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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name COBB, TYRUS (NSC): FILES

Withdrawer

KDB 12/23/2008

File Folder REYKJAVIK PREPARATORY MEETING (2)

FOIA

F01-123/1

Box Number ~~91098~~ RAC Box 5

LAHAM

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
59477	MEMO	PETER SOMMER TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE REYKJAVIK: ALLED CONSULTATIONS PLAN (W/NOTATIONS)	2	10/2/1986	B1
59478	NOTES	RE CONVERSATION WITH SHULTZ DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	1	ND	
59479	CABLE	RE MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS	2	9/30/1986	B1
59480	MEMO	RODNEY MCDANIEL TO NICHOLAS PLATT, COL. JAMES LEMON, ET AL. RE TRAVEL TO REYKJAVIK	1	ND	B1 B3
59481	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT, LEMON ET AL. RE TRAVEL TO REYKJAVIK (W/NOTATIONS)	1	10/4/1986	B1 B3

open 2/19/10
KMU

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Cobb

7172
Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

INFORMATION

October 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ALTON G. KEEL

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Reykjavik: Allied Consultations

You asked for an update on plans for consulting with Allies. The following is under consideration (State's formal recommendation is expected momentarily):

October 7: Presidential message on all four parts of the agenda to NATO Allies, Japanese and Australians. Separate Presidential messages to Heads of Government with regional concerns (e.g. Zia) and resistance groups (e.g., UNO).

October 9: Ridgway and Nitze brief NATO Allies in Brussels

October 12: Presidential letter to NATO Allies, Japanese, and Australians. (This may not be necessary with Shultz going to Brussels.)

October 13: Shultz briefs NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels.

State message to all diplomatic posts giving our version of Reykjavik meetings.

It is not yet clear how we will handle our Asian allies. State will likely recommend that DAS Tom Simons and an NSC rep (Linhard) brief the Asians in Brussels. In our view, this could be best done in Washington. The highest dividends would probably come from a follow-up Linhard trip to Asia. The Japanese have a long-standing invitation to him and have recently again pressed him to come. Kelly strongly supports such a trip and suggests that Bob also hit Seoul, Beijing, and Canberra in addition to Tokyo. Bob could do this shortly after the team returns from Iceland.

We will send a decision memo when State makes its formal recommendation.

psf Steve Sestanovich, Bob *psf* Linhard and Jim Kelly *(M. Howell)* concur.

cc: Jack Matlock/Ty Cobb
Don Mahley

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59477 MEMO

2 10/2/1986 B1

PETER SOMMER TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE
REYKJAVIK: ALLED CONSULTATIONS PLAN
(W/NOTATIONS)

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Re Attached #7172 attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

John has talked w/ Shultz

- o O.K. re pre Iceland consultations if Ridgeway/Nitze go Oct 9 to Brussels to "consult" all four areas on way to Iceland
- o O.K. if Shultz desires to go to Brussels post Iceland to debrief (assume we have no strong objections?)
- o JWP has no interest in ASIA/Australia etc debrief trips —

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Keel
URGENT
C

URGENT

MT

B

86 00

11:30

S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/23/08 EDB

MESSAGE NO. 011371 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 2

FROM: BLPASCOE S/S X73126 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION TELEGRAM TO ANATO: ALLIES CONSULTATIONS AFTER
US-SOVIET REYKJAVIK MEETING

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>ROBERT PEARSON</u>		
<u>NSC</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>		
	<u>McDaniel</u>		
	<u>Cobb</u>		
	<u>Rodman / Matlock</u>		
	<u>Linhard / Levin / Sommer</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: ASAP TODAY

*To Bob Pearson
Security attendance should be cleared
with JHP.
I have suggested a clarity change
to the letter.
Peter Sommer Oct 2 12 noon*

S/S Officer: BLPASCOE *for L. Tracy*

I clear as well for Matlock and Cobb.

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVER SHEET TO S/S.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 13, 1986

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

The Briefing Room

4:05 P.M. EDT

MR. HOWARD: Good afternoon. This briefing is ON THE RECORD, but not for camera, and our briefer is Admiral John Poindexter.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Because these issues are so complex, we made a decision yesterday evening that we would go ON THE RECORD with a great deal of detail about the discussions and talks in Iceland. So what I'd first like to do is to go through each of the major areas, specifically in the arms control, because I think the arms control areas are the most complex, and indicate to you what -- how the discussions went and what we achieved, and then after I finish all that, I'll take your questions. And then I may read something to you at the end, which is kind of a closing statement.

Q Why don't you read that first?

Q Yes, could we get to -- is there anything --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The bottom line first.

Q Yes.

Q -- that deals with the speech tonight?

Q Because we do have that pool report.

Q We're up against a deadline --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right.

Q -- that's going to force us to --

Q Is it true -- did you really kneel at the feet of the press on the plane yesterday? (Laughter.)

Q He asked our apologies.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not very long. It was too uncomfortable.

This very short statement here kind of summarizes what I think was the bottom line. We offered the Soviet side an agreement concerning strategic defenses that held the promise of a far safer and more stable world -- a world unburdened by offensive ballistic missiles in which defense would serve to ensure us both against third countries that might acquire these missiles and would ensure the free world against Soviet cheating.

In response to Soviet concerns, we offered to defer the

MORE

deployment of strategic defenses for 10 years, until after all ballistic missiles have been eliminated. And we agreed that during the 10 years in which the disarmament process went forward we would abide by the terms of the ABM Treaty.

But Mr. Gorbachev demanded more than that. He demanded that we agree to limit research on strategic defense immediately in a manner that went far beyond the restrictions of the ABM Treaty. This demand could have no other purpose than to force the United States to abandon any hope of successfully developing the defenses that we would acquire to ensure that the disarmament process did not leave us hopelessly vulnerable to Soviet cheating as the last of our ballistic missiles were dismantled. And it would have required that we now abandon meaningful research on strategic defense without any assurance that the other elements of our proposed agreements would in fact be implemented fully and properly.

Again and again, the President asked Mr. Gorbachev what possible objections he could have to the deployment of defenses after ten years. And after having eliminated all offensive ballistic missiles. Again and again, the President pressed him to explain how defensive systems, wholly lacking in offensive capability could threaten the Soviet Union. The President never received a satisfactory answer, or even a plausible response.

To go through each of the areas -- well, let me give you a little bit of color, I guess, first. (Laughter.) We went to Iceland --

Q Empty-handed.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not empty-handed, by any stretch of the imagination. (Laughter.)

Q It's better than empty-headed.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's the Soviet line, though.

Q You've got that down, Helen. (Laughter.)

