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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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| ID   | Doc Type | Document Description  | No of Pages | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 6544 | PAPER    | RE: ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY  | 1           | ND        | B1           |
| 6545 | PAPER    | NORTHWEST PASSAGE INITIATIVE  | 2           | ND        | B1           |
| 6546 | PAPER    | RE: ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY  | 2           | ND        | B1           |
| 6547 | PAPER    | DRAFT AGREEMENT RE: ARCTIC WATERS<br><b>R 2/23/2012 F2000-093/1</b> | 5           | ND        | B1           |
| 6548 | PAPER    | CANADA: EAST-WEST VS. NORTH-SOUTH<br><b>R 2/23/2012 F2000-093/1</b> | 5           | 1/14/1985 | B1           |
| 6549 | CABLE    | #312211Z JAN 86   | 3           | 1/31/1986 | B1           |
| 6550 | REPORT   | RE: USSR, PAGES 3-4 ONLY<br><b>D 1/22/2008 NLRRF00-093</b>          | 2           | 2/14/1986 | B1           |
| 6551 | CABLE    | CABLE NUMBER ILLEGIBLE, RE: USSR<br><b>R 2/23/2012 F2000-093/1</b>  | 1           | 2/1/1986  | B1           |

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Ty

Here's the paper you requested.  
Attached to it is a draft of a proposed  
agreement. The draft was written by State's  
lawyers and has been seen by DOD and DOT. We  
do not consider it to be fully cleared however.

Penell

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6546 PAPER

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RE: ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY

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Agreement Between the United States  
and Canada Concerning Arctic Waters

The United States and Canada,

Recognizing a common and everlasting interest in, and,  
commitment to, the security of the North American continent  
from attack or aggression,

Sharing an abiding desire that the unique environment of  
the Arctic region be maintained,

Considering their interest in the orderly development of  
the natural resources of the Arctic, with appropriate  
environmental safeguards, and,

Accepting that there are special legal issues associated  
with ice-covered maritime areas in international law,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

This agreement applies to the marine waters subject to the  
national jurisdiction of the United States or Canada between  
the Bering Strait at (lat-long) and the Davis Strait at  
(lat-long).

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/28/

## Article 2

The United States and Canada agree that all their activities and those of their nationals conducted in marine waters within the agreement area subject to the jurisdiction of the other Party fall within the purview of this agreement.

## Article 3

The United States and Canada agree that activities in the agreement area, especially its ice-covered areas, pose special environmental problems and that to afford appropriate safeguards commercial vessels flying their flags shall observe existing national laws concerning the preservation and protection of the marine environment when such vessels are in waters within the agreement area subject to the jurisdiction of the other Party. The Parties agree to seek harmonization of their national laws concerning the preservation and protection of the marine environment within the agreement area. The Parties further agree to consult when changes in such existing laws are envisioned and to give special consideration to requests by the other Party for adjustments in regulatory or administrative practice.

Article 4

The United States and Canada agree that naval and air mobility for their vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity is essential to the national security of both countries, and that the freedom of navigation and overflight by such vessels and aircraft may be carried out throughout the agreement area, except as may be controlled by mutual agreement.

Article 5

The United States and Canada agree that it is in their common interest to promote coordinated and efficient icebreaker operations in the agreement area. The Parties agree to consult prior to all icebreaker operations by vessels entitled to sovereign immunity in marine areas subject to the jurisdiction of the other Party within the agreement area.

Article 6

The United States and Canada recognize and affirm their respective responsibility for environmental damage caused by sovereign vessels within the agreement area in areas subject to the jurisdiction of the other Party. Each Party recognizes its responsibility to deal with reasonable claims for damage in accordance with customary procedures for settling international claims.

Article 7

The United States and Canada agree to consult annually concerning the operation of this agreement. The Parties agree to supplement this agreement from time to time as may be required to address any matters in more specific terms. The Parties agree that matters not specifically dealt with in this agreement or supplemental agreements are to be dealt with in accordance with respective relevant national laws.

Article 8

The United States and Canada agree that this agreement is without prejudice to positions of international law maintained by either Party.

Article 9

The United States and Canada agree that this agreement is without prejudice to the position of either Party concerning the location of the maritime boundary in the agreement area.

Article 10

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Drafter: L/OES:DAColson:pds  
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- Canada  
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Canada: East-West vs North-South

Canada's peculiar geography heavily affects its politics. A Canadian Prime Minister once said that his country's most distinguishing feature was that it had "too much geography and too little history." It is the second largest country in the world. Its northern-most point lies well above the Arctic Circle, its southern-most on the same latitude as Northern California. St. John's, Newfoundland is closer to London than it is to Vancouver, British Columbia, five time zones to the West. But Canada's population, at 25 million, is only one-tenth that of the US. Moreover, 85% of its people live within 100 miles of the US border, leaving most of the rest of the country uninhabited.

Thus populated Canada might be thought of as a long thin ribbon running along the US border from the Atlantic to Pacific. But the ribbon is chopped up. The Rockies form a barrier between British Columbia and the prairie provinces. The inhospitable Canadian shield renders travel difficult between the prairies and the central provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The Appalachians run between Quebec and the maritime

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NLRRFD-093#6548

BY RW NARA DATE 2/23/12



provinces. Newfoundland is an island.

