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ENGLISH

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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages		Restrictions
32927 LETTER	PM MULRONEY TO REAGAN	3	2/12/1985	B1
32931 MEMO	COBB TO JOHN M POINDEXTER PAR 3/1/2013 F1559/1	1	2/21/1985	B1
32932 E-MAIL	POINDEXTER TO COBB PAR 3/1/2013 F1559/1	1	2/20/1985	B1
32933 MEMO	WILLIAM MILLAN THROUGH CARROLL BROWN TO JAMES MEDAS R 3/1/2013 F1559/1	3	2/20/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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ENGLISH

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Document Type ID**Document Description** No of Doc Date Restric-

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32927 LETTER

2/12/1985

B1

PM MULRONEY TO REAGAN

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRESS LINE

o The Prime Minister and the President have had an exchange of views as part of their regular consultations on the subject of international security and arms control.

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The Prime Minister underlined the importance to Canada of the Geneva negotiations.

He expressed his support for the basic objectives of those talks as agreed between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

He underlined the importance of continuing, close and regular consultations within the Alliance on the subject of the Geneva negotiations.

He emphasized that Canada and the United States, as North American countries, share a distinct perspective on the specific dangers posed to North America by strategic nuclear weapons.

To enhance arrangements for consultations with the United States on security and arms control issues, he invited key figures in the Administration associated with the Geneva talks to visit Canada before the commencement of negotiations to descuss the preparations for them. The U.S. Government has accepted this invitation. Senior arms control advisor Ambassador Paul Nitze (and others?) is scheduled to visit Ottawa on March 6 for meetings with the Prime Milister, the SSEA, and others.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

February 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

TYRUS W. COBBTWE

SUBJECT:

Letter from Ambassador Gotlieb on Canadian

Acid Rain Program

Allan has written informing you of the announcement of a major Canadian program to reduce acid depositions. He notes that Mulroney views this as a major step in getting Canada's house in order before any more pressures are put on the U.S. to move on acid rain controls.

The details of Mulroney's program are being incorporated into the NSSD process. I do not believe there is any need for you to review the Canadian program outlined in Gotlieb's letter, nor to reply to Allan.

Attachment

Tab A - Letter from Gotlieb

1114



Canadian Embassy

Ambassade du Canada

1746 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-1985

February 7, 1985

7 Dass

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to President for National Security Affairs, The White House, Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud,

Following on Fred Doucet's comments to you 31 January about the importance the Prime Minister places on the acid rain issue, I would like to draw your attention to another major decision in the development of the Canadian acid rain control program.

In Canada there has been a sentiment that because more than half of the acid deposition results from emissions in the U.S., there was limited practical purpose served in further major unilateral reductions on Canada's part. However, this sentiment has now given way to agreement at the political level to move decisively ahead.

This past Tuesday in Montreal, the Environment Ministers of the Federal Government and the seven eastern provinces agreed on a formula for major SO2 reductions to be achieved by 1994, which ascribes to each province the reductions it must undertake. The Ministers have noted that compatible emissions reductions in the U.S. will be required if the Canadian program is to achieve its objective.

The Prime Minister has expressed determination that Canada will be seen to have its own house in order before expecting the U.S. to move further on acid rain controls. I believe the Montreal decision is a very significant step in that direction.

Details of this latest development are contained in the attached announcement.

Yours sincerely,

Allan Gotlieb, Ambassador

Recognizing the overall goal is to achieve a deposition level not greater than 20 kilograms per hectare per year and an eastern Canadian emission level of 2.3 million tonnes (50% of 1980 Base Case), the federal and provincial Ministers are committed to pursuing further reductions in sufficient time to achieve this overall goal by 1994.

Ministers have undertaken to review progress on an annual basis.

With reference to the smelting industry,
Ministers agree that primary responsibility for financing
abatement measures rests with the industry. Should
government assistance be deemed necessary, the federal
government will assume the lead role in arranging the
necessary financial support and negotiating agreements, in
conjunction with provincial governments, required for
modernization, technology development and the installation
of abatement equipment in order to meet the emission
objectives established by the provinces. The governments
concerned agree to undertake the necessary measures to
conclude the agreements as soon as possible.

The provincial Ministers agree to use their authorities to achieve these emission levels which include those already announced by Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick to take effect by 1990. Organized labour and affected communities will be consulted. In consultation with the provincial Ministers, the federal Minister agrees to use federal authorites in a complementary manner in matters under federal jurisdiction.

Federal/Provincial Commitment to SO₂ Emission Reductions

The federal Minister of Environment and the Minister of Environment of Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland are committed, using least cost options, to achieving a wet sulphate deposition of no more than 20 kilograms per hectare per year to protect the environment in moderately sensitive areas in eastern Canada by reducing total sulphur dioxide emissions east of the Saskatchewan/Manitoba border and by securing compatible emission reductions in the United States as soon as possible.

The federal and provincial governments agree to support financially the abatement efforts needed to meet the emission reductions incorporated in the following emission objectives in accordance with the needs identified by the parties.

Consequently, the provincial Environment Ministers agree to the following reductions in SO2 emissions to and achieving the 1994 objectives:

Province	1980 Base Case	Reductions	Emission Objectives
	(tonnes)	(tonnes)	(tonnes)
Manitoba	738,000	188,000	550,000
Ontario	2,194,000	,164,000 1	,030,000
Quebec	1,085,000	485,000	600,000
New			
Brunwick	215,000	20,000	185,000
Prince Edward			
Island	6,000	1,000	5,000
Nova Scotia	219,000	15,000	204,000
-Newfoundland	59,000	14,000	45,000
TOTAL	4,516,000	,897,000 2	,619,000

Saskatchewan Environment Minister, Neal Hardy, Alberta Environment Minister, Fred Bradley and Ben Marr, on behalf of B.C. Environment Minister, Tony Brummet, today in Montreal, Quebec, on the occasion of the Federal-Provincial Ministers' meeting on the Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants (LRTAP) confirm their support for the overall goal to achieve a wet sulphate deposition level of not greater than 20 kilograms per hectare per year in moderately sensitive areas. As well, they support the Eastern Canadian emission reduction levels to 2.3 million tonnes by 1994.

The Western provinces do not experience the same high wet sulphate deposition problem as their Eastern counterparts. However, the Western provinces have agreed to take cooperative action on a strategy for acid deposition. This allows these provinces to undertake preventive measures based on the monitoring and research presently being carried out.

One of these cooperative activities, with the federal government, is to establish deposition target loadings for Western Canadian conditions.

