called blind terrorism, that which strikes without distinction--the bomb in a plane or an airport--where innocent people are attacked--hostages, that is to be condemned without nuance, whatever the justice of the cause that it believes it serves.

That said, the most odious of terrorisms, which should cause revulsion to the whole world, is air bombing. I myself am disturbed to see and listen to so many intellectuals and moral authorities:

--Discuss the degree of responsibility of those who drop 1,000-kg bombs on human concentrations;

--Pose the question: should we approve or condemn President Reagan for having ordered the bombing of the two largest Libyan cities?

Whatever the wrongs or even the crimes that have prompted them, the decision and the act of bombing civilian populations in time of peace are--and I weigh my words--an abomination, an unpardonable crime, and a sin against mankind. Its authors, because all-powerful, put themselves above the law; in truth, they put themselves outside morality.

Carried out in cold blood, at night (to surprise, cause the maximum harm, and reduce their own losses), against civilian targets, while apparently sparing the big military installations (to spare the Libyan army, which it is hoped will take power), the American bombing of the Libyan cities on 15 April 1986 by a formidable armada of some 100 planes was the most cynical action, and the most contemptuous of international opinion and the values it holds, that has been committed in the West for a long time. It is military force without moral force.

If it does not appear to everyone this way, if, on the contrary, it has received the approval of large segments of the American and European people, this is because the random terrorism of the past few months has prepared the public for a reprisal that is just as blind and disproportionate. Add to this the frequent practice, by Israel especially but also by South Africa against its neighbors and by the USSR against the Afghan resistance, of this type of reprisal, and you will understand why this kind of terrorism, the most odious, now hardly shocks the Western consciences.

The Westerners condemn random terrorism, whose threat to their daily lives they feel, but wonder (sic) about the bombing of a big city, even though it inevitably kills women and children, and in general affects only the innocent. The very people who would not tolerate police firing on a gangster in a crowd, approve the bombing of a city in the hope of getting 'Arafat or Al-Qadhdhafi.

What morality condemns and public opinion, for the moment, tolerates, is it nevertheless effective? In other words, if Mr Reagan and his government want to kill Al-Qadhdhafi or, as they proclaim, to overthrow his regime, what chance have they of achieving their objective?

My opinion in this respect is that the Reagan-Al-Qadhdhafi duel is not won in advance by the former, whatever his determination and the imbalance of forces: Ronald Reagan is 64 years old, let us not forget it; his health is not assured, and he has only 20 months more in power. As for Al-Qadhdhafi, certainly today his regime and his life are more threatened than ever, his financial strength is only a memory, and, above all, the exodus of foreigners (the Europeans in particular) will put even the functioning of Libya in question. However, he is 46 years old; he has been, in the literal sense of the word, the master of his country for 16 years; and he is henceforth, thanks in good part to Reagan, genuinely popular in all of Africa and the Arab World. Al-Qadhdhafi's popularity is a recent phenomenon that is little known or inadequately known, because neither the press nor governments have wanted to publicize it.

While African and Arab leaders detest him, with one or two exceptions, and continue in private to give him only sarcasm and condescension (which does not prevent them from smiling at him in public, receiving him, and lavishing him with words of support), the crowds have come to admire and love this man. Just as they loved 25 years ago Lumumba, Guevara, Nasir, and Sekou Toure. And for the same reason: the humiliated identify with those who dare to raise their head, to say no, and not bend before force, and ... survive the furnace.

Will Al-Qadhdhafi receive the fate of Lumumba and Guevara, cut down before the zenith of their lives by the very people who today want to kill him? Or will he be spared the fate like Nasir and Sekou Toure? I cannot tell you.

On the other hand, I do know that before overthrowing Al-Qadhdhafi, if it succeeds in this, America will cause a great deal of damage and victims among the rulers of the area, or even of Europe, who have hitched their wagon to his chariot: Sadat and Numeiri are only the first in a long list.

I also know that in order to combat the policy of Reagan, loudly acclaimed by the Israeli leaders, one must have European and American opinion on one's side. Otherwise, it will be Reagan who wins.

Finally, I know that the terrorism originating in the Middle East has two causes that must be addressed if you want to have a chance of achieving some kind of normality:

--The injustice done to the Palestinians in particular, and Israel's abuse of its military force and the advantages it derives from its marriage to the United States;

--The failure of the political leaderships currently in power in the Arab countries of the region; it is because the governments do nothing (when they are not accomplices of the enemies of their peoples) that men and groups take recourse to this "savage war" that is terrorism.

Further on, in this issue, we open a debate, in which we invite our readers to participate: Should we support Al-Qadhdhafi if he is attacked?

In regard to the Libyan leader, a special case in politics, the question is

not improper, and, at the risk of moving against the tide, I will not hesitate to give a negative answer to it. Today, as yesterday, for the following reasons.

In a general way, I do not classify myself among those who think and say that "one must support one's brother, whether guilty or victim," or "my country first and above all, wrong or right." I classify myself among those who prefer to give their support to men and to just causes.

When Libya is attacked, I protest the aggression and condemn the aggressor. Should I anyway support the victim of the aggression, though knowing his wrongs; approve all he says, align myself with his policy, though I regard it as bad?

The Al-Qadhdhafi of the post-15 April period--the day of the aggression--is in my view that same as the Al-Qadhdhafi before it... about whom we have expressed our opinion more than once. We have presented the various aspects of his policy, as the current situation (and his own initiatives) shed light on them. And we have each time given our opinion.

We have not changed our opinion either about Al-Qadhdhafi or about his policy: the man is not very banal, what he says is sometimes very pertinent; what he does is not always so ridiculous or senseless as people say. "If he is mad, as some maintain, then it is a madness that reasons correctly. And which, thus far, has not come out too badly," I was told by a Maghrebian statesman who knows him and observes him without emotion.

For my part, I maintain that the man has embarked on a dangerous personal adventure, and is conducting a policy that is bad for Libya, for the Maghreb, for Africa, and for the Arab World: a policy that divides instead of uniting. that kills (a great deal), that wastes enormously (about \$200 billion in 15 years), that brought the French army into Chad and Central Africa, the fleet, the bombers and the American general officers--and tomorrow Soviet general officers--into these waters, skies and capitals of the Mediterranean.

That is my judgment, based on observation and analysis, not on prejudice or passion.

I know that it is not shared, today, by the majority of my readers. However, my role, as I envisage it, is not to convey the point of view of the moment, the ideas in fashion. Nor to be the mirror of the majority.

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WASHINGTON TIMES 26 June 1986 Pg. 1

Communists detail S. Africa takeover

By Peter Younghusband
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

CAPE TOWN, South Africa — A secret document circulated by the Politburo of the South African Communist Party confirms its partnership with the outlawed African National Congress and gives a blueprint for a "revolutionary seizure of power" that precludes any peaceful transition to black majority rule.