Canada is thus a country of regions, and of strong regional identities. The fostering of east-west ties between those regions, lest their ties southward to the US become too strong, has always been a central pre-occupation of the Canadian government. Canada as we know it today took form in the late nineteenth century under the leadership of its first Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, head of the Conservative Party. Largely as Sir John A.'s handiwork, Canada was outfitted with a federal government, the Canadian Pacific Railway, and a high tariff to build up an east-west economic system and to protect it from foreign, especially US, goods. During the twentieth century, Canadian governments followed Sir John A's example and created Canadian National Railways, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and Air Canada, all designed to foster east-west ties, and all government-owned. This nation-building has been complemented with a fairly active foreign policy partially designed to create some benign counter-weights to the US, such as ties with Europe and Japan.

But east-west strains persist in Canada. There are two primary sources. The first is Quebec, the country's largest and second most populous province. Over 80% of the Quebecois speak French as their mother tongue. Most cannot speak

English. The Quebecois have always considered themselves a people distinctly separate and different from other Canadians. Sentiment for Quebec independence has declined markedly in recent years, but the vast majority of Quebecois will continue to insist on a bilingual federal government, a strong Quebec government, and protection for the French language. The second source of strain is western alienation. Many Western Canadians feel that the federal government has favored in its policies the interests of the two populous and industrialized provinces of Ontario and Quebec.

The Canadian House of Commons is characterized by very tight party discipline. It is no great exaggeration to say that Members of Parliament simply vote as they are told by their party leaders. This can be wonderfully efficient. For example, there is little doubt that Parliament will approve, without change, any budget proposed by the government of a majority-ruling party. The drawback is that this tight discipline inhibits the free expression and resolution of regional grievances in Canada. As a result the provincial governments have grown powerful as regional spokesmen. Exacerbating this problem in the recent past have been the failures of the two major parties to establish strong electoral bases in all regions. The election of the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, with representation

from all regions, constitutes a real breakthrough.

Despite the historical, and continuing, emphasis on east-west nation-building, Canada's north-south ties with the US have intensified during this century, especially since World War II. Canadians are watching American TV, listening to American radio, reading American books, and going to American movies in greater numbers than ever. The economic interaction is massive. The US takes well over 70% of all Canadian exports, provides a roughly equal percentage of imports, and invests heavily in the Canadian economy.

The tariff barrier with the US, which since the days of Sir John A. Macdonald has been seen as an instrument of national prosperity, is being called into question by many Canadians. Canada is the only country in the industrial world without access to a "domestic" market of more than 100 million people.

Could Canadian firms compete in a free and open North American market? That question will figure heavily in the national debate now underway in Canada. But ultimately, the decision on free or freer trade may be taken more on political, cultural, or even emotional grounds. Politically, Canadians will be wondering if they can trust the US not to get cold feet

a few years after a North American free trade agreement has been struck. The impact on Canada's fragile cultural identity will also be pondered. Finally, Canadian political sentiments still run east-west, and may continue to form a strong emotional barrier against new north-south ties.

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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR-DAS MEDAS; S/S-O  
PLEASE PASS NSC FOR TYRUS COBB

E. O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: EAIR, CASC, CA  
SUBJECT: CRASH OF US AIRCRAFT AT GANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND  
REF: OTTAWA 9450

PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY TELEPHONED ME AT 10:00 AM THIS MORNING TO EXPRESS HIS DEEPEST CONDOLENCES WITH REGARD TO THE MANY AMERICAN PERSONNEL KILLED EARLIER IN THE MORNING IN THE CRASH OF A CHARTERED TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AT GANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE HAD DIRECTED MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION DON MAZANKOWSKI AND DEFENSE MINISTER ERIK NEILSEN TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ADDRESS THIS DISASTER AND TO OFFER EVERY COOPERATION TO US AUTHORITIES. HE ASKED THAT HIS CONDOLENCES AND OFFER OF ASSISTANCE BE PASSED TO THE PRESIDENT.

2. I EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND ASSURED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT WE WERE ALREADY RECEIVING THE FULL COOPERATION OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS.  
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BT

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Wash DC  
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## REGIONAL FOCUS

Defense &amp; Foreign Affairs

November 1985 Pg. 12

CANADA RETHINKS  
ITS DEFENSE POSTURE

*Canada is conducting its first Defence Study since a White Paper 14 years ago. The year-old Conservative Government seems committed to defining and strengthening the nation's defense, but several key questions of priority and strategic orientation remain. Managing Editor Michael Collins Dunn looks at the issues.*

Canada's last Defence White Paper was published in 1971. For 14 years, defense policy has remained based on that White Paper, a document issued by a Liberal Party Government. The year-old Conservative Government of Brian Mulroney has initiated a new Defence Review to chart out future policies in the much-changed world of the mid-1980s. Major issues will be decided in that study, the results of which are anticipated by the end of the year.

Canada has not, of course, been totally without defense policy. In the 14 years since the last White Paper, there have been a few internal reviews — a Defence Structure Review in the 1970s and a Defence Procurement Review in the 1980s — but no major reassessment of policy and direction. The Liberals under Pierre Trudeau annually sent a ministerial statement to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND).

The Mulroney Government is openly committed to strengthening Canadian defense, and the commitment to NATO has already been increased. But there are many major issues unresolved, almost all of them connected with the problem of defending a vast, but largely empty, land. Canada is the largest member

of NATO in area, but has a population of only 25-million; as a result its resources are stretched to the limit and even so are incapable of providing the kind of defense such a large territory requires. Yet add to this the fact that one of its three brigade groups is permanently deployed to Germany as part of the NATO commitment, and another pledged for Norway in wartime.

