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Collection: Cobb, Tyrus W.: Files
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name COBB, TYRUS (NSC): FILES

Withdrawer

KDB 12/23/2008

File Folder REYKJAVIK PREPARATORY MEETING (3)

FOIA

F01-123/1

Box Number ~~91098~~ RAC Box 5

LAHAM

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
59498	MEMO	JACK MATLOCK, T. COBB, AND SCOTT DEAN TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE ATTACHED MATERIAL (W/NOTATIONS)	1	10/7/1986	B1 B3
59499	REPORT	RE SOVIET OFFICIALS (ONLY COVER PAGE AND PAGES 3, 6, AND 7)	4	10/3/1986	B1
59500	BIO	(PAGES 1 AND 3 ONLY)	2	10/1/1986	B1 B3
59501	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3
59502	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3
59503	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3
59504	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3
59505	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3

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59506	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3
59507	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3
59508	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3
59509	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3
59510	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3
59511	BIO		1	ND	B1 B3
59512	STATEMENT	POST-REYKJAVIK PRESIDENTIAL PRESS STATEMENT (NOT USED)	2	ND	B1
59513	MEMCON	REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN REYKJAVIK, OCTOBER, 1986 - FIRST MEETING	8	ND	B1

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59514	MEMCON	RE10/6/86 SENIOR ADVISORS LUNCHEON ON REYKJAVIK MEETING	5	10/14/1986	B1
59515	PROFS NOTE	FROM T. COBB	1	ND	B1

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59499 REPORT

4 10/3/1986 B1

RE SOVIET OFFICIALS (ONLY COVER PAGE AND PAGES 3, 6, AND 7)

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59500	BIO (PAGES 1 AND 3 ONLY)	2	10/1/1986	B1 B3

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59502	BIO	1	ND	B1 B3

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59504 BIO

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59510 BIO

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Cobb

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

System II
90602

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By 603 NARA, Date 12/23/08

October 21, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM R. GRAHAM
Director
Office of Science and Technology Policy

SUBJECT: Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev (C)

Attached is a copy of National Security Decision Directive 244 which was approved by the President for his Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. NSDDs fall within a special accountability requirement of the NSC. (C)


Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment
NSDD 244

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



United States Department of State #7188

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington, D.C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED

October 2, 1986

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By COB NARA, Date 12/23/08MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Public Statements for Reykjavik

The Department of State was asked to prepare draft public statements for the President's use during his forthcoming visit to Iceland. The following drafts have been prepared for possible use:

Statement on arrival in Iceland, October 9

Toast for a social event hosted by Iceland

Remarks to U.S. servicemen at Keflavik

Presidential Press Statement, October 12.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:OADR

Reykjavik Trip: October 9 Arrival Statement

I am very pleased to be in Iceland. Our connections go back a very long way to the days of the great Viking voyagers who made their way first to Iceland and then to America. Today, in fact, we Americans celebrate Leif Ericsson Day.

Our friendship was cemented during World War II by the hardships and suffering we shared as Allies. The ultimate victory in Europe was due in no small part to the courage and skill of the many Icelandic seafarers who shared in the effort to keep the North Atlantic supply lines open. Iceland paid a high price for that victory and it is a sacrifice that we recall today with gratitude.

Iceland was one of the original NATO partners and today it continues to play a crucial role in the protection of the Alliance's northern flank. However, Iceland's role in the Alliance is not limited to its contribution to the common defense, but also extends to the search for a just peace. There can be no better testimony to President Vigdis Finnbogadottir's personal commitment to this elusive goal than her willingness to host this meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and me.

At Geneva last year, General Secretary Gorbachev and I began a dialogue designed to narrow the differences that divide our two countries and put our relations on a more stable footing. We have made progress toward this goal and there is potential for us to make even more.

But this is by its nature a complex and delicate task. When General Secretary Gorbachev suggested that we meet to prepare the way for the next summit I readily agreed. I am determined to spare no effort in the search for a stable and lasting peace.

We will discuss many things during our stay here: Reducing nuclear arms and the risk of war, resolving regional conflicts, making progress on human rights, and broadening contacts and cooperation between our two countries. We will not solve all our problems in the next two days but we hope to point the way to a fruitful summit in the United States in the near future.

The gracious hospitality of the government and people of Iceland will make a big contribution to this important work. We are pleased to be here and we thank you for your warm welcome.

Reykjavik Trip: Draft Toast by the President

Madam President, Mr. General Secretary, ladies and gentlemen:

I want to thank the Government of Iceland, and in particular President Finnbogadottir, for their hospitality and for the arrangements they have made on such short notice to make this meeting possible. Iceland is a country with which we have ancient ties and long-standing relations of friendship and alliance.

Some historians say it was a Norseman, Rurik, who sailed from Scandinavia down the rivers of Russia to found the first Russian state. It was, of course, another Norseman, Leif Ericsson, the son of Eric the Red -- no political significance intended -- who left Iceland and went on to discover America, calling it Vinland.

It is an odd turn of fate that has brought you, Mr. General Secretary, and me, together in Iceland, where we are guests of Leif Ericsson's descendants. Here we meet geographically halfway, but on friendly ground with a history all three nations share.

Rurik and Leif Ericsson, the Norsemen, were warriors. But it was their peaceful and exploratory activities that we remember them for. They lived in a cruel and barbarous time, when might made right. To recall those times gives us the measure of how far mankind has come.