The Western provinces are committed to continue in their efforts to maintain high air quality throughout Western Canada and prevent the potential for problems arising from acid rain in the future.

Montreal 05/02/85

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

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OTTAWA 1236

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UNCLAS SECTION 81 OF 84 OTTAWA 81236

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: MARR, MNUC, PGOV, PREL, CA, US

SUBJECT: GOC RESPONSE TO NEW YORK TIMES STORIES ON CONTINGENCY NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS

REF: A) STATE 44150; B) OTTAWA 1147; C) STATE 47083

- 1. SUMMARY: THE CANADIAN PRESS HAS PICKED UP
 FEB. 13 AND 14 NEW YORK TIMES STORIES ON CONTINGENCY
 NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS, AND THE ISSUE DOMINATED TODAY'S
 QUESTION PERIOD DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.
 RESPONDING TO OPPOSITION QUERIES, SECRETARY OF STATE
 FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS JOE CLARK DENIED THAT THE U.S.
 HAS INSISTED THAT CANADA ACCEPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
 EMPHASIZED THAT THE FINAL DECISION ON ANY DEPLOYMENT
 OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON CANADIAN SOIL RESTED WITH THE
 GOC; AND REASSERTED THE GOC'S INTENTION TO "HONOR
 OUR OBLIGATIONS TO NATO, TO NORAD AND TO OUR ALLIES".
 FOND SIMMARY.
- 2. ARTICLES BY LESLIE GELB APPEARING IN THE FEB. 13
 AND 14 NEW YORK TIMES (REFS A AND C), HAVE BEEN PICKED
 UP BY THE CAMADIAN PRESS. TODAY'S TORONTO STAR, FOR
 EXAMPLE, REPORTED THAT THE DEPARTMENT "FIRED OFF A
 TELEGRAM TO OTTAWA TELLING CAMADA IT HAS AN OBLIGATION
 TO ACCEPT STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER A 28
 YEAR OLD AGREEMENT". EMBASSY HAS ISSUED A PRESS
 RELEASE CHARACTERIZING REPORTS THAT THE U.S. IS
 PRESSURING CAMADA TO ACCEPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS
 "COMPLETELY FALSE".
- 3. GELB'S ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING CONTINGENCY NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS DOMINATED TODAY'S QUESTION PERIOD DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. RESPONDING TO QUERIES FROM LIBERAL MP LLOYD AXWORTHY, WHO FREQUENTLY SPEAKS FOR HIS PARTY ON DEFENSE ISSUES, NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SOCIALIST) LEADER ED BROADBENT, AND MOP MP JIM FULTON, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CLARK EMPHASIZED THAT THE USG HAS NOT INSISTED THAT CANADA

ACCEPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THAT THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO US CONTINGENCY PLANS INVOLVING THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HERE. CLARK EXPLICITLY CITED THE 1957 PARIS DECISION BY NATO HEADS OF STATE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR STOCKS AS HIS AUTHORITY FOR ASSERTING THAT THE GOC RETAINS THE RIGHT TO REFUSE THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON CANADIAN SOIL EVEN IN TIMES OF CRISIS. BUT HE REFUSED TO STATE THAT CANADA WOULD REJECT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, AS HE WAS REPEATEDLY PRESSED TO DO BY BROADBENT.

- 4. CLARK DEFTLY COUNTERED OPPOSITION CHARGES THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS NOT DEFENDING CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY BY ARGUING THAT THE GOC "WILL PROTECT AND ASSERT CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY" BY MODERNIZING THE NORTH WARNING SYSTEM, PART OF THE "DETERRENT SYSTEM" WHICH HAS PREVENTED NUCLEAR WAR. HE VIGOROUSLY REBUTTED FULTON'S CALL FOR CANADA TO FOLLOW NEW ZEALAND'S EXAMPLE AND REFUSE PORT CALLS TO U.S. "NUCLEAR WARSHIPS" BY RECALLING THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVES' TRIUMPHANT ELECTION CAMPAIGN, DURING WHICH "WE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT WE INTEND TO... HONOR OUR OBLIGATIONS TO NATO, TO NORAD AND TO OUR ALLIES. WE INTEND TO KEEP OUR WORD ON THIS AS ON OTHER POINTS."
- S. RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE CLARK-AXWORTHY, CLARK-BROADBENT, AND CLARK-FULTON EXCHANGES FOLLOW:
- (A) AXWORTHY:
- WE NOW HAVE A REPORT THAT THE UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT HAS SENT A COMMUNIQUE TO THIS GOVERNMENT INSISTING THAT CANADA MUST ACCEPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS NOT ONLY CONTRADICTS THE MINISTER'S OWN STATEMENTS, BUT IS A CLEAR CASE OF NUCLEAR COLONIALISM. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT IN FACT IS IN THAT TELEGRAM, WHEN DID THE MINISTER RECEIVE IT, AND, FINALLY, WILL THE HINISTER TODAY ISSUE A STATEMENT TOTALLY REJECTING THE AMERICAN REQUEST AND SAY IT IS OUTRAGEOUS THAT THEY SHOULD SUGGEST ANYTHING TO AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY?
- CLARK:
- HIS (AXWORTHY'S) FACTS ARE COMPLETELY WRONG. THERE WAS NO SUCH REQUEST BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S. TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA...THERE WAS, SO FAR AS I KNOW, NO SUGGESTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO ANYONE THAT CANADA SHOULD ACCEPT NUCLEAR ARMS. THERE WAS, SO FAR AS I KNOW, AN INSTRUCTION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR AMBASSADOR HERE BT

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ÖTTAWA 1236

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PNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 OTTAVA 01236

E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: MARR, MNUC, PGOV, PREL, CA, US SUBJECT: GOC RESPONSE TO NEW YORK TIMES STORIES ON

IN OTTAWA TO BE IN TOUCH WITH US (TO EXPRESS) CONCERN ABOUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE U.S. HAS TREATY ARRANGEMENTS WERE GOING TO HONOR THOSE ARRANGEMENTS. THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS ON CANADIAN SOIL DID NOT ARISE BECAUSE THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS ON CANADIAN SOIL IS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR. WE DO NOT ALLOW NUCLEAR ARMS TO BE STATIONED ON CANADIAN SOIL. IN THE EVENT OF ANY CONTINGENCY PLAN THAT MIGHT CALL FOR THE STATIONING OF NUCLEAR ARMS HERE. THIS GOVERNMENT RETAINS ITS RIGHT TO REFUSE NUCLEAR ARMS, AND THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXERCISE OUR OPTION TO REFUSE NUCLEAR ARMS ON CANADIAN SOIL IF WE BELIEVED THAT TO BE IN THE INTEREST OF CANADA.