Added to this is the geographical location of Canada, whose vast Arctic faces the Soviet Union across the North Pole, and thus is the first line of defense for the North American Continent. North American defense is not solely Canada's responsibility, of course: its partnership with the US in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is of longstanding. The old Defense Early Warning (DEW) line is being replaced with a new, upgraded North Warning System (NWS), with greater Canadian participation than in the past.

But defense of the Arctic is a sensitive political issue in Canada, and nationalist calls for greater defense spending in the region mean that this area, too, must compete with NATO and home defense for the defense dollar.

Despite the Mulroney commitment to a stronger defense, there is still a question of just

how much there will be to go around. The Department of National Defence had an authorized personnel level of 82,700 personnel in 1984-85, and a budget of C\$8.8-billion, with C\$9.3-billion called for in the 1985-86 Defence Estimates. (At the time of writing, the Canadian dollar (C\$1.00) equalled US \$0.73. When not otherwise identified, Canadian budget figures hereafter are in Canadian dollars.) Given the size of Canada's population, this is a reasonable defense posture; given the size of the country and the number of commitments, it is clearly inadequate. Major re-equipment programs are well underway — most started under the Trudeau Administration in fact — but many more needs must be addressed in coming years.

So far, the Mulroney Government's commitment to a greater defense has been shown in an augmentation of the number of forces in Germany, an increased defense budget request, and plans to increase the number of military personnel on the Department of National Defence payroll while reducing the civilians.

In the realm of symbolism, another gesture has been made. The Canadian Forces are a unified service, with a Mobile Command, Maritime Command, and Air Command in place of the usual separate Army, Navy, and

Air Force. As a symbol of that unification, the different Commands had all worn the same uniform. Earlier this year the Government announced that new uniforms were being introduced, with dark blue uniforms (white in summer) for Maritime Command units, green (tan in summer) for Mobile Command and light blue for Air Command. Ranks and structure remain unified, but the new uniforms restore a sense of separate services even if the organizational structure is unchanged. Reports that the Mulroney Government might restore separate services, however, have proven unfounded.

The issues and challenges faced by Canada and presumably under consideration in the Defence Study fall into several major areas: sustaining the NATO commitment, defending the Arctic, the country's rôle in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), maintaining and upgrading equipment, and other issues such as reserve forces.

THE NATO  
COMMITMENT

ONE OF THE earliest commitments of the Mulroney Government was to maintain and improve Canada's commitment to NATO. Despite the problems of applying limited resources to



## DEFENSE...CONTINUED

defense needs at home, Canada has maintained a substantial commitment in Europe, basing a brigade and three aircraft squadrons in West Germany; the numbers are being raised by 1,200. In addition Canada has a commitment to provide additional forces in an emergency.

Canadian Forces Europe (CFE) is a geographical command made up of 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (4 CMBG), based at the Canadian Forces Base at Lahr, West Germany, and the 1 Canadian Air Group (1 CAG) consisting of three squadrons based at Baden-Soellingen, West Germany. Those squadrons are in the process of replacing their old CF-104 *Starfighters* with the new McDonnell Douglas CF-18s. In addition, Canadian Forces Europe provides support to Canadian Forces serving in the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights, and at United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) Headquarters in Jerusalem.

In addition to the mechanized

brigade group and three tactical air squadrons deployed to Germany, in NATO's Central Front, Canada also is committed to maintain a brigade group in Canada available for deployment to the NATO Northern Front in Norway in an emergency, as well as two tactical air squadrons based in Canada which would be available for deployment to Europe. Canada also has committed an Ace Mobile Force (Land) Battalion Group for possible deployment to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force.

The Canadian-based brigade, the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, would be deployed to Norway in wartime. In late 1984, Canada designated the 5 Canadian Brigade Group (5<sup>e</sup> Groupe-brigade du Canada, a French-speaking Brigade) based at Valcartier, Quebec, as part of the CAST Brigade along with 10 Tactical Air Group, an Air Command formation under Mobile Command operationally and providing helicopter support. Two rapid reaction fighter squadrons are also made available for Europe in an emergency.

In addition to the provision of these forces for the European theaters, Canada has designated 15 destroyers with 26 *Sea King* helicopters, its three *Oberon*-class submarines, and two long-range maritime patrol squadrons (14 aircraft) to Allied Command Atlantic.

The CAST Brigade has not previously been deployed to Europe; in the first test of the deployment capability, Operation *Brave Lion* is scheduled for next summer.

The Defence Study is expected to address several key issues concerning Canada's NATO commitment, given the considerable drain financially of maintaining the presence and increasing participation. Among the issues:

► Can Canada realistically maintain its present commitment without seriously harming its defense requirements at home and other strategic interests such as defense of the Canadian Arctic; if not,

► Should the brigade deployed to Europe be withdrawn, with resultant savings in housing costs for a large force, and the Air Group

augmented, or

► Should the Air Group be withdrawn and the brigade augmented?

