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File Folder REYKJAVIK PREPARATORY MEETING (8)

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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
59551 NOTE	SITUATION ROOM NOTE (W/WNOTATION)	1	9/19/1986	B1 B3
59552 MEMO	RE SOVIETS (PAGE 2 ONLY)	1	ND	B1
59553 BIO		3	10/1/1986	B1 B3
59554 REPORT	RE GORBACHEV	5	10/2/1986	B1
59555 TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT FINNBOGADOTTIR AND PRIME MINISTER HERMANSSON (W/NOTATIONS)	1	10/2/1986	B1
59556 NOTES	RE 9/30/86 SITUATION ROOM MEETING (W/NOTATIONS)	2	ND	B1
59557 REPORT	POST-GENEVA THEMES: THEMES AND PERCEPTIONS FOR PUBLIC PRESENTATION (DRAFT, W/NOTATIONS)	1	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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59551 NOTE

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6786

TALKING POINTS ON SOVIET UN MISSION EXPULSIONS

-- Today we have provided the Soviet government a list of 25 members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations who must leave the United States by October 1.

-- The persona non grata notification was made in New York by the number two man in our UN mission, Ambassador Herbert Okun. He delivered his demarche at _____ p.m. to his counterpart,
_____.

-- This action was taken pursuant to the President's earlier decision, that the Soviets had exploited the large size of their mission, and the Ukrainian and Byelorussian missions, for espionage activities. These three missions are in fact a major center of espionage against the United States.

-- On March 7 of this year, we informed the Soviet side that these missions must be reduced, in stages, over a period of two years.

-- The current size of the mission is 275. The new ceiling, to take effect on April 1, 1988, is 170. The first of four reductions, down to 250, takes effect October 1, 1986. Subsequent interim reductions will be required by April 1, 1987 and October 1, 1987.

-- Under the President's original determination, the Soviet government would have been free to make its own reductions. Since we notified them of this timetable, however, the Soviets have refused to provide information as to which positions would be eliminated and which members of the mission would be withdrawn.

-- As you know, on September 19 the Soviet ambassador to the UN, Alexander Belonogov, went so far as to say that they were making no reductions and continued to regard this requirement as "absolutely illegal."

-- We regret this decision to transform a quiet diplomatic process into a public confrontation. We preferred to cooperate in implementing this reduction. We avoided focusing public attention on the program and sought voluntary compliance with the President's directives.

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-- The President has therefore directed that we identify the specific members of the mission that must be withdrawn to meet the first deadline. These are the 25 names we turned over to them today.

-- Reflecting the purpose of the President's decision in March, we have today focused on those members of the Soviet mission most actively engaged in KGB or GRU intelligence activities.

-- The point of this action is simple: the Soviet Union is not free to commit espionage in our country with impunity. It has abused the legitimate diplomatic purposes of its mission to the UN, and the President wants that to stop.

~~SECRET~~

Connection to Daniloff case?

-- Let me put the connection this way: the Soviets' decision to retaliate for the arrest of Zakharov by seizing Daniloff makes clear that they believe they are entitled to commit espionage with impunity.

-- The Daniloff case made it even more important for us to show them that they cannot do so.

-- Beyond this, we are today simply enforcing a decision already made by the President.

Effect on Daniloff's release?

-- We have made it very clear how much we want Daniloff out. We don't know whether his release can be arranged soon or not.

-- But that doesn't mean that while the Soviet keep Daniloff in Moscow, they can expect immunity against any other decisions we might make.

-- That would mean that their decision to arrest him had succeeded. The President isn't going to accept that.

Expected Soviet reaction?

-- We can't predict what the Soviets will do. They won't like losing the heart of their espionage apparatus in New York, but we don't see any advantage for them in escalating this matter. After all, their presence here is much larger than ours in the Soviet Union.

-- As for their precise thinking on the matter, you'll have to ask them. We have done what we felt we had to do. The President has considered the possible consequences and made his decision.

Impact on Shevardnadze visit?

-- We see no reason for the visit to be postponed.