AXWORTHY:

WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT COMMUNICATION WAS ISSUED BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THIS COUNTRY. IS IT NOT TIME THAT THIS COUNTRY TOOK THE INITIATIVE AND · ASKED FOR A FULL MEETING OF NATO MINISTERS TO DISCUSS HOW AND IN WHICH WAY ALL THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH ARE ALLIES OF THE U.S. WOULD PARTICIPATE IN BOTH THE PLANNING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEPLOYMENT STRATEGY, SO THAT WE WOULD BE INSURED THAT WE HAD THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY TO MAKE THAT DECISION, AND NOT HAVE IT IMPOSED UPON US, AS THE REPORT NOW SAYS IT WAS?

CLARK:

WE ARE LOOKING AT WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN EXPAND THE PARAMETERS OF THE DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY, SO THAT THERE MIGHT BE A GREATER OPPORTUNITY FOR COUNTRIES THAT ARE INVOLVED TO HAVE MORE LEAD TIME IN MAKING DECISIONS. I REPEAT THE POINT THAT THIS COUNTRY UNDER THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD RETAIN THE RIGHT TO REFUSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON CANADIAN SOIL. LET ME COME TO CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY.
THIS GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY DEFENDS CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY. THAT IS WHY... THIS GOVERNMENT WANTS TO PROCEED WITH

THE NORTH WARNING SYSTEM, WHICH WILL PROTECT AND MEMBER IN HIS QUESTIONS...INDIGATES THAT HE WANTS TO LEAVE OPEN GAPS IN THE RADAR WARNING SYSTEM, GAPS WHICH THREATEN CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THREATEN CANADIAN SECURITY

(B) BROADBENT:

THERE IS A REPORT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES TODAY THAT SAYS THAT THERE IS INDEED AN AGREEMENT THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S., THAT WOULD PERMIT THE LOCATING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONRY IN CANADA UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES...IS THERE SUCH AN AGREEMENT? .. DOES IT CONTAIN IN THAT AGREEMENT THE VETO RIGHT OF CANADA, THAT IS THE RIGHT TO SAY NO? AND THIRD. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK HIM, SINCE THE RIGHT TO SAY NO WOULD ALSO ENTAIL THE RIGHT TO SAY YES, WILL THE MINISTER USE THIS OCCASION TO CONVEY TO THE U.S. THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD WE PERMIT THE LOCATING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONRY ON CANADIAN SOIL?

CI ARK.

THERE IS NO SUCH AGREEMENT. THERE IS A NATO DECISION FROM THE SUMMIT MEETING OF NATO IN PARIS IN DECEMBER, 1957, WHEN IT WAS DECIDED THAT NATO SHOULD ESTABLISH STOCKS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIANCE IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AGREED AT THAT TIME. AND I QUOTE. "DEPLOYMENT OF THESE STOCKS AND MISSILES AND ARRANGING FOR THEIR USE WILL ACCORDINGLY BE DECIDED IN CONFORMITY WITH NATO DEFENSE PLANS, AND IN AGREEMENT WITH THE STATES DIRECTLY CONCERNED. " THAT IS THE AUTHORITY ON WHICH I HAVE BEEN ANSWERING QUESTIONS. THAT IS THE

AUTHORITY ON WHICH I HAVE SAID, AND REPEAT CATEGORICALLY NOW, THAT THIS COUNTRY RETAINS THE RIGHT TO REFUSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON CANADIAN SOIL IN ANY EMERGENCY.

- BROADBENT:

SINCE THE RIGHT TO SAY NO ALSO LOGICALLY ENTAILS THE POSSIBILITY OF SAYING YES...WILL THE MINISTER NOW MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE PEOPLE OF CANADA, AND SOON TO THE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

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OTTAWA 1236

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UNCLAS SECTION Ø3 OF Ø4 OTTAWA Ø1236

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: MARR, MNUC, PGOV, PREL, CA, US
SUBJECT: GOC RESPONSE TO NEW YORK TIMES STORIES ON

U.S., THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL WE ACCEPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA?

- CLARK:

THERE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS IN THE HOUSE FOR SOME TIME ABOUT SO-CALLED CONTINGENCY PLANS IN THE U.S. THERE ARE NO SUCH PLANS NOW. IN THE EVENT THAT CONTINGENCY PLANS WERE DEVELOPED, THE CONTINGENCY OF WHICH THEY WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT WOULD BE A CIRCUMSTANCE OF ATTACK, AND IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE CANADA HAS THE RIGHT TO SAY YES OR NO TO NUCLEAR ARMS. I AM NOT IN A POSITION AT THIS TIME TO BE ABLE TO SAY HOW WE WOULD RESPOND, NOT KNOWING THE CONDITIONS OF ATTACK THAT MIGHT PREVAIL. THIS GOVERNMENT RETAINS, AND, SO LONG AS I AM HERE, THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD EXERCISE THE RIGHT, TO SAY NO TO NUCLEAR ARMS EVEN IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF WE BELIEVED THAT TO BE IN THE CANADIAN INTEREST. AND IT WOULD BE CANADIANS, NOT ANYONE ELSE, WHO WOULD MAKE THAT DECISION.

- BROADBENT:

- WE SHOULD NEVER ACCEPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BECAUSE
 THE USE OF THEM UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD MEAN
 MUTUAL SUICIDE INVOLVING THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET
 UNION. IF THAT SHOULD HAPPEN, SO FAR AS IT'S POSSIBLE,
 WE DON'T WANT TO BE ANY PART OF THAT PROCESS. AND
 THEREFORE WILL HE (CLARK) NOW SAY, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE
 WILL WE HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA?
- CLARK:
- I AGREE THAT NUCLEAR CONFLICT WOULD BE FOLLY FOR THE WORLD...I THINK WE ALL HOPE THAT THAT FOLLY WOULD NEVER ARISE. INDEED, ONE OF THE REASONS THAT THIS GOVERNMENT IS PURSUING AS VIGOROUSLY AS WE ARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NORTH WARNING SYSTEM, THE MODERNIZATION OF OUR RADAR SYSTEM, IS THAT THAT IS THE PART OF THE DETERRENT SYSTEM WHICH FOR SO LONG

HAS PREVENTED THAT FOLLY FROM OCCURRING. WHAT THE HONORABLE MEMBER IS ASKING ME TO DO IS TO PREDICT HOW WE WOULD ACT IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK, WHICH ALL OF US HOPE DOES NOT OCCUR. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE THAT ANSWER BEFORE THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WE HOPE NEVER ARRIVE, DO ARRIVE.