Q Come on --

Q Let's go.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We went to Iceland very well-prepared. Granted, we took all of you by surprise by agreeing to go so rapidly, but don't forget that we have been working toward a summit in the United States sometime near the end of this calendar year. We have been working for months on all of our arms control proposals, we had had expert-level meetings with the Soviets, both in Moscow and in the United States, as well as Geneva. So we very well knew what their positions were, and what our maneuvering room was. We had had expert- and political-level meetings in the other areas of our agenda on regional issues, human rights and bilateral issues.

But because we weren't sure whether the Soviets were ready to move on these various issues, we thought the best that we could probably hope to get out of Iceland was a focusing of the agenda for a Washington summit. But we were surprised, pleasantly surprised, that the Soviets were ready to talk in detail about some of the obstacles to progress, especially in Geneva.

So, out of the heads of state meetings and the working-level meetings that we held all throughout Saturday night and early Sunday morning, we were able to reach some significant solutions to many of the obstacles to progress. In the START area, we agreed with the Soviet Union that both sides, in a START agreement at some point in the future, would come down to 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles on each side, that we would come down to 6,000 nuclear warheads on each side. We cleared up some of the problems that we'd been having with the Soviets on the counting rules, on how you count those 6,000 warheads.

We wanted to, and did engage them in discussions of some sublimits that we think should exist in a START agreement, but they were unwilling, at least at Iceland, to agree on any of these sublimits, so those sublimits remain a matter for negotiation in Geneva. They did say, though, that they were prepared to make significant cuts in the heavy ICBMs, which is a very high priority for us. And we were unable to pin them down, though, on exactly what "significant" means. But I think we're moving in the right direction.

Q What was the 50 percent, then?

MORE

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. The 50 percent, essentially is the 6,000 nuclear warheads -- is about 50 percent of where we are today.

Q But in the sublimits there were no percentages?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We had some percentages. I don't want to get into those right now, because we don't have agreement on them. But they were unwilling to agree to some of the specific sublimits. They were unwilling in Iceland to agree to a structure of sublimits. They said why not disagree on the 6,000 and then both sides can have whatever mix they want to make up the 6,000. We're not prepared to do that, because we want to make sure that we get proportional cuts in the more urgent, prompt delivery systems, such as the ICBM's.

Q Was this over a five-year period?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: In the discussions in -- on START up to this point, there wasn't any discussion of time periods. I'll get to that in a minute. That came later.

Q Was this the first time they've ever made the suggestion that they were willing to make significant cuts in the big ICBM's?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't have --

Q -- heard that before?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't have my arms control expert here and I'm not sure enough to answer your question. I believe it is the first time, but I can't swear to that.

Q Well, presumably they're referring to the 308 SS-18s.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, exactly.

Q And do you have any notion what they mean by significant cuts at all?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No.

Q What would be significant from our perspective?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't want to get into that -- it gets into our negotiating position that's not agreed upon yet. But they say significant; we'll have to wait and see what that means.

All right. So, all of those things that I went over were agreed upon in the discussions on START.

Q When? This was on Saturday?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it was Saturday and Saturday night, Sunday morning -- the late night meeting.

Q When you -- Admiral, when you say these are agreed upon --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, yes --

Q -- do you feel that they remain agreed upon, despite the failure to reach an overall agreement?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, we are going to, as they say in the negotiating business, pocket these various pieces that they've said they would agree to. I think clearly whether they will admit now that they have agreed to these things or not remains to be seen,

MORE

but in the meetings they did agree to them and we will try to hold them to that agreement at some point in the future.

Q Didn't Gorbachev say that all of these proposals remain on the table?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Gorbachev -- that's what I was going to add, Sam. In the press conference, at least the summary of it that I read that he conducted in Reykjavik last night -- my read of that is that he's leaving these things that they're prepared to agree to on the table. So we will hold him to that.

Q As linked or --

Q -- a link?

Q -- as a link package or as a package in its individual --

MR. SPEAKES: Let me make a suggestion. Would it be better to have John walk everybody right through the whole thing, hold your questions until he finishes and then pick them up.

Q Yes.

Q Yes.

MR. SPEAKES: Because he's going to answer a lot of them as he goes through and he'll go through the negotiating back and forth in the evening and Sunday.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. On INF, it was raised on Saturday afternoon. Our position was that the Soviet SS-20s in Asia must be addressed and they must be reduced by some amount, roughly in proportion to the reductions in Europe. The Soviet position was zero-zero in Europe for both sides, and they wanted a freeze on the systems in Asia with the U.S. having the right to deploy an equal number in the United States as they had in Asia. That was unacceptable to us because we have not wanted to shift the locust of the problem from Europe to Asia and burden our Asian allies with a problem -- a bigger problem than they now face.

Also because of the mobility of the SS-20s, they could be moved back and forth across the Ural Mountains, and because in the Western parts of Asia the SS-20 can still reach parts of Europe, we felt that we had to simply get them to agree to some sort of reduction in Asia.

So the President held out there for cuts in Asia and finally on -- and the negotiating -- the working group that night held firm with that position for the Soviets. And finally on Sunday morning, Gorbachev agreed to make some cuts in Asia. What he agreed on was 100-100 warheads globally. With the 100 for the Soviets in Asia and the 100 for the U.S. in the United States.

We agreed to that. That would make a 100 percent reduction in Europe and an 80 percent reduction in Asia. Or, stated another way, that would bring the Soviets from today 1,323 warheads down to 100.

On INF, earlier in the discussions, they had agreed on freezing their short-range INF and beginning negotiations on short-range INF after the long-range INF agreement was signed. There was discussion on verification. We have three major points that we want to get accepted on verification -- an exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place; second, we want on-site observation of the destruction of the weapons; and third, we want an effective monitoring arrangement to put in place after the weapons are destroyed with the provision for on-site inspections during this monitoring.

The Soviets although did not want to -- as usual, they did not want to get into detail in talking about verification, indicated that in principle they didn't have any problem with those provisions. But I'm not naive enough to think that we don't have a lot of hard work ahead negotiating out these verification provisions. But we're very pleased with this agreement on INF. We think that this substantial reduction in Asia accounts for what we were looking for and certainly the zero-zero in Europe is desirable from our point of view.

On nuclear testing, I think you're all familiar with the statement that the President made, or Larry made for the President, the night we arrived in Iceland, which was a slight change to our game plan on nuclear testing. Are you familiar with that, or do you want me to go through that?

Q We're familiar with that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. The -- in the discussions with the Soviets, they essentially agreed with that sort of game plan -- that we would begin negotiations in which the first item would be improved verification procedures, and we would not move beyond that first agenda item until it was agreed upon, and then we would move on to negotiating further limitations on nuclear testing, with the ultimate goal being a comprehensive test ban, as we reached the point that we no longer have to rely on strategic nuclear weapons for deterrence.