► Is Canada overextended with its commitment to both the Central and Northern Fronts? In the event of war, Canadian Forces would be deployed in both West Germany and Norway, and if the Ace Mobile Force (Land) Battalion is deployed, it might well go to Denmark. Thus Canada must maintain two, or possibly three, separate communications and logistical lines open. Would consolidating on one front, perhaps the Northern, given Canada's over-snow capabilities, be a more efficient use of resources?

The NATO commitment, like other commitments undertaken by Canada, is partly military, partly political, partly symbolic. Precisely how the country's limited capabilities will be applied to its extended commitments will doubtless depend on a new look at where the available resources can be applied for the most effective military and strategic result.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

## DEFENSE...CONTINUED

### LOOKING NORTHWARD

DESPITE THE INCREASING commitment to NATO, there is a renewed emphasis in Canada on the northern frontier as well, and a key question in the Defense Study now underway is how these two commitments will be balanced.

The North, of course, is one reason for Canada's geopolitical importance: the vast region is not only the area across which a Soviet missile or air attack on the US might come, but is also potential patrolling ground for the Soviet Union's increased submarine presence. A vast region under ice most of the year, there is no dispute to Canada's claim to the islands of the Arctic; the issue is the waterways (usually icebound) between them.

Canada has long claimed sovereignty over all the northern waterways, not on a mid-channel basis but by defining all the islands in the Arctic as within Canadian sovereign territory. It thus claims that the Northwest Passage and the other key passages between the islands — ice-blocked year round in many cases but nevertheless potential submarine channels — are Canadian waters.

Now, Canada is actively reasserting its sovereignty in the "Great White North". One reason — though not necessarily the major one — is growing concern about Soviet submarine operations in the North and about the overall strategic and defense implications of the vast, uninhabited region. While Canada has traditionally maintained an active ASW capability, this has been limited to coastal patrols in warmer waters, not to the northern ice. Canada has no naval vessels that can operate in the Arctic; even its icebreakers are too low-powered to function there in winter. And Canada's three aging Oberon-class submarines cannot operate under the icepack.

Soviet submarine operations under the Arctic icepack are

nothing new, and the Canadian Department of National Defence says that there is no major change in the pattern, although concern is always there. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark has mentioned the submarine threat as one of the reasons for the newly assertive emphasis on the Arctic.

But another reason, and the one which directly sparked the political reaction recently, is nationalism provoked by the refusal of many nations — most notably the United States — to accept the Canadian claim to the Arctic waterways.

In August of this year, the United States sent a Coast Guard icebreaker, the *Polar Sea*, through the Northwest Passage without asking Canadian permission to do so. This was normal practice, since the US does not recognize Canadian sovereignty over what it considers an international waterway. The Northwest Passage is not about to be used by everyday shipping, but from time to time an icebreaker or other vessel is sent through to make the diplomatic point. The dispute really began in 1969 when the tanker *Manhattan* passed through the Passage. Some Canadians point out that the US position that it is an international waterway virtually invites Soviet submarines into the waters, since they clearly would have a right to passage through an international strait.

Prime Minister Mulroney initially played down the importance of the *Polar Sea* journey — Canada belatedly "approved" the passage, though the US had not asked for such approval — but Canadian nationalists of all stripes pressed for action and Opposition leader John Turner called the voyage "an affront to Canada".

When Parliament reconvened in September, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark was ready with a plan to defend Canada's claim to the northern waters, announcing a series of legal and navigational steps including claiming Canada's boundaries as the outer line drawn around the Northern islands, thus including

all the waterways. Civil and criminal laws will be enforced in offshore areas within these boundaries. He also announced plans to build the world's largest and most powerful icebreaker, the *Polar 8*.

Plans for the *Polar 8* have been on the drawing boards for years, but most estimates place the cost of the vessel at some half a billion Canadian dollars. It is not certain where the funding will be found, and some in the defense establishment appear to feel that they may have to tighten belts to build the icebreaker. Officially the project will be worked out in consultations between the Transport and Defence Ministries. It should take some five years to build.

The reason the *Polar 8* is needed is that Canada does not now have sufficient icebreaking capacity to patrol the waters which it claims. Canada's four existing icebreakers combined reportedly generate less power than the US icebreaker *Polar Sea*, which made the August transit. This limits them to only about three months per year, in summer, when they can patrol. The 100,000 horsepower *Polar 8* would give them the capability of operating in the Northwest Passage year-round.

Canada does maintain air patrols over the Arctic, but on a sporadic basis. The Air Command's 18 Lockheed CP-140 *Auroras* (a variant for Canada of the P-3 *Orion*) are mostly used for long-range maritime patrol along the coasts, and have been making 16 flights a year over the Arctic. As part of the new emphasis on the North, that number will be increased. (An *Aurora* carried out a patrol over the Northwest Passage during the *Polar Sea* visit.)

In addition, plans are underway for Canadian naval activities in the eastern Arctic next year.

Administratively, the North's defenses are handled by Canadian Forces Northern Region Headquarters, which has a Headquarters Detachment at Whitehorse in the Yukon and controls the 440 Transport and Rescue Squadron Detachment at

Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, the 742 Communication Squadron Detachments at Yellowknife and Whitehorse, Canadian Rangers and officers of the Cadet Instruction List. In addition, Canada has high-security communications stations at Inuvik in the Mackenzie Delta and Alert on northern Ellesmere Island, both responsible to Communications Command at southern headquarters but physically located in the North, and also personnel at the DEW line stations.