- (C) FULTON:

RIGHT NOW, TODAY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN COME INTO THE HARBORS OF VANCOUVER AND HALIFAX AND INTO OTHER PORTS IN CANADA (ON U.S. SHIPS)...IS IT THE MINISTER'S VIEW THAT IT IS ACCEPTABLE TODAY FOR THE U.S. TO CONTINUE TO BRING LIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE HEART OF CANADA'S MAJOR CITIES OF HALIFAX AND VANCOUVER?

- CLARK:

- THERE HAS BEEN A LONGSTANDING ARRANGEMENT
 HAVING TO DO WITH THE NECESSITY TO VISIT PORTS OF
 SUBMARINES CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE
 SUBMARINES ARE GLVEN, OCCASIONALLY, THE OPPORTUNITY
 TO DOCK AT CANADIAN PORTS. THAT POLICY HAS NOT
 CHANGED.
- FULTON:
- IN TERMS OF THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE,
 IS THE MINISTER PREPARED NOW TO SHOW THE SAME KIND
 OF BACKBONE THAT NEW ZEALAND HAS SHOWN AND SAY NO
 TO THE U.S., NO MORE NUCLEAR WARSHIPS AND NUCLEAR
 WEAPONS IN OUR MAJOR PORTS IN CANADA?
- CLARK:
- I DON'T WANT TO COMMENT PARTICULARLY ON THE NEW ZEALAND SITUATION, EXCEPT THAT THERE IS A DEGREE IN WHICH THEIR SITUATION IS PARALLEL TO OUR OWN.
 IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN NEW ZEALAND, A PARTICULAR POSITION WAS TAKEN BY THE NOW GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO CARRY OUT. IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF SEPTEMBER 4, IN WHICH THE PEOPLE OF CANADA GAVE AN OVERWHELMING JUDGMENT, THIS PARTY MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT WE INTENDED TO STAND UP TO

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PAGE Ø1 OTTAWA 1236

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UNCLAS SECTION Ø4 OF Ø4 OTTAWA Ø1236

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: MARR, MNUC, PGOV, PREL, CA, US

SUBJECT: GOC RESPONSE TO NEW YORK TIMES STORIES ON

AND HONOR OUR OBLIGATIONS TO NATO, TO NORAD, AND TO OUR ALLIES. WE INTEND TO KEEP OUR WORD ON THIS AS ON OTHER POINTS.

ROBINSON

BT

2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Proprietary to the United Press International 1985

February 18, 1985, Monday, BC cycle

SECTION: Regional News

DISTRIBUTION: Washington

LENGTH: 293 words

DATELINE: SEATTLE

KEYWORD: Fugitive

BODY:

Two Snohomish County men are being held in a Victoria, B.C., jail after allegedly kidnapping a federal fugitive and returning him to Seattle.

Douglas Donald Fraser, 49, and James Ray Chapman, 54, are accused of forcing the man into a float plane, then taking him to federal authorities in Seattle.

Chapman, of Everett, and Fraser, whose hometown was not known, are scheduled to appear in Provincial Court Tuesday on kidnapping charges.

The fugitive, Donald Ralph Walters, 38, was wanted for violating the Bank Secrecy Act for allegedly failing to declare about \$90,000 when he passed through U.S. Customs in Blaine about two months ago, according to Mike Fleming, a Customs spokesman in Los Angeles.

Walters, who lives near Victoria, was reportedly kidnapped about 9 a.m. Saturday at Taylor Beach, 15 miles southwest of Victoria. While the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has refused to discuss the case, it did say Walters was ''forcibly placed'' on a plane that went to Seattle.

The King County Jail confirmed Walters was booked into jail Saturday afternoon on federal charges related to currency violations.

Fleming said Walters also was wanted on fugitive charges because he disappeared after his arrest in Blaine. He said the two men arrested for kidnapping Walters apparently were bail bondsmen and ''were upset about losing their bail money.''

Fleming said the men probably decided to kidnap Walters because they had no legal way to retrieve him. Canada and the U.S. have no extradition treaty regarding currency violations.

While American authorities put Walters in jail, they would not have participated in the method used to return him to the U.S., Fleming said.

''We don't condone or subsidize this kind of activity at all,'' he added.

LEXIS NEXIS LEXIS NEXIS

MEMORANDUM

(05)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1985

SYSTEM II 90162

File Consider

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO:

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

Director of Presidential Appointments

and Scheduling

FROM:

ROBERT M. KIMMITT BL

REQUEST:

NSC meeting to discuss final preparations

for the President's trip to Quebec, Canada on

March 17-18, 1985.

PURPOSE:

This session will be the final briefing prior to

the trip.

PREVIOUS

An NSC meeting was held on February 19 on

PARTICIPATION: the status of our policy review on U.S.-

Canadian relations.

DATE AND TIME:

March 15, 1985 -- 11:00 a.m.

DURATION: 60 minutes

LOCATION:

Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS:

The President, The Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Baker,

Robert C. McFarlane.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS:

Fifteen minute briefing for the President on the

status of final preparations for the Quebec meeting, followed by a 45-minute discussion of

any remaining issues to be resolved.

REMARKS REQUIRED:

None

MEDIA COVERAGE:

Photo Opportunity

PROPOSED "PHOTO"

The President and Members of the Cabinet sitting

at the table.

RECOMMENDED BY:

Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY:

None

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONF	DENTIAL

ACTION

February 14, 1985

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT:

Meeting with the NSC to Discuss the Status of Final Preparations for the President's Trip to Quebec, Canada on March 17-18, 1985

This schedule proposal requests an NSC meeting on March 14 or 15, 1985, to discuss the President's trip to Quebec, Canada on March 17-18, 1985. The meeting will provide a 15-minute briefing for the President on the status of final trip preparations, followed by 45-minutes for discussion of unresolved issues.

Appropriate briefing materials will be provided in advance of the meeting.

Jack Matlock, Bill Martin, Roger Rbinson and Doug Minn concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Disapprove ____

as amended

Attachment

Tab I

Schedule Proposal

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997

NARA, Date 1 25 0 7

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify: OADR

Cotatok

1ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Proprietary to the United Press International 1985

February 19, 1985, Tuesday, BC cycle

SECTION: Regional News

DISTRIBUTION: Washington

LENGTH: 560 words

DATELINE: SEATTLE

KEYWORD: Bounty

BODY:

A Canadian fugitive allegedly kidnapped by Washington state bounty hunters was allowed to return to Canada Tuesday after federal officials decided pursuing the case did not merit jeopardizing relations between the two countries.

