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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name COORDINATION OFFICE, NSC: RECORDS

Withdrawer

DLB 4/17/2006

File Folder SUMMIT OBJECTIVES

FOIA

F00-114

Box Number 92347

LETTOW, PAUL

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
23707	CABLE	#040105Z NOV 87 R 4/13/2007 F00-114	4	11/4/1987	B1
23708	LETTER	CHARLES WICK TO FRANK CARLUCCI R 4/13/2007 F00-114	2	ND	B1
23709	MEMO	FRITZ ERMARTH TO FRANK CARLUCCI, COLIN POWELL, RE: THE PRESIDENT'S SUMMIT OBJECTIVES R 5/21/2008 NLRR00-114	2	11/5/1987	B1
23710	NSDD	DRAFT - RE: MY OBJECTIVES AT THE SUMMIT R 5/21/2008 NLRR00-114	2	ND	B1
23711	MEMO	ROBERT DEAN TO CARLUCCI, RE: BILATERAL SUMMIT ISSUES	2	11/18/1987	B1
23712	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #23694, RAISING AT THE SUMMIT "DANGEROUS SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY"	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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23713	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #23711	2	11/18/1987	B1
23714	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #23712	1	ND	B1
23715	PAPER	RE: ECONOMIC/TRADE AGENDA ITEM FOR THE SUMMIT R 10/18/2006 F00-114	2	ND	B1

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23707 CABLE

4 11/4/1987 B1

#040105Z NOV 87

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

MB

FYI. USIA
sent this to
key posts to
apprise them
of summit
planning.
WHE

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: SIT

<PREC? IMMEDIATE <CLAS? ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG? 040105Z NOV 87

FM USIA WASHDC

TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUTADD/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE
RUFHOLB/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF IMMEDIATE
RUFHROA/AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE
RUFHOLC/AMCONSUL HAMBURG IMMEDIATE
RUDKRW/AMCONSUL KRAKOW IMMEDIATE
RUFNSHH/AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE
RUFHROD/AMCONSUL PALERMO IMMEDIATE
RUEHTH/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI IMMEDIATE
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL TORONTO IMMEDIATE
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL VANCOUVER IMMEDIATE
RUFHROB/AMCONSUL GENOA IMMEDIATE
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL DURBAN IMMEDIATE
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUDKRW/AMCONSUL POZNAN IMMEDIATE
RUESBR/AMCONSUL BARCELONA IMMEDIATE
ALL POLADS POSTS
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2799
INFO RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN 3351
RUDKDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 6241
RUFHBC/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 5585
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 5191
RUDKSA/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 3847
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 6717
RUDKRW/AMCONSUL KRAKOW 0708

DECLASSIFIED

NLS E00-114#23707

BY LOS NARA DATE 4/13/07

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

RUDKRW/AMCONSUL POZNAN 0626
XMT VOA /PHILIPPINE RELAY STATION TINANG
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PANAMA

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 USIA 72632
USIA
FOR PAO

WHITE HOUSE-HOWARD; NSC-BEMIS; MBFR-STEWART;
FT BRAGG-USIA ADVISOR; PARIS ALSO PASS ARS AND OECD;
USUN-NEGEM; OTHER MILITARY ADDEES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
POLADS; FOR AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC FOR CIS
EO 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

REFERENCE: USIA 63317

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE, A SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL BEGIN ON DEC 7 IN THE U. S.
2. THE AGENCY HAS BEGUN SUPPORT ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING WORLDNET BROADCASTS AND OTHER TV PROGRAMMING, SEVERAL

PAMPHLETS, VOA SPECIALS AND FOREIGN PRESS BRIEFINGS. EXTREMELY HELPFUL POSTS ASSESSMENTS, IN RESPONSE TO REFTTEL, ARE BEING UTILIZED AS A BASIS FOR PLANNING, WHERE POSSIBLE. MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES WILL BE FORTHCOMING.

