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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name COBB, TYRUS (NSC): FILES

File Folder REYKJAVIK PREPARATORY MEETING (7)

Box Number ~~91098~~ RAC Box 5

Withdrawer

KDB 12/23/2008

FOIA

F01-123/1

LAHAM

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
59544	LETTER	DRAFT HEAD OF STATE LETTER FROM REAGAN (W/NOTATIONS)	2	ND	B1
59545	REPORT	FBIS 102 (W/NOTATIONS)	1	10/14/1986	B3
59546	REPORT	FBIS 111	3	10/14/1986	B3
59547	REPORT	FBIS 112	2	10/14/1986	B3
59548	REPORT	FBIS 113	2	10/14/1986	B3
59549	REPORT	FBIS 002	2	10/14/1986	B3
59550	REPORT	FBIS 003	2	10/14/1986	B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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Poindexter pool - 2

SDI. At one point, said Poindexter (getting slightly ahead of his chronology), he asked Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze "What do you fear from the Strategic Defense Initiative?" According to the Admiral, the Soviet "avoided answering the question."

The others areas of conflict had to do with regional issues, human rights, particularly Jewish immigration, bilateral issues. Poindexter noted that earlier ^{discussions with} ~~protests to~~ the Soviet Union had not ~~produced~~ had "much impact on the low numbers of immigration."

Mikhail Gorbachev had received the U. S. positions (above) and in turn given the Americans his. Saturday ~~night~~ night the working groups were named. One ^{on} arms control and the other on human rights etc. The arms group worked 10 1/2 hours -- through the entire night. The other group worked ~~for~~ 5 1/2 hours. The latter group agreed on positions for a work plan for the next several months that would provide a continuing dialogue on regional, bilateral, immigration and other human rights issues.

The arms issues were, of course, the sticky ones. Saturday night the ^{working} ~~arms~~ group reached agreement on a "way of handling short range INF problem." According to the Admiral, the two sides agreed to freeze the short-range INF level at the current USSR level and continue negotiations once the long-range INF issue was settled. The long-range INF agreement ~~emerged~~ emerged from a proposal that each side accept 100 missiles ^{in Europe} ~~in Europe~~, 100 in Asia for the Soviets, and 100 in the U. S. for the Americans. The bargaining went on through Saturday night and before it was done the Soviets had agreed ~~for~~ to a zero-zero formula for Europe, but they wanted to delay on the Asian cut back. The U. S. team balked on that. By Sunday, however, the Soviets had agreed to come down to ~~2500~~ a hundred missiles ^{globally} for each side, theirs in ~~Asia~~ and ours in the United States. Poindexter felt that agreement was significant for the Soviets, representing a 100 percent reduction in Europe, 80 percent in Asia, in all a reduction from 1300 ~~war~~ war heads to 100. "We agreed ~~to~~ to that," declared the Admiral.

Though all of us in this discussion referred to "negotiations," Poindexter said the talks always were in the framework of "preparing instructions for the foreign ministers ^{TO PREPARE A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT} for the summit in Washington," ~~so that they might draft proposals that would lead to treaties.~~ ^{THIS} All of the above, as indeed, all of what follows, was "held hostage" to SDI, said Poindexter. ^{next came} START.

AGREEMENT
COULD
LEAD
TREATY

By Saturday night, by the Admiral's account, both sides had agreed on 1,600 strategic delivery nuclear vehicles. (This was in the talks on START) They also ~~had~~ agreed on 6,000 nuclear warheads. The Soviets, said Poindexter, were resisting the negotiations of sub limits but they thought that could be done in Geneva. One of the ~~significant~~ significant changes ~~in~~ in the Soviet position was that they agreed that bombers with gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles constituted one re-entry vehicle. "That meant that we had solved the problem on how to ^{count} ~~count~~ ^{them} ~~them~~," said the Admiral. The understanding covered ICBM's, SLBM's,

Poindexter pool - 3
ALCM's, Bombers, SRAM's.

~~A SLM's, Bombers, SRAM's.~~ "We made significant progress in that area," added Poindexter. "The Soviets were talking about nuclear charges ~~instead of the whole package.~~ ^{WHERE EACH BOMB AND SRAM WOULD COUNT AS ONE VICE THE AGREEMENT NOW WITH EACH BOMBER WITH BOMBS AND SRAM COUNTS AS ONE.}"

The Soviet working group was unusual, continued the Security Aide, because the head of it was Sergei Akhromeyev, ~~Army~~ chief of staff and deputy defense minister. The head of the American group was veteran arms negotiator Paul Nitze. Almost immediately Saturday night the problems with SDI emerged. The Soviets ~~were~~ not willing ~~to~~ to move the START understanding ahead unless we agreed not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for 10 years. They also wanted, said the Admiral, to make the ABM treaty more restrictive on the issues of the meaning of research and ~~development~~ development and testing. The Soviet intention to link SDI ~~and~~ and START was, thus, plain. And then that position of the ~~Soviet~~ Soviet's grew into linkage with ~~everything~~ INF also.

^ AND NUCLEAR TESTING

On nuclear testing, the working arms group agreed ~~that both sides would~~ begin negotiations on further limitations of nuclear testing. The first item on the agenda was to be verification. The U.S. position was to have an agreement that would provide further limitations on testing but ~~had~~ worked out ~~in~~ in conjunction with the agreement to reduce offensive forces. Ultimately, said the Admiral, the idea was to have a comprehensive test ban ~~treaty~~ treaty at that point ~~where~~ where we no longer had to rely on nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence.