Mankind has come very far. Our societies have grown from different roots and in different directions. But we share a common interest in preserving the world from war. As I have said before, and as we agreed at Geneva, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. But this is not enough. We must reduce the arms we have accumulated. We must reduce the political tensions that have led us to build those arms. The sources of these tensions are many -- conflicts in many regions of the world, the suffering of millions from disease, poverty and natural disasters.

There is a strong relationship between our interest in preventing war and our equally strong interest in human rights. Our concern for protecting human rights is, in fact, part of our concern for protecting and strengthening the peace. If we do not address all these issues, we will succeed at none.

To do what is necessary for the future of our world will take wisdom, strength and perseverance. It will require courage like that shown by Leif Ericsson when he crossed the Atlantic to discover America. For our part, we are determined to spare no effort in the search for a lasting and stable peace, and in the pursuit of human freedom and dignity.

I propose we lift our glasses to courage, wisdom, strength and perseverance, the qualities we will need as we continue the important work that lies before us.

ELEMENTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DEPARTURE SPEECH
TO U.S. FORCES AT KEFLAVIK, OCTOBER 12, 1986

- Great appreciation by America and our Allies for the members of the Icelandic Defense Force who are faced with a difficult task in a very challenging environment.
- The dedication and professionalism of all members of the IDF is a source of pride and an example for U.S. forces everywhere.
- The men and women of the U.S. armed forces at Keflavik and other sites in Iceland are truly in the front lines of the Alliance every day. The proximity to major Soviet naval bases on the Kola Peninsula and to the sea lines of communication between the U.S. and Europe place them in one of the most strategic spots in the NATO area.
- The importance of their task has grown in recent years as the Soviet Union continues its expansion of a blue water navy and naval air power.
- We are very pleased by the excellent level of cooperation given by Iceland in maintaining the peace that NATO has kept in Europe for 35 years.
- The contribution of Iceland and the Icelandic Defense Force cannot be overestimated. It is a crucial factor in NATO's northern flank.
- The IDF is an important link between the people of Iceland and of the United States. In addition to this personal contact between our citizens, I am very proud of the assistance rendered by the IDF to Iceland in such areas of search and rescue at sea.

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INTERVIEW OF ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER
ON RETURN FROM ICELAND

Air Force One

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: What we decided to do is be very open with you on the negotiations so our position comes out very clearly. As we said before we got up here, we really didn't expect to get any agreements. We thought the best that we could do was to focus the agenda because we knew that there were substantive differences in the INF area, where the differences were on Asia -- I probably will use a little shorthand here because I think you're familiar with the issues -- Asia, short-range INF, and verification.

On nuclear testing, given the President's latest proposal to the Congress -- of course, that obviously fit in with what we wanted to propose to the Soviets. And are you familiar with that proposal to the Congress? All right, I'll come back to that -- remind me.

But the fundamental difference that we have with the Soviets in the testing area is the Soviets believe that we should immediately enter into a comprehensive test ban. And what we're saying is that we're willing to negotiate toward a comprehensive test ban as the ultimate objective, but only reach that point of banning all tests when we've eliminated the nuclear weapons that we need for strategic deterrence, because as long as we've got to rely on those weapons, we feel we need to test them.

In the SALT area -- or START rather, START -- in the START area, our major areas of difference was how to distribute the 50 percent reduction that we both had agreed to in principle at Geneva -- the mix, the mix of the (inaudible.)

All right, now, let's see. That INF, nuclear testing, START, SDI.

Q SDI --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. On SDI, of course, we feel very strongly that in order to continue to provide deterrence as we reduce offensive weapons that it's important to have the strategic defensive system eventually.

Now, the President's proposal back in July was that the Soviets join us in a new treaty that we would be willing to sign now, but which would be -- the trigger for implementation would be a future decision after 1991 that either side wanted to proceed ahead with the development and deployment of SDI. The treaty that we were prepared to offer would have required the side that decided to proceed ahead with SDI to offer a sharing plan and would have required that party to share, if both parties would agree to work out a plan to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles.

Q Yes, but --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, I'm going through this part in history right now --

Q That's very good, very useful. Are you saying that both sides were on the side that offered to proceed with the plan?

Q When you say proceed, you mean laboratory testing --

MORE

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: At the end -- you see, for the first five-year period, we were talking about doing the research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. If we wanted to go beyond that point to development and testing not permitted by the ABM Treaty, at that point we would have to transition to this new treaty that we were prepared to sign now. That new treaty would -- the legal word would be a novation for those parts of the ABM Treaty where there was a conflict. But we would -- the main point here is that under our plan, we would have been under a continual treaty.

The question of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would not have arisen. So we would have just had transition from the situation today where we have one treaty, an ABM Treaty, to a situation where we would actually have two treaties. The ABM Treaty would remain in effect, but there would be a new treaty with provisions that would contradict the ABM Treaty and the new treaty would supercede it in those areas.

And our plan was a sincere effort on our part to figure out a way that both countries could transition from a situation where we've got to rely on offensive weapons for strategic deterrence to a situation where we could shift the reliance to defensive systems to maintain the deterrence.

Q In effect, from bad to something else.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right. From mutual assured destruction to defending one's country. In our case, we would have been defending much of the free world.

Now, the Soviets, all along, had wanted to do everything they could to stop SDI. That's why their proposal going into Iceland was that we agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 15 to 20 years. We do not feel that a workable SDI system is that far away. We feel that it's closer to that, and because we think it's a much safer way to coexist, we didn't want to wait that long.

Q Can I ask a question?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes.