3. THE AGENCY WILL CENTER ITS SUMMIT EFFORTS ON ELUCIDATING THE CONCEPT OF "THE U. S. SEARCH FOR PEACE WITH FREEDOM," STRESSING TWO MAIN POINTS:

-- BECAUSE PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS CONSISTENTLY PURSUED A POLICY OF REALISM, STRENGTH AND DIALOGUE IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS, AN HISTORIC NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION TREATY AND A POTENTIALLY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONSHIP ARE NOW POSSIBLE. THIS POINT UNDERLINES U. S. LEADERSHIP AND SHOULD HELP TO COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO TAKE CREDIT FOR INF AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

-- IMPROVED U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS DEPEND ON MOVEMENT ON A BROAD AGENDA. A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE SHOULD BRING IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS, BILATERAL RELATIONS, REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND A DRAMATIC CUT IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO EUROPEAN SECURITY, WESTERN VALUES AND THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY AROUND THE WORLD.

-- NATO UNITY AND PERSEVERANCE REMAIN A VITAL CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES; CONSULTATIONS AMONG ALLIES AND A STRONG ALLIANCE SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO EFFECTIVE DEALINGS WITH

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#2632

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 USIA 72632

USIA

FOR PAO

WHITE HOUSE-HOWARD; NSC-BEMIS; MBFR-STEWART;
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USUN-NEGEM; OTHER MILITARY ADDEES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
POLADS; FOR AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC FOR CIS

EO 12356 N/A

THE USSR.

-- NATO UNITY MET THE INF CHALLENGE AND WILL MAINTAIN FUTURE ALLIANCE SECURITY. AN IMMEDIATE CHALLENGE IS THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE.

4. IN CONSULTATION WITH THE WHITE HOUSE/NSC AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WE WILL SHORTLY SEND YOU MORE FULLY DEVELOPED THEMATIC GUIDANCE, ALONG WITH DETAILED TALKING POINTS ON SPECIFIC AGENDA ITEMS FOR THE SUMMIT.

5. THE BROAD AGENDA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ARMS CONTROL, BILATERAL ISSUES AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION. MOVEMENT ON A START AGREEMENT IS THE TOP PRIORITY IN ARMS CONTROL.

6. POSTS WILL BE RECEIVING SEPARATE MESSAGES DETAILING AVAILABLE PROGRAMMING RESOURCES, AND FACILITATION OF FOREIGN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

MEDIA PLANNING TO COVER THE MEETING AND OTHER MATTERS.
7. FYI: SUMMIT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COORDINATION WILL BE
HANDLED BY THE WHITE HOUSE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS THOMAS
GRISCOM AND NSC DEPUTY COLIN POWELL. AGENCY COUNSELOR STAN
BURNETT IS USIA COORDINATOR AND CONTACT WITH THE WHITE
HOUSE/NSC. P/G DIRECTOR PHILIP ARNOLD (485-8644) WILL BE
OVERALL MANAGER OF USIA OPERATIONS, INCLUDING POLICY,
GUIDANCE AND TALKING POINTS (WITH HANK GRADY, 485-1911) AND
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (WITH FPC DIRECTOR ROBERT GARRITY,

724-0032). (P/G)

WICK

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 05 NOV 87 18

TO

CARLUCCI

FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 04 NOV 87

KEYWORDS: NATO

EUROPE WEST

INF

USSR

AP

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE NATO MTG AFTER SUPERPOWER SUMMIT

- no
not
now
not
possible

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO GREEN TO WICK

DUE: 10 NOV 87 STATUS S

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MAHLEY

LEDSKY

COBB

COCKELL

HEISER

BATJER

MISKEL

SNIDER

STEINER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(SF)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington, D.C. 20547



Dear Mr. Secretary, Mr. Carlucci:

We all agree that the upcoming summit, aside from its impact on the future course of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations, should also be remembered as an affirmation of NATO unity and steadfastness. It will have been eight years -- precisely, on December 12 -- since NATO's historic dual-track INF decision was taken in Brussels in 1979.

Should the President decide to attend a NATO summit immediately after the summit in Washington, it would mark a perfect celebration of this anniversary -- more significantly, it would underscore the importance the President attaches to an INF agreement, to America's commitment to European security, and to close allied consultations. As congressional debate heats up over ratification, the President's ability to demonstrate solid European support for an INF accord will be a valuable asset.

There is another factor. Our own polling of European publics continues to show by overwhelming margins that Gorbachev is viewed more favorably than President Reagan (e.g. Britain (83%), Germany (80%), Italy (76%) and France (51%)), and more the advocate of peace and arms control. The Soviets will likely capitalize on these perceptions, maximizing their share of credit for the Washington summit. The President's immediate visit to Brussels would undercut these efforts. It would also affirm the President's take-charge leadership on Western security issues.