-- Each side has a long list of important issues it wants to raise. The Soviets will doubtless want to raise this one, but we expected them to do so anyway. We feel it would be a mistake to cancel potentially valuable talks, but if the Soviets do so that is of course their responsibility.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CNS NARA, Date 12/23/08

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Effect on summit?

-- The President is not making these decisions with the summit in mind.

-- He and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to meet this year. The President naturally hopes that the meeting will take place. He believes it would be useful. But a summit doesn't mean we stop protecting our interests.

Why not wait until the Shevardnadze visit?

-- This decision implements a previous policy. It is now an administrative matter, and we saw no need to crowd it onto the President's agenda.

Difference between these cases and Zakharov?

-- The members of this group, intelligence officers assigned to the Soviet UN mission, have diplomatic immunity. They are being declared persona non grata.

-- Zakharov was employed by the UN secretariat. He lacks diplomatic immunity, and was therefore liable to arrest and prosecution.

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59554	REPORT RE GORBACHEV	5	10/2/1986	B1

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59555	TALKING POINTS TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT FINNBOGADOTTIR AND PRIME MINISTER HERMANSSON (W/NOTATIONS)	1	10/2/1986	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SITUATION ROOM NOTE

September 30, 1986

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Shevardnadze Announcement of Reykjavik Summit

In a press conference today, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that a meeting, proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev, will take place between President Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. This "interim" summit, according to Shevardnadze, is preparatory and not a substitution of a Gorbachev-Reagan summit still to be scheduled in the US. The Reykjavik meeting will be to work out clear directives designed to achieve progress regarding arms issues. Shevardnadze expressed sincere thanks to the government of Iceland for making the meeting possible. He reiterated that the long and often complicated negotiations with Secretary Shultz were not in vain--they give both countries a reason to hope for "a turn for the better." Referring to the Daniloff-Zakharov cases, Shevardnadze stressed that mutual understanding and accord are much more important than short-lived sensations. (U)

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THE ISSUES IN BRIEF:

- ARMS CONTROL: Issues that require particular attention are: NST framework agreement; interim INF agreement, interim restraint regime, negotiations on testing, risk reduction centers, chemical weapons. Bob Linhard will be providing a detailed discussion paper on these issues separately.

- REGIONAL: Armacost-Adamishin talks last month identified hardly any areas of common ground. Both sides have agreed only that it would not be useful to draft broad and formally agreed principles. We can press Soviets for response to President's UNGA initiative on regional conflicts (3-stage process). Argue that plan provides basis for cooperation to resolve regional disputes.
 - Afghanistan: No regional question more important. Key must be Soviet troop withdrawal and national reconciliation. Reemphasize US pledge to act as guarantor of settlement, provided it gets Soviet troops out and has support of Afghan people.
 - Middle East: Goal--direct negotiations. Soviet objective of international conference does not appear useful. Soviet meeting with Israelis positive move. But must establish relations, increase Jewish emigration. New peace process after Mubarak-Peres meeting may be at hand; will USSR play constructive role?
 - Terrorism: Soviet condemnation of PanAm hijack welcome, also Gorbachev pledges to fight terrorism. Worth exploring ways toward practical cooperation. Could be summit topic/agreement.
 - Southern Africa: Some positive noise, but no movement. Soviets want South Africans out of Namibia, Angola; we insist on all foreign forces out of southern Africa. Soviets say they don't welcome deterioration within South Africa.
 - Other--Central America, Asia (Korea; Vietnam), no progress. Iran-Iraq limited prospects; also CW proliferation in Mid-East. In sum, can expect little more than renewed impetus to experts talks, except possibly on terrorism.

BILATERAL: Real progress on cultural exchanges, transportation. Fusion, space, and science/energy discussions at crucial turning point. US needs to reach decision (problem--IG process has resolved some areas of concern, but numerous areas of difficulty remain. President has made public commitment on these areas. We need to decide if we want to move forward.) Problems on Kiev-New York consular exchange; e.g., radiation monitoring. SMUN reductions proceeding, but in wake of Daniloff-Zakharov, problems will arise.

