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D

September 1985

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

BACKGROUND

US and Soviet views on arms control issues differ profoundly. We seek to enhance stability by reducing offensive nuclear systems, particularly those capable of preemptive attack, such as MIRVed ICBMs. In the longer term, we hope through the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to shift to a system of deterrence based increasingly on non-nuclear defensive systems.

The Soviets have also subscribed publicly to the idea of large reductions but in practice have sought to preserve their capabilities of holding vulnerable our land-based ICBM deterrent, the most worrisome element in the current strategic situation. They strongly oppose SDI, although they have historically placed greater reliance on defenses than has the U.S. and have pursued their own research program in defensive technologies for many years.

The President has decided that the US will continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations. This was an important decision which testifies to American willingness to maintain an arms control regime and improve it through negotiations in Geneva. The Soviets, in responding critically and in calling the decision a cover for an American buildup, seriously misrepresent the President's decision.

In the Geneva negotiations our positions remain far apart. The United States objective in the negotiations is to achieve equitable and verifiable agreements leading to substantial reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. Over the longer term -- should new defensive technologies prove feasible -- we would like to move away from deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation toward a more defense-reliant system. Providing the basis for determining whether or not we should seek such a shift is the purpose of the SDI research program.

As underscored by Secretary General Gorbachev in his Time interview, the Soviets continue to focus on stopping SDI and have made virtual US abandonment of SDI a precondition for any detailed negotiations, much less an agreement, in the two negotiating groups on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. Whereas the US has put forward flexible positions demonstrating a readiness to go beyond where talks left off in 1983, Soviet positions have regressed on many points.

The second round of negotiations ended in July; the negotiations will resume in Geneva this month.

Suggested Talking Points

I. Geneva Negotiations:

-- The Geneva negotiations remain central to the arms control process. We expect that the President and Gorbachev will discuss arms control issues at length during their November meeting and we hope that there will be progress that can be translated into specifics at the Geneva talks.

-- Soviet's precondition that the US must virtually abandon SDI before detailed bargaining can begin in the INF and strategic arms negotiating groups is not realistic, and ignores potential mutual benefits of emerging defensive technologies.

-- The Soviet's backtracking on various START and INF positions, e.g., limits on ALCM's and LRINF aircraft, makes reaching agreement more difficult.

II. Soviet Non-Compliance with Arms Control Agreements:

-- Soviet apparent non-compliance with existing arms control agreements is a serious matter.

-- The Soviet Union's failure to provide satisfactory explanations or undertake sufficient corrective actions erodes the public and legislative support necessary for future agreements.

-- Soviet explanations for the Krasnoyarsk radar are unpersuasive. No one in the US, Democrat or Republican, accepts the Soviet argument that the radar is for space tracking. Corrective action is essential.

III. SDI and US Programs:

-- SDI is a research program, which is fully in compliance with ABM Treaty and other arms control agreements. Soviet Union has been engaged in similar research for several years.

-- We believe that both countries have an interest in examining the possibility of a joint transition to a greater emphasis on non-nuclear defensive systems, with the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether. We hope the Soviet Union will hear us out.

-- If SDI research is successful, President Reagan has made clear that any future decision to deploy new defensive systems that were not permitted by the ABM Treaty would be a matter for consultation and, as appropriate, negotiation with the Soviet Union.

E

Human Rights in the Soviet Union

Current Situation

The overall human rights situation in the Soviet Union remains grim as Soviet authorities continue their campaign to eliminate all forms of internal dissent. The mainstream of human rights activism -- the Helsinki Monitors movement -- was effectively destroyed by late 1982. For well over a year, the Soviet authorities have kept Dr. Andrey Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, in the closed city of Gor'kiy, isolated from direct contact with their family or independent observers. Information about their current health and situation is difficult to verify. Their son, Alex Semyonov, has recently begun a hunger strike outside the Soviet Embassy in Washington in protest over Soviet refusal to let him visit his parents. Meanwhile, penal authorities continue to toy with Anatoliy Shcharanskiy's meagre rights as a prisoner in a Perm labor camp.

Religious believers are currently the major targets of Soviet persecution. Baptists have experienced the highest number of arrests, but there have also been arrests and systematic harassment directed against Ukrainian Uniates, Lithuanian Catholics, Pentacostals and Seventh Day Adventists. A community of 170 Pentecostals in the village of Chuguevka in the Soviet Far East has suffered particularly badly during the past several months. Ten community elders have been sentenced to labor camp terms and the rest fired from their jobs. Six families have been threatened with losing custody of their children.

