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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name COORDINATION OFFICE, NSC: RECORDS

Withdrawer

MJD 3/7/2013

File Folder REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT PLANNING
BACKGROUND MATERIAL

FOIA

F02-073/5

Box Number RAC BOX 22

COLLINS

27

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
155246	PAPER	RE EXCHANGE W/GORBACHEV	1	ND	B1
155247	MEMO	DENNIS THOMAS TO JONATHAN MILLER RE GORBACHEV PLANNING GROUP	1	1/23/1986	B1
155248	MEMO	WILLIAM HENKEL TO JOHNATHAN MILLER RE PLANNING	3	2/18/1986	B1
155249	MEMO	WILLIAM HENKEL/JOHNATHAN MILLER TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE GORBACHEV VISIT	4	ND	B1
155250	MEMO	DENNIS THOMAS/DONALD FORTIER TO DONALD REGAN/JOHN POINDEXTER RE PLANNING	2	2/21/1986	B1
155251	PAPER	PROPOSED SCHEDULE	2	ND	B1
155252	MEMO	STEPHEN RHINESMITH TO WILLIAM HENKEL RE SUMMIT	4	2/24/1986	B1
155254	PAPER	RE SCHEDULE OBJECTIVES (W/ATTACHMENT)	3	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
155256	DRAFT MEMO	DENNIS THOMAS/DONALD FORTIER TO DONALD REGAN/JOHN POINDEXTER	1	ND	B1
155257	PAPER	RE SCHEDULE (W/ATTACHMENT)	4	ND	B1
155259	MEMO	WILLIAM HENKEL TO DONALD REGAN/DENNIS THOMAS RE SUMMIT DATES	2	3/18/1986	B1
155261	MEMO	WILLIAM HENKEL TO DONALD REGAN/DENNIS THOMAS RE SUMMIT DATES (ANNOTATED)	2	3/18/1986	B1
155262	PAPER	RE SCHEDULE (W/ATTACHMENT)	5	ND	B1
155266	MEMO	WILLIAM HENKEL TO DONALD REGAN/JOHN POINDEXTER RE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS	2	4/2/1986	B1
155264	PAPER	SAME AS 155262	5	ND	B1
155267	MEMO	SAME AS 155266	2	4/2/1986	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
155269	MEMO	WILLIAM HENKEL TO DONALD REGAN RE PLANNING	2	7/14/1986	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 22, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR SUMMIT PLANNING GROUP

FROM: JAMES L. HOOLEY *JLH*
SUBJECT: IDEAS FOR NOVEMBER SUMMIT

As we begin to prepare for the real possibility of a visit to the United States by General Secretary Gorbachev, it might be helpful for everyone to have the same perspective of what thoughts, ideas and scenarios have been "kicked around" to date. A great deal of thought has gone into the size, scope and type of visit since that day in Geneva when the President asked Gorbachev ("out in the parking lot," as the President likes to say) to come to the U.S. The President himself has indicated his desires for a Summit; planning groups here in the White House prepared extensive proposals and concept memos throughout 1986, when we thought we might have a June, then later a Fall, Summit that year.

It occurred to me that some of that information would give perspective, would stimulate further thought and ideas, and might eliminate duplication of effort. Of course, when these papers were written, there was no indication as to the extent of a Gorbachev visit, or to the form it would take. Therefore, these papers must be taken for what they offer as background and perspective, in realization that the specific ideas may or may not relate to any eventual meeting between the two leaders.

The material has been put together in chronological order. It begins with trip concepts generated by the Advance Office and by the NSC. It continues with information and ideas developed by those two offices and submitted to the Summit Planning Group, were submitted by this group to then-Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan. Finally, it brings us up to the state of planning as of a week or so ago, including information regarding the President's outlook, as reported by Senator Baker.

I hope you find this chronology useful.

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENTS

mn
317113

9/22/87 10:00 a.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HENKEL

FROM: JAMES L. HOOLEY *JLH*

SUBJECT: GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO THE U.S.

Since we are meeting tomorrow to begin discussion of the proposals for a scenario of the visit to the United States of General Secretary Gorbachev, the Advance Office would like to weigh in with its own suggestions. Our proposal is based upon the assumption that the President will want the visit to include time for meetings in Washington and possibly Camp David. It also takes the President literally on the wording of his invitation to Gorbachev "out in the parking lot" to "show you the United States."

It is our feeling that the President should show Gorbachev the United States that he knows. What better way for Gorbachev to gain insight into Ronald Reagan's view of the world, to understand the philosophical underpinnings of the President's ideology, than for him to see the America that Reagan grew up in, developed his political views in, built two successful careers within, and that voted overwhelmingly--twice--to make him its leader?

