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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. note	Your Meeting with Italian Prime Minister Craxi October 24. (1 p.)	n.d.	P1
2. talking points	Talking Points. (1 p.)	n.d.	P1
3. talking points	Meeting with Prime Minister Craxi. (1 p.)	n.d.	P1
COLLECTION: Coordination Office, NSC: Records, 1981-88			rs
FILE FOLDER: 157 To Geneva (11/16-21/85) File 1 (3) [Box 90538]			11/3/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8509100

RECEIVED 09 NOV 85 14

TO PRESIDENT

FROM KORN, DAVID

DOCDATE 27 OCT 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

MP

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM KORN RE SUMMIT & USE OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

ACTION: MEMO MARTIN TO HIGGINS

DUE: 14 NOV 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SESTANOVICH

MANDEL

MILLER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(DR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

9100

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date:

11-4-85

NSC/S

To:

Carol Cleveland

anyone know
Russian up
there - is this
true?



ANNE HIGGINS
Special Assistant to the
President and Director
of Correspondence
Room 94, x7610

2932 DAVENPORT STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008
October 27, 1985

#350538

9100

AK
The President,
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

It was very good seeing you last week in the White House. When in 1975 we met at Ted Cummings' home in Beverly Hills we have all predicted that you will make a great President.

Our predictions came true and indeed you are not only a great man but one of the few great Presidents our country had. You have the courage, the dignity, sincerity, leadership and the humility of a great man.

When I commented about the summit and the usage of Russian language you suggested that I write you, so here it is.

In Russian language the words for peace and the world are spelled and pronounced indentically, namely MIR and to pronounce it in English would be MEER.


So in effect when the Soviets use the word MEER they mean that they want the WORLD and not Peace. For example, the word VLADIMIR (VLADEEMEER) means the ruler of the world and not the ruler of the peace and that goes back to 11th century AD.

The Soviets always dominated and oppressed their people and continue trying to take over the world.

When I mentioned this to you, you wanted it in writing, so here it is.

Good luck in Geneva, and please remember, the Soviets need us more than we need them.

With best wishes to you and Mrs. Reagan,


David Korn

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: OCTOBER 29, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE DAVID KORN

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING UPCOMING SUMMIT MEETING

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
ANNE HIGGINS		ORG	85/10/29		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
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	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *      OF SIGNER    *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED          *      CODE = A      *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *      OUTGOING     *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL PREFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b) White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983 BY <u>RP</u>, NARA, Date <u>8/17/95</u>					1 END OF SOVIET INF MORATORIUM DUTCH INF DEPLOYMENT DECISION	2 CAMP DAVID
3 CAMP DAVID THEME: PEOPLE TO PEOPLE AND ARMS CONTROL SCHEDULE HALF DAYS FOR GENEVA PREPARATIONS	4	5	6 INTERVIEW WITH U.S. WIRES	7 SDI EVENT MEDAL OF FREEDOM MEETING W/ SOVIET EXPERTS INTERVIEW W/US NEWS & WORLD REPORT	8 MEETING W/ GOP CONG. LEADERS LUNCH W/ RELIGIOUS LEADERS	9 RADIO TALK TO SOVIET PEOPLE VIA VOA
10	11 VETERAN'S DAY REMARKS AT ARLINGTON	12 MEETING BPART CONGRESS LEADERSHIP NSC TIME LUNCH W/FORMER NATL SECURITY ADV. INTERVIEW W/ SELECTED FOREIGN BROADCASTERS	13 MEETING W/ CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS CABINET MEETING NSC MEETING	14 NSC GENEVA MEETING W/ ARMS NEGOTIATORS PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION	15 NSC GENEVA DOD REPORT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT	16 GENEVA DEPARTURE REMARKS SHORT ARRIVAL CEREMONY IN GENEVA Apt
17 GENEVA MEET W/ SENIOR ADVISORS	18 GENEVA BRIEFING W/ SENIOR ADVISORS WORKING LUNCH MEETING W/ SWISS PRESIDENT	19 GENEVA MORNING SESSION W/ GORBACHEV WORKING LUNCH W/ ADVISORS AFTERNOON SESSION W/ GORBACHEV SOVIETS HOST DINNER	20 GENEVA MORNING SESSION W/ GORBACHEV WORKING LUNCH W/ ADVISORS AFTERNOON SESSION W/ GORBACHEV	21 GENEVA RETURN TO WASHINGTON CONSULT W/ NATO ALLIES IN BRUSSELS PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS	22 CAMP DAVID HOUSE ADJOURNS CABINET MEETING MEETING W/ U.S. PRESS	23 CAMP DAVID RADIO TALK
24	25	26	27	28 THANKSGIVING	29	30 RADIO TALK

RECEIVED 26 OCT 85 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 25 OCT 85

PLATT, N

26 OCT 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

MEDIA

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

HUMAN RIGHTS

ARMS CONTROL

AP

SUBJECT: GENEVA MTG PRESS PAPERS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 30 OCT 85 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

RAYMOND

MANDEL

MILLER

STEINER

KORENGOLD

KRAEMER

SESTANOVICH

SMALL

PEARSON

DOBRIANSKY

COMMENTS

REF# 8531731

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(DR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
-	10/28	Recd STATE MEMO		
Matlock	S 10/28	Appropriate Action		WR- JU- SS- SE- KS- KG- MI- SK- BP- PD-

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Geneva Meetings Press Book

These attached press papers are the final State Department submissions for the press book to be distributed before the President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. They supplement an earlier group of papers, submitted under a separate memorandum.

Bonckmley
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

President's Meeting with Gorbachev
Press Book

Geneva

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Human Rights

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- Soviet Jewry
- Prominent Human Rights Cases

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- U.S.-U.S.S.R. Civil Aviation

Arms Control

- Interim Restraint and Compliance
- U.S. Space Arms Control Policy (draft GIST)
- Soviet Strategic Defense
- Geneva NST Talks (draft GIST)
- INF: Previous Talks
- INF: Current Talks
- MBFR
- CDE (draft GIST)
- ABM Treaty

HUMAN RIGHTS

The human rights situation in the Soviet Union has been deteriorating since the late 1970's as Soviet authorities move to eliminate all forms of internal dissent. By late 1982 the Helsinki Monitors movement, created in the wake of Soviet signing of the Helsinki Final Act, had been effectively destroyed. Leading human rights activists such as Dr. Andrey Sakharov, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy and Yuriy Orlov had been imprisoned or forced into internal exile. Soviet authorities have also continued their efforts to repress religious believers and cultural minorities.