In a statement released Tuesday in Seattle, U.S. Attorney Gene Anderson said Donald Ralph Walters, 38, of Victoria, B.C., was given a one-day grace period to return to Canada.

''We do not, in this instance, wish to profit from these private actions or to encourage these cross-border forays in the future.'' Anderson said.

The decision to release Walters was recommended by the U.S. Justice Department, he said, adding the case was not worth threatening "the across-the-board cooperation from the Canadian government that we enjoy....'

Walters was charged with failing to appear in federal court last month after he was arrested for failing to declare more than \$90,000 while crossing the border into the U.S. at Blaine, Wash., two months ago.

Walters, who defaulted on a \$40,000 bond posted by Associated Bonding Services when he did not appear as required Jan. 16, was reportedly abducted in Victoria Saturday by two men hired by the bonding service, according to Canadian and U.S. authorities.

Walters was taken into custody by U.S. marshals at the bonding company Saturday. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, meanwhile, arrested his two accused kidnappers, who stayed behind in Canada when the float plane they rented to bring Walters back became overcrowded.

The two men, Douglas Donald Fraser, 49, of Marysville, and James Ray Chapman, 54, of Everett, appeared in Provincial Court in Victoria Tuesday and a bail hearing was set for Wednesday, said Crown Counsel Don Laughton of the Canadian Attorney General's Office.

Fraser and Chapman now are in custody of the RCMP at the Colwood jail near Victoria, he said.

Asked what would happen to the two men, Laughton said, ''My present instructions are to oppose their release under any circumstances.''



Proprietary to the United Press International, February 19, 1985

Attorney General Brian Smith indicated during a press conference in Victoria Monday that Canadians are angry about the incident, noting Walters is a Canadian citizen and developer of the World Fitness Center in Victoria.

Smith said he believes that two other people -- the pilot of the plane and Stan Cook, head of Associated Bonding -- should be extradited to Canada as part of the plot.

''If it is possible to extradite, that's precisely what we'll do,'' Smith said.

He added his office plans to crack down on this case to show that businesses like Associated Bonding cannot cross the border ''scooping up Canadian citizens and returning them to American jurisdictions.''

Phone calls to Cook in Seattle Tuesday were not returned.

U.S. Marshal Eugene Corr said the bail-jumping charge was not an extraditable offense.

According to Dennis Behrend, a deputy in the U.S. Marshal's Office, Fraser and Chapman rented a float plane from Lake Union Air Service to make the trip to Canada Saturday morning.

After they arrived, the bounty hunters ''lured the suspect out of his house on a ruse. Then they jumped him, handcuffed him and tied him up,'' Behrend said.

Corr said he believes the Canadian authorities are justifiably angry about the way Walters was returned to the U.S., adding his office does not condone nor did it participate in Walter's transfer.

LEXIS NEXIS LEXIS NEXIS

TO

POINDEXTER

FROM COBB

DOCDATE 21 FEB 85

RECEIVED 21 FEB 85 19

DECLASSIFIED White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

KEYWORDS: CANADA

NICARAGUA

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

SUBJECT CANADIAN AID TO NICARAGUA

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 23 FEB 85 STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

E.O. 12958 As Amended Sec. 1.4 a

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

February 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

TYRUS W. COBB TWC

SUBJECT:

Canadian Aid to Nicaragua

Canada

had increased its economic assistance to Nicaragua from \$6M last year to \$13.5M in 1984. You expressed concern over this report -- however, in looking into it further, it turns out to be a manifestation of a decision made by Trudeau, one that PM Mulroney felt would be politically risky to challenge.

The Trudeau Government announced in January 1984 a \$13.5 M letter of credit to Nicaragua for aid projects; most are through nongovernmental entities. Canadian aid to Nicaragua for the next several years will draw upon this money, and year to year expenditures will vary. The largest new program, announced in November 1984, is a humanitarian aid project (worth about \$7.5 million) for safe drinking water. This money also will be expended over several years.

While unwilling to break outright with the Trudeau-era policy towards Nicaragua, particularly on a humanitarian project like this, the new Mulroney Government has clearly adopted a more balanced and pro-U.S. position. They resumed official aid to 1 Salvador in December 1984, and have improved relations with Guatemala. They declined to sand observers to the Nicaraguan election, and they have rejected pressure from some domestic groups to open an embassy in Nicaragua.

Ray Burghardt CC:

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

MSG FROM: NSJMP To: Ty Cobb --CPUA

TO: Ty Cobb

+02/20/85 10:59:12

FOIA(b) (1)

-- SECRET --

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Canadian Financing to Nicaragua

E. O. 12958 A. Amended Sec. 1.4a

I note that in 1984 Canada provided \$13m in financing to Nicaragua. That is up from \$6m in 1983. We need to work that in to Canada trip. It would be good if we could get them to reduce that.

copy to: Ray Burghardt, David Wigg

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

EY RW NAME 3/1/3

EPA BACKGROUNDER ON ACID RAIN FEBRUARY 21, 1985

"Acid Rain" is the popular name given to a complexed set of pollution problems, which should be more accurately titled acid deposition. Acid deposition occurs when sulfur dioxide (SO_2) — emitted primarily by coal fueled electric utilities — and nitrogen oxides (NO_X) — emitted primarily by motor vehicles and electric utilities — are chemically transformed and transported in the atmosphere and deposited back on the earth either as dry deposition or in the form of rain, snow or fog.

In the past, acid deposition has been most clearly associated with damage to water ecosystems and damage to materials and structures.

More recently it has been speculated that acid deposition may be causing serious damage to forests.

Aquatic damage appears to occur in those areas which have both elevated levels of deposition to a low acid assimilating capacity. This means that most of the country should be unaffected by acid deposition but some areas can be significantly impacted. Additionally, due to the complex nature of soil chemistry, some watersheds may go for some years or even decades with no outward signs of damage only to rapidly shift to an acidified state. At our current level of data and understanding of knowledge, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of current damage or to estimate future damage.

Scientific knowledge about the effects of acid deposition on forests is more limited than that known about aquatic effects. However, concern about potential negative effects of acid deposition and related pollutants

on forests has been hightened because of observed changes in central European and high altitude U.S. forests.

In West Germany, researchers have observed serious problems in many of their forests. In the United States, dieback (death) and decline of red spruce has occurred in several high elevation forests both in New England and the southern appalachian mountains. Although there is this clear evidence of forest damage and decline, the extent to which acid rain or its precursors are significant causative agents remains unclear. In determining the cause or causes of the damage, full consideration must be given to natural environmental stresses such as drought, pests, inter-species competition and past forestry and land use practices. However, there are several plausible hypotheses that attribute this forest damage to exposure to acid deposition and its related precursors.