We believe that the President should tell Gorbachev that he would like to help them begin to better understand each by seeing the world from the vantage points of each other's lives. In the President's case, this could serve to satisfy the need to make at least part of the tour a view of small town or middle America, as our scenario demonstrates. At the same time, we also believe that the President should show Gorbachev a small slice of life in a typical American city--not a showcase, not a visit to Disneyland, but a visit to an urban environment with both problems and accomplishments, showing both the failure of government programs and the hope of the free market. Perhaps an Enterprise Zone in a location where one is working, or beginning to work, would be an opportunity to show the dynamic aspects of a capitalist or private industry-oriented economy.

Our proposal is that the President take Gorbachev from Washington to a medium-sized city which is moving--through initiative and cooperation between private industry, community and local government--from urban blight to a thriving environment. Others will better be able to tell us which city that is, but Baltimore, St. Louis or Buffalo come to mind. The President would then take the Soviet leader to that place which is the foundation of his views on life and the world around him, Eureka College. As Harry Truman did with Winston Churchill at Fulton College in Missouri, the President would invite Gorbachev to address the students of his alma mater on peace and international relations (the President, of course, would introduce him). This would give us the small-town, heartland setting needed, would give us a farm-economy region without the political problems of visiting a farm, and would give the President the opportunity to show off with pride "his America."

From Eureka, the two leaders would fly to Santa Barbara for private discussions at the ranch. Here the President would be able to express to Gorbachev what the ranch does for his psyche, and share his private retreat from the world's problems with the only other man on Earth who understands the need.

The visit could end with a state or official dinner in Los Angeles, attended by the celebrities of California politics, show business, and society, including the Reagan's close friends and associates.

Williamsburg If the visit is held in June, we could shoot for Gorbachev to arrive on a Thursday, spend Thursday and Friday morning in Washington; go to Camp David for the weekend. On Monday morning, they would begin their journey West, ending up the visit in L.A. late enough in the week for the President to stay at the ranch for a weekend; Gorbachev could fly home from L.A.

However, if the visit is scheduled for early September, reverse the route, allowing the President to begin the visit from his pre-Labor Day vacation at the ranch. Gorbachev would arrive just after Labor Day for an arrival at LAX (met by Shultz), helicopter to Point Magu for an arrival ceremony, join the President at the ranch for a few days, then fly to Eureka and the other city, moving on to Washington for a full honors ceremony on the South Lawn, meetings in the White House, and a weekend at Camp David. Either way, the "tourist journey" between meetings allows The President to informally lobby Gorbachev on any sticking points arising from the first meetings before the last ones begin.

I hope these thoughts are helpful. They were developed en route to Mexico with Johnathan Miller, Andrew Littlefair and Gary Foster. Let me know if you'd like to discuss them further.

Nat'l Park - background

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET Attachment
EYES ONLY

December 10, 1985

TO:

BILL HENKEL
DENNIS THOMAS
TOM DAWSON

FROM:

clm
for WILLIAM F. MARTIN
Executive Secretary

For your information .

SECRET ATTACHMENT

MP
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 22, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM HOOLEY

FROM: Mark Weinberg

In looking toward General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to the United States next year, it might make sense to treat his trip as we treated the trips here of Queen Elizabeth II and Premier Zhao - controlled by the White House Advance Office and advanced by our people. As the President will be going to the Soviet Union in 1987, it would be of great help for us to be able to build relationships we will need when we go to Moscow. With all due respect to the State Department, they have a different way of treating foreign visitors here than we want the President to be treated when he is abroad. We cannot expect the Soviets to give us what we did not give them a year earlier. State should be involved, of course, but the trip ought to be run out of the White House.

✓ cc: Bill Henkel

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Day One

Arrive Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. - Greeted by Secretary and Mrs. Shultz.

(Alternatively, arrive Williamsburg, Va. and rest and overnight)

Day Two

White House Lawn Arrival Ceremony.

Meeting with President Reagan.

Private working lunch for the Soviet Party
(or Secretary of State lunch).

Possible follow-up meeting with President Reagan.

White House State Dinner.

Day Three

Possible meetings with Cabinet Officials

Lunch hosted by Secy. and Mrs. Shultz at the State Dept.
(or lunch hosted by leaders of the Senate and House).

Sightseeing of Washington monuments and museums.

Day Four and Onward

Possible travel to:

Research Triangle in Winston-Salem/Raleigh-Durnham, N.C.
(high-tech, universities)

Mid-West working farm hosted by the Secretary of Agriculture
and/or Senator Dole.

Houston with the Vice President.

San Francisco, with day trip to Stanford University and
meal at the home of Secy Shultz.

Santa Barbara for final meeting with President Reagan
at the ranch.

Alaska for refueling stop on return to the Soviet Union.