Jewish emigration in 1984 reached a twenty year low of 896, down 98 percent from the record high of 51,320 in 1979. Monthly emigration figures during 1985 have been taking a roller-coaster ride, up one month and down the next. Whether these fluctuating figures represent statistical anomalies or are a deliberate tease is impossible to say. The bottom line is that overall numbers for the year to date are up only marginally over last year.

The crackdown on Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists which began in July 1984 continues. At least 16 have been arrested to date, including 9 Hebrew teachers. The most recent arrest was June 24. Thirteen have been convicted to date, and trials are pending for two others.

One long-standing U.S.-Soviet dual national case was resolved in April and three separated spouse cases have been resolved since the beginning of the year. Many other cases remain unresolved, including that of dual national Abe Stolar and separated spouses Tamara Tretyakova and Yuriy Balovlenkov. The latter two ended prolonged life-threatening strikes earlier this summer.

US Policy

Human rights are fundamental to American values, and therefore an integral part of our policy toward the Soviet Union. As Secretary Shultz has said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Human rights cannot be relegated to the margins of international politics."

Moreover, the United States views Soviet human rights violations not as a strictly bilateral problem, but rather in terms of solemn commitments freely undertaken by the Soviet Union in international agreements, most notably the Helsinki Final Act and the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Soviet willingness to fulfill these international understandings therefore inevitably reflects on Soviet willingness to abide by other accords as well, and consequently on our approach to negotiations and agreements with the USSR on issues across the spectrum of our relations.

The Soviets claim that our interest in their human rights performance represents interference in their internal affairs, and have in the past sought to avoid discussion of human rights issues on the ground that they are not legitimate topics for discussion between governments. Recently, they have increasingly adopted the tactic of counterattacking the United States for alleged violations of human rights in our country, including unemployment, the homeless, racism and denial of women's right. Despite this tactic, it is our sense that the Soviet authorities are coming to recognize that human rights will remain a permanent component of the US-Soviet agenda.

Human rights issues are a prominent item on the agenda of all high-level meetings of US officials with their Soviet counterparts. We continue to make clear to the Soviets that any overall improvement in relations is dependent to a great extent on significant and sustained Soviet improvement in the human rights area. It is the belief of the Executive Branch that the systematic expression of similar concerns through legislative actions, parliamentary exchanges, and the activities of private groups and prominent individuals, provides valuable parallel emphasis to this basic American policy message.

Points To Be Made

-- Human rights continues to be an important part of the U.S. agenda with the Soviet Union, and will remain so. Such emphasis is an accurate reflection of the importance the American people and all levels of the American Government attach to this issue.

-- We are deeply disturbed at the extreme downturn in Jewish emigration, which has been combined over the past year with an ominous crackdown on Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists.

-- We remain troubled by Soviet repression of courageous human rights activists such as Andrey Sakharov, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and Iosif Begun.

-- Current intense Soviet repression of religious believers is deeply troubling to the millions of religious believers in the United States.

-- We are also deeply concerned about the approximately 40 U.S.-Soviet dual nationals and Soviet spouses of U.S. citizens who have been denied permission to leave the Soviet Union.

-- These human rights abuses are a serious obstacle to the improved relations with the Soviet Union that the United States seeks. Some positive movement on our concerns would greatly improve the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations.

September 9, 1985

F

US-USSR Exchanges

August 1984

Background: Since 1958, agreements between the US and the USSR have sponsored exchanges in the fields of science, technology, education, and culture. Cooperation was expanded during the summits in Moscow (1972, 1974) and Washington (1973) to include 11 specialized cooperative agreements dealing with science and technology:

- Science and technology (1972);
- Environmental protection (1972);
- Medical science and public health (1972);
- Space (1972);
- Agriculture (1973);
- World oceans (1973);
- Transportation (1973);
- Atomic energy (1973);
- Artificial heart research and development (1974);
- Energy (1974); and
- Housing and other construction (1974).

A 12th agreement was concluded during the Washington summit in 1973--a 6-year General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation, covering education; performing arts; publications; exhibits; and exchanges by a variety of individuals and groups, including political leaders, education experts, writers, publishers, and other specialists. This framework of 12 agreements between our two governments led to a significant increase in exchange activities, especially in science and technology, that remained at a high level throughout much of the 1970s.

Status of Exchanges: Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the US Government reduced funding and other support for science and technology exchanges. Activities declined further in 1982 when three agreements (space, energy, and science and technology) were allowed to lapse in response to the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. The shutdown of the KAL airliner in September 1983 led to the US ending negotiations aimed at renewing the US-USSR transportation agreement, resulting in the termination of the agreement. In general, the level of activity under the remaining seven science and technology agreements by late 1983 amounted to roughly 20% of the level for the same period in 1979. In 1983 we renewed the atomic energy and housing agreements and, in mid-1984, the memorandum of cooperation between the National Bureau of Standards and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. This fall we will review the world oceans agreement for possible renewal.