Now, there was disagreement, though, with the Soviets on how we characterize such negotiations. They want to characterize the negotiations as negotiating a comprehensive test ban and we want to characterize it as negotiations on further limitations on nuclear testing. And there is, of course -- the reason for the difference in the way it's described, there's a -- each side has a slight different objective out of a set of negotiations like this.

They want us to agree to a comprehensive test ban very soon. We have indicated that we will agree to a comprehensive test ban in the future, but it's in conjunction with a program that brings the offensive forces down so at the time you reach zero strategic nuclear weapons, at that point we would be willing to agree to a test ban.

But I think, as time goes on, we will be able to work this out with the Soviets and begin a set of negotiations in the nuclear testing area that will result in improved verification procedures. And then we can get the two treaties fully ratified and move on to discussing further limitations.

So all of these things that I've said were agreed upon at this point are held hostage by General Secretary Gorbachev to our agreeing to what they want on the ABM Treaty. Their opening position in the meetings in Iceland was that the United States should agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years and that we also agree to modifying the ABM Treaty to make it more restrictive than it presently is, even under our restricted definition of the ABM Treaty.

Q That was their opening position on Saturday morning?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's correct. In effect, they have -- that's not a new position for them. They have maintained that for a long period of time in Geneva, that they want us to agree to tightening up, making more restrictive -- they refer to it as strengthening the ABM Treaty.

Q The ten years was new.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The ten years was new in Iceland. Because up to this point, they had been talking about up to 15. Recall when they first started talking about this -- and I've lost track of time, but Gorbachev talked about 15 to 20 years. And then in -- I guess that was their June proposal in Geneva, 15 to 20 years.

And then, in Gorbachev's letter to the President, in response to the President's letter to him of July the 25th, Gorbachev said up to 15 years, and in Iceland, they came to 10 years.

Q Yes, sir. You mentioned -- you indicated that you believe that these agreements remain viable, yet Mr. Gorbachev holds him hostage to --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, let -- yes?

Q I'm wondering whether they are viable in their separate parts, in your view, or whether it still is all interlinked?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, they're still linked. But let me go on, because I haven't quite finished the basic facts here. The Sunday morning session was devoted almost exclusively -- well, they got the INF issue out of the way rather rapidly, and the rest of the session was devoted essentially to ABM and SDI.

After the break that came, I guess at 1:30 p.m. or so on Sunday when they stopped the morning session, Secretary Shultz and I and some others met with Shevardnadze and some of his people at 2:00 p.m., in which we sat down and tried to see if we could find some way of getting around this problem with the Soviets wanting us to adhere to the ABM Treaty for 10 years, and make this more restrictive change to the ABM Treaty.

After the session that the Secretary and I had with Shevardnadze, we met with the President when he came back to Hofdi House, and we worked out a compromise position, a new proposal for us, that the President then tabled when he met with Gorbachev at 3:00 p.m. It was about 3:30 p.m., I guess. And the proposal goes like this: that the United States is prepared not to withdraw, or is willing not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for five years, during which time both sides would achieve the 50 percent cuts that they had agreed upon in START, and the United States would continue the research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, and at the end of the five-year period, if the reductions take place,

and if the Soviets are willing to continue to reduce offensive ballistic missiles for the next five years so that by 1996, in this case, both sides would have eliminated all offensive ballistic missiles. Under those conditions the United States would be prepared not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the second five-year period, so for a total of 10 years.

At the end of that 10-year period, both sides would be free to deploy a strategic defensive system if they so chose unless both sides agreed otherwise.

Now we felt that that was an imminently fair position, it was a change to what we have proposed in the past, but we thought that if Gorbachev was really interested in eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, this would clearly indicate to him that we were not interested in developing any sort of first-strike capability and we couldn't see that there was any way that deploying a strategic defensive system after the offensive ballistic missiles were eliminated could in any way threaten the Soviet Union.

After tabling this proposal, Gorbachev almost immediately said that they didn't agree, and they came forward with a revision to ours, which would have had us agree that all research, development and testing of space-based strategic defense systems would be banned except that that was done in the laboratory.

Q Was that tied to reductions? Was that their version of the ABM side of the equation?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That is correct. That was also -- that was tied to reductions.

Q May I just -- is this the -- when they came forward with this counterproposal, was it one that you suggested earlier, you were really familiar with from the Saturday discussion?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, they had never -- they hadn't put it quite that precisely, and linked in that way. They had talked about wanting to make more restrictive the provisions on research, development and testing in the ABM Treaty,

and they had talked in terms of strengthening it.

Q So, they had on Saturday morning said they wanted to make more restrictive the treaty. And here came the exact language of the proposal.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right. The way that they would make it more restrictive.

Q Thank you.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: At that point, or shortly after that, both sides caucused and we went over their rewrite of our proposal and moved their rewrite back in our direction by insisting on the ability to conduct research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty during the whole 10-year period. Their counter to our first one did not make explicit that at the end of the 10-year period, both sides would be free to deploy a strategic defensive system. They, obviously, would want to interpret that as being uncertain at that point and still open to negotiations at the end of the 10-year period, which we were unwilling to accept.

So we added the research, development and testing that's permitted by the ABM Treaty back into their proposal and we added the ability at the end of the 10-year period to deploy strategic defense -- we added that back in. After the caucus, the President -- in the caucus, the President decided that would be our last and final offer and he took that back in and Gorbachev would not agree. He insisted upon the research being restricted to the laboratory.

Now --

Q How long did that take, Admiral? Did that -- after the President goes back in with his final offer and the General Secretary turns him down, how long is this discussion at this point?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, let's see, I lost track. It was --

Q 5:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: -- 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. It would be about -- I guess --

Q 5:35 p.m.?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, you probably have it better than I. I don't remember -- yes, I don't remember the times, because I wasn't looking at my watch.

MR. SPEAKES: It's just the end time of the second meeting. It started at 4:33 p.m.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: It was the time from the -- when they went back in after the caucus until we -- they finally broke up about 7:30 p.m.

Q Do you have any color on that in terms of what was said and how it finally was broken off?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The President said that after they had discussed it for a good long period of time, he realized they weren't going to get anyplace and so the President pulled his papers together and got up. And Gorbachev got up and they both walked out.

Q Can you explain how seriously would the Soviet restrictions on testing hurt us?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it would be, we think, essentially killing the SDI program.

Let me just see if I've got any other points I want to

make and then I want to assess what I think all this means and then I'll take your questions.

Q Well did the President say anything when he pulled the papers together?

