

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Coordination Office, NSC: Records,
1983-1989

Folder Title: Unclassified Reading: President and
Gorbachev - Moscow Summit 05/29/1988-
06/02/1988 (2)

Box: RAC Box 25

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>



PRESIDENT
RONALD REAGAN
GENERAL SECRETARY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

MOSCOW SUMMIT

MAY 29 - JUNE 2, 1988

**PRESS
GUIDE**



PRESIDENT
RONALD REAGAN
GENERAL SECRETARY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

MOSCOW SUMMIT

MAY 29 - JUNE 2, 1988

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT SCHEDULE

2

PRESS FACILITIES
U.S. EMBASSY/STAFF/SPASO HOUSE

3

WESTERN NEWS MEDIA IN MOSCOW

4

USEFUL INFORMATION

5

BIOGRAPHIES – U.S. OFFICIALS

6

U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1943-1987

PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT SCHEDULE

(All times are Moscow local time.)

Sunday, May 29

-
- | | |
|------------------|--|
| 2:00 p.m. | The President and Mrs. Reagan arrive in Moscow aboard Air Force One. Official Arrival Ceremony at Vnukovo Airport with President Andrei Gromyko. |
| 2:45 p.m. | The President and Mrs. Reagan participate in an arrival ceremony with General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev. St. George's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace. |
| 3:15 p.m. | First meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace. |
| 5:00 p.m. | U.S. Deputy Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater and Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov hold joint press briefing. (Tentative)
Overnight: Spaso House. |
-

PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT SCHEDULE

Monday, May 30

10:00 a.m.	Second meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace.
1:30 p.m.	The President visits the Danilov Monastery.
3:00 p.m.	Third meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace.
4:30 p.m.	The President meets with selected Soviet citizens. Spaso House.
6:00 p.m.	Deputy Press Secretary Fitzwater and Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gerasimov hold joint press briefing. (Tentative)
7:30 p.m.	The President and Mrs. Reagan attend an official dinner hosted by General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev. Chamber of Facets, Grand Kremlin Palace. Overnight: Spaso House.

PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT SCHEDULE

Tuesday, May 31

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| 10:00 a.m. | Fourth meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. <ul style="list-style-type: none">— Meeting in General Secretary's private office of USSR government building.— Walk through Kremlin grounds.— Meeting in St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace. |
| <hr/> | |
| 12:00 noon | The President speaks to the Soviet cultural and artistic community. House of Writers. |
| <hr/> | |
| 2:30 p.m. | Deputy Press Secretary Fitzwater and Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gerasimov hold joint press briefing. (Tentative) |
| <hr/> | |
| 4:00 p.m. | The President addresses students and faculty at Moscow University. |
| <hr/> | |
| 8:00 p.m. | The President and Mrs. Reagan host a reciprocal dinner for the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev. Spaso House.
Overnight: Spaso House. |

PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT SCHEDULE

Wednesday, June 1

10:00 a.m. Fifth meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace.

11:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. Open.

6:00 p.m. The President and Mrs. Reagan attend the Bolshoi Ballet with General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev.

8:00 p.m. The President and Mrs. Reagan have dinner with General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev.
Overnight: Spaso House.

Thursday, June 2

9:00 a.m. Visit with Embassy personnel and families.
Spaso House.

10:00 a.m. The President and Mrs. Reagan participate in departure ceremony with General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev. St. George's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace.

10:45 a.m. Official Departure Ceremony at Vnukovo Airport with President Andrei Gromyko.

11:00 a.m. The President and Mrs. Reagan depart Moscow on Air Force One en route to London.

(Note: All times are subject to change.)

PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT SCHEDULE

PRESS FACILITIES

U.S. EMBASSY/STAFF

SPASO HOUSE

Press Facilities

All joint press briefings and other major press briefings will be held at the International Press Center at the Mezhdunarodnaya Hotel. The hotel is located at 12 Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya, a 15-minute walk from the U.S. Embassy. The Press Center is scheduled to open officially on May 23.

Additional facilities include the Technical Center for Television at the Ostankino Tower and the Soviet Press Center at the Foreign Ministry Press Office in the Novosti Press Complex at Zubovskiy Boulevard 4.

The Foreign Ministry will install filing facilities at the International Press Center to accommodate all journalists.

Shuttle service will be available between the Mezhdunarodnaya Hotel, the Rossiya Hotel and the Soviet Press Center.

The U.S. TV pool will be headquartered at the Rossiya Hotel.

U.S. Embassy

Address: Ulitsa Chaikovskogo 19-23

Phone: 252-2451

The chief U.S. representative to the Soviet Union is the Ambassador. He is assisted by the Deputy Chief of Mission, counselors for political, economic, public, scientific, consular, agricultural, commercial and administrative affairs; the Defense, Air, Navy and Army attaches; and various other Embassy staff. About 220 American employees are permanently assigned, representing the Foreign Service, Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), known abroad as the United States Information Service (USIS).

Chancery

The present Chancery is a former Soviet apartment building constructed in 1916, refitted during World War II and refurbished and enlarged in 1952-53, when it was leased to the U.S. government.

In March 1979, the Embassy concluded negotiations with Soviet authorities to construct a new Chancery office and living complex behind the existing Chancery. Although major construction on the central office building has been completed, the interior remains unfinished and security questions prohibit occupancy. In addition, the new complex contains 133 family housing units, a recreation center, housing units for the Marine Guard, and some classrooms for the Anglo-American School.

Commercial Office

Phone: 255-4660

255-4848

230-2121

Press Section

Phone: 252-2451, then ask for extension 289/294.

Cultural Section

Phone: 252-2451, then ask for extension 284/232.

U.S. Embassy Staff

Phone: 252-2451, then ask for appropriate extension.

Ambassador

Jack F. Matlock, Jr. Ext. 201

Deputy Chief of Mission

John M. Joyce Ext. 251

Counselor for Public Affairs

Philip C. Brown Ext. 270

Counselor for Administrative Affairs

William Kelly Ext. 420

Counselor for Consular Affairs

Max Robinson Ext. 230

Counselor for Political Affairs

Mark Ramee Ext. 211

Counselor for Economic Affairs

Mary Ann Peters Ext. 261

Counselor for Science and Technology Affairs

John Kendall Ward Ext. 269

Counselor for Agricultural Affairs

William P. Huth Ext. 208

Counselor for Commercial Affairs

Michael Mears Ext. 276

Defense Attache

Brigadier General Ervin Rokke Ext. 240

Regional Security Officer

John Drotos Ext. 216

Press Attache

Richard Gilbert Ext. 294

Cultural Attache

Anton Kasanof Ext. 284

Spaso House

Address: Spasopeskovskaya Pl 10

Phone: 252-2451

Spaso House has been the residence of American ambassadors in Moscow since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1933. The name of Spasopeskovskaya Square, and hence of Spaso House (which is officially designated House No. 10), derives from the nearby Russian Orthodox Church of the Salvation on the Sands (Tserkov' Spasa-na-Peskakh) built in 1711.

Spaso House was built in 1914 by Nikolai Aleksandrovich Vtorov, a wealthy merchant and manufacturer. After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Spaso House was expropriated by the Soviet government for official use. At the time the United States entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, the public rooms of Spaso House were being used for official entertaining by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet government.

When the first American ambassador, William C. Bullitt, arrived in Moscow in 1933, he was shown several buildings for possible use for the American Embassy and the Ambassador's residence. He chose Spaso House and a building then under construction. Bullitt envisaged this as a temporary arrangement, however, and expected that an Embassy compound would be constructed on the Sparrow Hills (now Lenin Hills), but the plan never materialized.

During World War II part of Spaso House was used for offices for the expanded Embassy staff, and a bomb shelter was built in the basement. In the late fall of 1941, when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, Spaso House was the evacuation point for the American community.

After the war and in recent years, work has been done on both the exterior and interior of the house to return it to its original 1914 appearance. And under the auspices of the State Department's Art in Embassies Program, a variety of distinguished American paintings and sculptures has been shown at Spaso House.

Former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union

William C. Bullitt	November 1933
Joseph E. Davies	November 1936
Laurence A. Steinhardt	March 1939
William H. Standley	February 1942
W. Averell Harriman	October 1943
Walter Bedell Smith	March 1946
Alan G. Kirk	May 1949
George F. Kennan	March 1952
Charles E. Bohlen	March 1953
Llewellyn E. Thompson	June 1957
Foy D. Kohler	August 1962
Llewellyn E. Thompson	December 1967
Jacob D. Beam	April 1969
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.	February 1974
Malcolm Toon	January 1977
Thomas J. Watson, Jr.	October 1979
Arthur A. Hartman	October 1981

WESTERN NEWS MEDIA IN MOSCOW

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Radio and Television

ABC (American Broadcasting Company)

Kutuzovskiy Pr. 13, Apt. 52

243-1907, 243-0572

Correspondents:

243-1876 Walter Rodgers (ABC TV),
Eleanor Rodgers (ABC Radio)

238-5574 Eileen O'Connor

203-2664 Maria Casby

433-0379 Meade Jorgensen, Dorothy Newell

Telex 413427 ABC

AP (Associated Press)

Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Kor. 5, 33

230-2845, 243-5153, 243-5692

Correspondents:

243-0311 Michael Putzel

272-4004 Carol Williams

281-1533 Mark Porubcansky

271-3479 John-Thor Dahlburg

272-7231 Andrew Katell

Telex 413422 AP

CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System)

Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 38

299-3270, 200-2992

Correspondents:

200-2938 Barry Petersen

132-4162 Simon Jarvis

238-2785 Vivienne Foley

233-8481 Ann Anderson (CBS Radio Stringer)

Telex 413435 CBS

CNN (Cable News Network)

Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Apt. 276

243-0909, 243-7753, 230-2542

Correspondents:

230-2944 Peter Arnett, Gerlund Younts (Producer)

Steven Hurst

238-2963 Gary Shore

243-0886 Bruce Conover

Telex 413953 CNN

Mutual Broadcasting System

Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 9

230-2145, 200-2027

Correspondents:

216-3832 Honor Wilson, Brian Hanrahan

(no telex)

NBC (National Broadcasting Company)

Gruzinskiy Per. 3, Apt. 219-220

230-2675, 230-2578, 230-2911

Correspondents:

230-2441 Sandy Gilmour

253-9002 Graham Tawse, Lee Griffen

230-2694 Stephen Coppen

230-2145, 200-2027 Brian Hanrahan (NBC Radio)

Telex 413428 NATBR

NPR (National Public Radio)

Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 1

230-2318

Correspondent:

230-2318 Ann Cooper

(no telex)

Print

Baltimore Sun

Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 18

200-2153, 230-2765

Correspondent:

200-2162 Scott Shane

Telex 413426 BASUN

Chicago Tribune
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Apt. 138
243-9593, 253-9012
Correspondent:
243-0930 Thomas Shanker
Telex 413436 CHITR

Christian Science Monitor
Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 53
200-2546
Correspondents:
200-3342 Paul Quinn-Judge, Sophia Quinn-Judge
Telex 413423 CSMON

Los Angeles Times
Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 37
230-2004
Correspondent:
200-1427 Michael Parks
Telex 413421 LAT

McGraw-Hill
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 9, Apt. 122
243-6600, 230-2512
Correspondents:
243-6256 Peter Galuszka
200-2530, 200-1513 Susan Roberts
Telex 413155 MGHLL

Newsday
(no offices)
Correspondents:
274-0014, 270-9115 Jeff Sommer
Telex 413548
291-0050, 291-1520 Edmund Stevens
Telex 413425 STEVE

Newsweek
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 14, Apt. 2
243-1773, 230-2120
Correspondents:
230-2468 Joyce Barnathan, Steven Strasser
Telex 413434 NWK

New York Times
Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 56
200-0187, 230-2503
Correspondents:
200-0325 Philip Taubman, Felicity Barringer
230-2318 Bill Keller
Telex 413431 NYTIM

Philadelphia Inquirer
B. Dorogomilovskaya 14, 6
243-4697, 230-2842
Correspondent:
243-4867 Steve Goldstein
Telex 413954 INQ

The Journal of Commerce
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 14, Apt. 5
Correspondent:
243-0032 Albert Axelbank
Telex 413263 JCOM

Time-Life
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 14, Apt. 3-4
243-1511, 243-1793, 230-2276
Correspondents:
243-7395 James Jackson
243-0311 Ann Blackman
272-4004 Ken Olsen
Telex 413433 TIME

UPI (United Press International)
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Apt. 67
243-6829, 230-2515
Correspondents:
243-6102 Jack Redden
243-7121 Jerry Nadler
243-7365 Charles Mitchell
Telex 413424 UPI

U.S. News & World Report
Leninskiy Pr. 36, Apt. 53
938-2051
Correspondent:
137-6078 Jeff Trimble
Telex 413216 USNWR

Wall Street Journal
Ul. Kalanchevskaya 33, Apt. 134
280-5049
Correspondent:
280-0352 Peter Gumbel
Telex 413299 WSJ

Washington Post
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Apt. 2
243-1848, 230-2793
Correspondents:
243-9628 Gary Lee
238-2753 David Remnick
Telex 413430 WP

Other Western Media

AUSTRIA
ORF (Radio & TV)
Ul. Dorbryninskaya 7, Apt. 67
230-2603, 237-7134
Correspondents:
238-2041 Franz Koessler
236-1296 Christian Schuller

CANADA
CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation)
Gruzinsky Per. 3, Apt. 163
250-5264, 230-2875
Correspondent:
243-0081 Michael McIvor

DENMARK
Danish Broadcasting Corporation
Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 64
200-1917, 200-0770
Correspondent:
200-1607 Leif Davidsen

Scandinavian News Agencies
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Kor 5. 30
243-0674, 243-7740
Correspondent:
Larserik Haggman

FINLAND

Finnish Radio & TV
Dobryninskaya 7, Apt. 122
237-1047, 230-2341
Correspondents:
238-2952 Hannu Vilpponen
Martti Hosia

Uusi Suomi
Ul. Narodnaya 13, Apt. 34
230-2574
Correspondent:
Ilkka Lampi

FRANCE

Agence France Presse
Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 67
230-2077, 292-3175
Correspondents:
236-1471 Anne Penketh
200-2193 Pierre Taillefer
200-2053 Pierre Glachant
200-2954 Bertrand de Saisset
209-4273 Sophie Shihab

Le Figaro
Ul. Kalanchovskaya 33, Apt. 30
280-0343, 280-7147
Correspondent:
230-2464 Denis Legras

Le Monde
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 13, Apt. 3
243-7242
Correspondent:
243-7050 Bernard Guetta

Radio France & Television Francaise 1
Gruzinsky Per. 3, Apt. 223
250-2505, 250-3122
Correspondent:
250-3125 Ulysses Gosset

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA)

Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Apt. 210

243-9790, 230-2543

Correspondents:

254-6145 Hartwig Nathe

243-4046 Sabine Katzke

Die Welt

Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Apt. 169

243-5286

Correspondent:

243-0276 Rose-Marie Borngasser

Westdeutscher Rundfunk (ARD)

Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Apt. 121

243-3010, 230-2653

Correspondents:

243-9638 Gerd Ruge

276-0359 Dr. Gabriele Krone-Schmalz

Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen

Ul. B. Dorogomilovskaya 54, 46

243-4078, 230-2054

Correspondent:

238-3225 Joachim Holtz

GREAT BRITAIN

BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation)

Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 9

230-2145, 200-2027

Correspondents:

200-1513 Jeremy Harris (Radio)

216-3832 Brian Hanrahan (TV)

Reuters

Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24

230-2658, 200-3948

Correspondents:

200-0392 Robert Evans

200-2014 Dominique Du Double

230-1288 Helen Womack

200-2673 Meg Bortin

280-9907 Robin Lodge

270-7232 Susan Cornwell

The Times (London)
Ul. B. Dorogomilovskaya 54, 78
230-2457
Correspondent:
243-6722 Christopher Walker

ITALY

Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata (ANSA)
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 9, Apt. 14
243-7393, 243-6358
Correspondents:
243-9062 Francesco Bigazzi
284-5306 Lucio Leante

Corriere Della Sera
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 13, Apt. 68
243-6777
Correspondent:
230-2851 Andrea Bonanni

Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI)
Pr. Myra 74, Apt. 160
280-7689, 280-8289
Correspondent:
971-4959 Antonio Natoli

JAPAN

N.H.K. TV & Radio (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
Ul. Sadovo-Samotechnaya 12/24, 23
200-1568, 200-2652
Correspondents:
299-4908, 299-7358 Koichi Watanabe
299-7209 Toshihiko Yamauchi

Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS)
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 9, Apt. 20
243-9980, 230-2980
Correspondent:
243-6068 Toshio Koike

THE NETHERLANDS

NRC-Handelsblad & NOS-TV (NEWS)
Krutitskiy Val. 3, Kor. 2, Apt. 173
274-0008
Correspondent:
Laura Starink

NORWAY

Aftenposten

Kutuzovskiy Pr.9/2, Apt. 119

243-6747

Correspondent:

243-0382 Aasmund Willersrud

Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation

Ul. Obrucheva 4, Kor. 2, Apt. 143

936-2121

Correspondent:

433-0483 Marit Christensen

SPAIN

El Pais

Kutuzovskiy Pr. 14, Apt. 117

230-2248

Correspondent:

Pilar Bonet

Radio Nacional de España

Krutitskiy Val. 3, Kor. 2, 153

276-6865

Correspondent:

276-4618 Luis Altimiras

SWEDEN

Svenska Dagbladet

Kutuzovskiy Pr. 9/2, Apt. 119

243-6747

Correspondent:

243-0382 Aasmund Willersrud

Swedish Radio/TV

Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Apt. 130-131

243-1446, 243-6266, 243-5165

Correspondents:

238-1335 Kent Wannstrom (TV)

238-2085 Kjell Albin Abrahamson (Radio)

Dagens Nyheter
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Apt. 54
243-1759
Correspondent:
243-0342 Harald Hamrin

SWITZERLAND
Neue Züricher Zeitung
Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7/4, Apt. 221
230-2273
Correspondent:
243-0998 Ulrich Meister

Swiss Radio and TV
Gruzinskiy Per. 3, Apt. 212
230-2443, 250-3341
Correspondent:
250-3425 Marianne Serret

USEFUL INFORMATION

U.S.-U.S.S.R. TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL

(The Council is a private organization of American and Soviet executives that promotes trade between the two nations.)

Tarasa Shevchenko 3, tel. 243-5621

243-5494

243-5470

Medical Information

AMERICAN MEDICAL UNIT

(Accredited American Journalists Only)

Location: Embassy Courtyard

Tel: 252-2451, extensions 247, 238

Hours: Open weekdays except Thursday afternoons; closed weekends. Non-appointment sick call — 0900-1000

By Appointment — 0900-1300, 1400-1700

EMERGENCY CARE

Call: Medical Unit during working hours — 252-2451, ext. 247

Medical Officer evenings — ext. 368

Medical Unit Nurse evenings — ext. 478

Soviet Emergency Aid for Foreigners — Ambulance 03 (no coin needed in pay phones)

CLINIC FOR TOURISTS

Gruzinskiy Proyezd 2

Tel. 254-4396

Currency

Members of the foreign community in Moscow need two kinds of currency in Moscow: "hard" currency or currency that is freely traded in the West, and rubles. Beriozkas generally require "hard" currency — dollars, pounds, or marks, for example — and they will accept credit cards. The same is true of many restaurants, bars and hotels in Moscow. Such restaurants or bars are identified as

foreign currency locations at the door. Some restaurants and shops that take rubles will also accept credit cards — for example, the Praga Restaurant and the middle shop of the Kutuzovskiy Russkiy Souvenir Shops. Look for the credit card sign on the register.

How to Use the Telephone System

LOCAL CALLS

At public pay telephones, deposit a two-kopeck piece or two one-kopeck pieces, lift receiver, wait for continuous buzzing, and dial.

LONG DISTANCE WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION

Call Inquiries for Internal Calls at 8-196, or, if you are staying in a hotel, book through your hotel.

LONG DISTANCE, INTERNATIONAL

Hotel guests may book calls from their hotel rooms. The charge for a three-minute call is from 2 to 5 rubles to most European countries, about 10 1/2 rubles to Japan. The charge for a call to the United States is about 6 rubles per minute.

EMERGENCY NUMBERS

(No coin needed from pay phone.)

Fire 01

Police 02

Ambulance 03

Emergency Gas Service 04

Telexes

For information on telex services in Moscow, call the Telex Center at 925-1588.

Telegrams

Telegrams can be sent to any city in the world from the Central Telegraph Office, Ul. Gorkogo 7, tel. 925-9268. Express telegrams cost twice the ordinary rate. To send a cable by phone within the Soviet Union, call 225-2002.

Postal Information

General Soviet Post Office Hours: 0800-1900 or 2000

Closest Post Office to Embassy:

Plochshad Vostaniya 3

Letter mail and small parcels only

Hours: Mon-Wed-Sat 0900-1500, Tue-Thur-Fri 1400-2000

Special Postal Branches:

Communications House

Pr. Kalinina 22

Hours: Telegraph, intercity and international telephone: 24 hours

Postal Services: 0800-2000

International Post Office

Varshavskoye Chaussee 37a

Hours: Telegrams, parcel services, international
telephone: 0900-2100

Moscow Central Post Office

Ul. Kirova 26

Hours: Telegrams, money orders, poste restante — 24 hours

Other services until 2000

Moscow Central Telegraph

Ul. Gorkogo 7

Hours: Telegrams, money orders, registered letters,
parcel services — 24 hours

Poste Restante — 0800-2300

Other services — 0800-2000

Mailboxes:

Blue — All mail going outside Moscow

Red — All local Moscow mail

Yellow — SPORT-LOTO (Soviet Lottery)

Soviet Postal Rates

	Socialist & CEMA Countries		Other Countries	
	Letters	Cards	Letters	Cards
Ordinary Mail	4k	3k	15k	10k
Registered	10k	9k	45k	40k
Airmail	6k	4k	32k	27k
Registered	12k	10k	62k	57k

USEFUL INFORMATION

Public Transport

TAXIS

Taxis are easily recognizable by the checkered band on both sides of the car. Most are yellow. The green light in the top right-hand corner of the windshield is lit when the cab is free, with certain exceptions. If the driver has flipped down his "returning to base" sign (V Park), and your destination is not on his route back, he may refuse to pick you up. The same is true if he shows an "on radio call" (zakaznat-radio) sign or the off-duty time (a sign posted at the top of the windshield).

Fixed-Route Taxis (Mini-buses)

There are many fixed-route taxis which run between the main squares, streets, railway stations and other important points in Moscow in intervals of ten minutes. They have definite stops along their routes but will stop to pick up additional passengers if space permits. The fare is 15 kopecks for any distance in one direction. These small vans are usually red, green and blue.

TICKETS

Trams, trolleybuses, and buses all follow the same procedure in taking fares. On most of these vehicles you will find a ticket machine; you drop in the fare and roll the receipt off. The exception is the occasional one that has a punch machine for prepurchased tickets. Books of ten tickets may be purchased in advance from newspaper kiosks or from the driver when the vehicle is stopped. Exact change only. Children under seven years of age ride free. There are no transfers.

FARES

Fare for tram, trolleybus, bus is 5 kopecks

HOURS

Tram 0530-0130

Trolleybus 0600-0100

Bus 0600-0100

THE METRO

Traveling by Metro is certainly the cheapest and often the fastest way to get around Moscow. It runs from 0600 until 0100 (0200 on national holidays) with trains every 90 seconds during rush hours and only 8 minutes apart late at night.

Transportation maps are available in magazine kiosks, and the Moscow Street Guide also has a good Metro map. The various lines and stations are known by local names, not by color. Even

though the Metro maps are color coded, within a station it may not always be obvious which color the line is. Transfers are easily made by reading the map and then following the signs to the connecting station.

If you have trouble reading the station names in Cyrillic, try memorizing the first three letters of the station. If this method fails, show the name of the station to a passerby or use sign language.

Metro Stations Closest to the American Embassy

Krasnopresnenskaya. On the circle line, this station gives easy access to each of the other six lines. From the American Embassy, turn left on the Sadovoye toward Pl. Vosstaniya (Square of the Uprising); go past the flagpoles. Turn left down Kudrinskiy Peryeulok, passing the large 1950s Gothic apartment building on the left and the Barrikadnaya Metro Station on the right. The station is across the street from the zoo.

Barrikadnaya. This line goes through Gorkiy Street (Cafe Lira and the Pushkin Theater are not far), Kirov St. in Dzherzhinskiy Square near the Hotel Rossiya, and Taganka Square directly opposite the theater of the same name. One passes this station on the way to Krasnopresnenskaya (see above).

Smolenskaya. On the Spaso House side of the Ring Road. This station is one stop from the Kremlin and two stops from the History Museum, the Hotel Metropole, and Red Square. An underground passage connects it with the Bolshoi and the National Hotel. Turn right from the Embassy and cross the Sadovoye, then cross Kalinina and walk just past the street leading to Spaso House to find it.

Smolenskaya. On the river side of the Ring Road. This station is not connected with the Smolenskaya Station listed above. It is part of a separate line which crosses the river to the Kievskiy Voksal (Kiev train station), and thence heads out into the suburbs.

Museums by Metro

Kremlin. From the Embassy, take the train, leaving from the lefthand platform out of Smolenskaya, one stop down to Arbatskaya. Turn right and ride the escalator up; the second corridor to the right leads to the Lenin Library station (Biblioteka Lenina on the red line). Climb steps at right end of hall (not those in center), turn left with the corridor, turn right and go upstairs to enter open foyer. The passage to the right leads into the Alexander Gardens, before the Troitsky Gates to the Kremlin.

History Museum. Pl. Revolutsii (Revolution Square Station on the dark blue line). Exit up the escalator to the left. You will come out facing the old Kitaigorod Wall by the Hotel Metropole, with the Bolshoi across the square to your left and the Lenin Museum behind you; the History Museum is adjacent to the Lenin Museum. If you find yourself confronted with a narrow street, you have taken the wrong escalator up. Turn right, and right again at the intersection, and you will come into Red Square at the back of the History Museum. (From the Embassy, take the train leaving from the lefthand platform two stops to Pl. Revolutsii.)

Pushkin Museum. From the Embassy, take the train on the left out of Krasnopresnenskaya — two stops to Park Kultury (Gorkiy Park). Ride the escalator up and walk down hall to right to connecting station. The next stop for the train, leaving on the right, is Kropotkinskaya. At Kropotkinskaya Station (on the red line), turn right to the Volkhonka St. exit, turning left in the corridor to the street. Cross at the first zebra crossing; the museum is on the left.

Novodevichiy Museum. From the Embassy, take the train on the left from Krasnopresnenskaya two stops to Park Kultury. Switch to the connecting line. The second stop for the train leaving from the lefthand platform will be Sportivnaya. At the Sportivnaya Station (on the red line), take the Lenin Stadium exit right. Turn right on the street and walk straight, keeping the railroad tracks and university on the left, until you see the monastery wall; turn right passing the Beriozka entrance to the right and the cemetery entrance to the left; the entrance to the monastery is through the tower at the corner.

TRAMS, TROLLEYBUSES AND BUSES

Trams

Streetcars on rails are called trams. They usually operate without a conductor, and they may take longer to get you where you want to go. They are also often less crowded.

Trolleybuses

Trolleybuses, buses that run on electric lines, are also slow and are often very crowded. Be sure to position yourself near an exit at least one stop ahead of the one you want.

Buses

Buses may go a little faster, but they are also crowded. Again, be sure to position yourself near an exit at least one stop ahead of the one you want.

Trains

In addition to the myriad of local trains, long distance trains connect Moscow with the capitals and cities of about 30 other countries. One of these, the Trans-Siberian Railway, is the longest railway in the world. It connects the city of Moscow with the port of Nakhodka on the Pacific Ocean, a trip of 9,436 kms taking about 150 hours or more than six days. Train travel is usually very pleasant; accommodations are adequate and clean, and porters will carry your bags for about 50k per bag. Some trains do have dining facilities, but it is always safer to carry some food with you — especially on long trips. Tea is always available. Once you have arrived at your destination, you will almost always find a taxi stand in front of the station. Since you may not always find a taxi there, it is a good idea, when possible, to have Intourist order a taxi to be waiting for you when you arrive.

Air Transportation

AIRPORTS

Moscow is served by the four airports Sheremetyevo 2, Sheremetyevo 1, Domodedovo, and Vnukovo. Sheremetyevo 2, opened in 1980, handles international flights. The others are principally for domestic flights. Be sure to check which airport your flight leaves from every time. Taxi service is available to and from each of the four airports; you should allow approximately 1 hour to get to Sheremetyevo 1 and 2, and approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes to reach Domodedovo and Vnukovo. Once you have arrived at the airport, porters will carry your bags for a fee of at least 50k per bag.

Intourist will make all train reservations, as well as hotel reservations. For general inquiries about all arrivals and departures call 266-9000. For Intourist inquiries in English call 221-4513.

AIRLINE TELEPHONE NUMBERS

<i>Airline</i>	<i>City Office</i>	<i>Airport</i>
AIR FRANCE	237-2325	578-2756
	237-3344	
	237-6777	
ALITALIA	923-9840	578-2767
	923-9856	
AUSTRIAN AIRLINES	253-1670	578-2733
	253-1671	578-2734
BRITISH AIRWAYS	253-2481	578-2723

USEFUL INFORMATION

<i>Airline</i>	<i>City Office</i>	<i>Airport</i>
FINNAIR	292-8788	578-2718
	292-3337	
	230-2988	
JAPAN AIR LINES	221-6448	578-2741
	221-6648	578-2742
KLM	253-2150	578-2762
	253-2151	
	230-2304	
LUFTHANSA	923-0488	578-2751
	923-0576	578-2752
PAN AM	253-2658	578-2737
	253-2659	
SAS	925-4747	578-2727
SWISS AIR	253-8988	578-2740
	253-1859	
	253-1860	

Flight Information

PAN AM

PA 31, non-stop service to New York, departs Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday at 1320 and arrives New York at 1450.

PA 65, to New York via Frankfurt, departs Tuesday and Friday at 0835 and arrives New York at 1315.

BRITISH AIRWAYS

BA 711 departs daily at 1740 and arrives London at 1850.

LUFTHANSA

LH 1391 departs daily at 1920 and arrives Frankfurt at 2040.

FINNAIR

AY 705 departs Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday at 1740 and arrives Helsinki at 1830.

AY 707 departs Monday, Thursday, Friday and Sunday at 2245 and arrives Helsinki at 2335.