In his speech of June 27, 1984, before the participants of the "Conference of US-Soviet Exchanges" sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution, President Reagan set forth a policy of reviving and strengthening activities under the environmental protection, housing,

agriculture, and health agreements. This will lead to a series of experts' meetings, high-level visits, new projects and exchange activities, and meetings of the joint committees under the various agreements.

The President also noted in his June speech that the US Government was prepared to negotiate a new general exchanges agreement to replace the previous accord that expired in 1979 following the Afghanistan invasion. We are now negotiating such an agreement with the Soviets.

Besides the seven government-to-government agreements, there are two other cooperative science programs that rely solely or partly on government resources: the exchange programs of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and of the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX). Reflecting changes in the overall political situation in the wake of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Poland and because of budget reductions, the academy program now provides for about half the number of man-months of exchanges each way (50 man-months) that it did in 1979. The level of activity also has been affected by the displeasure of NAS members over the treatment of Soviet Academician Andrei Sakharov (a foreign member of the NAS). The IREX program receives private as well as government funding and supports the short-term and long-term exchange of scientists in many fields. In the 1984-85 academic year, about 25 graduate students and young faculty scholars have been proposed for exchange in each direction under the IREX program with the USSR.

US objectives in exchange programs: Contacts between the science establishments in the US and USSR have, in the overall sense, provided us with a better understanding of the capabilities of Soviet science; an opportunity to conduct joint research in areas where the Soviets are more advanced and/or have unique resources or facilities; and direct communication of American views to an influential segment of Soviet society. Fields in which US experts have profited from these contacts include basic physics, advanced electroslag remelt techniques, laser treatment of glaucoma, studies of long-range air pollution, light-weight concrete construction technology, and effects of long-duration manned spaceflight missions.

Our foremost objective in maintaining these cooperative programs is to strengthen American scientific and technological capabilities through a US-USSR program that is mutually beneficial and alert to possible technology transfer concerns. The program with the USSR serves this goal by providing our scientists access to unique resources (e.g., geological or environmental conditions) and facilities (e.g., large research vessels) and the opportunity to conduct joint projects with leading Soviet scientists in their own laboratories. In addition, these programs form a significant component of the cooperative side of our political relationship with the USSR and illustrate to the Soviets the benefits of maintaining peaceful relations within the international community.

G

President Reagan

Reducing World Tensions

September 24, 1984



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by President Reagan, before the UN General Assembly, New York, September 24, 1984.

First of all, I wish to congratulate President Lusaka on his election as President of the General Assembly. I wish you every success, Mr. President, in carrying out the responsibilities of this high international office.

It is an honor to be here, and I thank you for your gracious invitation. I would speak in support of the two great goals that led to the formation of this organization—the cause of peace and the cause of human dignity.

The responsibility of this assembly—the peaceful resolution of disputes between peoples and nations—can be discharged successfully only if we recognize the great common ground upon which we all stand: our fellowship as members of the human race, our oneness as inhabitants of this planet, our place as representatives of billions of our countrymen whose fondest hope remains the end to war and to the repression of the human spirit. These are the important, central realities that bind us, that permit us to dream of a future without the antagonisms of the past. And just as shadows can be seen only where there is light, so, too, can we overcome what is wrong only if we remember how much is right; and we will resolve what divides us only if we remember how much more unites us.

This chamber has heard enough about the problems and dangers ahead;

today, let us dare to speak of a future that is bright and hopeful and can be ours only if we seek it. I believe that future is far nearer than most of us would dare to hope.

At the start of this decade, one scholar at the Hudson Institute noted that mankind also had undergone enormous changes for the better in the past two centuries, changes which aren't always readily noticed or written about.

"Up until 200 years ago, there were relatively few people in the world," he wrote. "All human societies were poor. Disease and early death dominated most people's lives. People were ignorant and largely at the mercy of the forces of nature."

"Now," he said, "we are somewhere near the middle of a process of economic development . . . at the end of that process, almost no one will live in a country as poor as the richest country of the past. There will be many more people living long healthy lives with immense knowledge and more to learn than anybody has time for. It will be able to cope with the forces of nature and almost indifferent to distance."

Well, we do live today, as the scholar suggested, in the middle of one of the most important and dramatic periods in human history—one in which all of us can serve as catalysts for an era of world peace and unimagined human freedom and dignity.

And today, I would like to report to you, as distinguished and influential members of the world community, on

what the United States has been attempting to do to help move the world closer to this era. On many fronts enormous progress has been made, and I think our efforts are complemented by the trend of history.