The 14-page "directive/discussion" document came into the hands of South African intelligence officers and, together with other intelligence gathered in the past two months, prompted the government's decision to declare a state of emergency on June 12.

The document makes it clear that any negotiations the ANC may have with "the liberal bourgeoisie" in South Africa should be regarded as purely diversionary, a ploy to "divide the enemy" rather than a serious attempt to seek a peaceful solution.

The Pretoria government has refused to enter into negotiations with the ANC until it renounces violence and separates itself from the SACP with which, the document confirms, it is so intertwined that its own executive is dominated by Moscow.

The document originated from an extended Politburo meeting with members of the central committee in March 1986. It concedes that there are South Africans genuinely committed to dismantling apartheid, but warns that the ANC should not allow these "forces for change" to dilute their revolutionary ardor.

Paragraph 5.3 of the document says: "Our broad strategy for achieving peoples power is to mobilise the masses for a seizure of power through a combination of political action and armed struggle in which partial and general uprisings will play a vital role in the developing states of people's war."

Paragraph 13.2.3 says: "The main thrust of our present strategy remains a revolutionary seizure of power."

The document expresses ambivalence about recent meetings between ANC executives in Lusaka (capital of Zambia) and liberal South African businessmen, such as Gavin Relly, chairman of Anglo American Corp. and liberal politicians, such as Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, former leader of the parliamentary opposition Progressive Federal Party.

"Premature speculation about possible compromises in order to tempt broader forces such as the liberal bourgeoisie on to our side, may

serve to blunt the edge of the people's revolutionary militancy," it says.

"... There are emerging in South Africa what Lenin called [in relation to the February 1917 Russian Revolution] 'dissimilar currents, heterogeneous class interests, contrary political and social stirrings,' as objective factors in deepening the enemy crisis, fragmenting its previously monolithic character and therefore objectively strengthening the prospects of a radical breakthrough.

"On the face of it there appears to be a proliferation of new groupings which consider themselves to be part of the forces for change, but which cannot necessarily be embraced as part of what we regard as the revolutionary forces."

Paragraph 10 says: "Let us be clear. The liberal bourgeoisie seek transformations of the South African society which go beyond the reform limits of the present regime but which aim to pre-empt the objectives of the revolutionary forces."

"They seek transformation through negotiation and not the kind of conflict which could culminate in a revolutionary seizure of power."

"To implement this tactic they, together with their external allies, can be expected to attempt to push the revolutionary forces into negotiation before they are strong enough to impose their basic objectives. The intention is to defuse the people's struggles and to force a compromise based on existing power relationships."

The document concedes that for the time being there might be strategy value in holding talks with the "liberal bourgeoisie." It says: "A serious revolutionary movement always tries to divide the enemy and to broaden the base of opposition to the main enemy."

It warns against the growth of right-wing movements in South Africa and "the possibility of an undisguised military dictatorship," adding, "we must not under-estimate the counter revolutionary offensive against freedom movements orchestrated by the Reagan administration."

The document reveals that the SACP regards the ANC as little more than a front and intends at some future stage to emerge from behind it and seize direct control of revolutionary action.

It gently downgrades the Freedom Charter, the manifesto of the ANC, which advocates a mild socialism for South Africa in which major industries may be nationalized but private property ownership will be recognized to a large extent. "It is not a programme for a socialist South Africa but, depending upon the social forces which come to power, it can become the starting point for creating conditions which would lead to a socialist transformation."

And it says: "The trade union movement does not and cannot carry out the functions of the political vanguard of the working class. This is the role of the party of the working class, which we are."

Paragraph 14.1 says, somewhat plaintively: "We continue to face the old problem of party work always being pushed into second place because of the necessary involvement of virtually all our talented personnel in other structures of the liberation alliance. This continues to limit our capacity for the independent spread of working class perspectives in the struggle and hinders the strengthening of the party organisationally. If no effective steps are taken to deal with this weakness, the party will not be able to carry out its historic mission."

Significantly, paragraph 14.2 says: "It is also necessary to reflect on the profile of the party in the liberation alliance whose public head is correctly the ANC. The question which needs to be addressed is: To what extent has it become accepted as a permanent feature of the alli-

ance that the party is not a participant as a party in the activities and relations of the alliance with other forces?"

"... It has become important to open up this problem for reflection and discussion especially in relation to the status and role of the party in our future serious negotiating processes."

Paragraph 14.3 says: "Making the formal profile of the party more visible will not, on its own, give it the capacity to perform its historic mission. In the end it is the party's strength on the ground and more especially, its organised presence among the black working class, which counts."

Paragraph 15.2 of the document makes clear again the SACP's goal of overturning South Africa from a capitalist society into a communist society: "Liberation implies a massive redistribution of wealth and cannot have much meaning without the undermining of the economic hold over the means of production which is exercised by the existing ruling class and without (at the political level) creating a state form in which the working people are dominant."

"This implies more than an alteration in voting arrangements. Meaningful exercise of people's power during the interim phase is inconceivable in a situation in which the army, the police, the state bureaucracy, the communication media etc. remain substantially in the control of the existing structures."

"It is only a provisional people's government which can take measures which will ensure the possibilities of a real exercise of democracy."

The document also registers smug satisfaction over the apparent increase in support for the ANC front world wide.

It says: "Our liberation front is becoming increasingly accepted as more than an agitational opposition. It is regarded by a large slice of the world and, more importantly, by the majority of our people, as the immediate alternative power to racism and exploitation."

WASHINGTON POST 26 June 1986 Pg. 3

Haig Eyes Presidency 'I'm a Dark, Dark Horse'

Associated Press

CHATTANOOGA, Tenn.—Former secretary of state Alexander M. Haig Jr. says he plans to seek the Republican presidential nomination in 1988.

Haig, secretary of state during part of President Reagan's first term, said Tuesday he will officially announce his bid after this year's elections.

"I just think timing is very, very important because I'm a dark, dark horse," Haig said in an interview with

the Chattanooga News-Free Press. "I believe it [the race] is wide open."

Among those expected to seek the GOP nomination are Vice President Bush, Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole, former senate majority leader Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, Rep. Jack Kemp of New York and former Delaware governor Pierre S. du Pont IV. Haig had explored the possibility of seeking the nomination in 1980 but dropped out long before serious campaigning had begun.

He said he doesn't think Bush can win the race if nominated, calling the vice president's support "a mile wide and an inch thick." Of all the possible GOP candidates, Baker "comes closer to fitting the handle of statesman" than any other, said Haig, who was in Chattanooga to address a local civic group.

NAVY NEWS

20 June 86 (26) Pg. 1

Old Wounds Reopened

Navy Would Lose Some Independence With New Proposal

BY JAMES A. RUSSELL

"Defense reorganization does not stop at the water's edge."