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155247 MEMO

1 1/23/1986 B1

DENNIS THOMAS TO JONATHAN MILLER RE
GORBACHEV PLANNING GROUP

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155248	MEMO WILLIAM HENKEL TO JOHNATHAN MILLER RE PLANNING	3	2/18/1986	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES L. HOOLEY

FROM: W. GREY TERRY
FREDERICK L. AHEARN

SUBJECT: PLANNING FOR GORBACHEV SUMMIT

Background

Per your direction and with the materials provided by Bill Henkel, we have held discussions between ourselves in an effort to encompass and unify the many themes, criteria and objectives related to General Secretary Gorbachev's visit sometime this year. There follows a review of our collective thoughts on the subject organized into four basic ideas: objective, perspective, themes, regional and specific examples. It is important to note that the entire contents of this review are notional in concept - that obviously many factors have yet to be developed and considered, and that many of those factors will originate outside the Advance Office.

Objectives

The objectives as we see them are: first, to provide the General Secretary with a view of America's character, diversity and dynamism; second, to permit both leaders further insights into each other's personalities and viewpoints and third, to provide a broad spectrum of opportunity for meetings including formal, semi-formal and informal occasions in which the process of substantive negotiations can continue.

The combination of cultural exposure, personal acquaintance and substantive negotiations requires careful balance and a unifying motif, or perspective.

Perspective

From a pure utility standpoint, it would seem productive to show America to the General Secretary largely as seen through the eyes of the President. This perspective - - Ronald Reagan's America - - derives not only from his historical antecedents in Illinois and California, but also in cultural, political and philosophical environments which have had an influence on his views without his necessarily ever having visited them.

This approach would afford Mr. Gorbachev not only a view of America in general, but also insights into the President's thinking and therefore further develop the three objectives of cultural exposure, personal acquaintance and a broad variety of settings for substantive talks.

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In addition to the above, the Ronald Reagan's America perspective lends itself to organizing the many aspects of America into several coherent themes.

Themes

To anyone who has tried to explain America to a foreign visitor, the task is virtually impossible unless organized under various - perhaps arbitrary - themes. After considerable discussion we have opted for the following as being important elements of a Gorbachev visit to Ronald Reagan's America.

Forms of American Government

Starting with Washington and Ronald Reagan as Head of Government and Head of State and tracing the system down to the grass roots level - perhaps a New England town meeting - where the one vote concept starts to work.

Historical Development of the United States

Trace the historical growth of the United States starting on the older, pre-colonial east coast and progressing westward looking at historical benchmarks that have helped shape the American viewpoint such as the struggle for independence, the pioneer spirit and the drive for a better standard of living.

Regional and Cultural Diversity

Demonstrate the diversity of American life, underscoring our pride in regional and cultural differences by observing first-hand the different ways Americans live, work and play - the ethnic and geographic contrasts which make-up the United States.

America's Economic System

Emphasize the impact of the private investment system by visiting the workplaces of America, meeting with business leaders, perhaps even attending a stockholder's meeting.

Regional and Specific Examples

We submit the following possibilities, not as concrete schedule proposals, but merely as initial ideas to illustrate some positive and negative aspects of regions for consideration, and several possibilities in those regions:

Washington, D.C.

Positive Aspects

Substantive Summit Sessions

Illustrates U.S. Government System

The President as Head of State and Head of Government

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Pageantry associated with State Visit
Cultural event (i.e. Kennedy Center, National Symphony, National Ballet)
Regional Life Style - Eastern Shore, Chesapeake Bay, Virginia Horse Farms

New England

Several possible sites could be considered in New England:

A. Greater Boston

Positive Aspects

"Cradle of Liberty"

Picturesque, historic, restored and vibrant downtown area
Cultural possibilities - Boston Symphony, etc.
High tech flourishing along Rt. 128 (such as Millipore Event)
Historic Pageantry available
Possible forum at College or University

Negative Aspects

Possible Demonstrations in Downtown/Cambridge area.

B. Northern New England (New Hampshire or Vermont)

Positive Aspects

Unique Life Style (small town)
Unchanged early form of Democracy (town meetings form of government)
Samanatha Smith's Home
Picturesque Scenery
Good environment for meetings or talks

Deep South

Several possible sites in the South:

A. Birmingham, Alabama

Positive Aspects

Heart of the deep South
Formerly site of racial violence, now has black mayor
Revitalized, vibrant city (Rebuilt South)
Center of Medical research and Education
Some Heavy Industry

Negative Aspects

No truly great photos
Nothing right in downtown area conducive to meetings/talks

B. New Orleans, Louisiana

Positive Aspects

Diverse cultural lifestyle (Southern Living)
Unique, picturesque architecture
black Mayor
Vibrant port

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Mississippi River - shows flow of America westward
Unique style of food
Ample sites for meetings - talks

Negative Aspects

Bourbon Street - Vieux Carre could portray "Western
Decadence"

Mid-West

Again, several examples of possible stops.