Q Was there an exchange on that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I'm sure there was but I don't have it verbatim and so I don't want to --

Q Do you have the gist of it -- I mean --

Q Can you take that question?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Beg your pardon?

Q Could you take that question? It's a fairly important historical point, what was said in the meeting, and I wondered if you would take the question and get us an official --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: They want us to take the question on exactly what the President said when he got up.

MR. SPEAKES: We take a lot of questions.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. (Laughter.)

MR. SPEAKES: We'll ask him when he comes over tonight and see if he --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. We'll take the question.

Q Do you have the tone of it?

MR. SPEAKES: We'll take a family newspaper first.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I think that the President was somber. We recognize -- the President certainly recognized that what he was proposing was an historic proposal. It would have resulted in 10 years in both sides eliminating all ballistic missiles. The world would be a lot safer. But our problem is and we're not questioning the sincerity or the trustworthiness of the present Soviet leaders, but the history --

Q Why do you want insurance, then?

Q Let him finish.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Let me finish here. The history of the relationship is such that in the past they have not complied with treaties. And when the national security of the country depends on the Soviets complying with a treaty such as this, and the national security of much of the free world, then it absolutely essential and the only prudent thing to do is to have some sort of insurance policy against failure to make the reductions or failure to comply with the total ban on into the future.

The other problem is the problem of nuclear weapons possessed by third countries -- if at some point in the future non-proliferation breaks down, nuclear weapons spread -- I mean, there are third countries today that have nuclear weapons that we would prefer not have them -- and it is only prudent and reasonable that not only the United States but the Soviet Union, in reality, would want some sort of defensive system to guard against non-compliance or the weapons of a third country.

Now I think -- those are all of the main points I wanted to make so I'll open it up to questions now.

Q I'm -- what I don't understand is why you expected that the Soviets would buy off on this in view of their -- the position that you say has been their traditional position they've maintained about SDI. Why was there a surprise that they wanted to restrict it to the laboratory and stick so strongly to this view?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, you know, one has to try to assess, you know, why are the Soviets opposed to SDI? Now, presumably, one of their concerns would be that they don't trust us, maybe, and they would think that what we were doing is working on a system that, once we achieved it, would give us a first-strike capability. So, you know, if we're willing before deployment to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles, then the problem of first-strike doesn't exist. So if that was their problem, this would have solved it.

Q Admiral, I'm going to make sure I understand you now. You're saying the President broke off the final hour of the talks, and at that point, can you give us any sense of what Gorbachev said, when the President took his papers --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I just -- you know, we have been so busy today --

Q I understand that --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER -- and we have not gone back, and I have not read the translators' record, so I don't know exactly what was said.

Q But what did Gorbachev do when the President took his papers?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That Gorbachev folded up his folder and he got up, and they both got up, and they both walked out of the room.

Q Admiral, is it correct that at no point during these discussions the U.S. side tried to, say, sweeten the pot by delving into the difference between the narrow interpretation of ABM and the broad interpretation? You never told the Soviets, well, instead of this -- confined only to the laboratory, let's talk about definitions of what's in the treaty right now. That never took place?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, that did not, and you would not expect that to take place in such a short session. That's a very complex subject.

Q John, can you give us a little help on what's going to happen in the speech tonight -- what the President's trying to achieve, and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: What he's trying to achieve is a clearer understanding by the American people what he proposed to the General Secretary, what that would have meant in terms of a safer world, why the strategic defense system is essential for our future, and why he was -- is unwilling and strongly supported by all of his advisers -- unwilling to give up the possibility of having a strategic defensive system in the next 10 years.

See, the problem here is -- I mean you can argue that, well, why not just restrict yourself to the laboratory for the ten years, then if you want to deploy a system, you go ahead and do it. But the problem -- there are several problems with that. One is that we feel that, frankly, SDI has been what has brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. We think that SDI will be the guarantor of their following up on the reductions they agreed to, and that, in the end, it will be the insurance policy against non-compliance.

Now, if you don't have a healthy SDI program, at the ten-year point, it's not a threat because you're still going to have maybe another ten years before you would ever be able to deploy such a system.

Q Admiral?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Barry.

Q Yes. You just said that, frankly, that SDI is what brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. That suggests that you understand clearly that they see it as a bargaining chip, do you not?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, bargaining chip is not the right way to describe it. I think it's the lever that makes the bargaining possible. And what I'm adding today, as I think we've said before but maybe not put so much emphasis on it, we've always felt that it was the thing that would guarantee compliance.

Q But is it not clear from this weekend session that, in fact, without the Soviets seeing it as a bargaining chip which drew them back, that that's where its value lies almost exclusively?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, I disagree because I don't think that we're through with this process. The Soviets in the past have broken off negotiations on various subjects and they come back. And I think that it's going to take a little time. Both sides need to reflect on what happened and we're going to continue to push ahead for progress in all the areas. And as I said in the beginning, even though he has linked all these other agreements to our agreeing to their position on the ABM Treaty, he himself has said that those agreements are still out there.

Way in the back.

Q Sir, why have you all allowed this impression to go out over the world since the conference was over that we lost, that we failed, that we're the cause of everything that failed, and from what you say in your speech here today, it sounds like there's a lot of good things here?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, we think --

Q -- we've lost this initiative on public relations or propaganda by not saying something -- this utterance sooner.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We can't control what the press prints or what the media shows on their television. (Laughter.) Wait, wait.

Q On that point, Admiral --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I just want to finish answering her question. We have tried very hard to get our story out. Secretary Shultz had a press conference last night in Iceland. The President spoke at Keflavik.

I had staff members on the press plane flying back last night. I spent an hour and a half on the record on Air Force One trying to set the record straight. And that is why the President is going on the air tonight.

Now --

Q Well, that speech tonight, Admiral, if we could focus on that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Just a second.

Q Do you feel that the Soviets reneged on their promise, not as a link with SDI, but with INF?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: They certainly backed -- went back on a position that we thought they had agreed on before.

Now, Terry?

Q On that point, will the speech tonight try to deal with the disappointment that has been expressed by some allies, and some of the public response, including the Congressional and others?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well --

Q Will the President try to deal with that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, I think so, in laying out the facts of what was proposed, why he took the position that he did, and why we feel that the Soviet position is so -- not understood by us as to why they won't agree to what is -- what we feel is a very reasonable, fair, non-threatening plan. And I'm convinced that we have a very strong understandable position, and the American people and the Congress, once they understand all the facts, will be very supportive. I'm very optimistic.

Q Admiral, I wonder if you could tell us if, at the end of this 10-year plan, the agreement had been implemented, what would have been left in the way of strategic bombers, cruise missiles, and other non-ballistic weapons -- tactical nuclear weapons?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, our proposal would have left the -- well, they would have been reduced under the START agreement, but we weren't proposing to make reductions in the non-ballistic missile strategic weapons in the second five-year period. We were proposing just offensive ballistic missiles.