Q Why, why are the Soviets so afraid of SDI?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, that's --

Q I mean -- (inaudible) -- thinking it's a first-strike -- Is it because they want the time to catch up or is it because they really fear that it is -- that they're going to be blown up?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's a great question, Helen. I'm not sure I know the answer to that question.

Q What came out of the dialogue with them that made -- showed their fear? What is it that -- are they trying to trick us?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This afternoon, I specifically asked Shevardnadze that question in one of the meetings. I tried -- I asked him, "What do you fear from SDI?" They simply avoided answering that question.

Q He wouldn't tell you?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right --

Q Do you think they have a good enough understanding, however, of the technology? You say we're much closer than that. Do they know how close we are?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, 15 years is a long time. Ten years is a long time. SDI is not just around the corner. We've got a lot of work to do. I don't want to mislead you that we've got some sort of breakthrough.

Q I just want to ask you one more question on that -- in that respect. What do you think bothers them? Is it because they are so far behind and they feel they'll be outgunned and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, let me go on and you come back to that question, Helen, because --

Q -- what we did in these 72 hours --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Some parts of the negotiations may reveal that. Now, in addition to arms control, of course, coming to Iceland, we wanted to talk about the regional issues, human rights, and the bilateral issues.

On human rights, we're very concerned about the lack of emigration from the Soviet Union. There are several hundred thousand people that want to emigrate from the Soviet Union. Since Geneva, we have made some progress in getting divided families out and well-know dissidents. But really, we have not been able to have much impact on the bulk numbers.

So in the discussions yesterday, the President and Gorbachev reviewed their respective positions and agreed that, last night at 8:00 p.m., that two working groups would convene, one on arms control and one on human rights, regional and bilateral issues.

The arms control group met for ten and a half hours. They went right straight through the night. The other working group went for about five and a half hours.

On the regional, human rights, bilateral issues, the working group was able to reach agreed positions on a work plan for the next several months to make progress in most of our outstanding bilateral issues; agreed to continue discussions on ways of addressing the human rights issues; and agreed to continue the dialogue we've been having with them on the regional issues.

In the arms control area --

Q Over the next several months?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Over the next several months.

Q Where? What area?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: In the same fora we've been using in bilateral talks.

In the arms control area, agreement was reached last night on a way of handling the short-range INF problem in that -- beg your pardon -- in that there was an agreement to freeze at the current Soviet level and continue negotiations on short-range INF, once the long-range INF issue was settled. There was agreement that the

(end of side one)

(begin side two -- interview in progress)

And that was not just a matter that we would have agreed to pull weapons out and they could immediately place them back in, that they would remain in effect -- in other words, prohibiting the reintroduction of these weapons. The weapons would be destroyed.

Our going-in coming to Iceland was that we were prepared to accept 100 warheads in Europe from each side and, for the Soviets, 100 warheads in Asia and 100 for the U.S. in the United States.

Through last night, the Soviets would agree to come down to zero-zero in Europe, but they wanted to delay a reduction in Asia and let that be dependent upon a future negotiation. We were unwilling to accept that last night because it would simply shift the burden from Europe on to our Asian allies.

Q -- future negotiations unspecified?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Unspecified. Now, probably, rather than going through this chronologically, let me just continue with INF for a moment. Today, the Soviets agreed to come down to 100 warheads on each side globally. Their 100 would be in Asia; our 100 would be in the United States. So that would amount to zero-zero for Europe. That would be 100 percent reduction for Europe for the Soviets and about an 80 percent reduction in Asia, or from 1323 warheads today down to 100 warheads for the Soviets -- a very significant reduction. And we agreed to that.

Q You say we agreed to that -- that means that at the end of the working group you --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, I'm sorry. I transitioned there from the working group last night to the discussions today.

Q Okay. You agreed to that on Sunday?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Right. The Soviets proposed it today and we agreed to it today.

Q At both leadership levels.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Right.

Q That would have been -- (inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, you must remember that what we were trying to achieve here were instructions for the Foreign Ministers of both countries. They would then take those instructions and prepare a framework agreement that could be signed in a Washington summit. And then treaties would have to be prepared from that framework agreement. There are a lot of details to be worked out, Helen, which were not addressed today.

Now, let me just give you a footnote here. As you'll see in a moment, Gorbachev held all of the arms control agreements that both sides were prepared to agree to hostage to our SDI. So, Helen, we do not have this INF agreement now. I'm just telling you what the two leaders were prepared to agree to.

Q So he linked them all?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All.

Q He linked all of the -- (inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right. But that was significant progress in INF.

MORE

On START, last night --

Q Let me just ask -- (inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Last night on START, both sides reached agreement on 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles.

Q 1,600?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: 1,600. And they agreed on 6,000 nuclear warheads. The Soviets were --

Q 1,600 nuclear delivery vehicles, 6,000 nuclear warheads.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. SNDV.

The Soviets were still resisting the negotiation on sub-limits, but we felt that could easily be a job completed in Geneva. They did agree there would be substantial reductions in their heavy ICBMs.

The agreed that bombers, gravity bombs, short-range attack missiles would count as one reentry vehicle each.