Since Gorbachev assumed power in March, the human rights picture has remained bleak. Arrests of Baptists, Pentecostals, Ukrainian and Lithuanian Catholics and other Christians remain high. Ten Pentecostals out of a community of 170 in the Siberian village of Chuguevka have been convicted since January. Every working person in the community has been fired and several families have been threatened with the loss of their children. The crackdown on the revival of Jewish cultural activism continues. Jewish emigration remains at its lowest level since the 1960's. Although news that three longterm refuseniks (waiting 12-15 years) were allowed to emigrate in August-October was positive, the numbers were too small to be encouraging.

Dr. Andrey Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, remain isolated, and conditions for human rights activists Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and Iosif Begun have deteriorated. Irina Grivnina, active in exposing psychiatric abuse, was promised exit permission in late October, probably an effort to influence Dutch opinion. Ukrainian Helsinki monitor Vasyl Stus died of emaciation in a labor camp in early September. Other prisoners have had their labor camp sentences extended under new legislation enabling authorities to resentence prisoners for alleged violations of labor camp rules. More than 150 separated spouse, dual national and divided family cases remain unresolved.

Judging from recent Gorbachev comments and a tough July article by KGB head Chebrikov, it appears that the new Soviet leadership intends to continue a hard line on internal dissent. Gorbachev, with the self-confident, vigorous image he has brought to Soviet leadership, seems determined that the USSR will not be put in a defensive position on human rights. The Soviets will now respond to our criticism of their human rights performance with aggressive attacks on economic and social conditions in the West. They seem determined to do this despite the fact that low Soviet living standards, declining life expectancy, cramped housing and rampant alcohol abuse make them extremely vulnerable on these issues. Whether Gorbachev will be willing to act pragmatically on meeting some of our human rights concerns, as he suggested he might be during his recent visit to France, remains to be seen.

EMIGRATION

During the 1970s, in an apparent effort to allow members of some disaffected groups to leave, promote detente, and win trade benefits from the West, the Soviet Union increased emigration in an unprecedented fashion, although the increase was limited primarily to three groups -- Jews, ethnic Germans, and Armenians. Emigration reached its peak in 1979, when over 62,000 Soviets emigrated (51,320 Jews). Since that time, the numbers have fallen drastically: to just over 2,000 (896 Jews) in 1984 and roughly 1200 (796 Jews) through September 1985.

Of particular interest to the United States are those Soviets who wish to join relatives in the U.S. We maintain three representation lists of Soviets denied permission to emigrate to the U.S.: American citizens, separated spouses, and divided families. These lists are presented periodically at high-level bilateral meetings.

There are 22 persons on our American citizens list. Notable cases include Abe Stolar, who has received exit permission but, understandably, will not leave until the Soviets grant exit visas to his entire family; Karo Chrovian, who left Cornell University in 1932 for a two-year engineering job in the Soviet Union and has now been trying to leave for over 50 years; and Vytautas Skuodis (AKA Ben Scott), who moved with his family in the 1930s to then independent Lithuania. Skuodis was sentenced to 12 years in 1980 for national and human rights work in Lithuania; the Soviets have routinely denied our requests for consular access to him. Another tragic case is that of Aaron Milman, who went to the USSR with his family in 1936. Although Aaron's father, Irving, finally managed to get back to the U.S. in 1977, Aaron and his family continue to be refused exit visas.

There are 23 cases on our list of American citizens separated from their Soviet spouses. Four cases have been successfully resolved this year, two within the last month. Anatoliy Michelson and his Soviet spouse, Galina Goltzman, have not seen each other for 29 years; Woodford McClellan and Irina McClellan have been separated for eleven. Sergey Petrov, who received a letter this year from President Reagan, has been separated since 1981 from his wife Virginia Johnson, and he was recently sentenced to 20 days in a labor camp. Amcit Elena Kusmenko has been permitted to visit her husband, Yuriy Balovlenkov only once, when he was on the first of two hunger strikes. Simon Levin and Tamara Tretyakova have been separated for seven years. He has not seen his son.

There are 136 families on our Divided Families list. One longtime case involves the sister of former Soviet Georgian human rights activist Valeriy Chalidze. Chalidze was a recent recipient of the MacArthur Award. In two other cases, Peter Jachno, a Korean War veteran, is separated from his wife and son in the Ukraine, and Alexander Kostomarov, a Baltimore resident who went on a prolonged hunger strike last fall, is separated from his wife and son in Leningrad.

SOVIET JEWRY

Jewish Emigration

Jewish emigration remains at the low level reached in 1984, when only 896 Jews emigrated (compared to 51,320 in the peak year of 1979). Figures through September 1985 (796) are equivalent to those through September 1984 (723). Barring a sudden Soviet change of heart at the end of the year, we expect 1985 figures to be at about the 1984 level. Three longterm refuseniks (waiting 12-15 years) were given exit visas during August-October; the numbers are too small to be encouraging, however. The Soviets often claim that all Jews who wish to leave have done so. We reject this claim, as we have hard information on over 3,000 families who have applied repeatedly to emigrate. Estimates of the number of Jews that would like to leave the Soviet Union range up to 440,000 (about 20% of all Soviet Jews).

Hebrew Teachers/Jewish Cultural Activists

Since July 1984 at least 16 Jewish cultural activists, including 9 Hebrew teachers, have been arrested in a campaign against the revival of Jewish culture in the USSR. The most recent arrest, that of Gorkiy Hebrew teacher Leonid Volvovskiy, occurred on June 24. To date, 14 of these men have been convicted, several on crudely trumped-up criminal charges specifically designed to discredit them. Two of the activists were savagely beaten following their arrests. One, Iosif Berenshtein, was almost completely blinded. We have also heard reports that Jewish activist Yuliy Edelshtein has been subjected to repeated beatings at the labor camp in Siberia where he is serving a three year sentence. The only positive news recently was the dropping of charges of malicious violation of camp rules against Simon Shnirman.

In addition to the arrests and beatings, many Jews have been fired from their jobs, have had their apartments searched, their phones disconnected and their mail seized. Articles have appeared in Soviet newspapers and programs on Soviet television branding Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists (often by name) as "Zionist" subversives. Zionism has been equated with Nazism and World War II Jewish leaders accused of helping the Nazis round up Jews for the death camps. Although Soviet authorities claim that their campaign is directed solely against those they label as Zionists, there is no doubt that repeated irresponsible charges like these can fan the ugly flames of anti-Semitism.

The Soviet Jews who are being singled out for persecution have in common a desire to be free to leave the Soviet Union for the country of their choice, to preserve their ethnic heritage, and to teach and learn their historic language. On June 14, the Department of State issued a press statement stressing that "the continuation of this campaign constitutes a real obstacle to the constructive relations with the Soviet Union that the United States seeks."

PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS CASES

The preeminent representative of the Soviet human rights movement, Andrei Sakharov, remains isolated in Gorkiy with his wife, Yelena Bonner. Despite Western outcry, the Soviets have permitted no family, friends, or independent observers to visit Sakharov to determine his condition. Former Helsinki monitor Anatoliy Shcharanskiy has now been imprisoned for more than eight years and is currently held in Labor Camp 35 near Perm; he still has six years to serve. The founder of the Soviet Helsinki Monitor movement, Yuriy Orlov, remains in exile in Yakutia.

The crackdown on Jewish cultural activists and Hebrew teachers begun in July 1984 has swelled the ranks of Jewish prisoners in the Soviet Union. Among those now imprisoned are Iosif Begun, Zakhar Zunshine, Yuriy Edelshtein, Iosif Berenshtein, and Aleksandr Kholmianskiy. Among the hundreds of Christians imprisoned in the USSR for their religious activities, the names of Vladimir Khailo, Dina Shvedsova, Vasyl Kobrin, Iosif Terelya, Father Svarinskas, Father Tamkevicius, Father Gleb Yakunin, Pastor Nikolai Goretoi, Viktor Val'ter, Viktoras Petkus, and Balys Gajauskas stand out. Muslims, such as Abuzakar Rahimov, and Hare Krishnas, including Vladimir Kustrya, are two of the many other religions that have suffered.

Soviet psychiatrist Anatoliy Koryagin remains near death in a Soviet prison as a result of his efforts to expose Soviet abuse of psychiatry. Unofficial peace group members Aleksandr Shatravka and Vladimir Brodskiy are in prison for their peace activities. Sergei Khodorovich, former administrator of the Russian Social (Solzhenitsyn) Fund, remains imprisoned, as does Valeriy Senderov, one of the founders of an independent trade union in the USSR.

Mart Niklus and Enn Tarto are both serving long sentences for their activities in defense of the Estonian national and human rights movements. Vytautas Skuodis (AKA Ben Scott) is a U.S. citizen of Lithuanian heritage imprisoned in Lithuania for his national and human rights activities. Mykola Horbal, a former Ukrainian Helsinki Monitor, has recently had his sentence extended in a Soviet labor camp. And Yuriy Shukhevich, first arrested at 14 because his father was the commander of the WWII Ukrainian Insurgent Army, has now spent 33 years of his life in prison.

EASTERN EUROPE

Following World War II, a string of Soviet-dominated Communist governments were put into place throughout Eastern Europe. In 1948, Tito's Yugoslavia broke from Moscow to follow a path of non-alignment between East and West. In 1961, tiny Albania severed relations with Moscow to follow a fiercely independent, neo-Stalinist path. To prevent similar defections, the Soviet Union resorted to brutal force to crush popular movements in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1981, the "Solidarity" trade union movement was suppressed in Poland through the imposition of martial law. East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are members of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact alliance. These nations are also members of CEMA, the Moscow-led regional economic grouping.

Notwithstanding the Soviet Union's military and political control over the region (except for Yugoslavia and Albania), Eastern Europe is not monolithic. Each country has its own distinct culture and history. Nationalism is a potent force, overshadowing the waning influence of communist ideology. The trends in this area are toward somewhat greater economic, social and even political diversity. Romania, for example, often acts as a maverick on foreign policy issues. Hungary has pursued liberalizing economic reforms.

In its approach to the region, the United States seeks to advance its overall interests through recognition of the diversity of each nation's situation. We differentiate between these countries and the Soviet Union. We also differentiate among individual East European countries to the degree that they distinguish themselves from Soviet policies, whether through adoption of distinct and more independent foreign policies; greater political and economic exchange with the non-communist world; greater tolerance of emigration and respect for human rights; encouragement of a more flexible climate for political expression and economic change; or, experimentation with economic decentralization.

The United States accepts no permanent division between the peoples of Europe. We share with the peoples of Eastern Europe their basic aspirations for freedom, prosperity and peace. Overall, we seek to maintain a prudent balance among our political, security, human rights and trade interests.

U.S. relations with the non-Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe are a special case. The U.S. maintains a well-developed, productive relationship with non-aligned Yugoslavia, based on our support for that country's unity, independence and territorial integrity. Although we have had no relations with Albania since 1939, the U.S. is prepared to respond should Albania express an interest in resuming relations.

US-USSR Civil Aviation

Pan Am, the only U.S. carrier which has operated scheduled service between the United States and the U.S.S.R., suspended its operations to the Soviet Union in October 1978. Pan Am gave as its reasons for suspension low load factors, low yields, high station costs, lack of access to traffic between the U.S.S.R. and third countries, and the hardships of doing business in the Soviet Union. Those hardships included the prohibition of direct ticket sales for local currency, inadequate offices, difficulty in making ground arrangements for tour groups (controlled by Intourist), and a wide variety of other pressures for traffic originating in the U.S.S.R. to fly Aeroflot (the Soviet flag carrier) rather than a U.S. flag carrier. In October 1981, Pan Am closed its Moscow office.

Aeroflot services to the United States have been suspended since January 5, 1982, when the Civil Aeronautics Board withdrew its operating privileges after President Reagan decided for foreign policy reasons that Aeroflot should not be permitted to operate to and from the United States. The decision was made in response to Soviet involvement in the imposition of martial law in Poland and the repression of the Polish people.

Aeroflot was permitted to continue to sell air transportation in the U.S. on an interline basis, that is, in conjunction with other airlines, which would connect with Aeroflot's service at a point outside the U.S. On September 12, 1983, the U.S. Government, in response to the Soviet attack on Korean Air Lines Flight 007, suspended all remaining commercial aviation links with the U.S.S.R.

A Memorandum of Understanding among Japan, the US, and the U.S.S.R. was signed July 29, 1985, to improve air safety in the North Pacific region. The core of this agreement is an arrangement to set up a new communication network between Anchorage, Tokyo, and Khabarovsk area control centers for use when a civil aircraft assigned to a North Pacific route is in trouble.

The agreement was brought into force on October 8 of this year. The three sides must still work out the technical details of the communication network and procedures. One meeting on these procedures was held in Moscow recently. We expect to hold additional meetings in the near future.

U.S. and Soviet delegations met in Washington October 15-18, 1985 to begin negotiations aimed at reestablishing bilateral air services. A major concern of the U.S. Government is that a new or revised civil aviation agreement would have to contain conditions which would allow a U.S. airline a reasonable opportunity for financially successful operations in the Soviet market. That concern was not adequately met during the negotiations and they ended inconclusively. No further negotiations are scheduled at this time.