Q So what would have been left in the arsenals of both countries?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: It would have been cruise missiles and air-breathing aircraft.

Q Admiral, the way you describe this today, the Soviets made a series of concessions on Saturday and Sunday -- START, some things on testing, INF on Sunday morning -- then finally came in at the end with the threshold that the President couldn't meet. Has anybody in the administration, reflecting on the whole range of events, come to the conclusion or even thought that maybe this was a trap that Gorbachev was setting for Reagan?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I don't think it was a trap. I think, you know, we have known all along that they were linking progress in START to agreement on the ABM Treaty, and

their way of thinking about strategic defense. So we were not surprised by that, but frankly, we saw a possibility of making an historic move forward here and that's why the President was willing to move to stay in compliance with the ABM Treaty for a 10-year period, which is twice as long as we've ever talked about before with the possibility of getting this major reduction in our strategic forces.

Q Well, if you knew all along that it was linked to that, although clearly from your description you didn't know at the outset how -- the specific language they were going to propose, why did you leave that to the end? Didn't anybody calculate that that was the toughest thing to do and they may come in at the end with a proposal you couldn't --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, no -- we -- I don't want to mislead you. I mean, it was very clear from the beginning -- before we got up there, as I said -- the connection with START. When we got to Iceland, it became clear -- the discussions -- and, as the discussions went on it became clearer -- and I think their position may have hardened a little bit, too, that they were linking the progress in START -- not only START, but INF and nuclear testing to our agreeing to their provisions on the ABM Treaty.

Q Admiral, you made a major point here -- and others have, too -- that the SDI got them at the negotiating table. What's the point of being at the negotiating table if SDI prevents you from reaching any agreement?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, SDI is not just simply a mechanism to get them to the negotiating table. We view SDI as the mechanism to eliminate ballistic missiles. That's been the vision all along that SDI would eventually make ballistic missiles obsolete, because they would be vulnerable to such a system. And so it doesn't make any sense just to use it for the factor of getting them to the negotiating table if you don't follow through. Because that's what drives the whole process we feel.

Way in the back.

Q Was there any discussion of technology sharing at the meeting?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. The President reiterated his proposal to share technology with the Soviet Union and indicated that he was willing to sign a treaty now that would be triggered at some point in the future when we decided to go into full scale engineering and development of such a system. And at that point, as he told the General Secretary in the July 25th letter, we'd be prepared to sit down and offer them a plan to share the benefits of SDI.

Q At what point in the meeting was that suggestion made?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That was made on Saturday afternoon.

Q What was their response to it?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This was simply -- but I must make clear, I mean, this was a reiteration of what he told the General Secretary July 25th. Their response is they don't believe that we would actually share it with them.

Q Sell it or give it to them -- the technology?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I'm sorry.

Q Sell it or give it?

Q Will we sell it or --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We have said share. We have not specifically gotten in to the details of how we would share, because at this point it is too difficult, not knowing exactly how the systems are actually going to be designed and built, to figure out what sharing arrangements might be possible. And you can also -- you can envision sharing that doesn't necessarily involve both sides having the equipment, their command and control systems that could be shared and all sorts of other things.

Q Admiral, what evidence is there now to refute the notion that both were at a serious impasse -- that each side was in an intractable position and relations and negotiations have essentially gone down the drain.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it's our observation that the Soviets have taken very tough positions that look insurmountable in the past. Just for example, on INF -- they have consistently said they wouldn't make any reductions in Asia. Well, they're prepared to do that. And I think that we need to continue discussions with them and explore -- if they're doing this in good faith and we don't have any real reason to doubt otherwise, then we may be able to explain to them and overcome their concerns by adjusting our position a little bit.

Q But it seems at this point that SDI for each side is somewhat of a sine qua non. How do you get over this hurdle that you mentioned earlier that the Soviets perhaps mistrust us and think that we're going to use this for offensive purposes? How do you get over that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, now, at one point we did think that the Soviets -- one of their concerns of SDI was their fear that we would somehow develop an offensive system that could strike targets on earth. And we spend a lot of time looking at that -- the physics of the matter don't make that a realistic threat and we have talked informally with their scientists, they understand that. That, frankly, is a propaganda point with them and they aren't really worried about that.

Q They just came out with a study last week that reiterates that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, they simply -- the problem is that from a, let's say, a space-based laser -- you can't get

enough energy down through the atmosphere to the Earth to cause massive destruction. I think -- you know, even with the largest type of laser that we've thought about, it would take something like a week to burn a city block. And that's not a credible threat. And if you want to destroy targets on Earth, the systems we've got today do that a hell of a lot better -- and cheaper.

Q Can you achieve a deployable SDI system in 10 years without going outside the existing ABM Treaty? I thought the existing treaty restricts certain things you need to do to make a full-scale SDI --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, that is correct. Well, when you run it under the treaty, you run into problems when you begin to integrate the components into a system. And limiting the research, development and testing to the laboratory, we will need to calculate exactly how much time that would add to the development process. But it would be substantial, and we don't think that it is the same credible incentive to continue with the reductions. We'd also have problems on the Hill in terms of Congress continuing to support the program.

Jerry?

Q But excuse me. Can I follow-up? You said that after 10 years, you would then deploy. So if you stayed with an ABM for 10 years, what you're saying is, you would not be able to deploy, then, under the existing treaty. Is that right? That was the President's second proposal, another five years under ABM.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. The President's second proposal would add some more time on the end. It would probably be maybe as much as a couple of years.

Q Twelve years --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Maybe 12 years.

Jerry?

Q Sir, when the President and all of the senior advisers left Washington to go to Iceland, what was the element of surprise when the Soviets made so many, in spite of concessions, laid down -- characterized the "99 yard line." Can you describe that to me? Did you expect that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, as I said earlier, Jerry, we weren't sure exactly what issues they were prepared to move on. They didn't move on any issues that hadn't been discussed. I would say in Geneva, they have talked about strategic nuclear delivery vehicles around 1,600 in that category, we've talked about numbers around 6,000, plus or minus a couple of thousand. Counting rules was an achievement, and that gets rather complex, but it involves how you count the bombers with the bombs and the short-range attack missiles.

The movement on Asia was hoped for, and we were pleased that they moved. I don't know whether I would characterize it as unexpected. It's just that I think the point here is that when we went to Iceland, we thought that the only thing that we might get out of it was just a decision by the two heads of state that we would push on INF, for instance, and nuclear testing, so that by the time of the Washington meeting, they would be prepared to sign agreements.