Q Gravity bombs and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Short range attack missiles. In other words, the combination of the bomber with its load of bombs and short-range attack missiles would count as one re-entry vehicle in the 6,000 count. In other words, this was solving the problem of our difference of opinion on how to count. The Soviets in the past had referred to nuclear charges. So that within the 6,000 you'd have the ICBM warheads, the SLBM warheads, the ALCM warheads, and then each bomber with bombs and SRAM that combination, each one of those would count as one. But is that clear? I want to be sure that --

Q Can you run through that again?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, okay. The nuclear warheads that count as one each: ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ALCMS -- air-launched cruise missiles -- and then the combination of the bomber with its bombs and with its short-range attack missiles, that package together counts as one. That was significant progress in that area.

Q What is our numbers today? Why would this be significant progress?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, because in the past up to this point when the Soviets have put forth a warhead number, they were talking about nuclear charges. So they counted the bomber and each of the bombs and each of the short-range attack missiles as one each rather than the package counting as one, which gives the Soviets a distinct advantage if you count that way because the equating one bomb or one short-range attack missile with the ICBM re-entry vehicle is an unfair equality. All right. Everybody agreed to that.

Q Today?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That was last night. No, they reached all those agreements on START last night, in the working group. The working group was unusual, by the way, in that the Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshall Akramehev, led the discussions.

Q How do you spell his name? A-R-K --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, A-K-R-A-M-E-H-E-V. Akramehev.

MORE

You need to have your staffs check that out. That's about right.

Q It's on the list. We got the list.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. This was very unusual.

Q To have him sitting in?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: To have him sit in. As the Chairman of the -- the leader, yes.

Q That, to you, I take it, showed seriousness of purpose.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Showed seriousness of purpose and carried on a very business-like negotiation last night for which we are appreciative.

Q (Inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. But they said last night that the -- well, there was not agreement last night on the INF. That only -- the agreement on that was arrived at today. But last night, especially in the START area, they indicated they were not willing to finally agree to these provisions unless we would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years and if we would agree to a modified and more restrictive definition as to what research development and testing is permitted under the ABM Treaty.

Q Let's get that straight because that's really crucial. Then they would -- willing to be -- not be willing to agree to these provisions unless the U.S. was willing to not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Right. And if we would agree to make the restrictions on research and developing and testing more restrictive than presently provided for in the ABM Treaty.

Q Was this -- you mentioned these types of treaties. Was this sort of a drop-in clause that they were working for? What were they --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I would just say, it was a condition -- I mean these are still -- these are not heads -- last night, this was not heads of state agreeing on these issues --

Q This -- it was last night that they laid this out?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right.

Q In the arms control group?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right.

Q Which was headed by whom on the U.S. side?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Paul Nitze.

Q They never made this so clear before?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: They hadn't made all of these provisions in START that they would agree to so clear before. But we knew that -- all along -- that they wanted some linkage between SDI and START. But last night, they also tied START, INF, and nuclear testing all to an agreement on the ABM Treaty view from their side or SDI as viewed from our side.

Q So what were those -- or are those restrictions that are stumbling blocks?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. Let me get to that a little bit later because I want to cover last night a little bit more.

Q Okay.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: On nuclear testing, there was agreement last night that both sides would agree on starting negotiations on further limitations to nuclear testing with improved verification being the number one agenda item -- number one by -- in terms of priority, with the ultimate objective of providing further limitations on nuclear testing in conjunction with agreement to reduce offensive forces in parallel with agreement to reduce offensive forces, with the ultimate objective being a comprehensive test ban at the point that we no longer had to rely on nuclear weapons for a strategic deterrence.

Now, the elements of this were agreed to. The way of characterizing it, the way I've just characterized it was not agreed to. In other words, to make that clear, both sides are prepared to begin negotiations. The agenda would be improved verification and further limitations on nuclear testing as we reduce offensive weapons, with the ultimate objective being a comprehensive test ban.

We want to characterize that as beginning negotiations on further limitations on nuclear testing. They want to characterize it as beginning negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. But there's an important distinction in that we want it to be made clear to everybody that we are not prepared to enter into an immediate comprehensive test ban, but only reach that point over time as we reduce the nuclear weapons.

Q So substantial difference in interpretation?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, of characterizing it, although, frankly, I think we could have resolved that difference today if we could have solved the SDI problem -- the ABM problem.

All right. The discussions today between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev -- they began at 10:00 a.m. They were supposed to finish at 12:00 p.m. They actually went to about 4:30 p.m. Well, you must have these times.

Q Yes, we have all of them.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: And then broke at 1:30 p.m. Then Secretary Shultz and I met at 2:00 p.m. with Shevardnadze. And we had some people on our side, he had some people on his side. And we met from 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Then the President and Gorbachev reconvened about 3:30 p.m. or so, I guess.

Because when the President came back, Secretary Shultz and I had to brief him on our discussions with Shevardnadze.

Q I'm sorry -- the President and Gorbachev, one-on-one?

MR. SPEAKES: Separately. Each side separately.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Each side separately. No, the meetings began this morning with two-on-two. Shultz and Shevardnadze -- or Shultz and the President and Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. Then that meeting went from 10:00 a.m. until about 1:30 p.m., broke. The President went to get lunch. Shultz and I met with Shevardnadze and his group from about 2:00 p.m. until 3:00 p.m. The President and Gorbachev came back. Each team met with their head of state for about a half hour I guess it was, and then, the President and Shultz and Gorbachev and Shevardnadze began two-on-two discussions that ran until we quit, whatever time that was.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We took one little break.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, there was one break in there where each side caucused with their own people.