With those words, Rep. Larry Hopkins (R-Ky.) touched off a storm of controversy this week with an amendment to the new House defense reform legislation. In what will surely spark an intense Navy lobbying campaign on Capitol Hill, Hopkins' amendment proposes to repeal the Navy's independent operating authority.

The new House legislation confers broad new powers on the commanders of the 10 unified and specified commands (called CINCs). Hopkins' amendment would delete language from current law that states the Navy "is generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and protection of shipping."

Unlike the Army and the Air Force, the Navy has authority in current law to conduct autonomous military operations independent of the CINCs. As one House staffer put it: "If Gen. Bernard Rogers [Supreme Allied Commander in Europe] wanted to use so much as a PT boat, he'd have to negotiate with the Navy." Hopkins' amendment would give Rogers control over the naval assets deployed in Europe.

"The question is whether we want to preserve our national security or the prerogative of an individual service," Hopkins told

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could dwarf the economic importance of the original government purchase.

Colt Firearms of Hartford, a division of Colt Industries of New York, which sold the Army its current standard firearm in 1911, withdrew from the 9mm competition because it did not manufacture a commercial weapon that fit the Army's specifications.

Frank Decker, Colt's senior representative in Washington, said Tuesday he believes his company would again decline to bid if the Army reopened competition with similar specifications and production deadlines used in 1984.

reporters this week. "My amendment deletes language from current law, which gives the Navy primary command or authority over naval forces. This conflicts with our bill's intention to grant the theater commanders authority over all our forces." The original language was put into law in the 1950s "because the Navy felt the Army might take their Marines and their Air Force might take their aviators," Hopkins said. His amendment "has nothing to do" with this possibility. "It simply puts them [the Navy] under the same [legal] language as the Army and the Air Force."

Hopkins' amendment, introduced last week during subcommittee markup, came as a complete surprise, according to congressional staff. "Nobody knew about it. But when he introduced it the subcommittee unanimously endorsed it," said one.

Needless to say, the Navy is not so pleased. "The Navy has not greeted it [the amendment] with standing applause. They feel they're different, but that's no reason not to come under the command of a CINC," said Hopkins.

House Armed Services Committee chairman Rep. Les Aspin (D-N.Y.) indicated he expects no serious opposition to the new bill on the committee, although he thinks Hopkins' amendment will become a "lightning rod" for the bill's opponents. The most likely oppo-

nent on the committee: Rep. Beverly Byron (D-Md.). The congresswoman "feels anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability and reconnaissance should remain with the Navy," said a Byron aide. The Air Force would like to take over the ASW mission, he added, and this would only reopen "old animosities."

Hopkins is apparently unmoved by the Navy's argument that it is unique, particularly in areas like anti-submarine warfare. Hopkins reminded service officials who came to plead their case that all the services have unique characteristics.

An early version of the Senate reform legislation, which has already passed, had similar language limiting the Navy's authority. It was stripped from the bill after strenuous objections from former Navy Secretary John Warner (R-Va.). But Hopkins' staff say they've checked with Sens. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman and ranking democrat on the Armed Services Committee, and both support Hopkins' amendment.

The issue opens old wounds first inflicted during the bitter inter-service battles at the close of World War II when the Pentagon was organized. The Navy won those battles, retaining its autonomy and control over its own air force and ground forces. Veteran Capitol Hill observers expect another protracted fight this time around.

Media versus Military

Some differences are bound to persist, but communication and candor can help

By Sue McMillin
Gazette Telegraph

Us versus them.

The attitudes really haven't changed. We've had the Sidle Report on the military's exclusion of the press during the Grenada invasion, plus who knows how many articles on the subject, discussions, panels and more discussions. Still, it's The Media vs. The Military.

A newspaper editor walked into the lecture hall during a National Security Forum at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., feeling as though she had a brand on her forehead. All around, military officers were rubbing their hands together and making such comments as, "We're ready for them this time."

"Them" was a panel of media colleagues.

The ensuing remarks, questions and answers lasted three hours. It was the longest, most intense session of a five-day forum attended

by 210 officers from the Air War College and 85 civilians, covering such lofty topics as arms control, the future of the Air Force, military balance and foreign affairs.

It turned out to offer a fairly healthy exchange of ideas, although it was the only session in the forum — or the college year, students said — that drew a caution against personal attacks.

Some of the most biting remarks and pointed questions came from civilians.

"I couldn't believe some of the remarks from the civilians," one officer reflected. "They really got nasty."

At the same time, he seemed to harbor the notion that the military is the only institution critical of the media.

Not true. "The Media" is the world's greatest scapegoat. Some think it's the old "kill the messenger who brings the bad news" syndrome. Occasionally the criticism is deserved. Mostly it's a case of being misunderstood. Yeah, that's

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GAZETTE-TELEGRAPH
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what The Military says too. And The Police. And The Congress. And The XYZ Industry.

It all boils down to one thing: Institutions often communicate rather poorly with the "outside" world.

As a speaker claimed, the media too often hides behind the First Amendment, claiming an inherent "right" to report something when it might be just as useful to explain directly why it is regarded as news.

Actually, the opinions of the media panelists and the military officers in the audience probably aren't so far apart. Both want to be treated fairly. Both place a high value on accuracy.

Disagreements about the handling of specific information or events are hardly surprising. There is disagreement even within the media.

Those differences aren't going to go away, but they could be eased with a little more communications — and candor.

HARTFORD COURANT 25 June 1986 (26) pg. 3

Panel Urges Army To Take New Bids for Sidearms

By JOHN F. FITZGERALD
Courant Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — A House committee recommended Tuesday that the Army reopen bidding on a \$75 million purchase of new sidearms for the military.

The House Government Operations Committee adopted a staff report that said competition for supplying the weapons should be reopened because the Smith & Wesson gunmakers of Springfield, Mass., was improperly eliminated from a 1984 Army competition. The Beretta USA Corp., a subsidiary of Armi Beretta, SpA., an Italian company, won the bid to supply 9mm pistols.

An Army spokesman said Tuesday that the service stands by its contract award and that it conducted the competition fairly and properly. The Army is acting as the purchasing agent for the weapons, which will

be used by all the military branches.

The House committee cannot force the Army to reopen the competition. Tuesday's action, however, gave added ammunition to Rep. Edward P. Boland, D-Mass., the second-ranking Democrat on the appropriations committee, whose district includes Springfield, the home of Smith & Wesson and many of its 1,950 employees.

Mike Sheehy, a Boland spokesman, said Boland will try to amend the 1987 defense appropriations bill to forbid the Army from spending \$18 million it has requested for sidearms next year unless the Beretta contract is cancelled and new bids are sought.