A. Illinois (Excluding Chicago due to large Polish, Eastern
European populace)

Positive Aspects

President Reagan's personal heritage - (Dixon, Eureka)
Possible forum at Eureka
Successful Agricultural Operations
Agriculture related industry
Small Town life style - "back bone of America"

Negative Aspects

Possible problems on some farms in area

B. St. Louis, MO

Positive Aspects

Vibrant Mid-western city
"Gateway to the west" (Westward flow of America)
Mississippi River town
Impoverished area being re-developed

Negative Aspects

Still some slum areas (predominantly black)
Limited photo opportunities

Southwest/West

The natural beauty of the Southwest or West could provide a
breathtaking back drop for further talks which could be inserted
into the middle of the week. Some examples follow:

Southwest

A. San Antonio, Texas

Positive Aspects

Lifestyle and cultural setting not seen previously
Hispanic-American presence (Hispanic Mayor)
Cattle ranches in area (if avoiding a farm, substitute a
ranch)
Vibrant downtown

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Negative Aspects

Remote possibility of anti-administration protests
Limited number of photo opportunities

B. Santa Fe, New Mexico

Positive Aspects

Outstanding photo opportunities
Atmosphere conducive to talks/meetings
Hispanic-American culture

Negative Aspects

No airport - Helicopters required

West

A. Sun Valley, Idaho

Positive Aspects

Mountainous backdrop provides contemplative atmosphere for meetings/talks
Ample off-season accommodations
Few distractions

The above could apply to any number of similar locations such as Vail or Aspen, Colorado or Park City, Utah. Similarly, we could consider a site in proximity to the Grand Canyon in Arizona.

B. California

1. San Francisco

Positive Aspects

Personifies the ultimate goal in early America's flow westward
Beautiful scenery
Ample locations for talks/meetings
Ample cultural opportunities (Symphony, Ballet, etc.)
Lifestyle unlike previous stops (Fishermen's Wharf, Cable Cars, steamed crabs, etc.)

Negative Aspects

Possible anti-administration and anti-Soviet demonstrations
Blatant examples of what the Soviets consider "Western Decadence"

2. Sacramento

Positive Aspects

Illustrates another major milestone in President Reagan's political and personal career
Illustrates another level of American Democratic Government (State Level)
Environment conducive to meetings/talks

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3. Santa Barbara - Rancho del Cielo

The ultimate expression of "Ronald Reagan-The Man"
Caps our westward tracking of the President's personal
and political development.
Illustrates what President Reagan's ultimate personal
objective, rather than political objective, has been.
Excellent environment for further talks/meetings

In closing, we reiterate that the above cities are not set forth as specific proposals, but merely illustrate our line of thought. As the process continues, we will all, no doubt, eliminate some of the aforementioned locations in favor of new ideas. These are simply meant to be examples.

We hope this memorandum is of some help to you in the continuing Summit process.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/25/86

TO: Dennis Thomas / Don Fortier

FROM: DONALD T. REGAN
CHIEF OF STAFF

Good start - I'd plan
on Pres' being in meeting
aspect of visit.

I'd ^{prefer} night of rest, talk,
couple or 3 days of visits,
talk, conclusion

as soon as we hear
from them we should
"gear up" in a hurry

WGR

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155250 MEMO

2 2/21/1986 B1

DENNIS THOMAS/DONALD FORTIER TO
DONALD REGAN/JOHN POINDEXTER RE
PLANNING

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GORBACHEV SUMMIT WHITE HOUSE WORKING GROUP

Chm Dennis Thomas
Chm Don Fortier

Larry Speakes
Pat Buchanan
Bill Henkel
David Chew
Fred Ryan
Rod McDaniel
Jack Matlock
Johnathan Miller
Doug Doan (Staff Asst)

TAB B

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155251 PAPER	PROPOSED SCHEDULE	2	ND	B1

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TAB C

Likely Soviet Diplomatic Activity

February	UK Foreign Minister Howe to Moscow
	Shevardnadze visit to Geneva.
	French Economic Minister to Moscow
	Soviet Envoy, Slyusar to Belgium
March	** Gorbachev visit to Rome and the Vatican
	Canadian Trade Representatives in Moscow.
March/April	Swedish PM Palme to Moscow.
April	Mitterrand visit to Moscow (tentative date)
May	Argentine President Alfonsin to visit Moscow.

Possible Diplomatic Activities:

1st half of 86	Dutch PM Lubbers to Moscow.
	Spanish PM Gonzalez visit to Moscow.
	** Gorbachev Visit to Greece.
	Politburo Member, Vorotnikov visit to FRG.
	Chinese FM Wu and Vice Premier Yoa Yilin to the USSR.
	Sengalese President Diouf to Moscow
2nd half of 86	Danish PM Schlueter to Moscow.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: STEPHEN RHINESMITH
FROM: WILLIAM HENKEL 
SUBJECT: Aspects of the Reagan Gorbachev Summit

Thank you for your excellent memorandum on the suggestions for People to People events associated with the Summit.