If we look closely enough, I believe we can see all the world moving toward a deeper appreciation of the value of human freedom in both its political and economic manifestations. This is partially motivated by a worldwide desire for economic growth and higher standards of living. And there's an increasing realization that economic freedom is a prelude to economic progress and growth—and is intricately and inseparably linked to political freedom.

Everywhere, people and governments are beginning to recognize that the secret of a progressive new world is to take advantage of the creativity of the human spirit; to encourage innovation and individual enterprise; to reward hard work; and to reduce barriers to the free flow of trade and information.

Our opposition to economic restrictions and trade barriers is consistent with our view of economic freedom and human progress. We believe such barriers pose a particularly dangerous threat to the developing nations and their chance to share in world prosperity through expanded export markets. Tomorrow at the International Monetary Fund, I will address this question more fully, including America's desire for more open trading markets throughout the world.

This desire to cut down trade barriers and our open advocacy of freedom as the engine of human progress are two of the most important ways the United States and the American people hope to assist in bringing about a world where prosperity is commonplace, conflict an aberration, and human dignity and freedom a way of life.

Let me place these steps more in context by briefly outlining the major goals of American foreign policy and then exploring with you the practical ways we're attempting to further freedom and prevent war. By that I mean, first, how we have moved to strengthen ties with old allies and new friends; second, what we are doing to help avoid the regional conflicts that could contain the seeds of world conflagration; and third, the status of our efforts with the Soviet Union to reduce the levels of arms.

U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives

Let me begin with a word about the objectives of American foreign policy, which have been consistent since the postwar era and which fueled the formation of the United Nations and were incorporated into the UN Charter itself.

The UN Charter states two overriding goals: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind," and "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."

The founders of the United Nations understood full well the relationship between these two goals, and I want you to know that the Government of the United States will continue to view this concern for human rights as the moral center of our foreign policy. We can never look at anyone's freedom as a bargaining chip in world politics. Our hope is for a time when all the people of the world can enjoy the blessings of personal liberty.

But I would like also to emphasize that our concern for protecting human rights is part of our concern for protecting the peace. The answer is for all nations to fulfill the obligations they freely assumed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It states: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections." The declaration also includes these rights: "to form and to join trade unions"; "to own property alone as well as in association with others"; "to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country"; and to enjoy "freedom of opinion and expression." Perhaps the most graphic example of the relationship between human rights and peace is the right of peace groups to exist and to promote their views. In fact, the treatment of peace groups may be a litmus test of government's true desire for peace.

Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships

In addition to emphasizing this tie between the advocacy of human rights and the prevention of war, the United States has taken important steps, as I mentioned earlier, to prevent world conflict. The starting point and cornerstone of our foreign policy is our alliance and partnership with our fellow democracies. For 35 years, the North Atlantic alliance

has guaranteed the peace in Europe. In both Europe and Asia, our alliances have been the vehicle for a great reconciliation among nations that had fought bitter wars in decades and centuries past. And here in the Western Hemisphere, north and south are being lifted on the tide of freedom, and are joined in a common effort to foster peaceful economic development.

We're proud of our association with all those countries that share our commitment to freedom, human rights, the rule of law—and international peace. Indeed, the bulwark of security that the democratic alliance provides is essential—and remains essential—to the maintenance of world peace. Every alliance involves burdens and obligations, but these are far less than the risks and sacrifices that would result if the peace-loving nations were divided and neglectful of their common security. The people of the United States will remain faithful to their commitments.

But the United States is also faithful to its alliances and friendships with scores of nations in the developed and developing worlds with differing political systems, cultures, and traditions. The development of ties between the United States and China—a significant global event of the last dozen years—shows our willingness to improve relations with countries ideologically very different from ours.

We're ready to be the friend of any country that is a friend to us and a friend of peace. And we respect genuine nonalignment. Our own nation was born in revolution; we helped promote the process of decolonization that brought about the independence of so many members of this body, and we're proud of that history.

We're proud, too, of our role in the formation of the United Nations and our support of this body over the years. And let me again emphasize our unwavering commitment to a central principle of the UN system, the principle of universality, both here and in the UN technical agencies around the world. If universality is ignored, if nations are expelled illegally, then the United Nations itself cannot be expected to succeed.

The United States welcomes diversity and peaceful competition; we do not fear the trends of history. We are not ideologically rigid; we do have principles and we will stand by them, but we will also seek the friendship and good will of all, both old friends and new.

We've always sought to lend a hand help others—from our relief efforts in Europe after World War I to the Marshall Plan and massive foreign assistance programs after World War II. Since 1946, the United States has provided over \$115 billion in economic aid to developing countries and today provides about one-third of the nearly \$90 billion in financial resources, public and private, that flow to the developing world. And the United States imports about one-third of the manufactured exports of the developing world.