The General Accounting Office said the Army plans to buy 444,030 pistols to replace about 400,000 Colt .45-caliber pistols and about 100,000 miscellaneous .38-caliber revolvers used by the various armed services.

In 1985, the Army gave a contract to Beretta to deliver the pistols over five years. So far, the Army has ordered 114,030 pistols.

The Government Operations Committee, on a voice vote Tuesday, accepted its staff findings that the Army's 1984 competition was "seriously flawed from the beginning" and that Smith & Wesson had been "denied a fair opportunity to compete."

A GAO official told the committee June 5 that the Army miscalculated requirements for a firing pin test and arbitrarily revised requirements for an endurance test. The Army then eliminated Smith & Wesson, saying the company's test pistols had failed both tests.

Robert I. Hass, senior vice president of Smith & Wesson, said Tuesday, "We are gratified that Congressman [Jack] Brooks's full committee has vindicated Smith &

Wesson's position that it was unfairly removed from competition. We will await with interest the result of their recommendation to the appropriations committee."

Brooks, a Texas Democrat, is chairman of the Government Operations Committee.

Hass said the committee's action also "tells every police chief in the United States that the Smith & Wesson [9mm pistol] does not suffer in comparison to the Beretta."

The 9mm program is a very large contract by small-arms industry standards, and it has greater significance. Both police and sportsmen worldwide share "a strong bias" toward choosing the weapon selected by the Army, Hass said. Profits from commercial sales of the 9mm pistol chosen by the Army ultimately

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GUARD...from Pg. 13

flying at night saw a suspicious boat in Miami's Biscayne Bay, called in two 41-foot patrol boats that corralled the boat and chased the three-man crew into the arms of waiting Miami police. The result: the biggest cocaine bust in Coast Guard history, almost a ton.

The Guard is spread thin

This year's prime crisis was the long search after the space shuttle Challenger went down. Now come the Fourth of July and the 100th birthday of the Statue of Liberty, which are expected to draw twice as many seagoing visitors to New York Harbor as sailed in for the Bicentennial.

And the statue's birthday is being staged in a world that sees terrorists everywhere.

All of this when the thin blue line has been stretched even thinner, and the ships and planes that wear Coast Guard red are spending more time at home.

"We're coming up on the busy season," says Gracey. "We've been doing without maintenance. We're eating into spare parts boxes."

He says he visited one unit recently where a patrol boat's going on a mission "depended on whether the morning mail brought the part it needed. You can only do that so long, and then you just have to shut them down."

Routine patrols have been cut to the nub, fishery patrols cut in half, spare parts purchasing stopped. Some units work 80 to 100 hours a week. The Coast Guard's men and

women spend up to six months of the year at sea, especially the polar icebreakers, and Gracey is unwilling to ask more. At one point this spring, seven search-and-rescue stations in southern Florida were on "Crew Fatigue Status," which means new priorities are set and operations are pared because fatigue could affect safety.

The fight for funds

The Guard depends on the Department of Transportation's ability to give it operating funds for the rest of the fiscal year. The DOT has another money-short unit as well — the Federal Aviation Agency, in charge of air and airport safety.

Hanging over all federal agencies is the possibility of across-the-board cuts under the Gramm-Rudman Act.

The Coast Guard's pinch started in Congress. Last fall the Senate came up with \$230 million in cuts. That would have meant laying off a third of the ships and planes and laying off 20 percent of the 39,000 Guard force.

A conference committee reduced the cut to \$36 million, but about the same time Congress passed a military pay and benefit bill that cost the Guard \$30 million. Congress didn't provide money. Then came Gramm-Rudman cuts for fiscal 1986 of \$76 million.

The Coast Guard insists that its budget is as lean as possible, especially compared with megabuck Washington services and agencies.

"I heard about one of our units who were buying some spare parts

with their own money," Gracey says.

Patriotic duty — unpaid

Meantime, the Guard is gearing up for Miss Liberty's birthday in New York Harbor. It is calling in 70 boats and ships from Eastern Seaboard stations, bringing up reservists and Coast Guard auxiliary with their own boats.

Nearly 50 U.S. and foreign naval vessels will be on station and on parade, as well as the Tall Ships that were present at the Bicentennial. Traffic will be horrendous; there will be stalled boats, people falling into the water, medical problems. The possibility of terrorism hangs over the harbor as well.

The Guard may spend as much as \$1 million for its brief effort, without reimbursement.

But the Guard is used to stretching and making do. When it reached out to take in the 200-mile limit nine years ago, it realized it would be encountering language problems when it faced foreign ships. It sent one Guardsman to school to learn Russian.

The Challenger search this year cost about \$2 million.

The Guard had three boats on patrol for the space shot. They swept into action, aided by Coast Guard helicopters and planes. The cutter Dauntless arrived later.

Normally, it would have taken longer for the Dauntless to get on site, but the cutter had been diverted from drug patrol off the Bahamas, south of Miami, to rescue a

small Haitian sailboat with 72 aboard well north of its station.

A Haitian vessel was foundering. Seas were rising to 20 feet. A Coast Guard helicopter was first on the scene, lowering its rescue basket, which a dozen desperate hands grasped at once. It was too much for the winch, so the helicopter simply rose above the seas with its human cargo dangling below, and airlifted them to the freighter.

The Dauntless arrived and saved the rest by lowering small boats.

Illegal people, illegal drugs

Coast Guard units in Florida face a flow of illegal immigrants from Haiti and ever-busy drug runners.

Some 7,000 Haitians have been caught since the interdiction began in October, 1981. The Coast Guard has intercepted about 1,100 Haitians since the fall of the Duvalier government.

They continue to come in leaky, rotting sailboats, jammed to the gunwales.

In addition, the Caribbean patrols seize about two million pounds of marijuana a year. Last year the Guard intercepted 7,500 pounds of cocaine, up from 2,000 pounds the year before.

In all, patrols seize 230 drug boats a year. Every so often, the boats are auctioned off with captured airplanes and cars. The auction last April brought more than \$3 million. The money does not go into Coast Guard coffers.

BOSTON GLOBE 25 June 1986 (26) Pg. 1

Study: AIDS exposure greater among military recruits

By Richard A. Knox
Globe Staff

PARIS — Routine blood testing has revealed that US military recruits have had nearly five times the exposure to AIDS as the American population at large, a leading Army researcher said here yesterday.

Unexpectedly high prevalence rates of AIDS antibodies were found in men and women who volunteered for military service, Dr. Donald Burke of Walter Reed Army Medical Research Institute reported at an international conference on AIDS.

Burke and others said the new findings demonstrate that AIDS is silently passing among young Americans through heterosexual contact, with peak exposure in 24-year-olds.