Sunday was the crucial day. Reagan laid out the American proposal in the morning meeting which ran over the limit by an hour or so. The President, said Poindexter, ran into the same linkage with Gorbachev, though, again, there was remarkable agreement in other areas like INF. After the Reagan-Gorb meeting ended, Reagan huddled with Shultz ^{REAGAN} and Poindexter and refined the proposal. They agreed to abide by the ABM treaty for 5 years and if the Soviets ~~agreed~~ reduced their missiles at the agreed upon rate and continued to do so in the second five years, the U. S. would continue compliance for the ~~sex~~ full 10 years. "By 1996," ~~he~~ said Poindexter, "both sides ^{TEN} would have eliminated all their ballistic missiles. At the end of ~~five~~ years both sides would feel ~~BE~~ free to deploy ~~to~~ and SDI system unless otherwise agreed upon by both parties."

Back at the table, the Soviets still balked. The General Secretary would not yield on ~~the~~ SDI ~~point~~. "He wanted an agreement," declared the Admiral, "restricting research, development and testing ~~of~~ of a space based system to the laboratory. The president felt this was essentially killing the SDI program. He was not willing to ~~xxx~~ accept this restriction."

~~I am frankly a little hazy here on the ~~xxx~~ sequence of meetings so I would advise further checking. It appears that after the American 10 yr. proposal was made in the morning by Reagan, the Soviets came back with ~~xxx~~ modifications. The Americans then came ~~up~~ up with a counter-counter proposal which moved their position back toward the first. Then, Reagan ~~went~~ back to ~~action~~ on one with Gorbachev. "This is going to be ~~xxx~~~~

to be our final offer."

The meeting did ^{not} end in bitterness, insisted Poindexter. "There was a sadness on our part." He did not question the sincerity of the Soviets, he said, but "the reason we are so insistent that we eventually have a defensive system is that, based on the history of our relationship with the Soviet Union, we are not absolutely confident that the reductions proposed will actually be carried out. The defense system is an insurance policy. Our national security and that of most of the free world depends on compliance with such a START treaty. It is only reasonable and prudent that both sides deploy defense systems if they so desire. ~~xx~~ ^{ONE SIDE WITHOUT BALLISTIC MISSILES, BUT WITH} We fail to see that a defensive system against ballistic missiles could possibly ~~be~~ constitute a threat. We do not understand what the Soviets fear in a defensive system."

At this point our source went on background. He speculated that perhaps the Soviets feared that ~~as~~ a defensive system might be used against weapons on the ground, although the Soviet scientists have told Americans they are not worried about that. Maybe, suggests our source, Gorbachev has a political problem, being so far out on a limb now he cannot yield on SDI. Or maybe he cannot really make ^{the} reductions called for in these negotiations. The ~~be~~ rhetoric may have gotten out ahead of reality, says our man. ~~Beke~~

Back on the record. Asked about the problems of verification, The Admiral said the asymmetry of our societies made it very difficult for us to detect Soviet weapons development. In the U.S., of course, the press ~~xxx~~ would poke and prod, a President would insist on living up to ~~xxx~~ agreements and Congress could constantly look over his shoulder. We don't have the same checks on them.

Poindexter said that the president understood the "historic proportions" of this meeting and the action he had taken, ~~as~~ "of what was on the table."

"We're not going to give up," he declared. "We are going to find some way to preserve SDI and still have reductions in nuclear weapons. Both sides need to ~~xxx~~ reflect on what happened for a few days." There was very little acrimony on either side, continued Poindexter, which is reason for some hope. But there is no prospect now of any near term meeting.

Hugh Sidey, Time

National Security Council
The White House

06 OCT 3 P 8: 59

Please include in appropriate memos.

System # _____
Package # _____
DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Rodney McDaniel			
Rodman/Cockell			
Al Keel	<u>2</u>		
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>to DC</u>
Situation Room			

OK/notes

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

FYR at this point - By w/ed collect views in his group. Bob

(A)

Reyk

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 1, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ALTON G. KEEL
FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TC*
SUBJECT: Interpreters/Notetakers

In Geneva we had a real problem in notetaking in the 1-on-1's, with interpreters required to do both notetaking and interpreting. I strongly recommend that in Iceland we do not use simultaneous translation; otherwise notetaking becomes impossible. At any rate, we will have three translators there to insure that we have fresh talent for each session. Obviously, the best solution would be that a notetaker be present (in addition to the translator) at each session and that our notetaker be Jack Matlock.

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



October 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Donald Regan
Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *MLS for CZW*

SUBJECT: Reykjavik Meeting: Emerging Issues in West
Europe

Summary

West Europeans want the Reykjavik meeting to focus primarily on nuclear arms control and have targeted INF as the most promising area for forward movement. Positive movement forward on INF at Reykjavik may strengthen Prime Minister Thatcher's position in the UK. British Labor Party leader Kinnock's anti-nuclear policy has drawn considerable coverage pro and con on the Continent. The French are increasingly sensitive to outside pressures on France's independent nuclear deterrent stemming from Britain's nuclear debate, a possible INF agreement, and possible superpower talks on limiting nuclear testing. The European press treats the congressional override of the President's veto on South African sanctions as a significant defeat for the President, but does not link it to the Reykjavik story. The Daniloff case is largely off the editorial pages with no speculation for the moment on its residual effects on Reykjavik. The attached memorandum provides additional details.

END SUMMARY

Attachment: As stated

October 3, 1986

REYKJAVIK MEETING: EMERGING ISSUES IN WEST EUROPE

Arms Control

West Europeans expect and want the President and General Secretary Gorbachev to discuss primarily nuclear arms control in Reykjavik. Virtually all West European press speculation continues to target INF as the most likely area for forward movement. However only news articles in the FRG on SRINF (Short Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces) have publicly raised the potential security ramifications of a possible future INF agreement. .

There is some speculation that forward movement on INF resulting from the Reykjavik meeting would strengthen Prime Minister Thatcher's position in the UK. British Labor Party leader Kinnock's stand on nuclear arms draws considerable coverage pro and con on the Continent, divided editorially along ideological lines.