But this is not as large a presence as it sounds on paper. The total number of active duty personnel is only about 600, including the Headquarters Detachment. The Rangers — a volunteer force from isolated settlements — number another 620, and there are some 600 cadets. Given the expanse of the territory, it is a tiny presence.

Other efforts to reassert sovereignty have included stationing a team of scientists on a drifting ice island in the Arctic, a practice regularly used by the US and the USSR but not previously by Canada. The team maps the ocean floor and explores possible resources on Canada's Arctic continental shelf during the periods the island is floating (it freezes into the icepack in winter).

In addition, Canada is playing a greater rôle in the North Warning System (NWS) now being planned than it did in the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, which the much more modern but less pronounceable NWS is replacing. The DEW Line was virtually a US operation, with Canadian presence largely to assure that sovereignty was not infringed. But NWS will involve far greater Canadian participation; Canada is responsible for the on-site construction and running of the stations and the costs of the system are being split in a 60:40 ratio between the US and Canada. NWS will still be a NORAD operation, but the Canadians will have a much more visible part of it than they

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*Showing the colors: Canadian Forces' new uniforms, just introduced.*

## DEFENSE...CONT'D.

did in the DEW line.

But the Arctic is vast, and even before the new emphasis on this frontier, Canada faced serious problems in providing adequate defense to its huge continental area while maintaining its European commitment. Precisely how the new Arctic efforts can be carried through without a reduction in the NATO presence is one of the major subjects which the Defence Review must address.

### NORAD

ANOTHER IMPORTANT COMMITMENT by Canada is its partnership with the United States in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The new North Warning System has already been mentioned; it will include a mix of 13 minimally-attended long range AN/FPS-117 radars and 39

"gapfiller" unattended short range radars deployed across northern Alaska and Canada and along the Labrador coast. It is intended to complement the US Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar system to provide a defense against aircraft and cruise missiles. Canada, as mentioned, is designing and building the short-range radar stations, procuring the systems communications, and providing the total system integration. Canada will also provide crew members "when appropriate" to Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) coverage.

Increased Canadian participation is not merely cosmetic; although no one can deny that Canada is to a certain extent the junior partner in NORAD, the extent to which the DEW line was perceived as a purely US operation seems to have grated on the nerves of some Canadian nationalists.

In addition, under the same Memorandum of Understanding signed during Mulroney's visit to Washington earlier this year, Canada and the US recognized the need to establish and define "requirements for the connectivity and interoperability" of

the communications system, and to add advanced technology as a permanent agenda item of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, which links Canadian and US officials.

That discussion of advanced technology will not, however, include Canadian participation in the research for the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Mulroney announced in September that Canada had declined the US invitation to participate in this research. But Ottawa is clearly not opposed to the SDI, merely unwilling to devote its scarce resources to a major research and development project when there are so many other demands on its limited budget, and the country is so overcommitted. There was not opposition to the general idea of strategic defense, or at least to supporting the research phase of SDI.

### EQUIPMENT NEEDS

SEVERAL MAJOR PROGRAMS are now well underway in the re-equipping and strengthening of Canada's defense equipment inventory, but more requirements will be cropping up in future years.

Among those programs well underway, one that is well in train is the New Fighter Aircraft (NFA) program, acquiring the CF-18. The contract, signed in 1980, called for McDonnell Douglas to provide 138 fighters over a nine-year period. Conversion to the CF-18 is well advanced, and, as mentioned, the squadrons deployed to NATO are in the process of integrating the aircraft.

Other Air Command acquisition in recent years have been the acquisition of the *Auroras* already mentioned, as a long-range patrol aircraft, and a project to acquire six de Havilland of Canada *Dash 8* aircraft; four are for use as navigation trainers; they will replace four Lockheed CC-130 *Hercules* which will be freed up for transport duties. The other two *Dash 8s* will go to Canadian Forces Europe for a light transport mission. Air Command is also investing in a

new headquarters at Winnipeg. In addition, Canada has contributed to the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) system acquiring joint E-3A AWACS for NATO; Canada's contribution was third in size after the US and FRG.

Several of Canada's biggest investments are, not surprisingly for a two-ocean nation, in Maritime Command, the naval forces. One major one is the Canadian Patrol Frigate program, under which Saint John Shipbuilding and Drydock Ltd. is building six *City*-class frigates, three to be built on the West coast and three in the East, with the first ship to be completed in 1989 and the last in 1992. Other ongoing programs are the Destroyer Life Extension (DELEX) Project, extending the operational life of Canadian destroyers through refit, the *Tribal*-class Update and Modernization Project (TRUMP) under which an air defense capability and other modernization programs are to be carried out on the four DDH-280 *Tribal*-class destroyers.

Other Maritime Command projects include the Canadian Tactical Towed Array Sonar System, which is evaluating towed array sonar equipment for installation in the new frigates and in two destroyers, plus projects for better naval air defense, better electronic warfare and ship-board communications capabilities, and the like. A new Maritime Command headquarters is being built in Halifax.

One of the major projects for protection of ground forces is the Low Level Air Defence (LLAD) Project. The LLAD contract should be awarded next year; it is aimed at providing low level defenses for Canadian forces in Europe.

Other major capital expenses for ground forces have been the Military Operational and Support Trucks project, under which Canada is acquiring 1,900 new quarter-ton trucks and plans also to produce in Canada a replacement for its existing five-ton military pattern truck.