U.S. SPACE ARMS CONTROL POLICY

Background: For 25 years, the U.S. has used satellites for a variety of purposes, including support of national defense and arms control: launch-detection satellites provide early warning of ballistic missile attack; communication and navigation satellites support command and control of U.S. and allied military forces; and other satellites aid in monitoring Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. The U.S. is party to and has had a lead role in negotiating several major international agreements that govern space activities, including the UN Charter, Outer Space Treaty, Limited Test Ban Treaty, and Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. At U.S. initiative, bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on antisatellite (ASAT) arms control were held in 1978-79. The U.S. supported formation of an ad hoc committee to discuss space arms control in the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

U.S. policy: The United States has been endeavoring in good faith to determine possible constraints on anti-satellite weapons that would meet the Congressionally-mandated criteria of verifiability and consistency with our national security interests. A number of serious problems, including definitional and verification difficulties, plus the need to counter existing Soviet targeting satellites, contribute to the conclusion that a comprehensive ban on development, testing, deployment and use of anti-satellite weapons cannot meet these criteria. We will continue to study possible ASAT limitations to see whether such limitations are consistent with the national security interests of the U.S. In the meantime, testing of the U.S. ASAT is necessary to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security. The U. S. believes that ASAT testing can be an incentive for the Soviet Union to reach agreement on a wide range of issues.

Space arms control issues: Problems in negotiating space arms control include:

- Definition and verification. Defining ASAT weapons for arms control agreement purposes is difficult because weapons systems used for other purposes have inherent capability for space use. Moreover, civilian space systems may be difficult to distinguish from weapons. For example many systems not designed to be ASAT weapons, such as boosters used to launch civilian space vehicles, have inherent (or residual) ASAT capabilities. Given these problems, a truly comprehensive and effective ban on tests of all means of countering satellites could not be effectively verified.

- Soviet military space threat. The Soviets have the world's only operational ASAT interceptor system. The interceptor is relatively small and is launched by a missile booster used for other missions. It threatens U.S. low-altitude satellites. Other current and projected Soviet space systems are designed to support Soviet forces in conflict by providing targeting intelligence for attacks on U.S. and allied forces. In order to deter threats to U.S. and allied space systems, the U.S. has been developing the Miniature Vehicle (MV) System, launched from an F-15 aircraft.

- Breakout. If an agreement ceased to remain in force--for example through sudden abrogation--breakout could occur and one nation could gain a unilateral advantage and a head start in deploying a weapon that had been banned. The importance of the few, but critical, U.S. satellites could create an incentive for the Soviets to maintain a breakout capability.

Soviet ASAT arms control activities: The Soviet Union has proposed a ban on research, development, testing and deployment of what they call "space-strike" arms. Its proposal would completely block SDI research, but would place no limitations upon ground-based ABM systems like the Soviets' own Moscow ABM system or Soviet directed energy research -- e.g. the test laser at Shary Shagon -- unless it was specifically identified as directed at space weapons development.

The Soviets' proposed ban on space-strike arms would cover ASAT weapons and would entail destruction of the Soviets' own operational ASAT. This proposal does not however address difficulties we would have in verifying destruction of the Soviet ASAT; nor does it acknowledge the potential of using ICBM's or ABM interceptors for ASAT purposes.

Space arms control prospects: These differences have hindered efforts to develop effective ASAT arms control measures. Problems of verification tend to be greater the more comprehensive the limitation. Less sweeping options under study would seek to limit specific types of weapons systems. There is a premium, however, on finding ways to limit those

ASAT systems that create the most difficult challenges to the survivability of our satellites. We are seeking limits that are effectively verifiable and allow us to protect U.S. and allied forces from being threatened by Soviet satellites, such as targeting satellites. Other options under study would regulate certain potentially threatening activities in space. The active search for space arms control proposals that are equitable, verifiable, and compatible with U.S. security and that of our Allies is continuing.

Interim Restraint and Compliance

On June 10 of this year President Reagan announced that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. To implement his decision, the President directed that an existing POSEIDON SSBN be deactivated and dismantled according to agreed procedures when the seventh U.S. Ohio-class submarine put to sea. The decision reflected the President's judgement that it remains in our interest to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursue our goal of real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals.

Thus our policy is to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reduction agreements in the currently ongoing Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. At the same time, the President decided that appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to ensure our security, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance, and to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs.

In the case of irreversible Soviet violations, such as flight-testing and deployment of the SS-X-25 missile, the United States reserves the right to respond in a proportionate manner at the appropriate time. The President has directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions which the United States could take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge gainst the military consequences of, those Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

The Soviet emphasis on strategic defense is firmly grounded in Soviet military doctrine and strategy. In the Soviet view, the USSR could best achieve its aims in any nuclear war if it attacked first and destroyed much of the U.S. and Allied capability for retaliation. Defensive measures would in turn prevent those enemy forces that survived a Soviet first-strike from destroying targets in the USSR. Over the past 25 years the Soviets have increased their active and passive defenses in a clear effort to blunt the effect of U.S. and Allied retaliation to any Soviet attack. Passive defenses are non-weapons measures, such as civil defense and hardening; active defenses utilize weapons systems to protect national territory, military forces or key assets.

The Soviet Union maintains the world's only operation anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow. In 1980 the Soviets began to upgrade and expand that system to the limit allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. When completed in 1987, the Moscow ABM system will have 100 ABM launchers (including silo-based long-range GALOSH interceptors and silo-based high-acceleration interceptors designed to engage targets within the atmosphere), associated engagement and guidance radars, and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control anti-ballistic missile engagements.

The Soviet system for detection and tracking of ballistic missile attack consists of a launch-detection satellite network, over-the-horizon radars and a series of large phased-array radars (LPARs). The Soviets are now constructing a network of six new LPARs that can track ballistic missiles with greater accuracy than the existing network. Five of the radars duplicate or supplement current coverage, but with greatly enhanced capacity. A sixth, under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, closes the final gap in the Soviet early warning radar coverage. This LPAR is not located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and pointed outward as required by the ABM Treaty; it is thus a direct violation of the ABM Treaty.

In the late 1960's the Soviet Union initiated a substantial research program into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles. That program covers many of the same technologies involved in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, but represents a far greater investment of plant space, capital, and manpower. The Soviet laser program, for example, is much larger than U.S. efforts and involves over 10,000 scientists and engineers. The Soviets are also pursuing active research in particle beam weapons, radio frequency weapons, kinetic energy weapons, as well as maintaining an operational anti-satellite system and a massive conventional air defense system.

THE GENEVA NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

Background: The U.S. undertook efforts to establish a more beneficial and constructive long-term relationship with the Soviet Union and to renew a dialogue on nuclear arms control issues when President Reagan met with former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Washington in September 1984. Later diplomatic contacts paved the way for agreement to enter into negotiations on "the whole range of questions" concerning nuclear offensive arms, and defense and space issues. Secretary Shultz and Mr. Gromyko met to discuss these questions in Geneva on January 7-8, 1985. At the conclusion of their meeting they issued a joint statement of agreement that new negotiations would address "a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms--both strategic and intermediate-range--with these questions considered and resolved in their inter-relationship." They agreed that the objective of the negotiations would be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability.