There is growing concern in France that its own commitment to an independent nuclear force may come under future pressure from three outside sources: the growing domestic political nuclear debate in Britain, progress towards an INF agreement, U.S.-Soviet talks on limiting nuclear testing.

Regional Issues

Congressional override of the President's veto on South African sanctions receives major play in Europe today, where it is being treated as a significant foreign policy defeat for the President. However, European coverage makes no linkage between the South African story and the Reykjavik story. There is no speculation that the President's reverse on South Africa will affect the Reykjavik meeting.

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement of Soviet interest in discussing Afghanistan at Reykjavik is widely reported without comment.

The Daniloff Case

On balance, European editorialists credit the Soviets with having bested the U.S. in the Daniloff affair, but continue to credit the President with recognizing the realistic need to deal with the Soviets and not allow the Daniloff case to prevent doing that. The conservative European press has been more concerned than the rest of the European press about the implications of what was generally regarded as the "trade-off" of an innocent American for a Soviet spy. There is no European press speculation for the moment, however, over whether the Daniloff affair will have any residual effects on the principals at Reykjavik.

This report is based on a survey of senior USIS officers at the following European posts: London, Bonn, Paris, Rome, Geneva, The Hague, Brussels, US NATO, Copenhagen, and Oslo.



S/S: 8630906
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By 605 NARA, Date 12/23/08

October 3, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Special Air Missions Aircraft

Secretary Shultz will accompany the President to Reykjavik for the pre-Summit meetings scheduled to take place on October 11 and 12. Immediately following the final meeting, the Secretary will travel to Brussels where he will brief the NATO allies on the results of the President's discussions with the Soviet leader. The Secretary plans to arrive Brussels on the evening of October 12, remain overnight, conduct the briefings on the 13th and return to Washington.

To allow Secretary Shultz to keep this schedule, the use of a Special Air Missions aircraft is requested to transport the Secretary and accompanying staff from Reykjavik on October 12.

Thank you for your continued cooperation and support.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: 10/31/86

10/6/86

MEETING WITH ICELANDIC PRESIDENT VIGDIS FINNBOGADOTTIR AND
PRIME MINISTER STEINGRIMUR HERMANSSON

Setting

- You will meet briefly with President Finnbogadottir, Prime Minister Hermannsson and Foreign Minister Mathiesen. All Icelandic participants speak English.
- Mrs. Finnbogadottir was elected to the largely ceremonial post of President in 1980 and was re-elected in 1984 without opposition. Prime Minister Hermannsson, a member of the Progressive Party, is the head of a center-right coalition that came into office following elections in 1983. New elections are scheduled to be held no later than the spring of 1987. Foreign Minister Mathiesen is a member of the senior coalition partner, the Independence Party.
- The government has turned around a long period of poor economic performance. Inflation has been brought down to a projected 10% this year from a high three years ago of 80%. Unemployment is negligible and real economic growth for this year is projected at 3.5%.
- Although there is a strong tradition of isolationism and support for a neutralist foreign policy, Icelandic support for NATO has strengthened in recent years.
- You will want to thank the Icelandic government for its many efforts to make the meetings a success. Other possible discussion topics include East-West relations and bilateral issues, such as the military cargo transport treaty, whaling and civil aviation. The Icelanders are not expected to pursue any substantive issues in detail during your courtesy call.

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Ronald Reagan Library processing

Collection Name

COBB, TYRUS (NSC): FILES

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REYKJAVIK PREPARATORY MEETING (7)

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59544 LETTER

2

ND

B1

DRAFT HEAD OF STATE LETTER FROM REAGAN
(W/NOTATIONS)

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DON GREGG

FROM: TY COBB *TC*

SUBJECT: Additional Language

Don, I have made some changes on the Vice President's speech and would suggest a paragraph be inserted along the following lines:

"The President goes to Iceland demonstrating his commitment to solving problems in U.S./Soviet relationship. He will insist on engaging the Soviets on the entire range of issues on the U.S. agenda -- bilateral, regional and human rights concerns, as well as arms control. While we expect no agreements to be reached in Reykjavik, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev will identify those issues with reasonable prospects of solution and accelerate efforts to resolve them. We are hopeful that Mr. Gorbachev will be equally willing to lay the groundwork for a meaningful summit in Washington.

The President's policy toward the Soviet Union -- based on realism, strength, and dialogue -- has created the potential for effective negotiations with the USSR. What the Soviets respect is.... "

Don: language is too formal, but thrust as there. You will, of course, want to make it more "Vice-Presidential".

TC

BASED ON PAST PERFORMANCE, WE REALLY HAVE LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE WE CAN TAKE THE SOVIETS AT THEIR WORD. SO WE NEED TO VERIFY THE OUTCOME OF ANY AGREEMENT WITH OUR OWN EYES, OUR OWN INSTRUMENTS. AND TO CEMENT THE DEAL, WE MUST PRESS THE SOVIETS TO REVERSE THEIR AGE OLD, CLOSE SOVIET RESISTANCE TO ON-SITE INSPECTIONS.

THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW WILL BE GOING INTO THAT MEETING WITH HIS EYES OPEN. HE WILL BE LOOKING AT SOVIET ACTIONS, NOT WORDS. HE WILL ^{WANT TO SEE CONCRETE PROOF} ~~REQUIRE PERSONAL VERIFICATION~~ OF GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S DESIRE TO ~~DO BUSINESS~~. ^{IMPROVE} ~~RELATIONS~~. ^{SOVIET - AMERICAN}

* Insert Here

~~I AM HOPEFUL MR. GORBACHEV IS WILLING TO ACCEPT THE~~ ^{WORK TOWARDS LAYING} ~~GROUNDWORK FOR A MEANINGFUL SUMMIT.~~ ^{in Washington.} WHAT THE SOVIETS RESPECT IS STRENGTH, AND THE ^{KEY} ONLY REASON THEY'RE NEGOTIATING WITH US TODAY IS BECAUSE SIX YEARS AGO WE BEGAN TO REBUILD OUR DEFENSES. SO WE'RE GOING TO REYKJAVIK IN A STRONG POSITION; WE'RE GOING WITH NO ILLUSIONS; AND WE'RE GOING WITH A LEADER WHO IS ONE OF THE MOST POPULAR IN OUR HISTORY.