What we didn't expect them to do in Iceland, very frankly, was to agree to make these moves in START, that although the moves are not surprising; it's just that we didn't think they were ready to do that, because in Gorbachev's last letter to the President, I don't even think he mentioned START.

Q So when you went to Iceland, in effect, you had the summit there you expected to have in Washington?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, I don't think so. I wouldn't call that a summit because there wasn't enough time and there was no joint statement issued at the end. Even if we had reached all these agreements, we probably would have been much more closed-mouth at this point and had a very short thing, that they met, worked on the agenda and --

Q May I follow that up, sir? Given that you had rather minimal expectations when you left, and came back without those -- mainly INF, impulse or a summit date -- is the President sorry he went to Reykjavik?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not at all. Not at all. We think that we've made -- we know what solutions are possible in these areas where there's been conflict in the past and if we can figure out a way to bring the Soviets to our way of thinking about defense, I think that there's great promise.

Q Admiral, you said last night that now we know each other's barriers a little more clearly. You've also said that each side would go back and reassess, but that the President also wants to pursue these issues in other fora in Geneva. How long a time period will this reassessment take? When will you be able --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, our negotiators -- yes -- our negotiators are heading back to Geneva -- if not today, they'll probably leave tomorrow. I mean we're --

Q But will they take this matter up immediately or will they first take a reassessment time and go over what was and was not --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Karpov, their chief negotiator and the one that handles the defense and space talks, was in Iceland. Max Kampelman who handles it for us was there. And they were both -- they're both fully involved in all the discussions in Iceland. So they will pick up the agenda and keep working on it, keep trying to hammer away. And we'll try to get them to agree in Geneva to these INF provisions and to the START provisions.

Q Why would they agree there if they didn't agree in Iceland?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You know, it's like a drop of water on a rock. You know, just keep trying, just keep trying.

Q Do you think Gorbachev will change his mind and transfer to Karpov new instructions on this issue? Or you hope he will?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not right away.

Q Admiral, how do you read what you describe as the failure of the General Secretary to give the President the satisfactory or even plausible explanation for his concerns about SDI?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, that's a hard question that I don't want to speculate on the record. I've got some ideas as to what --

Q You said it's not a matter of questioning his sincerity. What does that leave?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well --

Q Could he have been testing our commitment?

Q You said they don't trust us.

MR. SPEAKES: Tell them you need it on background --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me -- let's go on BACKGROUND and I'll answer that question. I think there are two possibilities. One is that Gorbachev has gotten himself out on a political limb so far on being opposed to SDI that he can't figure out a way to back off of it. So I don't think politically that he could go back to Moscow -- assessing and thinking about it since last night, I don't think that he --

he may have felt that he couldn't go back to Moscow, agreeing to a plan in which we could say that he gave in on SDI. That's one possibility.

The other possibility is that their rhetoric about their willingness to reduce offensive ballistic missiles has gotten out in front of reality. In other words, their claims about wanting to and being willing to reduce offensive, nuclear ballistic missiles, is beyond what they're really prepared to do at this time.

Q Sir, can we get back to the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Back ON THE RECORD.

Q -- back to the question of SDI timing, were there not the strictures of the ABM Treaty, how soon could you deploy? In other words, how much are you actually giving away by saying we won't deploy for 10 years?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I don't have a precise answer to that because we still don't have -- we're not at the point in our research and development to be able to specify the milestones that precisely. But that, Charles, is not so much the point as it is of the necessity we see of having a healthy, strong SDI program moving ahead as rapidly as we can afford because we think in the end it is a much safer way for us to be -- either with our having ballistic missiles or if we don't have them -- and certainly if we don't have them.

Q Let me follow-up on that, because you've given us two other time spectrums in saying that by the Soviet system it would take you an additional 10 years to reach a point of deployment, and by the President's proposal it would take you perhaps an additional two years. Earlier on you proposed this 5-2-6 month thing. Where would you have been in that sense? What I'm trying to do is establish the real technology vis-a-vis proposals here.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, what we have -- what we've generally said is sometime in the mid-90s, a lot of that -- it depends still of course on -- there's a lot of guess work, educated to be sure, as to how long it's going to take to get some of these technology improvements that we need, but 10 years is roughly right and that's why in the original proposal we agreed to a five-year, two-year, six-month provision and we think that's on the optimistic side as to what we'd be able to do.

Q Admiral, was there any discussion at all of these 25 Soviet Union employees? Did that come up?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. The President had not planned to raise that. That was to be a discussion between Shultz and Shevardnadze. And to my knowledge I don't think it was discussed because there just simply wasn't time. Shultz and Shevardnadze, except for the first hour of the meetings on Saturday, participated in all the other head-of-state meetings and so I'm relatively sure that George didn't have time to discuss that. But our position is still firm that 25 leave --

Q Today -- the deadline?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Beg your pardon?

Q Today's the deadline? Tomorrow's the deadline?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Tomorrow, I think, is the deadline. But I haven't talked to the Secretary about this and he may feel because they did agree to talk together about it in Iceland. If they haven't had an opportunity to do that, we may want to adjust that a few days.

Q Admiral, what is it in the September 19th letter that took the President to Iceland? And, in effect, didn't he break off the talks? He picked up his marbles and went home.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, no. The --

Q I mean, what was it that Gorbachev told him in this letter that took him to Iceland?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, Helen. The President generally is always willing to talk and he felt that it was possible to get some decisions in some of these areas like INF, in particular. He thought that if you made it clear enough to Gorbachev that he wasn't going to agree on INF unless Asia was addressed, that he could get Gorbachev to move. And, in fact, he did. And the President still believes -- as I think I've told many of you before -- that he can be very persuasive in a face-to-face conversation. Now --

Q Well, what did Gorbachev tell him? I mean, did he say we can negotiate here and we can --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No. What he said was -- and I don't think I brought the letter with me -- what he said was that he thought that it would be helpful if both heads of state met promptly in Iceland or another location to discuss the issues that are between us so that when we meet in Washington, progress can be made and out of these discussions he envisioned that there would be instructions to their foreign ministers to proceed ahead in making progress in specific areas.

Q Admiral? Admiral, you mentioned that you were surprised that the Soviets opened the agenda in a far more ambitious range than you had expected. You went in with a fairly modest agenda hoping to get INF, nuclear testing, and then go on to Washington summit. What puzzles me is now you're talking about pocketing INF. Did nobody on our side try to pocket INF when that was agreed to and say to the Russians, look, if we don't come out with a whole big package, can you at least agree to keep INF separate and let's go on to a Washington summit and take care of START and SDI at a later date?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Certainly we tried that. And that would be our preferable way of doing it. We are --

Q When did you try that in the two days of talks?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That was tried from the very beginning when arms control -- when the President discussed our position on arms control on Saturday afternoon. And that was discussed in the working talks on Saturday night and Sunday morning.