HUMAN RIGHTS: Overall trend since Geneva deeply disappointing. US will propose humanitarian working group. Jewish emigration at 20-year low. Harassment of human rights activists, religious believers up. Sakharov's treatment no better despite Reagan restraint during Bonner visit.

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59556	NOTES RE 9/30/86 SITUATION ROOM MEETING (W/NOTATIONS)	2	ND	B1

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STATES
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- 2 -

This memorandum assigns responsibilities for the preparation of briefing materials for use by the President and the Secretary during the official working visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Bureaus wishing to suggest additions or changes to this tasker should contact the S/S-S Action Officer as soon as possible.

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By COJ NARA, Date 12/23/08

I. PRELIMINARY PAPERS:

A. Scope Paper: EUR should draft a scope paper for the Secretary discussing the goals and strategy for the Shevardnadze meeting. It should address the following questions: 1) Where does our relationship stand? 2) What do we want from the meeting? 3) What do the Soviets want? and 4) What can we realistically achieve? The paper should be cleared by P, and other bureaus as appropriate. It should not exceed five pages in length. The scope paper is due in S/S-S by COB September 11.

B. Issues Agenda/Schedule: In the shortest possible outline format, using headings and ticks, this "game plan," or topical agenda, will note the key issues to be raised (using full-sized pages, format should include each meeting in sequence as it will occur) in each meeting the Secretary will attend. No more than a half dozen topics per meeting should normally be listed. This paper is due in S/S-S by COB September 11.

II. BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR THE SECRETARY

The following briefing materials should be prepared for use by the Secretary:

A. Background Materials:

Fact Sheets: The following one-page fact sheets should be prepared according to the attached format and cleared appropriately. They should be delivered to the EUR Coordinator no later than COB September 10.

<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>DRAFT</u>	<u>CLEAR</u>
ARMS CONTROL ISSUES		
(1) Nuclear and Space Talks	EUR	P, PM
(2) Compliance and Interim Restraint	PM	P, EUR, S/ARN

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(3) CSCE	EUR	P, PM, S/ARN
(4) CDE	EUR	P, PM, S/ARN
(5) Chemical Weapons Treaty	PM	P, EUR
(6) Chemical Weapons Proliferation	PM	P, EUR
(7) Nuclear Non-Proliferation	S/NP	P, EUR, PM
(8) Nuclear Testing	PM	P, EUR
(9) Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers	EUR	P, S/ARN, PM
(10) Conventional Force Reductions	EUR	P, PM
(11) MBFR	EUR	P, PM
(12) Hotline Upgrade	EUR	A/OC

REGIONAL ISSUES

(1) General Points on Regional Dialogue	EUR	P
(2) Middle East	NEA	P, EUR
(3) Iran-Iraq	NEA	P, EUR
(4) Terrorism	M/CTP	P, EUR
(5) Southern Africa	AF	P, EUR
(6) Central America/Caribbean	ARA	P, EUR
(7) East Asia/Pacific	EAP	P, EUR
(8) Afghanistan	NEA	P, EUR, IO

BILATERAL ISSUES

(1) Human Rights	EUR	P, HA
(2) Economic Issues (GATT and Bilateral)	EUR	EB, E
(3) Kiev/New York Consulates	EUR	P, M

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(4) Exchanges	EUR	P
(5) Scientific Cooperation	EUR	P
(6) Space Cooperation	EUR	P
(7) Transportation Agreement	EUR	P, EB
(8) U.S. Soviet Maritime Boundary	EUR	OES, L, INR
(9) Bilateral Review Commission	EUR	P
(10) Fusion	EUR	P, OES
(11) U.S.-Soviet Trade	EUR	E, DOT, FAA, EB
(12) Energy Agreement	EUR	P, OES
(13) Other Bilateral Issues (Daniloff case, SMUN Reduction)	EUR	P

Economic Data Sheet: EUR should prepare an economic data sheet (sample attached) for the USSR. It is due in S/S-S by COB September 11.