On March 12, 1985, The U.S. and Soviet Union resumed negotiations at Geneva. The negotiations are being conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups.

The groups are addressing strategic offensive nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), and defense and space arms issues. Ambassador Max M. Kampelman heads the U.S. delegation and serves as the negotiator on defense and space arms. Ambassador John G. Tower is the negotiator on strategic nuclear arms, and Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman the negotiator on intermediate-range nuclear arms. Ambassadors Paul H. Nitze and Edward L. Rowny serve in Washington as special advisers to the President and Secretary of State on arms control matters. Three rounds of negotiations have been held: Round 1 from March 12 - April 23; Round 2 from May 30 - July 16; and Round 3 from September 25 - November 1, 1985.

U.S. Approach: With respect to strategic arms, the U.S. seeks radical reductions in the numbers of destructive power of strategic forces that are both equitable and verifiable, and is prepared to explore tradeoffs that would accommodate differences in the two sides' force structures.

The December 1983 U.S. START position remains on the table in Geneva. This includes reductions in the destabilizing threatening weapons -- ballistic missile warheads -- to 5,000; reductions in ballistic missiles to a number higher than 850; a

separate limit of 400 heavy bombers; reductions in missile destructive capacity (throw-weight), either directly or indirectly to about half of the current Soviet level of approximately 5.6 million kilograms; and limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles to an unspecified percentage of the deployed force.

The U.S. also seeks the elimination of, or radical reductions in, U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces and is prepared to build upon the flexibility in its current proposal submitted to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1983 in pursuit of the lowest possible equal global limits.

The defense and space negotiations include questions of arms (whether based on earth or in space) and the broader question of strategic defense, including existing Soviet defenses. In the near term, the U.S. wishes to reverse the erosion in the stability of the strategic relationship that has resulted both from Soviet actions in violation of, and probable violation of the spirit and letter of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and from the continuing growth in Soviet offensive nuclear forces.

With respect to anti-satellite weapons, the United States is endeavoring to identify approaches that would allow us to negotiate with the Soviets a mutually and effectively verifiable agreement with the strictest possible limitations consistent with the national security of the United States. This is complicated by definitional and verification problems and the need to counter Soviet targetting satellites and the Soviet operational ASAT.

Looking to the longer term, the U.S. is endeavoring engage the Soviets in discussing the possibility of moving away from a situation in which security rests on the threat of offensive nuclear retaliation toward increased reliance on defense to strengthen deterrence. The President's Strategic Defense Initiative is designed to explore that possibility. It is a research program, fully consistent with the ABM Treaty.

The three areas of negotiation are interrelated. It is our view, however, that if we can reach agreement in one or two of these negotiations, we should move ahead to implement those agreements, even if differences remain in the other areas.

Soviet Approach:

At first the Soviet Union presented unverifiable moratoria and freezes and insisted on linking progress in offensive arms reductions to an unacceptable and one-sided ban on U.S.

research on strategic defense. The Soviet Union finally came forward with a counterproposal involving an offer to discuss reductions. The outlines of the counterproposal were first presented to President Reagan on September 27 by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in a letter from Secretary general Gorbachev. It was subsequently presented in further detail by Soviet negotiators in Round III. There are significant problems with the counterproposal. However, the U.S. is studying to determine whether, combined with proposals the U.S. had on the table, this could provide progress toward reducing nuclear arsenals.

The November Meeting: The Geneva arms negotiations will be on the agenda when President Reagan meets with General Secretary Gorbachev in November at Geneva. If during Round III there is mutual readiness for serious give and take, we should narrow U.S.-Soviet differences on substantive issues and produce ways to bridge these differences. We recognize, however, that the complex issues which affect the basic security of both sides cannot always be managed even in the short term. The U.S. will continue to press in diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union for evidence of flexibility in other key areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship: regional problems, human rights, and other bilateral questions.

Prospects: The United States is committed to reduce dramatically the level of nuclear arms through equitable and verifiable agreements. U.S. negotiators have unprecedented flexibility to negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement. With proposals by both sides on the table, we are prepared to be flexible within reason. If the Soviets show comparable flexibility, and reasonableness, and satisfactorily resolve U.S. concerns over Soviet non-compliance with previous arms control agreements, the prospects for arms reduction and progress on other issues will be enhanced.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons:
Positions in Previous Talks

In the mid-1970s two critical developments -- Soviet achievement of strategic parity with the U.S. and the deployment of the SS-20 -- came together to alter the security situation in Europe in favor of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet SS-20 missile force grew, and with no NATO missiles deployed in Europe which could reach the USSR, European members of NATO raised the concern that Moscow might come to believe --however mistakenly-- that U.S. strategic forces could be decoupled from the defense of Europe. They, thus, stressed the need for a NATO response. This led to NATO's 1979 dual track decision, which, on the one hand, called for deployment of 572 U.S. LRINF Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and, on the other, negotiations with the Soviet Union to restore an INF balance at the lowest possible level.

Formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November 1981, at which time the U.S. proposed to ban or eliminate all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile systems, including the Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5, and U.S. Pershing II and GLCM. Even though the Soviets deployed SS-20 missiles throughout the negotiations, on November 23, 1983, the Soviets walked out of the INF talks, protesting votes in the parliaments of Great Britain, Italy and West Germany that reaffirmed the dual track decision and the subsequent arrival of U.S. longer-range INF missiles in Europe.

The U.S. approach to the INF negotiations is based on five principles: 1) equality of rights and limits, 2) an agreement must include U.S. and Soviet systems only, 3) limitations must be applied on a global scale, with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia, 4) NATO's conventional defense capability must not be weakened, and 5) any agreement must be effectively verifiable.

The U.S. zero-zero option proposal which would eliminate all U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles, the Interim Agreement Proposal that would result in equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads between 0 and 572, and the President's September 1983 initiatives are based on those criteria.

The Soviet position in the talks was to prevent the deployment in Europe of U.S. Pershing II or cruise missiles while retaining a formidable arsenal of SS-20s in Europe and continuing their buildup of SS-20s in Asia. They sought to remove from Europe hundreds of U.S. aircraft which are capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional weapons and are essential to NATO's conventional deterrent. As a rationale for these demands, the Soviets insisted on compensation for the independent strategic nuclear forces of Britain and France.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons:
The Current Talks

On January 8, 1985, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed in Geneva to renewed arms talks divided into three areas: strategic offensive, intermediate-range, and defense and space arms. On March 12, 1985, the U.S. and Soviet Union began this new set of arms control negotiations in Geneva.

During the first two rounds, the INF negotiator Ambassador Maynard Glitman reiterated the U.S. position based on our long-standing criteria:

- 1) equality of rights and limits,
- 2) an agreement must include U.S. and Soviet systems only,
- 3) limitations must be applied on a global scale, with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia,
- 4) NATO's conventional defense capability must not be weakened, and
- 5) any agreement must be effectively verifiable.