Q And did they immediately, then, link INF to SDI?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. And that -- although in Gorbachev's discussion on Saturday afternoon, it was not clear but reviewing it in hindsight, it's pretty clear that even on Saturday afternoon he was linking progress in all the areas to our agreement on ABM and SDI.

Q What I'm trying to find out is were you, perhaps, lulled into a going along with a very dramatic range of objectives in Reykjavik and did not sufficiently stick to your moderate agenda and not insist enough to hold the things to what could be achieved instead of going for the whole thing and lose everything?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No. Look, we're not in this thing to play games, you know. We're in this to make progress on these many serious issues that divide us. If they're prepared to talk about making -- agreeing to solutions to some of these knotty problems -- and, you know, it may seem trivial to you, but in terms

of reaching a START agreement, getting agreement on counting rules is an important achievement. And we're not -- if they're offering to talk about these things -- if they offer to talk about these things, we're not going to say, well, we didn't talk about them. We're always ready to talk and we're always ready to reach agreements.

MORE

But they've got to be agreements that are in our interests.

Q What is going to happen to SALT II now? Anything --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Interesting question. SALT II interim restraint did not come up over the whole weekend in Iceland.

Q Sir, could I follow up on that?

Q Did the President not make up his mind about --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: He has not made up his mind yet. He will by the end of the year.

Q You said that the -- that Gorbachev went beyond the ABM restrictions in his counterproposal, but isn't it true that there is controversy within this administration and certainly in this country, including among the authors of the ABM Treaty, exactly what those restrictions are?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You are correct. There -- we have -- we are presently following what we call a restricted -- restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We believe that a broader interpretation is legal. This is a result of a very substantial legal analysis of the treaty and the negotiating record, and there are some disagreements with some Members of Congress, and Abe Sofaer, the Counselor at State, and Paul Nitze are working with the Congress to resolve this misunderstanding, and if at some point in the future we want -- the President decides to move to the broader interpretation, we will certainly be consulting with Congress.

But the point I want to make is that what Gorbachev is talking about is not the difference between what we call the restrictive interpretation and the broad interpretation. He is talking about modifying the treaty to make it more restrictive than either side ever intended for it to be in the beginning.

Q But would his position coincide with --

Q -- the broad or the narrow interpretation?

Q Would his position coincide with the Warnke-Reinlander interpretation? Would Gorbachev's position coincide with the Warnke-Reinlander interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I am not that familiar with that -- their specific interpretation, so I can't answer that.

Q In Reykjavik, Admiral, were you -- was the administration offering five and 10 years delay on the broad or the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Our position on that is that the five-year -- the way it was worded, it would be the same position that we've had since the July 25th letter to Gorbachev -- that we still reserve the right to go to the broad interpretation of the treaty at some point in the future, but at present we are -- our program is designed to be consistent with the restrictive interpretation, and that is what we're still following.

Q So it's really the broad one. As far as Gorbachev is concerned, he is entitled to say, that's what they're up to.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That would be correct.

Q Admiral, you said that -- to make progress. I was reminded this morning about Robert McNamara's electronic wall that was supposed to stop infiltration in Vietnam. If we are in this to make progress, why allow a chance to get this much of a deal to be held hostage to something that may or may not be technologically

practical?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I'll use a word that has been used in the press for -- recently. Our problem is that we are afraid that the reductions that we would get without SDI would be illusory.

MR. HOWARD: One last question, please.

Q Admiral, you said -- Secretary Shultz gave us a very bleak report on the outcome of the summit. He not only said you came away with nothing, but indicated that he does not expect any sort of summit. There's no talk at all of a summit in '87. You seem to be trying to put a better face on it now, and as a matter of fact over in Brussels today he seemed to be trying to put a better face on it.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I think last night everybody was tired.

Q Do you disagree with the assessment that Secretary Shultz gave us immediately after the summit?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I think -- you know, we recognize that there was the possibility here of achieving an historic agreement. And when we were unable to do that, everybody was somewhat disappointed. But I think, on reflection, everybody involved in the process -- and we were all tired. We'd been working hard and you become deeply involved in the issue. But upon reflection, I think overnight we realized that we've made significant progress and the possibility of, indeed, getting agreement outside of an agreement of SDI and ABM is a significant possibility.

Q Well, whose move is it now?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't think that I would want to characterize it that way. Our negotiating position will be reviewed and we will reflect on what moves they made and, as I said earlier, try to figure out some way to figure out what their concerns are, if they're being -- if they're negotiating here in good faith and if we find some way of convincing them that it's in both of our interests to move forward to a strategic defensive system.

You see, the think that's so imponderable here is if they're really serious about reducing nuclear weapons, it doesn't make any sense that they should be concerned whether we deploy a strategic defensive system or not at that point in the future because we would have -- except for our air-breathing and cruise missiles, we wouldn't have any nuclear weapons to attack them with. And that -- then you have to get into the question that I addressed on background as to, well, why won't Gorbachev agree. And maybe time will help solve some of those problems.

Q Admiral, you mentioned SALT II, and the President has not decided yet. Would you expect that, whether or not you're able to hold the Soviets to the concessions they have made piecemeal will be part of that decision?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I'm sorry, I missed the first part, and I've really got to go.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

5:15 P.M. EDT

Summary

File Reykjavik

November 28, 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES HOOLEY

FROM: W. ROBERT PEARSON *Bob*

SUBJECT: Travel to Reykjavik

As you know, there was extensive coordination through NSC and the Advance Office prior to the President's trip to Reykjavik to reach final decisions on various agencies' personnel to be approved for travel. All agencies were informed in writing of the final decisions.

On October 16, NSC received a letter from USIA indicating that 36 personnel from that agency had traveled to Reykjavik (Tab A). We have asked USIA for an explanation of those numbers and received a response (Tab B). USIA indicated in the response that certain informal arrangements were made for additional personnel to travel to Reykjavik. Could you let us know if any of these arrangements were coordinated with the advance office?

For your background information, I have included a copy of the final memo to USIA setting the ceiling on their personnel (Tab C). Two other NSC memos are also attached: (a) memo of October 2 informing agencies to coordinate travel arrangements with the White House Operations Coordinating Committee, on which your office was represented (Tab D), and (b) memo of October 4 stating that a travel ban remained in effect pending final decisions (Tab E).

Thanks very much.

Attachments:
As Stated

October 16, 1986

USIA

Dear John:

President Reagan's recent meetings in Iceland with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev were greatly supported by your participation in USIA's public affairs activities.