Q What were the issues -- (inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: From the morning meeting, the President and Gorbachev came to agreement on INF, on the 100-100 globally. On START and the Defensive Space Component -- SDI and ABM -- the Soviets continued to hold in their position and they would not agree to the START position or the INF positions that had been agreed upon, or the nuclear testing positions that had been agreed upon unless the United States was willing to not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years and with these further restrictions on what sort of research, development and testing could be accomplished during that ten-year period.

Q I'm sorry -- did that come up in the morning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: (Inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: So Shultz and I met with Shevardnadze and his people to see if we could work out a counterproposal that protected our interests in SDI. So through that meeting and the meeting with the President when he came back, we prepared a counterproposal in which --

Q A U.S. proposal?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This was a U.S. proposal. Let me preview this just a little bit in that throughout the discussions, both here and I think you've heard him say it publicly, both the President and Gorbachev have talked about the total elimination of nuclear weapons. So our counterproposal went like this.

We agreed not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for five years, during which time we would conduct research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, while we both achieved the 50 percent reduction in offensive weapons during this five-year period.

Q One is tied to the other?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Right. If the --

Q May I ask -- you're dealing with -- when you say what is allowed under the ABM Treaty, you're talking about the so-called broader interpretation?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This is an important point. Our position hasn't changed on that. We believe there is a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty that is legal. And we would want to preserve the right to use that broad interpretation during that five-year period but --

Q They don't agree with that, I presume?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We are still, at this point in the SDI program, sticking to the narrow interpretation and have not changed to the broad interpretation. But we want to preserve that right if at some future point the research reaches the point where that becomes important.

Q Not to be argumentative, but -- (inaudible) -- said testing was not a part of the ABM.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That clearly is not true.

Q We don't need to go through that whole argument --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Then our proposal continued -- that if the 50 percent reduction was achieved at the end of five years and if the Soviets would agree to continue reducing offensive weapons at the same rate --

Q This was after five years?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: After five years -- if they would agree to continue reducing offensive weapons at the same rate for the next five years, to reduce the last 50 percent, we would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for that -- the second five-year period. Thus, in 1996, both sides would have eliminated all of their offensive ballistic missiles which both leaders have said they were prepared to do.

At the end of the ten-year period, both sides would be free to deploy a strategic defensive system unless otherwise agreed by both parties.

Q Can I interrupt for a moment?

Q Do you have another tape?

Q Unless otherwise agreed by both parties?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Right.

Q Does that mean -- would that have meant new negotiations in any case or --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, it just means that there would have to be a specific agreement by both sides not to deploy, in other words. In other words, it would be the obverse of a situation today. Today, if we wanted to deploy, we would have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

Q This counterproposal was presented at the afternoon meeting?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The afternoon session that began at 3:00 p.m.

Q When they agreed to come back, and that was -- (inaudible) -- try to find some way out of the linkage or --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This would have kept the linkage, but it would have kept the linkage in such a way that a strategic defensive system would have been possible for both sides. But the system would not have been deployed until the offensive weapons were reduced, eliminated.

The General Secretary agreed with a large portion of this counterproposal. The point that he disagreed with was that he wanted us to agree to restrict all research, development and testing of space-based systems to the laboratory.

Q Can I just check that again. He wanted to agree to --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All research, development and testing of space-based advanced defensive systems to the laboratory -- and I'm not just talking about the 100 percent, I'm also talking about the 50 percent -- at this time.

Q So they're not really sincere in their negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to say they're insincere. I'm saying that's a possibility. And it may not -- it may simply be -- and, again, I don't want to question their sincerity, but you know they may have their rhetoric get a little far

out in front of what they're really prepared to do at this time.

Q But going back to the part that you discussed ON THE RECORD and therefore, if you're willing, going back on the record --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right, back on the record.

Q The explicit American fear here was that if we agreed to their proposal, that you not have any insurance policy on compliance.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Compliance with the reductions on schedule and compliance, once we had both come down to zero ballistic missiles on both sides -- because at that point we've become quite vulnerable unless we've got a defensive system.

Q When you would have had all this verification and on site inspection and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: But the problem there is that the asymmetries that exist between our two societies give us very much a disadvantage here of being able to protect concealment of weapons and unauthorized construction of new weapons in underground facilities and they don't have the same problem with us. Now, they may not believe that but we know damn good and well that if we sign a treaty, the Congress would insist that -- any administration would want to follow the treaty and our Congress would insist on it. But we don't have the same kind of insurance with them. And again, I don't want to challenge the sincerity of the present leaders, but we're talking about, you know, years and years into the future and the security of the country simply cannot rest on an uninsured agreement.

Q -- and probably vice versa?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's probably true, Helen.

Q It's almost a given but -- you couldn't find verification procedures that would be the submission insurance policy.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's our problem.

Q And when you came down to --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You've also got third world problems that would enter it but --

Q Yes, I mean, all of us would immediately wonder, wouldn't that be an odd world if the Soviet Union and U.S. eliminated all of their ballistic missiles and other nations had them -- European, Middle Eastern nations have them. How would you deal with that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, at some point, you know, if we had agreed with these general principles, and if we were going to go off and actually draw up framework agreements treaties, we would have to bring allies into the process at some point.

Q What about non-allies?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Non-allies you would have to try to convince to enter the program. But it, you know, it is possible that if you had a Strategic Defensive System that both sides would be willing, on a bilateral basis, to go down to zero ballistic missiles.