Nationwide, one in every 625 recruits tested from October to March showed definite evidence of AIDS antibodies. In New York City, the prevalence was much higher — one in every 50 male recruits — and there the results were similar in both men and women recruits.

By contrast, only one in every 2,940 units of blood collected in the United States contains AIDS antibodies, according to recent studies. (Contaminated blood is discarded.) Studies of blood donors

offer the only baseline data suggesting the extent of AIDS exposure in the American population at large.

Routine screening of all military recruits for AIDS antibodies began last autumn. The new results are based on testing of nearly 306,000.

Burke, a US Army colonel, said he does not think the finding reflects the presence of many recruits from groups known to be at high risk for AIDS — homosexuals and intravenous drug users — because "the system strongly selects against" such military volunteers.

The new statistics are ominous, several American AIDS researchers said, because they suggest a larger future caseload of the disease than previously suspected. Moreover, it may mean that heterosexual transmission is taking place much more efficiently than had been assumed.

"The value of these numbers is to show there is a lot of AIDS infection out there among young adults," said one scientist, who asked not to be named. "And our resources to fight this disease are still trivial."

The unpublished Army study shows that in many American cities one in every 100 to 200 young adults harbors AIDS antibodies. This approximates the level seen among homosexual men in San Francisco five years ago, Burke said in an interview.

Those who have antibodies to the virus are assumed by experts to be infected for life and capable of infecting others.

Women's exposure higher

In women recruits, the overall prevalence of AIDS antibodies was less than half that of men — one woman in every 1,613 compared to one man in every 641. But female recruits' exposure to AIDS was still considerably higher than had been suspected from earlier data.

Moreover, the much higher prevalence in women recruits from New York City shows that young women can be infected at rates almost as high as men if a "critical mass" of the virus is present in a given area. "I think we're seeing the first wave of spread into the heterosexual community," said Burke, who is chief of Walter Reed's viral diseases department.

Burke and other AIDS experts at this meeting said they were most worried about the nearly-

equal prevalence of AIDS antibodies among both sexes of recruits from Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens — a pattern seen until now only in Central African countries and Haiti. It has been thought that heterosexual transmission of the AIDS virus was linked in some way to cultural or environmental factors found in the developing world.

The number of actual AIDS cases in US women remains low — about 1,400 female cases so far out of nearly 22,000 total AIDS cases. Half of these female cases have been intravenous drug users who acquired the infection from contaminated needles. But the new figures suggest a much larger number of heterosexually transmitted cases in future years, when latent infection produces disease.

In addition, the figures seem to forecast a more rapid spread of AIDS among young adults generally because the chances of a sexual encounter with a person infected with the AIDS virus are high in many cities, Burke said.

The new figures were presented privately earlier this month to leading federal health officials and US AIDS experts.

The 454 military volunteers who tested positive on several blood tests were rejected for mili-

tary service but were called in and told that they carried antibodies to the virus and probably carried the virus itself.

'Shocking and tragic'

The overall test results surprised military researchers, but when the AIDS-positive recruits were recently analyzed by geographic region, the results were "shocking and tragic," as Dr. Robert Redfield of Walter Reed put it.

In the Middle Atlantic states from New York to Maryland and Delaware, two out of every 1,000 recruits were found to harbor the AIDS virus compared to about 1.6 per 1,000 nationally.

California is another AIDS "hotspot," reflecting the number of reported cases there.

Recruits from the New England states, including Massachusetts, had relatively low prevalence of AIDS antibodies, less than one in 1,000 tested.

Burke said he is "very confident" in the testing data. If an initial blood screen is positive, he explained, it is retested with a more accurate test. After positive individuals are informed of the results, about three-quarters asked for a repeat test; more than 98 percent of those repeat tests confirmed the positive results.

PROVIDENCE-JOURNAL 22 June 1986 (26) Pg. 18

Across America

Budget cuts and extra duties leave the Coast Guard reeling

By JOHN BARBOUR
Associated Press

GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N.Y. — While our century-old lady of the harbor looks on, the no-nonsense boats and aircraft emblazoned with the familiar vermilion insignia will shepherd some 40,000 boats and warships this Fourth of July.

It won't look like the U.S. Coast Guard is broke.

But it nearly is.

Efforts are under way in Congress to rescue the Guard for the fiscal year starting Sept. 30, but that won't restore the deficit for this year.

The 196-year-old service that guards the shorelines is running \$35 million short, having cut more than \$100 million in operating expenses so far this year, mostly by

deferring maintenance, reducing training and virtually halting routine patrols. The Guard doesn't go to sea these days unless there's clearly trouble out there.

The policy now is to call commercial towing services for boats in trouble, unless life and property are in danger.

While coping with an operating budget pared to \$1.69 billion in 1986, the Coast Guard has trimmed its manpower by almost 2,000 people through attrition in the past five years.

And impending are more cuts if Gramm-Rudman reductions are imposed indiscriminately.

Adm. James S. Gracey, who retired as commandant on May 30, says his tactic, should budget cuts become too stringent, would be to

continue to perform Guard functions, only in fewer places.

Over and over in any calendar year, the Guard is called on to do yeoman's work: the routine chores of maintaining buoys on the Mississippi River or navigation stations around the world, chasing down smugglers and illegal immigrants, dogging icebergs, yanking stricken sailors from the sea, checking fishermen for illegal catches.

There is always special duty when hurricanes strike. The Coast Guard even directs ships worldwide to the aid of other ships in trouble. Its computers watch over a quarter of the world's maritime fleet.

Last year, a Guard helicopter

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WASH. TIMES 6/26/86 Pg. 4

Judge lifts Army drug tests ban

A federal judge, reversing himself within 24 hours, yesterday decided to permit the Army to proceed with drug tests of civilian workers critical to national security.

U.S. District Judge Thomas F. Hogan ruled on Monday he did not have jurisdiction in the matter but ordered the drug tests blocked to allow the union bringing the suit a chance to appeal. Yesterday, the judge lifted the stay, saying the union would have to get an injunction from an appeals court.

The Army's civilian drug-testing program is being challenged by the National Federation of Federal Employees, its Aberdeen Proving Grounds local and the local's president, Charles W. Jackson, who is a guard at the Maryland facility.

In his original decision, made public Tuesday, Judge Hogan said the union, under the Civil Service Reform Act, must seek relief from either the Federal Labor Relations Authority or the Merit Systems Protection Board because the issue is primarily a labor-management dispute.