In your memorandum you indicated that a major criteria for selecting possible locations would be the Fall Campaign. I want to correct this misunderstanding. Political considerations will not be of major concern when we schedule Summit events.

cc: Mark Palmer
Mark Parris

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155252	MEMO STEPHEN RHINESMITH TO WILLIAM HENKEL RE SUMMIT	4	2/24/1986	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 25, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HENKEL

FROM: W. GREY TERRY
ANDREW J. LITTLEFAIR

SUBJECT: CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGY FOR SITE SELECTION FOR
GORBACHEV VISIT.

We believed it would be useful to review our discussion of yesterday outlining the criteria you set forth to be used when researching potential sites and outline the procedure we will begin to follow during the next week.

It was agreed that there should be at least three themes that should be found working within any of the sites that eventually be surveyed. These themes are somewhat theoretical in nature and can be broadly interpreted.

ECONOMIC: "America's Economic System"

Prioritized as the most important theme, you described this category as being able to demonstrate the health and power of the American economic system by finding sites that show innovation, productivity, automation and labor-management cooperation, just to name a few characteristics. In addition, the theme should be able to portray the dynamic of the integration of academia and capital as it provides for futuristic planning and the creation of new products.

INDIVIDUAL: "Power of the Individual in American Society"

Obviously, this theme permeates the others and can be found in varying degrees at most sites. This theme hopefully will show the General Secretary the importance of the contribution of the individual in society, be it in the workplace, local government, school, market place, community or home. In addition, this theme should show the idea that Americans have individualistic goals and objectives and often meet these by divergent paths.

CREATIVITY/INNOVATION: "American Society as creative and Innovative"

Again, this theme can be interpreted as closely associated with the others, however, any of the sites selected should be able to show that through our emphasis on the creativity of the individual, America is able to create a world that is a safer and better place. Hopefully, this category points out the versatility and variety of the American people. From the variety of ethnic neighborhoods to innovation and creativity found in exciting new businesses, we hope to find sites that are able to bring out this very important element of the American people.

Finally, you discussed the idea that elements of the new "People to People" program might be worked into many stops during the visit. The "People to People" program can effectively show concrete examples of the learning process which has begun between our countries through the exchange of young people.

In order to begin to develop a list of sites that may be examined by the above themes, we agreed it most important to immediately develop a series of "top ten" lists that can be used to start generating the best places to "show off" various aspects of our country. Below, is a rough listing of the categories that will be investigated.

- Ten best High-Tech areas.
- Ten best areas of urban economic development.
- Ten most innovative firms.
- Ten best cities in which to live.
- Ten most outstanding young Americans.
- Ten most effective local Governments.
- Ten most effective state Governments.
- Ten most effective county Governments.
- Ten best universities.
- Ten most outstanding medical institutions.
- Ten most outstanding inventions/discoveries.

In addition, you asked us keep mindful of things about America that could be considered as negatives by the Soviets. It could be an effective use of time to expose the Soviets to some of these "negatives", therefore, dispelling some of their beliefs.

2/25/1986
11:45 am.

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155254 PAPER	RE SCHEDULE OBJECTIVES (W/ATTACHMENT)	3	ND	B1

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155256	DRAFT MEMO DENNIS THOMAS/DONALD FORTIER TO DONALD REGAN/JOHN POINDEXTER	1	ND	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: DONALD T. REGAN
DENNIS THOMAS

FROM: WILLIAM HENKEL 

SUBJECT: Summer Summit

Dennis requested that I prepare a brief summary and outline schedule for the President to review and use during the proposed meeting to get his thoughts on the Gorbachev visit.

Attachment: Secret/Sensitive

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155257	PAPER RE SCHEDULE (W/ATTACHMENT)	4	ND	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1. *Bill*

FROM: DONALD T. REGAN
CHIEF OF STAFF

*Get John P. , Dennis,
Pat, et. al for a
discussion of this in the
next week, or so*

*Don
3-19-86*

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155259 MEMO

2 3/18/1986 B1

WILLIAM HENKEL TO DONALD REGAN/DENNIS
THOMAS RE SUMMIT DATES

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155261	MEMO WILLIAM HENKEL TO DONALD REGAN/DENNIS THOMAS RE SUMMIT DATES (ANNOTATED)	2	3/18/1986	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 27, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH: DONALD T. REGAN
FROM: WILLIAM HENKEL 
SUBJECT: Summit II Concepts

One of your major achievements of 1985 was the Geneva Summit and the "fresh start, a dialog for peace" that was so well received by the public. Dick Wirthlin has shown Geneva gave you a huge boost on the issue of peace and the conduct of foreign policy. The major tangible result was your agreement with the General Secretary to conduct two follow-up Summits.