YOU KNOW BARON VON STEUBEN, THE PRUSSIAN GENERAL WHO SERVED UNDER WASHINGTON IN OUR REVOLUTIONARY WAR, SAID SOMETHING VERY INTERESTING ABOUT AMERICANS.


**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547



October 1, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tyrus W. Cobb
Director of Soviet and
West European Affairs
National Security Council
The White House

FROM: Michael D. Schneider 
Deputy Associate Director
for Programs

SUBJECT: Worldwide Public and Media Reaction
To President's Announcement of
Pre-Summit Meeting

The President's announcement on Tuesday that a pre-summit meeting with Mr. Gorbachev would take place October 11-12 in Reykjavik drew overall positive comment from foreign publics and media. The attached briefing paper summarizes judgments from USIA posts overseas and foreign media commentary on the announced meeting. Major posts were surveyed in the five geographic regions for this report.

Also attached for your information is a Media Reaction Special Report on foreign media response to the announcement.

October 1, 1986

WORLDWIDE RELIEF AND RENEWED OPTIMISM FOR IMPROVED SUPERPOWER
RELATIONS GREET ANNOUNCEMENT OF REYKJAVIK MEETING

Summary:

Optimism and good wishes express the mood overseas in the wake of the announced Reykjavik meeting. The President is receiving credit for recognizing the need to deal with the Soviets and acting upon it. At the same time, Gorbachev's suggestion to meet in Reykjavik is seen as indicative of his serious commitment to arms control. Expectations center on making progress on nuclear arms control, especially INF. There is widespread relief that the Daniloff affair is over. Some European editorialists commented that the Daniloff-Zakharov cases went from being an "impediment to a summit" to being the "impetus" for one.

End Summary

Most people see the Reykjavik meeting as an unusual, but apparently necessary step toward making progress on arms control, which they see as the preeminent US-Soviet issue. However, there is no expectation that the meeting in Iceland is intended by either side to replace a Summit in the U.S. later this year.

In West Europe, attention is riveted on the possibility for movement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). In Israel and Egypt, there is concern that the Soviets will press for an expanded role in the Middle East. In East Asia, Latin America and Africa, Reykjavik is viewed as a possible harbinger for an easing in East-West tensions that will benefit trade and economic development. The Japanese are also concerned with how the Iceland meeting will affect chances for a Nakasone/Gorbachev meeting in January.

World Press Review:

The U.S.-Soviet announcement of a pre-summit meeting in Reykjavik was received with surprise and generally favorable early treatment in the world press. Initial editorials and commentaries, mostly from Western Europe, largely agreed that the overriding desire by both sides for a summit brought an end to the Daniloff-Zakharov cases. They said that the cases, which at first were an "impediment to a summit, in the end became the impetus." To some papers, the announcement of "this unusual meeting" was "astonishing," because "suddenly, both sides appeared to be flexible."

The meeting was welcomed in the West European press with widespread optimism for arms control agreements, especially in the reduction of intermediate range missiles. Most papers did not think Reykjavik will produce any final agreements, but would open the way for them in Washington. Many saw a determination by both sides to work towards arms control agreements.

Around the rest of the world, first-day commentary on Reykjavik was rare, except in East Asia. The examined papers welcomed the meeting and expressed optimism that improved U.S.-Soviet relations would lead to arms control agreements.

This briefing paper summarizes judgements from USIS posts overseas and foreign media commentary on the announced Reykjavik meeting. Major posts were surveyed in the five geographic regions for this report.

SPECIAL REPORT

Foreign Media Reaction

United States Information Agency

Wednesday, October, 1, 1986

PRE-SUMMIT ANNOUNCEMENT

Summary

The President's announcement of a meeting in Reykjavik with Mr. Gorbachev prompted expressions of surprise in world media, but at the same time writers judged the move to be a good sign that superpower relations were improving.

London's conservative Times called the news "a momentous announcement that astonished the world...a triumph of the diplomatic art."

Paris-based Europe One radio suggested the meeting will "give a new elan to Soviet-U.S. negotiations."

Many correspondents saw a clear connection between the meeting and the Daniloff case. Bonn's conservative Die Welt said it was a "surprising result of the settlement of the Daniloff case." In Seoul, independent Hankook Ilbo reported that "the preparatory meeting seemed to have stemmed from their consensus on the need for their wounds to heal from the Daniloff situation."

In fact, in the judgment of some foreign media writers, the Daniloff negotiations represented "questionable bargaining" which in the opinion of economic Les Echos of Paris led to the "almost indecent announcement--because of its rapidity."

Nevertheless, there was a strong feeling in the media that if the meeting of the two leaders came out of this crisis, it was a strong plus for the world. West Germany's TV Two commentator said that "we must take the meeting in Reykjavik as an attempt by the two superpowers to mend their damaged relations."

Along this line, Turin's centrist La Stampa held that "the most important fact is that, on the verge of a serious crisis or a stalemate in their relations, the two superpowers felt the need for a step forward."

In Hong Kong, the pro-Taiwan Oriental Daily remarked, "Since the USSR has released Daniloff, the whole international situation is no longer so dangerous." And a commentator for Tokyo's publicly financed NHK-TV maintained that the meeting "indicates U.S.-Soviet enthusiasm toward achieving concrete agreement."