B. Scenarios/Schedule:

S/CPR should prepare, in close consultation with IO and EUR, scenarios for all meetings and meals for the Secretary and Mrs. Shultz. These scenarios are due by COB September 11.

C. Cards for the Secretary's Meetings: Each of the briefing outlines for the Secretary's meetings, including the briefing of the President, should be accompanied by a cue card on one-half sheet of white bond paper (no more than two cards per meeting.) The cards should contain the major talking points, drawn from the briefing outlines. They are due by COB September 11.

III. PUBLIC STATEMENTS

EUR/SOV should prepare public statements for all possible occasions by COB September 11. These statements should be cleared with P, S/P and PA.

*Summit*SECRET/SENSITIVE

FALL PLANNING SCHEDULE
(September to December)

The following provides an outline of a plan for Presidential involvement in national security issues over the next four months both by theme (in the memo) and over time (in the calendar).

Preparations for a possible summit with Gorbachev in November dominate the agenda. A fully representative schedule of foreign visits and regional security events will require a substantial bloc of the President's time. Other issues such as the defense budget and South Africa will undoubtedly require more Presidential involvement than noted here.

***	Presidential involvement required
<u>Approved</u>	Presidential event already approved for Ryan Schedule
<u>Proposed</u>	Presidential event with scheduling proposal prepared
<u>Possible</u>	Presidential event on the horizon

GORBACHEV SUMMIT

-- U.S.-Soviet Preparation for Summit

	9/19-20	Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Washington
***	9/22	<u>Proposed</u> Reagan speech to UNGA in New York
	9/23	Rumored Shevardnadze speech to UNGA
	Late Oct	Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow
***	Nov	<u>Possible</u> Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in U.S.
***	Late-Nov	<u>Possible</u> Reagan major address to the nation

-- Reagan and Gorbachev Meetings with European Leaders

***	9/9	<u>Approved</u> Photo-Op with Portuguese Prime Minister
***	9/12	<u>Proposed</u> Photo-Op with Turkish Prime Minister
	Mid-Oct	Rumored Gorbachev trip to Italy & Greece
***	Oct	<u>Possible</u> Reagan multilateral with Allies
***	10/21	<u>Approved</u> Kohl Official Visit to Washington
	Early-Nov	Rumored Gorbachev-Kohl meeting
***	Early-Nov	<u>Proposed</u> Hermanson (Iceland) OWV in Washington
	Late-Nov	<u>Possible</u> Briefs to European leaders on Summit
	Jan	Rumored Gorbachev to Japan

-- Arms Control

	8/25	US-Sov Risk Reduction talks in Geneva
	Aug/Sept	US-Sov Talks on Regional Issues, Space Cooperation, and NST
	9/18	NST round VI begins in Geneva
***	9/25	<u>Proposed</u> President to ACDA 25th Anniversary

DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE

-- Defense Budget

Fall Congressional Budget Process
Fall FY '88-89 Budget Preparation
*** Fall Possible Presidential lobbying and decisions

-- Intelligence

*** Sept Proposed Visit to NSA
*** 10/1 Proposed President to DIA Anniversary

REGIONAL SECURITY

-- Foreign Assistance

Fall Congressional Budget Process
Fall FY '88-89 Budget Preparation
*** Fall Possible Presidential lobbying and decisions

-- Latin America

*** 9/10 Approved State Visit Sarney (Brazil)
Late-86 Possible 1st deliveries to Contras

-- Africa

9/9 Executive Order on South African sanctions ends
*** 12/86 Proposed OWV Mobutu of Zaire
*** 1/87 Proposed State Visit Moi of Kenya

-- Asia

*** 9/17 Approved OWV Aquino of Philippines

-- Middle East

9/10-13 Scheduled visit to DC by Israeli DM Rabin
9/16-17 Rumored visit to DC by Israeli PM Peres
Sept Possible Mubarek-Peres Summit

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

*** 9/30 Approved Reagan speech to IMF/IBRD (Kington event)

DRUGS

*** Sept Possible Presidential Meeting w/key U.S.
Ambassadors

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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CDB NARA, Date 12/23/08

File - Summit

PROPOSED OUTLINE SCHEDULE FOR GORBACHEV VISIT

DAY 1 AND/OR 2

OPTION:

- Rest and Time adjustment
 - * Camp David
 - * Williamsburg
 - * East Coast Resort
 - * USSR Mission, Washington, D.C.