Negotiations To Resolve Regional Conflicts

But any economic progress, as well as any movement in the direction of greater understanding between the nations of the world, are, of course, endangered by the prospect of conflict at both the global and regional level. In a few minutes, I will turn to the menace of conflict on a worldwide scale and discuss the status of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. But permit me first to address the critical problem of regional conflicts—for history displays tragic evidence that it is these conflicts which in set off the sparks leading to worldwide conflagration.

In a glass display case across the hall from the Oval Office at the White House, there is a gold medal—the Nobel Peace Prize won by Theodore Roosevelt for his contribution in mediating the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. It was the first such prize won by an American, and it is part of a tradition of which the American people are very proud—a tradition that is being continued today in many regions of the globe.

We're engaged, for example, in diplomacy to resolve conflicts in southern Africa, working with the frontline states and our partners in the contact group. Mozambique and South Africa have reached a historic accord on nonaggression and cooperation; South Africa and Angola have agreed on a disengagement of forces from Angola, and the groundwork has been laid for the independence of Namibia, with virtually all aspects of Security Council Resolution 435 agreed upon.

Let me add that the United States considers it a moral imperative that South Africa's racial policies evolve peacefully but decisively toward a system compatible with basic norms of justice, liberty, and human dignity. I'm pleased that American companies in

South Africa, by providing equal employment opportunities, are contributing to the economic advancement of the black population. But clearly, much more must be done.

In Central America, the United States has lent support to a diplomatic process to restore regional peace and security. We have committed substantial resources to promote economic development and social progress.

The growing success of democracy in El Salvador is the best proof that the key to peace lies in a political solution. Free elections brought into office a government dedicated to democracy, reform, economic progress, and regional peace. Regrettably, there are forces in the region eager to thwart democratic change, but these forces are now on the defensive. The tide is turning in the direction of freedom. We call upon Nicaragua, in particular, to abandon its policies of subversion and militarism and to carry out the promises it made to the Organization of American States to establish democracy at home.

The Middle East has known more than its share of tragedy and conflict for decades, and the United States has been actively involved in peace diplomacy for just as long. We consider ourselves a full partner in the quest for peace. The record of the 11 years since the October war shows that much can be achieved through negotiations. It also shows that the road is long and hard.

- Two years ago, I proposed a fresh start toward a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. My initiative of September 1, 1982, contains a set of positions that can serve as a basis for a just and lasting peace. That initiative remains a realistic and workable approach, and I am committed to it as firmly as on the day I announced it. And the foundation stone of this effort remains Security Council Resolution 242, which in turn was incorporated in all its parts in the Camp David accords.

- The tragedy of Lebanon has not ended. Only last week, a despicable act of barbarism by some who are unfit to associate with humankind reminded us once again that Lebanon continues to suffer. In 1983, we helped Lebanon and Israel reach an agreement that, if implemented, could have led to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces in the context of the withdrawal of all foreign forces. This agreement was blocked, and the long agony of the Lebanese continues. Thousands of people are still kept from their homes by continued violence and are refugees in their own country. The once flourishing economy

of Lebanon is near collapse. All of Lebanon's friends should work together to help end this nightmare.

- In the gulf, the United States has supported a series of Security Council resolutions that call for an end to the war between Iran and Iraq that has meant so much death and destruction and put the world's economic well-being at risk. Our hope is that hostilities will soon end, leaving each side with its political and territorial integrity intact, so that both may devote their energies to addressing the needs of their people and a return to relationships with other states.

- The lesson of experience is that negotiation works. The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt brought about the peaceful return of the Sinai, clearly showing that the negotiating process brings results when the parties commit themselves to it. The time is bound to come when the same wisdom and courage will be applied, with success, to reach peace between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors in a manner that assures security for all in the region, the recognition of Israel, and a solution to the Palestinian problem.

In every part of the world, the United States is similarly engaged in peace diplomacy as an active player or a strong supporter.

- In Southeast Asia, we have backed the efforts of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] to mobilize international support for a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian problem, which must include the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the election of a representative government. ASEAN's success in promoting economic and political development has made a major contribution to the peace and stability of the region.

- In Afghanistan, the dedicated efforts of the Secretary General and his representatives to find a diplomatic settlement have our strong support. I assure you that the United States will continue to do everything possible to find a negotiated outcome which provides the Afghan people with the right to determine their own destiny; allows the Afghan refugees to return to their own country in dignity; and protects the legitimate security interests of all neighboring countries.

- On the divided and tense Korean Peninsula, we have strongly backed the confidence-building measures proposed by the Republic of Korea and by the UN Command at Panmunjon. These are an important first step toward peaceful reunification in the long term.