Such a visit, underlining the movement toward peace, in a historic setting, would result in wide media coverage of the President. Ronald Reagan's appearances in Europe and on television have always projected an image of leadership and trust. The positive perceptions generated by his activities with other NATO leaders in the summit context would enhance this rare opportunity. Also, the American media would extend wide coverage and pickup of these events, thus coincidentally providing a positive thrust to the President's image at home and on the INF ratification process.

On Friday, November 6, the President is scheduled to meet with Lord Carrington in the Oval Office. This would be an ideal opportunity to explore the NATO summit idea, with the hope that Carrington would agree about its utility and that NATO would then invite heads of government. I envision the President's trip as a short two-day affair with a single stop -- Brussels -- and with a single mission in mind -- the affirmation of NATO unity.

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(DECL: OADR)

NLS F00-114+ 23708


BY LET NARA, DATE 4/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

I hope you will agree with me that such a proposal should be a high priority on our summit planning agenda.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Z. Wick', is written over the word 'Sincerely,'.

Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
George P. Shultz
Secretary of State

The Honorable
Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

23709
SYSTEM II
91220

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

November 5, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI
COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *F*

SUBJECT: The President's Summit Objectives

When we began the process of organizing summit preparations, we identified the need for a short NSDD stating the President's basic political and policy objectives for the summit, in addition to a directive on organization. The attached draft -- largely by John Herbst with inputs and concurrence from me, Peter Rodman and Bob Linhard -- is offered for your consideration.

Without being prescriptive in detail, it represents some very carefully drafted substantive and tonal choices. It sets some specific priorities beyond arms control, not to exclude others, but to focus attention and effort. It calls for actions before the summit which put pressure on the Soviets for movement in directions we wish. Most important, it specifies that we aim to conduct this summit in a way that supports our ability in the future to conduct policy on the basis of vigilance, strength, and dialogue. For that is what we expect the future will require, much as we might hope for better.

By contrast, we are not expecting nor immediately striving for a general breakthrough to a fundamentally more congenial relationship because the conditions for it simply are not there, within the USSR or in its actions around the world. This does not, however, preclude us from telling the Soviets what those conditions are and welcoming it when they are ready to move beyond tantalizing new words to genuinely more constructive behavior. Nor does it preclude the President himself from painting a more inviting portrait of the potential for this relationship to Gorbachev and in public. But this is a secret directive from the President to the top of his national security establishment which should not indulge in sentimentality about our hopes for a better USSR under Gorbachev. Should the document leak, it is even more important that sentimentality not be found in it.

I have deliberately not sent you this with a cover note for the President. I recommend that you discuss it with Peter, Bob, and me, perhaps with others on the Staff, then discuss it, modified as you direct, with the President and Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger. Thereby, the President's directive can present a

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F00-114th 23709

BY CW NARA DATE 5/21/08

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

2

consensus of his NSC principals on the substance and spirit of this summit, and will be taken seriously by the bureaucracy.

mm Rodman and Linhard *Boh* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you consider this draft directive, discuss possible modifications with us, and then discuss it with the President and other NSC principals prior to submitting a final for the President's approval.

Approval _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I NSDD

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

23710

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II

DRAFTNATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBERMY OBJECTIVES AT THE SUMMIT (U)

General Secretary Gorbachev has accepted my invitation to attend a Washington Summit, beginning December 7, that should witness the signing of an INF agreement and a thorough review of all elements on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. The signing of the INF treaty represents a triumph and vindication for the policy that this Administration has followed toward the Soviet Union from the start. It demonstrates that realism, strength, and unity with our allies are the prerequisites for effective negotiation with Moscow. We must keep this principle in mind as we address all issues related to the Summit. We must also bear in mind that the nature of the Soviet regime, while it may be changing slowly, sets limits to what we can achieve with Moscow by negotiation and diplomacy. (S)

Objectives

I have a carefully calibrated mix of objectives for the Summit. All are important. They include:

- the completion and signing of an INF agreement in a form and manner that maximizes Alliance solidarity and the prospects for ratification;
- making real progress toward a START agreement and moving toward a treaty on Defense and Space that furthers the promise the Strategic Defense Initiative holds for a safer world through deterrence based increasingly on defenses;
- taking diplomatic and public affairs actions which at a minimum assure that the Summit is seen as an event addressing thoroughly our whole agenda. Prior to and at the Summit, we should create political pressure for the Soviets to take positive steps on our human rights, regional, and bilateral concerns. For example:
 - o On human rights, we should make the point that while there has been some progress on the Soviet side, it has been marked by tokenism; it has not been institutionalized nor made irreversible, and is

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F00-114 #23710

BY CW NARA DATE 5/21/08

- 2 -

therefore far from adequate. We should seek Soviet adherence to all human rights conventions signed by the U.S.S.R., and vast improvement in emigration, repatriation, and resolving divided family cases. If the Soviets raise the issue, we should clearly say that they have a long way to go before we can give support to the idea of a human rights conference in Moscow.