Private Time

OPTION:

- * Arrive Andrews Air Force Base and proceed directly to White House
- * White House South Lawn Arrival Ceremony
- * Oval Office Tete Tete
- * Possible plenary after Oval Office
- * White House State Dinner

OPTIONS:

- * Secretary of State Luncheon
- * Possible meetings with Cabinet Officials
- * Participation in Washington area event(s)

DAY 2 OR 3 THROUGH 5 OR 6

- * Morning White House Meeting
 - OPTIONS:
 - * Breakfast
 - * Private Oval Office Study Tete Tete
- * Begin Tour of America
 - OPTIONS:
 - * City/Area(s) that exhibit change, openness, economic and social health of America and American people, tour East to West, i.e. New England, Mid-west, South/Southwest to California
 - * Illinois
 - Eureka College
 - Dixon
 - Tampico
 - Archer-Daniels-Midland/Agriculture Event
 - * California
 - Sacramento
 - San Francisco
 - Los Angeles
 - Ranch/Santa Barbara

DAY 6 THROUGH 7

Substantive Talks Conclude

OPTIONS:

Return to East Coast

- * White House
- * Camp David
- * Williamsburg
- * Other rustic, private setting
(i.e. Fleur d'Eau)

Remain on West Coast

- * Ranch/Santa Barbara
- * National Park
- * Other rustic setting

Likely Soviet Diplomatic Activity

February	UK Foreign Minister Howe to Moscow Shevardnadze visit to Geneva. French Economic Minister to Moscow Soviet Envoy, Slyusar to Belgium
March	** Gorbachev visit to Rome and the Vatican Canadian Trade Representatives in Moscow.
March/April	Swedish PM Palme to Moscow.
April	Mitterrand visit to Moscow (tentative date)
May	Argentine President Alfonsin to visit Moscow.

Possible Diplomatic Activities:

1st half of 86	Dutch PM Lubbers to Moscow. Spanish PM Gonzalez visit to Moscow. ** Gorbachev Visit to Greece. Politburo Member, Vorotnikov visit to FRG. Chinese FM Wu and Vice Premier Yoa Yilin to the USSR. Sengalese President Diouf to Moscow
2nd half of 86	Danish PM Schlueter to Moscow.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10/8/86

TO: Jack Matlock Paul Hanley Ty Cobb
 Steve Steiner Dan Howard Steve Sestanovich
 Sven Kraemer Peter Rodman

FROM: Judyt Mandel

SUBJECT: Replies to TASS Correspondent
Attached is a suggested reply to the correspondents' question on nuclear testing, which puts forward our four part agenda. Please provide comments/concurrence on the attached to Judyt Mandel (x3595, Room 351) by ASAP

Thanks.

While we have no commitment from them to publish, this would be a good opportunity to try to get a piece into the Soviet press, or at least get the message to other countries and US press if Soviets refuse to publish it.

Replies to TASS Correspondents' Question

During my meetings with the General Secretary in Geneva last year, we both agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought. It is important to understand what we mean by peace. Peace is not simply an absence of war, it is the presence of justice -- and respect for human rights, the willingness to resolve disputes peacefully, and to encourage free exchange of people and information are as essential to true peace as arms reduction agreements. As I have said before, nations arm themselves because they distrust each other, they do not distrust each other because they are armed. So we must address the sources of distrust between our two nations, and these include the broad areas we will be discussing at the Reykjavik meeting: respect for human rights, ending the use or threat of force in resolving regional conflicts peacefully, and broadening contacts and cooperation between the peoples of our two countries, especially the young people, and of course achieving genuine arms reductions.