Attached, for your information, is a report of USIA's Public Diplomacy activities for the Iceland meetings. Please accept my sincere thanks for all your help and that of the members of your staff.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Charlie", written in a cursive style.

Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
Vice Admiral John Poindexter
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUPPORT
FOR THE
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

REYKJAVIK, ICELAND
OCTOBER 11-12, 1986

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUPPORT BY THE
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY FOR THE
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
IN REYKJAVIK, ICELAND
OCTOBER 11-12, 1986

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HIGHLIGHTS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUPPORT
BY THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN
REYKJAVIK, ICELAND

This report describes USIA's coordinated public diplomacy campaign in support of President Reagan's meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland. USIA, working in close association with the White House, the National Security Council, and the Department of State, presented and explained policies that the President considers critical to world peace.

USIS-Reykjavik was reinforced with 36 officers and specialists drawn from 10 European Posts and from USIA headquarters in Washington. USIA Director Wick personally oversaw the Iceland activities and ensured complete and comprehensive support for the President. Major highlights of USIA support are:

- * VOA stayed far ahead of Radio Moscow in bringing the news from Reykjavik to an estimated 23 million Soviet listeners and countless others around the globe.
- * VOA frequently filed earlier and more comprehensive reports than U.S. network reporters by using a "white link" telecommunications link shared by commercial news services,
- * WORLDNET broadcasts presented U.S. views throughout the period of the meetings through interviews with Secretary Shultz and major Administration figures.
- * WORLDNET carried a major briefing in Reykjavik for the international press by Assistant Secretary Rozanne Ridgway on October 10.
- * All U.S. and Soviet delegation members and the press covering the meeting saw WORLDNET's "America Today" interviews with Ambassadors Kampelman, Nitze, Rowny and Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State Ridgway, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle. These shows were broadcast over closed circuit to Reykjavik hotels and at the International Press Center.
- * A "New Enhanced Wireless File" system enabled direct feeds of USIA material into the offices of three West German newspapers. Transcripts of all administration interviews and statements were immediately transmitted to Posts worldwide by USIA's Press Service.

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D C 20547



November 25, 1986

Mr. W. Robert Pearson
Deputy Executive Secretary
National Security Council

Mr. Pearson,

Here's the list for which you asked.

Some of the people (marked in yellow) were not really part of our contingent, but were part of the White House contingent.

Ivory and Gangstead are based in Reykjavik.

Those listed as White House Press Monitors were not doing the main USIA tasks: they came from Europe to be part of Speakes' team, at his request.

Two TV technicians (Beaudin and Goosman) were added by the Director after he got to Andrews Air Force base on October 9 and learned of the need for two more technicians.

Please note also that we only took three seats on the official plane and only took nine "accommodations", while handling all other transportation and housing outside White House support.

I think that these, plus the 22 authorized on the original paper, account for most of those who went.

We are simply too busy with current business to stop and do a full nose-counting and then, if we come up over some number, grill people to try to reconstruct some last-minute phone conversations. The heads of this Agency were working, at the end, on the basis of informal guidance to them which specified that, if proper travel and accommodations were available through our means, we should send the appropriate number of people for the doing of our assigned tasks. That's what, in good faith and effectively, we did.


Stanton H. Burnett
Counselor

Attachment: As Stated

e/leary

USIA PERSONNEL AT REYKJAVIK MEETING OCTOBER 1986

OVERALL COORDINATOR:

Charles Z. Wick, Director, USIA

LARRY SPEAKES' OFFICE:

Dan Howard, White House Press Office

PRESS SERVICE:

Alexander Sullivan, White House correspondent accompanying the President

EUROPEAN AREA:

John Kordek, Director, Office of European Affairs

Philip Brown, White House Press coordinator

Christopher Snow, International Press Center Director

Hugh Ivory, PAO Reykjavik

Steve Gangstead, APAO Reykjavik

Anne Edwards, Senior Secretary

Craig Springer, Press Transportation, Baggage

Lyndon (Mort) Allin, White House Press Center Director

Rick Ruth, White House Press Center Deputy Director

Robert Callahan, White House Press Center Deputy Director

Anne Sigmund, International Press Center Deputy Director

Victor Jackovich, International Press Center Deputy Director

Arthur Salvaterra, Financial Logistic Support

Mary Beckwith, Secretary

John Keller, White House Press Monitor

Bruce Byers, White House Press Monitor

Peter Antico, White House Press Monitor

VOA:

Philomena Jury, White House Press Correspondent
accompanying the President

Ron Pemstein, State Department Correspondent accompanying
the Secretary

Hubert Katz, Field Engineer on White House technician pool

Andre De Nesnera, Geneva correspondent

Victor Franzusoff, Russian Branch correspondent

Oksana Dragan, Ukrainian Branch correspondent

Joseph Gallagher, Field engineer

Richard Firestone, Special Events officer

RADIO MARTI:

Annette Lopez, White House correspondent

WORLDNET Television:

Alvin Snyder, Director, WORLDNET Television

Michael Messinger, Executive Producer

Metin Cambel, Satellite Coordinator

Tim White, America Today Anchorman

David Cohen, Live & VTR Producer/Director

Robert Beaudin, ENG Camera Crew

Mary Beth Goosman, ~~ENG~~ Camera Crew

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

October 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LARRY R. TAYLOR
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency


SUBJECT: Travel to Reykjavik

USIA is allocated a total of 14 spaces in Reykjavik in support of the President's trip. Accommodations will be provided only for Director Wick, his two accompanying assistants and those 6 (Snow, Allin, Callahan, Sigmund, Salvatera, and Beckwith) who are already occupying hotel rooms in Reykjavik. We understand a 7th person to support the White House Press Operations -- Brown -- is already present in Reykjavik and that he has no hotel requirement, i.e., he has private accommodations.

The total of 14 also includes 4 people, not yet in Iceland, to support the White House Press Operations. These people must make their own travel and accommodations arrangements. There are no additional hotel rooms for these 4.

Apart from the authorized USIA presence in Reykjavik (the 14 spaces), the White House Press Office has asked and the NSC has agreed that 5 VOA and 4 WORLDNET personnel can go to Reykjavik on the understanding that the White House will provide neither transportation, administrative, nor hotel support. To reemphasize, there are no hotel rooms available for these people in Reykjavik.

No other travel to Reykjavik is authorized.


Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

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2

ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
59480	MEMO RODNEY MCDANIEL TO NICHOLAS PLATT, COL. JAMES LEMON, ET AL. RE TRAVEL TO REYKJAVIK	1	ND	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
59481	MEMO MCDANIEL TO PLATT, LEMON ET AL. RE TRAVEL TO REYKJAVIK (W/NOTATIONS)	1	10/4/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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