EUROPE

BRITAIN

"Gorbachev to Meet Reagan for 'Summit'"

London headlines of October 1 read "Gorbachev to Meet Reagan for 'Summit'...Whitehall Sees INF Deal in Sight" (Times), "Reagan About-Turn Allows Mini-Summit...Reagan, Gorbachev Know Each Must Compromise in Iceland" (Guardian) and "Reagan, Gorbachev to Hold Pre-summit Meeting Next Week...Reagan About-Turn Takes U.S. Experts by Surprise" (Financial Times).

"A Momentous Announcement That Astonished the World"

The conservative Times Washington correspondent Michael Binyon called yesterday's news of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting "a momentous announcement that astonished the world....The U.S. Administration sees Soviet willingness to travel to a NATO country to speed up the preparations as indicative of Moscow's seriousness in wanting a productive and fully-prepared summit..."

"President Reagan Too Easily Satisfied"

The paper commented editorially, "A deal has been wrought which is a triumph of the diplomatic art. Its composers have every reason to congratulate themselves on the skill with which they have carried out their task. But the audience is still free to make up its own mind..."

"It looks, in short, as if President Reagan has been too easily satisfied. The harmonious resolution to the summit squabbles--rehearsed forte in Moscow and Washington simultaneously--drowns an unpleasantly insistent theme related to Daniloff.

"If Mr. Gorbachev's hostage-taking can win for him the summit of his choice and the release of his intelligence agent with so little sacrifice, he may just be tempted to try a variation in future."

"Reagan Backed Shultz, Certainly Alarmed Weinberger"

The liberal Guardian Washington correspondent Michael White said, "In a potentially historic switch the once-obdurate U.S. President has finally placed his authority behind his more conciliatory advisers, led by Secretary of State Shultz, and has almost certainly alarmed Defense Secretary Weinberger..."

"Daniloff Episode Became Impetus for Summit"

Ian Brodie reported from Washington for the conservative Daily Telegraph, "In the inevitable political scorecards drawn up over yesterday's dizzying turn of events, the United States finished slightly ahead, although innocent Americans in Moscow remain at risk any time a Soviet spy is arrested in the United States.

"Oddly, although the Daniloff episode was initially a stumbling block to a summit, in the end it became the impetus for the superpowers to get on with things..."

"Ploy of Arresting a Journalist Achieved Moscow's Purpose"

In the editorial opinion of the paper, "The fact is that few will be convinced by Mr. Reagan's emphasis upon having achieved the exchange of a spy for dissidents rather than for an American journalist..."

"What matters to the Soviet Union is that the ploy of arresting a journalist has accomplished its purpose, even if by a roundabout route..."

"Reykjavik Unlikely to Produce Major New Agreements"

The independent Financial Times asserted, "For at least two reasons, the forthcoming meeting in Reykjavik is unlikely to produce any major new agreement.

"First, the time is very short to reach agreement, even in outline, on any of the most important issues; second, Mr. Reagan will be reluctant to give hostages to fortune, three weeks before the midterm elections in the United States, by putting his name to any compromises which could even be suspected of being too favorable to the Russians..."

FRANCE

"Curtain Rising at Reykjavik"

Antenne 2 TV's Washington correspondent Jacques Abouchar stated October 1, "In Reykjavik, the two leaders will be on neutral ground without a specific agenda, but with the determination to reach concrete results on the thorny issue of arms control. Then and only then will the next step be prepared."

"A New Elan to U.S.-USSR Relations"

In the view of Europe One radio's Washington correspondent Jean-Pierre Joulin, "Gorbachev and Reagan will meet to give a new elan to Soviet-U.S. negotiations..."

"Arms control in Europe will be a main issue. If the conversations are positive, the meeting will be followed by a summit in Washington. If it is not, they will postpone the summit. But we already know that there is mutual determination to agree."

"Reagan-Gorbachev Surprise Pre-Summit in Iceland"

Parisian headlines included "Surprise Meeting Between Two Leaders" (Tribune de l'Economie), "Settlement of Daniloff Affair Opens Way to a Reagan-Gorbachev Summit" (Le Monde), "Reagan-Gorbachev Surprise Pre-Summit in Iceland" (Figaro), "The Big Swap" (Quotidien) and "Price for a Summit" (Le Matin).

"Questionable Bargaining Surrounded the Affair"

An editorial in economic Les Echos commented, "Despite President Reagan's affirmation that the Soviets 'yielded,' the two countries indulged in an unglorious swap.... 'National interest' won in the end..."

"Will the U.S. President think about the bitterness of the families of American hostages in Lebanon which would have liked to see Washington display as much 'determination' to obtain their release as it did in the Daniloff case?"

"Questionable bargaining surrounded the affair, and the almost indecent announcement--because of its rapidity--of the meeting in Iceland also revealed a brutal and impudent Gorbachev.

"Let's hope that President Reagan will remember this at the time of their surprising 'rediscovery.'"

"Perhaps a Summit Is Priceless"

Pro-Socialist Le Matin suggested in an editorial, "The event is important....It is out of the question to minimize the tete-a-tete even though electoral motivations pushed Reagan to obtain the meeting at any price.

"We cannot forget the regrettable bargaining preceding the announcement. This did not improve the image of Gorbachev or Reagan..."

"Reagan will have a hard time making people forget the very expensive price of his meeting with Gorbachev. But perhaps a summit is priceless."

WEST GERMANY

"An Attempt to Mend Damaged Superpower Relations"

TV Two's Washington correspondent Gerd Helbig reported on the Reagan-Shultz press conference September 30: "Of course one question was raised at once: who is the winner and who the loser of the game? The question should be settled soon."