Q Even if India, or Pakistan, or Israel --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it gets --

Q or anyone --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You see, the other point here that is important to recognize is that many of the criticisms of SDI have been trying to protect broad areas like Europe, the United States, because of the very large number of warheads and penetration aids. Once you get the numbers down small -- like from a third country, or from non-compliance, SDI becomes much more effective. You don't have the same problems with the smaller numbers of warheads and penetration aids. So, it becomes easier it solve the SDI problem. It becomes cheaper to solve it.

Q Was the President tempted by the sweeping proportions of the offer that was under discussion and on the table?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We recognize the historical proportions of what we were proposing. The President was very clear on that point.

Q Because what do you say to people who don't necessarily understand exactly what INF and START and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, that's why I'm going --

Q PBT is all about? What do you think that the general Joe out in --*

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, that's why I'm going on the record --

Q -- thinks about the safety of the world after this?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's why I'm going on the record and being so detailed in telling you what happened -- because we want you to get the story out straight.

Q But, do you believe that --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: And we will have to -- we'll have to -- the President is going to speak to Nation tomorrow night and we -- I guess you'd announced that hadn't you?

? Yes --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay.

Q Yeah.

Q -- in the Oval Office.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: And we'll try to explain as much as we can in that speech. But as you can see, it's a very complex issue. And we're not going to give up, you know, we're going to keep trying. We'll try to find some way to protect the opportunity to have a Strategic Defensive System and still get all these reductions.

Q Did you make any arrangements before you broke up today for further discussions other than those existing forums in, I guess, Geneva?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Nothing specific. But we needed to reflect -- I think both sides need to reflect on what's happened the past couple of days and decide how best to proceed from this point.

Q Would you say there is no animosity?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No animosity would not be the right description.

Q No, I'm saying is there --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, I don't think so. For example,

in leaving Hofdi House today I shook hands with Marshall Akramehev and we both expressed the pleasure in meeting one another and that we hope to be able to -- well, I don't -- he didn't say quite that. I'm trying to think exactly what we said because I don't want to misquote him. We expressed best wishes to each for the future.

Q Was the atmosphere in the room relaxed --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: It was very businesslike the whole time, Helen. There were few, if any, polemics on either side. It was very serious. Both Heads of State understood the seriousness of the issues that they were addressing and --

Q To understand the sequence -- you drew up this counterproposal by 3:30 p.m. The President presented it. They came back with their more restrictive definition. Did you then break and caucus and decide among yourselves what to do about it?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We modified their counter-counterproposal --

Q In the caucus?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: In the caucus, to remove the more restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty and I mean that's more restrictive than we're currently following, and put back in the right to deploy at the end of the ten-year period.

Q Came back into the room with that, presented it, and did Gorbachev simply say no at the table when he heard it?

(end of tape one)

(tape two, side one -- in progress)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: -- the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting.

Q -- he would not agree to --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: He would not agree to allow us to do the research, development and testing which we feel is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

Q May I ask -- after today, aren't you, in effect, going to go ahead with this anyway?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Go ahead with what?

Q Go ahead with the research and development and testing.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Oh, yes.

Q So he has been unable to -- from his point of view -- with the United States on --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right.

Q Was this a bitter ending?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't think bitter, I think sadness on our part that the Soviets wouldn't agree to what we thought was an imminently fair, non-threatening, safe, stable position.

Q Do you believe --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Let me -- I want to -- let me just wind up -- the sort of chronology here and then characterize it and then I'll get into your questions about what all this means.

We feel that we made good progress in our bilateral issues work program. We are -- remain disappointed the Soviets will not make progress on the immigration issue. We feel in the nuclear testing area, in INF, we were able to reach positions on both sides in which we could conclude agreements at some future time. And we think that we made significant progress in establishing positions on both sides in START that would allow continued negotiations toward a treaty -- an eventual treaty, much closer.

Q So are you saying that this wasn't necessarily a bitter breakup, that there is a level there that was reached today that you can build on?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's exactly right. I think we were able to break through a lot of obstacles that have existed in the Geneva negotiations, that if we can get over our difference of opinion about the necessity to have strategic defense that we can make progress much faster in the other areas.

On INF, we came to a way to solve the Asia problem. I think we came to an acceptable way of solving the short-range INF. There was an agreement in principle on what is required on verification of INF, but a lot of work would have to be done to have to refine that -- those general principles into a workable agreement.

Q Is that on-site?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: INF.

MORE

Q Did they agree to on-site?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: In principle, they're agreed to some type of on-site inspections.

Our general principles for verification on INF are data exchanges before and after the reduction, observation of the destruction of the weapons, and some sort of followup monitoring that would involve on site inspections.

Q When you come to a stopping point. I have a question.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay, go ahead.

Q So when it all came down in the end to a definition of the ABM Treaty -- the broader versus the more narrow --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, that's not quite right.

Q Well, I thought it did because if I understood you right, you said it was that that they wouldn't accept.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, what they -- what they -- it's not just the difference between the narrow and the broader interpretation, they want to make it narrower. They want to make it more restrictive by limiting research, development and testing of any space-based type system to the laboratory.

Q Let me -- let me try my narrowing. It all came down to that the President would not give up anything on SDI. Is SDI is the most important thing to them?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, that's not true.

Q Well, SDI is the thing that blew up all this.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, but it wasn't true that we weren't willing to give up anything. We did --

Q Oh, all right, I'll rephrase that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, please. We -- the President agreed -- would have been prepared to agree to withhold deployment of SDI for ten years.

Q Well, he doesn't even have SDI. He won't have it for about 11 years.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That is not necessarily the case.

Q But SDI really is the crux.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Let me finish.