AUSTRIAN AIRLINES

OS 602 departs daily at 1655 and arrives Vienna at 1745.

General Russian Phrases

<i>English</i>	<i>Phonetic</i>	<i>Russian</i>
Please	pozhaluysta	пожалуйста
Thank you	spasibo	спасибо
Yes	da	да
No	nyet	нет
And	i	и
Sunday	voskresen'e	воскресенье
Monday	ponedel'nik	понедельник
Tuesday	vtornik	вторник
Wednesday	sreda	среда
Thursday	chetverg	четверг
Friday	pyatnitsa	пятница
Saturday	subbota	суббота
Now	seychas	сейчас
Today	sevodnya	сегодня
Tomorrow	zavtra	завтра
Yesterday	vchera	вчера
Next week	na sleduyushchey nedelye	на следующей неделе
Every day	kazhdyy den'	каждый день
Once a week	raz v nedelyu	раз в неделю
Twice a week	dva raza v nedelyu	два раза в неделю
Once every two weeks	dva raza v mesyats	два раза в месяц
Breakfast	zavtrak	завтрак
Lunch	obed	обед
Dinner	uzhin	ужин
Use more	upotrebyayte bol'she	употребляйте больше
Use less	upotrebyayte men'she	употребляйте меньше
Show me	pokazhite mne	покажите мне
Have you seen?	vy videli?	вы видели?
Wait	podozhdite	подождите
Remind me	napomnite mne	напомните мне
Do it this way	eto nuzhno delat' tak	это нужно делать так
As we did before	kak my delali ran'she	как мы делали раньше
This may be thrown away	eto mozhno vybrosit'	это можно выбросить
Be careful	bud'te ostorozhny	будьте осторожны
They are expensive	oni dorigie	они дорогие

USEFUL INFORMATION

Time Conversion Chart

Time differences between Washington and selected foreign cities are: London, five hours; Paris, six hours; Helsinki, seven hours; and Moscow, eight hours.

Moscow	Helsinki	Paris	London	Washington
1200	1100	1000	0900	0400
1300	1200	1100	1000	0500
1400	1300	1200	1100	0600
1500	1400	1300	1200	0700
1600	1500	1400	1300	0800
1700	1600	1500	1400	0900
1800	1700	1600	1500	1000
1900	1800	1700	1600	1100
2000	1900	1800	1700	1200
2100	2000	1900	1800	1300
2200	2100	2000	1900	1400
2300	2200	2100	2000	1500
2400	2300	2200	2100	1600
0100	2400	2300	2200	1700
0200	0100	2400	2300	1800
0300	0200	0100	2400	1900
0400	0300	0200	0100	2000
0500	0400	0300	0200	2100
0600	0500	0400	0300	2200
0700	0600	0500	0400	2300
0800	0700	0600	0500	2400
0900	0800	0700	0600	0100
1000	0900	0800	0700	0200
1100	1000	0900	0800	0300

Shopping

STORE HOURS

Most stores are open from 1100 to 2000, Monday through Saturday, with a lunch break between 1400 and 1500. Food stores are open from 0900 to 2000 daily through Saturday and closed for lunch between 1300 and 1400. Beware of shopping at the smaller stores between 1300 and 1500 unless you know the shop, since you can never be certain which lunch-hour closing time is observed. Major department stores like TSUM and Dyetskiy Mir do not close for lunch. On Sundays and holidays stores close two hours earlier. They may also be closed for cleaning, inventory or because of an accident.

BERIOZKAS

In these special stores for foreigners, named for the beloved birch trees of the Russian countryside, you can find everything from electrical appliances to souvenirs. The Beriozkas come closest to the western style of "self service, one stop" shopping. This is especially true if you consider the International Trade Center where you can find clothing, perfumes, souvenirs, china and crystal, books and records, in separate shops but all in the same building. Payment is by hard currency — cash or credit card.

Hard Currency Beriozkas:

Book Beriozka

Kropotkinskaya 31

Hours: 1000-1900

In addition to books, prints, records, and some wooden products.

Kutuzovskiy Pr. 7

Hours: 0900-1400, 1500-1900

Fur hats, rugs, crystal, perfume, jewelry, china, some radios, lacquer work, etc. Across the road from Dom Igrushki Novodevichiy Monastery, this is the best and largest of all the Beriozkas in Moscow at this time.

International Trade Center

Krasnopresnenskaya Nab.

Boutiques devoted to lacquer work, books, clothing and furs, souvenirs, jewelry, radios, TV, and a hard-currency food store.

Some Other Hotel Beriozkas

Cosmos Hotel, opposite VDNKh

Rossiya Hotel, Ul. Rzina 6, river side
(one of Moscow's largest)

Ukraina Hotel, Kutuzovskiy Pr. at the bridge, second floor

Vneshtorgbank Gold Shop

Ul. Pushkinskaya

Hours: 1000-1700, Monday - Friday

Gold coins, metals, diamonds, emeralds, jade and other fine stones and jewelry available here. You can pay in hard currency; bring your passport.

DEPARTMENT STORES ("UNIVERSALNIE MAGAZINI")

The department stores, or "univermagi," also offer a wide selection of goods, albeit of a different nature than the Beriozkas. They usually have a selection of food, clothing, notions, appliances, and some housewares — volume and variety depending on the store.

The larger ones do not close for lunch hour, and some near the center of town stay open as late as 2100. Most neighborhoods have at least one small "Univermag"; look for yours and then check its hours. Some of the larger stores are listed below.

GUM (Red Square)

Hours: 0800-2100

A Moscow institution, sightseeing attraction.

Dyetskiy Mir

Pr. Marksa 2

Hours: 0800-2100

(near TSUM)

A children's department store with everything for children: clothing, toys, and sporting goods to school and art supplies. They do carry some women's clothing as well.

Moskva Department Store

Pr. Kalinina 23

Women's clothing.

TSUM

Ul. Petrovka 2

Hours: 0730-2100

(Near Kuznetskiy Most Metro)

BIOGRAPHIES

U.S. OFFICIALS

Ronald Reagan

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ronald Wilson Reagan was born February 6, 1911, in Tampico, Illinois, the son of Nelle Wilson Reagan and John Reagan. He was educated in Illinois public schools and was graduated from Eureka College (Illinois) in 1932, with a degree in economics and sociology.

Following a brief career as a sports broadcaster and editor, Mr. Reagan moved to California to work in motion pictures. His film career, interrupted by three years of service in the Army Air Corps during World War II, encompassed 53 feature-length motion pictures. He served six terms as president of the Screen Actors Guild and two terms as president of the Motion Picture Industry Council.

In 1952 he married Nancy Davis. They have two grown children, Patricia Ann and Ronald Prescott. President Reagan has two other grown children, Maureen and Michael, by a previous marriage.

From motion pictures, Mr. Reagan went into television in the 1950s as production supervisor and host of *General Electric Theatre*. In 1964-1965, he was host of the television series *Death Valley Days*.

In 1966 Ronald Reagan began his public service career with his election — by nearly a million-vote margin — as governor of California. Mr. Reagan was chairman of the Republican Governors Association in 1969, and he was elected to a second term as governor of California in 1970.

After completing his second term, Mr. Reagan began a nationally syndicated radio commentary program and newspaper column. He also undertook an extensive speaking schedule, addressing civic, business and political groups. In 1974-1975, he served as a member of the presidential commission investigating the CIA. In November 1975, he announced his candidacy for the 1976 presidential nomination. He lost narrowly, but campaigned vigorously for the Republican (GOP) ticket and for scores of local candidates in 1976. After the election, he renewed his radio

commentary program, newspaper column and national speaking schedule. He became a member of the board of directors of the Committee on the Present Danger, and he founded the Citizens for the Republic. In the 1978 elections, he campaigned on behalf of 86 candidates.

Ronald Reagan announced his candidacy for the GOP presidential nomination in November 1979 and was unanimously nominated on the first ballot at the Republican National Convention in July 1980. On November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected to the Presidency with an electoral vote margin of 489-49. He was sworn in as the 40th President of the United States on January 20, 1981.

In August 1984, the Republican Party once again unanimously selected Ronald Reagan as its presidential candidate. On November 6, 1984, he won reelection, carrying 49 states, and he was sworn in for a second term at the 50th Presidential Inaugural on January 20, 1985.

Mr. Reagan has received a number of awards, including: National Humanitarian Award from the National Conference of Christians and Jews; City of Hope "Torch of Life" Award for Humanitarian Service; Horatio Alger Award; American Newspaper Guild Award; Freedoms Foundation Awards; Distinguished American Award from the National Football Foundation Hall of Fame; American Patriots Hall of Fame; and Medal of Valor of the State of Israel.

Nancy Reagan

Nancy Davis Reagan was born on July 6, 1923, in New York City. Raised in Chicago, she graduated from Girls' Latin School and went on to Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts. She majored in drama at Smith.

In her early career, Nancy Davis worked as an actress in stage, film and television productions. Her on-stage performances ranged from summer stock to road tours to Broadway. In 1949 she was signed to a seven-year contract by MGM, a major motion picture production company. She married Ronald Reagan on March 4, 1952, and made 11 films in all, including three after her marriage. Her last film, at Columbia in 1956, was *Hellcats of the Navy*, in which she and her husband appeared together.

Shortly after her husband became governor of California in 1967, Mrs. Reagan began visiting wounded Vietnam veterans, and she became active in projects concerning U.S. prisoners of war and servicemen missing in action in Vietnam. During the war, she

wrote a syndicated column, donating her salary to the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Action in Southeast Asia.

While First Lady of California, she made regular visits to hospitals and homes for older citizens, and schools for physically and emotionally handicapped children. During one of these hospital visits in 1967, she observed participants in the Foster Grandparent Program and became its champion. This unique program brings together senior citizens, who need to be productive, with handicapped children, who need extra time, love and attention. As First Lady, Mrs. Reagan continues to work to expand the program on the national level and to promote private funding in local communities. She has co-authored a book with Jane Wilkie, *To Love a Child*, and a song by the same title was written and dedicated to her by Hal David and Joe Raposo. Frank Sinatra recorded the song and all proceeds from the book and record sales are going to the Foster Grandparent Program.

Mrs. Reagan's special project is fighting drug and alcohol abuse among youth. To place a national spotlight on the problem, she has traveled nearly 100,000 miles and gone to 50 cities in 28 states and four foreign countries in conjunction with her campaign to fight school-age drug and alcohol abuse. She has taped public service announcements, written guest articles, and visited prevention programs and rehabilitation centers across the country, talking with young people and their parents. She has participated in talk shows and other television programs focused on drug abuse; she appeared on an episode of NBC's *Different Strokes* about drug abuse, co-hosted a special edition of ABC's *Good Morning America*, which was devoted exclusively to the subject, and narrated a PBS special called *The Chemical People* to encourage communities to organize against drug abuse.

In April 1985, she expanded her drug awareness campaign to an international level by inviting First Ladies from around the world to attend a two-day briefing in Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, Georgia, on the subject of youth drug abuse. During the 40th Anniversary of the United Nations, Mrs. Reagan hosted 30 First Ladies for a second international drug conference.

In each annual Gallup Poll since 1981, the American public has voted Mrs. Reagan one of the 10 most admired women in the world, and in both 1981 and 1985, voted her number one. In 1981, 1982 and 1983, she was named one of the 10 most admired women in the world by readers of *Good Housekeeping* magazine, and in 1984-1985 she ranked number one in that poll. She has received numerous awards for her leadership role in the fight against drug abuse, including recognition from the U.S. Chamber of

Commerce, the United Service Organization (USO), the Salvation Army, the Entertainment Industries Council, Rotary Clubs International, Lions Club International, and from drug treatment programs such as Phoenix House and Second Genesis. Mrs. Reagan also has received humanitarian awards from United Cerebral Palsy and the International Center for the Disabled and the "Lifeline Award" from Variety Clubs International. In 1983, she received an Honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Pepperdine University for her commitment to public service.

She is the only daughter of the late Dr. Loyal Davis and Mrs. Edith Davis of Chicago and Phoenix. Her father, who died August 19, 1982, was Professor Emeritus at Northwestern University after serving as Professor of Surgery there for more than 30 years. She has a brother, Dr. Richard Davis, who resides in Philadelphia with his wife and two children.

The Reagans have four children, all of whom are married. Patti is pursuing an acting career in California. Ron is affiliated with ABC-TV in Los Angeles and is a free-lance writer. Maureen is a special consultant at the Republican National Committee and is the United States Representative to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. Michael hosts a radio talk show in Los Angeles and is the director of a fund-raising corporation. The Reagans have two grandchildren, Cameron and Ashley Marie, offspring of Michael Reagan.

George P. Shultz

SECRETARY OF STATE

George P. Shultz was sworn in on July 16, 1982, as the 60th U.S. Secretary of State.

Shultz graduated from Princeton University in 1942, receiving a B.A. degree in economics. That year, he also joined the U.S. Marine Corps, serving until 1945. In 1949, Shultz earned a Ph.D. in industrial economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He taught at MIT from 1948 to 1957, taking a year's leave of absence in 1955 to serve as a senior staff economist on the President's Council of Economic Advisers during the Administration of President Eisenhower.

In 1957, Shultz was appointed Professor of Industrial Relations at the University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business. He was named Dean of the Graduate School of Business in 1962. From 1968 to 1969, Shultz was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University in California.

Shultz served in the Administration of President Nixon as Secretary of Labor for 18 months from 1969 to June 1970, at which time he was appointed the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. He became Secretary of the Treasury in May 1972, serving until 1974. During that period, Shultz served also as Chairman of the Council on Economic Policy. As Chairman of the East-West Trade Policy Committee, Shultz traveled to Moscow in 1972 and negotiated a series of trade protocols with the Soviet Union.

In 1974, Shultz joined the Bechtel Corporation. Until his appointment as Secretary of State, Shultz was president and a director of Bechtel Group, Inc. During this period, Shultz also served part-time on the faculty of Stanford University.

Prior to his appointment, Shultz was Chairman of President Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board. At President Reagan's request, Shultz in May 1982 met with leaders in Europe, Japan and Canada to assist preparations for the Versailles Economic Summit.

Shultz holds honorary degrees from the University of Notre Dame, Loyola University, Princeton University, Carnegie-Mellon University, and others. Among his publications are *Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines* (1978), *Strategies for the Displaced Worker* (1966) and *Management Organization and the Computer* (1960).

Shultz was born in New York City on December 13, 1921. He is married to the former Helena M. O'Brien of Nashua, New Hampshire. They have five children.

Frank Carlucci

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Frank C. Carlucci was nominated by President Reagan to be Secretary of Defense on November 5, 1987, and took the oath of office on November 23, 1987.

Before being nominated to the Defense post, Carlucci was Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carlucci had been chairman and chief executive officer of Sears World Trade, Inc., since October 1984, after serving as president and chief operating officer since January 1983.

A retired Career Minister in the U.S. Foreign Service, Carlucci was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania, on October 18, 1930. He graduated from Princeton University in 1952, served for two years in the U.S. Navy, then attended the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. He joined the Jantzen Company in Portland, Oregon, in 1955.

Carlucci has had a long and varied career in public service. He joined the Department of State as a Foreign Service Officer in 1956 and served from 1957 to 1959 as Vice Consul and Economic Officer in Johannesburg, South Africa. He was subsequently assigned as Political Officer in Kinshasa, Congo (now Zaire), for two years. He also served as Congolese Political Affairs Officer in Washington from 1962 to 1964, Consul General in Zanzibar from 1964 to 1965, and Counselor for Political Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 1965 to 1969.