FEDERAL CONTRACTS REPORT

23 June 1986 (26) Pg. 1172

• **CONGRESS:** Reps. James L. Oberstar (D-Minn) and John G. Rowland (R-Conn) will co-chair a new Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition Task Force on Defense Spending. The appointments were announced by Coalition Co-Chairs Howard Wolpe (D-Mich) and Frank Horton (R-NY). The task force will coordinate the group's efforts to insure that Pentagon spending is distributed more equitably among the regions of the nation. It also plans to examine the strategic implications and the economic impact of defense spending patterns. Historically, states in the South and West on average have received a disproportionate share of defense dollars, according to the Coalition, and no major strategic installations are located north of the Mason-Dixon Line. Horton and Wolpe noted that the Defense Department by and large has resisted arguments that it should consider the effect on local and regional economies of its spending decisions. Establishment of the task force, they said, will allow the Coalition to examine legislative options in Congress and to influence the Pentagon's decision-making.

WASHINGTON POST 6/26/86 Pg. 19

Senate Unit Votes to Curb Federal Use of Polygraphs

Associated Press

The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee voted 11 to 5 yesterday for a bill that would ban polygraph testing of most nongovernment workers.

The bill, sent to the full Senate, would make it illegal for employers to require workers or job applicants to submit to lie detector tests.

The only exemptions would be for employees of federal, state and local governments and those working for defense contractors having access to classified information.

The House has passed a similar bill that would grant more exemptions.

It is estimated that more than a million polygraph tests are admin-

istered annually to employees in the private sector. Currently, 32 states regulate use of polygraphs or polygraph examiners.

Business representatives have testified that polygraphs are necessary to stop theft and rid firms of employees using dangerous drugs. Prominent attorney F. Lee Bailey told the committee the tests are useful in preparing defenses in court.

But opponents have said the tests are unreliable. At a hearing, a psychology professor who also is a licensed operator hooked himself to a polygraph machine, took a deep breath and caused a needle to jump sharply. Such a reading would indicate deception, he said.

WASHINGTON TIMES 26 June 1986 Pg. 8

No nuclear cover likely for allies, Turner says

TOKYO (Reuters) — The United States would not launch nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union to defend its own allies, former CIA chief Stansfield Turner has told a Japanese newspaper.

"It is foolish for NATO countries to assume that a European war is deterred by U.S. nuclear capabilities," said Adm. Turner in a Washington interview with the newspaper Yomiuri. The senior naval officer who headed the CIA under President Jimmy Carter was quoted as saying: "We have no idea to defend Europe with nuclear weapons based on the U.S. mainland."

"Whoever the U.S. president might be, it is impossible that the United States would wage a nuclear war on Moscow, even if Warsaw Pact

troops invaded [Europe]," he was quoted as saying.

"Similarly, it is impossible nuclear missiles would be launched from the U.S. mainland to defend Japan. We do not intend to defend our allies at the sacrifice of Washington."

Yomiuri said it was told by Adm. Turner that defense treaties concluded by the United States with foreign countries did not refer to the use of nuclear weapons.

Japanese government officials have said the United States provides Japan with a nuclear defense umbrella under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Asked why the United States does not make it clear that the nuclear umbrella is an illusion, the retired admiral was quoted as replying: "Making it clear frightens Japan."

Yomiuri quoted unnamed Defense Department sources as saying: "If New York and Washington were attacked, the president would order firing missiles against the Soviet Union without hesitation."

But it was doubtful he would push the nuclear button in the case of an attack on Japan, they said.

LIBYA...

from Pg. 11

ing one-two, though that had an important catalytic effect, but additionally because other nations followed up with body-blows: expulsions, drastic cuts in trade, sizable withdrawals of European workers in Libya. How well we in the industrialized nations can keep the terrorist scourge under control depends entirely on our common perseverance. Let's stick with the hard-nosed formula that has given us two months' respite from its ravages.

WASHINGTON TIMES

26 June 1986 Pg. 6

Indonesia, Australia strain eases

JAKARTA, Indonesia — Resumption of talks here today on joint development of the Timor Gap is an encouraging sign that Australian-Indonesian relations are returning to normal, Australian Ambassador Bill Morrison said yesterday. Bilateral relations deteriorated sharply in April after an Australian newspaper carried a story comparing Indonesian President Suharto to former Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos. Both countries have agreed to joint exploitation of the small but potentially oil-rich stretch of sea between their territory until they can agree on a sea boundary.

Mr. Morrison dismissed suggestions that his country is threatened by Indonesia but cautioned that a change of leadership in Jakarta could transform the vast archipelago into a springboard to Australia. "We learned in the Pacific War that when a hostile power was in charge in Indonesia, that this archipelago itself represents a springboard to Australia," said Mr. Morrison, a former defense minister. He told a press conference he was skeptical of a recent public opinion poll that indicated Australians view Indonesia as a greater military threat than the Soviet Union.

18 Arabs fitting terror profile seized at border

By J.H. Doyle
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The FBI is investigating 18 Arab aliens who match the bureau's terrorist profile and who were arrested Monday by Mexican authorities near the Texas border, sources said yesterday.

"They [the Arabs] were trying to make arrangements to be smuggled into the United States," said Jerry Goodman, associate chief in charge of intelligence and anti-smuggling for the U.S. Border Patrol in Del Rio, Texas.

"We shared this intelligence per a local agreement with Mexican authorities on ... 'suspected terrorists' or people who fit a certain profile," he said. "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

In the wake of the U.S. bombing raid on Libya in April, U.S. law enforcement authorities distributed profiles of potential terrorists and ordered the Border Patrol to be on alert for attempted entries by terrorists.

He said the group was "young, fairly well-dressed, fairly well-educated, from a certain part of the world ... and they had no logical reason for being in Sabinas [Mexico]."

The 18 Arabs were arrested by the Mexican police at a Sabinas motel,

about 60 miles away from the border town of Del Rio. They were not carrying any weapons and did not resist arrest, Mr. Goodman said.

The group, reportedly including two or three women, was comprised of 11 Lebanese, six Syrians and one Turk, he said.

Sabinas, on a main route to the U.S.-Mexico border, is a well-known staging area for smuggling illegal aliens into the United States. It is two hours by auto from the Texas border.

Mr. Goodman said the group was "in violation of their Mexican immigration status" for being that close to the southern border of the United States.

The group arrived in Mexico City on June 14, ostensibly to attend the World Cup soccer championships, but three days later showed up in Guadalajara to apply for visas to enter the United States, officials said.

"We are aware of the fact that they are in custody," William Carter, an FBI headquarters spokesman said. "The Mexican authorities obviously made the arrest. ... It's purely a Mexican operation."

The FBI's office in San Antonio declined to comment.

Joe Bennett, the U.S. immigration officer in Guadalajara who handled the Arab group's request for visas, said, "I know the case, but I can't talk

about it."

The group did not initially attract the suspicion of American officials, John Roney, spokesman for the U.S. Consulate in Guadalajara, said in a telephone interview.

"Their documents and reasons for entering didn't justify the granting of visas," Mr. Roney said. "Their documentation was insufficient. ... That's not unusual; that happens all the time."