- We take heart from progress by others in lessening tensions, notably the efforts by the Federal Republic to reduce barriers between the two German states.

- And the United States strongly supports the Secretary General's efforts to assist the Cypriot parties in achieving a peaceful and reunited Cyprus.

The United States has been, and always will be, a friend of peaceful solutions.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations

This is no less true with respect to my country's relations with the Soviet Union. When I appeared before you last year, I noted that we cannot count on the instinct for survival alone to protect us against war. Deterrence is necessary but not sufficient. America has repaired its strength; we have invigorated our alliances and friendships. We're ready for constructive negotiations with the Soviet Union.

We recognize that there is no sane alternative to negotiations on arms control and other issues between our two nations, which have the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it. I believe this is a view shared by virtually every country in the world, and by the Soviet Union itself.

And I want to speak to you today on what the United States and the Soviet Union can accomplish together in the coming years and the concrete steps we need to take.

You know, as I stand here and look out from this podium—there in front of me—I can see the seat of the representative from the Soviet Union. And not far from that seat, just over to the side, is the seat of the representative from the United States.

In this historic assembly hall, it's clear there is not a great distance between us. Outside this room, while there will still be clear differences, there is every reason why we should do all that is possible to shorten that distance. And that's why we're here. Isn't that what this organization is all about?

Last January 16, I set out three objectives for U.S.-Soviet relations that can provide an agenda for our work over the months ahead. First, I said, we need to find ways to reduce—and eventually to eliminate—the threat and use of force in solving international disputes. Our concern over the potential for nuclear war cannot deflect us from the terrible human tragedies occurring every day in the regional conflicts I just discussed. Together, we have a par-

ticular responsibility to contribute to political solutions to these problems, rather than to exacerbate them through the provision of even more weapons.

I propose that our two countries agree to embark on periodic consultations at policy level about regional problems. We will be prepared, if the Soviets agree, to make senior experts available at regular intervals for in-depth exchanges of views. I have asked Secretary Shultz to explore this with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Spheres of influence are a thing of the past. Differences between American and Soviet interests are not. The objectives of this political dialogue will be to help avoid miscalculation, reduce the potential risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, and help the people in areas of conflict to find peaceful solutions.

The United States and the Soviet Union have achieved agreements of historic importance on some regional issues. The Austrian State Treaty and the Berlin accords are notable and lasting examples. Let us resolve to achieve similar agreements in the future.

Our second task must be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world. I am committed to redoubling our negotiating efforts to achieve real results: in Geneva, a complete ban on chemical weapons; in Vienna, real reductions—to lower and equal levels—in Soviet and American, Warsaw Pact and NATO, conventional forces; in Stockholm, concrete practical measures to enhance mutual confidence, to reduce the risk of war, and to reaffirm commitments concerning non-use of force; in the field of nuclear testing, improvements in verification essential to ensure compliance with the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions agreements; and in the field of nonproliferation, close cooperation to strengthen the international institutions and practices aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons, together with redoubled efforts to meet the legitimate expectations of all nations that the Soviet Union and the United States will substantially reduce their own nuclear arsenals. We and the Soviets have agreed to upgrade our hotline communications facility, and our discussions of nuclear nonproliferation in recent years have been useful to both sides. We think there are other possibilities for improving communications in this area that deserve serious exploration.

I believe the proposal of the Soviet Union for opening U.S.-Soviet talks in Vienna provided an important opportunity to advance these objectives.

We've been prepared to discuss a wide range of issues and concerns of both sides, such as the relationship between defensive and offensive forces and what has been called the militarization of space. During the talks, we would consider what measures of restraint both sides might take while negotiations proceed. However, any agreement must logically depend upon our ability to get the competition in defensive arms under control and to achieve genuine stability at substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.

Our approach in all these areas will be designed to take into account concerns the Soviet Union has voiced. It will attempt to provide a basis for a historic breakthrough in arms control. I'm disappointed that we were not able to open our meeting in Vienna earlier this month, on the date originally proposed by the Soviet Union. I hope we can begin these talks by the end of the year or shortly thereafter.

The third task I set in January was to establish a better working relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

We've made some modest progress. We have reached agreements to improve our hotline, extend our 10-year economic agreement, enhance consular cooperation, and explore coordination of search and rescue efforts at sea.

We've also offered to increase significantly the amount of U.S. grain for purchase by the Soviets and to provide the Soviets a direct fishing allocation off U.S. coasts. But there is much more we could do together. I feel particularly strongly about breaking down the barriers between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and between our political, military, and other leaders. Now, all of these steps that I have mentioned, and especially the arms control negotiations, are extremely important to a step-by-step process toward peace. But let me also say that we need to extend the arms control process, to build a bigger umbrella under which it can operate—a roadmap, if you will, showing where, during the next 20 years or so, these individual efforts can lead.