Canadian Forces have major requirements for over-snow

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## DEFENSE...CONTINUED

vehicles, both for home defense and for meeting its commitments in Norway. Last year Canada signed a contract with Hägglunds and Söner of Sweden for procurement of another 91 BV-206 All Terrain Carriers to be used by Canadian troops in Norway; these are being prepositioned in Norway and deliveries should be complete this year. Other recent projects have been the contract to Bombardier Inc., a Canadian firm, to build 1,900 *Itis Canadian* 4x4 vehicles as Jeep replacements.

Canada's Small Arms Replacement Project (SARP) selected the Colt M-16 A2 rifle, modified to suit Canadian requirements and redesignated the C7 rifle, as standard for Canadian Forces; a carbine version for tank and armored vehicle crews, designated the C8, is also being acquired. The Belgian *Minimi* light machinegun made by Fabrique Nationale Herstal was chosen as the new section support weapon. Rounding out the package, Canadian NATO standard 5.56mm ammunition is to be procured from IWI Inc. of Courcellette, Quebec. Under a separate project 978 FN MAG 58 machine guns are being bought from Fabrique Nationale; they are designated the C6 in Canada.

Future needs are also fairly clear. There is talk of an additional six Patrol Frigates, though that decision probably will not be made for some time. Canada's helicopters are aging and will be in need of upgrade or eventual replacement, both the ground-based helicopters and its naval *Sea Kings*. Canada's *Leopard I* main battle tanks are in need of upgunning and upgrading and/or replacement. Heavy oversnow vehicles are also desired.

### THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY

ALTHOUGH MANY MAJOR systems such as the CF-18, the *Aurora*, and the *Leopard I* tank were bought from abroad, Canada has a vigorous and growing defense industry, as the Directory on



NEW FRONTIERS: Canada's vast Arctic is a major challenge for defense.

pages 16 and 17 indicates. Canada not only actively encourages purchases from Canadian firms when appropriate, but it was one of the first, and most consistent, countries to require local offset agreements for major purchases abroad.

The Department of National Defence supports research and development which in turn results in technology transfer to Canadian industry, especially in high tech areas. Engineering contracts awarded by DND to Canadian industries have helped in strengthening the engineering base of industry.

Because foreign procurements are generally connected with offset agreements, this too contributes to technology transfer to Canadian industry.

Canada is also increasing its rôle as a defense exporter. According to DND, there have been over \$1-billion in sales to Third World countries. A number of Canadian products have sold well, including the De Havilland *Buffalo* transport aircraft.

### CONCLUSIONS

SINCE THE CANADIAN Government's own Defence Review

was not complete when this was written, it would be presumptuous to predict precisely what it will conclude. It is certain that the Mulroney Government is committed to a greater defense effort, but since it is also a conservative Government as well as a Conservative Government, it seems likely to weigh the fiscal implications of major new programs. How the promised new emphasis on the North will be balanced with the other commitments is a major issue. If the half-billion dollars for the *Polar 8* is to come out of the Department of National Defence, what existing or planned programs will suffer?

Canada's Government is pledged to maintain its commitment to NATO, but this does not mean that the structure of that commitment might not be changed in the interest of efficiency: emphasis on either ground or air forces rather than a mix of both, or emphasis on one theater rather than the present commitment to both the Central and Northern European fronts.

There are other related issues as well. Canada has never maintained a large force of reserves in peacetime, but its commitments to European defense

and the potential threat to its own territory would require mobilization of far greater numbers in a crisis than are readily at hand. Plans are already in process to increase the number of reserves, and the issue will certainly be one of those which the Defence Review addresses.

Canada cannot hope to fund the kind of defense establishment which the United States possesses (and of which Canadian defense personnel posted to Washington speak enviously) because of its small population and thus limited resources, yet it has a territory even larger than the US to defend. While NORAD guarantees a US umbrella, the *Polar Sea* incident was a reminder that the two North American giants have their differences. ☆

**Canada: The New Emphasis on the Arctic***By Managing Editor Michael Collins Dunn*

CANADA HAS ANNOUNCED a number of new measures in recent weeks aimed at reasserting its sovereignty over the waterways of the Canadian Arctic, partly in response to political controversy over the voyage of a US icebreaker through the Northwest Passage but also because of the strategic importance of the region.

The move comes at a time when a major Defence Review is being prepared in Canada, which has not had a White Paper on defense policy for 14 years. The Conservative Government of Brian Mulroney, elected last year, is seeking to upgrade the country's defenses, but many wonder how Canada — so large in size and small in population — can afford to maintain its coastal and other defenses and its commitment to NATO while stepping up its activities in the Arctic. This will presumably be one of the issues addressed by the Defence Review.

The North, of course, is one reason for Canada's geopolitical importance: the vast region is not only the area across which a Soviet missile or air attack on the US might come, but is also potential patrolling ground for the Soviet Union's increased submarine presence. A vast region under ice most of the year, there is no dispute to Canada's claim to the islands of the Arctic; the issue is the waterways (usually icebound) between them.)

Canada has long claimed sovereignty over all the northern waterways, not on a mid-channel basis but by defining all the islands in the Arctic as within Canadian sovereign territory. It thus claims that the Northwest Passage and the other key passages between the islands — ice-blocked year round in many cases but nevertheless potential submarine channels — are Canadian waters.