Carlucci left the Foreign Service in 1969 to become Assistant Director of Operations and then Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, a domestic anti-poverty agency. He was appointed Associate Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1971, and a year later, OMB Deputy Director.

From 1974 to 1975, Carlucci was Under Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and Human Services), followed by appointment as Ambassador to Portugal. He returned to the United States in 1978 and served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency until 1981. Carlucci held the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1981 to 1983, when he resigned from government to head Sears World Trade, Inc., an international business subsidiary of Sears Roebuck & Company.

His awards and honors include: Presidential Citizens Award, 1983; Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal, 1983; Distinguished Intelligence Medal, 1981; National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, 1981; Defense Department Distinguished Civilian Service Award, 1977; Department of Health, Education and Welfare Distinguished Civilian Service Award, 1975; State Department Superior Service Award, 1972; and State Department Superior Honor Award, 1969.

Carlucci is married to the former Marcia McMillan Myers, and has three children.

Howard H. Baker, Jr.

CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

Howard H. Baker, Jr., was appointed by President Reagan to be his Chief of Staff on February 27, 1987.

Following undergraduate studies at the University of the South and Tulane University, Baker received a degree in law from the University of Tennessee. He served three years in the U.S. Navy during World War II.

Baker became the first Republican ever to be popularly elected to the U.S. Senate from Tennessee in 1966, and he won reelection by wide margins in 1972 and 1978. (Baker's father and mother both served in the U.S. House of Representatives, and his father-in-law, the late Everett Dirksen of Illinois, was the Republican leader of the U.S. Senate from 1959 to 1969.)

In 1973 Baker gained national recognition as Vice Chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee. He was the keynote speaker at the Republican National Convention in 1976, and he was a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1980. Baker served two terms as Senate Minority Leader (1977-1980) and two terms as Senate Majority Leader (1981-1985). He retired from the Senate in 1985, having given eighteen years of service to that body.

From 1985 until his appointment as Chief of Staff, Baker was a partner in the Washington office of the Houston-based law firm Vinson & Elkins. He was also affiliated with the Tennessee law firm Baker, Worthington, Crossley, Stansberry & Woolf, which was founded by his grandfather.

Baker is married to the former Joy Dirksen. They have two children and two grandchildren.

General Colin Powell

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Lieutenant General Colin Powell was appointed President Reagan's National Security Affairs Adviser on November 5, 1987, after serving in 1987 as the President's Deputy Assistant Security Affairs Adviser.

Early on in his military career, Powell was named a White House Fellow. Later, he served on the staff of former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and as Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and later Secretary of Energy Charles W. Duncan, Jr.

Powell was born on April 5, 1937 in the South Bronx, New York. He attended the City College of New York, where he was in the Reserve Officers Training Corps. He served two tours of duty in Vietnam: in 1962-1963 as an adviser to a South Vietnamese Army unit, and in 1968-1969 in an infantry battalion.

From 1974 to 1975, Powell served as a staff officer at the Pentagon. After attending the National War College from 1975 to 1976, he returned to the Pentagon in 1977, where he served as Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and, in 1983, to the Secretary of Defense.

Powell has commanded a battalion in South Korea and a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; he also was Assistant Division Commander of the Fourth Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado.

He is married and has three children.

Charles Z. Wick

DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

Charles Z. Wick was sworn in as Director of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) on June 9, 1981. He has served in this position longer than any previous USIA director.

Born in Cleveland, Ohio, on October 12, 1917, Wick attended the University of Michigan, where he received a degree in music. He later received his J.D. from Western Reserve University (now Case Western Reserve), and he is a member of the bar in Ohio and California.

Wick was an independent businessman involved in the financing and operation of health care and mortgage industries before joining the federal government. He was president of Mapleton Enterprises, a business with investments in health care, real estate, and agricultural and mining commodities.

Active in President Reagan's 1980 election campaign, Wick served as one of the campaign's principal fundraisers. He also was a co-chairman of the 1981 Presidential Inaugural Committee.

Wick has directed USIA during a period of unprecedented innovation and growth. In 1982, Wick established 10 private sector committees, whose 200 members have made in-kind contributions to USIA worth more than \$100 million. He created the Artistic Ambassador Program in 1983, which has sent 22 pianists and violin/cello duos abroad to promote international understanding through music.

On November 3, 1983, he launched Worldnet, the first live global satellite television network. The Voice of America's Radio Marti Program to Cuba was inaugurated on May 20, 1985.

Wick served as President Reagan's Personal Representative to implement the International Youth Exchange Initiative, which stimulated more than 22,000 additional exchanges during a three-year period. He also acted as President Reagan's Personal Representative to the Presidential Commission for the 1983 German-American Tricentennial.

Wick established an office within USIA to coordinate and implement the General Exchanges Agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva in November 1985.

In 1987 he established the USIA International Council to help the Agency in its task of strengthening foreign understanding and support for U.S. policies.

On May 5, 1985, Wick was awarded a Doctor of Laws degree by George Washington University (Washington, D.C.), and on May 18, 1986, he was awarded a Doctor of Communications degree by Hastings College (Nebraska). Wick was named the 1988 PR News Professional of the Year by Public Relations News.

Wick is married to the former Mary Jane Woods, and they have five children.

Michael Hayden Armacost

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Michael Hayden Armacost is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. He served as Ambassador to the Philippines from 1982 to 1984, when he was appointed Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Armacost was born April 15, 1937 in Cleveland, Ohio. He received a B.A. from Carleton College in 1958 and a master's degree and a Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1961 and 1965, respectively.

After completing his Ph.D., Armacost was an instructor and, later, Assistant Professor of Government at Pomona College in California. He was Visiting Professor of International Relations at the International Christian University in Tokyo in 1968 and became a lecturer at Georgetown University from 1970 to 1971 and at Johns Hopkins University from 1971 to 1972.

Armacost has held many positions in the federal government, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Senior Staff Member for East Asia to the National Security Council and Special Assistant to the Ambassador to Japan. He has also been a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State.

Included among Armacost's awards are the State Department's Superior Honor Award and the Department of Defense's Distinguished Civilian Service Award. His distinguished academic career includes publications and commentaries on national security and foreign affairs. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Armacost is married and has three children.

Max M. Kampelman

**COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE;
HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION,
NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS**

Ambassador Max M. Kampelman currently serves as Counselor of the Department of State, as Ambassador to the U.S. Office for Arms Reduction in Geneva, and as Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks. From 1980 to 1983, Kampelman was Ambassador and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe.

Kampelman received his J.D. from New York University and his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Minnesota, where he taught from 1946 to 1948. He also has served on the faculties of Bennington College, Claremont College, the University of Wisconsin and Howard University, and on the governing boards of Georgetown University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, New York University School of Law and Mt. Vernon College.

He was the founder and moderator of the public affairs program on public television, *Washington Week in Review*. He served as chairman of the Washington public broadcasting radio and television stations from 1963 to 1970.

Kampelman was a partner in the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman. He also served as Senior Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations from 1966 to 1967, and was Legislative Counsel to the late U.S. Senator Hubert Humphrey from 1949 to 1955.

Kampelman is married and has five children.

Paul Henry Nitze

**SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL MATTERS**

Paul Nitze was named Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations in 1981. He is now Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters.

He was born in Amherst, Massachusetts on January 16, 1907. Graduating from Harvard University in 1928, Nitze joined the New York investment banking firm of Dillon Read and Company.

From 1944-1946, Nitze was Vice Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, and he was awarded the Medal of Merit for his service. Joining the State Department in 1946, he

held several posts, including Director and Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff. Nitze was appointed Secretary of the Navy in 1963, and in 1967 became Deputy Secretary of Defense. From 1969 to 1974, he was the representative of the Secretary of Defense to the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

For the next seven years, Nitze returned to private industry and worked as a consultant on defense policy and international relations. He was also chairman of the Advisory Council of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, chairman of policy studies for the Committee on the Present Danger, and a member of the board of directors of several companies.

Nitze is married to the former Phyllis Pratt. They have four children.

Edward L. Rowny

SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL MATTERS

Edward L. Rowny was nominated by the President to be Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations and was confirmed by the Senate on July 27, 1981. He served as Chief Arms Control Negotiator for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and as Chairman of the START Delegation in Geneva. Currently, he is Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters, with the rank of Ambassador.

He was born in Baltimore, Maryland on April 3, 1917. He received a B.S. degree from Johns Hopkins University in 1937, and entered the United States Military Academy, graduating as a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers in 1941.

Rowny was awarded two master's degrees by Yale University in 1949 and a Ph.D. by American University in 1977.

He served in the U.S. Army until June 30, 1979. His last assignment in the Army (from 1973 to 1979) was Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). He retired from the Army on June 30, 1979, with the rank of lieutenant general.

From August 1979 to February 1981, Rowny was a fellow at the Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution, where he worked on a comparative analysis of United States and Soviet negotiating styles.

Rowny is married to the former Mary Rita Leyko. They have five children.

Rozanne L. Ridgway

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

From 1982 until assuming her present position, Rozanne L. Ridgway was American Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic. A career diplomat, Ridgway has also served as Counselor of the Department of State, Ambassador to Finland, and Ambassador for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs.

Ridgway was born in St. Paul, Minnesota. She received a B.A. from Hamline University in St. Paul, where she subsequently received an Honorary LL.D.

She began her Foreign Service career in the Department of State working as an information specialist. Her early assignments abroad were at the U.S. Embassy in Manila and the Consulate General in Palermo.

She has held a variety of positions at the Department of State, including Deputy Director for Policy Planning and Coordination in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and Deputy Chief of Mission in Nassau. In 1975, she was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs. In February 1976, she was confirmed as Ambassador for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs.

She served as Ambassador to Finland from 1977 to 1980, when she became Counselor of the Department. After a period of service as a special negotiator assigned to the Secretary's staff, she was sworn in as Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic.

Ridgway received the Department's Superior Honor Award in 1966, 1975 and 1981, the Meritorious Honor Award in 1970, and the William Jump Meritorious Award for Exemplary Achievement in Public Administration. In April 1977, she received the annual national award of the National Fisheries Institute; in October 1982, the Joseph C. Wilson Award for Achievement in International Affairs; and, in 1983, the Senior Foreign Service Presidential Meritorious Service Award. She holds the rank of Career Minister.

Ridgway is married to Captain Theodore Deming, U.S. Coast Guard.

Richard Schifter

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

Richard Schifter has served as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs since November 1, 1985.

Born in Vienna, Austria, in 1923, Schifter came to the United States in 1938. He graduated summa cum laude from the College of the City of New York in 1943 and received his L.L.B. from Yale Law School in 1951. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1946.

A lawyer by profession, Schifter practiced law in Washington, D.C., from 1951 until his entry into full-time government service.

Schifter served as Deputy United States Representative to the Security Council of the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador, during 1984-1985. In addition, from 1983 to 1986, he held the position of United States member of the United Nations Human Rights Commission.

For many years, Schifter participated in the educational affairs of his home state of Maryland as a citizen member of various boards and commissions. His service encompassed 20 years of membership on the Maryland State Board of Education, including eight years as the Board's vice president and four years as president. He also served on the Executive Committee of the Board of Visitors of the Maryland School for the Deaf, as Chairman of the Governor's Commission for the Funding of the Education of Handicapped Children and as Chairman of the Maryland Values Education Commission.

Schifter is married to Lilo Schifter. They have five children and six grandchildren.

Jack F. Matlock, Jr.

AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION

A career Foreign Service Officer, Jack F. Matlock, Jr., assumed his post as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union in April 1987. Since the summer of 1983 he had served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs on the National Security Council staff.

Matlock was U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from November 1981 until September 1983. He earlier served three tours of duty at the American Embassy in Moscow, as Chargé d'Affaires in 1981, as Deputy Chief of Mission from 1974-1978, and as Consular Officer from 1961-1963. At the State Department in

Washington, he served as Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs from 1971-1974 and as a research analyst on Soviet affairs from 1956-1958. He participated in most U.S.-Soviet summit meetings from the early 1970s, including the meetings between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in 1972, 1973 and 1974, and the meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva and Reykjavik.

Matlock spent seven years in Africa, serving as Political Officer at the American Embassy in Accra, Ghana from 1963 to 1966, then as principal officer in charge of the American Consulate in Zanzibar from 1967 to 1969, and finally as Chargé d'Affaires and Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. His earlier Foreign Service assignments included a tour as Consular Officer in Vienna, Austria, from 1958 to 1960.

From 1979 to 1980, Matlock was Deputy Director of the Foreign Service Institute. During the 1978-1979 academic year, he was Visiting Professor of Political Science and Diplomat-in-Residence at Vanderbilt University.

A native of Greensboro, North Carolina, he received his A.B. summa cum laude from Duke University in 1950. He pursued graduate studies at Columbia University, receiving a certificate of the Russian Institute in 1952 and an M.A. in Slavic languages and literature the same year. From 1952 to 1953, Matlock worked as an editor and translator on the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. He joined the faculty of Dartmouth College in 1952 as Instructor in Russian language and literature, where he stayed until his entry into the Foreign Service in 1956.

Matlock is the author of a handbook to the 13-volume Russian edition of *Stalin's Collected Works* (Washington, 1955), and has published articles on Soviet foreign policy, Soviet government and Russian literature in *American Slavic and East European Review*, *Russian Review*, *New Republic* and other journals. He speaks Russian, French, German, Swahili and Czech.

Matlock is married to the former Rebecca Burrum, and they have five children.

U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1943-1987

Every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt has participated in at least one meeting with the Soviet Premier or the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Through 1960, these meetings also included British and sometimes French leaders, except for the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting in 1959. Following the Paris Summit of 1960, all the meetings have been on a bilateral basis, although the occasion for the Helsinki summit of 1975 was a multilateral gathering.

Following is a list, in reverse chronological order, of meetings between U.S. Presidents and Soviet leaders since World War II.

WASHINGTON (December 7-10, 1987)

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Washington to continue discussions on the four-part U.S.-Soviet agenda: arms reductions, human rights, bilateral issues and regional issues. They had full and frank discussions on human rights issues. The U.S. and Soviet leaders discussed increasing bilateral exchanges, cooperation on environmental matters and trade expansion. They held wide-ranging talks on regional issues including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, Central America, southern Africa, the Middle East and Cambodia.

The two leaders signed the "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles." They instructed their negotiators at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks to intensify efforts to complete a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms to implement the principle of a 50-percent reduction in these arms, which was agreed at the Reykjavik meeting. The leaders also instructed their negotiators to work out a new and separate treaty on defense and space issues that would commit the sides to observe the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time.

Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also signed agreements to increase air service between the United States and the Soviet Union and to extend the U.S.-Soviet world oceans agreement.

General Secretary Gorbachev renewed his invitation for the President to visit the Soviet Union in the first half of 1988 and the President accepted.

REYKJAVIK (October 10-12, 1986)

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, Iceland, to discuss all four points of the U.S.-Soviet agenda — human rights, regional conflicts, bilateral cooperation and arms control — with particularly intense discussions on arms reductions. The two leaders agreed in principle to 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms to a level of 6,000 warheads on 1,600 delivery systems; they also reached agreement on a counting rule for strategic bombers. In addition, they agreed to seek an initial intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement of a global ceiling of 100 warheads on longer-range INF missiles, with none in Europe, and constraints on shorter-range INF missiles. The President and the General Secretary agreed to expand mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation.