In addition, the President gave Ambassador Glitman unprecedented flexibility to respond to any Soviet proposal. Unfortunately, the Soviet side was intransigent and failed to return even to positions which it held when the talks ended in November 1983.

During the current round, the Soviet Union has finally responded to U.S. calls for serious negotiation and put forth counterproposals which contain a number of INF-related aspects. While many elements of this counterproposal are one-sided, there are some positive elements which we intend to explore further in the negotiations.

The U.S. intends to work with the Soviets to seek a mutually acceptable agreement that meets the fundamental concerns of both sides. If the Soviets prove as serious and flexible as the U.S., meaningful progress can be achieved.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION (MBFR) TALKS

MBFR negotiations, involving 12 members of NATO and the 7 Warsaw Pact member states, began in Vienna in 1973 with a focus on the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Central Europe. The primary U.S. and Allied objective in MBFR is to enhance stability and security in Central Europe through asymmetrical reduction of ground forces to parity at lower levels with common collective ceilings on each side's military manpower.

While the sides have reached some agreement on reductions to parity at common collective ceilings of 700,000 for ground forces and 900,000 for air and ground forces combined, major differences remain as on the data and verification issues. The East claims that approximate parity already exists and has thus resisted Western calls for asymmetrical reductions. Eastern figures for their forces, however, are some 170,000 short of Western estimates, and the East has refused to discuss in any detail the reasons for this data discrepancy. Although the East made some concessions in 1983 on the verification issue, its position still falls far short of Western requirements for effective verification measures and their early implementation.

In 1982, the West proposed a draft MBFR treaty embodying a comprehensive proposal for staged reductions to parity along with a package of associated measures providing for cooperative verification. It also required full agreement prior to treaty signature on figures for all forces in order to resolve the data discrepancy. In April 1984, in order to break the impasse in the talks caused by the data issue, the West modified its requirement for full data agreement and proposed instead a data exchange prior to treaty signature on only the ground combat and combat support forces of the sides to fall within an acceptable range of Western estimates. The flexibility on data was offered in exchange for enhanced verification measures.

On February 14, 1985, the East tabled a proposal which essentially put into legally binding form previous Eastern proposals from 1983 calling for initial reductions of 13,000 U.S. and 20,000 Soviet ground forces and for a subsequent freeze on all forces for two years. This proposal thus offers little that is new and does not address the central issues of data and verification nor respond to the offer of flexibility in the West's April 1984 proposal.

The West has asked a number of questions about the details of the East's February 1985 proposal, which it will have to assess along with other broader factors in considering how to respond. The West is fully committed to move the talks forward and seeks an outcome equitable to both sides to enhance security in Europe.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

Background: On January 17, 1984, the U.S., Canada, and 33 European states, including NATO, Warsaw Pact, neutral and nonaligned countries, convened in Stockholm for the first stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). It was mandated by the Madrid meeting (1980-83) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which reviewed the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Its purpose is to agree on measures that would reduce the proximate causes of war: misunderstanding and miscalculation. CDE's Madrid mandate requires the measures to be militarily significant, politically binding, and provided with adequate forms of verification.

Western proposal: One week after the conference opened, the 16 NATO participants proposed six measures designed to make the European military environment more open, predictable, and stable:

- An Exchange of Military Information would require participants to inform each other annually about the structure of their ground and land-based air forces in Europe, giving unit designation, normal peacetime location, and force composition.
- An Exchange of Forecasts of Activities Notifiable in Advance would call for an annual exchange of forecasts of military exercises including the name, place, timing, purpose, and countries participating, along with the size and type of forces involved.
- Notification of Military Activities would call for notification 45 days in advance of out-of-garrison land activities of units at division level or above and notification of certain mobilization and amphibious exercises. Alert activities would be notifiable as they begin.
- Observation of Certain Military Activities would require states to invite observers from all other states to all notified activities.
- Compliance and Verification would allow participating states to request an inspection of activities that have not been notified in compliance with negotiated agreements and would require states not to interfere with other states' "national technical means" of verification--for example, photographic reconnaissance satellites.

- Development of Means of Communication encourages participating states to develop better means and procedures for communications.

How measures would work: These measures could be implemented with a minimum of interference with normal, nonthreatening military activity. Measure 1 would establish a baseline of information. At the same time, under measure 2, a state would advise other participants of military activities it has planned for the next calendar year.

Measure 3 notifications would then provide specific detail on a notifiable event, closer in time to the event. A state with aggressive intent would raise an alarm against itself if it announced an exercise it had not forecast; the alarm would sound even louder if the state also failed to notify the event 45 days in advance.

The observers called for in measure 4 would verify that activities are conducted as advertised. There might, however, be occasions where a state detects a military activity that it thinks should have been notified. Under measure 5, those suspicions could be alleviated or confirmed by asking for an inspection. Finally, the communications arrangements of measure 6 could be used to seek further information on a potentially destabilizing event.

Significance of Western proposals: These measures would not prevent war nor could they prevent a state from using force for political intimidation. They would, however, make unwanted confrontation less likely and they could raise the political cost of using force to intimidate. Having established a pattern of routine activities, if a deviation were to occur, there would be time to clarify the situation before political tensions escalated or to take counteraction against a real threat.

Soviet objections: The USSR has tried to use the CDE to portray Moscow as the defender of peace and the U.S. and some of its allies as aggressive, militaristic adventurers. It also has sought to exploit differences between the U.S. and European countries. This approach prevented the CDE from quickly getting down to business. Moscow has criticized information and verification provisions of the Western proposals as "legalized espionage." In fact, they are not designed to expose important Soviet military secrets. Forecasts and notifications will involve only out-of-garrison ground activities, not sensitive military installations. Observers would visit areas only where those activities are taking place.

Soviet proposal: The Soviets have offered six alternative proposals: a treaty on the non-use of force; a non-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge; creation of nuclear weapons-free zones; a freeze and reduction of military budgets; a chemical weapons ban in Europe; and expansion of the confidence-building measures of the Helsinki Final Act.

Western reaction: The West accepts the principle of non-use of force as embodied in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, President Reagan has offered to enter discussions with the Soviets on reaffirming this principle if this would lead them to negotiate meaningful confidence-building measures of the type contained in the Western proposal. Efforts to negotiate only a European chemical weapons ban would duplicate the Geneva negotiations where global and comprehensive chemical weapons agreements are being discussed.