"We must take the meeting in Reykjavik as an attempt by the two superpowers to mend their damaged relations. And it is a signal to the world public that both sides really want the summit."

"President Reagan had always refused to accept a meeting with Gorbachev at a 'third' place. That he has agreed to Reykjavik indicates that the superpowers are preparing for a summit with substantial results..."

"Hope for Success in Reykjavik"

Typical FRG headlines October 1 were "Reagan and Gorbachev to Meet in Reykjavik October 11-12" (Frankfurter Allgemeine and others) and "Hope for Success in Reykjavik...Gorbachev Initiated Idea of 'Preparatory Summit' (Die Welt).

"Surprising Result of Daniloff Settlement"

According to conservative Die Welt of Bonn, the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting "is one of the surprising results of the settlement of the Daniloff case.... When he announced the meeting, Reagan insisted that this will merely be a meeting for preparing an eventual summit."

"Kohl to Contribute Suggestions"

Bonn's independent General-Anzeiger noted, "Chancellor Kohl intends to make 'full use' of President Reagan's suggestion that others contribute ideas for the summit."

"Kohl wants to make sure that German interests, especially with a view to an INF agreement, will be taken into consideration."

"Soviet Recipe Proved Right"

Conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine wondered, "The next summit in Washington is to be preceded by a meeting in Reykjavik. Why that? Perhaps Reagan and Gorbachev are afraid that a big summit might fail and they want to make sure at a minor summit that there are prospects of success.

"Perhaps they hope to make enough progress in Reykjavik for being in a position to impress the world with detailed agreements at a later meeting in Washington.

"The Daniloff case was an obstacle on the road to the summit. The Soviets have removed it. However, they did not have to make a sacrifice. On the contrary: in view of indications that their spy Gennadi Zakharov will soon return to the USSR unscathed, their recipe has proved right again: arrest an American and exchange him for an important spy."

ITALY

"The Hope That Came in From the Cold"

Washington correspondent Vittorio Zuchoni judged October 1 in an editorial headlined as above in leftist, influential La Repubblica, "A meeting...which is not a formal summit but is not a postponement either.

"Perhaps it will not produce public agreement but it will make it possible in the future. No defeat for anybody, but no victory either...

"It's a diplomatic blitz...which is certainly the easiest solution, at present, for Reagan and Gorbachev--both unable for domestic reasons to maintain their commitment to a formal summit in America this year...

"The Soviet leader deserves credit for succeeding in having his offer for a pre-summit accepted....However, the American leader also deserves some credit for accepting it promptly.

"Let's not forget that Reagan is not the one who must ask for strategic concessions from Gorbachev, but that the opposite is true, since the Americans are holding the best card--Star Wars...

"For both Reagan and Gorbachev--the Great Communicator and the Great Persuader--the battle is one of vital importance..."

"Superpowers Felt Need for Step Forward"

The lead editorial in centrist La Stampa read, "The most important fact is that, on the verge of a serious crisis or a stalemate in their relations, the two superpowers felt the need for a step forward, even though one that might be reversed. Both Reagan and Gorbachev confirmed their willingness to reach some concrete agreement.

"Reagan, in particular, does not want to conclude his Presidency with only challenges as tests of strength...and Gorbachev is seeking more than ever an external relief which he needs for his domestic reforms..."

IRELAND

"Not the 'Real' Summit, but..."

The liberal Irish Times commented October 1, "The diplomatic pushing and shoving of recent weeks assuredly has been vindicated. Extraneous distractions such as accusations of espionage have been tidied away, so that the matters of essential and critical concern to the relationship of the superpowers may be isolated.

"Both Mr. Reagan and Mr. Shultz went out of their way to stress that the Icelandic encounter will be a curtain raiser and not the "real" summit, which the Americans hope will be held in the United States before the year is out, as originally planned.

"But, no matter how much logic is chopped, it will be hard to see this month's occasion as anything other than a summit, albeit less formal than the subsequent production--which may be all to the good.

"It was a fair guess that the Russian stood to lose more in his own constituency than the American in his, if there was no summit. Hence, perhaps, the dramatic proposal of the Icelandic meeting, which conceivably could be designed to preempt the disapproval of eminent critics in the Politburo."

"Gorbachev Sees Reduction in U.S. Public Hostility"

In a separate report from their Moscow correspondent, the paper said, "Mr. Gorbachev...sees a reduction in U.S. public hostility towards the Soviet Union and the consequent unwillingness of Congress to fund new weapons systems as an effective way of controlling the arms race, possibly with as much significance as diplomatic agreements on curtailing nuclear weapons..."

BELGIUM

"Reagan and Gorbachev in a Hurry"

Typical headlines in Belgium October 1 were "A Summit Which Is Not Quite One" (La Libre Belgique), "Reagan and Gorbachev in a Hurry: Appointment in 10 Days" (Le Soir) and "Reykjavik Summit Crowns Diplomatic Stunt Work" (Het Belang van Limburg).

"Reagan Has Landed on His Feet Again"

Conservative Catholic Gazet van Antwerpen commented, "It must be said that President Reagan, following a somewhat hesitant start when he was pushed onto the defensive by Gorbachev, has finally landed on his feet again..."

"There will be a second meeting with Gorbachev...just in time for the results of the meeting to influence the November 4 Congressional elections..."

"(But) it still remains to be seen whether the Reykjavik meeting will turn into...a clear success for Reagan."

SWITZERLAND

"The Summit That Isn't"

Swiss headlines October 1 included "Superpower Rendezvous in Iceland" (Berner Zeitung), "Reykjavik Rendezvous; Meeting to Prepare Next Summit in U.S." (Le Matin) and "The Summit That Isn't" (24 Heures).

"Both Sides Have Blinked"

On October 1, center-left Tages-Anzeiger reported, "The Reykjavik meeting shows both sides have blinked."