Q Okay.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The important thing here is that -- and the reason that we are so insistent on having an ability to eventually deploy a strategic defensive system, is that the history -- and I don't want to challenge the integrity or the sincerity of the present Soviet leaders -- but based on the history of our relationship we are not confident that the reductions that are proposed would actually be carried out. And so, a strategic defensive system becomes an insurance policy to make sure the reductions occur and that there is future compliance with this type of treaty.

With the national security of the United States and much

of the free world, depends on compliance with such a START treaty, we think it is only reasonable and prudent that both sides be permitted to deploy a strategic defensive system if they so desire. We fail to see how a defensive system when we would have no ballistic missiles, could possibly be perceived as a threat to the Soviet Union. Therefore, we do not understand what the Soviets are afraid of and why they would not agree to the President's proposal. One has to wonder, indeed, what it is they are afraid of.

Q (Inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: On BACKGROUND now. I'll answer that question on BACKGROUND.

Q What's the question?

Q Why are the Russians afraid -- deathly afraid of SDI?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One could wonder -- one could maybe assume -- this is on BACKGROUND now -- are you on BACKGROUND? One could speculate that maybe they think that we could develop a defensive system in SDI that would somehow be able to damage targets on earth. But we don't really believe that that's the case. They may claim in their propaganda following this meeting that that's one of the reasons. But, their scientists at a very senior level, have told us that they are not concerned about that. The point is, the physical principles that are involved, it wouldn't make any sense to do that because you can't get enough energy down through the atmosphere with a laser beam or an X-ray laser or any kind of a beam weapon to cause significant mass damage. It would be stupid of us to try to do that. It's much cheaper to keep the ballistic missiles. And their scientist, specifically Malikhov's deputy -- again this is on BACKGROUND -- told us some time ago that they weren't really concerned about that.

Q (Inaudible)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There may be a political question in that Gorbachev is so far out on a limb here with wanting to ban SDI that he can't get back in off the limb. The other possibility is that they are not willing -- really willing to make these significant reductions in offensive forces -- and I'm not just talking about the 100 percent, I'm also talking about the 50 percent -- at this time.

Q So they're not really sincere in their negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to say they're insincere. I'm saying that's a possibility. And it may not -- it may simply be -- and, again, I don't want to question their sincerity, but you know they may have their rhetoric get a little far out in front of what they're really prepared to do at this time.

Q But going back to the part that you discussed ON THE RECORD and therefore, if you're willing, going back on the record --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right, back on the record.

Q The explicit American fear here was that if we agreed to their proposal, that you not have any insurance policy on compliance.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Compliance with the reductions on schedule and compliance, once we had both come down to zero ballistic missiles on both sides -- because at that point we've become quite vulnerable unless we've got a defensive system.

Q When you would have had all this verification and on site inspection and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: But the problem there is that the asymmetries that exist between our two societies give us very much a disadvantage here of being able to protect concealment of weapons and unauthorized construction of new weapons in underground facilities and they don't have the same problem with us. Now, they may not believe that but we know damn good and well that if we sign a treaty, the Congress would insist that -- any administration would want to follow the treaty and our Congress would insist on it. But we don't have the same kind of insurance with them. And again, I don't want to challenge the sincerity of the present leaders, but we're talking about, you know, years and years into the future and the security of the country simply cannot rest on an uninsured agreement.

Q -- and probably vice versa?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's probably true, Helen.

Q It's almost a given but -- you couldn't find verification procedures that would be the submission insurance policy.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's our problem.

Q And when you came down to --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You've also got third world problems that would enter it but --

Q Yes, I mean, all of us would immediately wonder, wouldn't that be an odd world if the Soviet Union and U.S. eliminated all of their ballistic missiles and other nations had them -- European, Middle Eastern nations have them. How would you deal with that?

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Q Came back into the room with that, presented it, and did Gorbachev simply say no at the table when he heard it?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't have that detailed a debrief of the President of that last session. But I understand that he agreed -- that Gorbachev agreed to our rewrite of their proposal -- their last offer.

Q You mean put it down on paper or -- what do you mean "rewrite?"

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, in the caucus we took their response to our 3:30 p.m. proposal and we modified their response to move it back in the direction of our 3:30 p.m. proposal. The wording was a little bit different.

Q When it was all over -- how did they know it was all over? Did the President say, well, that's it?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't know the answer to that -- exactly what was said at the very end. But I -- when the President went down at 3:00 p.m. after the caucus, he said this is going to be our final offer.

Q He said it to Gorbachev?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, he said that to us.

Q That was about 3:30 p.m.? -- that was later.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't know what time it was.

MR. SPEAKES: 3:30 p.m. -- 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. was Reagan-Gorbachev-Shultz-Shevardnadze session, two-on-two.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: So that the caucus was about 4:30 p.m.

MR. SPEAKES: The caucus started at 4:30 p.m. and then he went back in from 5:00 p.m. until 6:30 p.m. approximately.

Q Did the two leaders express the wish to see each other in the near future, or was that at all brought up in the end?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No. We don't have any prospects of a -- of a near term meeting.

Q Why?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, at this point we simply don't.

Q Was it discussed at all?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: What?

Q Was it discussed at all -- (inaudible) --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Generally through the meetings, Gorbachev talked about his forthcoming trip to the United States. But both sides recognize that -- well, we're prepared -- we were

prepared for him to come at any point, but he wants -- he wanted to wait to see how long it would take to convert these instructions to foreign ministers, which would have come out of Iceland, to a framework agreement, that would cover all of these areas that the two heads of state could sign in Washington. And Gorbachev wasn't sure how long that would take.