The United States strongly believes that the first priority in arms control must be to reduce offensive nuclear weapons. Focussing on a nuclear test ban only deflects from the urgent task of reducing these terrible weapons. We hope the Soviet Union will join us now in beginning to reduce offensive nuclear arms. The US has recently made concrete new proposals that can form the basis for such reductions, if the Soviet Union is

willing. While we prefer to start with an unconditional 50% reduction in intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as the complete and worldwide elimination of intermediate-range missiles, we are prepared to consider interim steps in both areas, if that is what the Soviet Union prefers.

With respect to nuclear testing, our two countries' experts have met twice, and the United States outlined several proposals for the necessary verification improvements so we can move toward ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. I remain convinced we can find common ground.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a long-term objective of the United States just as the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains our long-term goal. But these must be approached, I believe, with practical steps. We are, for example, investigating new technologies which hold the promise of reducing and eventually eliminating our need to rely on nuclear weapons to deter aggression. In addition, I outlined, in my speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations last month, new steps that we might take to make real progress in the nuclear testing area. Upon ratification of the of the two Treaties I just mentioned, and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons, the US would be prepared to discuss ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

We are working hard in all of these areas to create a safer and better world for future generations. If the Soviet government joins us in this endeavor, we can succeed.

THE WHITE HOUSE TO RONALD WILSON REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEAR MR PRESIDENT

WE DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET JOURNALISTS WHOM YOU RECEIVED LAST OCTOBER AT THE WHITE HOUSE, SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO YOUR MEETING WITH CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT BOTH SIDES AT GENEVA DECLARED THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS IMPERMISSIBLE. IF YOUR ADMINISTRATION IS AS COMMITTED TO THIS MUTUAL DECLARATION NOW AS IT WAS THEN, IF THE US REALLY WANTS, AS THE AMERICAN SIDE CLAIMS, TO REDUCE AND THEN TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR ARMS, THEN WHY DON'T YOU, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SIMPLE LOGIC, TAKE THE HISTORIC STEP OF CEASING NUCLEAR TESTING? WHY NOT TRANSFORM THE UNILATERAL NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM, WHICH THE USSR HAS RECONFIRMED FOR THE SECOND YEAR NOW, INTO A BILATERAL SOVIET-AMERICAN MORATORIUM AND WITH THIS STROKE CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR ELIMINATING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE ALL NUCLEAR TESTING UNDER VERIFIABLE CONTROL?

WE WILL AWAIT YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS QUESTION.

REGARDS,

G. Borovik
S. Kondrashov
V. Ovchinnikov
G. Shishkin

For Steve Steiner

TASS NEWS AGENCY OF THE USSR

WASHINGTON BUREAU

1004 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING · WASHINGTON, D. C. 20045

(202) 628-7858

Do you think we should answer this? What about saying we expect the reply to be published (in the USSR) by Tass? We could release the answer as well here. Ideas for such a reply?

absolutely!

→ From Scott Dean X6959
For Amb Matlock

September 25, 1986

From Scott:
Steve, I have tried my hand at a very rough first draft for a response. Your comments please.

Scott - Let's give it a try. Can you do a draft saying how reductions in the real news of game in AC +

Dear Mr. Howard:

Thanks,
Scott X6959

We are enclosing the text of the letter addressed to the President by four Soviet journalists who interviewed Mr. Reagan last fall, namely Mr. Genrikh Borovick, Gennady Shishkin, Stanislav Kondrashev and Vsevolod Ovchynnikov. We hope that you will forward this letter to the President as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Oleg Polyakovsky

Oleg Polyakovsky
Acting Chief
Washington TASS Bureau

Mr. Dan Howard
Special Assistant to the President
Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC

we hope
will
just
be now
in
getting
on
with
this
urgent
task.
Roman
attached.
Steve



October 8, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
 Donald T. Regan
 Chief of Staff
 and Assistant to the President
 The White House

FROM: Marvin L. Stone
 Acting Director

SUBJECT: Europeans See Reykjavik as Setting the Stage
 for an INF Accord

REFERENCE: Attached Update

The President's linkage yesterday of human rights in the Soviet Union to an improved US-Soviet relationship has put his commitment to human rights on the Reykjavik agenda for Europeans. However, European focus on the Reykjavik Meeting continues to be arms control, especially INF. Secretary Shultz's cautious optimism on INF during his WORLDNET interview yesterday has set the tone of European coverage on this issue. Mrs. Gorbachev's trip to Reykjavik is read by Europeans, as one-up-manship and -- together with Gorbachev's notification to the world of fire aboard the Soviet nuclear submarine -- as more evidence of a Soviet leader who deals differently with the West than his predecessors. Afghanistan is treated as the lead regional issue for Reykjavik, but Europeans expect no movement on it.