On the final day of the meeting, however, General Secretary Gorbachev insisted that further progress on INF and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) be linked to new and unacceptable restrictions on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. The President rejected such linkage, noting that the proposed Soviet restrictions were more stringent than those contained in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and would cripple the SDI research program. The meeting concluded without a joint statement.

GENEVA (November 19-21, 1985)

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed a four-part agenda: human rights, regional issues, bilateral matters, and arms control. The President pressed for improvement in Soviet human rights practices, removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the resolution of regional conflicts in a number of countries, including Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua. In the arms control area, both leaders called for early progress on 50-percent reductions in offensive nuclear armaments and early completion of a separate INF accord. They also had frank exchanges on strategic defense issues. They agreed to study the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable treaty

banning chemical weapons. They endorsed a policy of regular exchanges between senior U.S. and Soviet officials. The General Secretary accepted the President's invitation to visit the United States in 1986 and the President agreed to visit the U.S.S.R. the following year. At the end of the meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, and announced that the two countries would resume civil air service.

VIENNA (June 1979)

President Jimmy Carter and Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II at this meeting. They discussed other arms control issues including the continuation of the SALT process, as well as the Middle East, Afghanistan and several other international, bilateral and trade issues. The two leaders signed several related agreements and issued a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms.

HELSINKI (July-August 1975)

During two meetings at Helsinki, where both were attending the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev attempted unsuccessfully to reach further agreement on strategic arms limitations. In an exchange with reporters after their July 30 meeting, both called it "businesslike" and "friendly."

VLADIVOSTOK (November 1974)

President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev's discussions focused on strategic arms limitations, but also included a number of bilateral and international issues, including the Middle East. In the SALT II negotiations, the leaders reached agreement in principle on some of the basic elements subsequently incorporated in the 1979 treaty. They issued a joint statement on strategic offensive arms (the Vladivostok Agreement) and a joint communiqué calling for continuing efforts at arms limitation and the development of economic cooperation.

MOSCOW (June-July 1974)

President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev discussed arms control and several international and bilateral issues. The two leaders signed a protocol which further limited each side to one ABM site apiece instead of the two allowed in the

1972 ABM Treaty. The two also signed a Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The governments signed several other instruments dealing with scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges and other bilateral matters. The communiqué “reaffirmed their agreement to hold such meetings regularly and when considered necessary for the discussion and solution of urgent questions.”

WASHINGTON (June 1973)

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev discussed the maintenance and strengthening of international peace, and a number of international and bilateral questions. The two leaders signed Agreements on the Prevention of Nuclear War and on the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Other agreements signed at the summit dealt with scientific cooperation, agriculture, trade and other bilateral issues. The joint communiqué expressed “deep satisfaction” with the conclusion during the preceding January of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam. President Nixon stated at Brezhnev’s departure that the meeting had “built on the strong foundation that we laid a year ago.”

MOSCOW (May 1972)

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and the SALT I Interim Agreement, both of which had been in negotiation for many months. Also concluded at Moscow were agreements on public health, environmental cooperation, incidents at sea, exchanges in science, technology, education and culture, and a Declaration of Basic Principles of Mutual Relations.

GLASSBORO (June 1967)

President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin’s meeting was hastily arranged and only agreed on after considerable haggling over a suitable location. The Glassboro, New Jersey, meeting was appended to Kosygin’s visit to the United Nations, where he had come to support the Arab nations’ proposals for ending the Middle East conflict that had erupted earlier that month. Disarmament and the Vietnam war were also discussed. Nothing came of a Soviet offer during the conference to serve as an intermediary with the North Vietnamese to negotiate a halt to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

VIENNA (June 1961)

President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier and First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita S. Khrushchev held discussions focused on the status of Berlin. But the conflict in Laos and the

general question of disarmament were also on the meeting's agenda. Kennedy was surprised and sobered by Khrushchev's belligerence on Berlin; but some progress was made when the two leaders agreed that further discussions on Laos should be continued at the Foreign Minister level.

PARIS (May 1960)

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, First Secretary Khrushchev, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and French President Charles de Gaulle planned to discuss Germany and Berlin, disarmament, nuclear testing and the general state of East-West relations. But on the second day of the conference, before any of the issues could be considered, Khrushchev demanded that Eisenhower apologize for the U-2 intelligence overflight of the Soviet Union in May. When Eisenhower refused, Khrushchev left the conference.

WASHINGTON-CAMP DAVID (September 1959)

During the September 1959 meeting, which President Eisenhower arranged mainly to acquaint First Secretary Khrushchev with the American way of life, the two leaders engaged in substantive talks for two days at Camp David, Maryland. They agreed to expand exchanges and to remove the Soviet deadline for a Berlin settlement, but on other issues, such as disarmament and the reunification of Germany, no progress was made.

GENEVA (July 1955)

At this conference, President Eisenhower, Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin, First Secretary Khrushchev, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Premier Edgar Faure discussed disarmament, German reunification, and the need for greater East-West contacts through travel and the exchange of information. Eisenhower advanced a proposal (the "Open Skies" plan) calling for an exchange of military blueprints with the Soviet Union and allowing aerial reconnaissance of each other's military installations.

POTSDAM (July 1945)

President Harry S. Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (after July 28, replaced by newly chosen British Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee) and Soviet Marshal Joseph Stalin dealt with political questions, primarily the occupation of Germany and the question of German reparations. The three powers created a Council of Foreign Ministers to work on peace treaties with the Axis powers. In a declaration issued on July 26,

they also demanded that Japan surrender unconditionally. During the conference, Truman learned of the successful test of the atomic bomb and informed Stalin in general terms.

YALTA (February 1945)

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin discussed the future of Poland and Eastern Europe, the nature of Security Council voting in the United Nations, the status of postwar Germany, and the conditions for Soviet entry into the Pacific War. In a Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Allies pledged to work toward the establishment of representative governments in the nations liberated from Axis domination through free elections. In a secret agreement, the Soviet Union promised to enter the Pacific War two to three months after Germany's surrender in return for certain Far Eastern concessions.

TEHRAN (November–December 1943)

President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin's discussion centered on military matters, such as planning for the cross-channel invasion (Operation OVERLORD) and the invasion of southern France. The three powers also agreed to try to get Turkey to join the war and to split Finland away from the Axis. There was general discussion about several political questions, such as a future world organization and postwar policy toward Germany. On certain contentious issues, such as the Polish question, decisions were postponed, which assured the conference an air of great cordiality.

*PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEETINGS WITH SOVIET LEADERS:
A CHRONOLOGY*

- 9/84 Andrei A. Gromyko
Chairman, Presidium, U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet
- 3/85 Vladimir V. Shcherbitskiy
Politburo Member, First Secretary of Ukrainian
Communist Party
- 9/85 Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 10/85 Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 11/85 Mikhail S. Gorbachev (Geneva)
General Secretary of the Central Committee (CC),
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
- 9/86 Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 10/86 Mikhail S. Gorbachev (Reykjavik)
General Secretary
- 12/86 Boris I. Aristov
Minister of Foreign Trade
- 10/87 Viktor P. Nikonov
Politburo Member, Secretary of the CC, CPSU
- 10/87 Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 12/87 Mikhail S. Gorbachev (Washington, D.C.)
General Secretary
- 3/88 Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

NST

Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet Proposals

May 6, 1988

UNITED STATES



SOVIET UNION



NST

Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet Proposals

May 6, 1988

UNITED STATES



SOVIET UNION



START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

General Approach:	50 percent reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner achieving equal intermediate ceilings by agreed dates over seven years from the date the treaty comes into force. Agreement not contingent upon the resolution of other issues outside START negotiations.	50 percent reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in two phases over seven years from the date the treaty enters into force, with subsequent negotiations for additional reductions. Implementation of 50 percent reductions contingent upon the resolution of Defense and Space (D & S) issues.
Delivery Vehicles:	1,600 ceiling on the number of strategic offensive delivery systems, which comprise deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers.	1,600 ceiling on the number of strategic offensive delivery systems, which comprise deployed launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers.
Warheads:	6,000 warhead ceiling, to include deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads and long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles), and with each heavy bomber equipped only for gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) counting as one warhead.	Same as the U.S. position.
Warhead Sublimits:	Sublimits of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads and 3,000-3,300 ICBM warheads.	Sublimit of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads; equal warhead sublimits on both ICBMs and SLBMs; and a sublimit of 1,100 on bomber-carried warheads.
Heavy ICBMs:	A limit of 1,540 warheads on 154 deployed heavy ballistic missiles. Ban on production, flight testing or modernization of new or existing types of heavy ICBMs.	A limit of 1,540 warheads on 154 deployed heavy ICBMs. Production, flight testing or modernization of existing types of heavy ICBMs permitted. Development, testing and deployment of new types of heavy ICBMs banned.
Throw-Weight:	The aggregate throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to 50 percent below existing level. Neither side will exceed this level for the duration of this treaty.	Same as the U.S. position in principle, but sides must agree on how to record commitment.
Ballistic Missile Warheads:	For existing types, a quota of on-site inspections to verify that deployed missiles contain no more than the number of warheads declared and agreed at the Washington Summit. For future types as well as changes in the number of warheads on existing types, procedures remain to be agreed.	On-site inspection permitted only if a side declares a warhead count lower than the maximum tested.
Mobile ICBMs:	Banned unless verification problems can be resolved.	Permitted with limits on launchers and warheads.
Heavy Bombers:	Each heavy bomber counts as one strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV). Each heavy bomber equipped only for gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in the 6,000 limit.	Same as the U.S. position.
ALCMs:	ALCMs defined as air-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missiles with a range in excess of 1,500 kilometers. An agreed number of ALCMs shall be attributed to each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs for the purpose of counting against the 6,000 warhead limit.	ALCMs defined as air-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. The number of ALCMs attributed to ALCM heavy bombers shall be the maximum number each type is equipped for. Nuclear-armed ALCMs shall be limited.
SLCMs:	The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs (sea-launched cruise missiles). Such limitations will not involve counting these SLCMs within the 6,000 warhead and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides commit themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include use of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection. Thus far, the U.S. has not identified any effective verification approach for SLCMs.	Specific force level limitations of 400 on nuclear-armed and of 600 on conventional-armed SLCMs, but the Soviets fail to identify effective verification measures. The Soviet approach would also undermine U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons at any particular location—an important underpinning of deterrence.
Verification of	Provisions, at a minimum, to include: exchange of data both	Same as the U.S. position in principle. Details differ significantly.

Ballistic Missile Warheads:	For existing types, a quota of on-site inspections to verify that deployed missiles contain no more than the number of warheads declared and agreed at the Washington Summit. For future types as well as changes in the number of warheads on existing types, procedures remain to be agreed.	On-site inspection permitted only if a side declares a warhead count lower than the maximum tested.
Mobile ICBMs:	Banned unless verification problems can be resolved.	Permitted with limits on launchers and warheads.
Heavy Bombers:	Each heavy bomber counts as one strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV). Each heavy bomber equipped only for gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in the 6,000 limit.	Same as the U.S. position.
ALCMs:	ALCMs defined as air-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missiles with a range in excess of 1,500 kilometers. An agreed number of ALCMs shall be attributed to each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs for the purpose of counting against the 6,000 warhead limit.	ALCMs defined as air-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. The number of ALCMs attributed to ALCM heavy bombers shall be the maximum number each type is equipped for. Nuclear-armed ALCMs shall be limited.
SLCMs:	The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs (sea-launched cruise missiles). Such limitations will not involve counting these SLCMs within the 6,000 warhead and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides commit themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include use of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection. Thus far, the U.S. has not identified any effective verification approach for SLCMs.	Specific force level limitations of 400 on nuclear-armed and of 600 on conventional-armed SLCMs, but the Soviets fail to identify effective verification measures. The Soviet approach would also undermine U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons at any particular location—an important underpinning of deterrence.
Verification of Compliance:	Provisions, at a minimum, to include: exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place; on-site inspection to verify data exchange and to observe elimination of weapons; continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities; and short-notice inspection of sites where treaty-limited systems are located both during and after the reduction period and sites at which a party considers that covert production, storage, repair or deployment may be occurring. Details remain to be worked out.	Same as the U.S. position in principle. Details differ significantly. Soviet provisions are not adequate for effective verification.

D & S Defense and Space

General Approach:	Defense and Space issues to be addressed in a new and separate treaty building upon the Washington Summit Joint Statement. The U.S. presented a draft D & S treaty on January 22, 1988.	Defense and Space issues to be addressed in a new and separate agreement, building upon the Washington Summit Joint Statement. The Soviet Union presented a draft agreement on April 22, 1988.
Commitment of Nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty:	Agreement would commit the sides to observe the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time for the purpose of deploying strategic defenses or acquiring capabilities for strategic defense.	Agreement would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time (9-10 years) for any reason. (Note: The Soviets continue to maintain an interpretation of the ABM Treaty that is more restrictive than agreed to by the parties in 1972.)
Regime after Nonwithdrawal Period:	Intensive discussion of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Either party will be free to choose to deploy strategic missile defenses that are beyond limitations in the ABM Treaty upon giving the other party six months' written notice of its intention to do so. (Note: The U.S. seeks a cooperative transition to an increasingly defense-reliant strategic regime in the event effective strategic defenses prove feasible.)	Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the agreed period. (Note: The Soviets propose that the aim of the discussions be to reach an accord on "further strengthening strategic stability"; the parties would discuss the "problems of ABM defenses taking into account the new situation resulting from reductions in strategic offensive arms.") In the event the sides have not agreed otherwise as a result of these discussions, after the D & S treaty expires, each side shall determine for itself its further actions with respect to the ABM Treaty and the START treaty, subject to compliance with the relevant procedures of these treaties.
Entry into Force/Duration/Linkage:	Entry into force contingent upon entry into force of START treaty; D & S treaty would be of unlimited duration with "specified period" of nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty to be negotiated; observance of the ABM Treaty through that period and until either party chooses a different course of action.	This agreement would enter into force simultaneously with the START treaty. The Soviets propose that the agreement expire at the end of the nonwithdrawal period. START treaty ceases to be in force if either party violates the ABM Treaty or this agreement.
Rights to Withdraw:	The U.S. insists that the sides retain withdrawal rights, recognized in international law, such as those that could be exercised in the event that a side's supreme interests are jeopardized as well as termination and suspension rights in the event the treaty is materially breached.	The Soviets propose an "unqualified" nonwithdrawal commitment, under which a party could not withdraw from the agreement for any reason.
Predictability:	The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. In the context of confidence-building measures to provide predictability for each side regarding the strategic defense programs of the other, the U.S. presented a Predictability Protocol on March 15, 1988, which calls for: annual exchange of programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on respective strategic defense efforts, reciprocal visits to associated research facilities, and reciprocal observation of strategic defense tests.	The Soviets make no reference to predictability beyond the Washington Summit Joint Statement. However, in the context of a Verification Protocol presented on April 12, 1988, they call for: an exchange of information to clarify ambiguous situations; an exchange of data regarding certain devices which are scheduled to be put into space; inspections of certain sites and facilities which give rise to concerns regarding compliance with the ABM Treaty; and resolution of compliance questions in the Standing Consultative Commission.

INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

The INF negotiations have successfully concluded. On December 8, 1987, in Washington, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. The Treaty provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched INF missile systems in the range of 500-5,500 kilometers (about 300-3,400 miles) and the elimination or conversion of related facilities within three years after it enters into force. The Treaty bans all production and flight testing of these missiles immediately upon entry into force. After elimination is completed, the Treaty will ban all facilities for deployment, storage, repair and production of these missile systems. The Treaty contains the most stringent verification provisions in the history of arms control, including various types of short-notice inspections as well as inspection by resident teams. On January 25, 1988, the Treaty was submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and

continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities; and short-notice inspection of sites where treaty-limited systems are located both during and after the reduction period and sites at which a party considers that covert production, storage, repair or deployment may be occurring. Details remain to be worked out.

D & S Defense and Space

General Approach:	Defense and Space issues to be addressed in a new and separate treaty building upon the Washington Summit Joint Statement. The U.S. presented a draft D & S treaty on January 22, 1988.	Defense and Space issues to be addressed in a new and separate agreement, building upon the Washington Summit Joint Statement. The Soviet Union presented a draft agreement on April 22, 1988.
Commitment of Nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty:	Agreement would commit the sides to observe the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time for the purpose of deploying strategic defenses or acquiring capabilities for strategic defense.	Agreement would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time (9-10 years) for any reason. (Note: The Soviets continue to maintain an interpretation of the ABM Treaty that is more restrictive than agreed to by the parties in 1972.)
Regime after Nonwithdrawal Period:	Intensive discussion of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Either party will be free to choose to deploy strategic missile defenses that are beyond limitations in the ABM Treaty upon giving the other party six months' written notice of its intention to do so. (Note: The U.S. seeks a cooperative transition to an increasingly defense-reliant strategic regime in the event effective strategic defenses prove feasible.)	Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the agreed period. (Note: The Soviets propose that the aim of the discussions be to reach an accord on "further strengthening strategic stability"; the parties would discuss the "problems of ABM defenses taking into account the new situation resulting from reductions in strategic offensive arms.") In the event the sides have not agreed otherwise as a result of these discussions, after the D & S treaty expires, each side shall determine for itself its further actions with respect to the ABM Treaty and the START treaty, subject to compliance with the relevant procedures of these treaties.
Entry into Force/ Duration/ Linkage:	Entry into force contingent upon entry into force of START treaty; D & S treaty would be of unlimited duration with "specified period" of nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty to be negotiated; observance of the ABM Treaty through that period and until either party chooses a different course of action.	This agreement would enter into force simultaneously with the START treaty. The Soviets propose that the agreement expire at the end of the nonwithdrawal period. START treaty ceases to be in force if either party violates the ABM Treaty or this agreement.
Rights to Withdraw:	The U.S. insists that the sides retain withdrawal rights, recognized in international law, such as those that could be exercised in the event that a side's supreme interests are jeopardized as well as termination and suspension rights in the event the treaty is materially breached.	The Soviets propose an "unqualified" nonwithdrawal commitment, under which a party could not withdraw from the agreement for any reason.
Predictability:	The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. In the context of confidence-building measures to provide predictability for each side regarding the strategic defense programs of the other, the U.S. presented a Predictability Protocol on March 15, 1988, which calls for: annual exchange of programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on respective strategic defense efforts, reciprocal visits to associated research facilities, and reciprocal observation of strategic defense tests.	The Soviets make no reference to predictability beyond the Washington Summit Joint Statement. However, in the context of a Verification Protocol presented on April 12, 1988, they call for: an exchange of information to clarify ambiguous situations; an exchange of data regarding certain devices which are scheduled to be put into space; inspections of certain sites and facilities which give rise to concerns regarding compliance with the ABM Treaty; and resolution of compliance questions in the Standing Consultative Commission.

INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

The INF negotiations have successfully concluded. On December 8, 1987, in Washington, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. The Treaty provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched INF missile systems in the range of 500-5,500 kilometers (about 300-3,400 miles) and the elimination or conversion of related facilities within three years after it enters into force. The Treaty bans all production and flight testing of these missiles immediately upon entry into force. After elimination is completed, the Treaty will ban all facilities for deployment, storage, repair and production of these missile systems. The Treaty contains the most stringent verification provisions in the history of arms control, including various types of short-notice inspections as well as inspection by resident teams. On January 25, 1988, the Treaty was submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.


NST

U.S. Arms Control Proposals

May 6, 1988

START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks)

GENERAL APPROACH:



50 percent reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner achieving equal intermediate ceilings by agreed dates over seven years from the date the treaty comes into force.

Agreement not contingent upon the resolution of other issues outside START negotiations.

DELIVERY VEHICLES:

1,600 ceiling on the number of strategic offensive delivery systems, which comprise deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers.

WARHEADS:

6,000 warhead ceiling, to include deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads and long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles), and with each heavy bomber equipped only for gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) counting as one warhead.

WARHEAD SUBLIMITS:




Sublimits of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads and 3,000-3,300 ICBM warheads.

HEAVY ICBMs:

A limit of 1,540 warheads on 154 deployed heavy ballistic missiles. Ban on production, flight testing or modernization of new or existing types of heavy ICBMs.

THROW-WEIGHT:



The aggregate throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to 50 percent below existing level. Neither side will exceed this level for the duration of this treaty.

BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS:

For existing types, a quota of on-site inspections to verify that deployed missiles contain no more than the number of warheads declared and agreed at the Washington Summit. For future types as well as changes in the number of warheads on existing types, procedures remain to be agreed.

MOBILE ICBMs:



D & S (Defense and Space)

GENERAL APPROACH:



Defense and Space issues to be addressed in a new and separate treaty building upon the Washington Summit Joint Statement. The U.S. presented a draft D & S treaty on January 22, 1988.

COMMITMENT OF NONWITHDRAWAL FROM ABM TREATY:




Agreement would commit the sides to observe the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time for the purpose of deploying strategic defenses or acquiring capabilities for strategic defense.

REGIME AFTER NONWITHDRAWAL PERIOD:

Intensive discussion of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Either party will be free to choose to deploy strategic missile defenses that are beyond limitations in the ABM Treaty upon giving the other party six months' written notice of its intention to do so. (Note: The U.S. seeks a cooperative transition to an increasingly defense-reliant strategic regime in the event effective strategic defenses prove feasible.)

ENTRY INTO FORCE/DURATION/LINKAGE:




Entry into force contingent upon entry into force of START treaty; D & S treaty would be of unlimited duration with "specified period" of nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty to be negotiated; observance of the ABM Treaty through that period and until either party chooses a different course of action.

RIGHTS TO WITHDRAW:

The U.S. insists that the sides retain withdrawal rights, recognized in international law, such as those that could be exercised in the event that a side's supreme interests are jeopardized as well

THROW-WEIGHT:



The aggregate throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to 50 percent below existing level. Neither side will exceed this level for the duration of this treaty.

BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS:

For existing types, a quota of on-site inspections to verify that deployed missiles contain no more than the number of warheads declared and agreed at the Washington Summit. For future types as well as changes in the number of warheads on existing types, procedures remain to be agreed.

MOBILE ICBMs:



Banned unless verification problems can be resolved.

HEAVY BOMBERS:



Each heavy bomber counts as one strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV). Each heavy bomber equipped only for gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in the 6,000 limit.

ALCMs:




ALCMs defined as air-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missiles with a range in excess of 1,500 kilometers. An agreed number of ALCMs shall be attributed to each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs for the purpose of counting against the 6,000 warhead limit.

SLCMs:



notice of its intention to do so. (Under the START II and a cooperative transition to an increasingly defense-reliant strategic regime in the event effective strategic defenses prove feasible.)

ENTRY INTO FORCE/DURATION/LINKAGE:




Entry into force contingent upon entry into force of START treaty; D & S treaty would be of unlimited duration with "specified period" of nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty to be negotiated; observance of the ABM Treaty through that period and until either party chooses a different course of action.

RIGHTS TO WITHDRAW:

The U.S. insists that the sides retain withdrawal rights, recognized in international law, such as those that could be exercised in the event that a side's supreme interests are jeopardized as well as termination and suspension rights in the event the treaty is materially breached.

PREDICTABILITY:



The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. In the context of confidence-building measures to provide predictability for each side regarding the strategic defense programs of the other, the U.S. presented a Predictability Protocol on March 15, 1988, which calls for: annual exchange of programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on respective strategic defense efforts, reciprocal visits to associated research facilities, and reciprocal observation of strategic defense tests.

HEAVY BOMBERS:



Each heavy bomber counts as one strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV). Each heavy bomber equipped only for gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in the 6,000 limit.

ALCMs:




ALCMs defined as air-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missiles with a range in excess of 1,500 kilometers. An agreed number of ALCMs shall be attributed to each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs for the purpose of counting against the 6,000 warhead limit.

SLCMs:




The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs (sea-launched cruise missiles). Such limitations will not involve counting these SLCMs within the 6,000 warhead and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides commit themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include use of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection. Thus far, the U.S. has not identified any effective verification approach for SLCMs.

VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE:



Provisions, at a minimum, to include: exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place; on-site inspection to verify data exchange and to observe elimination of weapons; continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities; and short-notice inspection of sites where treaty-limited systems are located both during and after the reduction period and sites at which a party considers that covert production, storage, repair or deployment may be occurring. Details remain to be worked out.

PREDICTABILITY:



The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. In the context of confidence-building measures to provide predictability for each side regarding the strategic defense programs of the other, the U.S. presented a Predictability Protocol on March 15, 1988, which calls for: annual exchange of programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on respective strategic defense efforts, reciprocal visits to associated research facilities, and reciprocal observation of strategic defense tests.

United States Information Agency

STRATEGIC
ARMS
REDUCTION
TALKS

START

Chronology
1981-1988

1981

Following an in-depth review of U.S. security, arms control and compliance policies, President Reagan decides to seek significant reductions in strategic forces rather than mere limitations on future growth.

MAY 9, 1982

In a speech at Eureka College, the President outlines the U.S. proposal, which emphasizes reductions in the most destabilizing systems, particularly intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The basic U.S. objective in these negotiations is a verifiable agreement that enhances stability, reduces the risk of war, and achieves deep reductions in the strategic nuclear weapons of both sides.

MAY 31, 1982

President Reagan announces that Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) with the Soviet Union will open on June 29 in Geneva. He also says that the U.S. will refrain from actions that undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.

JUNE 29, 1982

START negotiations begin in Geneva. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. presents a proposal for strategic reductions to be implemented in two phases. The proposal includes:

- Reductions in the number of deployed strategic ballistic missile warheads to 5,000 for each side with a sublimit of 2,500 warheads on land-based ICBMs.
- A limit of 850 deployed strategic ballistic missiles with a sublimit of no more than 210 heavy and medium ICBMs of which no more than 110 could be heavy ICBMs. These sublimits are to ensure substantial cuts in the most destabilizing missile systems—ballistic missiles, especially large ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.
- A ban on new heavy missiles.
- Substantial reductions in ballistic missile destructive capability and potential (throw-weight).
- An equal ceiling on heavy bombers below the U.S. level in SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) II.

- Equitable limits and constraints on other strategic systems.

MARCH 29, 1983

The Soviets table a draft START treaty, which would result in 25 percent reductions in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles and bombers). The proposal bans all ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and limits air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. The Soviet proposal provides modest reductions of the most destabilizing systems—fast, accurate ballistic missiles with multiple warheads—and, in fact, would permit substantial growth in the number of ballistic missile warheads above current levels.

The Soviets charge that the U.S. proposal discriminates against the Soviet Union and would force them to restructure their strategic forces.

APRIL 6, 1983

The Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission), appointed by President Reagan, publishes its report. The report underscores the need to modernize U.S. strategic weapons, and to undertake negotiations leading to balanced arms control agreements that would promote stability in times of crisis and result in meaningful, verifiable reductions. The President endorses this report.

JULY 7, 1983

The U.S. presents its first draft START treaty. This draft text reflects the central elements of the U.S. START proposal, while also taking into consideration several Soviet concerns about the original U.S. proposal. The U.S. relaxes its proposed limit of 850 deployed ballistic missiles and its insistence that no more than half of the warheads on ballistic missiles be land-based. In addition, the proposal includes a limit of 400 heavy bombers. The proposal would give both sides the option of restructuring their forces more flexibly, including moving in the direction of smaller and less threatening single-warhead ICBMs.

OCTOBER 1983

President Reagan adds to the U.S. START position the principle of mutual, guaranteed build-down of strategic weapons: whereby a ratio of older weapons would be reduced as certain newer ones are deployed. Variable ratios are designed to channel modernization of strategic forces toward more stabilizing systems.

DECEMBER 1983

The START talks come to a halt when the Soviets refuse to set a date for their resumption. They allege a "change in the strategic situation" following NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in response to Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, which threaten Western security. The U.S. offers to return to the talks whenever the Soviets are ready.

SEPTEMBER 24, 1984

In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Reagan proposes a broad "umbrella" framework for talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms control issues. Reagan makes clear that the U.S. is committed to achieving, among other objectives, a substantial reduction in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

NOVEMBER 22, 1984

The United States and the Soviet Union jointly announce their agreement to enter into new negotiations on nuclear and space issues.

JANUARY 7-8, 1985

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meet in Geneva to set an agenda for new comprehensive arms control negotiations to cover strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), and defense and space.

JANUARY 21, 1985

In his second Inaugural Address, President Reagan says: "We are not just discussing limits on a further increase of nuclear weapons. We seek, instead, to reduce their number."

MARCH 12, 1985

The United States and the Soviet Union begin new negotiations in the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). Among other objectives, the U.S. seeks radical reductions in the number and destructive power of offensive strategic arms. The U.S. draft START treaty of 1983 remains on the table. The Soviet side makes no specific proposal.

Progress in the talks is slowed by Soviet insistence on placing unacceptable limits on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as a precondition for progress in the strategic arms area.

JUNE 10, 1985

In a message to Congress, President Reagan says the U.S. will continue to refrain from undercutting the expired SALT I agreement and the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint and actively pursues arms reductions agreements at Geneva. The President announces the dismantlement of a Poseidon ballistic missile submarine to give the Soviets more time to take the steps necessary, including correcting its noncompliance with arms control agreements, to join the U.S. in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

The U.S.S.R. presents its START proposal, which contains a number of unacceptable elements, such as counting certain U.S. systems as "strategic," while excluding an even greater number of comparable Soviet systems. The Soviets, however, accept for the first time the principle, long advocated by the U.S., of deep reductions in strategic offensive forces.

NOVEMBER 1, 1985

The U.S. presents a new proposal at the negotiating table, including the following major elements:

- A limit of 4,500 re-entry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—about 50 percent below current levels.
- A sublimit of 3,000 RVs carried by ICBMs—about 50 percent below the current Soviet level.
- A sublimit of 1,500 RVs carried on permitted

ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.

- A 50 percent reduction in the highest overall strategic ballistic missile throw-weight of either side—that is, from the Soviet level of over 12 million pounds. (The U.S. has fewer than 4.4 million pounds.)
- Contingent upon Soviet acceptance of these RV and throw-weight limits, the U.S. would accept an equal limit of 1,500 on the number of long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers—about 50 percent below planned U.S. deployment levels.
- A limit of 1,250-1,450 on strategic ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs)—about 40 to 50 percent below the current higher Soviet level.
- In the context of an appropriate agreement on strategic ballistic missiles, the U.S. could accept a limit of 350 on heavy bombers—roughly a 40 percent reduction from U.S. SALT-accountable levels.
- A ban on all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles and the modernization of existing heavy missiles—the most destabilizing weapons.
- A ban on all mobile ICBMs because of difficulties in verification.