This can greatly assist step-by-step negotiations and enable us to avoid having all our hopes or expectations ride on any single set or series of negotiations. If progress is temporarily halted at one set of talks, this newly estab-

lished framework for arms control could help us take up the slack at other negotiations.

A New Beginning

Today, to the great end of lifting the dread of nuclear war from the peoples of the earth, I invite the leaders of the world to join in a new beginning. We need a fresh approach to reducing international tensions. History demonstrates beyond controversy that, just as the arms competition has its roots in political suspicions and anxieties, so it can be channeled in more stabilizing directions and eventually be eliminated, if those political suspicions and anxieties are addressed as well.

Toward this end, I will suggest to the Soviet Union that we institutionalize regular ministerial or cabinet-level meetings between our two countries on the whole agenda of issues before us, including the problem of needless obstacles to understanding. To take but one idea for discussion: in such talks we could consider the exchange of outlines of 5-year military plans for weapons development and our schedules of intended procurement. We would also welcome the exchange of observers at military exercises and locations. And I propose that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the U.S. nuclear test site, and for ours to go to theirs, to measure directly the yields of tests of nuclear weapons. We should work toward having such arrangements in place by next spring.

I hope that the Soviet Union will cooperate in this undertaking and reciprocate in a manner that will enable the two countries to establish the basis for verification for effective limits on underground nuclear testing.

I believe such talks could work rapidly toward developing a new climate of policy understanding, one that is essential if crises are to be avoided and real arms control is to be negotiated. Of course, summit meetings have a useful

role to play, but they need to be carefully prepared, and the benefit here is that meetings at the ministerial level would provide the kind of progress that is the best preparation for higher level talks between ourselves and the Soviet leaders.

How much progress we will make, and at what pace, I cannot say. But we have a moral obligation to try and try again.

Some may dismiss such proposals and my own optimism as simplistic American idealism. And they will point to the burdens of the modern world and to history. Well, yes, if we sit down and catalogue, year by year, generation by generation, the famines, the plagues, the wars, the invasions mankind has endured, the list will grow so long, and the assault on humanity so terrific, that it seems too much for the human spirit to bear.

But isn't this narrow and short-sighted and not at all how we think of history? Yes, the deeds of infamy or injustice are all recorded, but what shines out from the pages of history is the daring of the dreamers and the deeds of the builders and the doers.

These things make up the stories we tell and pass on to our children. They comprise the most enduring and striking fact about human history: that through the heartbreak and tragedy man has always dared to perceive the outline of human progress, the steady growth in not just the material well-being but the spiritual insight of mankind.

"There have been tyrants and murderers, and for a time they can seem invincible. But in the end, they always fall. Think on it . . . always. All through history, the way of truth and love has always won." That was the belief and the vision of Mahatma Gandhi. He described that, and it remains today a vision that is good and true.

"All is gift," is said to have been the favorite expression of another great spiritualist, a Spanish soldier who gave up the ways of war for that of love and

peace. And if we're to make realities of the two great goals of the UN Charter—the dreams of peace and human dignity—we must take to heart these words of Ignatius Loyola; we must pause long enough to contemplate the gifts received from him who made us: the gift of life, the gift of this world, the gift of each other.

And the gift of the present. It is this present, this time, that now we must seize. I leave you with a reflection from Mahatma Gandhi, spoken with those in mind who said that the disputes and conflicts of the modern world are too great to overcome. It was spoken shortly after Gandhi's quest for [Indian] independence took him to Britain.

"I am not conscious of a single experience throughout my three months' stay in England and Europe," he said, "that made me feel that after all east is east and west is west. On the contrary, I have been convinced more than ever that human nature is much the same no matter under what clime it flourishes, and that if you approached people with trust and affection, you would have tenfold trust and thousand-fold affection returned to you."

For the sake of a peaceful world, a world where human dignity and freedom are respected and enshrined, let us approach each other with tenfold trust and thousandfold affection. A new future awaits us. The time is here, the moment is now.

One of the Founding Fathers of our nation, Thomas Paine, spoke words that apply to all of us gathered here today. They apply directly to all sitting here in this room. He said: "We have it in our power to begin the world over again. ■"

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President Reagan

The U.S.-Soviet Relationship

January 16, 1984



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is President Reagan's address from the East Room of the White House, Washington, D.C., January 16, 1984.