Our plan for 1986 was framed around a few critical events and issues leading up to your Summit meeting and the Fall Elections:

- o State of the Union
- o Strong National Security Budget
- o Strong Domestic Economy
- o Tokyo Economic Summit
- o Summit II
- o Fall Elections

A key theme of yours, building a safer, more secure world, was to be accomplished by maintaining our strength, sustaining domestic and global economic growth, promoting world-wide democratic trends, and meeting with Gorbachev to manage the bilateral relationship and promote understanding. All of these conditions and activities were designed to help you lead the Republican campaign this fall.

Attached is a notional outline schedule which we would appreciate your comments and thoughts on.

Thank you.

Attachment

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155262	PAPER RE SCHEDULE (W/ATTACHMENT)	5	ND	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SUMMIT II AGENDA

*d/rt A ~
decis ~ ntl
9/20*

1. Probabilities of Summit II in 1986
2. Date Options/Realities
 - o November 4 Election Day
 - o Readjustment period, briefing/preparation time and public diplomacy activities will require time between Nov. 4 and start of Summit.
 - o November 10 - 16 (too early?)
 - o November 17 - 23 *idea*
 - o November 24 - 30 (Thanksgiving November 27)
 - o December 1 - 7 Possible (Dec. 4 - 7 White House closed for Christmas decorations)
 - o After December 7, Christmas schedule, etc. No per Mrs. Reagan.
3. Schedule of pre-summit public activities, Sept/Oct period, UNGA(?), major policy speech (?), etc. juxtaposition with '86 Election Campaign.
4. Allocation of personnel resources: September/October '86 Election Campaign with USSR Advance trips to U.S., Summit preparations during campaign. *9/23 minor changes*
5. Review President's views on Summit II schedule proposals presented to him on March 27. *NK agree*
6. USSR input on schedule, ideas, places to visit, etc. How get information prior to USSR advance arrival?
7. Utilizing August for surveys, preparations, etc. Recognize will fuel speculation and knowledge White House working on Summit. (NOTE: Henkel Trips to Geneva: July 18 - 22, 1985 and two trips in September 1985 for Nov. 19 - 21, 1985 Summit) *OK*
8. Oversight Mechanism
 - o Core Group
 - o Public Diplomacy
 - o Interagency
9. Role of Department of State Office of Protocol *7/1 - 7/3 announced*

mid Sept paper for Shults

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155266 MEMO

2 4/2/1986 B1

WILLIAM HENKEL TO DONALD REGAN/JOHN
POINDEXTER RE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 27, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH: DONALD T. REGAN
FROM: WILLIAM HENKEL 
SUBJECT: Summit II Concepts

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- o Strong National Security Budget
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- o Fall Elections

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Thank you.

Attachment

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155264	PAPER	5	ND	B1
	SAME AS 155262			

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155267	MEMO	2	4/2/1986	B1
	SAME AS 155266			

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155269 MEMO

2 7/14/1986 B1

WILLIAM HENKEL TO DONALD REGAN RE
PLANNING

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 8, 1987

Talking Points For Senator Baker

Conversation With Secretary Shultz

- * Precedent set on successful planning of trips with highly personal Presidential interest and participation for White House lead role in development and coordination.
 - Unlike "cookie cutter" nature of state/official visits to Washington which are standard scenario
 - Premier Zhao Ziang, Queen Elizabeth II visits examples where President's personal support operation took lead coordination role (Involved President in strong "host" role outside standard state visit fare)
 - Previous meetings with Gorbachev (Geneva and Iceland) were result of coordination group chaired by Chief of Staff and NSC advisor and a working group of their designees
- * Highly personal nature of a Gorbachev visit for the President requires that decision-making body be responsive to his personal hopes and aspirations for the visit.
- * Possible reciprocal nature of trip arrangements cannot be overemphasized.
 - We can expect that trip to USSR will mirror in many ways trip to U.S. Decisions on substantive and logistical nature of trip to USSR will probably be made at very personal level around Gorbachev
 - When we need decisions on those arrangements, we need to have access to people close to Gorbachev, not those in Soviet bureaucracy
 - Example set by us may be crucial, in terms of perception of personal involvement of President and the White House. This was demonstrated by our experience with reciprocal arrangements on visit to Chinese to U.S. and our visit to China

* Overall control of schedule and events should rest with group representing all relevant agencies (State, White House, NSC, USIA, etc.); group to be co-chaired by Baker and Carlucci, as was done in past.