NOVEMBER 21, 1985

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev issue a joint statement in Geneva following two days of intensive negotiations. Among other things, they agree to commit their countries to early progress at the Geneva NST talks, and to focus in particular on areas where there is common ground, including the “principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. appropriately applied.”

JANUARY 15, 1986

General Secretary Gorbachev proposes the elimination of nuclear weapons over 15 years. Gorbachev's plan restates several Soviet proposals, including:

- The elimination of nuclear weapons contingent upon U.S. acceptance of measures which would cripple the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
- A 50 percent reduction in each side's nuclear arms capable of reaching the other's territory, which would include many U.S. intermediate-

range systems while excluding comparable Soviet systems.

FEBRUARY 24, 1986

President Reagan issues a statement following analysis of General Secretary Gorbachev's January proposal for elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century:

“I am pleased that the Soviet Union appears to agree in principle with our ultimate goal of moving to the total elimination of nuclear weapons when this becomes possible....

“As the means of accomplishing this, we support a process by which the U.S. and the Soviet Union would take the first steps by implementing the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear offensive forces of both sides, appropriately applied We believe that the immediate focus should remain on the prompt accomplishment of these first necessary steps.”

MAY 27, 1986

Because of continued Soviet noncompliance with major arms control commitments, the continued buildup of Soviet strategic forces, and Soviet failure to follow through on its commitment to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations, President Reagan announces that, in the future, the U.S. will base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, not on standards contained in SALT. He points out the inappropriateness of continuing U.S. unilateral compliance with the SALT II Treaty, which the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated, which has never been ratified, and which would have expired had it been ratified. The U.S. will continue to exercise the utmost restraint in the future, seeking to meet U.S. strategic needs, given the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth.

JUNE 1986

The Soviets present a new “interim” proposal, which calls for less than the 50 percent reductions agreed to at the 1985 summit. The Presi-

dent cites the Soviet proposal as positive, although he emphasizes that the U.S. cannot accept the proposal without changes.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1986

Speaking to the U.N. General Assembly, President Reagan says the U.S. is seeking a "50 percent reduction of American and Soviet arsenals—with the central focus on the reduction of ballistic missile warheads"

FALL 1986

The U.S. presents substantial revisions of its proposals to accommodate the Soviet idea of taking interim steps to 50 percent reductions. The U.S. makes clear, however, that its 50 percent reduction proposal remains on the table and is preferred.

OCTOBER 11-12, 1986

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev meet in Reykjavik, Iceland. The U.S. seeks to narrow differences, where possible, between U.S. and Soviet arms control positions, and to lay the groundwork for more productive negotiations. The discussions stall when President Reagan refuses to limit SDI research and testing to the laboratory as General Secretary Gorbachev demands. Nevertheless, the sides agree to reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1,600 for each side, with no more than 6,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. The Soviets recognize the need for significant cuts in heavy ICBMs, and there is agreement on counting rules for bomber weapons. The Soviet Union, however, demands that the U.S. accept all Soviet proposals as a package, including measures that would have crippled SDI. The President refuses.

OCTOBER 22, 1986

The U.S. presents a new START proposal in Geneva, which incorporates areas of agreement reached at Reykjavik and proposes new solutions in areas where differences remain. Major elements of the proposal include:

- Fifty percent reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner. Agreement would *not* be contingent upon resolution of other issues outside START

negotiations, as was agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev at the November 1985 Geneva summit.

- A ceiling of 1,600 on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), including ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

- A ceiling of 6,000 warheads, to include ICBM and SLBM warheads and long-range ALCMs. Each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) would count as a warhead in the 6,000 limit. Each ALCM carried on a heavy bomber would count as one warhead in the 6,000 ceiling.

- Sublimits of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.

- Substantial reductions (50 percent) in heavy ICBMs. Heavy ICBM warheads would be included in the 1,650 warhead limit.

- Fifty percent reduction from the current Soviet throw-weight level, to be codified by direct or indirect limits.

- A ban on mobile ICBMs.

- Commitment to find a mutually acceptable solution to limiting long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs outside the 1,600/6,000 limits.

- Verification of compliance to include an exchange of comprehensive and accurate data both before and after the reductions take place, on-site observation of weapon reduction, and effective monitoring of remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

- Negotiations on verification details should take place in parallel with negotiations on reduction of weapons.

NOVEMBER 7, 1986

The Soviets present proposals which only partially reflect the headway made at Reykjavik and which, in part, backtrack on certain issues. The Soviets continue to insist that progress in all three of the NST negotiating forums be tied to U.S. acceptance of the unacceptable Soviet position on strategic defenses.

NOVEMBER 15-16, 1986

President Reagan and British Prime Minister Thatcher meet at Camp David and agree that

priority should be given to achieving, among other things, an effectively verifiable 50 percent cut in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive weapons over five years.

EARLY 1987

The U.S. seeks to narrow further the differences between the two sides, proposing that areas of agreement reached at Reykjavik should serve as the basis for a START agreement.

The sides develop a joint working document which specifies the points of agreement and disagreement on key issues.

APRIL 13-15, 1987

When Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze meet in Moscow, the sides agree to focus START negotiations on the priority objective of 50 percent reductions. Aside from this, there is no substantial progress on START issues.

MAY 8, 1987

The U.S. presents a draft START treaty in Geneva, which would reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent. This draft reflects basic areas of agreement reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik in October 1986:

- A ceiling of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
- A ceiling of 6,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles.
- Bombers and their weapons would be counted as agreed at the Reykjavik Summit.

Other elements of the U.S. draft treaty include:

- Sublimits of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based, light or medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.
- A reduction of 50 percent from the current Soviet throw-weight level, to be codified by direct or indirect limits.
- A ban on mobile missiles.

- Reductions to be phased in over a seven year period, rather than five years, to permit additional time for the sides to make adjustments in strategic forces required by the reductions.

President Reagan says the U.S. START proposal "provides a solid basis for the creation of a fair and durable agreement."

JUNE 12, 1987

At Reykjavik, North Atlantic Foreign Ministers strongly endorse the U.S. proposal for reducing U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms and urge the Soviets to respond positively.

JULY 31, 1987

The Soviet Union responds to the U.S. draft treaty presented on May 8, with its own draft treaty. The Soviet draft includes:

- A 50 percent reduction in each side's strategic offensive arms.
- A ceiling of 1,600 on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, including ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers.
- A 50 percent reduction in heavy ICBM launchers, which would mean 1,540 warheads.
- A ceiling of 6,000 nuclear warheads.

The Soviet proposal differs from the U.S. initiative in several important ways, including:

- It would limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and not the missiles themselves as called for in the U.S. proposal.
- It does not include specific sublimits on warheads.
- It would not record in a legally-binding form 50 percent reductions in throw-weight.
- It would permit mobile ICBMs.
- It would create a ceiling of 400 on long-range SLCMs and permit their deployment on submarines only.
- It would require that the 50 percent cuts be taken over five years rather than seven years.

Moreover, under the Soviet proposal, the 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms is contingent upon achievement of a U.S.-Soviet accord to limit the testing and deployment of space-based missile defense systems.

JULY 31, 1987

The U.S. welcomes Soviet tabling of a draft START treaty, calling it a "step forward" that will allow negotiators to begin the sustained effort necessary to put together a joint draft text and to negotiate remaining differences.

SEPTEMBER 15-17, 1987

Following three days of intensive discussions, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agree, among other things, to intensify the negotiating effort in Geneva to reduce strategic offensive arms by 50 percent. Some additional progress is made on outstanding issues:

- The Soviets put back on the table and update their earlier proposal to limit weapons on any one leg of the triad (air-, sea- and land-based weapons) to 60 percent of the RV total. Applying 60 percent to 6,000 RV cap results in 3,600 RVs on any one leg of the triad. The U.S. position is that limits should apply to ICBMs only, the most destabilizing system, and be lower (3,300).
- The Soviets agree they could express a 50 percent reduction in heavy ICBMs in terms of warheads (1,540).
- The Soviets state that their START proposal would result in a 50 percent reduction in throw-weight and that their throw-weight would not subsequently increase. The Soviets resist codifying this commitment in a treaty.

Many important issues remain—such as the need for a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads (the U.S. has proposed 4,800) and the Soviet proposal to link START to U.S. acceptance of measures that would cripple SDI.

OCTOBER 14, 1987

At the Geneva talks, the U.S. presents a draft Protocol on Conversion or Elimination, a key element of a START treaty.

OCTOBER 30, 1987

The President and Secretary Shultz meet with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Washington. Discussion on START focuses on ballistic missile warheads and verification. The U.S. makes clear the importance attached to a sublimit of 4,800 ballistic missiles. The Soviets propose new sublimits of 3,000-3,300 warheads on

ICBMs, 1,800-2,000 warheads on SLBMs and 800-900 on ALCMs. Discussion on this issue is inconclusive.

The U.S. stresses the importance of getting to work on verification; Shevardnadze is responsive and the two sides agree to consider how best to proceed on this subject in Geneva.

DECEMBER 7-10, 1987

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev sign a treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles. They also agree to instruct their negotiators to work toward completion of a START agreement at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of such a treaty during their next meeting, in Moscow in the first half of 1988.

They say the negotiators should build upon the areas of agreement on 50 percent reductions as reflected in the joint draft START treaty text being developed in Geneva. These include:

- A ceiling of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery systems with 6000 warheads.
- A ceiling of 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles.
- The agreed counting rules for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament.
- An agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50 percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. This agreement is to be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

During the summit, the two leaders make further progress on START, including agreement on a sublimit of 4,900 for the total number of ballistic missile warheads, declaration of the number of warheads on existing ballistic missiles and, building on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, guidelines for effective verification of a START treaty.

However, important differences remain, including such issues as mobile intercontinental ballis-

tic missiles, additional warhead sublimits on ICBMs, SLCMs and the details of an effective verification regime.

JANUARY 14, 1988

Round IX of the NST talks begins in Geneva. Work on a joint draft START treaty continues.

FEBRUARY 12, 1988

At the Geneva talks, the U.S. presents a draft Protocol on Inspection and Monitoring, a key element in a START treaty.

FEBRUARY 21-23, 1988

During their Moscow meeting, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reaffirm the Washington Summit commitment to an intensive effort to complete a START treaty at the earliest possible date. They review the entire complex of issues associated with the treaty, particularly focusing on finding mutually acceptable solutions to differences which still remain. Emphasizing the importance of verification, the ministers direct their negotiators to develop joint drafts of key verification documents before the next ministerial in March. The documents are:

- Protocol on Inspection,
- Protocol on Conversion or Elimination, and
- Memorandum of Understanding (on data exchange).

MARCH 2, 1988

At the Geneva talks, the U.S. presents a draft Memorandum of Understanding. The U.S. has now fulfilled a commitment to present all three of the documents that the ministers said were needed to be addressed by the negotiators prior to the March ministerial.

MARCH 2-3, 1988

The President participates in a meeting of NATO leaders, who reaffirm NATO support for a 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to be achieved at the Geneva negotiations.

MARCH 7-11, 1988

The Soviets present a draft Protocol on Inspection, draft Protocol on Conversion or Elimination, and a draft Memorandum of Understanding.

MID-MARCH 1988

Negotiators develop joint draft texts of the three verification documents with disputed points indicated in brackets.

MARCH 22-23, 1988

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze meet in Washington and reaffirm the strong commitment undertaken at the Washington Summit to make an intensive effort to complete a START treaty at the earliest possible date. The ministers review the three joint draft documents prepared by the negotiators and, re-emphasizing their commitment to effective verification measures, agree that the negotiators will seek to resolve the remaining differences in these documents and report on progress at the next ministerial.

The U.S. reiterates its proposal to conduct an early exchange of information and data to facilitate the effort to design an effective verification regime. This would help develop and tailor verification measures for each category of systems subject to START provisions. The Soviets are noncommittal on the proposal.

Both sides amplify their views on counting rules and definitions for ALCMs, the U.S.-proposed sublimit on ICBM warheads, the Soviet-proposed sublimit on SLBM warheads, the Soviet-proposed sublimit on bomber armaments, the difficulties of verifying SLCMs, the complexities of verifying mobile ICBMs, and qualitative limits on heavy ICBMs. Some clarification of views on these issues is achieved.

APRIL 21-22, 1988

In Moscow, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze review the drafting of the START treaty text and the three related documents. They note progress made and discuss remaining differences, including verification and counting of nuclear-armed, long-range ALCMs; limitation and verification of SLCMs; sublimits; and mobile ICBMs. Secretary Shultz presents new ideas on ALCMs and additional data on strategic forces.

They reaffirm their commitment to complete a START treaty by the earliest possible date.

SDI

**STRATEGIC
DEFENSE
INITIATIVE**

A CHRONOLOGY

1983-1988

F

ive years ago, President Reagan announced his commitment to explore intensively the promise of new technologies for defense against ballistic missile attack. Since then, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has evolved into a vigorous research and development program involving a number of U.S. allies. The objective of SDI is to strengthen U.S. and allied security and enhance long-term strategic stability. SDI is an integral part of U.S. national security strategy and has important benefits for U.S. efforts to achieve real reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. It also has important potential benefits not only for ballistic missile defenses but also for "spinoffs" to other defense programs, and for the development of technologies with potentially far-reaching applications in the civilian sector (e.g., medicine, new materials and integrated computer analyses).

The following chronology highlights key points in the evolution of U.S. strategic defense policy since March 1983. It describes milestones in the technology development and testing program of the SDI as well as major developments in the Defense and Space (D & S) forum of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva. It documents persistent Soviet efforts to kill the SDI program. Until recently, the Soviets have denied the very existence of Soviet strategic defense programs. While the U.S.S.R. has devoted approximately \$200,000 million over the last 10 years to its strategic defense programs, U.S. expenditures in the five years of the SDI program have been less than \$11,000 million.

1983

MARCH 23, 1983

In an address to the nation, President Reagan announces his intention to commit the U.S. to a research program, consistent with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, that will study the feasibility of defensive measures against ballistic missiles to maintain the peace:

"What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?"

"I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.... I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles."

APRIL 22, 1983

A letter to the New York Times denouncing SDI is signed by more than 200 senior Soviet scientists, a number of whom have been instrumental in the development of Soviet advanced ballistic missile defensive systems. Yevgeniy P. Velikhov, for example, has been a central figure in the U.S.S.R.'s program to develop high-energy laser weapons.

OCTOBER 1983

The findings and recommendations of three studies ordered by the President are delivered. The Defense Technology Study, focusing on the technical feasibility of a defense, concludes that "powerful new technologies are becoming available that justify a major technology development effort offering future technical options to implement a defensive strategy." The study recommends a five-year program to determine the technical feasibility of future ballistic missile defenses and proposes \$26,000 million for this effort.

The two Future Security Strategy Studies explore the strategy and policy implications of a strategic defense. The studies conclude that effective U.S. defense systems can offer a new, more stable and secure basis for managing our long-term relationship with the Soviet Union.

1984

JANUARY 1984

The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) is created to undertake a "comprehensive program to develop the key technologies associated with concepts for defense against ballistic missiles."

The SDIO charter notes that the technology plan identified by the Defense Technology Study and the policy approach derived from the Future Security Strategy Studies will "serve as general guides" for the program.