"The United States has dropped its earlier demand for thorough preparations and a definite agenda as preconditions for a meeting, and the Soviets are no longer insisting on having an agreement all ready to sign."

"This can be construed as acting with higher interests in mind."

"U.S.-USSR Happy Ending Looks Like an American Defeat"

Middle-of-the-road Le Matin held October 1, "With Nicholas Daniloff back in Washington and Gennadi Zakharov in Moscow, the American-Soviet happy ending begins to look like an American defeat..."

AUSTRIA

"Green Light for the Summit"

Under the above headline, Vienna's independent Die Presse October 1 carried this front-page byliner's comment, "The chances of success in Reykjavik are very good..."

"New Ground"

Under the headline "New Ground," Socialist Party Neue AZ's foreign editor wrote October 1, "Indications are that, in cold Iceland, not only ice will be broken...but one will also break new ground..."

"Moscow's heavy barrage for disarmament has broken Washington's resistance. But also Reagan's worries about his future position in history textbooks play a role.

"It sounds paradoxical, but if everything goes well, this champion of the cold war 'par excellence' might go down in history as the president who brought peace. This will be all right with us."

DENMARK

"The Pieces Are Falling Into Place"

In its October 1 editorial, left-of-center Politiken commented, "The pieces are falling into place. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev are going to hold the summit which for six months...has been the subject of a gigantic political game between the United States and the Soviet Union..."

"The outcome of the matter points to the fact that both sides want developments that may lead to new agreements..."

"A Good Sign for Improved East-West Relations"

Social Democratic Aktuelt reported October 1, "It is a good sign for the efforts to improve East-West relations that the two superpower leaders have now agreed to meet in Reykjavik..."

FINLAND

"Daniloff Case Turned From a Lock Into a Key"

Washington correspondent Matti Verkkola filed in leading independent Helsingin Sanomat October 1, "In an instant, 'the Daniloff case' turned from a lock into a key..."

"Explanation for Gorbachev's Hurry to Meet With Reagan"

The paper's Moscow correspondent judged October 1, "The simplest explanation for Gorbachev's hurry to meet with Reagan is that a concrete arms control agreement, most likely on the reduction of INF in Europe, is almost ready but that a principal question still remains unsolved so that the leaders need to meet personally..."

SOVIET UNION

"Gorbachev to Meet Reagan in Reykjavik"

Moscow TASS reported October 1, "The press informs Soviet readers that, under an accord reached, General Secretary Gorbachev and U.S. President Reagan will meet in the city of Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12, 1986.

"The proposal on the meeting was made by Gorbachev and accepted by Reagan. The meeting is held within the framework of preparations for Gorbachev's visit to the United States on which the sides agreed in Geneva..."

HUNGARY

"Evidence That Dialogue Is Continuing"

According to a comment in Budapest radio September 30, the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Iceland "is evidence that the dialogue that started in Geneva is continuing.

"The two governments, therefore, have managed to overcome a considerable number of the obstacles which cast such a big shadow over the two countries that they were close to becoming a direct threat to the meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev..."

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

JAPAN

"Meeting to Discuss Nuclear Disarmament"

Among headlines in Tokyo on October 1 were "Preparatory Meeting to Discuss Nuclear Disarmament" (Yomiuri) and "Iceland Meeting to Boil Down Summit Issues" (Asahi).

"Completely Unexpected"

Moderate Yomiuri said, "The summit preparatory meeting in Reykjavik was completely unexpected.

"Both the United States and the Soviet Union are saying that the Iceland meeting will be held to prepare for summit talks scheduled in Washington at the end of 1986, but both sides did not disclose the date of the summit.

"The Iceland meeting indicates that problems still remain before both countries can sign an agreement on disarmament and other issues at the summit talks in the United States."

"We Welcome This Step"

An editorial in the paper held, "No agenda has been announced for the Reykjavik meeting....In this sense, the upcoming meeting will not be a summit to reach a substantive agreement on improving East-West relations which is our earnest desire.

"But we would like to welcome the step taken by the United States and the Soviet Union toward this goal..."

"Foreign Ministry Taking Cautious Stand"

Liberal Mainichi's Moscow correspondent reported, "The Iceland meeting is separate from the U.S.-Soviet summit talks expected to be held this year in Washington.

"According to TASS, the President accepted General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal to prepare for the Washington talks.

"Because of the unusual nature of preparatory talks between top leaders, the Foreign Ministry is taking a cautious stand on prejudging the future course of U.S.-Soviet relations..."

"Meeting Greatly Welcomed"

The paper declared in an editorial "The meeting is greatly welcomed as it was finally realized following postponement of full-scale talks in July due to the U.S. bombing of Libya.

"We hope that the Iceland talks will be fruitful in substance."

"Focus on INF Negotiations"

Washington correspondent Shimada wrote in liberal Asahi that "Secretary Shultz characterized the Reykjavik talks as a preparatory meeting to invite General Secretary Gorbachev to the United States.

"In addition to discussing the next Washington talks, the Iceland meeting will focus on the INF negotiations as they have the strongest possibility of producing agreements.

"Other subjects expected to be discuss are human rights, bilateral problems and regional conflicts."

"Iceland Most Suited for Meeting"

A commentator for publicly financed NHK-TV asserted, "Iceland is most suited for the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting as it is a neutral country.

"The Iceland meeting indicates U.S.-Soviet enthusiasm toward achieving concrete agreement at the summit and raises the possibility of a formal summit this year."

SOUTH KOREA

"Meeting to Heal Wounds"

Independent Hankook Ilbo Washington correspondent Kim Byung-moo reported, "The agreement between President Reagan and Gorbachev for a preparatory meeting seemed to have stemmed from their consensus on the need for their wounds to heal from the Daniloff situation....