During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you and the people of the world my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace—relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, the United States will join the Soviet Union and 33 other nations at a European disarmament conference in Stockholm. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will be in Stockholm with the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace but also of opportunities for peace. Through times of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe that 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

We've come a long way since the decade of the 1970s—years when the United States seemed filled with self-doubt and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. Over the last 10 years, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product

to military expenditures as the United States, produced six times as many ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], four times as many tanks, and twice as many combat aircraft. And they began deploying the SS-20 intermediate-range missile at a time when the United States had no comparable weapon.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is now in the midst of the best recovery since the 1960s. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid, and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They've been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. If so, I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason that we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable but pro-

foundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: America's deterrence is more credible, and it is making the world a safer place—safer because now there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve.

Yes, we are safer now. But to say that our restored deterrence has made the world safer is not to say that it's safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. That is why 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

Problem Areas

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace, we must do more to find areas of mutual interest and then build on them. I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to reduce—and eventually to eliminate—the threat and use of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 100 major conflicts since the end of World War II. Today, there are armed

conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their origins in local problems, but many have been exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates—and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting violence only exacerbate local tensions, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Further, such activity carries with it the risk of larger confrontations.

Would it not be better and safer if we could work together to assist people in areas of conflict in finding peaceful solutions to their problems? That should be our mutual goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, our governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed, we should be able to move beyond this immediate objective.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on armed forces—some 20% of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

With regard to nuclear weapons, the simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. Today, we have far fewer nuclear weapons than we had 30 years ago. And in terms of its total destructive power, our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years.

Just 3 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe 3 years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years—and we hope this will not be necessary—we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability, and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we've had serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements and treaties. Compliance is important because we seek truly effective arms control. However, there's been mounting evidence that provisions of agreements have been violated and that advantage has been taken of ambiguities in our agreements.

In response to a congressional request, a report on this will be submitted in the next few days. It is clear that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated will be fulfilled. We must take the Soviet compliance record into account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control. In our discussions with the Soviet Union, we will work to remove the obstacles which threaten to undermine existing agreements and the broader arms control process.

The examples I have cited illustrate why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we're determined to try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

U.S. Approach: Realism, Strength, and Dialogue

In working on these tasks, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism. Realism means we must start with a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength. Strength is essential to negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we're weak, we can do neither. Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial, and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is our strength of spirit and unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Our strength is necessary to deter war and to facilitate negotiated solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America can now offer something in return.

Dialogue. Strength and dialogue go hand in hand. We are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiations. We're prepared to discuss the problems that divide us and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders, who've never shied from expressing their view of our system. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics. In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war—and especially nuclear war—is priority number one. A nuclear conflict could well be mankind's last. That is why I proposed over 2 years ago the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country would do everything to avert the threat of war. These are encouraging words. But now is the time to move from words to deeds.

The opportunity for progress in arms control exists; the Soviet leaders should take advantage of it. We have proposed a set of initiatives that would reduce substantially nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation.

The world regrets—certainly we do—that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces and has not set a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to work toward agreements in INF, START, and MBFR [intermediate-range nuclear forces, strategic arms limitation talks, and mutual and balanced force reductions]. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we'll meet them halfway.

We seek to reduce nuclear arsenals and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So, we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed to exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct channels of communication. Last week, we had productive discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the hotline.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities and to diminish the risk of surprise attack.

The Need to Defuse Tensions and Regional Conflicts

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires ways for both of us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts.

Take the Middle East as an example. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in the region, and our efforts are directed toward that goal. The Soviets could help reduce tensions there instead of introducing sophisticated weapons into the area. This would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union and over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad.

Our request is simple and straightforward: that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants—in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

A Challenge for Peace

Our policy toward the Soviet Union—a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation—will serve our two nations and people everywhere. It is a policy not just for this year but for the long term. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us halfway, we will be prepared to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. As I have said, we will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat; it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons and could have tried to dominate the world. But we didn't. Instead, we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild war-ravaged economies in Europe and the

Far East, including those of nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

We can't predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It's not an impossible dream, because eliminating these risks is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason why we ever should. Indeed, we fought common enemies in World War II. Today our common enemies are poverty, disease, and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as valid today as when he announced it: "So, let us not be blind to our differences," he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences are differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interests have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Just suppose with me for a moment, that an Ivan and Anya could find themselves, say, in a waiting room or sharing a shelter from the rain or a storm with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they then debate the differences between their respective governments? Or would they find themselves comparing notes about their children and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions and hobbies and what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, maybe Anya would be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice, she also teaches music." Maybe Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't like about his boss. They might even have decided that they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade, or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms, and know in doing so we have helped fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and, indeed, of people everywhere. Let us begin now. ■

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