JANUARY 23, 1984

President Reagan's first report to Congress on "Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements" finds that:

- The large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the ABM Treaty of 1972; and
- This and other ABM-related activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

These findings are reaffirmed in subsequent reports sent by the President to Congress in 1985, 1986 and 1987.

FEBRUARY 1984

The first SDI budget and program are submitted to Congress.

MARCH 1984

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger briefs NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Defense Ministers on the SDI at the Nuclear Planning Group Ministerial Meeting in Cesme, Turkey.

MARCH 1984

The Department of Defense booklet, "Defense Against Ballistic Missiles," makes clear that the "essential objective" of SDI is to "diminish the risk of nuclear destruction and to provide for a safer, less menacing way of preventing nuclear war in the decades to come."

APRIL 15, 1984

Lt. General James A. Abrahamson becomes the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO).

JUNE 10, 1984

The Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) successfully intercepts and destroys a mock ballistic missile warhead in the mid-course phase of its flight. This non-nuclear intercept is the first such experiment demonstrating the homing guidance system and the potential of kinetic energy weapons to destroy ballistic missiles and their warheads simply by colliding with them at great speeds.

HOE, managed by the U.S. Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command, represents a decade of research and development, data processing and optical technology. This experiment lays the foundation for the Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem, a technology being researched under the SDI program.

DECEMBER 22, 1984

President Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher agree on the following four points at their Camp David meeting:

- First, the U.S. and Western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet developments;
- Second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations;
- Third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine, deterrence; and
- Fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

1985

JANUARY 1985

A White House publication, "The President's Strategic Defense Initiative," explains the meaning and objectives of the SDI program:

- The SDI is a program of intensive research into advanced defensive technologies, with the aim of

accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty's obligations as long as the U.S. can meet the program's objectives.

NOVEMBER 1, 1985

The U.S. tables a new proposal at the D & S talks. The major points are:

- The U.S. is committed to the SDI program as permitted by, and in compliance with, the 1972 ABM Treaty.
- The U.S. seeks a Soviet commitment now to jointly explore how a cooperative transition could be accomplished should new defensive technologies prove possible.
- The U.S. proposes that the U.S.S.R. join in an "open laboratories" arrangement under which both sides would provide information on each other's strategic defense research programs and provide facilities for visiting associated research organizations and laboratories.

DECEMBER 1985

The Eastport Study Group, formed "to devise an appropriate computational/communications response to the (strategic defense battle management) problem and make recommendations for a research and technology development program to implement the response," issues its report to Gen. Abrahamson.

The report concludes that "computing resources and battle management software for strategic defense systems are within the capabilities of the hardware and software technologies that could be developed within the next several years." The report describes battle management and command, control and communications as the "paramount strategic defense problem" to be resolved. The report's conclusions agree with SDIO's assessments of the issues confronting the technology development program. SDIO formulates plans to implement the study group's recommendations.

DECEMBER 6, 1985

The U.S. and the United Kingdom sign a Memorandum of Understanding on British participation in SDI research. This is the first agreement with an ally on SDI participation, following Secretary Weinberger's invitation of March 18, 1985.

1986

JANUARY 15, 1986

Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev announces a proposal which envisages the elimination of nuclear weapons over a 15-year period. The plan restates several Soviet proposals, including the elimination of offensive nuclear weapons contingent on banning research, development and testing of space-based missile defense systems. This is a continuation of Soviet efforts to kill or cripple SDI.

FEBRUARY 26, 1986

In an address to the nation, President Reagan says that "We're pushing forward our highly promising Strategic Defense Initiative—a security shield that may one day protect us and our allies from nuclear attack, whether launched by deliberate calculation, freak accident or the isolated impulse of a madman. Isn't it better to use our talents and technology to build systems that destroy missiles, not people?"

MARCH 27, 1986

The U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany sign a Memorandum of Understanding on the terms of West German participation in SDI research.

APRIL-JUNE 1986

A series of Flexible Lightweight Agile Guided Experiments (FLAGE) are conducted. These kinetic energy experiments demonstrate the guidance technologies necessary to intercept a warhead both in and beyond the Earth's atmosphere.

MAY 6, 1986

The governments of the United States and Israel sign a Memorandum of Understanding on the terms of Israeli participation in SDI research.

JULY 1986

SDI's first Particle Beam Experiment irradiates a miniature reentry vehicle with a high-intensity proton beam. The results indicate that the explosive contained in the reentry vehicle is highly vulnerable to the particle beam.

JULY 25, 1986

In a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan proposes that the sides agree not to deploy advanced strategic defenses for a period through 1991. Thereafter, if either side wished to deploy such

defenses, it would present a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and eliminating ballistic missiles. The plan would be subject to negotiation for two years. If, at the end of two years, the sides were unable to reach agreement, either side would be free to deploy defenses after giving six months' notice.

AUGUST 1986

"The Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative," is published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

It explains the methods of the Soviet anti-SDI campaign: to flood the West with statements from high Soviet officials, with interviews with Soviet spokesmen on Western broadcast media, and with newspaper articles, press releases, pamphlets, and petitions from front organizations and state-controlled Soviet scientific groups.

It also explains the goals of this campaign: to "stimulate opposition to SDI in the U.S. and other allied countries, inhibiting Western research and development into defenses—even as the Soviet Union forges ahead with its own ABM programs, including research and development in advanced ballistic missile defense technologies."

AUGUST 6, 1986

In remarks at a Washington briefing on SDI, President Reagan says "SDI is no bargaining chip, it is the path to a safe and more secure future...it's the number of offensive missiles that needs to be reduced, not efforts to find a way to defend mankind against these deadly weapons."

SEPTEMBER 5, 1986

The Delta 180 experiment obtains data for characterizing rocket plumes during the boost phase; studies rocket signatures during the close-in phase of a space intercept; and validates guidance laws using actual accelerating vehicles in space. The mission's results provide data critical to the development of small space-based interceptors.

The experiment utilizes an SDI satellite carrying a radar tracker and a rocket modified to carry advanced infrared sensors, the first laser radar ever flown in space, a Maverick air-to-ground missile infrared imaging system and two cameras. The target is intercepted at a closing speed of 6,500 miles per hour.

SEPTEMBER 19, 1986

The U.S. and Italy sign a Memorandum of Understanding on the terms of Italian participation in SDI research.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1986

Speaking to the U.N. General Assembly, President Reagan says that if the U.S. and U.S.S.R. can agree on radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons, the U.S. is prepared to sign an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on research, development, testing and deployment of strategic defenses based on the following:

- Both sides "would agree to confine themselves, through 1991, to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible."
- "If, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles."
- "If the two sides can't agree after two years of negotiation, either side would be free to deploy an advanced strategic defensive system, after giving six months' notice to the other."

OCTOBER 11-12, 1986

At a meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev come close to an agreement for significant reductions of offensive ballistic missiles. However, Soviet efforts to cripple SDI prevent agreement.

In response to the Soviet proposal that the U.S. provide a 10-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the U.S. offers to accept such a commitment for the 10-year period through 1996, during which research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, would continue. U.S. acceptance is contingent upon:

- A 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive forces of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. by 1991;
- Elimination by 1996 of all U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles; and
- Agreement that either side could deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1996, unless the sides agreed otherwise.

The Soviets, however, seek in effect to amend the ABM Treaty by banning testing of space-based "elements" of a missile defense system outside of laboratories. This would have killed the U.S. SDI program—something President Reagan could not accept.

NOVEMBER 5-6, 1986

At meetings between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Vienna, the U.S.S.R. proposes special talks to negotiate what would be permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty.

NOVEMBER 7, 1986

The U.S.S.R. tables a proposal at the Geneva NST talks which would commit both sides not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years.

1987

JANUARY 15, 1987

The U.S. begins Round VII of the NST talks in Geneva with its proposals on D & S already on the table:

- Mutual commitment, through 1996, not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying advanced strategic defenses; and during that period to observe all ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.
- Mutual commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty through 1996 contingent upon 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms by the end of 1991 and the total elimination of all remaining U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996.
- Acknowledgment that either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1996 if it so chooses, unless the parties agreed otherwise.
- The right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for reasons of supreme national interests or material breach would not be forfeited by the above commitment.
- All of the above elements to be incorporated in a new treaty. Alternatively, the U.S. proposal set out in President Reagan's July letter to General Secretary Gorbachev remains on the negotiating table.

APRIL 15, 1987

During meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow, Secretary Shultz makes a new U.S. D & S proposal, incorporating the following elements:

- Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
- This commitment would be contingent on implementation of agreed START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) reductions, i.e., 50-percent cuts to equal levels of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery

vehicles and 6,000 warheads, with appropriate sublimits.

- The agreement would not alter the sovereign rights of the parties under customary international law to withdraw in the event of material breach of the agreement or jeopardy to their supreme interest.
- After 1994, either side could deploy defensive systems of its choosing, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

To build mutual confidence by further enhancing predictability in the area of strategic defense, and in response to stated Soviet concerns, the U.S. also proposes that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. annually exchange data on their planned strategic defense activities.

In addition, the U.S. seeks reciprocal U.S. and Soviet briefings on their respective strategic defense efforts and visits to associated research facilities, as proposed in the U.S. Open Laboratories Initiative. The U.S. also proposes establishing mutually agreed procedures for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.

MAY 21, 1987

A FLAGE follow-on test is conducted at the White Sands Missile Range. The successful intercept demonstrates guidance technologies and accuracy required for the interception and destruction of a tactical ballistic missile within the atmosphere. The 12-foot FLAGE vehicle uses its millimeter-wave radar to lock onto the target, a U.S. Army Lance short-range missile. The onboard computer fires some 216 rocket motors, the size of a shotgun shell, in a collar behind the radar to move the speeding vehicle in the correct direction. The intercept takes place at an altitude of 12,000 feet.

JULY 21, 1987

The U.S. and Japan sign a Memorandum of Understanding on the terms of Japanese participation in SDI research.

JULY 29, 1987

The Soviets propose at Geneva a draft D & S agreement limiting ABM research and development to laboratories on Earth and permitting some non-ABM research in space. The Soviets still seek to impose additional constraints on U.S. SDI far beyond those contained in the ABM Treaty and still tie reductions of strategic offensive nuclear weapons to U.S. acceptance of measures designed to cripple SDI.

SEPTEMBER 1987

In the Geneva D & S talks, the Soviets amend their July proposal, thus acknowledging the right of the sides to conduct ABM research in space.

SEPTEMBER 15-18, 1987

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze fail to narrow their differences on D & S issues during their meetings in Washington.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1987

Secretary Weinberger approves the recommendation of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) that selected SDI concepts and technologies enter the Demonstration and Validation phase of the defense acquisition process. The recommendation is based on a thorough review by the DAB of the SDI program's technical progress throughout the summer and a determination that several SDI technologies were sufficiently advanced to enter the next phase of research and development—the Demonstration and Validation phase. This is the first SDI milestone review and is a normal step in the Department of Defense acquisition process.

OCTOBER 22-23, 1987

Discussions between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow produce no narrowing of differences on D & S issues.

NOVEMBER 30, 1987

In the first public admission by the Soviets that they are engaged in research similar to the SDI program, General Secretary Gorbachev says during a televised interview:

“Practically, the Soviet Union is doing all that the U.S. is doing, and I guess we are engaged in research, basic research, which relates to those aspects which are covered by SDI in the U.S.”

DECEMBER 7-10, 1987

At the Washington Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agree to instruct their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit both nations to:

Observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time for the purpose of deploying advanced defenses.

The leaders agree that:

- Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period. After the specified period, in the

event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its own course of action.

- Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the ABM Treaty and other similar legally binding agreements.
- The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

1988

JANUARY 15, 1988

The U.S.S.R. presents a draft START treaty protocol pertaining to D & S issues. This draft is not consistent with the Washington Summit Joint Statement. The Soviets continue to maintain a position on the ABM Treaty that is clearly more restrictive than that agreed to in 1972. Provisions of the Soviet draft protocol include:

- Agreement would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, of those ABM systems which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for the duration of this protocol (10 years).
- Negotiations with the aim of reaching an accord on further strengthening of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the term of the protocol. The parties will discuss the problem of ABM defenses taking into account the new situation resulting from reductions in strategic offensive arms.
- In the event the sides have not agreed otherwise as a result of these negotiations, after the protocol expires each side shall determine for itself its further actions with respect to the ABM Treaty and the START treaty, subject to compliance with the relevant procedures of these treaties.
- Entry into force simultaneous with the START treaty for duration of 10 years. START treaty ceases to be in force if either party violates the ABM Treaty or protocol regarding that Treaty.
- Exchange of information to clarify ambiguous situations; exchange of data regarding certain devices which are scheduled to be put into space; and inspections of certain sites and facilities which give rise to concerns regarding compliance with the ABM Treaty.

JANUARY 22, 1988

The U.S. presents a draft D & S treaty, which is consistent with the Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the Washington Summit. Provisions of the draft treaty include:

- Agreement would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time.
- Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action.
- Entry into force contingent upon entry into force of START treaty; D & S treaty would be of unlimited duration with "specified period" of nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty to be negotiated; continued observance of the ABM Treaty through that period and until either party chooses a different course of action. After the "specified period," either party is free to choose to deploy strategic missile defenses that are prohibited by the ABM Treaty upon giving the other party six months' written notice of its intention to do so.
- The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.
- The U.S. proposes that confidence-building measures to provide predictability for each side regarding the strategic defense programs of the other be included as an integral part of the D & S treaty in the form of a protocol.
- U.S.-proposed predictability measures include an annual exchange of data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on respective strategic defense efforts, visits to associated research facilities, and establishment of procedures for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.

FEBRUARY 8, 1988

In the successful Delta 181 Experiment, a Delta rocket is launched from Cape Canaveral with a payload of sensors and test objects. The sensor module deploys 14 test objects and, using an assortment of active and passive sensing instruments, characterizes the objects in a variety of space environments. Sensors also observe the launching of a research rocket from the Pacific Missile Range. The data gathered from this complex, unmanned orbital space mission will aid in the design of sensors for a strategic defense system.

MARCH 14, 1988

Addressing a Washington conference on the first five years of SDI, President Reagan discusses progress made in the program and the U.S. concept of moving in phases toward SDI's ultimate goal of truly comprehensive defenses. He says that the U.S. will "continue to research SDI, to develop and test it. And, as it becomes ready, we will deploy it."

MARCH 17, 1988

At the D & S talks in Geneva, the U.S. proposes a protocol to enhance predictability in the development and testing of strategic defense technologies.

MARCH 23, 1988

The U.S. celebrates the fifth anniversary of President Reagan's landmark speech on SDI.

The official groundbreaking for the construction of SDI's National Test Facility (NTF) is held. The NTF will serve as the coordinating point and hub for the various geographically remote facilities that will be linked electronically. Those experiment and simulation facilities together constitute the National Test Bed (NTB). The NTB program will provide the capability to compare, evaluate and test the alternative architectures proposed for a layered defense and its associated battle management and command, control and communications. The NTB will represent the major simulation activity for the SDI program and will provide as much realism as possible within the constraints of international agreements.

**UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY
APRIL 1988**

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Collections

This is not a presidential record. This marker is used as an administrative marker by the Ronald W. Reagan Presidential Library Staff. This marker identifies that there was an object in this folder that could not be scanned due to its size.