To reduce acid deposition requires a reduction of emission from sources of SO_2 and/or NO_X . Unfortunately, our current state of scientific understanding of the many environmental processes involved does not allow us to prescribe with precision how much, of which pollutant, over what time frame, must be reduced in order to adequately protect the environment. It is clear that any major reduction of emissions would be expensive (billions of dollars) and carry with it resistance by those adversely effected by the change.

Because sulfur emissions are thought to be most directly related to aquatic damage, particular public attention has been directed to reducing SO₂ from power plants. Moderate reduction could be accomplished at these facilities by substituting low sulfur content coal in place of the currently used high sulfur coal. For larger reductions in emissions

(like the 50% reduction currently proposed in Congressional legislation) greater reliance would have to be placed on flue gas desulfurization (scrubber) technology. Scrubbing can be much more expensive than fuel switching but does not carry with it the severe impact on the high sulfur coal industry that large scale fuel switching would entail.

The Administration conducted a thorough review of both the extent of the acid deposition problem and the options to address it. From the review emerged the current Administration policy.

This Administration has publically recognized that acid rain is a serious environmental problem both here in the United States and in Canada. However, we have chosen to postpone a decision on what action, if any, is appropriate. In so doing, we have not decided that acid rain controls are unnecessary or that they are too expensive. Rather we have chosen to wait, because we feel it is premature and unwise to make a decision limited by our current understanding. Additional scientific information is needed before we are in a position to make a prudent choice regarding the best course of action to be taken. Our past and current efforts under the Clean Air Act have resulted in a 40 percent reduction of sulfur emissions over projected levels in the absence of these efforts. We intend to continue this kind of performance. The Administration has stated both publically and before Congress that "when the fundamental scientific uncertainties have been reduced, this Administration will craft and support an appropriate set of measures to solve the acid rain problem."



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 20, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

TO:

EUR - James Medas

THROUGH:

EUR/CAN - Carroll Brown,

FROM:

EUR/CAN - William Milian

SUBJECT:

Acid Rain/ The Policy Crux

It might be useful at this moment to recapitulate just where and why we and the Canadians differ regarding acid rain policy:

- -- Canada's Clean Air Act was modelled on ours. They, like ourselves, show large (over 25%) reductions in SO₂ emissions over the last decade. Their scientists are competent, and they talk freely to ours. Yet they come out at a different point on how to deal with acid rain.
- -- Their official policy is to push for a 50% reduction in allowable emissions by 1994, from a 1980 base. If matched by the US, this reduction would (they believe) cut the "load" of sulphur deposition to a tolerable one in sensitive regions.
- They recognize there are many scientific uncertainties about acid rain, but they argue that perfect knowledge is not attainable and the risks of inaction are great. They point out that major studies of the issue, including the NAS study and the OSTP Peer Review, ended by supporting some type of additional cleanup effort.
- The USG, by contrast, recognizes the problem but refuses to be rushed into emergency measures. We are spending substantial sums on research, and meanwhile our existing law (plus the decline of "smokestack" industry) is continuing to reduce our emissions levels. (As the economy recovers, the trend on emissions may turn back up).
- -- Why the difference in our national policies?

NIRR 61559 # 3293
NARA DATE 3/1

CONFIDENTIAL DECL: OADR

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- -- Where scientific evidence is less than perfect, marginal decisions are usually driven by legitimate factors of economic and political interest. In Canada, such factors promote additional action against acid rain. In the US, they do not.
- -- Canada has enormous areas that are geologically vulnerable to acid rain. These areas are the economic
 and political heart of the nation (Ontario and
 Quebec). Timber and tourism, two of Canada's largest
 industries, are both at risk. Large numbers of
 Canadians have personal experience of acidified
 lakes. An acid rain cleanup to reverse the damage,
 or at least prevent it from getting worse, has broad
 popular and non-partisan support. There is no
 regional split: the main producers of acid rain are
 also the provinces that suffer most damage.
- In the US, vulnerable regions are much smaller in area and population. Timber and tourism are less important and depend less on the vulnerable regions. There is a regional split: states that produce heavy emissions (like Ohio) are not geologically vulnerable to acid rain. Those that suffer the damage (upstate New York, Vermont, Maine, etc.), are not heavy polluters.
- -- An additional difference is the nature of the pollution emittors. About one-half of total Canadian SO2 comes from just five or six very large sources, all of them non-ferrous smelters. Power plants are not a major element. In the US emissions are split more widely, with coal-fired power plants the major cause. Many utilities are in bad financial shape. If forced to pay cleanup costs, some might go bankrupt. If the utilities cannot pay, who does? General revenues?
- -- The US and Canadian split on this issue is basic, not a function of poor communications or ignorance of each others views. Yet, longer term, it may be surprisingly manageable. In particular:
- -- As both nations increasingly switch to "knowledgeintensive" industries, emissions may continue to decline without any further policy action.

CONFIDENTIAL

- -- Existing US law, via the "tall stacks" case and other measures, may ultimately demand some additional cleanup measures.
- -- Current research efforts may (by 1987) provide evidence that will convince one Government or the other to modify its position.
- Our task is to avoid a needless blow-up in the meantime.

WWM/ej/jrs No. 5356A

POUR PARTY PARTY, REPORT

THE - CHARGE COMMENTS ON ACTO BAIN

The United States 7864 "Candd "Togother - singelly seeks approximately 25,000,000 tons of sulfur dioxide and a comparable amount of mitrogen as orides. These oxides can be converted by atmospheric chemical processes into sulfuric and nitric acids (H2SO4 and HNO3, respectively). endestinate due: finge-lineagh: to-singrapes approachebly- the socidity-of instural rainfall. ## Mainbia anoth of eastern North America is considerably more acid than expected from natural processes alone. The Clean Air Act of villes marked the formal rusegainien by the United States government of the importance of reducing emissions of sulfur and mitrogen oxides to the atmosphere. New power plants constructed since 1970 do control such emissions to lower levels. Such controls were a prudent first step, but have not accomplished all that was initially intended. We recommend that additional steps should be taken now which will result in meaningful reductions in the emissions of sulfur and nitrogen compounds into the atmosphere, beginning with those steps which are most cost-effective in reducing total deposition. Emission reductions are meaningful when they produce a detectable decrease in both acidic deposition and degradation of the biosphere.