The UN tries annually to study military budgets, but the Warsaw Pact, not the West, blocks this effort. Nonetheless, the Soviets' own proposals call for Helsinki-type confidence-building measures that could prove similar to proposals offered by the West and neutral and nonaligned countries at the conference. When the Soviet Union decides that its interests lie in a cooperative approach, the CDE can make its contribution toward improving European security.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

In the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems the United States and the Soviet Union agree that each may have only two ABM deployment areas,¹ so restricted and so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one. Each country thus leaves unchallenged the penetration capability of the other's retaliatory missile forces.

The treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital and another to protect an ICBM launch area. The two sites defended must be at least 1,300 kilometers apart, to prevent the creation of any effective regional defense zone or the beginnings of a nationwide system.

Precise quantitative and qualitative limits are imposed on the ABM systems that may be deployed. At each site there may be no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers. Agreement on the number and characteristics of radars to be permitted had required extensive and complex technical negotiations, and the provisions governing these important components of ABM systems are spelled out in very specific detail in the treaty and further clarified in the "Agreed Statements" accompanying it.

Both parties agreed to limit qualitative improvement of their ABM technology, e.g., not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching more than one interceptor missile at a time or modify existing launchers to give them this capability, and systems for rapid reload of launchers are similarly barred. These provisions, the Agreed Statements clarify, also ban interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

There had been some concern over the possibility that surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) intended for defense against aircraft might be improved, along with their supporting radars, to the point where they could effectively be used against ICBMs and SLBMs, and the treaty prohibits this. While further deployment of radars intended to give early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack is not prohibited, they must be located along the territorial boundaries of each country

¹Subsequently reduced to one area (see section on ABM Protocol).

and oriented outward, so that they do not contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior.

Further, to decrease the pressures of technological change and its unsettling impact on the strategic balance, both sides agree to prohibit development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems and their components, along with mobile land-based ABM systems. Should future technology bring forth new ABM systems "based on other physical principles" than those employed in current systems, it was agreed that limiting such systems would be discussed, in accordance with the treaty's provisions for consultation and amendment.

The treaty also provides for a U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission to promote its objectives and implementation. The commission was established during the first negotiating session of SALT II, by a Memorandum of Understanding dated December 21, 1972. Since then both the United States and the Soviet Union have raised a number of questions in the Commission relating to each side's compliance with the SALT I agreements. In each case raised by the United States, the Soviet activity in question has either ceased or additional information has allayed U.S. concern.

Article XIV of the treaty calls for review of the treaty 5 years after its entry into force, and at 5-year intervals thereafter. The first such review was conducted by the Standing Consultative Commission at its special session in the fall of 1977. At this session, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the treaty had operated effectively during its first 5 years, that it had continued to serve national security interests, and that it did not need to be amended at that time.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972

Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972

Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972

Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972

Entered into force October 3, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

(a) operational;

(b) under construction;

(c) undergoing testing;

(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or

(e) mothballed.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:

- (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and
- (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

- (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

**FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA**

**FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

RICHARD NIXON

L. I. BREZHNEV

*President of the United
States of America*

*General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU*

Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles

1. Agreed Statements

The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added);

AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[C]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

[D]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

[E]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[F]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blue prints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

2. Common Understandings

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations:

A. Location of ICBM Defenses

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: "The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers." In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Agreed Statement [C].)

B. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:

Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that "the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges." We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed test

ranges" to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges.

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

C. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

D. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:

The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,¹ agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, *ad hoc* arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.

Minister Semenov replied that, on an *ad referendum* basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

E. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:

In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents.

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:

¹See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed Sept. 30, 1971.

The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

3. Unilateral Statements

The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:

The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position.

B. Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term "tested in an ABM mode," in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes; not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for

non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode," we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be "tested in an ABM mode" if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.

C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 2, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: President's Interview with Japanese Press

As requested, we have attached draft answers to questions submitted to the President by the Japanese Press.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Q: 1. Your first meeting with the Soviet party secretary in Geneva next month has focused worldwide attention upon the subject of U.S.-Soviet relations, greatly raising the expectations of many for possible improvements in this relationship. What do you yourself think that the outcome of the summit meeting will be?

A. I am optimistic that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev can be an important step on the path to a safer, more stable, and more productive East-West relationship -- if the Soviets come to Geneva with the same goal in mind. Such an outcome would go well beyond the too-often shortlived agreements signed at past summits; it would be an investment in the future, in a safer and better world for ourselves and our children.

I think it's clear that the Soviets see things much differently than do we of the democratic world, and that those differences will ensure continued competition for years to come. Yet this competition can and must be peaceful.

Arms control is one obvious area where we can limit our competition. General Secretary Gorbachev and I should go to Geneva with the idea of moving the arms control process along. Yet progress in arms reductions must be accompanied by a frank discussion of the factors that require these arms.

That's why its especially important to make progress in all areas of our relations, even as we seek to cut our nuclear arsenals. On October 24 I proposed a comprehensive approach to dealing with five long-running conflicts, in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua. We are seeking ways to increase contact and communication between the Soviet and American peoples. We hope the Soviet Union will take practical steps to meet Western concerns on human rights and humanitarian questions.

I cannot predict breakthroughs in any of these areas. But I think the meeting will be an important step towards real progress down the road.

Q: 2. Could you discuss the possibility that an even broader, more encompassing framework for arms-control negotiations might come about as a result of your meeting with the Soviet leader in Geneva next month? In your view, are there any substantive issues not now included in the arms-control talks that should be?

A. I do not believe that the problem has been in the structure of the arms talks, and thus I will not propose structural changes during my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev.

The Geneva Nuclear and Space forum provides an adequate framework for us to address our two overriding goals: first, to bring about the radical reduction of offensive nuclear weapons to equal levels under verifiable agreements; and second, to discuss with the Soviets the possibilities for moving toward a more stable and secure world in which defenses play an increasingly prominent role, if the technological research being done by the U.S. and the Soviet Union shows this is feasible.

There are other arms control fora where the U.S. and our NATO allies are pressing a good arms control agenda -- for example, the MBFR talks on troop levels in Central Europe; the Stockholm CDE conference; and the Conference on Disarmament, where we have tabled a comprehensive chemical weapons proposal.

On nuclear testing, we think the first step is to improve the verification of compliance with the thresholds set down in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. I've invited Soviet experts to observe one of our nuclear tests -- a practical step toward verification of effective limits on underground nuclear testing.

The lack of arms control agreements to date has nothing to do with the structure of arms control talks; it has to do with the Soviet Union's willingness to reach genuine arms control agreements. For too long the Soviets matched a massive military buildup with an attempt to win in the streets and parliaments of the democratic world concessions that they couldn't win at the bargaining table. Fortunately, Western governments and public opinion remained steadfast in their insistence that arms control agreements improve stability rather than unilateral Soviet advantage, and meet other criteria of a successful agreement, such as significant reductions in nuclear warheads and the most destabilizing missile defense systems, equitable limits and constraints on other systems, and verifiability.