Q Was it suggested --

Q -- didn't come up with some dates, did they?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: There were no dates mentioned on either side.

Q Yes. Well, in other words, if you didn't reach this -- (inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Have I covered about everything for you?

Q Yes. You've covered everything.

Q But I'd like you to just stand up and do one or two questions on the camera -- make it very brief.

Q One last question. Did you feel deceived by the extent to which they apparently wanted agreements here or -- had not this been billed simply as a discussion, begin directions or mootness. I mean, did they go farther than you thought here? Did they push this towards agreements?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. They went further than we thought. But I wouldn't characterize this as feeling deceived.

Q Inaudible.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. They were all -- all of the things that they were prepared to move on focused the agenda on how to resolve these problems.

Q There was no -- given the large number of areas in which you say there was agreement reached, why wasn't it possible to come away with a -- the ability to say, okay, we still disagree about SDI and ABM but can't we continue to talk and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, we're -- yes, we're prepared to continue to talk, but from our point of view, we would like to proceed ahead to sign agreements in these other areas that we think are important. But the Soviet side is holding the ball hostage to our agreeing to their very restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Well, it's not really an interpretation. They really want to modify the ABM Treaty to make it more restrictive, because, Ellen, going to back to your point, the ABM Treaty provides for the possibility of research, testing and development on systems that are based on other physical principles that were not thought about when the ABM Treaty was originally signed. And, clearly, the lasers and the particle beams and those kinds of space-based systems would fall in this other physical principles category.

Q And how did they want to limit it specifically? I mean, for example -- one example.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, they would not have wanted us to conduct any research, testing or development of any space-based system.

Q Any --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Any.

Q Based on any principle?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: On any principles.

Q Want me to do that for you?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You don't have to.

Q Better.

(end of tape two, side one)

(in progress)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: -- that we were working on issues of historical importance in that we were proposing a reduction of -- ballistic missiles to zero to be achieved in 10 years. And that is clearly historic.

Q You must have been tremendously disappointed when that did not work.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I must say that we were sad that the Soviets could not see fit to give us the opportunity to continue to develop a strategic defense system, which threatens no one, but simply provides a shield against ballistic missiles, when, at the same time, we were willing to withhold deployment of such a system until the ballistic missiles were eliminated. At that point, we feel that because the national security of the country would be so dependent upon compliance with such a future treaty, the President felt it would not be prudent to agree to such reductions unless we could be assured of having a strategic defensive system.

Q So you needed, or felt you needed, an insurance policy to guarantee Soviet compliance to reduce the missiles to zero?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's correct. An insurance policy.

Q And therefore you have doubts about the Soviet willingness to adhere to such an agreement?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We don't want to question the sincerity of the Soviet leaders of today. But based on a history of problems that we have had in our relationship and the compliance with past treaties, the President feels that it's essential, since the national security of the United States and much of the free world would depend on that compliance, that we have a strategic defensive system to make sure that the treaties were followed in reducing the missiles to zero but, also, staying at that level and not reintroducing these -- this type of weapon.

Q And how far, finally, were the Soviets prepared to go? I mean, what was their minimum position?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: They were -- they said that they were prepared to reduce to zero and they were prepared to allow the possibility of future deployment. But they wanted to make more restrictive the ABM Treaty with regard to what type of research, testing and development that could be conducted during this 10-year period that we would be reducing the offensive ballistic missiles.

Q Basically in the laboratory?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right. They wanted to restrict it just to the laboratory, which is more restrictive than the existing treaty -- even the narrow interpretation of the existing treaty. We, and the President specifically -- I agree with him -- feels that that would essentially kill the SDI program.

Q So it came down to that definition of SDI?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's correct.

Q Thank you very much.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You're welcome.

Q Can I ask you a question? Did he ever seem to think -- talk the President out of Star Wars and what was their feeling when it was all over? There was great disappointment on our side --

MORE

or sadness --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Helen, that would be pure --

Q How do you think they felt?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: -- pure speculation on my part. I

--

Q Did they show any emotion or were they unhappy or --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The Soviets, usually in meetings like this, don't show much emotion.

Q You mean they just accepted the blowup of the summit without any --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I just -- I don't really have any color there for you. I --

Q Maybe one final thing's worthwhile. Where do we go from here?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I'm sure that, as we, they are going to go back and reassess what's happened over the past two days. We were able to reach solutions to many of the obstacles to progress in the other negotiations that are going on. At this point, they are holding agreement to these solutions hostage to an agreement in the strategic defense area. But we're going back and reflect and we hope they do and we will work to try to figure out some way to continue the progress that we have achieved here in Iceland but, at the same time, protecting our ability to develop a strategic defensive system and deploying it at some point in the future if we so choose.

Q Thank you.

END

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7263

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CCOB NARA, Date 12/23/08

~~SECRET~~

October 15, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TC*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

At Tab I is a memorandum of conversation from the Senior Advisors Luncheon on the Reykjavik Meeting held October 6th in the Cabinet Room.

RECOMMENDATION

That you place this memorandum of conversation in the NSC files.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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REYKJAVIK PREPARATORY MEETING (3)

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59514	MEMCON RE10/6/86 SENIOR ADVISORS LUNCHEON ON REYKJAVIK MEETING	5	10/14/1986	B1

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59515	PROFS NOTE FROM T. COBB	1	ND	B1

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.