"It was supposed to be a tour ... arranged through Beirut," he said.

Mexico is swamped with foreign tourists now because of the World Cup, he said. About 1,000 people a day apply for visas at the Guadalajara office, he said.

Mr. Roney said he recalled that a group of "26 or 28" Arabs had applied for visas at the office on June 17 and stated they wanted "to go right away" to Disney World in Orlando, Fla.

He recalled that, according to their applications, a few of the Arabs had listed themselves as self-employed, while others listed employers. "There was one mechanic and a couple of white-collar workers," he said.

From Guadalajara, the Mideast "tour group" apparently drove north by bus to Sabinas, where they stayed

in a motel until they were apprehended. The group contacted a "pipeline," or commercial smuggling ring, and sought entry into the United States, sources said.

It costs up to \$10,000 per head to be smuggled across the treacherous Rio Grande River in canoes, with getaway vehicles on the other side, sources said.

"They're off the beaten path if they were doing any sightseeing," a source said. "There's nothing out here."

In their possession when arrested were "a couple of envelopes" listing names and addresses of people in "more than one city" in the United States, Mr. Goodman said.

The FBI is checking those leads, sources said.

Seventeen of the 18 in the group reportedly were taken yesterday to Monterrey, Mexico, where they will to be questioned further. The 18th was hospitalized after the arrest. Mexican officials said the 17 would be flown to Mexico City and "repatriated" to their native countries.

"We would have no information on that," said Carl Olson, a spokesman at the American Consulate in Monterrey.

HARTFORD COURANT

25 June 1986 (26)

Libya bombing showing a payoff

More than two months after the U.S. attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi, it begins to look as if President Reagan's bombing order, widely praised at home and much maligned abroad, has paid off. Knock on wood.

Save for a few minor flare-ups, none of which are attributable to Libya, all has been quiet in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. The brooding Moammar Gadhafi may be plotting retribution, but his forces in the field — potential arms smugglers and terrorist ringleaders — have been thinned significantly by the expulsion of more than 100 Libyans, mostly "diplomats," from Europe. It can be reasonably assumed that the few personnel remaining in Libya's overseas missions are the objects of uncommon curiosity on the part of local security services.

Just as important, after all the post-bombing hullabaloo died down, Gadhafi found how lonely it was to be an unabashed supporter/bankroller of institutionalized cut-throats. Very soon it became evident he had been stiffed by all his nominal colleagues, be they of Third World radical, Arab, Moslem or OPEC persuasion. There was no room for the outcast Gadhafi under any of their umbrellas nor that of his military

hardware-providers in Moscow, who clearly conditioned replacement of weaponry lost in the U.S. raids upon his subdued conduct.

And subdued he has been, so much so that many speculate he was unhinged by the attacks. Surely, he's under enough strain — not all of which is of U.S. origin. Libya's economy, for instance, is moribund, mainly due to the oil price-and-production war but also resulting from his own cockamamie notions of nation-building. And Gadhafi's habit of sleeping in a different location each night may have less to do with evading U.S. bombers than with keeping out of the way of his restive professional soldiers.

Gadhafi's all-too-deserved plight hasn't gone unnoticed by other dabblers in the black arts of terror. Syria's Hafez Assad, it is said, aims to exert far tighter control over the assassins' gangs on his turf, and even Iran appears to be trying to rein in Shiite extremists in Lebanon. No one wants to share the glaring spotlight with Gadhafi.

The world ought to mark well this lull in state-sponsored terrorism and reflect on the reasons underlying it. It's not working just because Reagan hit Gadhafi with a iolt-

TO: PWArnold
FROM: JAFischman
SUBJECT: Status of Libya Action Plan Projects

At this point, it is probably best (for me as well as for you) to keep a written log of the status of the projects which are at various stages of incompleteness.

THEMATIC DEVELOPMENT

EUROPEAN ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA: One article, based in part on MOK's research has appeared on the Wireless File. Monica has produced a second more detailed unclassified version, although some gaps remain, awaiting post responses. The Wireless File has this second version. *expressions, tightening visas, travel requirements*
1. State Department release 2. Wireless By Fri.

LIBYAN INTERFERENCE IN AFRICA: MOK has produced a list which still needs further additions from classified sources. - *Several weeks*

aim 4 public documents
QADHAFI/GADHAFI SELF-INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS
CRITICAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY LIBYA'S NEIGHBORS AND FELLOW ARABS
TERRORIST NETWORKS
EVIDENCE OF LIBYA SUPPORT

These four items have been assigned to John Tenuta, who is conducting research at the Library of Congress (primarily, but not exclusively FBIS and JPRS material and NEXIS leads provided by Monica O'Keefe). Tenuta can comb for all four simultaneously, using the same material.

Also on STATE SUPPORTED TERRORISM, Wireless File is *trying to get right*
to ~~examining~~ feature in Global Affairs by Charles Lichtenstein.

EVENTS IN LIBYA -

We are expecting some material from DOD sources. We are probing other sources. *Post & Times - separate cable*

DESCRIPTION OF TERRORIST TRAINING CAMPS

We may be unsuccessful in uncovering information which adds significantly to what already appeared in the Newsweek cover story.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIBYA

Appeared as a Wireless File story.

HISTORY OF QADHAFI, RISE TO POWER, STORMY RELATIONS WITH ARAB WORLD, etc.

Much of this type of information may be available, unclassified and on the shelf, in the form of papers prepared by participants in War College (and similar) programs. DOD is looking into the inventory.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

UPDATED CHRONOLOGY

White House has provided us with a good first cut. We are filling in from multiple sources and should have something ready for release within a few days. *To be circulated for clearance*

FAA has provided us with a complete (more than you ever wanted to know) chronology on aircraft incidents starting with the Year 0.

ECONOMIC COSTS OF TERRORISM

Terrell Arnold (Parker Borg's predecessor, now a consultant) is looking for an economist either at State or Commerce who can do a reliable analysis of this complex theme. We want to treat tourism as an incidental; it is a theme we should no longer be dwelling on.

Bob Oakley is scheduled to present testimony on this theme in a couple of weeks. //

TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Sofaer article (essentially the same as the Columbia Law Commencement Address) is the lead piece in the current Foreign Affairs. The Wireless File is looking into further replay. ✓

WORLDNET is considering a transmission on this theme with Judge Sofaer and a ranking Justice Department official. ✓

AVIATION SECURITY

Wireless File is considering an interview with FAA officials within the next few days on the consultative process with Europe and others and progress that has resulted from that process. Dante Fascell is expected to release an HFAC report (with press conference) critical of European efforts mid-week. Wireless File interview, if ready, would be pre-positioned. //

FAA has recommended possible WORLDNET with Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole in early July to precede the Tokyo Economic Summit follow-up meeting in Bonn. *July 9*

OTHER ACTIVITY:

→ The FOREIGN PRESS CENTER SEMINAR is scheduled for July 9 at the State Department. - *One day*

? *Fascell/Lugar Wouldnet - bipartisan support for US policy on terrorism - not finally*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

[*Wouldnet for Europe on Terrorism - follow up to TO-Ryo Summit - Whitehead*]

The request for an OVAL OFFICE INTERVIEW has been submitted to the White House.