This steadfastness brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table after their walkout and, more recently, convinced them to table an arms control counterproposal that, for the first time, accepts the principle of deep reductions. Although the Soviet counterproposal is unacceptable to us as is, it includes positive elements. It is for this reason that I instructed American negotiators at Geneva to put forward a new U.S. proposal designed to advance the prospects for achieving real reductions in nuclear arms, enhancing stability and addressing the legitimate concerns of the United States and our allies as well as the Soviet Union.

Q: 3. Although we can assume that this coming summit meeting between the two superpowers might contain a sort of give-and-take process, it seems to us that you have struck a hard, or rather, non-negotiable position on behalf of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), to which the Soviet leader is deadly opposed. Are you confident in persuading Mr. Gorbachev to accept this SDI concept, or are you going to take a little bit more flexible stance on this issue?

A. My vision of the future is of a more stable and secure world in which strategic defenses play a dominant role -- one which would neutralize the menace of ballistic missiles and, ultimately, allow us to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether.

No leader who is interested in reducing the risks of nuclear war should oppose this concept. And since a transition from reliance on offensive to defensive weapons will be neither simple nor quick, it is in everyone's interest to explore now the possibilities for doing so.

That's why we have raised with the Soviets the vital relationship between offensive and defensive systems, and sought to discuss ways for jointly managing a stable transition to a peace based on defensive systems rather than the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Now let me speak more specifically about SDI. It is a research program to ascertain the feasibility of defenses against ballistic missiles. SDI research has been and will continue to be conducted within the bounds of the ABM treaty. Incidentally, General Secretary Gorbachev has said that research is being done by both sides, and will continue.

When our research is completed, and if strategic defenses prove feasible, we will consult with our allies before deciding whether to develop and deploy strategic defenses. We will discuss and, as appropriate, negotiate with the Soviets prior to deployment, in accordance with the ABM Treaty.

Q: 4. Large numbers of Soviet SS-20's have been deployed in the Pacific Far East in recent years, but the Soviets have refused to negotiate their presence. Is the U.S. planning to try to include these SS-20's in the Geneva arms-control talks? What is the U.S. position on the strategic importance of the Soviet SS-20's that are stationed in Asia? Do they threaten Western security interests in the Pacific region?

A. The Soviet SS-20 is more accurate than earlier Soviet intermediate-range forces. It is mobile, and thus easily redeployed. It also carries three independently targetable warheads, as opposed to the single warhead of the earlier generation of Soviet intermediate-range missiles. Thus the SS-20 greatly increases the threat to Asia as well as to Europe.

We have long advocated that a total elimination of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles is the best solution. As an interim measure, however, we have proposed reductions to the lowest possible equal number of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads on a global basis.

Nuclear weapons that threaten our allies and friends anywhere in the world are, of course, of deep concern to us. We could not, therefore, accept any Soviet proposal in Geneva which would endeavor to address European security by increasing the threat to our friends and allies in Asia. We have consulted and will continue to consult with the Japanese government as negotiations over Soviet intermediate-range forces proceed.

Q: 5. What kind of progress are you expecting to make in Geneva on regional problems such as Afghanistan and the Middle East? We are particularly interested in what might happen with regards to Afghanistan.

A. Discussion of our regional differences is an important part of our overall dialogue. We have initiated experts' talks on these problems between our regional specialists and their Soviet counterparts. In my speech to the United Nations October 24, I proposed that we and the Soviets make a special effort to contribute to the resolution of crises in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua.

Our starting point would be a process of negotiation among the warring parties in troubled countries. In the case of Afghanistan, this would include the Soviet Union; in Cambodia, the Vietnamese. On a second level, once negotiations take hold, and the parties involved are making progress, representatives of the U.S. and the Soviet Union should sit down together, and ask how we can best support the ongoing talks among warring parties. Finally, if the first two steps are successful, we would welcome each country back into the world economy.

Actions by the Soviet Union in Asia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere have been a major cause of tension in our relations over the last decade. Moreover, they could lead to situations that could be hard for either side to control.

I hope we will make substantial progress in resolving our differences over our approaches to regional problems. General Secretary Gorbachev can contribute to this progress by bringing a positive response to my U.N. initiative.

Afghanistan would be the perfect place to start. The Soviets say that they agree with us that only a political solution can end Afghanistan's war. If so, they should begin by addressing the critical question: that of the more than 100,000 Soviet troops waging a war against the Afghan people.

As for the Middle East, the way to peace is through direct negotiations with the parties involved. Unfortunately, Soviet actions are those of a spoiler. The Soviet Union consistently attacks the very concept of direct negotiations between the parties. We note Soviet recognition of Israel's right to exist; we would welcome the Soviet Union playing a constructive role towards Middle East peace.

Q: 6. What do you think is the most important thing on your part to make this summit meeting productive?

A. The meeting with Mr. Gorbachev is an important part of a process we have long pursued -- putting East-West relations on a safer and more productive course.

I have no illusions about the difficulties involved. But General Secretary Gorbachev and I have an obligation to try and narrow some of the profound differences between us. If we make progress toward that goal, all of the world will benefit.

To establish the foundation for a more constructive relationship, I want to discuss not just arms control, but regional tensions, our bilateral relationship, and our obligation to respect human rights. All of these issues are as important to us as the question of nuclear arms.

In the few weeks before the meeting, we want to make as much progress as possible in all aspects of our relationship. We are ready to do this, if the Soviet Union is willing to reach realistic agreements.

Obviously, we're not going to solve every difference in the next few weeks. I hope, however, that the meetings will give momentum to a genuine process of problem-solving, and that we can agree on a bilateral agenda that will bring dividends in the future. A dedicated, joint approach to an agreed agenda would be the most important thing I can bring home from Geneva.

Q: How might Japan and the other Allies countries contribute to the success of the upcoming summit?

A. You have already made a considerable contribution to peace and East-West stability through your steadfast support of a policy which brought the Soviets back to the bargaining table and convinced them to respond to our arms control proposals with a serious counterproposal of their own.

The free world has also contributed by maintaining its strength, unity, and sense of purpose. The revival of democratic beliefs in all corners of the world, and the expanding global prosperity within the free world, has to have had a deep impression on the Soviet leadership.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in East Asia, where countries such as Japan which are dedicated to freedom and initiative have set new standards for social and economic development. And I think the United States can be proud of its role in the recent history of the Pacific. The evolution of the U.S.-Japanese relationship during the past forty years, for example, has is evidence of the foresight of two generations of American and Japanese statesmen.

The support of nations such as Japan, which share our democratic values, has played a crucial role in strengthening our hand as we look to our meeting in Geneva. I have consulted frequently with Prime Minister Nakasone in the months leading up to the meeting, and I will continue to do so as our discussions with the Soviets develop.