An incomplete data base and sometimes contradictory interpretation of these data prevent the kinds of certainty which scientists would prefer.

There are, however, many indicators which, taken collectively, lead us to conclude that acid deposition is a problem for which solutions should be sought. These indicators are as follows:

(1) In eastern North America, emissions of SO_2 and NO_X from human activities appear to be at least ten times larger than emissions from natural processes.

- (2) A substantial fraction of such emissions returns as sulfate and nitrate (NO₃⁻) in rainfall; a comparable amount returns as "dry" deposition through surface-interaction processes which are more difficult to monitor than "wet" deposition.
- (3) In eastern North America the areas receiving the most-acid rain are found within and close to the major source regions.
- (4) Acidity (sulfate and nitrate) in wet deposition is substantially greater in eastern North America than in areas without industrial activity.
- (5) Acid precipitation contributes to the greater-than-natural hydrogen-ion levels in some lakes and streams in eastern North America.
- (6) Although some kinds of lakes have been acide throughout their known history, others in areas subjected to acide deposition have become appreciably more acid during the past few decades.
- (7) These changes in lake acidity have been accompanied by major changes in the biological activity within them, often including the disappearance of various aquatic biota, most visibly fish.
- (8) The largest of such aquatic effects have occurred in "sensitive" regions, in which acidity is not "buffered" by the presence of alkaline minerals.
- (9) Large areas of eastern North America have been identified whose geologic composition is characterized by the absence of any important buffering capacity.
- (10) Forest damage has been increasing in eastern North America during the past few decades; acid deposition may be a contributor.

The overall scientific understanding of the various aspects of acidic precipitation is incomplete at the present time, and will continue to

have major uncertainties well into the future. Some of these gaps in our knowledge are permanent because the necessary measurements were not made ten, twenty, or fifty years ago; the potential future utility of such information was not yet recognized. Other gaps exist because the needed scientific techniques have not yet been perfected or have not been adapted to the scale required for measurements covering much of the entire Western Hemisphere. Some of the important information will require at least ten or twenty years of additional data collection to take full cognizance of atmospheric variability and atmospheric cycles. Biological systems are extremely complex and variable. Response and recovery of many of these systems to external stress will require long-term (decades) detailed study for full evaluation. For these reasons, any current scientifically derived recommendations must be based on an imperfect, but always increasing, body of pertinent data whose quality and completeness can be expected to improve for decades. Recommendations based on imperfect data run the risk of being in error; recommendations for inaction pending collection of all the desirable data entail the even greater risk of ecological damage.

The chemical processing of SO_2 and NO_x into acids in the atmosphere potentially involves a very large number of chemical reactions, whose relative importances change drastically with time and location, often in response to varying meteorological conditions. Sulfur and nitrogen can be removed from the atmosphere in various chemical forms, and by both dry processes at the surface and wet processes in rainfall. Measurements of SO_4^{-2} and NO_3^- in rainfall are now widespread, but do not have a long historical base. Measurements of dry deposition are so scattered (and of questionable validity) that quantitative assessment is essentially not possible even now.

Modeling of atmospheric emissions, transport and deposition has been confined almost entirely to the sulfur cycle, leaving nitrogen and other pollutants to the future. The existing models do not agree with one another, and cannot be verified by good field data because such data are scarce. The models do not even reproduce well the observations on gaseous SO₂ that are available. Models cannot be relied on to estimate how much material emitted at one place will be deposited in another, or how much SO₂ will be converted to H₂SO₄ before deposition.

There exists now me ecceptable meshed for determining source-receptor relationships on a scale much smaller than "eastern North America". With a very large effort in laboratory atmospheric chemistry, field measurements, and atmospheric modeling, it might be possible within ten years (but certainly more than five years) to produce a verified source-receptor model for eastern North America. We have great hope that methodology based on natural tracers in fossil fuels may bypass some of these difficulties and perhaps reduce the time needed to elucidate this complex of problems. Even if a verified model is developed in the future, the source-receptor relationship may be found to be sufficiently complex and variable that emission controls would still need to be assigned over large areas rather than locally.

Reducing present SO₂ emissions would reduce deposition of total sulfur, and, consequently, both reduce the probability of major degradation of additional acid-sensitive lakes or forests and allow anthropogenically acidified areas to begin to return to their original biological condition.

The effects of acid deposition on biological systems in North America range from certain to speculative. There is no question that fresh water bodies in sensitive areas have been altered. At high concentrations, acidity can release, or "mobilize", aluminum from solid minerals; this may lead to toxic effects on biota in both lakes and forest soils. While there is strong evidence for damage to limestone monuments, bridges, buildings, and other structures from SO₂ and other corrosive gases, there is no good estimate of the economic magnitude of these effects or of the contribution from acid deposition. The effects of air pollutants and acid deposition on agriculture may be important but quantitative evidence is scanty.

Lakes and streams may require years or decades to recover from anthropogenic acidification once the acidic inputs are removed, with the recovery time depending on local geochemical factors, flushing rates, rates of species colonization, extent of alteration of trace-element composition, and other factors. In contrast, recovery times for stressed terrestrial ecosystems are decades to centuries. At its simplest level, this difference in recovery times arises because the major photosynthetic organisms in aquatic environments are relatively short-lived compared to trees. There are, however, many other complex differences between the two types of systems.

We are especially concerned about real and potential changes in the chemistry and biology of soils in nonagricultural areas (i.e., unmanaged soils). Because soils need hundreds to thousands of years to develop, they will recover very slowly from anthropogenically induced changes unless artificial amendments such as lime are used.

Soil microorganisms may be particularly sensitive to changes in acidity; this fundamental part of the biological cycle is responsible for cycling nitrogen, carbon, phosphorus and other essential nutrients through the food web. For example, the entire biosphere depends on proper functioning of denitrifying microbes. Although evidence that increased acidity is perturbing populations of microorganisms is scanty, the prospect of such an occurrence is grave. Biogeochemical changes in soils appear to be particularly long-term. It may take years or even decades of accumulation of acidity and other toxic airborne pollutants before consequences can be observed. It may take at least that long for the soils to revert to their original condition. It is this aspect which gives us the greatest concern.

Acid deposition belongs to a socially very important class of problems that appear to be precisely soluble by a straightforward sum of existing technological and legislative fixes. This is deceptive. Rather, this class of problems is not permanently solved in a closed fashion, but is treated progressively. As knowledge and understanding steadily increase, actions are taken which appear most effective and economical at each stage.