For further details please see the attached Update.

October 8, 1986

REYKJAVIK SEEN IN EUROPE AS SETTING STAGE FOR AN INF ACCORD

Arms Control: The major focus of European interest in the Reykjavik Meeting continues to be arms control, particularly the possibility that Reykjavik will clear the way for an eventual interim accord on intermediate range nuclear forces (INF). Secretary Shultz's tone of cautious optimism on INF drew the most interest from European journalists who participated in the Secretary's interview on WORLDNET and led European press coverage of the interview. Secretary Shultz's call for "radical reductions" in nuclear arsenals -- coming in the wake of the accidental sinking of the Soviet nuclear submarine the day before -- also struck a responsive chord. However, the Secretary's statement on the necessity for continued nuclear testing as long as deterrence rests on nuclear weapons did not fall on receptive ears.

Human Rights: The President's highly public embrace of Yuri Orlov and statements by both linking improved human rights in the Soviet Union to an improved superpower relationship has now put the President's commitment to human rights on the Reykjavik agenda for Europeans.

Regional Issues: Afghanistan remains the regional issue of greatest European press interest, but with little expectation that Reykjavik will produce movement on it. The capture of a US citizen-pilot by Nicaraguan forces received coverage today, but commentary did not link the incident to the up-coming Reykjavik meeting.

Sinking of the Soviet Submarine: General Secretary Gorbachev's relatively quick notification to the world of fire aboard a Soviet nuclear submarine furthered his image with West Europeans as a Soviet leader who deals differently with the West than his predecessors. The President's offer of help struck Europeans as evidence of his commitment to forward movement at Reykjavik.

Raisa Gorbachev: Mrs. Gorbachev's trip to Reykjavik is seen in Europe as one-up-manship by Gorbachev. The London Times today commented that the President's "interest in peace-making" may be adversely affected by Mrs. Reagan's absence.

US Government Disinformation Against Qaddafi: The President's integrity and ability to negotiate at Reykjavik are not questioned, although the administration is seen as embarrassed by the "revelations".

This report summarizes judgements from ten USIS West European posts.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Other letters from visit to
Iceland.

S/RR
JH



WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1986

*File
Reykjavik*

Dear Admiral McVadon:

I truly valued addressing our nation's men and women in uniform who extended the warm welcome to me during my visit to Reykjavik.

Iceland's strategic position continues to be crucial to the advancement of peace today just as it was to the cause of freedom during World War II. The contingent of America's Armed Forces stationed in Iceland are carrying out their mission as a vanguard for the United States and all the NATO allies with professional resolve. As Secretary Gorbachev and I shall continue the effort we began in Reykjavik, I'm deeply grateful for the dedicated effort of the personnel under your command to maintain our nation's security.

Please convey my thanks to the members of the Icelandic Defense Force for their thoughtful gifts. The flight jacket and the specially designed clock are perfect remembrances of my visit and of the outstanding job being done by a terrific group of patriots.

With my best wishes to you all,

Sincerely,

Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, USN
Commander
Icelandic Defense Force
The Naval Station
Keflavik

S/RR
JA



WHITE HOUSE

VASHINGTON

mber 5, 1986

Dear Bishop Sigurgeirsson:

Please accept my sincere thanks for the magnificent reproduction of the first Icelandic version of the Bible, which you presented for Nancy and me on the occasion of my important discussions in Reykjavik with General Secretary Gorbachev.