--Group would include Shultz designee, i.e., Roz Ridgway

--Next-level "working group" would be responsible for day-to-day implementation of decisions of Baker-Carlucci group. From White House, Griscom and Powell would co-chair. Active participation of senior State advisors crucial: Tom Simons, Mark Palmer, Soviet desk director, etc. Also, USIA, State Protocol and others

--The working group (Griscom-Powell) is responsible for substantive and protocol development of the visit

--This based on model of past successful trips mentioned above

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 3, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR BAKER

FROM: TOM GRISCOM 3

SUBJECT: SUMMIT INFORMATION

Attached to this memorandum is a longer version with some issues that should be considered as we head into the Fall.

Earlier today I had a discussion with General Powell concerning the initial planning stages for foreign policy initiatives that may occur later this year. It is our recommendation that we go forward and designate a planning team in the White House that will pull together the inter-agency contacts.

As you recall, Colin and I already chair a U.N. planning group and our recommendation would be this group be continued, with you and Frank Carlucci as the chairmen and the two of us (Colin/Griscom) as the operational co-chairmen. This is similar to planning steps that were taken prior to the 1985 Geneva summit. One other recommendation that was used for Geneva was the designation of this planning group in an NSDD. It is our feeling that taking this action now will send a clear signal that the White House will serve as the coordinating and decision-making group for any summit-related logistical, public diplomacy etc. activities.

I would also suggest that on Sunday when you finish your conversation with the President on the other subject matter, that you raise this coordination plan for his concurrence and that you ask in general for any thoughts that they may have at this time as it relates to a summit and plans for a summit.

After that conversation, Bill Henkel could get any follow-up that needs to be put into our planning process.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

FROM

THOMAS C. GRISCOM 3

SUBJECT

TALKING POINTS FOR CONVERSATION WITH THE
PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN ON U.S.- U.S.S.R. SUMMIT

In an informal conversation today, Bill Henkel, Jim Hooley and I began discussing the many steps we would have to begin immediately if a Summit date emerges from the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit next week. It is clear that we will have an immense task before us, in terms of both substance and logistics, which will have to begin immediately. It is our expectation that a Soviet delegation will want to come to the U.S. to review our plans within a few weeks of an announcement. Therefore, we will have to decide very shortly what it is we want from a Summit, what we want to do, and what we want to show the Soviets.

The necessary first step is to find out from the President and Mrs. Reagan what are their thoughts, ideas and expectations. On Sunday, aboard Air Force One en route Washington from Topeka, there is a timely opportunity for you to probe for some of their thoughts. At this time, you and Frank Carlucci are scheduled to brief the President on disarmament and arms control during that flight. We recommend that you follow that meeting with an invitation for Mrs. Reagan to join the three of you for a private and informal discussion of the Summit. You should explain to them that, assuming that Schevardnadze carries a message from Gorbachev accepting his invitation, it would be immensely helpful if we had their current thoughts on these activities, and their sense of the scope of the visit. You could convey these to Bill Henkel aboard the flight as they are fresh in your mind.

For your information, we will use this information as background for a small, private preliminary planning meeting I expect to convene in Washington on Wednesday. Following my discussions with Bill and Jim, it is evident to me that an immense commitment of time, manpower and resources will need to be dedicated to this project, almost to the exclusion of other matters. Therefore, it is vital that we begin now. The key to beginning this process is learning from the President and Mrs. Reagan, in a quiet and private conversation, their hopes and aspirations for the Summit.

In short, what we need to know is: if the President could have it any way he wanted it, how would the Gorbachev visit to the U.S. go?

cc: Bill Henkel
Jim Hooley

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 11, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS C. GRISCOM

FROM

JAMES L. HOOLE 

SUBJECT

POSSIBLE GORBACHEV VISIT TO U.S.

As I mentioned this morning, we have prepared a memorandum for Senator Baker to give to the President, summarizing our understanding of current thinking for the possible Summit trip. Bill Henkel and I feel very strongly that this should be submitted to the President, and given to Gen. Powell at NSC for Secretary Shultz and his people. This is so that everyone is singing from the same sheet of music if the subject of the Summit comes up in meetings with Schevardnadze next week.

It is possible that certain key players may have their own ideas as to what the President wants from a Gorbachev trip. This memo would serve as notice that there is one plan, and the President has approved it.

Our proposal is that Sen. Baker, if he approves the attached memorandum, submits it to the President this afternoon for perusal over the weekend at Camp David.

If you agree, we would have Colin Powell circulate a similar document (also attached), which would contain the same thoughts as the memorandum, but which would be in the form of an event concept proposal sent out to select State and NSC players. This would then constitute the paper which you indicated you would pass out to these players following our meeting on Wednesday.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 11, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

SUBJECT: INITIAL THOUGHTS ON A POSSIBLE GORBACHEV VISIT

Pursuant to our recent conversation aboard Air Force One, and some follow-up discussions with selected senior staff members, I think that it is important to have some approved concepts in hand in the event they are needed during the course of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit next week.