Actions to reduce acid deposition will have to be taken despite incomplete knowledge. We have earlier estimated how long it may take to understand "wet" atmospheric chemistry or the biological response to acidity. Reasonably accurate models incorporating relevant meteorology, chemistry, mineralogy and biology will take even longer. Yet, if we wait until scientific knowledge is definitive, recovery times may have increased to decades or a century or more (for mature forests and soils).

We feel that the proper initial approach is to begin immediately with the most economically effective steps for reducing acid deposition.

Control costs appear to range widely, especially for sulfur removal; some steps can be much more cost-effective than others. Some of the most economically efficient means for lessening sulfur emissions in eastern North America and other sensitive areas are intensifying coal washing and placing initial controls on nonferrous smelters; switching to fuel of lower sulfur content during summer (when most sulfuric acid is deposited) might lessen the overall deposition in distant regions without necessarily changing annual emissions. Other control technologies are often more expensive, but research is steadily decreasing their cost.

MEMORANDUM



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



ACTION

February 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT:

Possible Meeting with Fred Doucet

Allan Gotlieb has called to inform us that Fred Doucet will be back in town on February 28 to continue discussions on the Quebec visit. You and Mike Deaver had a very productive meeting with him recently; but he feels that it is necessary to have further talks on the substance of the visit with you. I specifically asked Allan if he felt this meeting was "imperative" or "desirable," and he responded "very desirable."

Fred will be meeting with Deaver at 4:30 p.m. for about 30-minutes. Given your tight schedule, I do not feel that it is necessary for you to meet with Doucet this time around. As an alternative, you may want to consider dropping by the Deaver-Doucet session.

prohibits your meeting with Fred on February 28.

RECOMMENDATION

1.

		•
	Approve	Disapprove
2.		pass the above message to Allan, but to join the session with Fred and Mike
	Approve	Disapprove

That I inform Allan that your hectic schedule unfortunately

Jack Matlock concurs.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

CARROLL

February 21, 1985

Dear Mr. Berman:

This is in further reply to your letter of January 25, 1985. On behalf of President Reagan, I would like to thank you for sending your views on arms control.

As you mention in your letter, a nuclear war would be a disastrous event for all mankind. The United States Government is committed to reducing the possibility of such an event from ever happening.

We will soon resume negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control. Our goal in these negotiations is for a verifiable and meaningful agreement that significantly reduces the numbers of weapons on both sides and contributes to real security in the world.

The President is appreciative of your warm comments on his reelection. We value highly the close relationship between Canada and the United States, and the President looks forward to his visit with Prime Minister Mulroney and the Canadian people in March.

Sincerely.

Jack F. Matlock

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mr. Anthony Berman Apartment 405 33 Cote-Saint Catherine Road Montreal, Quebec H2V 2A1

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Ottawa

January 28, 1985

Dr. Tyrus W. Cobb
Deputy Director for Western Europe
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Dr. Cobb,

Ambassador Robinson has requested that I send you the enclosed letter, addressed to President Reagan, from Mr. Anthony Berman, a 19-year-old Montreal College Student.

The obvious sincerity of this young man's concern and his high regard for the President attracted the Ambassador's attention and he has already sent the attached interim reply. The White House may wish to send an additional response to Derman's letter.

Sincerely,

Mario Ruggia Staff Aide

Enclosure

MR: bb

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OTTAWA, CANADA

January 28, 1985

Mr. Anthony Berman Apartment 405 33 Cote-St. Catherine Road Montreal, Quebec H2V 2A1

Dear Mr. Berman:

Your letter, addressed to President Ronald Reagan, arrived this morning, and I will be forwarding it to the White House for a reply. You will be hearing from them in due course.

The concern you express over the risk of nuclear war is shared by Canadians and Americans alike. It is one of the most important issues of our time, and the President has pledged every possible effort toward the goal of eradicating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

Accomplishing this will not be easy, and visible results should not be expected overnight, but the government of the United States is fully committed to negotiations with the Soviet Union, and will stay with the process as long as it takes to achieve meaningful arms reduction and control.

I appreciate your comments on the occasion of the President's inauguration. Like most Americans, I share your enthusiasm as he enters his second presidential term, and am confident that the "New Beginning" we saw four years ago will become a period of unparalleled movement toward peace, human freedom, and economic prosperity... "A New American Emancipation" which will be shared by all North Americans.

Sincerely,

Paul H. Robinson, Jr. Ambassador

National Security Council The White House

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Dear: Mr. President

My name is Anthony Berman, I am a 19 year old student attending an English college in Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

During the beginning of this year, the most widely news report was "Nuclear War" and the meeting between your Secretary of State, Mr. Schultz and Soviet Concellor, Mr. Gromeyko about the issues of Finding a "peaceful Adultion" and avoiding any possible Nuclear War. Although there was some progress.

Although there was some progress.

Accomplished. Like many millions of

asians, Europians, etc ... I Feel petrified

people, whether they are americans,

of the Future. The devastation and destruction that I feel no living thing or object will survive if there was such a war! I've also read Mr. President that my country Canada would be the hardest hit since we are in the midd of the United States and Russia in the event of war!

I've visited Vermont twice and I have enjoyed my visit to the U.S. very much! I -would not want to see any beautiful country like Canada or United States being destroyed. If any people survived a nuclear war, all that they would have to look at is books of pictures to see its one time beauty of their country in the pass

I know Mr. President you are well aware of the Facts and I would hope that you continue your progress, whether the Russians are strict or not, I hop are agreement will be reached in the near Future!

By the way, I was pleased that you were elected for a second term in office and I congratulate you! When I heard your statement on T.V. "YOU AIN'T SEEN NOTHIN YET"! I had a feeling of pride, not only For the american people, the U.S. econo but for Canadians and for World Wide Relations which eventually will lead to somekind of an agreement with the Soviet Union!

after studying Us and World History, I would honestly like to say to you Mr. Reagan that I Feel you are one of the best Presidents in the United States history. I would rank you among Presidents Abe Lincoln Theodore Roosevelt and John F. Kenned Lincoln for his attitude of peace he preached, Roosevelt for his unity of the great world powers for an end to end all wars (world War II) and Kennedy For his equality to all mankind! F. real thrill For me Mr. Presidents is to meet you in person. To meet

you because you are a great Amercia

In conclusion, I thank-you Mr.

President very much for taking your
time in reading my letter of
importance for the worlds concern.

I find you the most important man
in this world to creating a future
and I feel confident that you can
succeed!

Sincerly

Anthony Berman

In order that this letter had

reached you, please reply if you can

Anthony Berman 33 Cote-St. Catherine Road. Apt. 40 Montreal, Quebec Canada; Hav-2A1

Thank-you again