- o We should make clear that the absence of any progress on regional issues is a fundamental impediment to a general improvement of our relations. We should be firm on the need for a prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, urge agreement right away to a transitional regime free from Communist domination, and repeat our willingness to facilitate their withdrawal and to guarantee a genuinely independent, non-aligned and neutral Afghanistan. We should make clear our grave concern about the turn for the worse in Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf -- shielding Iran from a second UNSC Resolution as Iran's behavior towards us and the Gulf Arabs becomes more belligerent, and allowing their Bloc partners and clients to ship arms to Iran that could be used against us. We should put the Soviets on notice that they are at a crossroads: cooperation now on a second resolution would mean real progress on the regional agenda, but persistence in their current policy could damage U.S.-Soviet relations and put us on a potentially very dangerous collision course. (S)

In conducting this Summit we must strike a sensible balance. While seeking concrete agreements in arms reductions which serve our national interests, we must not foster false illusions about the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Such illusions would only undermine our ability to continue conducting the realistic policies which brought us an INF agreement and have enabled us to meet the Soviet challenge worldwide. (S)

Our conduct at the Summit and the framing of its results must in no way complicate our efforts to maintain a strong defense budget and key programs like SDI; they must help us maintain support for the Contras, Mujahidin, UNITA, and the democratic resistance in Cambodia; and they must reinforce Alliance unity. In brief, the Summit should seek simultaneously to codify progress in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, prepare the way for future progress, yet make clear where fundamental differences remain which block progress. (S)

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23711 MEMO

2 11/18/1987 B1

ROBERT DEAN TO CARLUCCI, RE: BILATERAL
SUMMIT ISSUES

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ECONOMIC/TRADE AGENDA ITEM
FOR THE SUMMIT

BY CK NARA DATE 10/18/06

The primary focus and political imperative of this Summit -- arms control -- will leave little time for a comprehensive discussion of trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the President and General Secretary can use this occasion to:

- o Endorse near-term efforts to expand U.S.-Soviet trade by issuing a statement on joint ventures;
- o Provide a political endorsement at the highest levels for a more expansive discussion of U.S.-Soviet trade and economic issues at the upcoming meeting of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission (JCC); and
- o Lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive discussion of these issues at subsequent Summits.

More specifically, a short economic item on the Summit agenda could include:

- o A brief review of progress on a range of issues
 - Recent progress in a number of areas -- expanding civil aviation links, textiles, reciprocal access to fisheries (dependent on decertification of Soviet whaling), maritime discussions, and possible tourism talks -- as signs of what can be accomplished.
 - Assurances of Administration action opposing anti-Soviet proposals in trade legislation.
 - Reiteration of U.S. desire for progress on fundamental trade issues, noting the linkage of trade to emigration and our hopes for substantial and sustained emigration.
- o Issuance of a statement of support of joint ventures in U.S.-Soviet trade
 - Over 20 U.S. companies now discussing joint ventures in the Soviet Union strongly desire a statement from both governments supporting their efforts to establish a new mechanism for expanding business.
 - The President has the opportunity to offer Gorbachev a positive step to keep the trade relationship moving by telling him that we are prepared to support joint ventures as long as they comply with our export control regulations.
 - The Summit leaders could issue a statement that joint ventures in the Soviet Union between American firms and Soviet enterprises in civilian areas could play a constructive role in the development of bilateral trade ties. Such joint ventures would have to comply with the policies, laws, and regulations of both countries.

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- o Endorsement of the Joint Commercial Commission as a follow-on mechanism to develop specific measures for expanding trade

-- The President and the General Secretary can direct their trade ministers to hold a meeting of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission to follow up on the Summit trade discussions and develop specific measures for increasing peaceful trade.

- o A commitment to revisit trade and economic issues more extensively at future Summits

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