This beautifully bound volume of the 1584 edition is a most fitting expression of the prayerful support of the National Lutheran Church of Iceland. Nancy and I shall treasure your Church's special gift always as a remembrance of the vital goals of freedom and self-determination for all peoples.

With our warm best wishes to you and your fellow churchmen,

Sincerely,

The Most Reverend Petur Sigurgeirsson
Bishop of the Church of Iceland
101 Reykjavik

RR
JH



WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1986

Dear Mr. Palsson:


You were good to think of me on the occasion of my visit to Reykjavik for meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev, and I want you to know how pleased I am by your kindness. Thank you for remembering me with the original watercolored photograph. I truly appreciate the goodwill for the goals of peace and freedom that prompted your symbolic gift.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Mr. Bjorguin Palsson
Alfatun 25
200 Kopavogur
Iceland

S/RK
GH



WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 5, 1986

Dear Friends:

Nancy and I join in thanking you very much for the wonderful comforters filled with Icelandic eiderdown which you presented for us during my visit to Reykjavik for talks with General Secretary Gorbachev. Your special remembrance is certainly appreciated as is the support for peace that prompted your gift.

With our best wishes for the future,

Sincerely,

Members of The Association of
Eiderduck Farmers of Iceland
c/o Mr. Olafur H. Torfason
Director of Icelandic Agriculture's
Information Service
Baendahollin - Hagatorg
107 Reykjavik

S/RR
JH



WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1986

Dear Friends:

You were good to think of Nancy and me on the occasion of my visit to Reykjavik for meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev, and we want you to know how pleased we are by your kindness. Thank you for remembering us with the handknitted wool sweaters. We truly appreciate this gesture of friendship as we pursue the goals of peace and freedom for all mankind.

With our best wishes,

Sincerely,

The Members of the Board and Staff
of Alafoss Ltd.
Skrifstofa and Verkmidja
Mosfellveit
Iceland

S/RR
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WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 5, 1986

Dear Mr. Johannsson:

You were good to think of me on the occasion of my visit to Reykjavik, and I want you to know how pleased I am by your kindness. Your gift of the fragrances is indeed appreciated, and I'm truly grateful for the friendship and goodwill that prompted it.

Nancy joins me in sending you and your staff our best wishes.

Sincerely,

Mr. Jakob P. Johannsson
General Manager
NYCO
Post Office Box 1164
121 Reykjavik
Iceland

S/RR
JH



WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ember 5, 1986

Dear Mr. Jonsson:

You were good to think of me on the occasion of my visit to Reykjavik, and I want you to know how pleased I am by your kindness. Thank you for remembering me with the inscribed peace emblem. I truly appreciate the goodwill conveyed in your artwork for my efforts to bring about a lasting peace in the world.

Nancy joins me in sending you our best wishes.

Sincerely,

Mr. Tomas Jonsson
Midstraeti 10
101 Reykjavik
Iceland

S/RR
GH



WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1986

Dear Mr. Vigfusson:

You were good to think of me on the occasion of my visit to Reykjavik for meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev, and I want you to know how pleased I am by your kindness. Thank you for remembering me with a copy of the biography of an Icelandic family in North Dakota. Your thoughtful gesture is appreciated, and I'm truly grateful for the friendship conveyed in your note.

Nancy joins me in sending you our best wishes.

Sincerely,

Mr. Helgi Vigfusson
Bolstadarhild 50
Reykjavik
Iceland

S/RR
JH



WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 5, 1986

Dear Mr. Samuelson:

Please accept my sincere gratitude for the "Award of the Anchor Cross" which you presented for me on the occasion of my visit to Reykjavik for meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. This gesture of support for my efforts toward bringing about an enduring peace in the world is truly appreciated. I shall treasure the framed certificate among my special memorabilia.

Nancy asked me to express her thanks for the anchor and heart pendant which you included for her. She is pleased to have this symbolic memento of your organization's friendship.

With our best wishes to you and your membership,

Sincerely,

Mr. Kjell Samuelson
Founder & President
The Anchor Cross Foundation
Post Office Box 27
19121 Sollentuna, Sweden