Now, Canada is actively reasserting its sovereignty in the "Great White North". One reason — though not necessarily the major one — is growing concern about Soviet submarine operations in the North and about the overall strategic and defense implications of the vast, uninhabited region. While Canada has traditionally maintained an active ASW capability, this has been limited to coastal patrols in warmer waters, not to the northern ice. Canada has no naval vessels that can operate in the Arctic; even its icebreakers are too low-powered

to function there in winter. And Canada's three aging *Oberon*-class submarines cannot operate under the icepack.

Soviet submarine operations under the Arctic icepack are nothing new, and the Canadian Department of National Defence says that there is no major change in the pattern, although concern is always there. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark has mentioned the submarine threat as one of the reasons for the newly assertive emphasis on the Arctic.

But another reason, and the one which directly sparked the political reaction recently, is nationalism provoked by the refusal of many nations — most notably the United States — to accept the Canadian claim to the Arctic waterways.

**US Icebreaker**

In August of this year, the United States sent a Coast Guard icebreaker, the *Polar Sea*, through the Northwest Passage without asking Canadian permission to do so. This was normal practice, since the US does not recognize Canadian sovereignty over what it considers an international waterway. The Northwest Passage is not about to be used by everyday shipping, but from time to time an icebreaker or other vessel is sent through to make the diplomatic point. The dispute really began in 1969 when the tanker *Manhattan* passed through the Passage.

Prime Minister Mulroney initially played down the importance of the *Polar Sea* journey — Canada belatedly "approved" the passage, though the US had not asked for such approval — but Canadian nationalists of all stripes pressed for action and Opposition leader John Turner called the voyage "an affront to Canada".

When Parliament reconvened in September, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark was ready with a plan to defend Canada's claim to the northern waters, announcing a series of legal and navigational steps including claiming Canada's boundaries as the outer line drawn around the Northern islands, thus including all the waterways. Civil and criminal laws will be enforced in off-shore areas within these boundaries. He also announced plans to build the world's largest and most powerful icebreaker, the *Polar 8*.

Plans for the *Polar 8* have been on the drawing boards

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## CANADA...CONTINUED

for years, but most estimates place the cost of the vessel at some half a billion Canadian dollars. It is not certain where the funding will be found, and some in the defense establishment appear to feel that they may have to tighten belts to build the icebreaker. Officially the project will be worked out in consultations between the Transport and Defence Ministries. It should take some five years to build.

### **Inability to Patrol**

The reason the *Polar 8* is needed is that Canada does not now have sufficient icebreaking capacity to patrol the waters which it claims. Canada's four existing icebreakers combined reportedly generate less power than the US icebreaker *Polar Sea*, which made the August transit. This limits them to only about three months per year, in summer, when they can patrol. The 100,000 horsepower *Polar 8* would give them the capability of operating in the Northwest Passage year-round.

Canada does maintain air patrols over the Arctic, but on a sporadic basis. The Air Command's 18 Lockheed CP-140 *Auroras* (a variant for Canada of the P-3 *Orion*) are mostly used for long-range maritime patrol along the coasts, have been making 16 flights a year over the Arctic. As part of the new emphasis on the North, that number will be increased. (An *Aurora* carried out a patrol over the Northwest Passage during the *Polar Sea* visit.)

In addition, plans are underway for Canadian naval activities in the eastern Arctic next year.

### **Skeleton Forces**

Administratively, the North's defenses are handled by Canadian Forces Northern Region Headquarters, which has a Headquarters Detachment at Whitehorse in the Yukon and controls the 440 Transport and Rescue Squadron Detachment at Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, the 742 Communication Squadron Detachments at Yellowknife and Whitehorse, Canadian Rangers and officers of the Cadet Instruction List. In addition, Canada has high-security communications stations at Inuvik in the Mackenzie Delta and Alert on Ellesmere Island, both responsible to Communications Command

at southern headquarters but physically located in the North, and also personnel at the DEW line stations.

But this is not as large a presence as it sounds on paper. The total number of active duty personnel is only about 600, including the Headquarters Detachment. The Rangers — a volunteer force from isolated settlements — number another 620, and there are some 600 cadets. Given the expanse of the territory, it is a tiny presence.

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In addition, Canada is playing a greater rôle in the North Warning System (NWS), the continent-wide chain of minimally-attended and unattended radar stations now being planned, than it did in the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line which the much more modern but less pronounceable NWS is replacing.

The DEW Line was virtually a US operation, with Canadian presence largely to assure that sovereignty was not infringed. But NWS will involve far greater Canadian participation; Canada is responsible for the on-site construction and running of the stations and the costs of the system are being split in a 60:40 ratio between the US and Canada.

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But the Arctic is vast, and even before the new emphasis on this frontier, Canada faced serious problems in providing adequate defense to its huge continental area while maintaining its European commitment. Precisely how the new Arctic efforts can be carried through without a reduction in the NATO presence is one of the major subjects which the Defence Review must address. ■



# INTERVIEWS

AMERICAN SENTINEL December 1985 Pg. 4

## Special Report

### EYEWITNESS REPORT ON THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS

S.J. MASTY writes a thrice weekly column in The Washington Times. He recently traveled to Pakistan to help television journalist KURT LOHBECK report on the Afghan war. (For my interview with Lohbeck, see Issue #342.) In this exclusive AMERICAN SENTINEL interview, Masty told me what he saw and heard.

SEILER: How are the Afghan freedom fighters doing?