Bob Oakley gave an interview two weeks ago with two Egyptian correspondents. A number of additional ONE-ON-ONE INTERVIEWS with selected correspondents should be considered.

BUILD ON TREVI GROUP (and similar) MEETINGS: (See AVIATION SECURITY above.)

HUMAN RIGHTS, etc. CONTACTS: Not enthusiastically received by posts.

VIDEO PRODUCT: A new script has been completed. Product has been funded.

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY: Planning underway.

OTHER USIA ACTIVITY:

POST AMPART REQUESTS:

-P/D has responded to posts' responses with several additional offerings.

WORLDNETS:

-International Law: (Judge Sofaer/Ranking Justice Official) Status pending.

-International Law/Extradition Treaty: (One Country WORLDNET - UK) - State Dept Legal Advisor had asked to hold until the bill comes out of committee (which happened 6/12)

-Aviation Security: Possible program with Secretary Dole in early July.

-The daily European feed has devoted heavy coverage to the theme (see printout).

WIRELESS FILE

-ABA Convention: File carried Oakley and Weinberger texts and five additional stories (Overview, Sofaer, Webster, Kupperman, John Norton Moore).

-EC Actions (based on material from Monica O'Keefe and newsclips) carried this past week.

-Human Rights in Libya, selections from Annual Country Reports, with Schifter quotes, ran in File last week.

-Interview with Terrell Arnold (former S/CT Deputy) scheduled for the coming week.

-Other items being examined by the File: Terrorism and the Law (Sofaer in Foreign Affairs), feature in Global Affairs by Charles Lichtenstein on state-supported terrorism, FAA interview on aviation security.

ACQUIRED TV PRODUCTS: See printout.

AMPARTS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM

Action Plan Requests

Under the Public Diplomacy Action Plan, Amparts were requested by the following posts: Kuwait, Kuala Lumpur, Vienna, Lisbon, and Caracas.

P/DF has completed the following actions:

Kuwait - Arranged for O/CT officer to conduct briefings requested by post.

Kuala Lumpur - The only EA post requesting an Ampart (USG official). It is not cost effective to send a one-country Ampart. We hope to arrange a visit by a government official already traveling in Asia.

Vienna - Robert Bentley scheduled for June 27 (post cancelled).

Lisbon - Robert Bentley scheduled for June 30.

Caracas - Hope to program Brian Jenkins or Alberto Coll.

Ampart Programs Offered to Posts

Yonah Alexander - Australia, New Zealand - June 1986

William Farrell - Netherlands, France, U.K., Austria, Sweden, Italy - July 1986

Brian Jenkins - Mexico and/or Venezuela - September 1986

Alberto Coll - Expect to offer him to Latin American posts including Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile, Trinidad - June-July 1986

Ampart Programs Completed

Ambassador Edward Marks - The Netherlands (The Hague) - March 1986;
Germany (Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Hamburg),
Switzerland (Geneva, Bern, Zurich), and
Belgium (Brussels) - May 1986

Brian M. Jenkins - Italy (Milan) - April 1986;
Spain (Madrid) - June 1986

Supplemental Ampart Programs

Ambassador Jean Gerard - Germany (Frankfurt) - May 1986

Joseph Kruzel - Germany (Munich) - May 1986

Richard P. Cronin - India (New Delhi, Madras, Calcutta, Hyderabad) and
Pakistan (Islamabad) - April 1986

DAS Robert Smalley - U.K. (London) - May 1986

Charles Maechling - Spain (Madrid, Seville) - June 1986


Jerrold Green - U.K. (London), Kuwait, Bangladesh (Dhaka), Malaysia (K.L.)
- April 1986

Electronic Programs Completed

Alberto Coll (TPC) - Buenos Aires (US-Libya) February 5, 1986
Alberto Coll (TPC) - Caracas (US-Libya) February 24, 1986
Michael Austrian/Don Wallace (TPC) - Lagos (US-Libya) March 27, 1986
DAS Parker Borg (TPC) - Vienna (Terrorism) April 10, 1986
Ambassador Edward Marks (TPC) - Sydney (US-Libya) April 16, 1986
Ambassador Edward Marks (Radio Interview) - Sydney (US-Libya) April 17, 1986
Alberto Coll (TPC) - Mexico/Asuncion/Buenos Aires (US-Libya) April 18, 1986
Walter Laqueur (TPC) - Vienna (US-Libya) April 22, 1986
Walter Laqueur (TPC) - Hamburg (US-Libya) April 23, 1986
Ambassador Vernon Walters (TPC) - Brussels (US-Libya) April 25, 1986
Joseph Sisco/Amb. Edward Marks (TPC) - Athens (US-Libya) April 25, 1986
Alberto Coll (TPC) - Bogota/La Paz/San Jose (US-Libya) April 25, 1986
Alberto Coll (TPC) - Caracas/Montevideo/Santiago (US-Libya) April 30, 1986
Brian Jenkins (TPC) - Sao Paulo (Terrorism) May 9, 1986
Brian Jenkins (TPC) - Bogota (Terrorism in LatAm) May 22, 1986

TERRORISM

USIA Wireless File/USInfo Support
January 1985 - May 1986



June 15, 1986

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN
TERRORISM AND LIBYA

Press and Publications:

Wireless File/USInfo:

Total items for May: 263
April: 565
March: 133
February: 45
January: 241

Last week: 11 items on File
2 USInfo cables

Pamphlets:

Nothing reported

TV Service:

VCRs offered to field: 14
America Today segments: 22

Planned productions:

Nothing reported

VOA:

Editorials:

Total for May: 4
April: 6

Last week: 0

VOA Features:

Nothing reported

Language Versions:

Nothing reported

Foreign Press Center:

Briefings on terrorism: 5
Last week: --

Upcoming briefings:

Nothing reported

American Participants/Satellite Speakers:

Offers made since beginning of Plan: 3
No information available on whether any of these
individuals were accepted, programmed.

Prior to beginning of Plan: 2 AmParts travelled
8 Satellite Speakers conducted EDs,
TPCs

International Visitor Program:

Nothing reported

Miscellaneous Items:

Policy Guidance Cable 86-33, 5/6/86
Soviet Propaganda Highlights, 6/4-10
Soviet Propaganda Highlights, 5/21-27
Disinformation Alert, 5/23