"The Soviet proposal for the preparatory meeting seems to aim at gaining compromises from President Reagan by burdening the President with the proposal."

"Special Push for Geneva Talks"

Conservative Chosun Ilbo commented that "although President Reagan tries to play down the meaning of the Reykjavik meeting as a preparatory one, it can be termed a summit in a substantial sense especially in that it would improve the general milieu of the U.S.-Soviet relationship...

"The meeting would also give a special push to the Geneva disarmament talks."

"Contradictory Justifications"

Government-dominated Seoul Shinmun's Washington correspondent Lee Chung-yon wrote that "although the U.S. side claims that Daniloff returned home as an 'innocent citizen' the Soviet side said the Daniloff was expelled and Zakharov was released...

"Contradictory justifications have accompanied previous U.S.-Soviet negotiations....However, the U.S.-Soviet 'spying happening' led to the productive results of a face-to-face meeting between President Reagan and Gorbachev....

"Shultz and Shevardnadze demonstrated that the basic relationship between the two superpowers should not and cannot vacillate through their long negotiations."

"Need for Unprecedented Type of Meeting"

Washington correspondent Chang Doo-sung wrote in independent Joongang Ilbo that "having reviewed the atmosphere which surfaced during the resolution of the Daniloff incident, the two nations' leaders found a need for an unprecedented type of a summit meeting.

"Each nation's stand toward disarmament approached the other's considerably....We interpret the mutual approach as having resulted from the consensus reached by President Reagan and Gorbachev on the need to improve their relationship."

"Working-Level Meeting"

Government-dominated Kyunghyang Shinmun had this report from Washington correspondent Yoon Koo: "Although President Reagan defined the Reykjavik meeting as not being a summit, the Oct. 11 event still is...

"But, as Secretary Shultz described, the meeting will be a working-level one.... Secretary Shultz predicted that all problems of bilateral concern ranging from disarmament, and regional dispute to human rights problems will be discussed.

"But, if consensus is reached on some issue during the summit, the leaders cannot exceed the boundary of the reduction of medium-range missiles, a construction of a center for preventing accidental danger and ban on the proliferation of chemical weapons."

HONG KONG

Simultaneous Announcement

Typical headlines on October 1 included "Spy Deal Clears Way for Summit" (independent South China Morning Post), "U.S. and USSR Simultaneously Announce Reagan Will Meet Gorbachev in Middle of Month" (PRC-owned Wen Wei Po) and "U.S.-Soviet Spy Case Resolved, Reagan-Gorbachev Iceland Meeting in October" (pro-Taiwan Oriental Daily).

"International Situation No Longer So Dangerous"

A columnist for pro-Taiwan Oriental Daily remarked, "Since the USSR has released Daniloff, the whole international situation is no longer so dangerous. The U.S. and Soviet leaders can use this second summit to negotiate important global issues.

"It is believed that both sides will make mutual concessions after some bargaining, in order to solve certain problems."

"U.S. Trying to Prevent Negative Public Opinion"

The independent Hong Kong Economic Journal's international affairs writer observed: "The United States said that the 'spy-reporter exchange' is not related to the upcoming meeting between the leaders. Obviously, the United States is trying to prevent any negative public opinion concerning this behind-the-scene transaction...

"However, if the American people and the Congressmen ponder this matter, how can they be happy over the use of a reporter in such an exchange? Unless Daniloff is also a spy, working for the CIA--that would be another matter."

MIDDLE EAST

ISRAEL

"Jewish Organizations Plan Iceland Protest Against USSR"

Israeli Radio reported today, "Jewish organizations and Aliya activists are standing by to travel to Iceland to stage protest demonstrations against Soviet policies regarding the Jews..."

"Correspondents Reacted Cynically"

Middle-of-the-road Maariv's Washington correspondent Ofra Yeshua-Lyth wrote: "Correspondents reacted cynically to the White House statement that the Reykjavik encounter would not be a 'summit' but a 'meeting' to prepare the ground for a summit later this year in the United States.

"The President's critics noted yesterday that he broke his repeated promises that the next summit would be held in the United States after the mid-term elections..."

SYRIA

Headline Treatment

These were October 1 headlines in Damascus' Government-supported dailies "Gorbachev and Reagan Agree to Hold a Summit in Iceland" (Tishrin) and "American-Soviet Summit October 11 in Iceland" (al-Thawra).

SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

U.S., USSR Can Now Proceed With Issues of Vital Concern

The independent Times of India had this editorial view October 1, "With the release of Daniloff, the Americans and the Russians can once again conduct their business on issues of vital concern to them in a spirit of equanimity..."

The paper also suggested that, in their talks in Reykjavik, the two leaders "might wish to reflect on what is perhaps the most significant lesson of the Daniloff affair: the important role that the Western media have steadily assumed not just as reporters of public affairs, but, increasingly, as arbiters in relations between nations."

LATIN AMERICA

BRAZIL

"Gorbachev Asks, Reagan Accepts Meeting"

These were front-page headlines October 1 "Gorbachev Asks, Reagan Accepts Meeting" (O Estado de Sao Paulo), "Reagan and Gorbachev Will Meet October 11 in Iceland...Reagan and Gorbachev May Reach Arms Accord" (Folha de Sao Paulo) and "Reagan Frees Zakharov and Will Meet With Gorbachev the 11th" (Rio de Janeiro's Jornal do Brasil).

"Reagan Took Best Possible Advantage of Gorbachev's Idea"

New York correspondent Paulo Francis wrote in liberal Folha de Sao Paulo, "It does not matter that Gorbachev suggested the preparatory meeting.

"Reagan took from the idea the best possible advantage, both at home and abroad. The timing gives the Republican candidates in Congress the opportunity of capitalizing on the Great Pacific, Ronald Reagan, absolute master of politics in the United States since 1980..."

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