MASTY: There's a lot of disillusionment and anger among the Afghans, who feel that they've been misled by American promises and foreign policy statements--that they're being sacrificed for American political deals cut with the Soviets in other spheres.

SEILER: How determined are the Afghan freedom fighters?

MASTY: I saw a young man with his leg cut off get out of the hospital before anybody in the U.S. with such an operation would get out of his bed. The hospital employees--all volunteers from Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia and France--work just with admiration and tears in their eyes over just the sheer physical courage of these people.

The Afghans are bound and determined to fight for their country with a fierceness I've never seen anywhere in the world. Ninety-percent of the Afghans are prepared to fight to the last man.

SEILER: How long do you think they'll be able to hold on against the Soviets?

MASTY: I think there will probably always be an "Afghan problem"--unless the Russians pull out. There will always be Afghans ready to fight. The question is whether or not their force can effectively harass the Russians. And that question is largely up to us--whether we'll give them the Stinger anti-aircraft missiles that they need to shoot down the air attacks that strike at them.

SEILER: How were conditions in the Afghan refugee camps that you saw in Pakistan?

MASTY: Probably good, by the standard of refugee camps. Utterly squalid, for any other person in the world. Most Americans I know don't like to live in mud huts, and go to the bathroom in slit trenches, and cook their meals over open fires. There are shortages of blankets, clothing, tents. There seems to be enough food; I didn't see any signs of malnutrition. But these people, who are used to fierce independence, are forced into conclaves.

SEILER: How are the Afghan civilians doing inside Afghanistan?

MASTY: First, there hardly are any Afghan civilians left inside the country. The Soviets' scorched earth policy is obvious: my friend Kurt Lohbeck, who just went through there, said that, whereas a year ago there were 15 or 20 villages, now they were lucky to find two or three that were inhabited at all. The Soviets drive those Afghans who accept communist rule into Kabul, where they can be easily policed--all the other Afghans will be either exterminated, or flushed over the border to become a problem for Western aid and the Pakistani government.

But even that hasn't worked, because the Afghans driven over the border are still fighting like tigers. In response, since 1979 the Soviet and Afghan air forces have invaded Pakistani airspace more than 500 times; there have been plenty of bombings of anything from refugee camps to cities to ammunitions dumps.

SEILER: Did you see any victims of Soviet atrocities?

MASTY: I saw a lot of little girls with shiny aluminum peg legs and other deformities--caused by stepping on anti-personnel mines, or picking up toy trucks or babies' dolls that were impregnated with enough explosive not to kill the child, but specifically to cripple it, in an attempt to demoralize the Afghan rebels. Believe me, an eight-year old girl with a shiny aluminum peg leg is something you don't forget.

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E.O. 12356: DECL OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: A.S. CHERNYAYEV TO REPLACE ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV

REFS. A1 MOSCOW 1930, B1 MOSCOW 1460

1. IC - ENTIRE TEXT. I

2. ACCORDING TO SEVERAL RELIABLE SOVIET AND WESTERN SOURCES, A.S. CHERNYAYEV, A DEPUTY HEAD OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S (CC) INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT SINCE 1970, WILL REPLACE A.A. ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV AS GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER. ULTIMATELY, CHERNYAYEV IS TO BECOME HEAD OF A KREMLIN NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF, ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE. THE SIZE, STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THIS NEW ORGANIZATION, AND OF A SISTER ORGANIZATION TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, REPORTEDLY HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV, WHO IS NEARLY 60, REPORTEDLY RETIRED FEBRUARY 8.

3. CHERNYAYEV, ACCORDING TO OUR RECORDS, IS 64 AND HAS SPENT MOST OF HIS PROFESSIONAL CAREER IN THE CC. HE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT CHIEF MORIS PONOMAREV WHO REPORTEDLY WILL RETIRE SOON. THEIR ASSOCIATION MAY DATE BACK AS FAR AS 1954 WHEN PONOMAREV ASSUMED HIS PRESENT POSITION. CHERNYAYEV'S EXPERTISE APPEARS TO LIE IN WEST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. HE HAS VISITED THE U.S. ONCE (IN 1968) AND REPORTEDLY TRAVELLED FREQUENTLY TO WESTERN EUROPE AS A MEMBER OF CPSU DELEGATIONS. HE BECAME A CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE CC IN 1981 AND WILL MOST LIKELY MOVE UP TO FULL MEMBERSHIP AT THE XVII CPSU CONGRESS LATER THIS MONTH.

4. COMMENT. IF SUCH AN ORGANIZATION IS BEING CREATED, ITS LIKELY FUNCTION IN THE SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING APPARATUS IS FAR FROM CLEAR. ONE MAJOR QUESTION WOULD BE THE RELATIONSHIP OF A NEW STAFF OF THIS KIND TO THE EXISTING STAFFS OF THE MFA, CC AND DEFENSE COUNCIL. CHERNYAYEV STRIKES US AS THE SAME KIND OF STAFFER THAT ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV HAS BEEN, ASSUMING THAT BOTH MEN HAVE SIMILAR DEGREES OF COMPETENCE. ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV SERVED BREZHNEV QUIETLY FOR MANY YEARS, BECOMING PERSONALLY KNOWN TO U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY WHEN HIGH LEVEL U.S.-SOVIET CONTACTS BEGAN TO EXPAND IN THE EARLY 1970'S. HARTMAN

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