First, let me reiterate some of your views to ensure that we are building on the proper foundation. I believe that you would like to see a Gorbachev visit which focuses more on the American experience and American values than on a ceremonial structure. Our objective ought to be to impart in the General Secretary a sense of how Americans live and work - a sense of our everyday family community, economic and moral outlook. While playing down the Washington pomp and ceremony aspects, we should similarly avoid anything which could be labeled "Potemkin Village."

With this as a rough guideline, I have discussed the matter with others here in the White House and retrieved some data from previous experiences during this Administration which are relevant and consistent with your views.

One way to structure a Gorbachev visit might be a simple progression from East to West - that is, starting in Washington with a minimum of necessary official activity and then moving West increasing the General Secretary's exposure with several cross-country stops and ending on the West Coast. Activities under this scenario might include an Arrival Ceremony/State Dinner day in Washington, followed by a Mid-Western, Southern and/or Southwestern visit featuring industry and agriculture, and finally a visit to the West Coast.

This East-West vehicle could sustain a variety of themes - it traces the direction of this country's settlement, it would reveal the scope and diversity of the American experience and, most importantly, might provide you with the maximum flexibility to personalize the General Secretary's experience.

09/11/87 12:30 p.m.

One approach would be for you to bracket Gorbachev's visit - that is, greet him in Washington in a fairly official context, and after the requisite formalities, invite him to see our country firsthand with the understanding that you would join him "at the other end" - away from Official Washington for a more personal intensive meeting. This could be structured around dual speeches to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, for example. On a still more personal basis, you might wish to "compare notes" on his impressions by inviting him to the Ranch.

One theory mitigating against this East-West approach is the unconfirmed idea that the Soviets have a great concern for the General Secretary's personal security abroad, particularly here in the U.S., and would greatly prefer the safety of their Embassy here in Washington for overnight accommodations. If this is true, and we needed to acquiesce to the concept of day trips out of Washington, we could still offer up an impressive diversity of American experience. Williamsburg for historical context could be followed by Baltimore, Philadelphia or New York for a glimpse of rejuvenated urban life, while Virginia and Pennsylvania could offer views of agriculture and industrial America. Annapolis and the Chesapeake area are also natural possibilities.

In either case, in your cordial but brief official greetings you could indicate that you wish to interact on a more personal level after the General Secretary is exposed to the America you represent.

Another possible consideration that we must factor in is the likely Soviet sensitivity to the fact that Gorbachev is neither Head of State nor Government. The omission of an invitation to The White House, or any other Washington based formality normally accorded a world leader could be misinterpreted. (I am told that this almost became a Soviet obsession during the planning for the Nixon - Brezhnev meeting in 1973.)

In a related area, I think that it is important to make the General Secretary aware that a visit to the U.S. would merit your personal attention and that you are willing to contribute to its success in any way possible. Not only would this set a beneficial tone for negotiations, but also as with the Zhao Ziang visit it could establish an invaluable precedent for your experience on any reciprocal visit to the U.S.S.R. Again drawing from the Zhao model, perhaps you should give consideration to designating a personal representative to act as your liaison in these matters as Mike Deaver did during Premier Zhao's and Queen Elizabeth II's visits.

Finally, pending your reaction to these matters, I would like to discuss them with George Shultz and Frank Carlucci. If we are of one voice and have some generally agreed upon guidelines in hand prior to the Foreign Minister's visit on Tuesday, we can meet the subject head-on, impress the Soviets with our seriousness and perhaps prompt some early responses in what might otherwise be a very fast-paced preparation period.

09/11/87 12:30 p.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 11, 1987

EVENT CONCEPT FOR POSSIBLE U.S.-U.S.S.R. SUMMIT

For use during Shevardnadze Meetings September 15-17

Pursuant to a recent conversation with the President aboard Air Force One, and some follow-up discussions with selected senior staff members, it has become apparent that it is important to have some approved concepts in hand in the event they are needed during the course of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit next week.

First, it is important to reiterate some of the President's views to ensure that we are building on the proper foundation. The President would like to see a Gorbachev visit which focuses more on the American experience and American values than on a ceremonial structure. Our objective should be to impart to the General Secretary a sense of how Americans live and work - a sense of our everyday family community, economic and moral outlook. While playing down the Washington pomp and ceremony aspects, we should similarly avoid anything which could be labeled "Potemkin Village."

With this as a rough guideline, these matters have been discussed with others here in the White House and some data has been retrieved from previous experiences during this Administration which are relevant and consistent with the President's views.

One way to structure a Gorbachev visit might be a simple progression from East to West - that is, starting in Washington with a minimum of necessary official activity and then moving West increasing the General Secretary's exposure with several cross-country stops and ending on the West Coast. Activities under this scenario might include an Arrival Ceremony/State Dinner day in Washington, followed by a Mid-Western, Southern and/or Southwestern visit featuring industry and agriculture, and finally a visit to the West Coast.

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